CREDIT TRANSACTIONS - DEPOSIT

 RCJ Bus Lines, Inc. v. Master Tours and Travel Corp.

G.R. No. 177232, October 11, 2012

Abad, J.

Doctrine: As an incident to the contract of lease, the lessee must keep the thing safe

from injury or harm while these were in its possession which does not constitute a

contract of deposit.

Facts:

On February 9, 1993, respondent Master Tours and Travel Corporation (Master

Tours) entered into a five-year lease agreement with petitioner RCJ Bus Lines,

Incorporated (RCJ) covering four buses, described as "presently junked and not

operational" for the lease amount of P 600,000.00, with P 400,000.00 payable upon

the signing of the agreement and P 200,000.00 "payable upon completion of

rehabilitation of the four buses by the lessee."

More than four years into the lease agreement, Master Tours wrote RCJ a letter,

demanding the return of the buses to it and the payment of the lease fee of that

had remained unpaid since 1993. However, RCJ alleged that it had no use for the

buses, they being non-operational, and that the lease agreement had been modified

into a contract of deposit of the buses for which Master Tours agreed to pay RCJ

storage fees of P 4,000.00 a month. To prove the new agreement, RCJ cited Master

Tours letter of June 16, 1997 which acknowledged that the buses were brought to

RCJs garage for "safekeeping."

This prompted Master Tours to file a collection suit against RCJ before the RTC of

Manila. Subsequently, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of Master Tours and

rejected RCJ’s defense of novation from a contract of lease to a contract of deposit,

given the absence of proof that Master Tours gave its consent to such a novation.

On appeal, the CA affirmed in toto the judgment of the lower court. Thus, this

petition.

Issue:

1. Was the Contract of Lease validly novated and converted into a Contract of

Deposit?

2. Assuming absence of novation, did the CA erred in ruling that RCJ can be held

liable for rental fee notwithstanding that the buses never became operational?


Ruling:

1. No, there was no novation between the agreement of the parties.

The Supreme Court held that Article 1292 of the Civil Code provides that in

novation, “it is imperative that it be so declared in unequivocal terms, or that the

old and the new obligations be on every point incompatible with each other.”

To begin with, the cause in a contract of lease is the enjoyment of the thing; in a

contract of deposit, it is the safekeeping of the thing. They thus create essentially

distinct obligations that would result in a novation only if the parties entered

into one after the other concerning the same subject matter. The turning point in

this case, therefore, is whether or not the parties subsequently entered into an

agreement for the storage of the buses that superseded their prior lease

agreement involving the same buses.

Art. 1962. A deposit is constituted from the moment a person receives a thing

belonging to another, with the obligation of safely keeping it and of returning the

same. If the safekeeping of the thing delivered is not the principal purpose of the

contract, there is no deposit but some other contract.

RCJ failed to present any clear proof that it agreed with Master Tours to abandon

the lease of the buses and in its place constitute RCJ as depositary of the same,

providing storage service to Master Tours for a fee. The only evidence RCJ relied

on is Master Tours’ letter of June 16, 1997 in which it demanded the return of the

four buses which were placed in RCJs garage for "safekeeping."

For one thing, the letter does not on its face constitute an agreement. It contains

no contractual stipulations respecting some warehousing arrangement between

the parties concerning the buses. At best, the letter acknowledges that five

Master Tours buses were "brought to RCJ’s garage for safekeeping." But the idea

of RCJ safekeeping the buses for Master Tours is consistent with their lease

agreement. The lessee of a movable property has an obligation to "return the

thing leased, upon the termination of the lease, just as he received it.” This

means that RCJ must, as an incident of the lease, must keep the buses safe from

injury or harm while these were in its possession. Thus, there was no novation as

the safekeeping of the buses is incident to the lease agreement.

2. No, RCJ shall still be held liable for the rental fee notwithstanding that the

buses never became operational.

The Supreme Court finds no basis in the lease agreement for holding that RCJ’s

obligation to pay the rents depended on the buses being rehabilitated. The

provision in the lease agreement is more about the mode of payment rather than

the extinguishment of the obligation to pay the amounts due. In addition, the

buses may have turned out to be unsuitable for use despite repair cannot

prejudice Master Tours. The latter did not hide the condition of the buses from

RCJ. Indeed, the lease agreement described them as "presently junked and not

operational." Thus, RCJ shall be held liable for the rental fee.



CA Agro-Industrial Dev. Corp. v. Court of Appeals

GR No 90027, March 3, 1993

Davide Jr, J.


Doctrine: The prevailing rule is that the relation between a bank renting out safedeposit

boxes and its customer with respect to the contents of the box is that of a

bailor and bailee, the bailment being for hire and mutual benefit.

Facts:

Petitioner CA Agro-Industrial Development Corp, through its president, and spouses

Ramon and Paula Pugao entered into an agreement whereby the former purchased

from the latter 2 parcels of land for a consideration of Php350,625.00. Of this

amount, Php75,725 was paid as downpayment while the balance was covered by 3

postdated checks. Among the terms and conditions were that the titles to the lots

shall be transferred to petitioner upon full payment of the purchase price and the

TCTs of the property shall be deposited in a safety deposit box of any bank. They

then rented a safety deposit box of respondent Security Bank. For this purpose,

both signed a contract of lease subject to conditions 13 and 14 which provide that:

(13) the bank is not a depositary of the contents of the safe and it has neither

possession nor control of the same; and (14) the bank has no interest whatsoever in

said contents, except herein expressly provided, and it assumes absolutely no

liability in connection therewith. Moreover, it was stipulated that: “8. The Bank

shall use due diligence that no unauthorized person shall be admitted to any rented

safe and beyond this, the Bank will not be responsible for the contents of any safe

rented from it.” Thereafter, a certain Mrs Ramos offered to buy from petitioner the

lots at a higher price. Mrs Ramos demanded the execution of a deed of sale which

necessarily entailed the production of the TCT. Petitioner and spouses Pugao then

proceeded to the bank to open the safety deposit box only to find out that the

certificates were not there.

Issue:

1.Was the contractual relation between petitioner and Security Bank that of a

bailor and bailee?

2. Were conditions 13 and 14 of the questioned contract of lease of the safety

deposit box valid?

3. What is the degree of diligence required of depositary?

Ruling:

1. Yes. The prevailing rule is that the relation between a bank renting out safedeposit

boxes and its customer with respect to the contents of the box is that of

a bailor and bailee, the bailment being for hire and mutual benefit. The contract

for the rent of the safety deposit box is not an ordinary contract of lease as

defined in Article 1643 of the Civil Code. However, We do not fully subscribe to

its view that the same is a contract of deposit that is to be strictly governed by

the provisions in the Civil Code on deposit; the contract in the case at bar is a

special kind of deposit. It cannot be characterized as an ordinary contract of lease

under Article 1643 because the full and absolute possession and control of the

safety deposit box was not given to the joint renters — the petitioner and the

Pugaos. The prevailing rule is that the relation between a bank renting out safedeposit

boxes and its customer with respect to the contents of the box is that of

a bailor and bailee, the bailment being for hire and mutual benefit.

2. No. These conditions are void as they are contrary to law and public policy. We

find Ourselves in agreement with this proposition for indeed, said provisions are

inconsistent with the respondent Bank's responsibility as a depositary under

Section 72(a) of the General Banking Act. Both exempt the latter from any

liability except as contemplated in condition 8 thereof which limits its duty to

exercise reasonable diligence only with respect to who shall be admitted to any

rented safe. Furthermore, condition 13 stands on a wrong premise and is contrary

to the actual practice of the Bank. It is not correct to assert that the Bank has

neither the possession nor control of the contents of the box since in fact, the

safety deposit box itself is located in its premises and is under its absolute

control; moreover, the respondent Bank keeps the guard key to the said box. As

stated earlier, renters cannot open their respective boxes unless the Bank

cooperates by presenting and using this guard key.

3. Due diligence must be exercised. Article 1173 provides that, in the absence of

any stipulation prescribing the degree of diligence required, that of a good father

of a family is to be observed. Condition 8 thereof limits its duty to exercise

reasonable diligence only with respect to who shall be admitted to any rented

safe.



Triple V Food Services, Inc. v. Filipino Merchants Insurance

G.R. No. 160544, February 21, 2005

Doctrine: In a contract of deposit, a person receives an object belonging to another with

the obligation of safely keeping it and returning the same. A deposit may be constituted

even without any consideration. It is not necessary that the depositary receives a fee

before it becomes obligated to keep the item entrusted for safekeeping and to return it

later to the depositor.

Facts:

Mary Jo-Anne De Asis (De Asis) dined at petitioner’s Kamayan Restaurant at 15 West

Avenue, Quezon City. De Asis was using a Mitsubishi Gallant Super Saloon Model

1995, assigned to her employer Crispa Textile Inc. (Crispa) On said date, De Asis

availed of the valet parking service of petitioner and entrusted her car key to

petitioner's valet counter. A corresponding parking ticket was issued as receipt for

the car. The car was then parked by petitioner's valet attendant, a certain Madridano,

at the designated parking area. Few minutes later, Madridano noticed that the car

was not in its parking slot and its key no longer in the box where valet attendants

usually keep the keys of cars entrusted to them. The car was never recovered.

Thereafter, Crispa filed a claim against its insurer, herein respondent Filipino

Merchants Insurance Company, Inc. (FMICI). Having indemnified Crispa in the amount

of P669,500 for the loss of the subject vehicle, FMICI, as subrogee to Crispa's rights,

filed with the RTC at Makati City an action for damages against petitioner Triple-V

Food Services, Inc.

Petitioner Triple V argued that it was not a depositary of the subject car and that it

exercised due diligence and prudence in the safe keeping of the vehicle, in handling

the car-napping incident and in the supervision of its employees.

Petitioner further argued that in accepting the complimentary valet parking service,

De Asis received a parking ticket whereunder it is so provided that "[Management

and staff will not be responsible for any loss of or damage incurred on the vehicle

nor of valuables contained therein", a provision which, to petitioner's mind, is an

explicit waiver of any right to claim indemnity for the loss of the car; and that De

Asis knowingly assumed the risk of loss when she allowed petitioner to park her

vehicle, adding that its valet parking service did not include extending a contract

of insurance or warranty for the loss of the vehicle.

The trial court rendered judgement in favor of FMICI. On appeal to the CA, the CA

dismissed petitioner’s appeal and affirmed the decision of the trial court. The

appellate court agreed with the findings and conclusions of the trial court that:

(a) petitioner was a depositary of the subject vehicle; (b) petitioner was negligent

in its duties as a depositary thereof and as an employer of the valet attendant.

Issue:

Was petitioner Triple V a depositary of the vehicle of De Asis?

Ruling:

Yes. Triple V was a depositary of the vehicle of De Asis.

In a contract of deposit, a person receives an object belonging to another with

the obligation of safely keeping it and returning the same. A deposit may be

constituted even without any consideration. It is not necessary that the

depositary receives a fee before it becomes obligated to keep the item entrusted

for safekeeping and to return it later to the depositor.

In this case, When De Asis entrusted the car in question to petitioners valet

attendant while eating at petitioner's Kamayan Restaurant, the former expected

the car's safe return at the end of her meal. Thus, petitioner was constituted as a

depositary of the same car.



Sia v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 102970, May 13, 1993

Davide, Jr., J.

Doctrine: The relation between a bank renting out safe deposit boxes and its customer

with respect to the contents of the box is that of a bailor and bailee, the bailment for

hire and mutual benefit.

Facts:

The plaintiff rented Safety Deposit Bank No. 54 of the defendant bank wherein he

placed his collection of stamps. The said safety deposit box leased by the plaintiff

was at the bottom or the lowest level of the safety deposit boxes at the defendant

bank. During the floods that took place in 1985 and 1986, floodwater entered into

the defendant bank’s premises, seeped into the safety deposit box and caused,

according to the plaintiff, damage to his stamp collection. The defendant rejected

plaintiff’s claim for compensation for his damaged stamps, so, the plaintiff instituted

an action for damages against defendant bank. The trial court then directed that an

ocular inspection on the contents of the safety deposit box be conducted, wherein it

was found that the contents therein are wet, moldy and badly damaged. On appeal,

the Security Bank and Trust Company appealed the trial court’s decision, wherein the

Court of Appeals reversed the appealed decision.

The Court of Appeals, in absolving SBTC from liability, held that the contract entered

into by the parties regarding Safe Deposit Box No. 54 was not a contract of deposit

wherein the bank became a depositary of the subject stamp collections, hence, as

contended by SBTC, the provisions on deposits do not apply.

Issue:

Is Security Bank and Trust Company guilty of negligence?

Ruling:

Yes. According to jurisprudence, with respect to property deposited in a safe deposit

box by a customer of a safe deposit company, the parties, since the relation is a

contractual one, may by a special contract define their respective duties or provide

for increasing or limiting the liability of the deposit company, provided such

contract is not in violation of law or public policy. Unfortunately, however, the

public respondent failed to consider that in the present case, as correctly held by

the trial court, SBTC was guilty of negligence. SBTC’s negligence aggravated the

injury or damage to the stamp collection. SBTC was aware of the floods of 1985

and 1986; it also knew that the floodwaters inundated the room where Safety

Deposit Box No. 54 was located. In view thereof, it should have lost no time in

notifying the petitioner in order that the box could have been opened to retrieve

the stamps, thus, saving the same from further deterioration and loss. In this

respect, it failed to exercise the reasonable care and prudence expected of a

good father of a family, thereby becoming a party to the aggravation of the injury

or loss. The destruction or loss of the stamp collection which was the product of

27 years of patience and diligence caused the petitioner pecuniary loss; hence, he

must be compensated therefor.



Baron v. David

G.R. No. 26948 & 26949. October 8, 1927

Street, J.

Doctrine: Article 1768 of the Civil Code: When the depositary has permission to make

use of the thing deposited, the contract loses the character of mere deposit and

becomes a loan or a commodatum; and of course by appropriating the thing, the bailee

becomes responsible for its value

Facts:

Defendant Pablo David had been engaged in running a rice mill in the municipality of

Magalang which was well patronized by the rice growers of the vicinity and almost

constantly running. A fire occured that destroyed the mill and its contents and it was

some time before the mill could be rebuilt and put in operation again. Silvestra

Baron was the aunt of the defendant and Guillermo Baron was his uncle. The spouses

Baron placed cavans of palay in the mill and they received no compensation on

account of the palay placed with the defendant. The plaintiffs claim that the palay

which was delivered by them to the defendant was sold to the defendant, while the

defendant, on the other hand, claims that the palay was deposited subject to future

withdrawal by the depositor or subject to some future sale which was never effected.

He supposes himself to be relieved from all responsibility by virtue of the fire

already mentioned. The plaintiffs further say that their palay was delivered to the

defendant at his special request, coupled with a promise on his part to pay for the

same at the highest price per caravan at which palay would sell during the year

1920. The court stated that the palay in question was placed by the plaintiffs in the

mill with the understanding that the defendant was at liberty to convert it into rice

and dispose of it at his pleasure.

Issue:

Was there a deposit?

Ruling:

No. There was no deposit.

Article 1768 of the Civil Code states that when the depositary has permission to

make use of the thing deposited, the contract loses the character of mere deposit

and becomes a loan or a commodatum and of course by appropriating the thing,

the bailee becomes responsible for its value.

In this case, the palay in question was placed by the plaintiffs in the mill with the

understanding that the defendant was at liberty to convert it into rice and

dispose of it at his pleasure. The mill was actively running during the season and

it was impossible to keep the plaintiffs’ palay segregated. Considering this, the

defendant had thus milled and doubtless sold the plaintiffs’ palay prior to the

fire.

There was no deposit and the defendant is bound to account for the value of the

plaintiffs’ palay.



Durban Apartments Corp. v. Pioneer Insurance and Surety Corp.

G.R. No. 179419, January 12, 2011

Nachura, J.

Doctrine: The deposit of effects made by travelers in hotels or inns shall also be

regarded as necessary. The keepers of hotels or inns shall be responsible for them as

depositaries, provided that notice was given to them, or to their employees, of the

effects brought by the guests and that, on the part of the latter, they take the

precautions which said hotel-keepers or their substitutes advised relative to the care

and vigilance of their effects.

Facts:

Jeffree See, respondent’s insured, arrived and checked in at the City Garden Hotel,

belonging to petitioner, in Makati before midnight. Vicente Justimbaste, the hotel’s

parking attendant, got the key to See’s vehicle and parked it in an adjacent lot

owned by a third party. After midnight, See was awakened by the hotel’s chief

security officer and was informed that his vehicle was carnapped. As such, the

former made the necessary reports and thereafter filed a claim for insurance with

Pioneer Insurance and Surety Corp., which paid the same as indemnity for the

vehicle’s loss. By right of subrogation, respondent filed a complaint for recovery of

damages against the petitioner and Justimbaste before the trial court. It alleged

that the loss was a result of the hotel’s negligence. It was established that there

was a previous similar incident and yet no necessary precautions were taken to

prevent its repetition. Meanwhile, petitioner countered that the insured was not a

guest of the hotel, but a visitor therein; and that Justimbaste did not get See’s key,

but it was the latter who requested the former to find a space wherever one was

available. The trial court ruled in favor of the respondent and ordered the petitioner

to pay the former. On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the trial court.

Issue:

Is the petitioner liable to the respondent for the loss of See’s vehicle?

Ruling:

Yes, the petitioner is liable to the respondent for the loss of See’s vehicle. Under

Article 1962 of the Civil Code, a deposit is constituted from the moment a person

receives a thing belonging to another, with the obligation of safely keeping it

and returning the same. If the safekeeping of the thing delivered is not the

principal purpose of the contract, there is no deposit but some other contract.

Further, under Article 1998 of the same, the deposit of effects made by travelers

in hotels or inns shall also be regarded as necessary. The keepers of hotels or

inns shall be responsible for them as depositaries, provided that notice was given

to them, or to their employees, of the effects brought by the guests and that, on

the part of the latter, they take the precautions which said hotel-keepers or their

substitutes advised relative to the care and vigilance of their effects. In this case,

See deposited his vehicle for safekeeping with the petitioner, through the latter’s

employee, Justimbaste. In turn, Justimbaste issued a claim stub to See. As such,

the contract of deposit was perfected from See’s delivery, when he handed over

the key to his vehicle to Justimbaste, which the latter received with the

obligation of safely keeping and returning it. Hence, the petitioner is liable to the

respondent for the loss of See’s vehicle.



YHT Realty Corp. v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 126780, February 17, 2005

Tinga, J.

Doctrine: In case of loss of any item deposited in the safety deposit box, it is inevitable

to conclude that the management had at least a hand in the consummation of the

taking, unless the reason for the loss is force majeure.

Facts:

McLoughlin, was an Australian businessman-philanthropist who stayed in Tropicana

Suites owned by petitioner. McLoughlin rented a safety deposit box, as he usually did

when he stayed at Tropicana, and in renting the box, he was asked to sign a waiver

“Undertaking For the Use of Safety Deposit Box”, which exonerated the hotel, its

management and employees from liability in case of loss of the item in the box. The

safety deposit box could only be opened through the use of two keys, one of which is

given to the registered guest, and the other in the possession of the management of

the hotel. He allegedly placed the following in his safety deposit box: one envelope

containing USD10,000 and another envelope containing USD5,000; AUS10,000 in

another envelope; two other envelopes containing letters and credit cards; two

bankbooks; and a checkbook, arranged side by side inside the safety deposit box.

On December 12, 1987, before leaving for a brief trip to HongKong, McLoughlin

opened his safety deposit box with his key and took the envelope containing

USD5,000, the envelope with AUS10,000, his passports and his credit cards. He left

the other items in the box as he did not check out of his room. When he arrived in

Hongkong, he opened the envelope that had USD5,000 and discovered upon counting

that only USD3,000 were there. After returning to Manila, he checked out of

Tropicana and left for Australia. When he arrived in Australia, he discovered that the

envelope with USD10,000 was short of USD5,000. He also noticed that the jewelry he

bought in Hongkong and stored in the safety deposit box was also missing, except

for a diamond bracelet. When he came back to the Philippines, he immediately

confronted Lainez and Payam (employees of Tropicana) who admitted that Tan, a

woman who befriended McLoughlin, opened the safety deposit box with the key.

McLoughlin confronted Tan and the latter admitted that she had stolen his key

and was able to open the safety deposit box with the assistance of Lopez, Payam,

and Lainez. Lopez issued a promissory note to pay McLoughlin AUS4,000 and

USD2,000 and requested Tan to sign the same. McLoughlin insisted that it must

be the hotel who must assume responsibility for the loss he suffered. However,

Lopez refused to accept the responsibility relying on the conditions of the waiver

signed by McLoughlin for renting the safety deposit box.

Issue:

Is the “Undertaking For The Use of Safety Deposit Box”, exonerating the hotel

from liability, null and void?

Ruling:

Yes. Art. 2003 of the New Civil Code provides that the hotel-keeper cannot free

himself from responsibility by posting notices to the effect that he is not liable

for the articles brought by the guest. Any stipulation between the hotel-keeper

and the guest whereby the responsibility of the former as set forth in Arts. 1998-

2001 is suppressed or diminished shall be void.

Catering to the public, hotel-keepers are bound to provide not only lodging for

hotel guests and security to their persons and belongings. The twin duty

constitutes the essence of the business. The law in turn does not allow such duty

to the public to be negated or diluted by any contrary stipulation in so-called

“undertakings” that ordinarily appear in prepared forms imposed by hotel keepers

on guests for their signature. The undertaking was intended to bar any claim

against Tropicana for any loss of the contents of the safety deposit box whether

or not negligence was incurred by Tropicana or its employees. The New Civil Code

is explicit that the responsibility of the hotel-keeper shall extend to loss of, or

injury to, the personal property of the guests even if caused by servants or

employees of the keepers of hotels or inns as well as by strangers, except as it

may proceed from any force majeure. In the case at bar, there is no showing that

the act of the thief or robber was done with the use of arms or through an

irresistible force to qualify the same as force majeure. Thus, the hotel should be

held liable for the undertaking signed by McLoughlin is null and void.



Gonzales v. Gotiong

G.R. No. L-11776, August 30, 1958

Montemayor, J

Doctrine: Any deposit made with a bonded warehouseman must necessarily be governed

by the provisions of Act No. 3893. The kind or nature of the receipts issued by him for

the deposits is not very material, much less decisive.

Facts:

Defendant Go Tiong owned a rice mill and warehouse. He then obtained a license to

engage in the business of a bonded warehouseman. The warehouse and palay

deposited were insured with the Alliance Surety and Insurance Company. Plaintiff

Ramon Gonzales deposited palay to Go Tiong on several occasions even before and

after the issuance of the license to Go Tiong to operate as bonded warehouseman,

for which Go Tiong issued ordinary receipts, not the "warehouse receipts" defined

by the Warehouse Receipts Act (Act No. 2137). After some time, plaintiff demanded

from Go Tiong the value of his deposits but Go Tiong failed to return them.

Thereafter, the warehouse burned to the ground. Plaintiffs, along with other

depositors, filed their claims with the Bureau of Commerce. Some of the claims

were paid off with the proceeds of the insurance policy. Plaintiff's counsel later

withdrew his claim with the Bureau of Commerce since nothing came from

plaintiff's efforts to have his claim paid. Thereafter, Gonzales filed claims against

defendant and later renewed his claim with the Bureau of Commerce. Trial court

ruled in favor of Gonzales. Defendant urged that plaintiff's claim is governed by the

Civil Code and not by the Bonded Warehouse Act (Act No. 3893, as amended by

Republic Act No. 247), for the reason, that what Go Tiong issued to plaintiff were

ordinary receipts, not the warehouse receipts contemplated by the Warehouse

Receipts Law.

Issue:

Is the plaintiff’s claim covered by the Civil Code, and not the Bonded Warehouse

Act?

Ruling:

No. Any deposit made with him as a bonded warehouseman must necessarily be

governed by the provisions of Act No. 3893. The kind or nature of the receipts

issued by him for the deposits is not very material, much less decisive. Though it

is desirable that receipts issued by a bonded warehouseman should conform to

the provisions of the Warehouse Receipts Law, said provisionsin our opinion are

not mandatory and indispensable in the sense that if they fell short of the

requirements of the Warehouse Receipts Act, then the commodities delivered for

storage become ordinary deposits and will not be governed by the provisions of

the Bonded Warehouse Act. Under Section 1 of the Warehouse Receipts Act, the

issuance of a warehouse receipt in the form provided by it is merely permissive

and directory and not obligatory and the Bonded Warehouse Act as amended

permits the warehouseman to issue any receipt.

In the case, the fact that the receipts issued by Go Tiong were not "quedans" is no

valid ground for defense because he was the principal obligor. Furthermore, Go

Tiong had repeatedly promised plaintiff to issue to him "quedans" and had

assured him that he should not worry; and that Go Tiong was in the habit of

issuing ordinary receipts (not "quedans") to his depositors. Therefore, the case at

bar is covered by the Bonded Warehouse Act.

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