tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-77200970181429531372024-03-19T15:58:09.974-07:00Dura Legis Optimus Unusduralegis.com is a site where one can find morale boosters or guides/advices and case digests of cases decided by the Supreme Court of the Philippines especially for those law students, those who want to study law, and those who are lawyers for their reference.Tardigradehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14890558896153261318noreply@blogger.comBlogger374125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7720097018142953137.post-86966903409752167652023-11-25T19:12:00.000-08:002023-11-26T19:32:45.478-08:00LABOR CASE DOCTRINES<p><span style="font-size: large;"><b>Definition of Labor Dispute</b></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">Citibank v. CA, November 27, 1998 G.R. No. 108961</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">-<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>The question arises whether a labor dispute exists between Citibank and the security guards of respondent CIGLA, regardless of their employment status. The Labor Code’s definition of a labor dispute includes controversies over employment terms, even if the disputing parties are not direct employer and employee.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">PAL v. NLRC, March 20, 1998 G.R. No. 120567</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">-<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>The term “labor dispute” is defined as “any controversy or matter concerning terms and conditions of employment or the association or representation or persons in negotiating, fixing, maintain, changing, or arranging the terms and conditions of employment regardless of whether or not the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employers and employees.” There is no labor dispute when there is no complaint yet for illegal dismissal filed with the labor arbiter. The term “controversy” is likewise defined as “a litigated question; adversary proceeding in a court of law; a civil action or suit, either at law or in equity; a justiciable dispute.” A “justiciable controversy” is one involving an active antagonistic assertion of a legal right on one side and denial thereof on the other concerning a real, and not a mere theoretical question or issue.”</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">San Miguel Corporation Employees Union v. Bersamira, June 13, 1990 </span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">-<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>“labor dispute” under Article 212 (1) of the Labor Code includes “any controversy or matter concerning terms and conditions of employment or the association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or arranging the terms and conditions of employment, regardless of whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee.”</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><b>Article 224 (formerly Article 217)</b></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><b>Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiter</b></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><b><br /></b></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">Pondoc v. NLRC, October 3, 1996</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">-<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>The element of control is absent where a person who works for another does so more or less at his own pleasure and is not subject to definite hours or conditions of work, and in turn is compensated according to the result of his efforts and not the amount thereof, we should not find that the relationship of employer and employee exist.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"> </span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">Villamaria v. CA, April 19, 2006</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">-<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>The Labor Arbiter had jurisdiction over Bustamante’s complaint. Under the Kasunduan, the relationship between him and Villamaria was dual: that of vendor-vendee and employer-employee. An employer-employee relationship is an indispensable jurisdictional requisite.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">Mendoza v. Officers of Manila Water Employee’s Union, January 25, 2016 (ULP) G.R. No. 201595</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">-<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>In essence, unfair labor practice relates to the commission of acts that transgress the workers’ right to organize. All the prohibited acts constituting unfair labor practice in essence relate to the workers’ right to self-organization. The term unfair labor practice refers to that gamut of offenses defined in the Labor Code which, at their core, violates the constitutional right of workers and employees to self-organization.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">Atlas Farms v. NLRC, November 18, 2002 (Termination Dispute)</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">-<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>Article 217 of the Labor Code provides that labor arbiters have original and exclusive jurisdiction over termination disputes. A possible exception is provided in Article 261 of the Labor Code, which provides that – The Voluntary Arbiter or panel of voluntary arbitrators shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide all unresolved grievances arising from the interpretation or implementation of the Collective Bargaining Agreement and those arising from the interpretation or implementation of the company personnel policies referred to in the immediately preceding article. Accordingly, violations of a Collective Bargaining Agreement, except those which are gross in character, shall no longer be treated as unfair labor practice and shall be resolved as grievances under the Collective Bargaining Agreement. For purposes of this article, gross violations of Collective Bargaining Agreement shall mean flagrant and or malicious refusal to comply with the economic provisions of such agreement. </span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">Negros Metal v. Lamayo, August 25, 2010 (Termination Dispute) G.R. No. 186557</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">-<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>As a general rule, termination disputes should be brought before a labor arbiter, except when the parties, under Art. 262, unmistakably express that they agree to submit the same to voluntary arbitration.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">Vivero v. CA, October 24, 2000 (Termination Dispute) G.R. No. 87098</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">-<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>A dispute falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter may be submitted to voluntary arbitration provided that the parties state in equivocal language that they conform to the submission of said dispute to voluntary arbitration. There is a need for an express stipulation in the CBA that illegal termination disputes should be resolved by a Voluntary Arbitrator or Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators, since the same fall within a special class of disputes that are generally within the exclusive original jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters by express provision of law. </span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">University of Immaculate Concepcion v. NLRC, January 26, 2011 (Termination</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">Dispute) G.R. No. 181146</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">-<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>Article 217 of the Labor Code states that unfair labor practices and termination disputes fall within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter. Article 262 of the same Code provides the exception that the Voluntary Arbiter, upon agreement of the parties, shall also hear and decide all other labor disputes including unfair labor practices and bargaining dead locks. For the exception to apply, there must agreement between the parties clearly conferring jurisdiction to the voluntary arbitrator. Such agreement may be stipulated in a collective bargaining agreement. However, in the absence of a collective bargaining agreement, it is enough that it is enough that there is evidence on record showing the parties have agreed to resort to voluntary arbitration. </span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">Austria v. NLRC, August 16, 1999 (Termination Dispute) (priest) </span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">-<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>Relationship of the church as an employer and the minister as an employee is purely secular in nature because it has no relation with the practice of faith, worship or doctrines of the church, such affairs are governed by labor laws. The Labor Code applies to all establishments, whether religious or not.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">Reyes v. RTC Makati Branch 42, August 11, 2008 (Termination Dispute)</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">-<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>To determine whether a case involves an intra-corporate controversy, and is to be heard and decided by the branches of the RTC specifically designated by the Court to try and decide such cases, two elements must concur: (a) the status or relationship of the parties; and (2) the nature of the question that is the subject of their controversy.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">Locsin v. Nissan Lease Philippines October 20, 2010 (Intracorporate dispute)</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">-<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span> A corporate officer’s dismissal is always a corporate act, or an intra-corporate controversy which arises between a stockholder and a corporation so that RTC should exercise jurisdiction based on Section 5(c) of PD 902-A.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">Weslayan University v. Maglaya, January 23, 2017 (Termination Dispute) </span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">-<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>The creation of the position is under the corporation’s charter or bylaws, and that the election of the officer is by the directors or stockholders must concur in order for an individual to be considered a corporate officer, as against an ordinary employee or officer. It is only when the officer claiming to have been illegally dismissed is classified as such corporate officer that the issue is deemed an intra-corporate dispute which falls within the jurisdiction of the trial courts.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">Cacho v. Balagtas, February 7, 2018 (Termination Dispute) G.R. No. 202974</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">-<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>A two-tier test must be employed to determine whether an intra-corporate controversy exists in the present case, viz.: (a) the relationship test, and (b) the nature of the controversy test. A dispute is considered an intra-corporate controversy under the relationship test when the relationship between or among the disagreeing parties is any one of the following: (a) between the corporation, partnership, or association and the public; (b) between the corporation, partnership, or association and its stockholders, partners, members, or officers; (c) between the corporation, partnership, or association and the State as far as its franchise, permit or license to operate is concerned; and (d) among the stockholders, partners, or associates themselves.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">Paredes v. Feed the Children Philippines, September 9, 2015 (damages) G.R. No. 184397</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">-<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>The money claims within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of labor arbiters are those which have some reasonable causal connection with the employer-employee relationship. This claim is distinguished from cases of actions for damages where the employer-employee relationship is merely incidental and the cause of action proceeds from a different source of obligation.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">Lunzaga v. Albar Shipping, April 18, 2012 (damages)</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">-<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>LA has jurisdiction over a case involving a claim arising from employer-employee relationship. While LA has no jurisdiction to determine who among the heirs are entitled to receive the death benefits it has jurisdiction to decide whether Albar is liable for the claim.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">Santos v. Servier Philippines Inc. November 28, 2008 (Tax deduction) (damages) G.R. No. 166377</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">-<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>Any money claim (i.e deductions for tax purposes) arising from the employer-employee relationship clearly falls within the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC. Any money claim (i.e deductions for tax purposes) arising from the employer-employee relationship clearly falls within the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">World’s Best Gas v. Vital, September 9, 2015 (damages) G.R. No. 211588</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">-<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>The RTC's ruling on Vital's claim of P845,000.00 and P250,000.00 in unpaid salaries and separation pay is, thus, null and void, and therefore, cannot perpetuate even if affirmed on appeal.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">Halaguena v. PAL October 2, 2009 (damages) G.R. No. 172013</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">-<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>The jurisdiction of labor arbiters and the NLRC under Article 217 of the Labor Code is limited to disputes arising from an employer-employee relationship which can only be resolved by reference to the Labor Code, other labor statutes, or their collective bargaining agreement.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">Pepsi Cola v. Gal-lang, September 24, 1991 (damages)</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">-<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>It must be stressed that not every controversy involving workers and their employers can be resolved only by the labor arbiters. This will be so only if there is a "reasonable causal connection" between the claim asserted and employee-employer relations to put the case under the provisions of Article 217. Absent such a link, the complaint will be cognizable by the regular courts of justice in the exercise of their civil and criminal jurisdiction. A complaint for damages for malicious prosecution filed by employees has its jurisdiction belonging with the regular courts.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">Milan v. NLRC, February 4, 2015 (damages) G.R. No. 202961</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">-<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>As a rule, withholding of final wages and benefits of separated employees is prohibited. The exception applies where the employees refuse to return the company property to settle their debts and accountabilities. In relation to damages: Claims arising from an employer-employee relationship are not limited to claims by an employee. Employers may also have claims against the employee, which arise from the same relationship.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">Amecos Innovations v. Lopez, July 2, 2014 (damages) G.R. No. 178055</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">-<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>The Court holds that the Labor Arbiter's jurisdiction under Article 217(a)(4) of the Labor Code is applicable between the parties. This provision gives Labor Arbiters original and exclusive jurisdiction over damages claims arising from employer-employee relations. This view is supported by the connection between the SSS contribution issue and the employer-employee relationship. While the Labor Arbiter can award damages governed by the Civil Code, the dispute, in this case, should be referred to labor tribunals.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">PAL v. ALPAP, February 26, 2018 (damages) G.R. No. 200088</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">-<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>Reasonable connection rule: the claim for damages must have reasonable causal connection with any of the claims provided for in Article 217 of the Labor Code.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">Dai-chi Electronics v. Villarama, November 21, 1994 (damages)</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">-<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>Jurisprudence has evolved the rule that claims for damages under paragraph 4 of Article 217, to be cognizable by the Labor Arbiter, must have a reasonable causal connection with any of the claims provided for in that article. Only if there is such a connection with the other claims can the claim for damages be considered as arising from employer-employee relations.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">People’s Broadcasting Service v. Sec of Labor, March 6, 2012 (DOLE can determine</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">existence of EE Rel and summary on Articles 128, 129 and 224) </span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">-<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>Under Art. 128(b) of the Labor Code, as amended by RA 7730, the DOLE is fully empowered to make a determination as to the existence of an employer-employee relationship in the exercise of its visitorial and enforcement power, subject to judicial review, not review by the NLRC.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">Ex-Bataan Veterans Security Agency v. Sec.Laguesma, November 20, 2007 (in</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">relation to Articles 128 and 129) </span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">-<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>Under Art. 128 (b) of the Labor Code, notwithstanding provisions of articles 129 and 217 of the Code, the Secretary of Labor or his duly authorized representatives have the power to issue compliance orders to give effect to labor legislation based on findings of DOLE officers or industrial safety engineers made in the course of inspection.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">Meteoro v. Creative Creatures, July 13, 2009 (in relations to Articles 128 and 129) G.R. No. 171275</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">-<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>In order to divest the Regional Director of its power to hear and decide monetary claims of employees, the requisites of the exception clause under article 128(b) must be all present; these are a.) that the employer contests the findings of the labor regulations officer and raises issues thereon; b.) that in order to resolve such issues, there is a need to examine evidentiary matters; and c.) that such matters are not verifiable in the normal course of inspection.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">Okol v. Slimmers World December 11, 2009 G.R. No. 160146</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">-<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law.20 The determination of the rights of a director and corporate officer dismissed from his employment as well as the corresponding liability of a corporation, if any, is an intra-corporate dispute subject to the jurisdiction of the regular courts.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">Santiago v. CF Sharp Crew Management , July 10, 2007 (OFW) G.R. No. 162419</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">-<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>The jurisdiction of labor arbiters is not limited to claims arising from employer-employee relationships.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">Industrial Personnel and Management Services v. De Vera, March 7, 2016 (OFW) </span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">-<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>Based on the foregoing, the general rule is that Philippine laws apply even to overseas employment contracts. The parties may agree that a foreign law shall govern the employment contract. But this exception is subject to the following requisites:</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">1.That it is expressly stipulated in the overseas employment contract that a specific foreign law shall govern;</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">2.That the foreign law invoked must be proven before the courts pursuant to the Philippine rules on evidence;</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">3.That the foreign law stipulated in the overseas employment contract must not be contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy of the Philippines; and </span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">4.That the overseas employment contract must be processed through the POEA.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">Ace Navigation v. Fernandez, October 10, 2012 (OFW) G.R. No. 197309</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">-<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>According to Art. 261 of the Labor Code, The Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide all unresolved grievances arising from the interpretation or implementation of the Collective Bargaining Agreement and those arising from the interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">Estate of Nelson Dulay v. Aboitiz Jebsen Maritime (OFW) </span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">-<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>The element of control is absent where a person who works for another does so more or less at his own pleasure and is not subject to definite hours or conditions of work, and in turn is compensated according to the result of his efforts and not the amount thereof, we should not find that the relationship of employer and employee exist.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">LRTA v. Alvarez, November 18, 2016 (related to GOCC) </span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">-<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>The only issue, therefore, as in Mendoza, is whether LRTA can be made liable by the labor tribunals for private respondents' money claim despite the absence of an employer-employee relationship, and though LRTA is a government-owned and controlled corporation. Court upheld the jurisdiction of the labor tribunals over LRTA. Court further ruled that LRTA must submit itself to the provisions governing private corporations, including the Labor Code, for having conducted business through a private corporation, in this case, METRO. In this case, the NLRC accordingly declared, LRTA’s contractual commitments with METRO and its employees arose out of its business relations with METRO which is private in nature. Such private relation was not changed notwithstanding the subsequent acquisition by LRTA of full ownership of METRO and take-over of its business operations at LRT.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">GSIS v. NLRC, November 17, 2010 (related to GOCC) G.R. No. 180045</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">-<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>SOLIDARY LIABILITY OF THE EMPLOYER OF AN INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR An employer of an independent contractor can be held solidarily liable for the monetary claims made by the employees of the latter because he is an indirect employer. The joint and several liability of the employer or principal was enacted to ensure compliance with the provisions of the Code, principally those on statutory minimum wage. The contractor or subcontractor is made liable by virtue of his or her status as a direct employer, and the principal as the indirect employer of the contractor’s employees. This liability facilitates, if not guarantees, payment of the workers’ compensation, thus, giving the workers ample protection as mandated by the 1987 Constitution. This is not unduly burdensome to the employer. Should the indirect employer be constrained to pay the workers, it can recover whatever amount it had paid in accordance with the terms of the service contract between itself and the contractor. The liability however cannot extend to the payment of separation pay. An order to pay separation pay is invested with a punitive character such that an indirect employer should not be made liable without finding that it had conspired in the illegal dismissal of the employees.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">Duty Free Phils. V. Mojica, September 30, 2005 (related to GOCC)</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">-<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>The established rule is that the hiring and firing of employees of government- owned and controlled corporations are governed by provisions of the Civil Service Law and Civil Service Rules and Regulations.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">WPP Marketing Comunications v. Galera, March 25, 2010 (with foreign element)</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">-<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>Galera was an employee and not a corporate officer by subjecting WPP and Galera’s relationship to the four-fold test: (a) the selection and engagement of the employee; (b) the payment of wages; (c) the power of dismissal; and (d) the employer’s power to control the employee with respect to the means and methods by which the work is to be accomplished.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">Pakistan International Airlines v. Ople, September 28, 1990 (with foreign element) G.R. No. 61594</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">-<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>The jurisdiction of the Regional Director in this case pertains to their authority to handle termination or dismissal cases involving employees with at least one year of service, as specified in the labor laws and regulations existing at that time. The court referred to Article 278 of the Labor Code, which was in effect at the time of the case. This article prohibited employers from terminating the services of employees with at least one year of service without prior clearance from the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE). Rule XIV of Book V of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code provided further details regarding cases of termination without the necessary clearance. According to Section 2 of this rule, any shutdown or dismissal without prior clearance would be conclusively presumed to be a termination of employment without just cause. In such cases, the Regional Director was empowered to order the immediate reinstatement of the employee and the payment of their wages from the time of the shutdown or dismissal until the time of reinstatement.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">PNB v. Cabansag, June 21, 2005 (with foreign element) G.R. No. 157010</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">-<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>The basic policy is that all Filipino workers, whether employed locally or overseas, enjoy the protective mantle of Philippine labor and social legislations. Our labor statutes may not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or stipulations agreed upon, in a foreign country.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">Kawachi v. Del Quero, March 27, 2007 (reasonable causal connection rule)</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">-<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>If there is a reasonable causal connection between the claim asserted and the employer-employee relations, then the case is within the jurisdiction of our labor courts. In the absence of such nexus, it is the regular courts that have jurisdiction.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">Perpetual Help Credit Cooperative Inc. v. Faburada, October 8, 2001(in relation to</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">cooperatives) G.R. No. 121948</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">-<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>SEC. 8 Mediation and Conciliation. — Upon request of either or both parties, the Authority shall mediate and conciliate disputes within a cooperative or between cooperatives: Provided, That if no mediation or conciliation succeeds within three (3) months from request thereof, a certificate of non-resolution shall be issued by the Commission prior to the filing of appropriate action before the proper courts. The above provisions apply to members, officers and directors of the cooperative involved in disputes within a cooperative or between cooperatives. There is no evidence that private respondents are members of petitioner PHCCI and even if they are, the dispute is about payment of wages, overtime pay, rest day and termination of employment. Under Art. 217 of the Labor Code, these disputes are within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">San Miguel v. Semillano, July 5, 2010 (in relation to cooperatives) G.R. No. 164257</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">-<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>Although respondent Semillano is a member of AMPCO, he had joined the others in filing the complaint because it is his position that petitioner SMC is his true employer and therefore is liable for all his claims under the Labor Code.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">Ellao v. BATELEC, July 9, 2010 (in relation to cooperatives) G.R. No. 209166</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">-<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>Complaints for illegal dismissal filed by a cooperative officer constitute an inter-cooperative controversy, jurisdiction over which belongs to the regional trial courts not the Labor Arbiter nor the NLRC.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">Comscentre v. Ricio, January 22, 2020 (refund of employment bond) G.R. No. 222212</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">-<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>The element of control is absent where a person who works for another does so more or less at his own pleasure and is not subject to definite hours or conditions of work, and in turn is compensated according to the result of his efforts and not the amount thereof, we should not find that the relationship of employer and employee exist.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">Pasay City Alliance Church v. Benito, November 28, 2019</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">-<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>The termination of a religious minister's engagement at a local church due to administrative lapses, when it relates to the perceived effectivity of a minister as a charismatic leader of a congregation, is a prerogative best left to the church affected by such choice. If a religious association enacts guidelines that reserve the right to transfer or reassign its licensed ministers according to what it deems be it for a particular congregation, ministry or undertaking in pursuit of its mission, then the State cannot validly interfere.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">Tumaodos v. San Miguel, February 15, 2020 </span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">-<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>If there is a reasonable causal connection between the claim asserted and the employer-employee relations, then the case is within the jurisdiction of the labor courts, and in the absence thereof, it is the regular courts that have jurisdiction.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">Peak Ventures Corp. v. Sec of Labor, July 20, 2022</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">-<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>Secretary of Labor or his duly-authorized representatives has jurisdiction over matters involving the recovery of any amount of wages and other monetary claims arising out of employer-employee relations at the time of inspection, even if the money claim exceeds P5,000.00. It is only when the labor standards case falls within the exclusion clause of Article 128 (b) will the RD be mandated to endorse or refer the complaint to the appropriate labor arbitration branch of the NLRC.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">Esico v. Alphaland, November 17, 2021</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">-<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>Where the claim to the principal relief sought is to be resolved not by reference to the Labor Code or other labor relations statute or a collective bargaining agreement but by the general civil law, the jurisdiction over the dispute belongs to the regular courts of justice and not to the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">Article 225 (formerly Article 218)</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">PAL v. NLRC, March 20, 1998 G.R. No. 120567</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">-<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>The power of the NLRC to issue an injunctive writ originates from "any labor dispute" upon application by a party thereof, which application if not granted "may cause grave or irreparable damage to any party or render ineffectual any decision in favor of such party." A labor dispute must first exist.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">Landbank of the Phils. v. Listana, August 5, 2008 G.R. No. 152611</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">-<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>Except for indirect contempt proceedings initiated motu proprio by order of or a formal charge by the offended court, all charges shall be commenced by a verified petition with full compliance with the requirements therefor and shall be disposed of in accordance with the second paragraph of this section.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">Robosa v. NLRC, February 8, 2012. G.R. No. 176085</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">-<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>Under Article 218 [now 225] of the Labor Code, the NLRC (and the labor arbiters) may hold any offending party in contempt, directly or indirectly, and impose appropriate penalties in accordance with the law.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">Jolo’s Kiddie v. Cabilla, November 29, 2017</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">-<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>As a rule, the filing of a motion for reconsideration is a condition sine qua non to the filing of a petition for certiorari. The rationale for this requirement is that "the law intends to afford the tribunal, board or office an opportunity to rectify the errors and mistakes it may have lapsed into before resort to the courts of justice can be had." Notably, however, there are several recognized exceptions to the rule, one of which is when the order is a patent nullity. In labor cases, grave abuse of discretion may be ascribed to the NLRC when its findings and conclusions are not supported by substantial evidence, which refers to that amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><b>Article 227 (formerly Article 221)</b></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">Meralco v. Gala, March 7, 2012 G.R. No. 191288</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">-<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>A probationary employee's overall job performance and behavior are closely monitored and measured according to the standards set out in their probationary employment agreement. The case emphasizes that even if a probationary employee is not directly involved in a particular misconduct, if there is substantial evidence showing that the employee had knowledge of or participated in the misconduct by his or her inaction or failure to report the incident to company authorities, it could render the employee unfit to become a regular employee. In such cases, the employer's decision to terminate the probationary employee's employment would be upheld, as long as there is substantial evidence supporting the decision. The case underscores the importance of maintaining a high degree of transparency, selflessness, and integrity in the performance of duties by probationary employees, in line with the terms and conditions of their probationary employment agreements.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">Diamond Taxi v. Llamas, March 12, 2014 </span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">-<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>In any proceeding before the Commission or any of the Labor Arbiters, the rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law or equity shall not be controlling and it is the spirit and intention of this Code that the Commission and its members and the Labor Arbiters shall use every and all reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and objectively, without regard to technicalities of law or procedure, all in the interest of due process.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">Sara Lee v. Macatlang, January 14, 2015 G.R. No. 180147</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">-<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>The element of control is absent where a person who works for another does so more or less at his own pleasure and is not subject to definite hours or conditions of work, and in turn is compensated according to the result of his efforts and not the amount thereof, we should not find that the relationship of employer and employee exist.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><b>Article 229 (formerly Article 223)</b></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">GBMLT Manpower v. Malinao, July 6, 2015</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">-<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>Appeal bond requirement for judgments involving monetary awards may be relaxed in meritorious cases, as in instances when a liberal interpretation would serve the desired objective of resolving controversies on the merits.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">Orozco v. CA, April 29, 2005 G.R. No. 155207</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">-<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>private respondents cannot be expected to post such appeal bond equivalent to the amount of the monetary award when the amount thereof was not included in the decision of the labor arbiter. The computation of the amount awarded to petitioner not having been clearly stated in the decision of the labor arbiter, private respondents had no basis for determining the amount of the bond to be posted</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">Lepanto Consolidated Mining v. Icao, January 15, 2014</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">-<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>In appeals from any decision or order of the labor arbiter, the posting of an appeal bond is required under Article 223 of the Labor Code. However, when the law does not clearly provide a rule or norm for the tribunal to follow in deciding a question submitted, but leaves to the tribunal the discretion to determine the case in one way or another, the judge must decide the question in conformity with justice, reason and equity, in view of the circumstances of the case.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">Forever Security v. Flores, September 7, 2007 G.R. No. 147961</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">-<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>The requirement of a cash or surety bond for the perfection of an appeal from the Labor Arbiter’s monetary award is not only mandatory but jurisdictional as well, and non-compliance therewith is fatal and has the effect of rendering the award final and executory. In instances where a more compassionate interpretation of the rules may be allowed, there must be the existence of meritorious grounds and substantial compliance or at the very least, a willingness to pay by posting a partial bond.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">UERM- Memorial Medical Center v. NLRC, March 3, 1997 </span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">-<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>In case of a judgement involving a monetary award, an appeal by the employer may be perfected upon the posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited by the Commission in the amount equivalent to the monetary award.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">Banahaw Broadcasting v. Pacana, May 30, 2011 G.R. No. 171673</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">-<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>As a general rule, the government and all the attached agencies with no legal personality distinct from the former are exempt from posting appeal bonds whereas government-owned and controlled corporations (GOCCs) are not similarly exempted. This distinction is brought about by the very reason of the appeal bond itself: to protect the presumptive judgment creditor against the insolvency of the presumptive judgment debtor. When the State litigates, it is not required to put up an appeal bond because it is presumed to be always solvent. This exemption, however, does not, as a general rule, apply to GOCCs for the reason that the latter has a personality distinct from its shareholders. Thus, while a GOCC's majority stockholder, the State, will always be presumed solvent, the presumption does not necessarily extend to the GOCC itself.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">Mc Burnie v. Ganzon, October 17, 2013 G.R. No. 178034 & 178117 and G.R. No 186984-85</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">-<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>The posting of a bond is indispensable to the perfection of an appeal in cases involving monetary awards from the decision of the Labor Arbiter. The lawmakers clearly intended to make the bond a mandatory requisite for the perfection of an appeal by the employer as inferred from the provision that an appeal by the employer may be perfected "only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond." The word "only" makes it clear that the posting of a cash or surety bond by the employer is the essential and exclusive means by which an employer’s appeal may be perfected.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">AFP General Insurance v. Molina, June 30, 2008 G.R. No. 151133</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">-<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>The Court highlights that the core of the matter is not a typical property or life insurance contract, but rather an appeal bond mandated by both substantive and procedural labor laws. Specifically, Article 223 of the Labor Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 6715, and Rule VI, Section 6 of the Revised NLRC Rules of Procedure, dictate that an appeal in labor cases involving a monetary award can only be perfected by posting a cash or surety bond from a reputable bonding company accredited by the NLRC. This underscores the lawmakers' intention to make such bonding the exclusive means by which an employer's appeal can be perfected. Additionally, the Court notes that the filing of a cash or surety bond is a jurisdictional requirement in appeals concerning money judgments to the NLRC. Rule VI, Section 6 of the Revised NLRC Rules of Procedure reinforces this requirement by stipulating that the bond remains effective until the case's final disposition. This interpretation is further supported by Section 177 of the Insurance Code, which governs suretyship and establishes that a surety bond, once accepted by the obligee, becomes enforceable regardless of whether the premium has been paid.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">Islriz Trading v. Capade et. al. January 31, 2011 (payment of accrued salaries</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">pending appeal before the NLRC) </span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">-<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>Employees are entitled to their accrued salaries during the period between the Labor Arbiter’s order of reinstatement pending appeal and the resolution of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) overturning that of the Labor Arbiter.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">Loon v. Power Master , December 11, 2013. G.R. No. 189404</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">-<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>The subsequent revocation of a bonding company’s authority should not prejudice the respondents who relied on its then subsisting accreditation in good faith. The respondents perfected their appeal with the NLRC because the revocation of the bonding company’s authority has a prospective application.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">Waterfront Cebu City Casino v. Ledesma, March 25, 2015. (Rule 65) G.R. No. 197556</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">-<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>Section 4. When and where the petition was filed. — The petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, the sixty (60) day period shall be counted from notice of the denial of said motion. The petition shall be filed in the Supreme Court or, if it relates to the acts or omissions of a lower court or of a corporation, board, officer or person, in the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court. It may also be filed in the Court of Appeals whether or not the same is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, or in the Sandiganbayan if it is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. If it involves the acts or omissions of a quasi-judicial agency, unless otherwise provided by law or these Rules, the petition shall be filed in and cognizable only by the Court of Appeals. No extension of time to file the petition shall be granted except for compelling reason and in no case exceeding fifteen (15) days. (4a) (Bar Matter No. 803, 21 July 1998; A.M. No. 00-2-03-SC)</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">Turks Shawarama v. Pajaron, January 16, 2017</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">-<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>"It is clear from both the Labor Code and the NLRC Rules of Procedure that there is legislative and administrative intent to strictly apply the appeal bond requirement, and the Court should give utmost regard to this intention."</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">Reinstatement Aspect of LA’s Decision</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">Air Phil Corp. v. Zamora, August 7, 2004 G.R. No. 148247</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">-<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>Even if the order of reinstatement of the Labor Arbiter is reversed on appeal, it is obligatory on the part of the employer to reinstate and pay the wages of the dismissed employee during the period of appeal until reversal by the higher court. On the other hand, if the employee has been reinstated during the appeal period and such reinstatement order is reversed with finality, the employee is not required to reimburse whatever salary he received for he is entitled to such, more so if he actually rendered services during the period.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">Lansangan v. Amkor Technology Philippines, January 30, 2009</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">-<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>The doctrines in Roquero vs. PAL and Article 223 of LC do not apply where there is no finding of illegal dismissal, as in the present case. Article 223 concerns itself with an interim relief, granted to a dismissed or separated employee while the case for illegal dismissal is pending appeal, as what happened in Roquero.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">Mt. Carmel College v. REsuena October 10, 2007</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">-<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>As contemplated by Article 224 (now 230) of the Labor Code, the Secretary of Labor and Employment or any Regional Director, the Commission or any Labor Arbiter, or med-arbiter or voluntary arbitrator may, motu proprio or on motion of any interested party, issue a writ of execution on a judgment within five (5) years from the date it becomes final and executory.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">Smart Communications v. Solidum, April 15, 2015 G.R. No. 204646</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">-<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>Employees are entitled to their accrued salaries, allowances, benefits, incentives and bonuses until the NLRC’s reversal of the labor arbiter’s order of reinstatement becomes final and executory, as shown on the entry of judgment.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">Manila Doctors College v. Oloroes, October 3, 2016</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">-<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>Notwithstanding the reversal of the finding of illegal dismissal, an employer, who, despite the LA's order of reinstatement, did not reinstate the employee during the pendency of the appeal up to the reversal by a higher tribunal may still be held liable for the accrued wages of the employee, i.e., the unpaid salary accruing up to the time of the reversal.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><b>Article 230 (formerly Article 224)</b></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">Yupangco Cotton Mills v. CA, January 16, 2002 G.R. No. 126322</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">-<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>A third-party claimant, who asserts ownership or a right over the levied properties and is not a party to the labor case, has the option to pursue an "accion reinvindicatoria" (recovery of ownership) in a separate civil court. This action allows the third-party claimant to recover ownership or possession of the property wrongfully seized, even when such property is not subject to the execution due to its being owned by a stranger to the labor dispute. In this context, the court underscores the principle that the remedies available to third-party claimants, as stipulated in Article 230 (formerly Article 224) of the Labor Code, are cumulative and can be pursued independently. A third-party claimant's right to file a separate action to vindicate its claim of ownership is reserved and distinct from the proceedings before the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC. This doctrine reinforces the notion that third-party claimants should not be barred from availing themselves of the legal remedies provided by law to protect their ownership interests when their property is wrongfully subjected to levy due to a labor dispute judgment.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">PAL v. Bischara, September 2, 2015 </span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">-<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>Where the writ of execution is not in harmony with and exceeds the judgment which gives it life, the writ has pro tanto no validity. A companion to this rule is the principle of immutability of final judgments, which states that a final judgment may no longer be altered, amended or modified, even if the alteration, amendment or modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law and regardless of what court renders it.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">Guillermo v. Uson, March 7, 2016 </span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">-<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>Under Art. 128(b) of the Labor Code, as amended by RA 7730, the DOLE is fully empowered to make a determination as to the existence of an employer-employee relationship in the exercise of its visitorial and enforcement power, subject to judicial review, not review by the NLRC.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">Genuino Agro v. Romano, September 18, 2019 (Piercing the veil of corporate</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">fiction) G.R. No. 204782</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">-<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>The basis for computing separation pay is usually the length of the employee's past service, while that for backwages is the actual period when the employee was unlawfully prevented from working. Backwages represent compensation that should have been earned but were not collected because of the unjust dismissal. Separation pay, on the other hand, is that amount which an employee receives at the time of his severance from employment, designed to provide the employee with the wherewithal during the period that he is looking for another employment, and is a proper substitute for reinstatement.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">Carag v. NLRC, April 2, 2007</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">-<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>For a wrongdoing to make a director personally liable for the debts of the corporation, the wrongdoing approved or assented to by the director must be a patently unlawful act. Mere failure to comply with the notice requirement of labor laws on company closure or dismissal of employees does not amount to a patently unlawful act. Patently unlawful acts are those declared unlawful by law which imposes penalties for commission of such unlawful acts. There must be a law declaring the act unlawful and penalizing the act.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">Roca v. Dabuyan, March 5, 2018 G.R. No. 215281</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">-<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>“In rendering justice, courts have always been, as they ought to be, conscientiously guided by the norm that on the balance, technicalities take a backseat against substantive rights, and not the other way around.” In short, substantive law outweighs procedural technicalities as in this case.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">Amoroso v. Vintage Drilling, August 8, 2022 (Doctrine of Piercing the</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">Corporate Veil)</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">-<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>In Kukan International Corporation v. Reyes, the Court explained that he principle of piercing the veil of corporate fiction, and the resulting treatment of two related corporations as one and the same juridical person with respect to a given transaction, is basically applied only to determine established liability; it is not available to confer on the court a jurisdiction it has not acquired, in the first place, over a party not impleaded in a case.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">Reliefs against judgments/ decisions rendered by the Commission</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">St. Martin Funeral Homes v. NLRC, September 16, 1998 </span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">-<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>The petitioners rightfully filed a motion for reconsideration, but the appeal or certiorari should have been filed initially to the Court of Appeals – as consistent with the principle of hierarchy of courts. As such, the SC remanded the case to the Court of Appeals.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">Veloso v. China Airlines, July 14, 1999</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">-<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>It should be stressed that without a motion for reconsideration seasonably filed within the ten-day reglementary period, an order, decision or resolution of the NLRC, becomes final and executory after ten (10) calendar days from receipt thereof. Hence, the resolution of the NLRC had become final and executory on January 17, 1992, insofar as petitioner is concerned, because she admits under oath having received notice thereof on January 7, 1992. The merits of her case may no longer be reviewed to determine if the public respondent might be faulted for grave abuse of discretion, as alleged in her petition dated March 14, 1992. Thus, the Court has no recourse but to sustain the respondent's position on jurisdictional and other grounds, that the petition ought not to be given due course and the case should be dismissed for lack of merit.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">Appeal of the CA decision to the SC</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">Stanfilco v. Tequillo, July 17, 2019 G.R. No. 209735</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">-<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>The remedy from an adverse decision or final order of the NLRC is to file a petition for certiorari before the CA on the ground that the former tribunal acted with grave abuse of discretion in arriving at its determination of the case. Rule 45 petitions in labor cases ultimately concern whether the NLRC's decision is tainted with grave abuse of discretion, and not whether said decision is correct on the merits.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">Hanjin Engineering v. CA, April 10, 2006 G.R. No. 165910</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">-<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>The repeated re-hiring and the continuing need for their services over a long span of time have undeniably made them regular employees. Thus, we held that where the employment of project employees is extended long after the supposed “appointments” has been finished, the employees are removed from the scope of project employees and considered regular employees.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><b>Article 232 (formerly Article 226)</b></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">Montaño v. Verceles, July 26, 2010 G.R. No. 168583</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">-<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>The Labor Code's Section 226 clearly establishes that both the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR) and Regional Directors of DOLE have concurrent jurisdiction over disputes within unions and among unions. This includes matters like elections of officers within unions and workers' associations. As such, the BLR has jurisdiction over this dispute, which involves member-unions of a federation and pertains to differences arising from the federation's constitution and by-laws.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><b>Article 233 (formerly Article 227)</b></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">Magbuana v. Uy, May 6, 2005 G.R. No. 161003</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">-<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>Rights may be waived through a compromise agreement, notwithstanding a final judgment that has already settled the rights of the contracting parties.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">Philippine Transmarine Carrier v. Pelagio, August 12, 2015 G.R. No. 211302</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">-<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>In the instant case, it is undisputed that the parties had entered into a Satisfaction of Judgment signifying that petitioners had already given Pelagio the amount of P3,313,772.00 as full and complete satisfaction of the NLRC ruling. While this document may be properly deemed as a compromise agreement, it is conditional in nature, considering that it is without prejudice to the certiorari proceedings pending before the CA, i.e., it obliges Pelagio to return the aforesaid proceeds to petitioners should the CA ultimately rule in the latter's favor. In Leonis Navigation Co., Inc. v. Villamater 48 (Leonis Navigation), the Court held that such an agreement will not render a pending case moot and academic as it does not preclude the employer from recovering from the employee should the courts ultimately decide in favor of the former.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">Solomon et . al. v. Powertech Corp., January 22, 2008 </span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">-<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>Posting of surety bond is mandatory and jurisdictional. Failure to post surety bond rendered the Labor Arbiter decision final and executory.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">Periquet v. NLRC, June 22, 1990 G.R. No. 91298</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">-<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>Not all waivers and quitclaims are invalid as against public policy. If the agreement was voluntarily entered into and represents a reasonable settlement, it is binding on the parties and may not later be disowned simply because of a change of mind. It is only where there is clear proof that the waiver was wangled from an unsuspecting or gullible person, or the terms of settlement are unconscionable on its face, that the law will step in to annul the questionable transaction.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><b>Article 240 (formerly Article 234)</b></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">Mariwasa Siam Ceramics, Inc. v. Sec of Labor, December 21, 2009 G.R. No. 183317</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">-<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>In relation to Article 240 (formerly Article 234) of the Labor Code of the Philippines, compliance with the 20% membership requirement for labor organization registration is necessary only at the time of application for registration. Continuous compliance with this requirement throughout the organization's existence is not mandated. The court emphasizes that the provision does not demand ongoing maintenance of the 20% membership threshold after registration. While the minimum membership percentage is vital during registration, fluctuations in membership levels post-registration do not necessarily jeopardize the legitimacy of the labor organization.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">Electromat Manufacturing and Recording Corporation v. Lagunzad et. al., July 27, 2011</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">(only related to Article 234) G.R. No. 172699</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">-<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>ARTICLE 240. The intent of the law in imposing lesser requirements in the case of a branch or local of a registered federation or national union is to encourage the affiliation of a local union with a federation or national union in order to increase the local union’s bargaining powers respecting terms and conditions of labor.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">Eagle Ridge Golf and Country Club v. CA, March 18, 2010 (old law)</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">-<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>Before their amendment by Republic Act No. 9481 on June 15, 2007, the then governing Art. 234 (on the requirements of registration of a labor union) and Art. 239 (on the grounds for cancellation of union registration) of the Labor Code.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><b>Articles 245-248 (formerly Articles238-239)</b></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">Heritage Hotel Manila v. NUWHRAIN-HHMSC, January 12, 2011 G.R. No. 178296</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">-<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>Jurisdiction to review the decision of the Regional Director lies with the BLR.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">-<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>Failure to comply with the requirements under Art. 239 shall not be a ground for cancellation of union registration but shall subject the erring officers or members to suspension, expulsion from membership, or any appropriate penalty.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">Republic of the Phils. v. Kawashima Textile Manufacturing, July 23, 2008 G.R. No. 160352</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">-<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>Section 8. Article 245 of the Labor Code is hereby amended to read as follows: “Art. 245. Ineligibility of Managerial Employees to Join any Labor Organization; Right of Supervisory Employees. – Managerial employees are not eligible to join, assist or form any labor organization. Supervisory employees shall not be eligible for membership in the collective bargaining unit of the rank-and-file employees but may join, assist or form separate collective</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">bargaining units and/or legitimate labor organizations of their own. The rank and file union an the supervisors’ union operating within the same establishment may join the same federation or national union.” </span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">Section 9. A new provision, Article 245-A is inserted into the Labor Code to read as follows: “Art. 245-A. Effect of Inclusion as Members of Employees Outside the Bargaining Unit. – The inclusion as union members of employees outside the bargaining unit shall not be a ground for the cancellation of the registration of the union. Said employees are automatically deemed removed from the list of membership of said union.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">AIM Faculty Association v. AIM, August 31, 2022 G.R. No. 1973089</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">-<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>Faculty members are not managerial employees who are disqualified from forming or joining a labor organization. Moreover, the legitimacy of labor organizations cannot be collaterally attacked in a petition for certification election. Meanwhile, the grounds to cancel the registration of a labor organization are exclusive. If none of these grounds are proven to exist, its registration shall be sustained, owing to the State policy according primacy to the right to self-organization.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><b>Article 250 (formerly Article 241)</b></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">Del Pilar Academy et. al. v. Del Pilar Academy’s Employee’s Union , April 30, 2008</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">-<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>When so stipulated in a collective bargaining agreement or authorized in writing by the employees concerned, the Labor Code and its Implementing Rules recognize it to be the duty of the employer to deduct the sum equivalent to the amount of union dues, as agency fees, from the employees' wages for direct remittance to the union. The system is referred to as check off. No requirement of written authorization from the non-union employees is necessary if the non-union employees accept the benefits resulting from the CBA.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">Edgardo Marino Jr. et. al. v. Gamilia, July 7, 2009</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">-<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>Article 222 (b) of the Labor Code, as amended, prohibits the payment of attorney's fees only when it is effected through forced contributions from the employees from their own funds as distinguished from union funds. Hence, the general rule is that attorney's fees, negotiation fees, and other similar charges may only be collected from union funds, not from the amounts that pertain to individual union members. As an exception to the general rule, special assessments or other extraordinary fees may be levied upon or checked off from any amount due an employee for as long as there is proper authorization by the employee. A check-off is a process or device whereby the employer, on agreement with the Union, recognized as the proper bargaining representative, or on prior authorization from the employees, deducts union dues or agency fees from the latter's wages and remits them directly to the Union.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">Ergonomic Systems Phil Inc. v. Enase, December 13, 2017 G.R. No. 195163</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">-<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>AFFILIATION AND DISAFFILIATION: A local union does not owe its existence to the federation with which it is affiliated. It is a separate and distinct voluntary association owing its creation to the will of its members. Mere affiliation does not divest the local union of its own personality, neither does it give the mother federation the license to act independently of the local union. It only gives rise to a contract of agency, where the former acts in representation of the latter. Hence, local unions are considered principals while the federation is deemed to be merely their agent.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><b>Article 251 (formerly Article 242)</b></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">Abaria v. NLRC, December 7, 2011</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">-<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>Not being a legitimate labor organization, NAMA-MCCH-NFL is not entitled to those rights granted to a legitimate labor organization under Art. 242, specifically: (a) To act as the representative of its members for the purpose of collective bargaining; (b) To be certified as the exclusive representative of all the employees in an appropriate collective bargaining unit for purposes of collective bargaining;</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">Peninsula Employees Union v. Esquivel, December 1, 2016 G.R. No. 218454</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">-<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>Jurisprudence states that the express consent of the employee to any deduction in his compensation is required to be obtained in accordance with the steps outlined by the law, which must be followed to the letter.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">Ergonomic Systems v. Enaje, December 13, 2017 (affiliation and disaffiliation)</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">-<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>A local union does not owe its existence to the federation with which it is affiliated. It is a separate and distinct voluntary association owing its creation to the will of its members. Mere affiliation does not divest the local union of its own personality, neither does it give the mother federation the license to act independently of the local union. It only gives rise to a contract of agency, where the former acts in representation of the latter. Hence, local unions are considered principals while the federation is deemed to be merely their agent.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">Nature of CBA</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">Weslayan University Phils. v. Weslayan University Philippines Faculty and Staff</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">Association, March 12, 2014</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">- When the provision of the CBA is clear, leaving no doubt on the intention of the</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">parties, the literal meaning of the stipulation shall govern. However, if there is doubt in its</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">interpretation, it should be resolved in favor of labor, as this is mandated by no less than the</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">Constitution.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><b>Article 253 (formerly Article 243)</b></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">Samahan ng Mangagawa sa Hanjin Shipyard v. BLR, October 14, 2015</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">-<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>The right to self-organization is not limited to unionism. Workers may also form or join an association for mutual aid and protection and for other legitimate purpose. Also, inherent in the right to self-organization is the right to choose whether to form a union for purposes of collective bargaining or a workers’ association for purposes of providing mutual aid and protection.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">Metrolab Industries v. Confesor, February 28, 1996</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">-<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>Although Article 245 of the Labor Code limits the ineligibility to join, form and assist any labor organization to managerial employees, jurisprudence has extended this prohibition to confidential employees or those who by reason of their positions or nature of work are required to assist or act in a fiduciary manner to managerial employees and hence, are likewise privy to sensitive and highly confidential records.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">San Miguel Foods v. San Miguel Corporation Supervisors and Exempt Union, August 1, 2011</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">VI. Article 255 (formerly Article 245) G.R. No. 146206</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">-<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>Confidential employees are defined as those who (1) assist or act in a confidential capacity, in regard (2) to persons who formulate, determine, and effectuate management policies in the field of labor relations. A confidential employee is one entrusted with confidence on delicate, or with the custody, handling or care and protection of the employer’s property. Confidential employees, such as accounting personnel, should be excluded from the bargaining unit, as their access to confidential information may become the source of undue advantage.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">SMCC v. Charter Chemical and Coating Corp., March 16, 2011 G.R. No. 169717</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">-<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>The right to file a petition for certification election is accorded to a labor organization provided that it complies with the requirements of law for proper registration. The inclusion of supervisory employees in a labor organization seeking to represent the bargaining unit of rank-and-file employees does not divest it of its status as a legitimate labor organization.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">Cathay Pacific Steel Corp. V. CA, August 30, 2003 G.R. No 164561</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">-<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>Supervisory employees are those who, in the interest of the employer, effectively recommend such managerial actions, if the exercise of such authority is not merely routinary or clerical in nature but requires the use of independent judgment; whereas, managerial employees are those who are vested with powers or prerogatives to lay down and execute management policies and/or hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, discharge, assign or discipline employees.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">AIM v. AIM Faculty Association, January 23, 2017</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">-<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>In case of alleged inclusion of disqualified employees in a union, the proper procedure for an employer is to directly file a petition for cancellation of the union's certificate of registration due to misrepresentation, false statement or fraud under the circumstances enumerated in Article 239 of the Labor Code, as amended.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><b>Articles 258-260 (formerly Articles 247-249)</b></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">T&H Shopfitters Corporation v. T&H Shopfitters Union, February 26, 2014</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">-<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>In essence, ULP relates to the commission of acts that transgress the workers' right to organize. As specified in Articles 248 [now Article 257] and 249 [now Article 258] of the Labor Code, the prohibited acts must necessarily relate to the workers' right to self-organization.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">Ren Transport v. NLRC, June 27, 2016 G.R. No. 188020</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">-<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>An employer's refusal to bargain collectively with a certified bargaining agent during the freedom period, as provided for in Article 263 in relation to Article 267 of the Labor Code, constitutes an act of unfair labor practice. This doctrine emphasizes that the duty to bargain collectively remains even if disaffiliation or the formation of another union occurs, as long as no petition for certification election is filed within the freedom period. The case underscores that an employer's interference with the right to self-organize, such as refusing to remit union dues and prematurely recognizing another union, also constitutes unfair labor practice.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">Digital Telecommunications Phils. v. Digitel Employees Union, October 10, 2012 G.R. No. 184903</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">-<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>Under Article 248(c) of the Labor Code the dismissal constitutes an unfair labor practice. Art. 248 (c) refers to contracting out services or functions being performed by union members when such will interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their rights to self-organization.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">General Santos Coca-Cola Plant Free Workers Union Tupas v. Coca-Cola Bottlers, Phils. Inc.,</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">February 13, 2009</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">-<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>Unfair labor practice refers to “acts that violate the workers’ right to organize.” The prohibited acts are related to the workers’ right to self-organization and to the observance of a CBA. Without that element, the acts, even if unfair, are not unfair labor practices.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">UST Faculty Union v. UST April 7, 2009 </span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">-<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>Article 259. Unfair Labor Practices of Employers – It shall be unlawful for an employer to commit any of the following unfair labor practices:</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">(a) To interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their right of self-</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">organization</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">X X X X X X X X X X X X</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">(d) To initiate, dominate, assist or otherwise interfere with the formation or administration</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">of any labor organization, including the given of financial or other support to it or its</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">organizers or supporters</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">X X X X X X X X X X X X</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">(g) To violate the duty to bargain collectively as prescribed by this code</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">Phil. Skylanders Inc. v. NLRC Jan 31, 2002 G.R. No. 127374</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">-<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>The mere act of disaffiliation did not divest PSEA of its own personality; neither did it give PAFLU the license to act independently of the local union. Recreant to its mission, PAFLU cannot simply ignore the demands of the local chapter and decide for its welfare. PAFLU might have forgotten that as an agent it could only act in representation of and in accordance with the interests of the local union. The complaint then for unfair labor practice lodged by PAFLU against PSI, PSEA and their respective officers, having been filed by a party which has no legal personality to institute the complaint, should have been dismissed at the first instance for failure to state a cause of action.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">Tropical Hut Employee’s Union v. Tropical Hunt Foot Market Inc. January 20, 1990</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">-<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>When a local Labor Union disaffiliates to its mother federation, it does not lose its legal personality as the bargaining union under the CBA. The Union security clause embodied in the agreements cannot be used to justify the dismissals meted to petitioners since it is not applicable to the whole Labor Union, only to “employees”.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">Purefoods Corp. v. Nagkakaisang Samahang Mangagawa ng Purefoods Rank and File,</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">August 28, 2008</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">-<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>Badges of bad faith are evident from the following acts of the petitioner: it unjustifiably refused to recognize the STFWU's and the other unions' affiliation with PULO; it concluded a new CBA with another union in another farm during the agreed indefinite suspension of the collective bargaining negotiations; it surreptitiously transferred and continued its business in a less hostile environment; and it suddenly terminated the STFWU members, but retained and brought the non-members to the Malvar farm.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"> The sudden termination of the union members is tainted with ULP when it was done to interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their right to self- organization.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">De la Salle University v. DLSUEA-NAFTEU, April 7, 2009 G.R. No. 177283</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">-<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>The union officers shall continue their functions and enjoy the rights and privileges pertaining to their respective positions in a hold-over capacity, until their successors shall have been elected and qualified.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">Alabang Country Club v. Nlrc, February 14, 2008 G.R. No. 170287</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">-<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>Under the Labor Code, an employee may be validly terminated on the following grounds: (1) just causes under Art. 282; (2) authorized causes under Art. 283; (3) termination due to disease under Art. 284; and (4) termination by the employee or resignation under Art. 285.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">St. John Colleges Inc. v. John Academy Faculty and Employees union October 27, 2006 G.R. No. 167892</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">-<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>The employer cannot unilaterally close its establishment on the pretext that the demands of its employees are excessive. As already discussed, neither party is obliged to give-in to the other’s excessive or unreasonable demands during collective bargaining, and the remedy in such case is to refer the dispute to the proper tribunal for resolution.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">UFE-DFA-KMU v. Nestle Phils. Inc. March 3, 2008 G.R. No. 158930-31</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">-<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>The duty to bargain collectively between employers and employees is mandated by law, and both parties are expected to approach negotiations with an open mind and make reasonable efforts to reach a common ground of agreement. In cases of alleged unfair labor practices, it's essential to provide substantial evidence showing that the employer's actions were motivated by ill will, bad faith, or fraud, and were oppressive to labor or done in a manner contrary to morals, good customs, or public policy. A charge of unfair labor practice should be supported by evidence that demonstrates a clear violation of the constitutional rights of workers and employees to self-organization and their right to bargain collectively. While the law obligates both parties to bargain, it doesn't compel them to agree to each other's proposals. The failure to reach an agreement after negotiations does not automatically establish a lack of good faith.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">Malayang Mangagawa ng Stayfast v. NLRC, August 28, 2014. G.R. No. 155306</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">-<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>In unfair labor practice cases, allegations must be proven with sufficient evidence.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">SWOFLU v. Universal Robina Corp, July 5, 2017 </span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">-<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>Generally, a wage increase not included in the Collective Bargaining Agreement is not demandable. However, if it was withheld by the employer as part of its unfair labor practice against the union members, this benefit should be granted.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">PEU v. Esquivel et al, December 1, 2016 </span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">-<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>Case law interpreting Article 250 (n) and (o) of the Labor Code mandates the submission of three (3) documentary requisites in order to justify a valid levy of increased union dues. These are: (a) an authorization by a written resolution of the majority of all the members at the general membership meeting duly called for the purpose; (b) the secretary’s record of the minutes of the meeting, which shall include the list of all members present, the votes cast, the purpose of the special assessment or fees and the recipient of such assessment or fees; and (c) individual written authorizations for check-off duly signed by the employees concerned.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><b>Article 263 (formerly Article 252)</b></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">UFE-DFA-KMU v. Nestle Phils. Inc. March 3, 2008 G.R. No. 158930-31</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">-<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>The duty to bargain collectively between employers and employees is mandated by law, and both parties are expected to approach negotiations with an open mind and make reasonable efforts to reach a common ground of agreement. In cases of alleged unfair labor practices, it's essential to provide substantial evidence showing that the employer's actions were motivated by ill will, bad faith, or fraud, and were oppressive to labor or done in a manner contrary to morals, good customs, or public policy. A charge of unfair labor practice should be supported by evidence that demonstrates a clear violation of the constitutional rights of workers and employees to self-organization and their right to bargain collectively. While the law obligates both parties to bargain, it doesn't compel them to agree to each other's proposals. The failure to reach an agreement after negotiations does not automatically establish a lack of good faith.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">UST Faculty Union v. UST April 7, 2009 G.R. No. 180892</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">-<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>In order to show that the employer committed ULP under the Labor Code, substantial evidence is required to support the claim. Substantial evidence has been defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. In other words, whether the employee or employer alleges that the other party committed ULP, it is the burden of the alleging party to prove such allegation with substantial evidence. Such principle finds justification in the fact that ULP is punishable with both civil and/or criminal sanctions.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">General Milling Corporation v. CA, February 2004 G.R. No. 146728</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">-<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>There is no per se test of good faith in bargaining. Good faith or bad faith is an inference to be drawn from the facts. The effect of an employer's or a union's actions individually is not the test of good-faith bargaining, but the impact of all such occasions or actions, considered as a whole. Failing to comply with the mandatory obligation to submit a reply to the union's proposals, GMC violated its duty to bargain collectively, making it liable for unfair labor practice.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">Teng v. Pahagac, Nov. 17, 2010 G.R. No. 169704</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">-<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>The Voluntary Arbitrator's decision may still be reconsidered on the basis of a motion for reconsideration seasonably filed within 10 days from receipt thereof. The seasonable filing of a motion for reconsideration is a mandatory requirement to forestall the finality of such decision.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">Samahan ng mga Mangagawa sa Hyatt (SAMASAH-NUWHRAIN) v. Magsalin, June 6,</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">2011<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>G.R. No. 172303</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">-<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>A decision or award of a voluntary arbitrator is appealable to the CA via petition for review under Rule 43.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><b>Articles 278-279 (formerly Articles 263-264)</b></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">YSS Employees Union v. YSS Laboratories Inc., December 4, 2009 G.R. No. 155125</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">-<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>When, in his opinion, there exists a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to the national interest, the Secretary of Labor and Employment may assume jurisdiction over the dispute and decide it or certify the same to the Commission for compulsory arbitration. Such assumption or certification shall have the effect of automatically enjoining the intended or impending strike or lockout as specified in the assumption or certification order. If one has already taken place at the time of assumption or certification, all striking or locked out employees shall immediately return to work and the employer shall immediately resume operations and readmit all workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout. The Secretary of Labor and Employment or the Commission may seek the assistance of law enforcement agencies to ensure compliance with this provision as well as with such orders as he may issue to enforce the same.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">NUWHRAIN-APL-IUF Dusit Hotel Nikko Chapter v. CA, November 11, 2008 G.R. No. 163942</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">-<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>The Labor Code defines a strike as "any temporary stoppage of work by the concerted action of employees as a result of an industrial or labor dispute."</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">Jackbilt Industries Inc., v. Jackbilt Employees Workers Union-NAFLU-KMU, March</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">20, 2009 G.R. No. 171618-19</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">-<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>Declaration of illegality of strike is not a prerequisite to the dismissal of members who committed illegal acts during a strike.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">NCMB primer on strikes and lockouts</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">APAP v. PAL, June 6, 2011 G.R. No. 168382</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">-<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>There is no necessity to conduct a proceeding to determine the participants in the illegal strike or those who refused to heed the return-to-work order because the ambiguity can be cured by reference to the body of the decision and the pleadings filed. While the dispositive portion of the DOLE Resolution does not specifically enumerate the names of those who actually participated in the strike but only mentions that those strikers who failed to heed the return-to-work order are deemed to have lost their employment. This omission, however, cannot prevent an effective execution of the decision. Any ambiguity may be clarified by reference primarily to the body of the decision or supplementary to the pleadings previously filed in the case, as in this case. A review of the records reveals that the DOLE Secretary declared the ALPAP officers and members to have lost their employment status based on either of two grounds, viz: their participation in the illegal strike on June 5, 1998 or their defiance of the return- to-work order of the DOLE Secretary. The records of the case unveil the names of each of these returning pilots.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">Olisa et. al. v. Escario Et. al. VCMC v. Yballe, January 15, 2014</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">-<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>Conformably with the long honored principle of a fair day’s wage for a fair day’s labor, employees dismissed for joining an illegal strike are not entitled to backwages for the period of the strike even if they are reinstated by virtue of their being merely members of the striking union who did not commit any illegal act during the strike.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><b>Article 292 (b) [formerly Article 277 (b) ]</b></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">St. Lukes Medical Center Inc. v. Notario, October 20, 2010 G.R. No. 152166</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">-<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>A single or isolated act of negligence, even if it results in possible legal action against the employer, does not constitute gross and habitual neglect of duties justifying an employee's dismissal. To justify dismissal under Article 282 (b), neglect of duty must be both gross and habitual.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">Perez v. PT&T April 9, 2009 G.R. No. 152048</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">-<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>An actual hearing or conference is not a condition sine qua non for compliance with the due process requirement. To meet the requirements of due process in the dismissal of an employee, an employer must furnish the worker with two written notices: (1) a written notice specifying the grounds for termination and giving to said employee a reasonable opportunity to explain his side and (2) another written notice indicating that, upon due consideration of all circumstances, grounds have been established to justify the employer's decision to dismiss the employee.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><b>Article 294 (formerly Article 279)</b></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">Yap v. Thenamaris Ship’s Management May 30, 2011(for OFW re RA 8042 as</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">amended by RA 10022) G.R. No. 179532</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">- The clause "or for three months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less" provided in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042 is unconstitutional for being violative of the rights of Overseas Filipino Workers (OFWs) to equal protection of the laws. Applying so would send a wrong signal that employers and recruitment agencies may violate the OFWs security of tenure embodied in their employment contract and would actually profit from such violation based on the unconstitutional provision of law.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">St. Mary’s Academy v. Palacio et. al. September 8, 2010 (Eg./ Limited backwages)</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">- "Under the policy of social justice, the law bends over backward to accommodate the interests of the working class on the humane justification that those with less privilege in life should have more in law."</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">Dreamland Hotel Resort v. Johnson, March 12, 2014 (separation pay and strained</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">relations)</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">- An illegally dismissed employee is entitled to two reliefs: backwages and reinstatement. The two reliefs provided are separate and distinct. In instances where reinstatement is no longer feasible because of strained relations between the employee and the employer, separation pay is granted. In effect, an illegally dismissed employee is entitled to either reinstatement, if viable, or separation pay if reinstatement is no longer viable, and backwages.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">Manila Water v. Del Rosario, January 29, 2014 (separation pay)</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">- Separation pay may be allowed if the employee is legally dismissed and granting it is an act of social justice or on equitable grounds. In both instances, it is required that the dismissal</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">1. Was not for serious misconduct, willful disobedience, gross and habitual neglect of duty,</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">fraud or willful breach of trust, commission of a crime against the employer or his family; and</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">2. Did not reflect on the moral character of the employee</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">Bani Rural Bank Inc. v. De Guzman et. al., November 13, 2013 ( computation) G.R. No. 170904</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">- The element of control is absent where a person who works for another does so more or less at his own pleasure and is not subject to definite hours or conditions of work, and in turn is compensated according to the result of his efforts and not the amount thereof, we should not find that the relationship of employer and employee exist.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">Maersk-Filipinas Crewing Inc. v. Avestruz, February 18, 2015 (OFW) G.R. No. 207010</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">- The element of control is absent where a person who works for another does so more or less at his own pleasure and is not subject to definite hours or conditions of work, and in turn is compensated according to the result of his efforts and not the amount thereof, we should not find that the relationship of employer and employee exist.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><b>Article 295 (formerly Article 280)</b></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">Lynvil Fishing Enterprises Inc. v. Ariola, February 1, 2012 G.R. No. 181974</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">-<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>The employees' various positions and the cyclical rehiring for more than ten years indicate an attempt to bypass the security of tenure. The court held that the employees were, in fact, regular employees, as per Article 295 (formerly Article 280) of the Labor Code.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">Consolidated Broadcasting Systems Inc. v. Oberio June 8, 2007 G.R. No. 168424</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">-<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>The test to determine whether employment is regular or not is the reasonable connection between the particular activity performed by the employee in relation to the usual business or trade of the employer. Also, if the employee has been performing the job for at least one year, even if the performance is not continuous or merely intermittent, the law deems the repeated and continuing need for its performance as sufficient evidence of the necessity, if not indispensability of that activity to the business.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">DM Consunji Inc. v. Jamin April 18, 2012 G.R. No. 192514</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">-<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>Once a project or work pool employee has been: </span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">(1)<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>Continuously, as opposed to intermittently, rehired by the same employer for the same tasks or nature of tasks; and</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">(2)<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>These tasks are vital, necessary and indispensable to the usual business or trade of the employer, then the employee must be deemed a regular employee.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">Aro et. al. v. NLRC March 7, 2012 G.R. No. 174792</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">-<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>Article 280. Regular and Casual Employment. — The provisions of written agreement to the contrary notwithstanding and regardless of the oral agreement of the parties, an employment shall be deemed to be regular where the employee has been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer, except where the employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking the completion or termination of which has been determined at the time of the engagement of the employee or where the work or service to be performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is for the duration of the season. An employment shall be deemed to be casual if it is not covered by the preceding paragraph: Provided, That, any employee who has rendered at least one year service, whether such service is continuous or broken, shall be considered a regular employee with respect to the activity in which he is employed and his employment shall continue while such activity exists.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">Universal Robina Sugar Milling Corp v. Acibo et. al, January 15, 2014 (R. Seasonal</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">Employees) G.R. No. 186439</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">-<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>The nature of the employment does not depend solely on the will or word of the employer or on the procedure for hiring and the manner of designating the employee. Rather, the nature of the employment depends on the nature of the activities to be performed by the employee, considering the nature of the employer’s business, the duration and scope to be done, and, in some cases, even the length of time of the performance and its continued existence.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">GMA Network Inc. v. Pabriga, November 27, 2013 G.R. No. 176419</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">-<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>The principal test for determining whether particular employees are properly characterized as "project employees" as distinguished from "regular employees," is whether or not the "project employees" were assigned to carry out a "specific project or undertaking," the duration (and scope) of which were specified at the time the employees were engaged for that project.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">Pasas v. PNCC, July 3, 2013. G.R. No. 192394</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">-<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>Failure of an employer to file termination reports after every project completion proves that an employee is not a project employee.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">Gapayao v. Fulo, June 13, 2013 G.R. No. 193493</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">-<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>The element of control is absent where a person who works for another does so more or less at his own pleasure and is not subject to definite hours or conditions of work, and in turn is compensated according to the result of his efforts and not the amount thereof, we should not find that the relationship of employer and employee exist.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">Millennium Erectors Corp. v. Magallanes, November 15, 2010 </span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">-<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>The repeated and continuing need for respondent’s services is sufficient evidence of the necessity, if not indispensability, of his services to petitioner’s business and, as a regular employee, he could only be dismissed from employment for a just or authorized cause.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">Leyte Geothermal Power Progressive Employees Union v. PNOC, March 30, 2011 (project) G.R. No. 170351</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">-<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>Project employees are those "whose employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking, the completion or termination of which has been determined at the time of the engagement of the employee"</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">Salazar v. NLRC (1996 CASE) G.R. No. 109210</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">-<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>Project employees are not entitled to termination pay if they are terminated as a result of the completion of the project or any phase thereof in which they are employed, regardless of the number of projects in which they have been employed by a particular construction company.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">Basan v. Coca Cola Bottles, February 4, 2015. G.R. No. 174365-66</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">-<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>In determining whether an employment should be considered regular or non-regular, the applicable test is the reasonable connection between the particular activity performed by the employee in relation to the usual business or trade of the employer. Although the work to be performed is only for a specific projector seasonal, where a person thus engaged has been performing the job for at least one year, even if the performance is not continuous or is merely intermittent, the law deems the repeated and continuing need for its performance as being sufficient to indicate the necessity or desirability of that activity to the business or trade of the employer. The employment of such person is also then deemed to be regular with respect to such activity and while such activity exists.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">Convoy Marketing Corp. v. Albia, October 7, 2015. </span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">-<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>The existence of an employer-employee relationship cannot be negated by expressly repudiating it in a contract and providing therein that the employee is an independent contractor when the facts clearly show otherwise. This is because the employment status of a person is defined and prescribed by law and not by what the parties say it should be.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">Jamias v. NLRC, March 9, 2016 G.R. No. 159350</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">-<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>A fixed period in a contract of employment does not by itself signify an intention to circumvent Article 295 (formerly Article 280) of the Labor Code. The test to determine whether a particular employee is engaged as a project or regular employee is whether or not the employee is assigned to carry out a specific project or undertaking, the duration or scope of which was specified at the time of his engagement. There must be a determination of, or a clear agreement on, the completion or termination of the project at the time the employee is engaged. Otherwise put, the fixed period of employment must be knowingly and voluntarily agreed upon by the parties, without any force, duress or improper pressure being brought to bear upon the employee and absent any other circumstances vitiating his consent, or it must satisfactorily appear that the employer and employee dealt with each other on more or less equal terms with no moral dominance whatsoever being exercised by the former on the latter.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">Gadia v. Sykes Asia, January 28, 2015 (project) G.R. No. 209499</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">-<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>For an employee to be considered project-based, the employer must show compliance with two (2) requisites, namely that: (a) the employee was assigned to carry out a specific project or undertaking; and (b) the duration and scope of which were specified at the time they were engaged for such project.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">Innodata Knowledge Services v. Inting, December 6, 2017</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">-<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>The employment status of a person is defined and prescribed by law and not by what the parties say it should be. Equally important to consider is that a contract of employment is impressed with public interest such that labor contracts must yield to the common good. Thus, provisions of applicable statutes are deemed written into the contract, and the parties are never at liberty to insulate themselves and their relationships from the impact of labor laws and regulations by simply entering into contracts with each other.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">Pacific Metal Case, December 5, 2019 (Project/ Regular Employee)</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">-<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>For while the appropriate evidence showing that a person is a project employee pertains to the employment contract specifying the project and its duration; the existence of such contract is not always conclusive of the nature of one's employment.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">Claret School of QC v. Sinday, October 9, 2019 (fixed term contract) G.R. No. 226358</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">-<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>Brent ruling recognized that the Civil Code and the Labor Code allow the execution of fixed-term employment contracts. However, in cases where periods are imposed to prevent an employee from acquiring security of tenure, such contracts must be disregarded for being contrary to public policy and morals. Brent's application is limited to cases where the employer and the employee are more or less on an equal footing when they enter into the contract.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">Gapayao v. Fulo, June 13, 2013 (Seasonal)</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">-<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>Farm workers generally fall under the definition of seasonal employees. We have consistently held that seasonal employees may be considered as regular employees.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">Paz v. Northern Tobacco Redrying Co. (Seasonal) G.R. No. 199554</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">-<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>1. Article 280 of the Labor Code and jurisprudence identified three types of employees, namely: "(1) regular employees or those who have been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer; (2) project employees or those whose employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking, the completion or termination of which has been determined at the time of the engagement of the employee or where the work or service to be performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is for the duration of the season; and (3) casual employees or those who are neither regular nor project employees." Jurisprudence also recognizes the status of regular seasonal employees</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">2. The nature of one’s employment does not depend solely on the will or word of the employer. Nor on the procedure for hiring and the manner of designating the employee, but on the nature of the activities to be performed by the employee, considering the employer's nature of business and the duration and scope of work to be done.<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="white-space: normal; white-space: pre;"><span style="font-size: large;"> </span></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">Kimberly Independent Labor Union v. Drilon, May 9, 1990 (casual) G.R. No. 77629</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">-<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>The status of regular employment attaches to the casual worker on the day immediately after the end of his first year of service. To rule otherwise, and to instead make their regularization dependent on the happening of some contingency or the fulfillment of certain requirements, is to impose a burden on the employee which is not sanctioned by law.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">Samonte v. La Salle Greenhills, February 10, 2016 (fixed) G.R. No. 199683</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">-<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>A fixed-term employment is allowable under the Labor Code only if the term was voluntarily and knowingly entered into by the parties who must have dealt with each other on equal terms not one exercising moral dominance over the other.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">-<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><b>Management Prerogative</b></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">Philippine Span Asia Carriers v. Pelayo, February 28, 2018 (discipline) G.R. No. 212003</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">- Supreme Court concluded that the employee's involvement in a legitimate company investigation, even if it resulted in inconvenience or stress, did not constitute constructive dismissal. The decision upheld the employer's right to investigate acts of wrongdoing by employees without automatically implying harassment or constructive dismissal.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">Zuellig Freight and Cargo System v. NLRC, July 22, 2013. G.R. No. 157900</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">- The changing of the name of a corporation is no more the creation of a corporation than the changing of the name of a natural person is begetting of a natural person. The act, in both cases, would seem to be what the language which we use to designate it imports – a change of name, and not a change of being.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">Peckson v. Robinsons Supermarket Corp. , July 3, 2013. (transfer) G.R. No. 198534</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">- Under the doctrine of management prerogative, every employer has the inherent right to regulate, according to his own discretion and judgment, all aspects of employment, including hiring, work assignments, working methods, the time, place and manner of work, work supervision, transfer of employees, lay-off of workers, and discipline, dismissal, and recall of employees. The only limitations to the exercise of this prerogative are those imposed by labor laws and the principles of equity and substantial justice.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">Puncia v. Toyota Shaw, June 28, 2016, (right to impose productivity standard)</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">- An employer is entitled to impose productivity standards for its employees, and the latter's non-compliance therewith can lead to his termination from work.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">SME Bank v. Peregrin, October 8, 2013 G.R. No. 184517</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">-<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>Security of tenure is a constitutionally guaranteed right. (1) Employees may not be terminated from their regular employment except for just or authorized causes under the Labor Code (2) and other pertinent laws. A mere change in the equity composition of a corporation is neither a just nor an authorized cause that would legally permit the dismissal of the corporation's employees en masse.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><b>Article 296 (formerly Article 281)</b></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">Universidad De Sta. Isabel v. Sambajon, April 2, 2014 G.R. Nos. 196280 & 196286</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">-<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>The probationary employment of teachers in private schools is not governed purely by the Labor Code. The Labor Code is supplemented with respect to the period of probation by special rules found in the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools. It is the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools, and not the Labor Code, that determines whether or not a faculty member in an educational institution has attained regular or permanent status.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">Phil. Daily Inquirer v. Magtibay, July 24, 2007 G.R. No. 164532</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">-<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>The services of an employee who has been engaged on a probationary basis may be terminated for a just cause or when he fails to qualify as a regular employee in accordance with reasonable standards made known by the employer to the employee at the time of his engagement. An employee who is allowed to work after a probationary period shall be considered a regular employee.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">Alcira v. NLRC, June 9, 2004 G.R. No. 149859</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">-<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>The computation of the 6-month probationary period is reckoned from the date of appointment up to the same calendar date of the 6th month following. An employer is deemed to substantially comply with the rule on notification of standards if he apprises the employee that he will be subjected to a performance evaluation on a particular date after his hiring. The limited security of tenure accorded to probationary employees ends on the date of the expiration of the probationary period.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">-<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><b>Serious Misconduct</b></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">Northwest Airlines v. Del Rosario, G.R. No. 157633, 10 September 2014 (Definition of</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">fight; fighting as serious misconduct) </span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">- The term fight was considered to be different from the term argument. the Court characterized fight as not just a merely verbal tussle but a physical combat between two opposing parties.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">Citibank v. NLRC, G.R. No. 159302, 6 February 2008 (Attitude problem as serious</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">misconduct)</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">- While findings of fact in administrative decisions such as those rendered by the NLRC are to be accorded not only great weight and respect, but even finality, the rule only applies for as long as these findings are supported by substantial evidence.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">Nacague v. Sulpicio Lines, G.R. No. 172589, 9 August 2010 (required proof for</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">dismissal for use of drugs, drug use as serious misconduct)</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">- To constitute valid dismissal from employment, two requisites must concur: (1) the dismissal must be for a just or authorized cause; and (2) the employee must be afforded an opportunity to be heard and to defend himself. Sec 36 R.A. No. 9165 provides that drug tests shall be performed only by authorized drug testing centers, and that drug testing shall consist of both the screening test and the confirmatory test.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">Leus v. St. Scholastica’s College, G.R. No. 187226, 28 January 2015 (immorality)</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">- To constitute immorality, the circumstances of each particular case must be holistically considered and evaluated in light of the prevailing norms of conduct and applicable laws. Otherwise stated, it is not the totality of the circumstances surrounding the conduct per se that determines whether the same is disgraceful or immoral, but the conduct that is generally accepted by society as respectable or moral.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">Cadiz v. Brent Hosptial, February 24, 2016 G.R. No. 187417</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">- The determination of whether a conduct is disgraceful or immoral involves a two-step process: first, a consideration of the totality of the circumstances surrounding the conduct; and second, an assessment of the said circumstances vis-a-vis the prevailing norms of conduct, i.e., what the society generally considers moral and respectable. Premarital sexual relations between two consenting adults who have no impediment to marry each other, and, consequently, conceiving a child out of wedlock, gauged from a purely public and secular view of morality, does not amount to a disgraceful or immoral conduct.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">Sterling Paper Products v. KMM-Katipunan, August 2, 2017 (invectives)</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">- For misconduct or improper behavior to be a just cause for dismissal, the following elements must concur: (a) the misconduct must be serious; (b) it must relate to the performance of the employee's duties showing that the employee has become unfit to continue working for the employer; and (c) it must have been performed with wrongful intent. In a number of cases, the Court has consistently ruled that the utterance of obscene, insulting or offensive words against a superior is not only destructive of the morale of his co-employees and a violation of the company rules and regulations, but also constitutes gross misconduct.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">Maribago Resort v. Dual, July 20, 2010</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">- Respondent's acts constitute serious misconduct which is a just cause for termination under the law. Theft committed by an employee is a valid reason for his dismissal by mthe employer. Although as a rule this Court leans over backwards to help workers and employees continue with their employment or to mitigate the penalties imposed on them, acts of dishonesty in the handling of company property, petitioner's income in this case, are a different matter.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">The Coca-Cola Export Corporation v. Gacayan, December 15, 2010</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">- doctrine of loss of confidence -</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">(a) Loss of confidence should not be simulated; (b) It should not be used as a subterfuge for causes which are improper, illegal or unjustified; (c) It may not be arbitrarily asserted in the face of overwhelming evidence to the contrary; and (d) It must be genuine, not a mere afterthought to justify earlier action taken in bad faith.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">Holcim Phil. v. Obna, August 8, 2016 G.R. No. 220998</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">- Infractions committed by an employee should merit only the corresponding penalty demanded by the circumstance. The penalty must be commensurate with the act, conduct or omission imputed to the employee.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">2. To constitute a valid cause for dismissal within the text and meaning of Article 282 (now Article 297) of the Labor Code, the employee's misconduct must be serious, i.e., of such grave and aggravated character and not merely trivial or unimportant.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">Waterfront Cebu City Casino Hotel v. Ledesma, March 25, 2015 (misconduct)</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">- This being a labor case, the evidence required is only substantial evidence which was adequately established here by the positive and credible testimonies of the complainants.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">Adamson University Faculty & Employees Union v. Adamson University, March 9,</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">2020 (use of expletives as a casual expression of surprise) G.R. No. 227070</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">- A fixed-term employment is allowable under the Labor Code only if the term was voluntarily and knowingly entered into by the parties who must have dealt with each other on equal terms not one exercising moral dominance over the other.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><b>Gross insubordination/Willful disobedience</b></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">Lores Realty Enterprises v. Pacia, G.R. No. 171189, 9 March 2011 (good faith refusal</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">to obey a lawful order)</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">- An employee's good faith refusal to obey a lawful order does not constitute willful disobedience and may not justify termination.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">Tongko v. The Manufacturer’s Life Insurance Co. Inc., November 7, 2008 (willful</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">disobedience) G.R. No. 167622</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">- Control over the performance of the task of one providing service – both with respect to the means and manner, and the results of the service - is the primary element in determining whether an employment relationship exists.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">School of Holy Spirit of Quezon City v. Taguiam, July 14, 2008 (gross and habitual</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">neglect) G.R. No. 165565</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">- Under Article 282 of the Labor Code, gross and habitual neglect of duties is a valid ground for an employer to terminate an employee. Gross negligence implies a want or absence of or a failure to exercise slight care or diligence, or the entire absence of care. It evinces a thoughtless disregard of consequences without exerting any effort to avoid them. Habitual neglect implies repeated failure to perform one's duties for a period of time, depending upon the circumstances.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><b>Loss of confidence/Breach of trust</b></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">Hormillosa v. Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, G.R. No. 198699, 9 October 2013 (Nonmanagerial</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">employees)</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">- There are two (2) classes of positions of trust. The first class consists of managerial employees. They are defined as those vested with the powers or prerogatives to lay down management policies and to hire, transfer suspend, lay-off, recall, discharge, assign or discipline employees or effectively recommend such managerial actions. The second class consists of cashiers, auditors, property custodians, etc. They are defined as those who in the normal and routine exercise of their functions, regularly handle significant amounts of money or property. There is a high degree of trust and confidence reposed on route salesmen, and when confidence is breached, the employer may take proper disciplinary action on them.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">Concepcion v. Minex Import Corporation, January 24, 2012 (loss of trust and</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">confidence, criminal prosecution not a requisite for validlity of dismissal)</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">- The employer may validly dismiss for loss of trust and confidence an employee who commits an act of fraud prejudicial to the interest of the employer. Neither a criminal prosecution nor a conviction beyond reasonable doubt for the crime is a requisite for the validity of the dismissal. Nonetheless, the dismissal for a just or lawful cause must still be made upon compliance with the requirements of due process under the Labor Code; otherwise, the employer is liable to pay nominal damages as indemnity to the dismissed employee.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">Manila Jockey Club v. Trajano, June 26, 2013. G.R. No. 160982</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">- The loss of trust and confidence, to be a valid ground for dismissal, must be based on a willful breach of trust and confidence founded on clearly established facts. Moreover, the loss of trust and confidence must be related to the employee's performance of duties.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><br /></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">Yrasuegui v. PAL, October 17, 2008 </span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">- The obesity of petitioner, when placed in the context of his work as flight attendant, becomes an analogous cause under Article 282(e) of the Labor Code that justifies his dismissal from the service. His obesity may not be unintended, but is nonetheless voluntary. As the CA correctly puts it, "voluntariness basically means that the just cause is solely attributable to the employee without any external force influencing or controlling his actions. This element runs through all just causes under Article 282, whether they be in the nature of a wrongful action or omission. Gross and habitual neglect, a recognized just cause, is considered voluntary although it lacks the element of intent found in Article 282(a), (c), and (d)."</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">Son et al. v. UST, April 18, 2018 (other causes) G.R. No. 211273</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">-<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>A void contract is equivalent to nothing; it produces no civil effect; and it does not create, modify or extinguish a juridical relation.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><b>Abandonment</b></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">Manarpiis v. Texas Phils, January 28, 2015 G.R. No. 197011</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">-<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>The court laid down the two elements which must concur for a valid abandonment:</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">(1) the failure to report to work or absence without valid or justifiable reason, and </span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">(2) a clear intention to sever the employer-employee relationship, with the second element as the more determinative factor being manifested by some overt acts.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">Abandonment as a just ground for dismissal requires the deliberate, unjustified refusal of the employee to perform his employment responsibilities. Mere absence or failure to work, even after notice to return, is not tantamount to abandonment. It is well-settled that the filing by an employee of a complaint for illegal dismissal with a prayer for reinstatement is proof enough of his desire to return to work, thus, negating the employer’s charge of abandonment. An employee who takes steps to protest his dismissal cannot logically be said to have abandoned his work.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">People’s Broadcasting Service v. Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">-<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>Under Art. 128 (b) of the Labor Code, as amended by RA 7730, the DOLE is fully empowered to make a determination as to the existence of an employer-employee relationship in the exercise of its visitorial and enforcement power, subject to judicial review, not review by the NLRC.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">Urbanes v. Secretary of Labor, February 19, 2003 G.R. No. 122791</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">-<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>Where no employer-employee relationship exists between the parties and no issue is involved which may be resolved by reference to the Labor Code, other labor statutes or any collective bargaining agreement, it is the Regional Trial Court that has jurisdiction.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">Hanson v. Secretary of Labor, February 11, 2008 G.R. No. 159026</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">-<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>Art. 128 (b) of the Labor Code clearly provides that the appeal bond must be “in the amount equivalent to the monetary award in the order appealed from.” The reduction of bond in the NLRC is expressly authorized under the Rules implementing Article 223 and no similar authority is given the DOLE Secretary.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">Balladares v. Peak Ventures Corporation, June 16, 2009 G.R. No. 161794</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">-<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>The Secretary of Labor or his duly authorized representatives is now empowered to hear and decide, in a summary proceeding, any matter involving the recovery of any amount of wages and other monetary claims arising out of employer-employee relations at the time of the inspection, even if the amount of the money claim exceeds P5,000.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">Star Paper Corporation v. Simbol, April 12, 2006</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">-<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>When the employer can prove that the reasonable demands of the business require a distinction based on marital status, and there is no better available or acceptable policy which would better accomplish the business purpose, an ER may discriminate against and EE based on the identity of the EE’s spouse.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">-<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>To justify a bona fide occupational qualification, the employer must prove 2 factors:</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">1.<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>That the employment qualification is reasonably related to the essential operation of the job involved; and,</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">2.<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>That there is a factual basis for believing that all or substantially all persons meeting the qualification would be unable to properly perform the duties of the job.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">However, the absence of a statute expressly prohibiting marital discrimination in our jurisdiction cannot benefit the petitioners. The protection given to labor in our jurisdiction is vast and extensive that we cannot prudently draw inferences from the legislature’s silence that married persons are not protected under our Constitution and declare valid a policy based on a prejudice or stereotype.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">Phil. Aeolus Automotive United Corp., v. NLRC, April 28, 2000</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">-<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>The Supreme Court, in a litany of decisions on serious misconduct warranting dismissal of an employee, has ruled that for misconduct or improper behavior to be a just cause for dismissal </span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">(a)<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>It must be serious;</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">(b)<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span> must relate to the performance of the employee’s duties; and,</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">(c)<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span> Must show that the employee has become unfit to continue working for the employer.</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">Apex Mining Co. v. NLRC, April 22, 1991 G.R. No. 94951</span></p><p><span style="font-size: large;">-<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>The mere fact that the househelper or domestic servant is working within the premises of the business of the employer and in relation to or in connection with its business, as in its staffhouses for its guest or even for its officers and employees, warrants the conclusion that such househelper or domestic servant is and should be considered as a regular employee of the employer and not as a mere family househelper or domestic servant as contemplated in Rule XIII, Section I(b), Book 3 of the Labor Code, as amended. </span></p><p><br /></p>Tardigradehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14890558896153261318noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7720097018142953137.post-86270340121037982502023-11-06T07:31:00.003-08:002023-11-06T20:39:59.850-08:00TRABAHO PARA SA BAYAN <p><span style="font-size: large;"> </span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: large;">TRABAHO PARA SA BAYAN ACT<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><o:p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></o:p></p><p class="MsoNormal"><o:p><span style="font-size: large;"></span></o:p></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: large;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEi-Gj4vVA_kH7HQiBLymOcu08aOXSGrhvA3TxwUNdA0z1-JxQN4QQvwRnp4P9Nrshz6PwudvjP-EppI9fPsdbTNxGPehtc9CSfYLcBMIGSwTWV_x-HWvgKknHdAH_530EQ5fmCK3htTpSq8cB91VYK2M-pPLdKVegdmVxcTGL66xkA8YMyjrHCV05P5Lzo/s3072/pexels-plato-terentev-5909686.jpg" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="2048" data-original-width="3072" height="259" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEi-Gj4vVA_kH7HQiBLymOcu08aOXSGrhvA3TxwUNdA0z1-JxQN4QQvwRnp4P9Nrshz6PwudvjP-EppI9fPsdbTNxGPehtc9CSfYLcBMIGSwTWV_x-HWvgKknHdAH_530EQ5fmCK3htTpSq8cB91VYK2M-pPLdKVegdmVxcTGL66xkA8YMyjrHCV05P5Lzo/w389-h259/pexels-plato-terentev-5909686.jpg" width="389" /></a></span></div><span style="font-size: large;"><br /> </span><p></p><p class="MsoNormal"><o:p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: large;">Ito ay Republic Act No. 11962, ang batas na trabaho para sa bayan,
para sa buong bansa. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Layunin nito na ang
ating gobyerno ay magbigay ng buong proteksyon sa ating mga trabahador. Sila
man ay nasa ibang bansa o nandito sa Pilipinas. Sinisigurado din ang
pantay-pantay na oportunidad na magkaroon tayong lahat ng trabaho, mapababae
man o lalake, o may ibang lahi, kulay, relihyon, politikal na opinyon o
pinanggalingan. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: large;">Gagawin din ng gobyerno ang paghikayat ng mas madaming pang trabaho
para sa bayan. Kasali na din ang mga karagdagang negosyo na magbibigay
oportunidad sa mas madaming pang tao. Para magampanan ito, may nakahandang
plano na magiging gabay ng gobyerno. Ito ay tinatawag na “Trabaho Para sa Bayan
Plan”. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: large;">Dito sa “Plan” na ito, nakasaad ang mga layunin. Gaya ng: <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoListParagraph" style="mso-list: l0 level1 lfo1; text-indent: -0.25in;"><span style="font-size: large;"><!--[if !supportLists]--><span><span style="mso-bidi-font-family: Calibri; mso-bidi-theme-font: minor-latin;"><span style="mso-list: Ignore;">1.<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-stretch: normal; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; font-weight: normal; line-height: normal;"> <span> </span></span></span></span>Pagpapasigla ng ekonomiya sa pamamagitan ng paglikha
ng mga insentibo at pamumuhunan. Dahil dito, magkakaroon ng disenteng trahabo
ang mga walang trabaho at muling makakasalamuha at makakatrahabo ng matiwasay
ang ating mga OFWs sa Pilipinas. Dagdag pa dito, itong batas ay may pakay na
paigtingin ang pagiging mapagkumpitensya ng ating bansa sa larangan ng kakayahan
at kasanayan ng ating mga empleyado sa kahit anumang trabaho.</span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><o:p><span style="font-size: large;"> </span></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpFirst" style="mso-list: l0 level1 lfo1; text-indent: -0.25in;"><span style="font-size: large;"><!--[if !supportLists]--><span><span style="mso-bidi-font-family: Calibri; mso-bidi-theme-font: minor-latin;"><span style="mso-list: Ignore;">2.<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-stretch: normal; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; font-weight: normal; line-height: normal;"> <span> </span></span></span></span>Pagbigay ng suporta sa mga negosyo at pagluwag
ng pribilehiyo na makakuha ng kapital. <o:p></o:p></span></span></p>
<p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle"><o:p><span style="font-size: large;"> </span></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="mso-list: l0 level1 lfo1; text-indent: -0.25in;"><span style="font-size: large;"><!--[if !supportLists]--><span><span style="mso-bidi-font-family: Calibri; mso-bidi-theme-font: minor-latin;"><span style="mso-list: Ignore;">3.<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-stretch: normal; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; font-weight: normal; line-height: normal;"> <span> </span></span></span></span>Insentibo para sa mga amo at ng mga pribadong organisasyong
nagaalok ng pagsasasanay, teknolohiya, kaalaman, kasanayan, at iba pang angkop
na aktibidad kaugnay sa trabaho.<o:p></o:p></span></span></p><p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="mso-list: l0 level1 lfo1; text-indent: -0.25in;"><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiMrr_g3ttHhhOwGllsxZwDBJNrDuwILQzB-z4pq7xy-ITIWl2tvhr0-tutGGnamRwQygwQRApBfCcAzRHIPtLBtEIeZfITuiob5qnAa8c-FsMlAdww4QR8ZsNoM3yM278l-X1IEJPOL1gI5svMyg9MjPECPD_1YMhvPLoPsSFFuRzdVkJnI12NKpGQO7g/s2472/pexels-chris-john-2783232.jpg" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><span style="font-size: large;"><img border="0" data-original-height="1687" data-original-width="2472" height="268" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiMrr_g3ttHhhOwGllsxZwDBJNrDuwILQzB-z4pq7xy-ITIWl2tvhr0-tutGGnamRwQygwQRApBfCcAzRHIPtLBtEIeZfITuiob5qnAa8c-FsMlAdww4QR8ZsNoM3yM278l-X1IEJPOL1gI5svMyg9MjPECPD_1YMhvPLoPsSFFuRzdVkJnI12NKpGQO7g/w456-h268/pexels-chris-john-2783232.jpg" width="456" /></span></a></div><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span><p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="mso-list: l0 level1 lfo1; text-indent: -0.25in;"><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p>
<p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpLast"><o:p><span style="font-size: large;"> </span></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: large;">Sa Plan mayroong tinatawag na “development timeline” na kung
saan may <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: large;">3-year<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: large;">6-year, at<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: large;">10-year development timeline para sa pangitain, misyon, at layunin<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><o:p><span style="font-size: large;"> </span></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: large;">Magkakaroon din ng “Trabaho Para sa Bayan Inter-Agency
Council” para sa pagbabalangkas ng takdahan ng mga pagganap, pagsasagawa at pagtupad
ng “Trabaho Para sa Bayan Act”. Kung kinakailangan, itong lupon ay maaring
magtawag pa at humingi ng tulong sa iba pang mga ahensya ng gobyerno para
magampanan nito ang nararapat at tamang operasyon ng trabaho para sa bayan. Puwede
din na kapag nangangailangan pa ang lupon, maari itong magtatag ng “Working
Groups” nang sa gayon ay tuluyang makamit ang mga layunin na nakasaad sa batas.
<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><o:p><span style="font-size: large;"> </span></o:p></p><p class="MsoNormal"><o:p><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoListParagraph"><o:p><span style="font-size: large;"> </span></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: large;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: large;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><o:p><span style="font-size: large;"> </span></o:p></p>Tardigradehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14890558896153261318noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7720097018142953137.post-62233174236401244762023-09-30T10:14:00.003-07:002023-09-30T10:14:18.614-07:00Tan v. Dasal<p><span style="font-size: large;"> </span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: large;">Tan v. Dasal<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: large;">G.R. No. 255694<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: large;">January 16, 2023<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><o:p><span style="font-size: large;"> </span></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: large;">FACTS:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: large;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Spouses
Silverio and Purificacion Dasal owned a parcel of land located in Roxas City.
When they died, ownership was passed onto their three surviving children,
namely: Enrico, Cristino, and herein respondent Diosdado Dasal who later
subdivided the property into three portions. Thereafter, the Dasal brothers
decided to sell Lots 1833-L-2 and 1833-L-3, retaining Lot 1833-L-1 which was
further subdivided into four lots and a Subdivision Plan prepared for such
purpose wherein a portion of Diosdado's property abutting the property of
Inocencio Bermejo and parallel to Lot 1833-L-1-B owned by Enrico was indicated
as an existing alley. Sometime in October 1987, Enrico caused the further
subdivision of Lot 1833-L-1-B into two parcels: (1) Lot 1833-L-1-B-1, which was
sold to herein petitioners; and (2) Lot 1833-L-1-B-2, which was sold to Edmund
Sia. Attached to the Subdivision Plan prepared for Lot-1833-L-1-B, subject to
the approval of the Land Management Sector of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources, was an Affidavit purportedly executed by respondent
Diosdado, stating that a portion of his lot had been donated to all the
occupants within the said subdivision for their free use and passage as an
alley. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent: .5in;"><span style="font-size: large;">Later on, petitioners constructed a
commercial building on Lot 1833-L-1-B-1, which was leased out to different
entities, including the AMA Computer Learning Center. However, respondent
Diosdado apparently constructed a fence on the disputed alley, preventing
petitioners and their lessees from using it. After he rejected their request to
re-open the alley, petitioners were constrained to institute a complaint for
injunction and damages. In in their complaint asserted that the Dasal brothers
and Inocencio earlier agreed to reserve a portion of respondent Diosdado's lot
as an alley to provide ingress and egress to their property. Respondent
Diosdado disavowed having knowledge about the subdivision of Lot 1833-L-1 and
claimed that his signature appearing on the supposed Subdivision Agreement of
Lot 1833-L-1 was forged. Likewise, he was not aware that a portion of the area
assigned to him was reserved as an alley. However, since his house was already
erected on Lot 1833-L-1-D, he no longer objected to such assignment. He also
insisted that the alley was intended as a foot path for the use only of
Inocencio and no one else, and that his property was not a servient estate
insofar as petitioners' lot was concerned. Instead, petitioners should have
asked for a right of way from Enrico, who sold the realty to them. Ultimately,
respondent Diosdado denied that petitioners had to pass through the existing
alley in his lot to go to and from their property; only that it was more
convenient for them to use the same.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><o:p><span style="font-size: large;"> </span></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: large;">ISSUE:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: large;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Whether
or not the petitioners are legally entitled to the use of the alley in dispute.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><o:p><span style="font-size: large;"> </span></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: large;">HELD:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: large;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>The
Court ruled in negative. It found no reason to deviate from the pronouncement
of the Court of Appeals that petitioners are not entitled to use the alley
found on the property of respondents. In Republic v. Ortigas, the Court
elucidated that the foregoing provision contemplates roads and streets in a
subdivided property, not public thoroughfares built on a private property that
was taken from an owner for public purpose. Given that the alley involved in
the case at hand refers to one located inside a private subdivided property,
reliance on Section 50 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 is proper. Section 50 of
Presidential Decree No. 1529 supersedes Section 44 of Act No. 496. Section 50
of Presidential Decree No. 1529 now allows the Register of Deeds to register a
subdivision plan containing streets or passageways, duly approved by the
Commissioner of Land Registration or the Bureau of Lands, sans court approval.
The Register of Deeds is enjoined to annotate on the new certificate of title a
memorandum to the effect that the streets or passageways delineated as such
shall not be closed by the registered owner without court approval. Therefore,
the best evidence that the alley in Diosdado's property is truly a street or
passageway reserved for the use of all occupants of Lot 1833-L-1, as
subdivided, and not merely Inocencio, would be the memorandum to that effect
annotated on the certificate of title covering it. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent: .5in;"><span style="font-size: large;">In the case at bar, petitioners
presented Transfer Certificate Title No. T-21393, covering Lot 1833-L-1-D in
the name of respondent Diosdado, which bears the following statement:
"NOTE: Existing Alley of 3.00 m. wide along Line 5-1 is reserved."
This annotation does not explicitly state for whom the use of the alley on Lot
1833-L-1-D was reserved. After careful examination of the approved Subdivision
Plan from which the title was derived, it demonstrates that it is equally
ambiguous for whose benefit the existing alley was reserved since it was only
designated as such. Moreover, it bears stressing that the annotation on
respondent Diosdado's title does not comply with the required tenor of the
memorandum under Section 50, signaled by the use of the word shall in the said
provision. Absent clear and express terms in the Subdivision Agreement and the
Subdivision Plan for Lot 1833-L-1 drawn up by the parties herein as to the
nature of the burden upon respondent Diosdado's estate, the Court may determine
their intention, as may be gathered from their contemporaneous and subsequent
acts. The Court also noted that a voluntary easement defined by Article 619 of
the Civil Code as that created by will of the owners was not established by the
documentary evidence proffered by petitioners. The Court proceeds there being
none to determine whether a legal easement was created over the disputed alley
in favor of petitioners. The conferment of a legal or compulsory easement of
right of way is governed by Articles 649 and 650 of the Civil Code must concur
such as the dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables and has no
adequate outlet to a public highway (Art. 649, par. 1); There is payment of
proper indemnity (Art. 649, par. 1); The isolation is not due to the acts of
the proprietor of the dominant estate (Art. 649, last par.); and The right of
way claimed is at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate; and
insofar as consistent with this rule, where the distance from the dominant
estate to a public highway may be the shortest (Art. 650).</span><o:p></o:p></p>Tardigradehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14890558896153261318noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7720097018142953137.post-74085511781291592832023-09-30T10:10:00.004-07:002023-09-30T10:10:33.626-07:00Bariata v. Carpio Morales<p><span style="font-size: large;"> </span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: large;">Bariata v. Carpio Morales<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: large;">G.R. No. 234640<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: large;">February 1, 2023<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><o:p><span style="font-size: large;"> </span></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: large;">FACTS:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: large;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Crispin
Bariata (petitioner) filed a complaint against private respondents then Mayor
Joselito A. Ojeda (Joselito) and Dulce R. Quinto-Ojeda (Dulce) for alleged
unexplained wealth and for failure to file a true and detailed Sworn Statements
of Assets, Liabilities, and Net Worth (SALNs) for certain calendar years. Among
others, petitioner alleged that Joselito and his wife Dulce, is a co-owner
together with a certain Apolinar Quinto (Apolinar) of a parcel of land covered by
TCT No. 343418, which was not declared. Joselito countered that the parcel of
land covered by TCT No. 343418 is a paraphernal property of his wife who had
already waived and assigned her interest in favor of her brother Apolinar, as
evidenced by a Waiver/Quitclaim with Assignment of Rights dated February 2,
2002, and should no longer be included in his SALN. The Ombudsman dismissed
both the criminal and administrative cases against Joselito and his wife. It
was provided that the lot under TCT No. T-343418 has been waived and assigned
by respondent Dulce to Apolinar as early as 2002 per Waiver/Quitclaim with
Assignment of Rights. As the subject lot is a paraphernal property, it is
considered as respondent Dulce's exclusive property under Articles 92 and 109 of
the Family Code and could be disposed without the consent of her husband.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><o:p><span style="font-size: large;"> </span></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: large;">ISSUE:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: large;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Whether
the lot under TCT No. T-343418 has been validly donated.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><o:p><span style="font-size: large;"> </span></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: large;">HELD:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: large;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>YES.
The lot under TCT No. T-343418 has been validly donated. Quitclaims, being
contracts of waiver, involve the relinquishment of rights, with knowledge of
their existence and intent to relinquish them. A mere waiver of rights is not
an effective mode of transferring ownership under our Civil Code. Under Article
712 of the Civil Code, the modes of acquiring ownership are generally
classified into two classes, namely, the original mode (i.e., through
occupation, acquisitive prescription, law, or intellectual creation), and the
derivative mode (i.e., through succession mortis causa or tradition as a result
of certain contracts, such as sale, barter, donation, assignment, or mutuum).
In this case, the Waiver/Quitclaim partakes the nature of a donation. In order
that a donation of an immovable property be valid, the following elements must
be present: (a) the essential reduction of the patrimony of the donor; (b) the
increase in the patrimony of the donee; (c) the intent to do an act of
liberality or animus donandi; (d) the donation must be contained in a public
document; and (e) that the acceptance thereof be made in the same deed or in a separate
public instrument; if acceptance is made in a separate instrument, the donor
must be notified thereof in an authentic form, to be noted in both instruments.
The foregoing elements are present in the instant case. A reading of the terms
and conditions of the Waiver/Quitclaim shows that Dulce freely and voluntarily
relinquished and waived her rights and interests over the subject property in
favor of her brother, Apolinar without any material or valuable consideration.
Moreover, the Waiver/Quitclaim was contained in a public document, having been
acknowledged before a Notary Public. In addition, Apolinar's acceptance is
shown by his signature on the same instrument executed by Dulce.</span><o:p></o:p></p>Tardigradehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14890558896153261318noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7720097018142953137.post-46647032727437835882023-09-30T10:07:00.004-07:002023-09-30T10:07:47.562-07:00Integrated Credit and Corporate Services, Co. v. Novelita Labrador and Philippians Academy of Paranaque City<p><span style="font-size: large;"> </span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: large;">Integrated Credit and Corporate Services, Co. v. Novelita
Labrador and Philippians Academy of Paranaque City<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: large;">G.R. No. 233127<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: large;">July 10, 2023<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><o:p><span style="font-size: large;"> </span></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: large;">FACTS:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: large;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Respondent
Novelita Labrador (Labrador) was the former owner of two parcels of land with improvements
situated in Paranaque City, and covered by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT)
Nos. 173576 and 173577 (subject properties). Labrador obtained a loan from
Chinatrust Commercial Bank Corporation (Chinatrust) in the amount of P3,
440,000.00. On September 26, 2007, in order to secure the payment of her
obligations, Labrador executed a real estate mortgage (REM) over the subject
properties in favor of Chinatrust. The REM was registered and annotated on the
TCTs of the subject properties. When Labrador defaulted in the payment of her
obligations, Chinatrust applied for extrajudicial foreclosure of the REM before
the Office of the Clerk of Court and Ex<span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span style="font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; line-height: 107%;">[1]</span><!--[endif]--></span>Officio
Sheriff of the Regional Trial Court of Paranaque City, Branch 196 (RTC). The
case was docketed as LRC Case No. 12-0044. After notice and publication,
pursuant to the provisions of Act No. 3135, as amended, the public auction sale
of the subject properties was scheduled on May 26, 2009. Labrador failed to
exercise her right of legal redemption within one year from July 3, 2009 and,
thus, petitioner consolidated its ownership over the subject properties by
executing an Affidavit of Consolidation dated July 5, 2010. Consequently, the
TCTs previously issued in the name of Labrador nwere cancelled by the Register
of Deeds, and TCT Nos. 010-20100022269 and 010- 2010002227 were issued in favor
of petitioner. On March 2 1, 2012, 14 petitioner filed with the RTC an Ex Parte
Petition for Issuance of a Writ of Possession against Labrador praying that a
writ of possession be issued in its favor against Labrador, her successors or
assigns or whomsoever may be in possession of the subject properties. It
further prayed that a break open order be also issued to the branch sheriff to
ensure the effective implementation of the writ of possession with reasonable
force, if necessary.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><o:p><span style="font-size: large;"> </span></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: large;">ISSUE:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: large;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Whether
the CA erred when it failed to observe the jurisprudential doctrine that when
the title is consolidated in the name of the purchaser at foreclosure sale, the
writ of possession becomes a matter of right.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><o:p><span style="font-size: large;"> </span></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: large;">HELD:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: large;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>YES,
the Supreme Court ruled that in the present case, it must be emphasized that
petitioner was able to consolidate its title to the subject properties after
Labrador failed to redeem the latter after the one-year period. The TCTs
previously issued in the name of Labrador were cancelled by the Register of
Deeds, and TCT Nos. 010-2010002226 and 010-2010002227 were issued in favor of
petitioner. Therefore, petitioner is entitled to the issuance of a writ of
possession based on its right of ownership.</span><o:p></o:p></p>Tardigradehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14890558896153261318noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7720097018142953137.post-70399008791392558162023-09-30T09:55:00.005-07:002023-09-30T09:55:21.902-07:00Municipality of Sta. Maria Bulacan v. Buenaventura<p><span style="font-size: large;"> </span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: large;">Municipality of Sta. Maria Bulacan v. Buenaventura<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: large;">G.R. No. 191278<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: large;">March 29, 2023<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><o:p><span style="font-size: large;"> </span></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: large;">FACTS:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: large;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>On Oct.
11, 2002, respondent filed a complaint for sum or money and damages against the
petitioners Municipality of Sta. Maria, Bulacan, its then Mayor Bartolome Ramos
(Mayor Ramos) and the Municipal Members of the Sangguniang Bayan of Sta Maria
Bulacan. Respondent alleged that he is the registered owner of a parcel of land
in Barangay Guyong, Sta. Maria Bulacan. He claimed that without his knowledge
and consent, petitioners took possession and constructed a road on a part of
the property. Upon discovery thereof, respondent wrote to Mayor Ramos demanding
the removal of the constructed road. The petitioners committed to return the
property to the respondent in its original condition. The petitioners argued
that the complaint has no cause of action as the land in which the road was
constructed belongs to Barangay Guyong, Sta. Maria, Bulacan by virtue of a Deed
of Donation executed by the respondent in the latter's favor. The RTC held that
the notarized Deed of Donation which has the respondent's signature is a public
document and as such is admissible without further proof of its authenticity
and is entitled to full faith and credit. The RTC adjudged that the Deed of
Donation is deemed valid until annulled in a proceeding specifically lodged for
the purpose, not the one before it which is a case for sum of money and
damages. Accordingly, it held that the petitioners acted in good faith in
relying upon the Deed of Donation as the basis for its construction on the
subject property and are not liable for damages. On appeal, the CA reversed the
trial court’s judgement. The appellate court held that the Deed of Donation was
forged.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><o:p><span style="font-size: large;"> </span></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: large;">ISSUE:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: large;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Whether
or not the Deed of Donation is valid and sufficient to support the petitioners’
construction on the subject premises.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><o:p><span style="font-size: large;"> </span></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: large;">HELD:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: large;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>No. As
a rule, forgery cannot be presumed. It must be proved by clear, positive, and
convincing evidence. The burden rests upon the party alleging forgery to prove
his or her case by preponderance of evidence. Forgery can be established by a
visual comparison between the alleged forged signature and the authentic and
genuine signature of the person whose signature is theorized to have been
forged. On this matter, the opinion of handwriting experts is not conclusive
upon the courts, particularly when "the question involved is mere handwriting
similarity or dissimilarity, which can be determined by a visual comparison of
specimens of the questioned signatures with those of the currently existing
ones." In determining whether there has been forgery, the judge is not
bound to rely upon the testimonies of handwriting experts. The judge must
conduct an independent examination of the questioned signature to arrive at a
reasonable conclusion as to its authenticity. In this case, the Court agrees
with the conclusion of the CA that the respondent's signature on the deed is a
forgery. The respondent established by preponderance of evidence that his
signature on the instrument is a forgery. As observed by the court, by the bare
look on the signature of the [respondent] as found in the verification/certification
portion of his complaint vis-à-vis his signature appearing on the questioned
Deed of Donation, one would show patent and distinct dissimilarities Indeed, a
simple visual examination and comparison of the specimen signatures of the
respondent in the Verification and Certification of his Complaint as well as of
his letter of demand to Mayor Ramos dated May 14, 2002, with that in the
subject Deed of Donation, clearly reveals that they are not one in the same and
have been affixed by different persons. The petitioner did not submit any
countervailing evidence, thus, based on the weight of evidence presented, the
Court is more inclined to rule on the respondent's favor.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent: .5in;"><span style="font-size: large;">On the issue of the respondent’s
rights, recovery of possession may no longer be had as the return of the
subject property is no longer feasible as a road has already been constructed
thereon. Thus, in the higher interest of justice, in order to prevent
irreparable injury that may result if the subject property were to be surrendered
and the public would be prevented from having access to the road, payment of
just compensation is warranted under the premises reckoned from the time of
taking on April 11, 2002, the date when the petitioner took possession and
constructed a road on the respondent's property.</span><o:p></o:p></p>Tardigradehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14890558896153261318noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7720097018142953137.post-26503987235120593052023-09-30T09:51:00.004-07:002023-09-30T09:51:48.047-07:00Cando v. Solis<p><span style="font-size: large;"> </span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: large;">Cando v. Solis<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: large;">G.R. No. 251792<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: large;">February 27, 2023<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><o:p><span style="font-size: large;"> </span></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: large;">FACTS:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: large;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Spouses
Solis were the registered owners of two parcels of land located in Quezon City
and covered by Transfer Certificates of Title. Spouses Solis borrowed
P15,000,000.00 from Cando and executed a Real Estate Mortgage covering the
subject properties. A year later, Spouses Solis received a demand letter from
Cando's counsel stating that the former already sold the subject properties to
Cando, but they refused to vacate the premises. Petitioners allege that they
signed the document out of mistake and out of belief that the document was a
real estate mortgage and not a sale. Thus, Spouses Solis filed a complaint for
annulment of sale with reformation of instrument and damages against Cando.
Spouses Solis maintained that the deed of mortgage did not disclose their true
intent because their transaction with Cando was one of mortgage and not the
sale and that the document was null and void for being a pactum commissorium.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><o:p><span style="font-size: large;"> </span></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: large;">ISSUE:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: large;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Whether
or not the agreement between Spouses Solis and Cando is one of equitable
mortgage that warrants the annulment of the deed of sale they supposedly
entered into.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><o:p><span style="font-size: large;"> </span></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: large;">HELD:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: large;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>An
equitable mortgage is defined as one which, although lacking in some formality,
or form or words, or other requisites demanded by a statute, nevertheless
reveals the intention of the parties to charge real property as security for a
debt, and contains nothing impossible or contrary to law. The intention of the
parties to an agreement is determined not only by the terminology used in the
document but also by all the surrounding circumstances that would show the real
nature of their understanding. For the presumption of an equitable mortgage to
arise under Article 1602, two (2) requisites must concur: (a) that the parties
entered into a contract denominated as a contract of sale; and (b) that their
intention was to secure an existing debt by way of a mortgage. The requisites
for the presumption of an equitable mortgage to arise under Article 1602 are
present in the case: (a) Spouses Solis and Cando entered into a contract of
sale dated October 29, 2012 and (b) the circumstances show that they executed
the contract to guarantee the loan amounting to P15,000,000.00. Verily, the
facts and evidence in the case show that the true intent of the parties was to
secure the payment of the loan and not to transfer the ownership of the subject
properties in favor of Cando. The presence of the foregoing badges thus creates
a strong presumption of the existence of an equitable mortgage in the case. The
Court finds that the deed of sale entered into by the parties is indeed an
equitable mortgage.</span><o:p></o:p></p>Tardigradehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14890558896153261318noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7720097018142953137.post-57836350860325244942023-09-30T09:45:00.005-07:002023-09-30T09:45:35.074-07:00Pryce Corporation v. Engr. Vicente Ponce<p><span style="font-size: large;"> </span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: large;">Pryce Corporation v. Engr. Vicente Ponce<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: large;">G.R. No. 206863<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: large;">March 22, 2023<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><o:p><span style="font-size: large;"> </span></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: large;">FACTS:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: large;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Prudencio
Soloza applied for a homestead patent over a 15-hectare lot in Sta. Filomena,
Iligan City. The five-hectare portion of the subject property was acquired by
Ponce from Dionisio Ong. Another portion of the 15-hectare lot was in
possession of the Quidlat siblings which was soon after acquired by Pryce
Corporation in 1995. The six-hectare lot registered to Pryce overlaps the
five-hectare subject property registered to Ponce. Ponce filed a complaint for
quieting of title, reconveyance of property, and damages against Pryce. Ponce
alleged that his claims of ownership began with Prudencio's OCT RP-62 (21) that
initially covered 15 hectares of land and which included the subject property.
Meanwhile, Pryce rooted its title to the subject property from the outcome of
the cadastral case over Lot No. 1936 that was decided in favor of the Quidlat
siblings. The trial court ruled in favor of Ponce. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the trial court’s decision.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><o:p><span style="font-size: large;"> </span></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: large;">ISSUE:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: large;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Whether
or not Ponce has a better right to the subject property.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><o:p><span style="font-size: large;"> </span></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: large;">HELD:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: large;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>No. This
Court held that when there appears to have been two titles issued over the same
property, the better approach is to trace the original certificate/s of title
from which the certificates of title were derived. Pryce vehemently attacks the
validity of OCT 21 and its reconstituted OCT RP-62 for being fake and spurious
on account of several irregularities. This Court cannot close its eyes to the
abovementioned irregularities and/or defects in Prudencio's titles, upon which
the title of Ponce was derived. Notably, Ponce submitted no substantial
evidence to rebut the aforesaid irregularities or to validate the alterations
by some other competent proof. It has been held that when a land registration
decree is marred by severe irregularity that discredits the integrity of the
Torrens system, the Court will not think twice in striking down such illegal
title in order to protect the public against scrupulous and illicit land
ownership. Considering that Ponce's title is void, the priority in right given
to a prior or earlier registrant would not apply in his favor. Thus, after due
consideration of all the facts at hand, while Ponce is the earlier registrant
in 1979, Pryce is the first registrant in good faith in 1996.</span><o:p></o:p></p>Tardigradehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14890558896153261318noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7720097018142953137.post-45716237207678770022023-09-30T09:40:00.004-07:002023-09-30T09:40:45.269-07:00Atty. De Guzman v. Spouses Santos<p><span style="font-size: large;"> </span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: large;">Atty. De Guzman v. Spouses Santos<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: large;">G.R. No. 222957<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: large;">March 29, 2023<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><o:p><span style="font-size: large;"> </span></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: large;">FACTS:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: large;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Petitioner
Rogelio B. De Guzman (De Guzman) owned a house and lot located at Lot 1, Block
II, New York Street, Cresdaville II Subdivision, Bangiad, San Juan, Taytay,
Rizal (Subject Property). In November 2000, De Guzman accepted the offer of
respondents Bartolome and Susan Santos (collectively, spouses Santos) to
purchase the Subject Property. They executed a Contract to Sell which
stipulated the purchase price of P1,500,000.00. The terms of payment included a
down payment of P250,000.00 upon signing of the contract, and succeeding
monthly installments of P15,000.00 until full payment. The unpaid balance of
the principal would earn interest at the rate of 9% per annum. In return, the
spouses Santos were given permission to take immediate possession of the
Subject Property and use it as their residence. The spouses Santos paid De
Guzman the down payment on November 15, 2000 and moved in. They lived there but
did not pay the monthly installments agreed upon. In February 2001, they
unilaterally decided to vacate the Subject Property and return to their old
residence at Angono, Rizal. On June 21, 2001, the spouses Santos filed a
complaint for rescission of the Contract to Sell, recovery of down payment, and
damages against De Guzman. They deducted a reasonable rental rate of P10,000.00
per month for the period they lived there and demanded the return of the
balance of their down payment in the total amount of P208,500.00.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><o:p><span style="font-size: large;"> </span></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: large;">ISSUE:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: large;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Whether
or not De Guzman is liable to reimburse the spouses Santos their down payment.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><o:p><span style="font-size: large;"> </span></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: large;">HELD:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: large;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>The
seller has no obligation to transfer ownership over the property to the
intending buyer until they execute a contract of sale after full payment of the
purchase price, even if they already entered into a contract to sell. It was
thus recognized in Spouses Roque v. Aguado that the seller retains the freedom
and legal right to sell the property to a third party before the intending
buyer's full payment of the purchase price. It was explained in Coronel v. CA
(Coronel) that such sale to third party is legal because prior to full payment
of the purchase price, there is no defect in the seller's title per se. In such
an event, the intending buyer under the contract to sell is not even entitled
to reconveyance of the property sold to the third party and can at most seek
damages against the seller. It is clear from the evidence on record that the
spouses Santos were the parties first in bad faith in complying with their
obligations under the Contract to Sell. However, it is also undeniable that De
Guzman committed a grave fault and was guilty of bad faith when he sold the
Subject Property to Algoso during the trial stage without any judicial
authorization. This made the enforcement of the Contract to Sell moot and
academic, and constituted a violation of his duties to the court. It is
apparent from the foregoing that the parties in this case are in pari delicto,
or "in equal fault." In such cases, the parties shall have no action
against each other and the courts shall leave them where it finds them. The CA
therefore gravely erred in ordering De Guzman to reimburse the down payment in
the interest of justice and equity for lack of legal and factual basis.</span><o:p></o:p></p>Tardigradehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14890558896153261318noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7720097018142953137.post-68204465669907613082023-09-30T09:38:00.004-07:002023-09-30T09:38:38.125-07:00Galande v. Espiritu-Sarenas<p><span style="font-size: large;"> </span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: large;">Galande v. Espiritu-Sarenas<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: large;">G.R. No. 255989<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: large;">March 1, 2023<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><o:p><span style="font-size: large;"> </span></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: large;">FACTS:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: large;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Petitioner
filed an unlawful detainer case against Respondent, alleging that the former
had been in actual and continuous possession of the disputed land, initially as
a tenant of Spouses Salamanca before purchasing the same on an installment
basis. While Petitioner was still paying installments, he allowed the
Respondents to till half the land beginning on May 2015 under the condition
that the latter may be forced to vacate at any time. Upon Petitioner’s eventual
demand to vacate the premises, Respondents refused to do so as they claimed the
disputed property to be theirs, having inherited the same from their deceased
mother and also being in occupancy and enjoyment of the lot since 1966, all
based on an adverse claim by their deceased mother on the property as annotate
on Petitioner’s TCT. The MTCC, as affirmed by the RTC, ruled in favor of
Petitioner and ordered Defendants to vacate the property, based on the strength
of the former’s TCT. On appeal, the CA reversed the assailed decision, ruling
that petitioner failed to prove the first and second requisites to establish a
cause of action for unlawful detainer. Defendant’s possession of the one-half
portion of the subject property was made not by tolerance of the petitioner but
by color of title; that their possession was in the concept of an owner on the
basis of the Notice of Adverse Claim annotated by their predecessor-in<span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span style="font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; line-height: 107%;">[1]</span><!--[endif]--></span>interest,
Gertrudes, on the title of the subject property in 1966 which has remained
outstanding; and that respondents, therefore, cannot be ejected through an
action for unlawful detainer.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><o:p><span style="font-size: large;"> </span></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: large;">ISSUE:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: large;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Whether
or not an action for unlawful detainer is the proper recourse for Petitioners.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><o:p><span style="font-size: large;"> </span></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: large;">HELD:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: large;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Yes.
The SC states that the CA erred in ruling that Petitioners lacked the
jurisdictional facts necessary to initiate unlawful detainer proceedings, which
are prior physical possession and tolerance. The CA held that defendant’s
possession of the property was not by mere tolerance, as although there was an
agreement between the two parties in 2015, the actual basis for the possession
was the annotated adverse claim. The SC ruled this to be improper as between
defendant’s occupancy since 1966 to their present possession, Petitioner had
possessed the subject lot for a period of time sufficient enough to break
defendant’s allegations of continued possession. As such, the possession
starting from 2015 as agreed upon by the parties is already based on mere tolerance,
and longer on the prior adverse claim.</span><o:p></o:p></p>Tardigradehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14890558896153261318noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7720097018142953137.post-20752052436823220422023-09-30T09:35:00.001-07:002023-09-30T09:35:10.688-07:00Danganon v. Vda. De Tanquion<p><span style="font-size: large;"> </span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: large;">Danganon v. Vda. De Tanquion<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: large;">G.R. No. 233076<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: large;">March 22, 2023<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><o:p><span style="font-size: large;"> </span></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: large;">FACTS:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: large;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Esteban
Tanquion and his wife, Leoncia Lapara donated a lot in favor of Barangay
Poblacion, Cabanglasan, Bukidnon. In the Deed of Donation, they placed a
condition that as long as the donors are alive, the barangay cannot sell,
alienate, exchange, mortgage or in any manner encumber the property without the
prior knowledge and written consent of the donors. However, later on, the
donation was revoked, allegedly because the barangay sold the property despite
the prohibition in the deed. Leoncia consequently demanded Prociso Danganon and
the other petitioners, who were occupying the property at the time, to vacate
the property, but her demands were unheeded, so she filed a complaint for
recovery of possession against Danganon and the others who were occupying the
property. The RTC dismissed the complaint on the ground of prescription,
stating that according to Art. 1144 of the Civil Code, Leoncia had 10 years
from the execution of the deed to file for recovery of possession, and as the
period already lapsed, she couldn’t bring the action anymore. The CA reversed
the ruling of the RTC, stating that by virtue of the fact that the property was
covered by the Torrens system, Leoncia’s title is rendered imprescriptible and
the property couldn’t be acquired through prescription by adverse possession.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><o:p><span style="font-size: large;"> </span></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: large;">ISSUE:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: large;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Whether
or not Danganon and the other petitioners who were occupying the property
acquired ownership of the lot through acquisitive prescription.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: large;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Whether
or not the action to recover possession has prescribed.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><o:p><span style="font-size: large;"> </span></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: large;">HELD:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: large;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>No.
Prescription is a mode of acquiring ownership through the lapse of time and
under certain conditions. Under Art. 1106 of the Civil Code, in relation to
Art. 712, acquisitive prescription may either be ordinary (possession of the
thing in good faith for a period of 10 years) or extraordinary acquisitive
prescription (uninterrupted adverse possession of 30 years, without need of
title or of good faith). In this case, Leoncia’s title over the property is
covered by the Torrens system, and as such, the subject land is imprescriptible
and cannot be the subject of acquisitive prescription. And even assuming that
Danganon and the others have been occupying the property since 1960, their
possession is not in the concept of an owner, public, peaceful, uninterrupted,
and adverse, as they all admitted that the land was owned by the barangay, and
that they were only occupying the property by the tolerance of the barangay. Thus,
Danganon and the others cannot acquire ownership of the property through
acquisitive prescription.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: large;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>No.
When an action for the recovery of possession is anchored on a title of
ownership, the action is imprescriptible. In this case, Leoncia brought the
action on the basis of her right as the holder of a certificate of title under
the Torrens system, and thus her right to recover possession of her property is
imprescriptible.</span><o:p></o:p></p>Tardigradehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14890558896153261318noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7720097018142953137.post-35839895528434935602023-09-30T09:30:00.004-07:002023-09-30T09:30:35.421-07:00Heirs of Jimenez v. Lourdes Juachon, et. Al<p><span style="font-size: large;"> </span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: large;">Heirs of Jimenez v. Lourdes Juachon, et. Al<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: large;">G.R. No. 244558<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: large;">January 25, 2023<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><o:p><span style="font-size: large;"> </span></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: large;">FACTS:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: large;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Petitioners
filed a complaint for annulment of a transfer certificate of title (TCT) in the
name of the respondents as they alleged that the subject land in this case was
unlawfully included in such TCT. In their Answer, respondents maintained that
petitioners’ possession of the subject land was only by mere tolerance and that
it was under the name of a certain Petrona Angor Santos (Petrona), their
predecessor-in-interest, as evidenced by OCT No. 14750. Consequently, the sale
made to the petitioners is belied by the fact that petitioner’s
predecessor-in-interest, Alfredo, participated in the extrajudicial settlement
of Petrona's estate. The trial court ruled that petitioners herein cannot claim
that their predecessors were innocent purchasers for value because the subject
property involved is a registered land. Additionally, petitioners' claim that
they already acquired ownership over the land through acquisitive prescription
is likewise incorrect. Prescription will not set in against the registered
owner. Hence, this Petition.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><o:p><span style="font-size: large;"> </span></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: large;">ISSUE:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: large;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Whether
or not petitioners acquired ownership over the subject land.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><o:p><span style="font-size: large;"> </span></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: large;">HELD:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: large;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>No. The
Court ruled that petitioners could not very well invoke good faith since
petitioners’ predecessor-in-interest bought the said land from Alfredo who was
not the registered owner thereof. In this regard, petitioners' assertion that
their father — aside from scrutinizing OCT No. 14750, also relied on the
aforesaid extra-judicial partition of Petrona's estate executed by Trinidad
Tinio — could hardly be considered the higher degree of diligence required
under the circumstances. As correctly found by the CA: “Quite significantly,
the settlement of estate executed by Trinidad Tinio does not appear to have
been registered with the Registry of Deeds of Nueva Ecija where the land lies,
as provided under Section 50 of the Land Registration Act, which provision was
substantially reproduced in Section 51 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No 1529,
otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree. . . . Under Section 52 of
P.D. No. 1529, said registration operates as a notice to all persons of the
instrument affecting the land from the time of its registration. Since
Trinidad's settlement of estate was not registered, it does not bind third
persons, including (respondents) who had no participation therein whatsoever.”
Thus, Petition dismissed.</span><o:p></o:p></p>Tardigradehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14890558896153261318noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7720097018142953137.post-30636541363319018422023-09-30T09:28:00.002-07:002023-09-30T09:28:16.088-07:00Lila Gail Corpuz-Alfiler v. Spouses Cayabyab<p><span style="font-size: large;"> </span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: large;">Lila Gail Corpuz-Alfiler v. Spouses Cayabyab<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: large;">G.R. No. 217111<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: large;">March 13, 2023<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><o:p><span style="font-size: large;"> </span></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: large;">FACTS:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: large;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>In
March 2010, respondent-spouses John and Geraldine Cayabyab (respondents),
represent by their attorney-in-fact, Jose Vasallo, filed with the Metropolitan
Trial Court (MeTC) a complaint for ejectment against the petitioner (Lilah) and
all persons claiming rights under them (Garduce, et al.) alleging that they are
the owners of the property having acquired it through a Deed of Absolute Sale
(DOAS) executed by Quintin on August 20, 1997 through his attorney-in-fact,
Norman Santiago (Norman). Respondents further claimed that Garduce, et al. have
in possession of the property, illegally building their houses without paying
rent since 1997. They issued their final demand on May 8, 2009 for Garduce, et
al. to vacate the premises, but to no avail. In their Answer, petitioner Lilah
and Meda (sister of petitioner) denied respondents’ claim of ownership and
possession over the property alleging that the DOAS is null and void because
Norman was not authorized by an SPA to sell the property; and that Garduce, et
al. have a better right to possess the property by virtue of the contract of
sale between Linglingay, et al. and Quintin. Furthermore, that MeTC has no jurisdiction
over the case because it was filed one year from the time respondents were
dispossessed of the property, hence, the action must be one for accion
publiciana, to be filed with the RTC. The MeTC ruled in favor of the
respondents stating that Garduce, et al. were not able to prove their right
over the property. On appeal, the RTC affirmed in toto the decision of the
MeTC. The CA dismissed the petition for certiorari by the petitioner on the
ground that it was the wrong mode of judicial review. Hence, this petition.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><o:p><span style="font-size: large;"> </span></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: large;">ISSUE:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: large;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Whether
or not the respondents have established their right of possession.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><o:p><span style="font-size: large;"> </span></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: large;">HELD:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: large;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>No, the
respondents have not established their right of possession over the subject
property because they have no right of ownership in the first place. In
ejectment cases, it is the plaintiff who has the burden of proof to establish
by preponderance of evidence that he or she is entitled to the de facto
possession. In the case at bar, it was the respondents who filed the complaint
for unlawful detainer before the MeTC, and thus, they have the burden to
establish that they have a right of possession over the subject property. There
are several legal infirmities in their claim. First, a cursory reading of the
DOAS shows that it was executed on August 20, 1997 by respondents and Quintin,
through an SPA, but Quintin already died in March of the same year. Thus,
Quintin does not have any legal personality to transfer any property rights
after his death. Moreover, respondents could not produce the mandatory requirement
of a written SPA authorizing Norman to sell the land of Quintin rendering their
claim of ownership and possession doubtful.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: large;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>The
cause of action for an action for unlawful detainer is the act or omission by
which a party violates the legal right of the other. Meanwhile, the real party
in interest as a complainant thereto is the landlord, vendor, vendee, or other
person against whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully
withheld after the expiration or termination of his right to hold possession,
by virtue of a contract, express or implied. In other words; the plaintiff
should have a right of possession over the property. Not having acquired any
right over the property in question, no right of respondents' could have been
violated. Thus, respondents' evidence failed to prove their cause of action
alleged in their pleadings. Due to the insufficiency of factual or legal basis
to grant the complaint and the failure to establish their burden of proof,
respondents' complaint should be dismissed.</span><o:p></o:p></p>Tardigradehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14890558896153261318noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7720097018142953137.post-45924951971859776982023-09-30T09:24:00.004-07:002023-09-30T09:24:52.058-07:00Jose v. Quesada-Jose<p><span style="font-size: large;"> </span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: large;">Jose v. Quesada-Jose<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: large;">G.R. No. 249434<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: large;">March 15, 2023<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><o:p><span style="font-size: large;"> </span></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: large;">FACTS:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: large;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Rene
Manuel R. Jose (petitioner) and Luis Mario Jose (Luis) are the sons of spouses
Domingo Jose (Domingo) and Emilia Jose (Emilia). In 1996, Domingo was sued as
solidary debtor with five co-defendants by Philippine Export and Foreign Loan
Guarantee Corporation (now called Trade Investment Development Corporation
[TIDCORP]) before the Regional Trial Court of Makati (RTC Makati). After due
proceedings, the RTC Makati rendered judgment in TIDCORP's favor. Pending
appeal before the CA, Domingo requested help from petitioner and his wife,
Cynthia Cuyegkeng Jose (Cynthia), to settle the case by ceding to TIDCORP a
portion of their 23-hectare property in Antipolo City (Antipolo property). The
CA approved the compromise agreement. The Antipolo property was later subdivided
into three lots. Three titles were issued with the first in TIDCORP’s name and
the last two in the name of Cynthia. Pursuant to their oral agreement,
petitioner later demanded Domingo to pay him P120 Million corresponding to the
fair value of the property ceded to TIDCORP. Domingo failed to pay despite
demands. On July 4, 2005, Domingo executed a Deed of Revocation claiming that
he and his wife, Emilia, are the real owners of the Antipolo property. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent: .5in;"><span style="font-size: large;">Luis alleged that on November 3,
1978, his parents executed a simulated sale of the Antipolo property in favor
of Cynthia for a consideration of only P65,000.00 to supposedly hide the
property from their creditor, TIDCORP. Domingo allegedly gave clear
instructions not to transfer the title in Cynthia's name, but the latter did
not comply. In September 1980, TCT No. N-50023 was issued in Cynthia's name
covering the Antipolo property. Despite the sale, his parents allegedly
remained in possession and enjoyment of the property in the concept of owners
by continuing to keep the title and by paying taxes. On appeal, Domingo
endeavored to settle the case by offering a portion of the Antipolo property.
After the satisfaction of the loan to TIDCORP, Domingo allegedly wanted to
reinstate in his name the two titles issued in Cynthia's name. However,
petitioner and Cynthia began to claim ownership over the property. In
connection with this adverse claim, Domingo and Emilia executed a deed of
revocation as regards the Antipolo property.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><o:p><span style="font-size: large;"> </span></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: large;">ISSUE:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: large;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Whether
or not there was a collateral attack on the title.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><o:p><span style="font-size: large;"> </span></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: large;">HELD:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: large;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Yes.
The Court acknowledges the settled rule in this jurisdiction that the issue as
to whether a certificate of title was procured by fraud can only be raised in
an action expressly instituted for the purpose. This finds basis in Section 48
of the Property Registration Decree 70 (PRD) which states that a certificate of
title shall not be subject to a collateral attack and cannot be altered,
modified or cancelled, except in a direct proceeding. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: large;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>In the
collection case, Luis attempted a collateral attack on Cynthia's title when he
assailed the validity of the deed of sale. Jurisprudence has emphasized that
"an attack on a deed of sale pursuant to which a certificate of title was
issued [constitutes] an impermissible collateral attack on the certificate of
title." To recall, in the collection case, petitioner and Cynthia aimed to
claim the proceeds representing the value of the portion of the property
transferred to TIDCORP to answer for Domingo's obligations. For their part, Domingo
and Emilia, and later Luis, argued that they were the true owners of the
Antipolo property, alleging that its sale to Cynthia was simulated and the
latter fraudulently transferred the title of the property to her name.
Effectively, Luis, in his affirmative defense, challenged the validity of the
sale upon which TCT No. N-50023 was issued. Accordingly, he questioned the
validity of the issuance of TCT Nos. R<span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span style="font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; line-height: 107%;">[1]</span><!--[endif]--></span>19952
and R-19953 which were issued in Cynthia's name after the property covered by
TCT No. N-50023 was subdivided. The collateral attack through an affirmative
defense is not proper.</span><o:p></o:p></p>Tardigradehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14890558896153261318noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7720097018142953137.post-1463278049626400762023-09-30T09:22:00.004-07:002023-09-30T09:22:31.899-07:00Heirs of Raisa Dimao v. National Grid Corporation of the Philippines<p><span style="font-size: large;"> </span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: large;">Heirs of Raisa Dimao v. National Grid Corporation of the
Philippines<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: large;">G.R. No. 254020<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: large;">March 1, 2023<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: center;"><o:p><span style="font-size: large;"> </span></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: large;">FACTS:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: large;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>The
National Power Corporationconstructed the Baloi-Agus 2 138kV Transmission Line
(BATL). Pursuant to the "Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001,"
the National Transmission Corporation (TRANSCO) assumed the electrical
transmission functions, including the authority and responsibility for the
planning, construction, operation and maintenance of the NPC's high voltage
transmission facilities, including grid interconnections and ancillary
services. Meanwhile, respondent assumed the management, operation, and
maintenance of TRANSCO's nationwide transmission business. To perform its
mandate, respondent needed to clear and cut tall vegetation and other hazardous
improvements underneath and within the transmission line right-of-way corridors
of the lots. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent: .5in;"><span style="font-size: large;">Respondent instituted expropriation
proceedings involving 11,640 square meters on Lot No. 104, Gss-10- 000286,
located in Barangay Basagad, Baloi, Lanao del Norte, covered by Katibayan ng
Orihinal na Titulo (KOT) Blg. P-19-080, registered in the name of the late
Raisa A. Dimao (Subject Property). Respondent prayed among other things, for
the issuance of a writ of possession in its favor, authorizing it to enter and
take possession of the subject property for the maintenance of the BATL.
Subsequently, respondent deposited with the Land Bank of the Philippines the
amount of P1,756,400.00, representing 100% of the BIR Zonal Value of the
subject property. Consequently, the RTC of Lanao Del Norte, Branch 4 issued a
writ of possession. Thus, respondent was placed in possession of the subject
property. Petitioners filed an Answer demanding the payment of just
compensation, with accrued interest and rentals from the time of the taking of
the subject property.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><o:p><span style="font-size: large;"> </span></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: large;">ISSUE:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: large;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Whether
or not petitioners are entitled to just compensation.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><o:p><span style="font-size: large;"> </span></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: large;">HELD:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: large;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>No.
Petitioners, not being the registered owners of the subject property during the
construction of the BATL in 1978, are not entitled to just compensation. A
unique circumstance obtains in this case — the BATL was constructed in 1978,
while Dimao, petitioners' predecessor-in-interest, obtained a free patent over
the subject property only on October 2, 2012. Glaringly, at the time of the
construction of the BATL, the government was still the owner of the subject
property. Accordingly, petitioners are not entitled to just compensation. The
following circumstances further bar petitioners from claiming just
compensation: First, Dimao's application for a free patent evidences her acknowledgment
of the public nature of the subject property. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent: .5in;"><span style="font-size: large;">Remarkably, in Yabut v. Alcantara,
the Court held that the filing of a free patent application constitutes an
admission that the property is a public land, and thus, the applicant may not
be regarded as the land's rightful owner. Additionally, the mere possession of
a land for 30 years does not automatically divest the land of its public
character. On this score, petitioners may not argue that the issuance of the
homestead patent in their favor bolsters their possession and ownership of the
subject property since 1955. Besides, petitioners failed to present an iota of
proof of their ownership or even their possession prior to 1978. At any rate,
even assuming that they have been in possession of the subject property since
1955, no law, rule or jurisprudence authorizes an award of just compensation to
a mere possessor of the land. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent: .5in;"><span style="font-size: large;">Further, it is highly questionable
that petitioners, who claim to have been in possession of the subject property
prior to 1978, never questioned NPC's entry thereto; claimed damages for the
destruction of their alleged property; or even instituted inverse expropriation
proceedings. Their complete silence for many years foments doubt on their claim
of possession. Second, petitioners' title over the subject property stemmed
from a homestead patent and is thus, subject to the 60 meter right-of-way in
favor of the Government provided in Section 112 of C.A. No. 141, as amended by
Presidential Decree No. 635: Sec. 112. Said land shall further be subject to a
right-of-way not exceeding sixty (60) meters in width for public highways,
railroads, irrigation ditches, aqueducts, telegraph and telephone lines,
airport runways, including sites necessary for terminal buildings and other government
structures needed for full operation of the airport, as well as areas and sites
for government buildings for Resident and/or Project Engineers needed in the
prosecution of government<span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span style="font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; line-height: 107%;">[1]</span><!--[endif]--></span>infrastructure
projects, and similar works as the Government or any public or quasi-public
service or enterprise, including mining or forest concessionaires, may
reasonably require for carrying on their business, with damages for the
improvements only . Records reveal that the portion of the subject property
traversed by the BATL is only 30 meters wide and is thus well-within the
60-meter width right- of-way. The fact that the BATL is operated by respondent
does not foreclose the application of Section 112, which clearly covers
projects undertaken by quasi-public entities. At best, petitioners may only
claim damages for the improvements in the subject property.</span><o:p></o:p></p>Tardigradehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14890558896153261318noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7720097018142953137.post-78303972004184380422023-09-30T09:15:00.004-07:002023-09-30T09:15:49.851-07:00Republic v. Spouses Jovito<p><span style="font-size: large;"> </span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: large;">Republic v. Spouses Jovito<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: large;">G.R. No. 214223<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: large;">January 10, 2023<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><o:p><span style="font-size: large;"> </span></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: large;">FACTS:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: large;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Spouses
Jovito allege that they purchased a 345-square meter parcel of land situated in
Carcar City Cebu from the parents of their co-respondent Kathleen Bercede. It
was then bought by the parents of Bercede from Lourdes Paraz, Bercede’s
grandmother. Lourdes acquired such property from the heirs of the original
owners, the spouses Teofisto Alesna and Faustina Esmena by way of an extra<span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span style="font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; line-height: 107%;">[1]</span><!--[endif]--></span>judicial
settlement of the estate of the spouses. Meanwhile, the parcel of land is still
registered in the names of Teofisto and Faustina. Spouses Jovito claim in their
prayer for reconstitution of the OCT that the original copy of the title as
well as the owner’s duplicate have both been lost and destroyed. Respondent
spouses filed several pieces of evidence which proved that the title still
belonged to Teofisto and Faustina. Petitioner sought to dismiss the petition
for reconstitution for not following the mandatory requirements of RA No. 26.
The RTC ruled in favor of the respondent spouses and directed the Register of
Deeds of Cebu to reconstitute the original copy of the OCT and furnish the
respondents a copy. The CA affirmed such decision of the trial court.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><o:p><span style="font-size: large;"> </span></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: large;">ISSUE:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: large;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Whether
or not the CA correctly affirmed the RTC Judgment which directed the
reconstitution.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><o:p><span style="font-size: large;"> </span></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: large;">HELD:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: large;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>No. The
CA was incorrect in affirming the RTC Judgment. According to Section 2 of RA
26, “Original certificates of title shall be reconstituted from such of the
sources hereunder enumerated as may be available, in the following order: a)
The owner's duplicate of the certificate of title; (b) The co-owner's,
mortgagee's, or lessee's duplicate of the certificate of title; (c) A certified
copy of the certificate of title, previously issued by the register of deeds or
by a legal custodian thereof; (d) An authenticated copy of the decree of
registration or patent, as the case may be, pursuant to which the original
certificate of title was issued; (e) A document, on file in the registry of
deeds, by which the property, the description of which is given in said document,
is mortgaged, leased or encumbered, or an authenticated copy of said document
showing that its original had been registered; and (f) Any other document
which, in the judgment of the court, is sufficient and proper basis for
reconstituting the lost or destroyed certificate of title.” In the case at bar,
the respondent spouses have failed to secure or find the documents mentioned
under Section 2 of RA No. 26. Without such documents to prove the lost or
destroyed title, the reconstitution cannot be done.</span><o:p></o:p></p>Tardigradehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14890558896153261318noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7720097018142953137.post-71303219871097661852023-09-30T09:14:00.004-07:002023-09-30T09:14:20.601-07:00 Zampaga v. Nerida<p style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: large;"> Zampaga v. Nerida</span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: large;"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: large;">G.R. No. 239918<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: large;">January 11, 2023<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><o:p><span style="font-size: large;"> </span></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: large;">FACTS:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: large;"> The
petitioners, relying on the cases of Kapunan v. Casilan (Kapunan) and Ong v.
Ong (Ong), argue that the formal acceptance of a donation by the minor's legal
representative is required only in onerous and conditional donations, and not
in pure donations. Allegedly, since the subject Deeds of Donation executed by
Amado N. Nerida (Amado) in favor of Johnnie, a minor, are pure and not onerous
donations, the formal acceptance of Johnnie's legal representative is not
required for their validity.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><o:p><span style="font-size: large;"> </span></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: large;">ISSUE:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent: .5in;"><span style="font-size: large;">Whether or not the formal
acceptance of a donation by the minor's legal representative is required only
in onerous and conditional donations, and not in pure donations.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><o:p><span style="font-size: large;"> </span></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: large;">HELD:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: large;"> It is
explicit from the foregoing provisions (Art. 741 & Art. 749 of the Civil
Code) that while minors may become donees, their acceptance should be done
through their parents or legal representatives. Further, in case of donation of
immovable property, the same must be made in a public document and the
acceptance thereof be made in the same deed or in a separate public instrument;
in cases where the acceptance is made in a separate instrument, the donor
should be notified thereof in an authentic form, to be noted in both
instruments. As explained by the eminent civilist, Arturo M. Tolentino, if the
donation requires a formal or written acceptance, such as the donation of
immovable property, the acceptance of the minor donee can be made only through
its parents or legal representatives: <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent: .5in;"><span style="font-size: large;">Capacity to Accept — Minors and
incapacitated persons do not have the capacity to make a formal acceptance of a
donation; the intervention of their parents or legal representatives is
required by [Article 741]. We believe, however, that in pure donations, a minor
or incapacitated person may validly receive a donation of personal property
when made orally with simultaneous delivery. But when the donation requires a formal
or written acceptance, or it imposes obligations upon the donee, the acceptance
can be made only through the parents or legal representatives of the minor or
incapacitated donee. We believe that the present article merely states the view
of Manresa in interpreting the provisions of article 626 of the old Civil Code.
That article required the intervention of the legal representatives of
incapacitated donees in conditional or onerous donations;but Manresa opined
that even if the donation were pure, if written acceptance is required, such
acceptance must be made through the legal representatives. Thus, contrary to
the petitioners' stance, regardless of whether the donation is pure or onerous,
since a minor does not have the capacity to make a formal acceptance of the
donation, the same can be made only through the intervention of its parents or
legal representative. Plainly, in case of donation of immovable property in
favor of a minor, the condition of formal acceptance is fulfilled only through
the written acceptance of the parents or legal representatives. In this case,
the subject donations failed to comply with the required formal acceptance by
Johnnie's mother or legal representative.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<span style="font-size: large;"> <span style="font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; line-height: 107%;">It bears noting that where the deed of donation
fails to show the acceptance, or where the formal notice of the acceptance,
made in a separate instrument, is either not given to the donor or else not
noted in the deed of donation and in the separate acceptance, the donation is
null and void . Consequently, having failed to establish compliance with the
indispensable requirement of written acceptance, the Deeds of Donation are
therefore null and void.</span></span>Tardigradehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14890558896153261318noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7720097018142953137.post-44933856697735253442023-09-30T09:10:00.004-07:002023-09-30T09:10:30.168-07:00Office of the Ombudsman v. Duterte<p><span style="font-size: large;"> </span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: large;">Office of the Ombudsman v. Duterte<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: large;">G.R. No. 19820 & 198334<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: large;">March 15, 2023<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><o:p><span style="font-size: large;"> </span></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: large;">FACTS:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: large;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>The
controversy in this case arose from a Canal-Cover Project by then
Representative of the First District of Davao City, Prospero C. Nograles
(Representative Nograles). The project in Quezon Boulevard, Davao City was
allegedly made "to secure the residents and children from any untoward
accident, prevent disposal of garbage and clogging of canal and prevent
emission of foul odors." In their defense, the concerned city officials
alleged that the Canal Cover Project was constructed by the Department of
Public Works and Highways on top of a main drainage artery/canal, which
receives water from Uyanguren, Gempesaw, Ponce, and Sauzo Streets, the
Mini-Forest, Magsaysay Park, and a portion of Quezon Boulevard before flowing
to the sea. They likewise alleged that the concrete cover was named
"Nograles Park" in violation of the Local Government Code, which
requires the approval of the Sangguniang Panlungsod for the naming and
construction of public parks. The Office of the Ombudsman rendered its Decision
finding Mayor Duterte, City Administrator Avisado, City Engineer Gestuveo, City
Legal Officers Atty. Raño and Atty. Quitain, and Chief Jimlani guilty of simple
neglect of duty and imposed the penalty of suspension from office for six
months.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><o:p><span style="font-size: large;"> </span></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: large;">ISSUE:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: large;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Whether
or not the local government of Davao City, in demolishing the Canal-Cover
Project, followed the legal procedure to abate such a nuisance.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><o:p><span style="font-size: large;"> </span></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: large;">HELD:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: large;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>YES.
The law provides that the building official, in this instance the respondent
City Engineer Gestuveo, may order the demolition or abatement of dangerous
buildings and structures. Article 694 of the Civil Code defines a nuisance as
"any act, omission, establishment, business, condition of property, or
anything else which: (1) injures or endangers the health or safety of others;
or (2) annoys or offends the senses; or (3) shocks, defies or disregards decency
or morality; or (4) obstructs or interferes with the free passage of any public
highway or street, or any body of water; or (5) hinders or impairs the use of
property." It further defines a public nuisance as a nuisance which
"affects a community or neighborhood or any considerable number of
persons, although the extent of the annoyance, danger or damage upon
individuals may be unequal." Nuisances are further defined by the method
by which they could be abated. In Monteverde v. Generoso: Nuisances are of two
classes: Nuisances per se and per accidens. As to the first, since they affect
the immediate safety of persons and property, they may be summarily abated
under the undefined law of necessity. But if the nuisance be of the second
class, even the municipal authorities, under their power to declare and abate
nuisances, would not have the right to compel the abatement of a particular
thing or act as a nuisance without reasonable notice to the person alleged to
be maintaining or doing the same of the time and place of hearing before a
tribunal authorized to decide whether such a thing or act does in law
constitute a nuisance. Both the Office of the Ombudsman and the Court of
Appeals concluded that the Canal-Cover Project was not a nuisance per se, since
it "did not affect the immediate safety of persons and property as an open
canal would." While the local government of Davao City may have the power
to declare and abate nuisances within their territory, it cannot unilaterally
state as a fact that the Canal-Cover Project is a nuisance that must be abated
if it is not a nuisance per se: It is clear that municipal councils have, under
the code, the power to declare and abate nuisances, but it is equally clear
that they do not have the power to find as a fact that a particular thing is a
nuisance when such thing is not a nuisance per se; nor can they authorize the
extrajudicial condemnation and destruction of that as a nuisance which in its
nature, situation, or use is not such. These things must be determined in the
ordinary courts of law.</span><o:p></o:p></p>Tardigradehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14890558896153261318noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7720097018142953137.post-90629652145620420152023-09-30T09:03:00.004-07:002023-09-30T09:03:35.099-07:00Jacqueline Uy v. 3tops De Philippines Estate Corporation<p style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: large;"> </span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: large;">Jacqueline Uy v. 3tops De Philippines Estate Corporation<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: large;">G.R. No. 248140<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: large;">January 16, 2023<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><o:p><span style="font-size: large;"> </span></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: large;">FACTS:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: large;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Respondent
averred that it is the registered owner of two parcels of land. Respondent
alleged that the subject properties were previously owned by Lucy S. Uy, who
obtained a loan from RCBC in 1995 and as a security, mortgaged the said
properties in favor of RCBC. In 2007, RCBC assigned all its rights and
interests in the mortgage agreement to Star Two, Inc. (Star Two). When Lucy
defaulted in her obligation, Star Two initiated the extrajudicial foreclosure
of the mortgaged properties. Upon failure by Lucy to redeem the properties,
Star Two consolidated the ownership of the same in its name, under TCT Nos.
092-2013003691 and 092-2013003692. On January 8, 2014, Star Two sold the
properties to respondent in the amount of PHP 4,700,000.00, as evidenced by a
Deed of Absolute Sale. Respondent caused the titling of the subject properties
in its name, including the commercial building situated thereon. Respondent
averred that since its acquisition of the properties in 2014, it has paid the
corresponding taxes on the lots and the commercial building. As proof,
respondent attached the official receipts and certification from the City
Treasurer evidencing payment of property taxes for previous years up to 2018. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent: .5in;"><span style="font-size: large;">On May 10, 2018, a Notice to Vacate
was issued to Lucy and all adverse occupants. Petitioner Jacqueline S. Uy, in
the interest of her mother, Lucy, and as the then occupant of the subject
properties, filed an Urgent Motion to Admit Herein Opposition (With Motion for
the Honorable Court to reconsider its Order dated April 24, 2018, to Quash the
Petitioner's [Ex Parte] Petition for Issuance of a Writ of Possession, and to
Hold in Abeyance the Implementation of the Writ of Possession dated May 08,
2018 and the Notice to Vacate dated May 10, 2018) dated May 25, 2018
(hereafter, Urgent Motion). Petitioner argued that the duty of the trial court
to issue a writ of possession ceased to be ministerial considering the
irregularities in the foreclosure proceedings, as well as, the illegality in
the titling of the subject properties by Star Two, and in its subsequent sale
to respondent. Thus, petitioner prayed for the trial court to admit her
Opposition, reconsider its Order dated April 24, 2018, quash respondent's Ex
Parte Petition, and hold in abeyance the implementation of the Writ of
Possession and the Notice to Vacate pending resolution of the issues in Civil
Case No. 05-12643. The trial court denied petitioner's Urgent Motion and
ratiocinated that any question regarding the validity of the mortgage or its
foreclosure cannot be a legal ground for refusing the issuance of a writ of
possession;30 that a judge to whom an application for the issuance of such writ
is made need not look into the validity of the mortgage or manner of the
foreclosure;31 and that the obligation of a court to issue an ex parte writ of
possession in favor of the purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale
ceases to be ministerial once it appears that there is a third party in
possession of the property who is claiming a right, adverse to that of the
debtor-mortgagor, which is not the case here. The CA likewise denied
petitioner's motion for reconsideration in its Resolution dated July 1, 2019.
In the said Resolution, the appellate court also noted that petitioner has
already voluntarily surrendered the possession of the subject properties to
respondent; thus, the relief sought by petitioner has already been rendered
moot.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: large;">ISSUE:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: large;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Whether
or not the alleged voluntary surrender by petitioner of the subject properties
rendered the relief sough moot.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><o:p><span style="font-size: large;"> </span></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: large;">HELD:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: large;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Yes. It
is settled that a purchaser of properties in an extra-judicial foreclosure sale
is entitled to a writ of possession even before the expiration of the period of
redemption provided he or she furnishes the necessary bond. After the
expiration of the period without redemption, the right of the purchaser becomes
absolute. Moreover, when the thing purchased at a foreclosure sale is in turn
sold or transferred, the right to the possession thereof, along with all other
rights of ownership, follows the thing sold to the new owner. The relief sought
by petitioner: cancellation or suspension of the Writ of Possession, has
already been rendered moot by her surrender of the subject properties to
respondent. Having validly acquired possession of the subject properties,
respondent can no longer be disturbed in its possession by mere cancellation or
suspension of the implementation of the Writ of Possession. As discussed above,
its right being absolute, respondent is entitled to the possession of the
Subject Properties by virtue of its ownership. Petitioner's remedy would
already have to be the annulment of the foreclosure and/or reconveyance of the
Subject Properties.</span><o:p></o:p></p>Tardigradehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14890558896153261318noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7720097018142953137.post-39014685132483153042023-09-30T08:57:00.002-07:002023-09-30T08:57:10.151-07:00Manarin v. Manarin<p><span style="font-size: large;"> </span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: large;">Manarin v. Manarin<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: large;">G.R. No. 247564<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: large;">January 11, 2023<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><o:p><span style="font-size: large;"> </span></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: large;">FACTS:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: large;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>On June
5, 1997, respondent heirs executed an extrajudicial settlement of estate of
Fermin Manarin where they adjudicated unto themselves, as legal heirs, a
504,286 square-meter lot in Carmona, Cavite, covered by TCT No. T-741686.
Because of being not included in the said extrajudicial settlement despite also
being a legal heir, petitioner sought the annulment of the extrajudicial
settlement of estate against the respondents. On November 15, 2005, both
parties entered into a compromise agreement; stipulating therein that a.) they
are the legitimate descendants of Fermin Manarin; b.) that the property would
be sold or offered for joint venture to interested buyers; c.) the proceeds of
the sale would be equally shared by the heirs of Fermin; and d.) Danilo
Sayarot, who financed the reconstitution of the TCT, would turn over the
owner’s copy of the title to the parties. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent: .5in;"><span style="font-size: large;">On December 10, 2012, respondent
heirs executed an SPA in favor of Fely Panganiban, giving her the power and
duty to take custody and possession of the duplicate copy of the TCT. On July
14 of the following year, petitioner filed an omnibus motion praying for: (a)
correction of the title number of the property from TCT No. T-7416786 to TCT
No. T-741686, (b) issuance of a writ of execution, and (c) cancellation of
Entry No. 2013004653 on TCT No. T-741686. On September 26, 2017, the RTC
granted the petitioner’s omnibus motion correcting the TCT number but denied
the cancellation of entry. Danilo was also ordered to turn over the owner’s
copy of the title. However, on May 21 of the following year, a sheriff’s report
indicated that Danilo was not in the possession of the same. Thus, an amended
Omnibus Motion to Declare Lost Title with Motion to Issue an Order for the
Issues of a New Title in Lieu of the Lost One was filed, and was subsequently
granted by the RTC. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent: .5in;"><span style="font-size: large;">A Manifestation by the Register of
Deeds of Cavite informed the RTC that Fely executed an affidavit claiming to be
in possession of the owner’s duplicate copy of the TCT. Respondents then sought
to annul the order directing the issuance of the new title. RTC, however,
directed Fely to surrender such TCT, saying that SPA granting her custody was
contrary to the RTC decision in 2012. Such was assailed by the respondents, to
no avail. Meanwhile, the petitioner filed a Manifestation, informing the CA
that the Register of Deeds of Cavite already issued a new owner’s duplicate
copy of the TCT. The CA nullified the orders of the RTC, ruling that the
issuance of a new owner’s duplicate copy must have been filed separately, and
should have complied with the requirements under Sec. 109 of PD 1529.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><o:p><span style="font-size: large;"> </span></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: large;">ISSUE:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: large;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Whether
the RTC erred in issuing an Order directing the surrender of possession and
custody of the owner’s duplicate copy of the subject TCT<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><o:p><span style="font-size: large;"> </span></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: large;">HELD:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: large;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>No, the
RTC did not err in its issuance of Orders in this case. To clarify, in the
instant case, what has been considered lost is the owner's duplicate copy of
the subject TCT, and not the original copy of the TCT on file with the Register
of Deeds. Accordingly, since the issue deals with an owner's duplicate
certificate of title, either Sec. 107 or 109 of P.D. No. 1529 should apply.
Sec. 107 of P.D. No. 1529 provides the proper remedy when an owner's duplicate
certificate of title is being withheld by another person. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent: .5in;"><span style="font-size: large;">On the other hand, Sec. 109 of P.D.
No. 1529 provides the proper remedy of replacement of an owner's duplicate
certificate of title when it is lost or destroyed. A reading of both provisions
clearly shows that Sec. 107 is the remedy applicable where the owner's
duplicate certificate of title is withheld by another person, who is
unauthorized to hold the same; it does not contemplate a situation where the
owner's duplicate certificate of title is not lost or destroyed. Said provision
indicates that the party-in-interest may file a petition in court to compel the
surrender of the owner's duplicate certificate of title in case the person in
possession of it refuses or fails to surrender the same to the Register of
Deeds in order to register any voluntary or involuntary instrument and the
issuance of a new owner's duplicate certificate of title. The Court finds that
the RTC correctly applied the provisions of Sec. 107 of P.D. No. 1529 in the
issuance of a new owner's duplicate certificate of title because Fely refused
to surrender the same. In Spouses Ibias v. Macabeo, it was held that therein
respondent should have availed of the remedy provided under Sec. 107 of P.D.
No. 1529 since the owner's duplicate certificate of title was not in fact lost
or destroyed, but was in the possession of another. Here, the owner's duplicate
certificate of title is not lost, but is in fact in the possession and custody
of Fely by virtue of the SPA executed by respondent heirs themselves. The said
SPA was even annotated at the back of the title as Entry No. 2013004653. Fely
even executed an Affidavit to attest that the owner's duplicate copy of TCT No.
T-741686 was not lost or missing, but in her possession and custody pursuant to
the SPA.</span><o:p></o:p></p>Tardigradehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14890558896153261318noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7720097018142953137.post-21772958500675662952023-09-30T06:23:00.003-07:002023-09-30T06:23:13.880-07:00Castaneto v. Spouses Adame<p style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: large;"> </span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: large;">Castaneto v. Spouses Adame<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: large;">G.R. No. 248004<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: large;">April 12, 2023<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><o:p><span style="font-size: large;"> </span></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: large;">FACTS:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: large;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>On
September 1995, Castaneto purchased, in good faith, from Sps. Tablada a parcel
of land covered by TCT 206899. On December 1995, Sps. Adame acquired the 130sqm
lot in good faith from Serain and purchased the adjacent 197 sqm land with TCT 224655.
In which they have been in possession of since 1995. They subsequently
mortgaged the property to Solid bank. They have built concrete fences and a
warehouse on the property.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><o:p><span style="font-size: large;"> </span></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: large;">ISSUE:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: large;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Whether
Castaneto or Sps. Adames possess a validly issued certificate.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><o:p><span style="font-size: large;"> </span></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: large;">HELD:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: large;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>“Where
two transfer certificates of title have been issued on different dates, to two
different persons, for the same parcel of land even if both are presumed to be
holders in good faith, it does not necessarily follow that he who holds earlier
title should prevail. On the assumption that there was regularity in the
registration leading to the eventual issuance of subject transfer certificates
of title, the better approach is to trace the original certificates from which
the certificates of title in dispute were derived. Should there be only one
common original certificate of title, xxx, the transfer certificate issued on
an earlier date along the line must prevail, absent any anomaly or irregularity
tainting the process of registration."<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: large;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>The
party having the burden of proof must establish his case by preponderance of
evidence, which is evidence of greater weight, or more convincing than that
which is offered in opposition to it. Preponderance of evidence is the weight,
credit, and value of the aggregate evidence on either side and is usually
considered to be synonymous with the term "greater weight of
evidence" or "greater weight of credible evidence." Failure to
present a any verification survey of property is not fatal, as long as it is sufficiently
established that the identity of property through boundaries and technical
description is stated in his title. Castaneto’s title which describes the
property, the location, area, and the boundaries thereof, is the most credible
proof of the identity of her property and her ownership. In sum, because
petitioner had proven that her title was regularly and validly issued, then she
is entitled to the reliefs prayed for by her.</span><o:p></o:p></p>Tardigradehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14890558896153261318noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7720097018142953137.post-20985455084095163002023-09-30T06:17:00.002-07:002023-09-30T06:17:15.364-07:00Lim v. Cruz<p><span style="font-size: large;"> </span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: large;">Lim v. Cruz<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: large;">G.R. No. 248650<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: large;">March 15, 2023<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: center;"><o:p><span style="font-size: large;"> </span></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: large;">FACTS:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: large;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>The
case revolves around a dispute between petitioner Elizabeth Ong Lim and
respondent Lazaro N. Cruz. Lazaro had been awarded two parcels of agricultural
land in Calumpit, Bulacan by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) in 1994.
The first parcel covered an area of 18,865 square meters, while the second
parcel covered 11,099 square meters. These lands were covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 9307/Certificate of Land Ownership Awards (CLOA)
No. 00243956 and TCT No. 9308/CLOA No. 00243955, respectively. Within six years
of receiving the land award, Lazaro obtained a loan of P1,500,000.00 from
petitioner Elizabeth Ong Lim. As security for the loan, Lazaro executed a Real
Estate Mortgage over the first parcel of land in favor of petitioner.
Subsequently, within eight years of receiving the award, Lazaro executed a Deed
of Sale over the second parcel of land in favor of petitioner, amounting to
P1,500,000.00. Lazaro also handed over the original copies of the TCTs/CLOAs
for both parcels of land to petitioner. Lazaro's son, Vicente T. Cruz,
represented him in filing a complaint for annulment of the deed of mortgage,
deed of absolute sale, and recovery of possession with damages against
petitioner before the Regional Trial Court (RTC). They argued that the transactions
violated the restrictions on the transfer of awarded lands under Section 27 of
RA 6657. The section prohibits the sale, transfer, or conveyance of such lands
for a period of ten years from the award, with limited exceptions.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><o:p><span style="font-size: large;"> </span></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: large;">ISSUE:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: large;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Whether
or not the sale of the second parcel of land violated the 10-year prohibition
stated in Section 27 of RA 6657.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><o:p><span style="font-size: large;"> </span></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: large;">HELD:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: large;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Yes.
The sale of the second land parcel was void for violating the prohibition in
Section 27 of RA 6657. The CA's ruling, deeming the sale void, was upheld as it
followed established jurisprudence. Its interpretation was based on the
principle that any waiver or transfer of rights over awarded lands within the
10-year prohibitory period is void. This is to uphold the rights and interests
of farmer-beneficiaries and promote the overall goals of agrarian reform. The
CA's decision aligns with previous cases, such as the Torres v. Ventura case,
which declared that the principle of pari delicto (both parties are equally at
fault) does not apply in agrarian reform cases. This is because the agrarian
reform law aims to liberate the farmers from the bondage of the soil and ensure
their rights are upheld. As such, the respondent was entitled to recover the
land, and the petitioner was obligated to return the purchase price with legal
interest. The petition for review on certiorari was denied, affirming the CA's
decision. The case was remanded to the RTC to determine the actual purchase
price of the land to be returned by the respondent to the petitioner.</span><o:p></o:p></p>Tardigradehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14890558896153261318noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7720097018142953137.post-15229354550735213442023-09-30T06:13:00.004-07:002023-09-30T06:13:46.776-07:00Villarete v. Alta Vista Golf and Country Club, Inc.,<p><span style="font-size: large;"> </span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: large;">Villarete v. Alta Vista Golf and Country Club, Inc.,<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: large;">G.R. No. 255212<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: large;">February 20, 2023<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><o:p><span style="font-size: large;"> </span></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: large;">FACTS:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: large;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>On May
13, 2011, then OIC-City Treasurer of Cebu City, Ofelia M. Oliva caused the
publication with The Freeman newspaper, a "Notice of Sale of Tax
Delinquent Properties" which includes, among others Lot No. 4 PSU-192448,
covered by OCT No. 0-251 registered in the name of Heirs of Benigno Sumagang.
Plaintiff-Appellee Alta Vista participated in the auction sale held on May 27,
2011, and secured the winning bid over Lot No. 4 PSU-192448, in the amount of
PhP295,994.89. After payment of the bid amount, the corresponding official
receipt and Certification of Sale of Delinquent Property were issued to Alta
Vista. Anita Sumagang, one of the Heirs of Benigno Sumagang wrote a letter to
then OIC-City Treasurer Ofelia N. Oliva. In a letter dated May 23, 2011 (year
mistakenly indicated as 2011, should have been 2012), Oliva advised the Heirs
of Benigno Sumagang to redeem the subject lot on or before May 28, 2011
(mistakenly indicated as 2011, should have been 2012), and required documents
to show proof of the legal personality or identity of Anita Sumagang as one of
the Heirs of Benigno Sumagang. On May 28, 2012, Anita Sumagang went to the
Office of the City Treasurer with sufficient cash to pay the redemption price,
interest, and other charges. The tender of payment, however, was not accepted
by Arnold Binondo, the personnel-in-charge of the Real Property Tax Division,
for failure of Anita Sumagang to bring with her documents proving her identity
as an heir of Benigno Sumagang. On May 30, 2012, Anita Sumagang went back to
the Office of the City Treasurer bringing with her, proof of her identity, as
one of the Heirs of Benigno Sumagang, and she was allowed to redeem the subject
lot. On June 4, 2012, a Certificate of Redemption dated June 4, 2012 was issued
in favor of the Heirs of Benigno Sumagang. A Notice of Redemption similarly
dated, was issued to Alta Vista, requiring it to surrender the Certificate of
Sale previously issued in its favor. Alta Vista, in a letter dated June 22,
2012, replied, pointing out that the redemption made by the Heirs of Benigno
Sumagang was invalid as it was made beyond the one year redemption period. Alta
Vista demanded from the Office of the City Treasurer to cancel the Certificate
of Redemption in favor of the Heirs of Benigno Sumagang. On October 11, 2012,
Emma Villarete, the sitting City Treasurer at that time, denied Alta Vista's
demand for the issuance of the final Deed of Conveyance. Alta Vista filed a
Petition for Mandamus and Damages before the Regional Trial Court of the City of
Cebu, docketed as Civil Case No. Ceb-39242.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><o:p><span style="font-size: large;"> </span></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: large;">ISSUE:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: large;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Whether
the CA erred when it refused to uphold the liberal policy of petitioner in the
application of the redemption period.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><o:p><span style="font-size: large;"> </span></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: large;">HELD:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: large;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Yes. In
the present case, Anita gave notice to the City Treasurer of Cebu as early as
May 22, 2012 that she intended to redeem the subject property. On May 28, 2012,
or on the last day of the redemption period, Anita was ready to pay the full
amount in cash, but was turned down by the Real Property Tax Division of the
City of Cebu simply because she was unable to bring with her a written document
that would prove her identity as an heir of Benigno — a document she was in
fact able to bring just two (2) days after. These circumstances show that there
was an earnest and sincere effort to tender payment and exercise the right to
redeem on Anita's part. Indeed, as Anita presented the document to show her
right to redeem two (2) days thereafter, or on May 30, 2012, and paid the full
amount of the redemption price, including the two percent (2%) interest for
every month as well as the expenses of the sale, this should be looked upon
with favor. Petitioner should not be faulted in its liberal application of
redemption rules and allowing the heirs to redeem the property, especially
considering that they have been residing therein ever since Benigno was issued
a title over the lot.To stress, where the redemptioner has chosen to exercise
the right of redemption, it is the policy of the law to aid rather than to
defeat such right.</span><o:p></o:p></p>Tardigradehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14890558896153261318noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7720097018142953137.post-84405895607425980672023-09-30T06:08:00.004-07:002023-09-30T06:08:57.446-07:00Dimas-San Juan v. Belo<p><span style="font-size: large;"> </span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: large;">Dimas-San Juan v. Belo<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: large;">G.R. No. 243165<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: large;">January 25, 2023<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><o:p><span style="font-size: large;"> </span></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: large;">FACTS:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: large;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Petitioners
Anita Dimas-San Juan, Reynan San Juan, Ryan San Juan, and Annalyn San Juan
obtained a loan from respondent Adoracion Z. Belo (Belo) in the amount of
P1,600,000.00. The Promissory Note stated that the sum of P1,600,000.00 is
payable within six months from 13 July 2010, without need of notice or demand,
and with an interest rate of 4.75% per month until full payment of the amount.
To secure the loan, petitioners executed in favor of Belo a Deed of Real Estate
Mortgage 5 dated 13 July 2010 on their property covered by Transfer Certificate
of Title. As payment for the loan, petitioner Anita Dimas-San Juan issued in
favor of Belo a postdated check dated 6 March 2011 7 in the amount of
P1,600,000.00 and two additional postdated checks dated 12 December 2010 8 and
12 January 2011 9 for P76,000.00 each for the monthly interest. However, when
the postdated checks were presented for payment in March 2011, all the checks
were dishonored for the reason "ACCOUNT CLOSED." Despite the
non-payment of the loan, Belo never initiated foreclosure proceedings over the
mortgaged property. Subsequently, Belo sent petitioners a notice to vacate the
property and to surrender possession thereof. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent: .5in;"><span style="font-size: large;">When petitioners refused to vacate
the property, Belo filed on 06 February 2012 a Complaint for Ejectment with
Damages against petitioners. The complaint was filed before the Municipal Trial
Court (MTC) of Marilao, Bulacan and was docketed as Civil Case No.771.
Petitioners filed before the RTC of Malolos City a Complaint for
"Annulment of Deed of Dacion En Pago Sale against respondents Belo and the
Register of Deeds. Petitioners alleged that Belo used the dacion en pago sale,
dated 11 October 2011, in the ejectment suit she filed against petitioners.
However, petitioners insisted that the dacion en pago sale is void since they
already issued a postdated check in the amount of P1,600,000.00 as full payment
of the loan in accordance with the Real Estate Mortgage Agreement dated 13 July
2010. Petitioners argued that under the mortgage agreement, in case of default,
mortgagee Belo may foreclose the property but that the dacion en pago sale was
never intended in the mortgage agreement. In the caes before the Supreme Court,
petitioners argue that they are entitled to the civil fruits of the property
since Belo is a possessor in bad faith because she was aware of the flaw in her
title over the property which was acquired through a dacion en pago sale.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><o:p><span style="font-size: large;"> </span></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: large;">ISSUE:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: large;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Whether
or not the petitioners are entitled to the civil fruits of the subject
property.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><o:p><span style="font-size: large;"> </span></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: large;">HELD:<br />
<span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>No. Even if the Court
considers the issue belatedly raised by petitioners, there is still no merit in
their claim that they are entitled to the civil fruits of the property since
Belo cannot be considered a possessor in bad faith. As argued by Belo, she obtained
a title over the property by virtue of the dacion en pago sale, which was
declared valid by the RTC in its Decision dated 12 May 2017, albeit
subsequently reversed by the CA. The Court also notes that in the ejectment
case filed by Belo against petitioners, the MTC's ruling in favor Belo was
affirmed by Branch 81, RTC of Malolos City. Moreover, in an Order 24 dated 27
June 2017, the RTC (Branch 81) granted Belo's Motion for Execution of Judgment
Pending Appeal, and ordered the issuance of a writ of execution to implement
the MTC Decision dated 26 October 2016 in the ejectment case. Clearly, Belo's
possession of the property was by virtue of the MTC and RTC Decisions and
Order, which negates petitioners' claim of possession in bad faith.</span><o:p></o:p></p>Tardigradehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14890558896153261318noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7720097018142953137.post-11523963969096175092023-09-30T06:05:00.004-07:002023-09-30T06:05:43.215-07:00Spouses Feliciano v. Elisan Credit Corporation<p><span style="font-size: large;"> </span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: large;">Spouses Feliciano v. Elisan Credit Corporation<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: large;">G.R. No. 255239<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: large;">February 13, 2023<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><o:p><span style="font-size: large;"> </span></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: large;">FACTS:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: large;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Spouses
Tomas Libiran and Potenciana Feliciano obtained a loan from Elisan in the
amount of Php 200,000.00. This was secured by a promissory note and a real
estate mortgage over a parcel of land covered by TCT No. T-405042. The mortgage
was anotated on the titled. IT was stipulated in the mortgage contract that the
property shall stand as security not only for the payment of the loan but also
for all other obligations that they may subsequently incur. The Spouses Libiran
obtained another loan from Elisan in the amount of Php 609, 000.00 but they
were only able to pay Php 293,000.00. Thereafter, Spouses Libiran obtained
another lan in the amount of Php 118,000.00 but they were only able to pay Php
13,500.00. In addition interest beginning August 7, 2006 remained unpaid. On
June 15 2006,, Spouses Libiran again obtained a loan for Php 474,000.00 from
Elisan but they only paid Php 9,120.00. Despite repeated demands, Spouuses
Libiiran failed to pay their obligatioin totaling Php 885.380.00,, as well as
the interests and penalties due. As a result, Elisan instituted a complaint for
judicial foreclosure. Spouses Libiran denied the accusations against them and
insisted they did not owe Elisan any money. They claimed that they were made to
sign blank documents, making it appear that they obtained loan despite not
receiving any money from Elisan. They also averred that Elisan was merely
holding the owner’s duplicate copy of the subject property in trust for the
loan of their daughter, Florentina Libiran Santos, which was already paid in
full.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><o:p><span style="font-size: large;"> </span></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: large;">ISSUE:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: large;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Whether
or not a complaint for judicial foreclosure of mortgage is a real action.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><o:p><span style="font-size: large;"> </span></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: large;">HELD:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: large;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Yes. A
complaint for judicial foreclosure of mortgage is a real action and the
assessed value of the property determines the jurisdiction of the court.
Foreclosure of mortgage is the process by which a property covered may be
subjected to sale to pay demand for which mortgages stand as security (Pacific
Commercial Co. v. Alvarez, 38 OG 758). Foreclosure is the necessary consequence
of non-payment of mortgage indebtedness. The mortgage can be foreclosed only
when the debt remains unpaid at the time it is due (Producers Bank v. CA, GR
No. 111584, 17 Sept. 2001; Gov’t of the PI v. Espejo, 57 Phil 496) or in case
of default in the payment of obligation. Foreclosure of real estate mortgage is
either done extra-judicially or judicially. The provisions of Rule 68 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure govern judicial foreclosure. The extra-judicial
foreclosure of real estate mortgage, on the other hand, is carried out in the
procedure governed by the provisions of Act 3135 , as amended, otherwise known
as “An Act to Regulate the Sale of Property Under Special Powers Inserted in or
Annexed to Real Estate Mortgages.” <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent: .5in;"><span style="font-size: large;">It is a hornbook doctrine that
jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law. It is determined
through the allegations in the complaint comprising a concise statement of the
ultimate facts of the plaintiff’s cause of action. The defense of lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter may be raised at any stage of the
proceedings, whether during the trial or on appeal. An action for foreclosure
of mortgage is an action incapable of pecuniary estimation, and thus, within
the jurisdiction of the RTC. This is pursuant to Sec. 19(1) of BP Blg. 1129, as
amended by RA 7691. However, in identifying the tribunal with proper
jurisdiction over the case, this Court must also consider that while a
foreclosure suit is incapable of pecuniary estimation, it is also a real
action. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent: .5in;"><span style="font-size: large;">Foreclosure is but a necessary
consequence of non-payment of the mortgage indebtedness. In a real estate
mortgage, when the principal obligation is not paid when due, the mortgagee has
the right to foreclose the mortgage and to have the property seized and sold
with the view of applying the proceeds to the payment of the obligation. In a
judicial foreclosure suit, the assessed value of the subject property must be
alleged. The failure to do so is fatal to the plaintiff’s cause. Otherwise,
there is no way to determine which tribunal has original jurisdiction over the
case. The failure to aver the assessed value of the subject property is a
violation of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended, and gives
rise to the dismissal of a case. The ruling of the Court in dismissing the case
is without prejudice to the filing of another case in the proper court in
accorande with the Rules of Court and Batas Pampabansa Blg. 1129, as amended.</span><o:p></o:p></p>Tardigradehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14890558896153261318noreply@blogger.com0