RCJ Bus Lines, Inc. v. Master Tours and Travel Corp.
G.R. No. 177232, October 11, 2012
Abad, J.
Doctrine: As an incident to the contract of lease, the lessee must keep the thing safe
from injury or harm while these were in its possession which does not constitute a
contract of deposit.
Facts:
On February 9, 1993, respondent Master Tours and Travel Corporation (Master
Tours) entered into a five-year lease agreement with petitioner RCJ Bus Lines,
Incorporated (RCJ) covering four buses, described as "presently junked and not
operational" for the lease amount of P 600,000.00, with P 400,000.00 payable upon
the signing of the agreement and P 200,000.00 "payable upon completion of
rehabilitation of the four buses by the lessee."
More than four years into the lease agreement, Master Tours wrote RCJ a letter,
demanding the return of the buses to it and the payment of the lease fee of that
had remained unpaid since 1993. However, RCJ alleged that it had no use for the
buses, they being non-operational, and that the lease agreement had been modified
into a contract of deposit of the buses for which Master Tours agreed to pay RCJ
storage fees of P 4,000.00 a month. To prove the new agreement, RCJ cited Master
Tours letter of June 16, 1997 which acknowledged that the buses were brought to
RCJs garage for "safekeeping."
This prompted Master Tours to file a collection suit against RCJ before the RTC of
Manila. Subsequently, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of Master Tours and
rejected RCJ’s defense of novation from a contract of lease to a contract of deposit,
given the absence of proof that Master Tours gave its consent to such a novation.
On appeal, the CA affirmed in toto the judgment of the lower court. Thus, this
petition.
Issue:
1. Was the Contract of Lease validly novated and converted into a Contract of
Deposit?
2. Assuming absence of novation, did the CA erred in ruling that RCJ can be held
liable for rental fee notwithstanding that the buses never became operational?
Ruling:
1. No, there was no novation between the agreement of the parties.
The Supreme Court held that Article 1292 of the Civil Code provides that in
novation, “it is imperative that it be so declared in unequivocal terms, or that the
old and the new obligations be on every point incompatible with each other.”
To begin with, the cause in a contract of lease is the enjoyment of the thing; in a
contract of deposit, it is the safekeeping of the thing. They thus create essentially
distinct obligations that would result in a novation only if the parties entered
into one after the other concerning the same subject matter. The turning point in
this case, therefore, is whether or not the parties subsequently entered into an
agreement for the storage of the buses that superseded their prior lease
agreement involving the same buses.
Art. 1962. A deposit is constituted from the moment a person receives a thing
belonging to another, with the obligation of safely keeping it and of returning the
same. If the safekeeping of the thing delivered is not the principal purpose of the
contract, there is no deposit but some other contract.
RCJ failed to present any clear proof that it agreed with Master Tours to abandon
the lease of the buses and in its place constitute RCJ as depositary of the same,
providing storage service to Master Tours for a fee. The only evidence RCJ relied
on is Master Tours’ letter of June 16, 1997 in which it demanded the return of the
four buses which were placed in RCJs garage for "safekeeping."
For one thing, the letter does not on its face constitute an agreement. It contains
no contractual stipulations respecting some warehousing arrangement between
the parties concerning the buses. At best, the letter acknowledges that five
Master Tours buses were "brought to RCJ’s garage for safekeeping." But the idea
of RCJ safekeeping the buses for Master Tours is consistent with their lease
agreement. The lessee of a movable property has an obligation to "return the
thing leased, upon the termination of the lease, just as he received it.” This
means that RCJ must, as an incident of the lease, must keep the buses safe from
injury or harm while these were in its possession. Thus, there was no novation as
the safekeeping of the buses is incident to the lease agreement.
2. No, RCJ shall still be held liable for the rental fee notwithstanding that the
buses never became operational.
The Supreme Court finds no basis in the lease agreement for holding that RCJ’s
obligation to pay the rents depended on the buses being rehabilitated. The
provision in the lease agreement is more about the mode of payment rather than
the extinguishment of the obligation to pay the amounts due. In addition, the
buses may have turned out to be unsuitable for use despite repair cannot
prejudice Master Tours. The latter did not hide the condition of the buses from
RCJ. Indeed, the lease agreement described them as "presently junked and not
operational." Thus, RCJ shall be held liable for the rental fee.
CA Agro-Industrial Dev. Corp. v. Court of Appeals
GR No 90027, March 3, 1993
Davide Jr, J.
Doctrine: The prevailing rule is that the relation between a bank renting out safedeposit
boxes and its customer with respect to the contents of the box is that of a
bailor and bailee, the bailment being for hire and mutual benefit.
Facts:
Petitioner CA Agro-Industrial Development Corp, through its president, and spouses
Ramon and Paula Pugao entered into an agreement whereby the former purchased
from the latter 2 parcels of land for a consideration of Php350,625.00. Of this
amount, Php75,725 was paid as downpayment while the balance was covered by 3
postdated checks. Among the terms and conditions were that the titles to the lots
shall be transferred to petitioner upon full payment of the purchase price and the
TCTs of the property shall be deposited in a safety deposit box of any bank. They
then rented a safety deposit box of respondent Security Bank. For this purpose,
both signed a contract of lease subject to conditions 13 and 14 which provide that:
(13) the bank is not a depositary of the contents of the safe and it has neither
possession nor control of the same; and (14) the bank has no interest whatsoever in
said contents, except herein expressly provided, and it assumes absolutely no
liability in connection therewith. Moreover, it was stipulated that: “8. The Bank
shall use due diligence that no unauthorized person shall be admitted to any rented
safe and beyond this, the Bank will not be responsible for the contents of any safe
rented from it.” Thereafter, a certain Mrs Ramos offered to buy from petitioner the
lots at a higher price. Mrs Ramos demanded the execution of a deed of sale which
necessarily entailed the production of the TCT. Petitioner and spouses Pugao then
proceeded to the bank to open the safety deposit box only to find out that the
certificates were not there.
Issue:
1.Was the contractual relation between petitioner and Security Bank that of a
bailor and bailee?
2. Were conditions 13 and 14 of the questioned contract of lease of the safety
deposit box valid?
3. What is the degree of diligence required of depositary?
Ruling:
1. Yes. The prevailing rule is that the relation between a bank renting out safedeposit
boxes and its customer with respect to the contents of the box is that of
a bailor and bailee, the bailment being for hire and mutual benefit. The contract
for the rent of the safety deposit box is not an ordinary contract of lease as
defined in Article 1643 of the Civil Code. However, We do not fully subscribe to
its view that the same is a contract of deposit that is to be strictly governed by
the provisions in the Civil Code on deposit; the contract in the case at bar is a
special kind of deposit. It cannot be characterized as an ordinary contract of lease
under Article 1643 because the full and absolute possession and control of the
safety deposit box was not given to the joint renters — the petitioner and the
Pugaos. The prevailing rule is that the relation between a bank renting out safedeposit
boxes and its customer with respect to the contents of the box is that of
a bailor and bailee, the bailment being for hire and mutual benefit.
2. No. These conditions are void as they are contrary to law and public policy. We
find Ourselves in agreement with this proposition for indeed, said provisions are
inconsistent with the respondent Bank's responsibility as a depositary under
Section 72(a) of the General Banking Act. Both exempt the latter from any
liability except as contemplated in condition 8 thereof which limits its duty to
exercise reasonable diligence only with respect to who shall be admitted to any
rented safe. Furthermore, condition 13 stands on a wrong premise and is contrary
to the actual practice of the Bank. It is not correct to assert that the Bank has
neither the possession nor control of the contents of the box since in fact, the
safety deposit box itself is located in its premises and is under its absolute
control; moreover, the respondent Bank keeps the guard key to the said box. As
stated earlier, renters cannot open their respective boxes unless the Bank
cooperates by presenting and using this guard key.
3. Due diligence must be exercised. Article 1173 provides that, in the absence of
any stipulation prescribing the degree of diligence required, that of a good father
of a family is to be observed. Condition 8 thereof limits its duty to exercise
reasonable diligence only with respect to who shall be admitted to any rented
safe.
Triple V Food Services, Inc. v. Filipino Merchants Insurance
G.R. No. 160544, February 21, 2005
Doctrine: In a contract of deposit, a person receives an object belonging to another with
the obligation of safely keeping it and returning the same. A deposit may be constituted
even without any consideration. It is not necessary that the depositary receives a fee
before it becomes obligated to keep the item entrusted for safekeeping and to return it
later to the depositor.
Facts:
Mary Jo-Anne De Asis (De Asis) dined at petitioner’s Kamayan Restaurant at 15 West
Avenue, Quezon City. De Asis was using a Mitsubishi Gallant Super Saloon Model
1995, assigned to her employer Crispa Textile Inc. (Crispa) On said date, De Asis
availed of the valet parking service of petitioner and entrusted her car key to
petitioner's valet counter. A corresponding parking ticket was issued as receipt for
the car. The car was then parked by petitioner's valet attendant, a certain Madridano,
at the designated parking area. Few minutes later, Madridano noticed that the car
was not in its parking slot and its key no longer in the box where valet attendants
usually keep the keys of cars entrusted to them. The car was never recovered.
Thereafter, Crispa filed a claim against its insurer, herein respondent Filipino
Merchants Insurance Company, Inc. (FMICI). Having indemnified Crispa in the amount
of P669,500 for the loss of the subject vehicle, FMICI, as subrogee to Crispa's rights,
filed with the RTC at Makati City an action for damages against petitioner Triple-V
Food Services, Inc.
Petitioner Triple V argued that it was not a depositary of the subject car and that it
exercised due diligence and prudence in the safe keeping of the vehicle, in handling
the car-napping incident and in the supervision of its employees.
Petitioner further argued that in accepting the complimentary valet parking service,
De Asis received a parking ticket whereunder it is so provided that "[Management
and staff will not be responsible for any loss of or damage incurred on the vehicle
nor of valuables contained therein", a provision which, to petitioner's mind, is an
explicit waiver of any right to claim indemnity for the loss of the car; and that De
Asis knowingly assumed the risk of loss when she allowed petitioner to park her
vehicle, adding that its valet parking service did not include extending a contract
of insurance or warranty for the loss of the vehicle.
The trial court rendered judgement in favor of FMICI. On appeal to the CA, the CA
dismissed petitioner’s appeal and affirmed the decision of the trial court. The
appellate court agreed with the findings and conclusions of the trial court that:
(a) petitioner was a depositary of the subject vehicle; (b) petitioner was negligent
in its duties as a depositary thereof and as an employer of the valet attendant.
Issue:
Was petitioner Triple V a depositary of the vehicle of De Asis?
Ruling:
Yes. Triple V was a depositary of the vehicle of De Asis.
In a contract of deposit, a person receives an object belonging to another with
the obligation of safely keeping it and returning the same. A deposit may be
constituted even without any consideration. It is not necessary that the
depositary receives a fee before it becomes obligated to keep the item entrusted
for safekeeping and to return it later to the depositor.
In this case, When De Asis entrusted the car in question to petitioners valet
attendant while eating at petitioner's Kamayan Restaurant, the former expected
the car's safe return at the end of her meal. Thus, petitioner was constituted as a
depositary of the same car.
Sia v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 102970, May 13, 1993
Davide, Jr., J.
Doctrine: The relation between a bank renting out safe deposit boxes and its customer
with respect to the contents of the box is that of a bailor and bailee, the bailment for
hire and mutual benefit.
Facts:
The plaintiff rented Safety Deposit Bank No. 54 of the defendant bank wherein he
placed his collection of stamps. The said safety deposit box leased by the plaintiff
was at the bottom or the lowest level of the safety deposit boxes at the defendant
bank. During the floods that took place in 1985 and 1986, floodwater entered into
the defendant bank’s premises, seeped into the safety deposit box and caused,
according to the plaintiff, damage to his stamp collection. The defendant rejected
plaintiff’s claim for compensation for his damaged stamps, so, the plaintiff instituted
an action for damages against defendant bank. The trial court then directed that an
ocular inspection on the contents of the safety deposit box be conducted, wherein it
was found that the contents therein are wet, moldy and badly damaged. On appeal,
the Security Bank and Trust Company appealed the trial court’s decision, wherein the
Court of Appeals reversed the appealed decision.
The Court of Appeals, in absolving SBTC from liability, held that the contract entered
into by the parties regarding Safe Deposit Box No. 54 was not a contract of deposit
wherein the bank became a depositary of the subject stamp collections, hence, as
contended by SBTC, the provisions on deposits do not apply.
Issue:
Is Security Bank and Trust Company guilty of negligence?
Ruling:
Yes. According to jurisprudence, with respect to property deposited in a safe deposit
box by a customer of a safe deposit company, the parties, since the relation is a
contractual one, may by a special contract define their respective duties or provide
for increasing or limiting the liability of the deposit company, provided such
contract is not in violation of law or public policy. Unfortunately, however, the
public respondent failed to consider that in the present case, as correctly held by
the trial court, SBTC was guilty of negligence. SBTC’s negligence aggravated the
injury or damage to the stamp collection. SBTC was aware of the floods of 1985
and 1986; it also knew that the floodwaters inundated the room where Safety
Deposit Box No. 54 was located. In view thereof, it should have lost no time in
notifying the petitioner in order that the box could have been opened to retrieve
the stamps, thus, saving the same from further deterioration and loss. In this
respect, it failed to exercise the reasonable care and prudence expected of a
good father of a family, thereby becoming a party to the aggravation of the injury
or loss. The destruction or loss of the stamp collection which was the product of
27 years of patience and diligence caused the petitioner pecuniary loss; hence, he
must be compensated therefor.
Baron v. David
G.R. No. 26948 & 26949. October 8, 1927
Street, J.
Doctrine: Article 1768 of the Civil Code: When the depositary has permission to make
use of the thing deposited, the contract loses the character of mere deposit and
becomes a loan or a commodatum; and of course by appropriating the thing, the bailee
becomes responsible for its value
Facts:
Defendant Pablo David had been engaged in running a rice mill in the municipality of
Magalang which was well patronized by the rice growers of the vicinity and almost
constantly running. A fire occured that destroyed the mill and its contents and it was
some time before the mill could be rebuilt and put in operation again. Silvestra
Baron was the aunt of the defendant and Guillermo Baron was his uncle. The spouses
Baron placed cavans of palay in the mill and they received no compensation on
account of the palay placed with the defendant. The plaintiffs claim that the palay
which was delivered by them to the defendant was sold to the defendant, while the
defendant, on the other hand, claims that the palay was deposited subject to future
withdrawal by the depositor or subject to some future sale which was never effected.
He supposes himself to be relieved from all responsibility by virtue of the fire
already mentioned. The plaintiffs further say that their palay was delivered to the
defendant at his special request, coupled with a promise on his part to pay for the
same at the highest price per caravan at which palay would sell during the year
1920. The court stated that the palay in question was placed by the plaintiffs in the
mill with the understanding that the defendant was at liberty to convert it into rice
and dispose of it at his pleasure.
Issue:
Was there a deposit?
Ruling:
No. There was no deposit.
Article 1768 of the Civil Code states that when the depositary has permission to
make use of the thing deposited, the contract loses the character of mere deposit
and becomes a loan or a commodatum and of course by appropriating the thing,
the bailee becomes responsible for its value.
In this case, the palay in question was placed by the plaintiffs in the mill with the
understanding that the defendant was at liberty to convert it into rice and
dispose of it at his pleasure. The mill was actively running during the season and
it was impossible to keep the plaintiffs’ palay segregated. Considering this, the
defendant had thus milled and doubtless sold the plaintiffs’ palay prior to the
fire.
There was no deposit and the defendant is bound to account for the value of the
plaintiffs’ palay.
Durban Apartments Corp. v. Pioneer Insurance and Surety Corp.
G.R. No. 179419, January 12, 2011
Nachura, J.
Doctrine: The deposit of effects made by travelers in hotels or inns shall also be
regarded as necessary. The keepers of hotels or inns shall be responsible for them as
depositaries, provided that notice was given to them, or to their employees, of the
effects brought by the guests and that, on the part of the latter, they take the
precautions which said hotel-keepers or their substitutes advised relative to the care
and vigilance of their effects.
Facts:
Jeffree See, respondent’s insured, arrived and checked in at the City Garden Hotel,
belonging to petitioner, in Makati before midnight. Vicente Justimbaste, the hotel’s
parking attendant, got the key to See’s vehicle and parked it in an adjacent lot
owned by a third party. After midnight, See was awakened by the hotel’s chief
security officer and was informed that his vehicle was carnapped. As such, the
former made the necessary reports and thereafter filed a claim for insurance with
Pioneer Insurance and Surety Corp., which paid the same as indemnity for the
vehicle’s loss. By right of subrogation, respondent filed a complaint for recovery of
damages against the petitioner and Justimbaste before the trial court. It alleged
that the loss was a result of the hotel’s negligence. It was established that there
was a previous similar incident and yet no necessary precautions were taken to
prevent its repetition. Meanwhile, petitioner countered that the insured was not a
guest of the hotel, but a visitor therein; and that Justimbaste did not get See’s key,
but it was the latter who requested the former to find a space wherever one was
available. The trial court ruled in favor of the respondent and ordered the petitioner
to pay the former. On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the trial court.
Issue:
Is the petitioner liable to the respondent for the loss of See’s vehicle?
Ruling:
Yes, the petitioner is liable to the respondent for the loss of See’s vehicle. Under
Article 1962 of the Civil Code, a deposit is constituted from the moment a person
receives a thing belonging to another, with the obligation of safely keeping it
and returning the same. If the safekeeping of the thing delivered is not the
principal purpose of the contract, there is no deposit but some other contract.
Further, under Article 1998 of the same, the deposit of effects made by travelers
in hotels or inns shall also be regarded as necessary. The keepers of hotels or
inns shall be responsible for them as depositaries, provided that notice was given
to them, or to their employees, of the effects brought by the guests and that, on
the part of the latter, they take the precautions which said hotel-keepers or their
substitutes advised relative to the care and vigilance of their effects. In this case,
See deposited his vehicle for safekeeping with the petitioner, through the latter’s
employee, Justimbaste. In turn, Justimbaste issued a claim stub to See. As such,
the contract of deposit was perfected from See’s delivery, when he handed over
the key to his vehicle to Justimbaste, which the latter received with the
obligation of safely keeping and returning it. Hence, the petitioner is liable to the
respondent for the loss of See’s vehicle.
YHT Realty Corp. v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 126780, February 17, 2005
Tinga, J.
Doctrine: In case of loss of any item deposited in the safety deposit box, it is inevitable
to conclude that the management had at least a hand in the consummation of the
taking, unless the reason for the loss is force majeure.
Facts:
McLoughlin, was an Australian businessman-philanthropist who stayed in Tropicana
Suites owned by petitioner. McLoughlin rented a safety deposit box, as he usually did
when he stayed at Tropicana, and in renting the box, he was asked to sign a waiver
“Undertaking For the Use of Safety Deposit Box”, which exonerated the hotel, its
management and employees from liability in case of loss of the item in the box. The
safety deposit box could only be opened through the use of two keys, one of which is
given to the registered guest, and the other in the possession of the management of
the hotel. He allegedly placed the following in his safety deposit box: one envelope
containing USD10,000 and another envelope containing USD5,000; AUS10,000 in
another envelope; two other envelopes containing letters and credit cards; two
bankbooks; and a checkbook, arranged side by side inside the safety deposit box.
On December 12, 1987, before leaving for a brief trip to HongKong, McLoughlin
opened his safety deposit box with his key and took the envelope containing
USD5,000, the envelope with AUS10,000, his passports and his credit cards. He left
the other items in the box as he did not check out of his room. When he arrived in
Hongkong, he opened the envelope that had USD5,000 and discovered upon counting
that only USD3,000 were there. After returning to Manila, he checked out of
Tropicana and left for Australia. When he arrived in Australia, he discovered that the
envelope with USD10,000 was short of USD5,000. He also noticed that the jewelry he
bought in Hongkong and stored in the safety deposit box was also missing, except
for a diamond bracelet. When he came back to the Philippines, he immediately
confronted Lainez and Payam (employees of Tropicana) who admitted that Tan, a
woman who befriended McLoughlin, opened the safety deposit box with the key.
McLoughlin confronted Tan and the latter admitted that she had stolen his key
and was able to open the safety deposit box with the assistance of Lopez, Payam,
and Lainez. Lopez issued a promissory note to pay McLoughlin AUS4,000 and
USD2,000 and requested Tan to sign the same. McLoughlin insisted that it must
be the hotel who must assume responsibility for the loss he suffered. However,
Lopez refused to accept the responsibility relying on the conditions of the waiver
signed by McLoughlin for renting the safety deposit box.
Issue:
Is the “Undertaking For The Use of Safety Deposit Box”, exonerating the hotel
from liability, null and void?
Ruling:
Yes. Art. 2003 of the New Civil Code provides that the hotel-keeper cannot free
himself from responsibility by posting notices to the effect that he is not liable
for the articles brought by the guest. Any stipulation between the hotel-keeper
and the guest whereby the responsibility of the former as set forth in Arts. 1998-
2001 is suppressed or diminished shall be void.
Catering to the public, hotel-keepers are bound to provide not only lodging for
hotel guests and security to their persons and belongings. The twin duty
constitutes the essence of the business. The law in turn does not allow such duty
to the public to be negated or diluted by any contrary stipulation in so-called
“undertakings” that ordinarily appear in prepared forms imposed by hotel keepers
on guests for their signature. The undertaking was intended to bar any claim
against Tropicana for any loss of the contents of the safety deposit box whether
or not negligence was incurred by Tropicana or its employees. The New Civil Code
is explicit that the responsibility of the hotel-keeper shall extend to loss of, or
injury to, the personal property of the guests even if caused by servants or
employees of the keepers of hotels or inns as well as by strangers, except as it
may proceed from any force majeure. In the case at bar, there is no showing that
the act of the thief or robber was done with the use of arms or through an
irresistible force to qualify the same as force majeure. Thus, the hotel should be
held liable for the undertaking signed by McLoughlin is null and void.
Gonzales v. Gotiong
G.R. No. L-11776, August 30, 1958
Montemayor, J
Doctrine: Any deposit made with a bonded warehouseman must necessarily be governed
by the provisions of Act No. 3893. The kind or nature of the receipts issued by him for
the deposits is not very material, much less decisive.
Facts:
Defendant Go Tiong owned a rice mill and warehouse. He then obtained a license to
engage in the business of a bonded warehouseman. The warehouse and palay
deposited were insured with the Alliance Surety and Insurance Company. Plaintiff
Ramon Gonzales deposited palay to Go Tiong on several occasions even before and
after the issuance of the license to Go Tiong to operate as bonded warehouseman,
for which Go Tiong issued ordinary receipts, not the "warehouse receipts" defined
by the Warehouse Receipts Act (Act No. 2137). After some time, plaintiff demanded
from Go Tiong the value of his deposits but Go Tiong failed to return them.
Thereafter, the warehouse burned to the ground. Plaintiffs, along with other
depositors, filed their claims with the Bureau of Commerce. Some of the claims
were paid off with the proceeds of the insurance policy. Plaintiff's counsel later
withdrew his claim with the Bureau of Commerce since nothing came from
plaintiff's efforts to have his claim paid. Thereafter, Gonzales filed claims against
defendant and later renewed his claim with the Bureau of Commerce. Trial court
ruled in favor of Gonzales. Defendant urged that plaintiff's claim is governed by the
Civil Code and not by the Bonded Warehouse Act (Act No. 3893, as amended by
Republic Act No. 247), for the reason, that what Go Tiong issued to plaintiff were
ordinary receipts, not the warehouse receipts contemplated by the Warehouse
Receipts Law.
Issue:
Is the plaintiff’s claim covered by the Civil Code, and not the Bonded Warehouse
Act?
Ruling:
No. Any deposit made with him as a bonded warehouseman must necessarily be
governed by the provisions of Act No. 3893. The kind or nature of the receipts
issued by him for the deposits is not very material, much less decisive. Though it
is desirable that receipts issued by a bonded warehouseman should conform to
the provisions of the Warehouse Receipts Law, said provisionsin our opinion are
not mandatory and indispensable in the sense that if they fell short of the
requirements of the Warehouse Receipts Act, then the commodities delivered for
storage become ordinary deposits and will not be governed by the provisions of
the Bonded Warehouse Act. Under Section 1 of the Warehouse Receipts Act, the
issuance of a warehouse receipt in the form provided by it is merely permissive
and directory and not obligatory and the Bonded Warehouse Act as amended
permits the warehouseman to issue any receipt.
In the case, the fact that the receipts issued by Go Tiong were not "quedans" is no
valid ground for defense because he was the principal obligor. Furthermore, Go
Tiong had repeatedly promised plaintiff to issue to him "quedans" and had
assured him that he should not worry; and that Go Tiong was in the habit of
issuing ordinary receipts (not "quedans") to his depositors. Therefore, the case at
bar is covered by the Bonded Warehouse Act.
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