Dura Legis Optimus Unus: CASES ON SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS

UNITED COCONUT PLANTERS BANK vs. HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT

March 20, 1990 | GR No. 72664-65 | FELICIANO, J.:| Interpleader

PETITIONER: UNITED COCONUT PLANTERS BANK

RESPONDENTS: HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and MAKATI BEL-AIR CONDOMINIUM DEVELOPERS, INC.

DOCTRINE:

(1) A compulsory counterclaim is “one which arises out of or is necessarily connected with the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party’s claim.”

(2) Interpleader is a proper remedy where a bank which had issued a manager’s check is subjected to opposing claims by persons who respectively claim a right to the funds covered by the manager’s check.

FACTS:

1. Petitioner UCPB issued a manager’s check in the amount of Php494,000.00 payable to private respondent Bel-Air, purchased by Altiura Investors, Inc. (Altiura) for part payment of a condominium unit.

2. Altiura gave instructions to UCPB to hold the payment of the check due to a material discrepancy in the area of the condominium unit it sold to it. The unit measured only 124.58m2, less than the 165m2 agreed upon by Altiura and Bel-Air.

3. Altiura further advised UCPB to hold in abeyance the payment of the check for 15 days so as to give time for Altiura and Bel-Air to resolve the discrepancy issue. UCPB told Bel-Air to likewise hold in abeyance the presentation of the manager’s check to give way to the amicable settlement but the latter did not agree.

4. UCPB then filed a complaint-in-interpleader against Altiura and Bel-Air to require both buyer and seller to litigate and settle the claims over the funds represented by the check. The Bank also asked the court, and was granted, to deposit the funds of the check into a special account with any reputable bank until the adjudication of the conflicting claims.

5. Bel-Air filed its answer with counter-claim against petitioner Bank for Php5,000,000.00 as damages for allegedly violating its (Bank’s) guarantee in the manager’s check when it stopped payment of said check.

6. UCPB then moved to withdraw the complaint and to dismiss the counter-claim against it. It alleged that there was no more conflict between Altiura and Bel-Air as to who was entitled to the funds under the manager’s check as Bel-Air, in its answer, alleged that it had already cancelled and rescinded the sale of the condominium unit and hence relinquished any of its claim over the funds of the check.

7. Bel-Air then delivered the manager’s check to the Bank. TC ordered release of funds to Altiura.

PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:

RTC ● motion to withdraw complaint-in-interpleader rendered moot and academic by the order to release Php494,000.00 to Altiura.

● later clarified that the counter-claim posed by Bel-Air was dismissed when funds released to Altiura without the former’s objection. (clarificatory order)

● denied MR of the clarificatory order by Bel-Air

CA ● nullified both clarificatory order and denial of Bel-Air’s MR- withdrawal of complaint-in-interpleader and its dismissal as moot and academic did not operate ipso facto to dismiss Bel-Air’s counter-claim as the it was based on a cause of action different from that of the interpleader

● UCPB: Bel-Air’s counter-claim was compulsory in nature and hence was dissolved when the complaint-in-interpleader was withdrawn and dismissed.

● Bel-Air: counter-claim was not compulsory (hence, not ipso facto dismissed with complaint-in-interpleader withdrawal and dismissal).

ISSUE/S:

1. WON Bel-Air’s counter-claim was compulsory and hence dissolved upon withdrawal and dismissal of UCPB’s complaint-in-interpleader. YES

RULING:

Yes Court Resolved to Grant the petition and to reverse and set aside CA’s decision.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to GRANT the Petition for Review and to REVERSE and SET ASIDE the Decision of respondent appellate court dated 27 June 1985 in AC-G.R. SP Nos. 01669-70.

● Rev. Rules of Court, Rule 9, Sec.4 provides that a compulsory counterclaim is “one which arises out of or is necessarily connected with the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party’s claim.”

● Interpleader is the proper remedy for the Bank when the check it issued was subjected to the opposing claims of Altiura and Bel-Air. The filing of such remedy was a necessary precaution for the Bank to not make a mistake as to who was entitled to payment.

● In this case, Bel-Air’s counterclaim arose out of or was necessarily connected to UCPB’s interpleader. This counterclaim was a claim by private respondent that the Bank refused to honor its undertaking to pay in the manager’s check in bad faith. The TC’s granting of petitioner Bank’s motion to withdraw the complaint-in-interpleader in effect was a holding that the Bank did not act in bad faith in withholding the payment under the check, as it was based on the cancellation of the sale and return by Bel-Air of the check to UCPB. Thus, UCPB cannot be held liable under Bel-Air’s counterclaim.

● Bel-Air was not a holder in due course of the check as it was aware of the at least partial failure of consideration when it failed to deliver less than the 165m2 condominium unit and when it was informed by both Altiura and UCPB of the alleged defect in its (Bel-Air’s) title over the check or its right to its proceeds.

United Coconut Planters Bank v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. Nos. 726645-65, 20 March 1990

UNITED COCONUT PLANTERS BANK V.

INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT

20 March 1990 | G.R. Nos. 726645-65 | Feliciano, J. | Propriety of Interpleader

PETITIONER: United Coconut Planters Bank,

RESPONDENTS: Hon. Intermediate Appellate Court And Makati Bel-Air Condominium Developers, Inc.,

DOCTRINE:

Interpleader is a proper remedy where a bank which had issued a manager's check is subjected to opposing claims by persons who respectively claim a right to the funds covered by the manager's check. The Bank is entitled to take necessary precautions so that, as far possible, it does not make a mistake as to who is entitled to payment.

FACTS:

1. Altiura wishes to buy a condominium unit from Makati-Bel Air (Respondent), so he bought a manager’s check from UCPB (Petitioner). He then handed the check to the Respondent.

2. On July 17, 1979, Altiura sent a letter to UCPB to hold payment of the manager’s check due to a discrepancy in the unit.

3. On July 19, UCPB requested the Respondent to hold in abeyance for a period not exceeding fifteen (15) days the presentation of the manager's check, so that both parties could settle their differences amicably.

4. On July 20, Respondent sent a letter to UCP stating that they do not agree with the request.

5. This prompted UCP to file a complaint in interpleader against Altiura and the Respondent to require the latter to litigate with each other their respective claims over the funds represented by the manager's check involved, and at the same time asking the court for authority to deposit the funds in a special account until the conflicting claims shall have been adjudicated.

6. On July 23, Altiura had filed a complaint for rescission of the contract of sale, which was eventually consolidated with the interpleader case.

7. On Aug. 18, Respondent filed its answer.

8. IMPT Respondent also filed a counterclaim in the interpleader proceedings for an amount of P5,000,000.00, based upon the theory that UCPB had violated its guarantee embodied in its manager's check when it in effect stopped payment of said check.

9. On Aug. 29, UCPB filed a "motion to withdraw complaint and motion to dismiss counterclaim", stating that there was no longer any conflict between Respondent and Altiura as to who was entitled to the funds covered by the manager's check, since Respondent alleged in its answer that it had canceled and rescinded the sale of the condominium unit and had relinquished any claim it had over the funds covered by the manager's check.

10. On Sept. 28, Respondent delivered the manager’s check to UCPB

PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:

RTC ● On Feb 18, the trial court issued an order directing the release of funds covered by the check to Altiura.

● On April 28, 1983, the court rendered the motion to withdraw of UCPB moot and academic. The court also granted Respondent’s motion to consolidate the interpleader case and the case filed by Altiura.

● On July 12, the trial court issued an order clarifying its previous order by stating that the counterclaim of Respondent was dismissed when the funds covered by the manager's check were released to Altiura without objection of Respondent.

● Respondent filed for reconsideration but it was denied.

IAC ● Respondent filed for certiorari

● The appellate court granted the certiorari and nullified the trial court’s order.

● They state that the withdrawal and dismissal of the complaint-in-interpleader did not ipso facto dismissed the Respondent’s counterclaims for it was based on "an entirely different cause of action from that in the complaint-[in]-interpleader"

ISSUE/S:

1. Whether Respondent’s counter-claim dissolved when the complaint-in-interpleader was withdrawn and dismissed.

RULING:

ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to GRANT the Petition for Review and to REVERSE and SET ASIDE the Decision of respondent appellate court dated 27 June 1985 in AC-G.R. SP Nos. 01669-70.

RATIO:

YES

● Under Section 4, Rule 9 of the Revised Rules of Court, a compulsory counterclaim is "one which arises out of or is necessarily connected with the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim."

● Interpleader is a proper remedy where a bank which has issued a manager's check is subjected to opposing claims by persons who respectively claim a right to the funds covered by the manager's check. The Bank is entitled to take necessary precautions so that, as far as possible, it does not make a mistake as to who is entitled to payment.

● In the case at bar, UCP felt compelled to file an interpleader when the Respondent refused to comply with UCPB’s suggestion to refrain from the presentation of the check.

● Respondent’s counter-claim arose out of or was necessarily connected with the recourse of UCPB.

● When the trial court granted UCPB’s motion for withdrawal of its complaint-in-interpleader, as having become moot and academic, the trial court in effect held that UCPB’s recourse to interpleader was proper and not a frivolous or malicious maneuverer to evade its obligation.

● Having done so, the trial court could not have logically allowed Respondent to recover on its counterclaim for damages against petitioner Bank.

Sy-Quia v. Sheriff of Ilocos Sur

October 10, 1924 | GR No. L-22807 | Ostrand | Propriety of Interpleader

PETITIONER: GREGORIO R. SY-QUIA

RESPONDENT: THE SHERIFF OF ILOCOS SUR and FILADELFO DE LEON

DOCTRINE:

REQUISITES OF AN INTERPLEADER

1. There must be two or more claimants with adverse or conflicting interests upon a subject matter;

2. The conflicting claims involve the same subject matter;

3. The conflicting claims are made against the same person (plaintiff); and

4. The plaintiff has no claim upon the subject matter of the adverse claims or if he has an interest at all, such interest is not disputed by the claimants.

FACTS:

1. On February 3, 1915, Miguel Aglipay Cheng-Laco and Feliciano Reyes Cheng-Kiangco executed a chattel mortgage in favor of the petitioner, Gregorio R. Sy-Quia on their mercantile establishment, with all the merchandise therein contained, as security for a debt.

a. The chattel mortgage was duly recorded on the date of its execution and fell due on February 3, 1917.

b. From its terms it may be inferred that it was the intention of the parties that the mortgagors were to be permitted to sell the merchandise replenishing their stock from time to time and that the new stock brought in should also be subject to the mortgage.

2. On May 5, 1924, Miguel Aglipay Cheng-Laco executed another chattel mortgage on the same establishment and all its contents in favor of the respondent Filadelfo de Leon. This was recorded May 4, 1924.

3. Later, the petitioner Sy-Quia, in writing, requested the sheriff to take possession of the mortgaged property and to sell it at public auction under the provisions of the Chattel Mortgage law.

4. The sheriff seized the establishment in question as well as its contents and fixed the date of the sale.

5. In the meantime respondent De Leon presented an adverse claim to the property by virtue of his chattel mortgage, alleging that all the goods on which the chattel mortgage of Gregorio R. Sy-Quia was given had been sold long before the chattel mortgage in favor of De Leon was executed and that, therefore, the earlier chattel mortgage was of no effect.

6. The sheriff, being in doubt as to the priority of the conflicting claims, suspended the foreclosure proceedings and brought an action under section 120 of the Code of Civil Procedure requiring the two claimants to interplead.

ISSUE: WON the sheriff correctly filed the interpleader to determine the conflicting claims between Sy Quia and De Leon — YES, the sheriff correctly filed the interpleader since the requisites of an interpleader were present in the case.

RULING:

The petition is denied with the costs against the petitioner. So ordered.

RATIO:

YES, the sheriff correctly filed the interpleader since the requisites of an interpleader were present in the case.

● In these circumstances, his action in suspending the sale pending the determination of the action of interpleader seems justified.

● Though it would have been better practice for the sheriff to sell the property and hold the proceeds of the sale subject to the outcome of the action of interpleader, nevertheless, the facts shown do not justify the interference of mandamus.

● The sheriff might lay himself open to an action for damages if he sold the goods without the consent of the holder of the last mortgage, and it does not appear that the petitioner offered to give bond to hold him harmless.

o IN OTHER WORDS… The interpleader was proper since it complied with the requisites of an interpleader, namely the following:

■ 1. There must be two or more claimants with adverse or conflicting interests upon a subject matter;

■ 2. The conflicting claims involve the same subject matter;

■ 3. The conflicting claims are made against the same person (plaintiff); and

■ 4. The plaintiff has no claim upon the subject matter of the adverse claims or if he has an interest at all, such interest is not disputed by the claimants.

o Applying the foregoing, here, all the requisites were complied with.

■ There were two claimants which were petitioner Sy-Quia who was the first mortgagee and respondent De Leon the subsequent mortgagee.

■ These claimants had adverse conflicting interests, which are their rights to claim upon the securities executed in their favor under their respective chattel mortgages.

■ It involved the same subject matter, which is the mercantile establishment owned Miguel Aglipay Cheng-Laco and Feliciano Reyes Cheng-Kiangco, and the merchandise contained therein.

■ The conflicting claims were made against the same person who was the Sheriff of Ilocos Sur, pursuant to his duties to comply with the auction sale in relation to the judgment ruling on the propriety of such remedy to collect upon one of the chattel mortgages.

BELTRAN, ET AL. vs. PEOPLE'S HOMESITE & HOUSING CORP.

August 28, 1969 | GR No. L-25138 | J. Teehankee | En Banc | Special Civil Actions

PETITIONER: Jose Beltran, Jr., Cendaña, Camu, Pelias & Manuel

RESPONDENTS: PEOPLE'S HOMESITE & HOUSING CORPORATION, and GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM

DOCTRINE:

The dismissal on the ground that where the defendants sought to be interpleaded as conflicting claimants have no conflicting claims against plaintiff, the special Civil action of interpleader will not lie.

FACTS:

1. Plaintiffs allege that since they first occupied in 1953 their respective housing units at Project 4, under lease from the PHHC, they were assured by competent authority that after 5 years of continuous occupancy, they would be entitled to purchase said units.

2. On February 21, 1961, the PHHC announced that the management, administration and ownership of Project 4 would be transferred to the GSIS in payment of debts.

3. PHHC announced that all payments made by the tenants after March 31, 1961 would be considered as amortizations or installment-payments.

4. In September 1961, collections from tenants on rentals and/or installment payments were delivered to the GSIS. Subsequently, however, PHHC refused to recognize all agreements and undertakings previously entered into with GSIS, while GSIS insisted on its legal rights to enforce the said agreements.

5. Plaintiffs thus claimed that these conflicting claims caused them great inconvenience and incalculable moral and material damage, as they did not know to whom they should pay the monthly amortizations or payments.

6. They further alleged that as the majority of them were GSIS policy holders, they preferred to have the implementation of the outright sale in their favor effected by the GSIS.

7. Upon urgent ex-parte motion of plaintiffs, the trial Court issued its Order designating the People's First Savings Bank "to receive in trust the payments from the plaintiffs on their monthly amortizations on PHHC lots and to be released only upon proper authority of the Court."

8. On August 29, 1962, the two defendant corporations filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action as well as to lift the Court's designation of the People's First Savings Bank as trustee.

9. The trial Court heard the motion and thereafter issued its Order, dismissing the Complaint.

10. It appears that there is no dispute as to whom the residents of Project 4 should make their monthly amortizations payments, there is, therefore, no cause of action for interpleading and that the order of August 23, 1962 is not warranted by the circumstances surrounding the case.

11. Counsel for defendants went further to say that whatever dispute, if any, may exist between the two corporations over the lots and buildings in Project 4, payments made to the PHHC will not and cannot in any way affect or prejudice the rights of the residents thereof as they will be credited by either of the two defendants.

12. Plaintiffs subsequently filed their motion for reconsideration which the trial court denied.

13. On appeal, plaintiffs claim that the trial Court erred in dismissing their suit, contending the allegations in their complaint "raise questions of fact that can be established only by answer and trial on the merits and not by a motion to dismiss heard by mere oral manifestations in open court, " and that they "do not know who, as between the GSIS and the PHHC, is the right and lawful party to receive their monthly amortizations as would of eventually entitle them to a clear title to their dwelling units."

PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:

Trial Court ● Dismised the Interpleader

○ Dismissed the Motion for Reconsideration

CA ● Certified the case to the Supreme Court

ISSUE/S: WON the Trial Court erred in dismissing the Interpleader

RULING:

We affirm the dismissal on the ground that where the defendants sought to be interpleaded as conflicting claimants have no conflicting claims against plaintiff, as correctly found by the trial court, the special Civil action of interpleader will not lie.

ACCORDINGLY, the trial Court's order of dismissal is hereby affirmed. Without costs.

RATIO:

1. Plaintiffs entirely miss the vital element of an action of interpleader. Rule 63, Section 1 of the Revised ROC (formerly Rule 14) requires as an indispensable element that conflicting claims upon the same subject matter are or may be made against the plaintiff-in-interpleader who claims no interest whatever in the subject matter or an interest which in whole or in part is not disputed by the claimants.

2. While the two defendant corporations may have conflicting claims between themselves, such conflicting claims are not against the plaintiffs nor do they involve or affect the plaintiffs.

3. The questions of fact raised in their complaint concerning the enforceability and recognition or non-enforceability and non-recognition of the turn-over agreement of December 27, 1961 between the two defendant corporations are irrelevant to their action of interpleader, for these conflicting claims, loosely so-called, are between two corporations and not against plaintiffs.

4. As held by this Court in an early case, the action of interpleader is a remedy whereby a person who has property in his possession or has an obligation to render wholly or partially, without claiming any right in both, comes to court and asks that the defendants who have made upon him conflicting claims upon the same property or who consider themselves entitled to demand compliance with the obligation be required to litigate among themselves in order to determine who is entitled to the property or payment of the obligation.

5. Thus, in another case, where the occupants of two different parcels of land adjoining each other belonging to two separate plaintiffs, but on which the occupants had constructed a building encroaching upon both parcels of land, faced two ejectment suits from the plaintiffs, each plaintiff claiming the right of possession and recovery over his respective portion of the lands encroached upon, this Court held that the occupants could not properly file an interpleader suit against the plaintiffs to litigate their alleged conflicting claims; for evidently, the two plaintiffs did not have any conflicting claims upon the same subject matter against the occupants, but were enforcing separate and distinct claims on their respective properties.

6. We find no error, therefore, in the trial court's order of dismissal of the complaint for interpleader and the lifting, as a consequence, of its other order designating the People's First Savings Bank as trustee to receive the tenants' payments on the PHHC lots.

WACK WACK GOLF & COUNTRY CLUB v. WON

March 26, 1976 | GR No. L-23851 | Castro, J. | Propriety of Interpleader

PLAINTIFF: WACK WACK GOLF & COUNTRY CLUB, INC.

DEFENDANTS: LEE E. WON alias RAMON LEE and BIENVENIDO A. TAN

DOCTRINE:

A stakeholder should use reasonable diligence to hale the contending claimants to court. He need not await actual institution of independent suits against him before filing a bill of interpleader. He should file an action of interpleader within a reasonable time after a dispute has arisen without waiting to be sued by either of the contending claimants. Otherwise, he may be barred by laches or undue delay. But where he acts with reasonable diligence in view of the environmental circumstances, the remedy is not barred.

FACTS:

1. In this case, Wack Wack Golf and Country Club filed an interpleader complaint against Lee Won who claims ownership of a membership fee certificate and Tan who also claims ownership of the same by virtue of the membership certificate 201 serial no. 1199 which was issued to him by an assignment made in his favor by the original owner and holder of the said certificate.

2. In its second cause of action, Wack Wack alleged that the said membership fee certificate issued by the deputy clerk of court to Lee Won in behalf of the Corporation is null and void it being a violation of its by-laws that requires the surrender and cancellation of the outstanding membership fee certificate 201 before issuance may be made to the transferee of a new certificate.

3. Thereafter, the Corporation prayed that an order be issued to require Lee and Tan to interplead and litigate their conflicting claims and judgment be rendered to declare who of the two is the lawful owner of membership fee certificate 201 and cancel the membership fee certificate issued to Lee Won.

4. Defendants then filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the grounds of res judicata, failure of the complaint to state a cause of action, and barred by prescription.

PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:

RTC ● Finding the grounds of bar by prior judgment and failure to state a cause of action well taken, the trial court dismissed the complaint, with costs against the Corporation. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE/S:

1. Whether or not the action for interpleader was barred with res judicata and prescription. – YES.

RULING:

ACCORDINGLY, the order of May 28, 1964, dismissing the complaint, is affirmed, at appellant's costs.

RATIO:

● The actions of interpleader under Section 120 of the Code of Civil Procedure is a remedy whereby a person who has personal property in his possession, or an obligation to render wholly or partially, without claiming any right to either, comes to court and asks that the persons who claim the said personal property or who consider themselves entitled to demand compliance with the obligation, be required to litigate among themselves in order to determine finally who is entitled to one or other thing. The remedy is afforded to protect a person not against double liability but against double vexation in respect of one liability.

● A stakeholder should use reasonable diligence to hale the contending claimants to court. He need not await actual institution of independent suits against him before filing a bill of interpleader. He should file an action of interpleader within a reasonable time after a dispute has arisen without waiting to be sued by either of the contending claimants. Otherwise, he may be barred by laches or undue delay. But where he acts with reasonable diligence in view of the environmental circumstances, the remedy is not barred.

● It has been held that a stakeholder's action of interpleader is too late when filed after judgment has been rendered against him in favor of one of the contending claimants, especially where he had notice of the conflicting claims prior to the rendition of the judgment and neglected the opportunity to implead the adverse claimants in the suit where judgment was entered.

● The Corporation has not shown any justifiable reason why it did not file an application for interpleader in civil case 26044 to compel the appellees herein to litigate between themselves their conflicting claims of ownership. It was only after adverse final judgment was rendered against it that the remedy of interpleader was invoked by it. By then it was too late, because to be entitled to this remedy the applicant must be able to show that he has not been made independently liable to any of the claimants. And since the Corporation is already liable to Lee under a final judgment, the present interpleader suit is clearly improper and unavailing.

● In fine, the instant interpleader suit cannot prosper because the Corporation had already been made independently liable in civil case 26044 and, therefore, its present application for interpleader would in effect be a collateral attack upon the final judgment in the said civil case; the appellee Lee had already established his rights to membership fee certificate 201 in the aforesaid civil case and, therefore, this interpleader suit would compel him to establish his rights anew, and thereby increase instead of diminish litigations, which is one of the purposes of an interpleader suit, with the possibility that the benefits of the final judgment in the said civil case might eventually be taken away from him; and because the Corporation allowed itself to be sued to final judgment in the said case, its action of interpleader was filed inexcusably late, for which reason it is barred by laches or unreasonable delay.

REPUBLIC v. HEIRS OF CRUZ

October 17, 2018 | GR No. 208956 | Caguioa, J. | Propriety of Interpleader

PETITIONER: Republic, represented by Department of Public Works and Highways

RESPONDENTS: HEIRS OF ELIGIO CRUZ, represented by CRISANTA OLIQUINO, and HEIRS OF ELIGIO CRUZ, represented by MAXIMINO AGALABIA

DOCTRINE:

Clearly, the immediate execution of the Partial Judgment approving the Compromise Agreement facilitates the premature distribution of the Republic's remaining balance without affording the De Leon group and Atty. Borja of the opportunity to establish their entitlement, if any, to compensation beyond the amounts unilaterally set by the Oliquino and Agalabia groups. This defeats the very purpose for which the Republic's Interpleader had been filed, as it opens the portals to protracted litigation not only among the opposing claimants, but also between said claimants and the Republic.

FACTS:

1. The Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH), then Ministry of Public Highways, conducted the widening of Visayas Avenue, Quezon City. The construction encroached upon a 4,757-square meter portion (Disputed Portion) of Lot 643 which was subdivided, and thereafter registered in the name of the Republic. However, no payment of just compensation was made.

2. A certain Crisanta Oliquino (Oliquino) filed with the DPWH a claim for payment of just compensation for and on behalf of several heirs of Eligio Cruz, namely, Nieves Cruz, Gregorio Cruz, Ester CruzBernardino and Remigio Cruz (the Oliquino group). Oliquino demanded just compensation for the Disputed Portion at the rate of Php15,000.00 per square meter, and engaged the services of Atty. Maximo Borja (Atty. Borja) to facilitate the claim.

3. In exchange for Atty. Borja's services, Oliquino executed a Deed of Assignment ceding in his favor the amount of Php14,000,000.00 out of the Php71,355,000.00 she expected to receive from the Republic. However, for reasons not apparent in the records, Oliquino later repudiated the deed, prompting the Republic to release the partial payment of Php39,533,239.13 in Oliquino's favor.

4. Confronted with conflicting claims of ownership over the Disputed Portion of Lot 643 left unpaid, the Republic withheld further payments and demanded the claimants to settle their opposing claims through litigation. Since the claimants failed to do so, the Republic was constrained to file the Interpleader, impleading as defendants the following claimants: 1. The Oliquino group, as heirs of Eligio Cruz; 2. Emilia Cruz-Agalabia represented by Diosdado C. Agalabia (the Agalabia group), as heirs of Eligio Cruz; 3. The estate and/or heirs of Virginia Uichanco (Estate of V. Uichanco); and 4. Atty. Borja.

PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:

RTC ● Subsequently, Inisetas De Leon, Narciso Ignacio and Rebecca Basilio (the De Leon group) filed a Motion for Intervention, also claiming just compensation as heirs of Eligio Cruz.

○ The motion was granted.

● The case was later referred to the Philippine Mediation Center upon the manifestation of the Oliquino and Agalabia groups. After termination of the mediation, the Oliquino group presented before the RTC a Compromise Agreement for approval. Only the Oliquino and Agalabia groups agreed upon the allocation of the remaining balance of just compensation.

○ The approval of the Compromise Agreement was opposed by the De Leon group and Atty. Borja.

■ Notwithstanding such opposition, the RTC issued a Partial Judgment Based on Compromise Agreement (Partial Judgment) approving the terms of the Compromise Agreement.

● The De Leon group and Atty. Borja filed their respective motions for reconsideration of the Partial Judgment while the Estate of V. Uichanco filed a Motion to Dismiss.

○ The several motions for reconsideration and motion to dismiss were denied.

CA ● Aggrieved, the Republic filed before the CA a Petition for Certiorari, averring that the orders directing the execution of the Partial Judgment are premature and were issued without legal basis, since the Partial Judgment "did not adjudicate nor settle the conflicting adversarial claims of the other impleaded defendants who are not parties to the [Compromise Agreement],” namely, Atty. Borja and the De Leon group.

○ The CA dismissed the Petition for lack of merit as the Partial Judgment had attained finality. According to the CA, it is "immaterial" that the issue raised in the Interpleader has yet to be resolved, as "[t]his does not derogate the judgment's susceptibility to execution."

ISSUE/S:

1. WON the CA erred when it affirmed the validity of the July 2011 Omnibus Order and November 2011 Order directing the immediate execution of the Partial Judgment - YES

RULING:

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Omnibus Order dated July 25, 2011 and Order dated November 28, 2011 issued by the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 222 (RTC) in Special Civil Action No. Q09-65409 are hereby declared NULL and VOID. The case is REMANDED to the RTC for proper disposition and determination of the issue raised in the Complaint-in-Interpleader filed by the Republic of the Philippines.

RATIO:

1. YES

● The Court finds that the RTC failed to exercise the degree of scrutiny required by law and jurisprudence when it ordered the immediate execution of the Compromise Agreement. To recall, the Compromise Agreement divides the Republic's entire remaining balance between and among the defendants, in accordance with the terms agreed upon by the Oliquino and Agalabia groups. The allocation of the remaining balance was determined without the participation of all other claimants who likewise stand as parties to the Interpleader.

o Clearly, the immediate execution of the Partial Judgment approving the Compromise Agreement facilitates the premature distribution of the Republic's remaining balance without affording the De Leon group and Atty. Borja of the opportunity to establish their entitlement, if any, to compensation beyond the amounts unilaterally set by the Oliquino and Agalabia groups.

■ This defeats the very purpose for which the Republic's Interpleader had been filed, as it opens the portals to protracted litigation not only among the opposing claimants, but also between said claimants and the Republic.

UNITED COCONUT PLANTERS BANK vs. HON.

INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and MAKATI BEL-AIR

CONDOMINIUM DEVELOPERS, INC.

March 20, 1990 | G.R. Nos. 72664-65 | FELICIANO, J. | Effect of Dismissal of Interpleader on Counterclaim

COMPLAINANT: UNITED COCONUT PLANTERS BANK

RESPONDENT: INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and MAKATI BEL-AIR CONDOMINIUM DEVELOPERS, INC.

DOCTRINE:

Under Section 4, Rule 9 of the Revised Rules of Court, a compulsory

counterclaim is "one which arises out of or is necessarily connected with the

transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party's

claim." Interpleader is a proper remedy where a bank which had issued a

manager's check is subjected to opposing claims by persons who

respectively claim a right to the funds covered by the manager's check.

The Bank is entitled to take necessary precautions so that, as far possible, it

does not make a mistake as to who is entitled to payment; the necessary

precautions include, precisely, recourse to an interpleader suit.

FACTS:

1. On 17 July 1979, petitioner Bank received from Altiura instructions to hold payment on the manager's check, in view of a material discrepancy in the area of the office unit purchased by Altiura which unit actually measured 124.58 square meters, instead of 165 square meters as stipulated in the contract of sale. Petitioner Bank immediately requested private respondent Makati Bel-Air, by a letter dated 17 July 1979, to advise the Bank why it should not issue the stop payment order requested by Altiura. The next day, petitioner Bank received a reply from Makati Bel-Air explaining the latter's side of the controversy and at the same

proposing a possible reduction of the office unit's purchase price.

2. UCPB received a letter from Altiura of even date requesting the Bank to hold payment of its manager's check while Altiura was discussing Makati Bel-Air's proposal for reduction of the purchase price and requesting the Bank to give both parties fifteen (15) days within which to settle their differences. By a letter dated on the same date, petitioner Bank requested Makati Bel-Air to hold in abeyance for a period not exceeding fifteen (15) days the presentation of the manager's check, so that both parties could settle their differences amicably. UCPB was advised in writing by Makati BelAir that the latter did not agree to the request of the Bank.

3. UCPB filed a complaint-in-interpleader against Altiura and Makati Bel-Air to require the latter to litigate with each other their respective claims over the funds represented by the manager's check involved, and at the same time asking the court for authority to deposit the funds in a special account until the conflicting claims shall have been adjudicated. The trial court ordered the deposit of the funds into a special account with any reputable banking institution subject to further orders of the court. Makati Bel-Air filed its answer and incorporated therein a counter-claim against petitioner Bank and a cross-claim against Altiura.

4. Altiura had filed a complaint for rescission of the contract of sale of the condominium unit, with damages, against Makati Bel-Air docketed as Civil Case No. 33967, which case was eventually consolidated with the interpleader case.

5. UCPB filed a "motion to withdraw complaint and motion to dismiss counter-claim", stating that there was no longer any conflict between Makati Bel-Air and Altiura as to who was entitled to the funds covered by the manager's check, since Makati Bel-Air in its answer had alleged that it had cancelled and rescinded the sale of the condominium unit and had relinquished any claim it had over the funds covered by the manager's check.

PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:

RTC GRANTED in Favor of Petitioner.

On 28 April 1983, the trial court issued an order resolving petitioner Bank's motion to withdraw complaint-in-interpleader and to dismiss counterclaim, declaring that motion to withdraw the complaint-in-interpleader had been rendered moot and academic by the court's earlier order of 18 February 1980 directing petitioner Bank to release to Altiura the P494,000.00 covered by the manager's check, which Makati Bel-Air had not opposed nor appealed from.

CA The appellate court granted certiorari and nullified the trial court's orders to the extent that these had dismissed Makati Bel-Air's counter-claim.

ISSUE/S:

WON the appellate court erred in reversing the order of dismissal of the counter-claim - YES

RULING:

ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to GRANT the Petition for Review and to REVERSE and SET ASIDE the Decision of respondent appellate court dated 27 June 1985 in AC-G.R. SP Nos. 01669-70.

RATIO:

YES.

In the instant case, petitioner Bank having been informed by both Altiura and Makati Bel-Air of their respective positions in their controversy, and Makati Bel-Air having refused the Bank's suggestion voluntarily to refrain for fifteen (15) days from presenting the check for payment, petitioner Bank felt compelled to resort to the remedy of interpleader. It will be seen that Makati Bel-Air's counter-claim arose out of or was necessarily connected with the recourse of petitioner to this remedy of interpleader.

Makati Bel-Air was in effect claiming that petitioner Bank had in bad faith refused to honor its undertaking to pay represented by the manager's check it had issued. When the trial court granted petitioner's motion for withdrawal of its complaint-in-interpleader, as having become moot and academic by reason of Makati Bel-Air's having cancelled the sale of the office unit to Altiura and having returned the manager's check to the Bank and acquiesced in the release of the funds to Altiura, the trial court in effect held that petitioner Bank's recourse to interpleader was proper and not a frivolous or malicious maneuver to evade its obligation to pay to the party lawfully entitled the funds represented by the manager's check. Having done so, the trial court could not have logically allowed Makati Bel-Air to recover on its counterclaim for damages against petitioner Bank.

VELARDE v. SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY

28 April 2004 | GR No.159357 | J. Panganiban | Declaratory Relief and Similar Remedies

PETITIONER: Brother Mariano “Mike” Z. Velarde

RESPONDENTS: Social Justice Society

DOCTRINE:

An action for declaratory relief should be filed by a person interested under a deed, a will, a contract or other written instrument, and whose rights are affected by a statute, an executive order, a regulation or an ordinance. The purpose of the remedy is to interpret or to determine the validity of the written instrument and to seek a judicial declaration of the parties' rights or duties thereunder.

The essential requisites of the action are as follows:

(1) there is a justiciable controversy;

(2) the controversy is between persons whose interests are adverse;

(3) the party seeking the relief has a legal interest in the controversy; and

(4) the issue is ripe for judicial determination.|||

FACTS:

1. On January 28, 2003, SJS filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief ("SJS Petition") before the RTC-Manila against Velarde and his aforesaid co-respondents.

2. SJS, a registered political party, sought the interpretation of several constitutional provisions, specifically on the separation of church and state; and a declaratory judgment on the constitutionality of the acts of religious leaders endorsing a candidate for an elective office, or urging or requiring the members of their flock to vote for a specified candidate.

3. After narrating the above incidents, the trial court said that it had jurisdiction over the Petition, because "in praying for a determination as to whether the actions imputed to the respondents are violative of Article II, Section 6 of the Fundamental Law, [the Petition] has raised only a question of law." It then proceeded to a lengthy discussion of the issue raised in the Petition — the separation of church and state — even tracing, to some extent, the historical background of the principle. Through its discourse, the court a quo opined at some point that the "[e]ndorsement of specific candidates in an election to any public office is a clear violation of the separation clause.

4. After its essay on the legal issue, however, the trial court failed to include a dispositive portion in its assailed Decision. Thus, Velarde and Soriano filed separate Motions for Reconsideration which, as mentioned earlier, were denied by the lower court. Hence this petition for review.

PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:

RTC ● Ruled in favor of the respondents. Opined that at some point that the "[e]ndorsement of specific candidates in an election to any public office is a clear violation of the separation clause.

After its essay on the legal issue, however, the trial court failed to include a dispositive portion in its assailed Decision.

ISSUE/S:

1. Whether SJS’ petition for declaratory relief raised a justiciable controversy. (NO)

2. Whether SJS’ petition for declaratory relief stated a cause of action. (NO)

3. Whether SJS’ have any legal standing to file the petition for declaratory relief. (NO)

RULING:

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review of Brother Mike Velarde is GRANTED. The assailed June 12, 2003 Decision and July 29, 2003 Order of the Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch 49) are hereby DECLARED NULL AND VOID and thus SET ASIDE. The SJS Petition for Declaratory Relief is DISMISSED for failure to state a cause of action.|||

1. No. There exists no justiciable controversy. A justiciable controversy refers to an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for judicial determination, not one that is conjectural or merely anticipatory. The SJS Petition for Declaratory Relief fell short of this test. It miserably failed to allege an existing controversy or dispute between the petitioner and the named respondents therein. Further, the Petition did not sufficiently state what specific legal right of the petitioner was violated by the respondents therein; and what particular act or acts of the latter were in breach of its rights, the law or the Constitution.

As pointed out by Brother Eliseo F. Soriano in his Comment, what exactly has he done that merited the attention of SJS? He confesses that he does not know the answer, because the SJS Petition (as well as the assailed Decision of the RTC) "yields nothing in this respect." His Eminence, Jaime Cardinal Sin, adds that, at the time SJS filed its Petition on January 28, 2003, the election season had not even started yet; and that, in any event, he has not been actively involved in partisan politics.

An initiatory complaint or petition filed with the trial court should contain "a plain, concise and direct statement of the ultimate facts on which the party pleading relies for his claim . . .." Yet, the SJS Petition stated no ultimate facts.

Indeed, SJS merely speculated or anticipated without factual moorings that, as religious leaders, the petitioner and his co-respondents below had endorsed or threatened to endorse a candidate or candidates for elective offices; and that such actual or threatened endorsement "will enable [them] to elect men to public office who [would] in turn be forever beholden to their leaders, enabling them to control the government"[;] and "pos[ing] a clear and present danger of serious erosion of the people's faith in the electoral process[;] and reinforc[ing] their belief that religious leaders determine the ultimate result of elections," which would then be violative of the separation clause.

Such premise is highly speculative and merely theoretical, to say the least. Clearly, it does not suffice to constitute a justiciable controversy. The Petition does not even allege any indication or manifest intent on the part of any of the respondents below to champion an electoral candidate, or to urge their so-called flock to vote for, or not to vote for, a particular candidate. It is a time-honored rule that sheer speculation does not give rise to an actionable right.

Obviously, there is no factual allegation that SJS' rights are being subjected to any threatened, imminent and inevitable violation that should be prevented by the declaratory relief sought. The judicial power and duty of the courts to settle actual controversies involving rights that are legally demandable and enforceable cannot be exercised when there is no actual or threatened violation of a legal right.

2. No. There exists no cause of action. Such general averment does not, however, suffice to constitute a legal right or interest. Not only is the presumed interest not personal in character; it is likewise too vague, highly speculative and uncertain. The Rules require that the interest must be material to the issue and affected by the questioned act or instrument, as distinguished from simple curiosity or incidental interest in the question raised.

SJS has, however, ignored the crucial point of its own reference — that there must be no uncertainty that the loss will occur or that the asserted rights will be invaded.Precisely, as discussed earlier, it merely conjectures that herein petitioner (and his co-respondents below) might actively participate in partisan politics, use "the awesome voting strength of its faithful flock [to] enable it to elect men to public office ...,enabling [it] to control the government."

Indeed, the Court finds in the Petition for Declaratory Relief no single allegation of fact upon which SJS could base a right of relief from the named respondents. In any event, even granting that it sufficiently asserted a legal right it sought to protect, there was nevertheless no certainty that such right would be invaded by the said respondents. Not even the alleged proximity of the elections to the time the Petition was filed below (January 28, 2003) would have provided the certainty that it had a legal right that would be jeopardized or violated by any of those respondents.

3. No. SJS does not have any legal standing to file the petition for declaratory relief. Legal standing or locus standi has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case, such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the challenged act. Interest means a material interest in an issue that is affected by the questioned act or instrument, as distinguished from a mere incidental interest in the question involved.

There was no showing in the Petition for Declaratory Relief that SJS as a political party or its members as registered voters would be adversely affected by the alleged acts of the respondents below, if the question at issue was not resolved. There was no allegation that SJS had suffered or would be deprived of votes due to the acts imputed to the said respondents. Neither did it allege that any of its members would be denied the right of suffrage or the privilege to be voted for a public office they are seeking.|

A taxpayer's action may be properly brought only when there is an exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending power. In the present case, there is no allegation, whether express or implied, that taxpayers' money is being illegally disbursed.

MANGAHAS, ET AL., V. PAREDES, et al

14 February 2007 | GR No. 157866 | CHICO-NAZARIO, J. | Declaratory Relief and Similar Remedies

PETITIONER: AUGUSTO MANGAHAS and MARILOU VERDEJO

RESPONDENTS: Hon. JUDGE VICTORIA ISABEL PAREDES, Presiding Judge, Br. 124, Regional Trial Court, Caloocan City; SHERIFF ERLITO BACHO, Br. 124, Regional Trial Court, Caloocan City; and AVELINO BANAAG

DOCTRINE:

Rule 63 of the Rules of Court which deals with actions for declaratory relief, enumerates the subject matter thereof, i.e., deed, will, contract or other written instrument, the construction or validity of statute or ordinance.

FACTS:

1. Private respondent Avelino Banaag filed a complaint for ejectment against the petitioners, alleging that they constructed houses on his property, located in Caloocan City, without his knowledge and consent.

2. The petitioners claimed that they had resided on the property with the knowledge and conformity of the true owner, Pinagkamaligan Indo-Agro Development Corporation (PIADECO).

3. Petitioners filed a Manifestation and Motion To Suspend Proceedings on the ground that the subject property is part of the Tala Estate and that the RTC of Quezon City issued a Writ of Preliminary Injunction dated 10 November 1997, enjoining the MeTCs of Quezon City and Caloocan City from ordering the eviction and demolition of all occupants of the Tala Estate. They posited that the injunction issued by the Quezon City RTC is enforceable in Caloocan City because both cities are situated within the National Capital Region.

PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:

MeTC ● MeTC denied said manifestation and ruled in favor of respondent, stating that the injunction issued by the Quezon City RTC has binding effect only within the territorial boundaries of the said court and since Caloocan City is not within the territorial area of same, the injunction it issued is null and void for lack of jurisdiction

RTC ● Trial court affirmed the MeTC decision.

● Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration which the RTC denied

CA ● Affirmed the ruling of the RTC

4. Private respondent filed with the RTC a motion for execution pending appeal. Petitioners filed a Motion to Suspend Execution before the RTC. Said motion was denied in an order dated 14 February 2003.

5. The petitioners filed this present case before the Supreme Court:

a. THE NATURE OF THE PETITION: Declaratory Relief, Certiorari, Prohibition With Prayer For Provisional Remedy filed by petitioners Augusto Mangahas and Marilou Verdejo seeks to nullify and set aside the 14 February 2003 Order of the RTC Caloocan City, denying their Motion to Suspend Execution.

ISSUE/S:

1. Whether or not the Petitioners availed of the proper remedy?

2. Whether or not the injunction issued by the Quezon City RTC is binding upon the RTC of Caloocan?

RULING:

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Order of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 124, Caloocan City, denying petitioners’ Motion to Supend Execution dated 14 February 2003 in Civil Case No. C-19097 is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.

RATIO:

1. NO.

At the outset it must be pointed out that petitioners’ direct recourse to this Court via petition for Declaratory Relief, Certiorari, Prohibition With Prayer For Provisional Remedy is an utter disregard of the hierarchy of courts and should have been dismissed outright. This Court’s original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction is not exclusive. It is shared by this Court with the Regional Trial Courts and the Court of Appeals. Such concurrence of jurisdiction does not give the petitioners unbridled freedom of choice of court forum. A direct recourse of the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition.

In the instant case, petitioners have not offered any exceptional or compelling reason not to observe the hierarchy of courts. Hence, the petition should have been filed with the Regional Trial Court.

Equally noteworthy is petitioners’ resort to this Court through petition for declaratory relief. This action is not among the petitions within the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. Rule 63 of the Rules of Court which deals with actions for declaratory relief, enumerates the subject matter thereof, i.e., deed, will, contract or other written instrument, the construction or validity of statute or ordinance. Inasmuch as this enumeration is exclusive, petitioners’ action to declare the RTC order denying their motion to suspend execution, not being one of those enumerated, should warrant the outright dismissal of this case.

2. No.

Because the courts only exercise jurisdiction over the territory which is apportioned to their branch.

Under Sec. 17 of B.P. 129, the exercise of jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts and their judges is basically regional in scope (Malaoan vs. Court of Appeals, 232 SCRA 249), but under Sec. 18, it may be limited to the territorial area of the branch in which the judges sits (OCA vs. Matas, August 2, 1995). Sec. 18 of B.P. 129 states:

"Sec. 18. Authority to define territory appurtenant to each branch. - The Supreme Court shall define the territory over which a branch of the Regional Trial Court shall exercise its authority. The territory thus defined shall be deemed to be the territorial area of the branch concerned for purposes of determining the venue of all suits, proceedings or actions, whether civil or criminal, as well as determining the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts over which the said branch may exercise appellate jurisdiction.xxx”

Taking Our bearings from the above pronouncement, the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City could not be deemed to have committed a reversible error when it denied the petitioners’ Motion to Suspend Proceedings. Apparently, the extent of the enforceability of an injunction writ issued by the Regional Trial Court is defined by the territorial region where the magistrate presides.

Consequently, the issue involving the binding effect of the injunction issued by the Quezon City RTC became the law of the case between the parties. Under this legal principle, whatever is irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule or decision between the parties in the same case continues to be the law of the case, so long as the facts on which the decision was predicated continue. Stated otherwise, the doctrine holds that once an appellate court has declared the law in a case that declaration continues to hold even in subsequent appeal. The reason lies in the fact that public policy dictates that litigations must be terminated at some definite time and that the prevailing party should not be denied the fruits of his victory by some subterfuge devised by the losing party.

PDIC v. CA

April 30, 2003 | G.R. No. 126911 | Carpio Morales, J. | Rule 63 – Non-execution of declaratory judgments; exceptions

PETITIONER: Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC)

RESPONDENTS: Court of Appeals And Jose Abad, Leonor Abad, Sabina Abad, Josephine "Josie" Beata Abad-Orlina, Cecilia Abad, Pio Abad, Dominic Abad, Teodora Abad

DOCTRINE:

There is nothing in the nature of a special civil action for declaratory relief that proscribes the filing of a counterclaim based on the same transaction, deed or contract subject of the complaint. A special civil action is after all not essentially different from an ordinary civil action except that the former deals with a special subject matter which makes necessary some special regulation. But the identity between their fundamental nature is such that the same rules governing ordinary civil suits may and do apply to special civil actions if not inconsistent with or if they may serve to supplement the provisions of the peculiar rules governing special civil actions.

RECIT- READY SUMMARY: Respondents filed claims with the PDIC for the payment of the 20 insured golden time deposits (GTDs) at the Manila Banking Corporation (MBC), Iloilo Branch. PDIC paid respondents the value of 3 claims but withheld the payment of the 17 remaining claims. Subsequently, PDIC filed a petition for declaratory relief against respondents for a judicial declaration of the insurability of respondents' GTDs. Respondents set up a counterclaim against PDIC whereby they asked for payment of their insured deposits.

The RTC decided in favor of respondents Abads, declared the 20 GTDs of respondents to be deposit liabilities of MBC, hence, are liabilities of PDIC as statutory insurer, and ordered to pay immediately. The CA affirmed this.

PDIC, thru a petition for review, questioned the decisions of RTC and CA for the reason that an action for declaratory relief does not essentially entail an executory process as the only relief that should have been granted by the trial court is a declaration of the rights and duties of petitioner.

SC ruled on negative because while a petition for declaratory relief does not essentially entail an executory process, it does not however prohibits a counterclaim from being set-up in the same action. The same rules governing ordinary civil suits may and do apply to special civil actions if not inconsistent with or if they may serve to supplement the provisions of the peculiar rules governing special civil actions.

FACTS:

1. Respondents filed claims with the PDIC for the payment of the twenty insured golden time deposits (GTDs) at the Manila Banking Corporation (MBC), Iloilo Branch.

2. PDIC paid respondents the value of 3 claims; however, it withheld the payment of the 17 remaining claims.

3. Subsequently, PDIC filed a petition for declaratory relief against respondents for a judicial declaration of the insurability of respondents' GTDs.

4. Respondents set up a counterclaim against PDIC whereby they asked for payment of their insured deposits..

PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:

RTC Decided in favor of respondents Abads and declared the 20 GTDs of respondents to be deposit liabilities of MBC, hence, are liabilities of PDIC as statutory insurer and ordered to pay immediately.

CA On appeal, CA affirmed the trial court's decision except as to the award of legal interest, which it deleted.

ISSUE/S:

Whether CA erred in affirming the RTC decision that ordered PDIC to pay the Abads for the reason that an action for declaratory relief does not essentially entail an executory process as the only relief that should have been granted by the trial court is a declaration of the rights and duties of petitioner? – NO

RULING:

WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED.

RATIO:

NO, while a petition for declaratory relief does not essentially entail an executory process, it does not however prohibits a counterclaim from being set-up in the same action.

MATALIN COCONUT CO., INC. V. MUNICIPAL COUNCIL OF MALABANG, LANAO DEL SUR

August 13, 1986 | G.R. No. L-28138| Yap, J. | Declaratory Relief

PETITIONER: Matalin Coconut

RESPONDENTS: Municipal Council of Malabang

DOCTRINE:

The declaratory relief action was still proper even if Matalin Coconut decided to pay “under protest” the fees imposed by the ordinance. Such payment did not affect the case because the applicability of the ordinance to future transactions still remained to be resolved, although the matter could also be threshed out in an ordinary suit for the recovery of taxes paid.

The general rule is that there is nothing to execute in a declaratory relief judgment. The judgment does not essentially entail an executory process since generally, other than a declaration of such rights and duties, as these are understood in ordinary civil actions, are not sought by the proponent. However, an exception to this rule is when the reliefs prayed for by the plaintiff include payment and these allegations and prayers were not objected by the respondents in their answer. Respondents were thus fully aware of the petitioner’s claim for refund and of what would happen if the ordinance were to be declared invalid by the court.

FACTS:

The Municipal Council of Malabang, Lanao del Sur enacted Municipal Ordinance No. 45-46, entitled "AN ORDINANCE IMPOSING A POLICE INSPECTION FEE OF P.30 PER SACK OF CASSAVA STARCH PRODUCED AND SHIPPED OUT OF THE MUNICIPALITY OF MALABANG AND IMPOSING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATIONS THEREOF." The ordinance made it unlawful for any person, company or group of persons "to ship out of the Municipality of Malabang, cassava starch or flour without paying to the Municipal Treasurer or his authorized representatives the corresponding fee fixed by (the) ordinance." It imposed a "police inspection fee" of P.30 per sack of cassava starch or flour, which shall be paid by the shipper before the same is transported or shipped outside the municipality. Any person or company or group of individuals violating the ordinance "is liable to a fine of not less than P100.00, but not more than P1,000.00, and to pay P1.00 for every sack of flour being illegally shipped outside the municipality, or to suffer imprisonment of 20 days, or both, in the discretion of the court.

The validity of the ordinance was challenged by the Matalin Coconut, Inc. in a petition for declaratory relief filed with the then Court of First Instance of Lanao del Sur against the Municipal Council, the Municipal Mayor and the Municipal Treasurer of Malabang, Lanao del Sur. Alleging among others that the ordinance is not only ultra vires, being violative of Republic Act No. 2264, but also unreasonable, oppressive and confiscatory, Matalin Coconut, Inc. prayed that the ordinance be declared null and void ab initio, and that the respondent Municipal Treasurer be ordered to refund the amounts paid by Matalin Coconut, Inc. under the ordinance. The respondent Municipal Treasurer was ordered to allow payment of the taxes imposed by the ordinance under protest. After trial, the Court a quo rendered a decision declaring the municipal ordinance in question null and void; ordering the respondent Municipal Treasurer to refund to Matalin Coconut, Inc the payments it made under the said ordinance from September 27, 1966 to May 2, 1967, amounting to P 25,500.00, as well as all payments made subsequently thereafter; and enjoining and prohibiting the respondents, their agents or deputies, from collecting the tax of P.30 per bag on the cassava flour or starch belonging to intervenor, Purakan Plantation Company, manufactured or milled in the Municipality of Balabagan, but shipped out through the Municipality of Malabang.

One of the errors raised by the appellants in their brief is that the trial court erred in adjudicating the money claim of the petitioner in an action for declaratory relief. They maintain that it was error for the trial court, in an action for declaratory relief, to order the refund to Matalin Coconut, Inc the amounts paid by the latter under the municipal ordinance in question. It is the contention of respondents-appellants that in an action for declaratory relief, all the court can do is to construe the validity of the ordinance in question and declare the rights of those affected thereby. The court cannot declare the ordinance illegal and at the same time order the refund to petitioner of the amounts paid under the ordinance, without requiring petitioner to file an ordinary action to claim the refund after the declaratory relief judgment has become final. Respondents maintain that under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court, the court may advise the parties to file the proper pleadings and convert the hearing into an ordinary action, which was not done in this case.

ISSUE/S:

Whether the petition for declaratory relief is still proper despite payment under protest.

Whether the court erred in ordering the refund to petitioner without requiring Matalin Coconut to file an ordinary action to claim the refund.

RULING:

NO. Under Sec. 6 of Rule 64, the action for declaratory relief may be converted into an ordinary action and the parties allowed to file such pleadings as may be necessary or proper, if before the final termination of the case “a breach or violation of an ordinance, should take place.” In this case, no breach or violation of the ordinance occurred. Matalin Coconut, Inc. decided to pay “under protest” the fees imposed by the ordinance. Such payment did not affect the case; the declaratory relief action was still proper because the applicability of the ordinance to future transactions still remained to be resolved, although the matter could also be threshed out in an ordinary suit for the recovery of taxes paid.

NO. In its petition for declaratory relief, Matalin Coconut, Inc. alleged that by reason of the enforcement of the municipal ordinance, it was forced to pay under protest the fees imposed pursuant to the said ordinance, and accordingly, one of the reliefs prayed for by Matalin Coconut, Inc. was that the respondents be ordered to refund all the amounts it paid to respondent Municipal Treasurer during the pendency of the case. The inclusion of said allegation and prayer in the petition was not objected to by the respondents in their answer. During the trial, evidence of the payments made by Matalin Coconut, Inc. was introduced. Respondents were thus fully aware of the petitioner’s claim for refund and of what would happen if the ordinance were to be declared invalid by the court. Respondent’s contention, if sustained, would in effect require a separate suit for the recovery of the fees paid by petitioner under protest. Multiplicity of suits should be allowed or encouraged and, in the context of the present case, is clearly uncalled for and unnecessary.

Lucasan, et al., v. Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation

04 July 2008 | G.R. No. 176929 | NACHURA, J | INTERPLEADER - Nature and Definition – Art. 476-477, Civil Code

PETITIONER: INOCENCIO Y. LUCASAN

RESPONDENTS: PHILIPPINE DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION (PDIC

DOCTRINE:

To avail of the remedy of quieting of title, two (2) indispensable requisites must concur, namely:

(1) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an equitable title to or interest in the real property subject of the action; and

(2) the deed, claim, encumbrance or proceeding claimed to be casting a cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy.

FACTS:

6. Petitioner Inocencio (Lucasan) and his wife Julianita Sorbito (now deceased) were the owners of Lot Nos. 1500-A and 229-E respectively covered by TCT Nos. T-68115 and T-13816.

7. Pacific Banking Corporation (PBC) extended a P5,000.00 loan to Lucasan, with Carlos Benares as his co-maker. Lucasan and Benares failed to pay the loan when it became due and demandable. Consequently, PBC filed a collection case with the RTC of Bacolod City.

8. RTC rendered a decision ordering Lucasan and Benares to jointly and severally pay PBC. Lucasan failed to pay the monetary award; thus, to satisfy the judgment, the RTC issued a writ of execution directing the sheriff to effect a levy on the properties owned by Lucasan and sell the same at public auction.

9. In compliance with the writ, the City Sheriff of Bacolod issued a Notice of Embargo, which was annotated on Lucasan's TCT Nos. T-68115 and T-13816 as Entry No. 110107. Annotated as prior encumbrances on the same titles were the mortgages in favor of Philippine National Bank (PNB) and Republic Planter's Bank (RPB) executed to secure Lucasan's loans with the banks.

10. The lots were sold at public auction and were awarded to PBC as the highest bidder. A certificate of sale was executed in its favor and was registered and annotated on TCT Nos. T-68115 and T-13816 as Entry No. 112552. Neither PNB nor RPB, the mortgagees, assailed the auction sale.

11. Lucasan, as well as the mortgagee banks, PNB and RPB, did not redeem the properties within the redemption period. Nevertheless, PBC did not file a petition for consolidation of ownership.

12. Lucasan, through counsel, wrote a letter to the Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC), PBC's receiver and liquidator seeking the cancellation of the certificate of sale and offering to pay PBC's claim against Lucasan.

13. Lucasan paid his loans with the PNB and RPB. Consequently, the mortgagee banks executed their respective releases of mortgage, resulting in the cancellation of the prior encumbrances in favor of PNB and RPB.

14. PDIC denied Lucasan's request for the cancellation of the certificate of sale stating that the redemption period had already lapsed

15. Lucasan then filed a petition denominated as declaratory relief with the RTC of Bacolod City. He sought confirmation of his rights provided in the second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court in relation to Section 75 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529. Lucasan also pleaded for the lifting and/or cancellation of the notice of embargo and the certificate of sale annotated on TCT Nos. T-68115 and T-13816, and offered to pay P100,000.00 or such amount as may be determined by the RTC, as consideration for the cancellation.

16. PDIC moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of cause of action. It averred that an action to quiet title under Section 1 of Rule 63 may only be brought when there is a cloud on, or to prevent a cloud from being cast upon, the title to real property. It asseverated that a cloud on the title is an outstanding instrument record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which is actually invalid or inoperative, but which may nevertheless impair or affect injuriously the title to property. PDIC claimed that the notice of embargo was issued pursuant to a writ of execution in Civil Case No. 12188, while the certificate of sale was executed as a result of a public bidding. Thus, their annotations on the titles were valid, operative or effective. PDIC asserted that Lucasan's petition is nothing but a disguised attempt to compel PDIC to resell the properties at a reduced price of P100,000.00.

PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:

●

RTC ● RTC granted PDIC's motion to dismiss.

● The petition filed by [Lucasan] pursuant to the said article is equivalent to questioning the validity of the subsequent annotation of Entry No. 110107 and Entry No. 112522 in TCT Nos. T-13816 and T-68115.

● Entry No. 110107 which is a Notice of Embargo was issued by virtue of a valid judgment rendered in Civil Case No. 12188,whereby the Court found [Lucasan] liable in favor of [PBC]

● As mandated in Sec. 12, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court, such levy on execution create a lien in favor of [PBC] over the right, title and interest of [Lucasan] over the two (2) subject parcels of land covered by TCT Nos. T-13816 and T-68115, subject to liens and encumbrances then existing. The fact that [Lucasan] has redeemed the mortgage properties from the first mortgages (sic), PNB and PNB (sic) Republic Bank, does not vest him any title free from the lien of [PBC].

● While the law requires that the judgment debtor, [Lucasan] must be served with a notice of levy and even if not served therewith, the defect is cured by service on him of the notice of sale prior to the sale, nowhere in the petition which alleges that [Lusasan] refutes the validity of the execution sale. Thus, he is deemed to have received and recognized the same.

● Lucasan filed a motion for reconsideration, but the RTC denied it.

CA ● Affirmed the ruling of the RTC

ISSUE/S:

Whether or not the dismissal of Lucasan’s action for quieting of title under Rule 63 of the Rules of Court is proper? - Yes

RULING:

Yes. The dismissal of of Lucasan’s action for quieting of title under Rule 63 of the Rules of Court is proper since the requisites for the same are absent.

Quieting of title is a common law remedy for the removal of any cloud of doubt or uncertainty with respect to real property. The Civil Code authorizes the said remedy in the following language:

ART. 476. Whenever there is a cloud on title to real property or any interest therein, by reason of any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which is apparently valid or effective but is in truth and in fact invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title, an action may be brought to remove such cloud or to quiet the title.

An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from being cast upon title to real property or any interest therein.

ART. 477. The plaintiff must have legal or equitable title to, or interest in the real property which is the subject-matter of the action. He need not be in possession of said property.

To avail of the remedy of quieting of title, two (2) indispensable requisites must concur, namely:

(1) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an equitable title to or interest in the real property subject of the action; and

Stated differently, the plaintiff must show that he has a legal or at least an equitable title over the real property in dispute, and that some deed or proceeding clouds its validity or efficacy.

First, Lucasan no longer possess any legal or equitable title to or interest over the subject parcels of land; hence, he cannot validly maintain an action for quieting of title.

Admittedly, the subject parcels of land were levied upon by virtue of a writ of execution issued in Civil Case No. 12188. A public auction of the subject parcels of land was held and the lots were awarded to PBC as the highest bidder. A certificate of sale in favor of PBC was issued on the same day, and was registered and annotated on TCT Nos. T-68115 and T-13816 as Entry No. 112552.

Under the 1964 Rules of Court, which were in effect at that time, the judgment debtor or redemptioner had the right to redeem the property from PBC within twelve (12) months from the registration of the certificate of sale. With the expiration of the twelve-month period of redemption and no redemption having been made, as in this case, the judgment debtor or the redemptioner lost whatever right he had over the land in question.

Lucasan admitted that he failed to redeem the properties within the redemption period, on account of his then limited financial situation. It was only fifteen (15) years later that he manifested his desire to reacquire the properties. Clearly thus, he had lost whatever right he had over Lot Nos. 1500-A and 229-E.

The payment of loans made by Lucasan to PNB and RPB in 1997 cannot, in any way, operate to restore whatever rights he had over the subject properties. Such payment only extinguished his loan obligations to the mortgagee banks and the liens which Lucasan claimed were subsisting at the time of the registration of the notice of embargo and certificate of sale.

Neither can Lucasan capitalize on PBC's failure to file a petition for consolidation of ownership after the expiration of the redemption period.

Moreover, with the rule that the expiration of the 1-year redemption period forecloses the obligor's right to redeem and that the sale thereby becomes absolute, the issuance thereafter of a final deed of sale is at best a mere formality and mere confirmation of the title that is already vested in the purchaser.

Certainly, Lucasan no longer possess any legal or equitable title to or interest over the subject parcels of land; hence, he cannot validly maintain an action for quieting of title.

The second requisite for an action to quiet title is, likewise, absent. Lucasan failed to demonstrate that the notice of embargo and the certificate of sale are invalid or inoperative. In fact, he never put in issue the validity of the levy on execution and of the certificate of sale duly registered on June 5, 1981. It is clear, therefore, that

Hence, the RTC rightfully dismissed Lucasan's complaint.

GENUINO V. COMMISSION ON AUDIT

June 15, 2021 | G.R. No. 230818 | DELOS SANTOS, J | Review on Judgments and Final Orders or Resolutions of the COA

PETITIONER: Efraim C. Genuino

RESPONDENTS: Commission On Audit, COA Office of the Director, Corporate Government Sector, Cluster 6, represented by Director Joseph B. Anacay, and the Office of the COA Supervising Auditor Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation, represented by Auditor Belen B. Ladines

DOCTRINE:

COA's audit jurisdiction over PAGCOR is limited to the 5% franchise tax and 50% of the Government's share in its gross earnings as stated in Section 15 of P.D. No. 1869. COA's general mandate cannot prevail over P.D. No. 1869 or the "PAGCOR Charter."

FACTS:

1. Pleasant Village Homeowners Association (PVHA) requested financial assistance from PAGCOR for the construction of a flood control and drainage system project for Pleasant Village Subdivision. PAGCOR Board of Directors approved to sponsor the project and donated P2,000,000.00 to PVHA.

2. Subsequently, the COA issued Notice of Suspension No. 2011-004 (10) suspending the P2,000,000.00 financial assistance for failure to submit certain documentary requirements provided under COA Circular No. 2007-001. Explicit in the said NSSDC was a statement to the effect that the financial assistance was still under evaluation, pending confirmation on whether the subject roads have been donated.

3. COA issued Notice of Disallowance 2013-002 (10) disapproving the financial assistance to PVHA for being spent for a private purpose in violation of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1445, otherwise known as the Government Auditing Code. The COA held Efraim C. Genuino, Chairman and CEO of PAGCOR, personally and solidarily liable to refund the amount. Aggrieved, petitioner filed an appeal.

4. Petitioner received COA-Corporate Government Sector (CGS) Cluster 6 Decision No. 2014-004 denying the same. Petitioner filed a Petition for Review. Petitioner avers that COA's audit jurisdiction over PAGCOR is limited to 5% franchise tax remitted to the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and 50% of its gross earnings remitted to the National Treasury. Since the P2,000,000.00 financial assistance to PVHA was sourced from PAGCOR's operating expenses, in particular its marketing expenses, it was beyond COA's audit jurisdiction.

PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:

COA ● COA denied the appeal

COA ● The COA dismissed the petition for review for being filed out of time.

COA ● The COA granted the motion for reconsideration insofar as it set aside the issue of the belated filing of the petition, but maintained the propriety of the disallowance and petitioner's liability.

ISSUE/S:

1. Whether or not the COA exceeded its audit jurisdiction over PAGCOR. —YES

RULING:

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari with Application for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction is GRANTED. The Commission on Audit Decision and the Resolution are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

RATIO:

1. YES

Yes. By law, COA's audit jurisdiction over PAGCOR is limited to the 5% franchise tax and 50% of the Government's share in its gross earnings as stated in Section 15 of P.D. No. 1869. The Court finds that COA acted with grave abuse of discretion when it exceeded its audit jurisdiction over PAGCOR. The financial assistance granted by PAGCOR to PVHA was sourced from PAGCOR's operating expenses, in particular, its marketing expenses. It is, thus, clear that the audit conducted by COA in this case was not made in relation to either the 5% franchise tax or the Government's 50% share in its gross earnings and therefore, beyond the scope of COA's audit authority. The limitation imposed on COA's authority to audit PAGCOR is further bolstered by the fact that there are bills in Congress that have been filed precisely to expand COA's audit jurisdiction beyond the said franchise tax and the Government's share in its gross earnings. By implication, these bills would have been unnecessary had COA been empowered to conduct a general audit on all of PAGCOR's funds.

Despite COA's general mandate to ensure that "all resources of the government shall be managed, expended or utilized in accordance with law and regulations, and safeguard against loss or wastage through illegal or improper disposition, x x x" the same cannot prevail over a special law such as P.D. No. 1869 or the "PAGCOR Charter." In granting a special charter to PAGCOR, legislature is presumed to have specially considered all the relevant factors and circumstances in granting the same, being mindful of PAGCOR's dual role: first, to operate and to regulate gambling casinos and second, to generate sources of additional revenue to fund infrastructure and socio-civic projects, and other essential public services.

It remains a basic fact in law that the decision of a court or tribunal without jurisdiction is a total nullity. The COA's actions in this case, from the issuance of Notice of Disallowance 2013-002 (10), the assailed Decision and Resolution, are null and void. They create no rights and produce no legal effect.

FORTUNE LIFE INSURANCE CO. V COA

January 27 2015 | GR No. 213525 | J Bersamin | En Banc| Timeliness of Filing Petition; Exception

PETITIONER: FORTUNE LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, INC.

RESPONDENTS: COMMISSION ON AUDIT (COA) PROPER; COA REGIONAL OFFICE NO. VI-WESTERN VISAYAS; AUDIT GROUP LGS-B, PROVINCE OF ANTIQUE; AND PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT OF ANTIQUE

DOCTRINE:

There is no parity between the petition for review under Rule 42 and the petition for certiorari under Rule 64. The fresh period rule in Neypes v.CA does not apply to Rule 64.

FACTS:

1. Respondent Provincial Government of Antique (LGU) and the petitioner executed a memorandum of agreement concerning the life insurance coverage of qualified barangays members worth ₱4,393,593.60 for the premium payment.

2. The latter office disallowed the payment for lack of legal basis under Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code). Respondent LGU appealed but its appeal was denied.

3. Petitioner filed its petition for money claim in the COA.

PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:

COA The money claim was denied, holding that under Section 447 and Section 458 of the Local Government Code only municipal or city governments are expressly vested with the power to secure group insurance coverage for barangayworkers; and noting the LGU’s failure to comply with the requirement of publication under Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9184

CA n/a

ISSUE/S:

1. WON Petitioner complied with the rule on proof of service --NO

2. WON the fresh period rule in Neypes V. CA applies in Rule 64 of RoC. --NO.

RULING:

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the Motion for Reconsideration for its lack of merit; ORDERS the petitioner and its counsel, Atty. Eduardo S. Fortaleza, to show cause in writing within ten (10) days from notice why they should not be punished for indirect contempt of court; and FURTHER DIRECTS Atty. Fortaleza to show cause in the same period why he should not be disbarred.

RATIO:

1. NO.

● The claim is unwarranted. The petitioner obviously ignores that Section 13, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court concerns two types of proof of service, namely: the affidavit and the registry receipt

o A compliance withthe rule is mandatory, such that there is no proof of service if either or both are not submitted.

● Here, the petition for certiorari only carried the affidavit of service executed by one Marcelino T. Pascua, Jr., who declared that he had served copies of the petition by registered mail "under Registry Receipt Nos. 70449, 70453, 70458,70498 and 70524 attached tothe appropriate spaces found on pages 64-65 of the petition."14 The petition only bore, however, the cut print-outs of what appeared to be the registry receipt numbers of the registered matters, not the registry receipts themselves.

o The rule requires to be appended the registry receipts, nottheir reproductions. Hence, the cut print-outs did not substantially comply with the rule.

NO. There is no parity between the petition for review under Rule 42 and the petition for certiorari under Rule 64.

● As to the nature of the procedures, Rule 42 governs an appeal from the judgment or final order rendered by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. Such appeal is on a question of fact, or of law, or of mixed question of fact and law, and is given due course only upon a prima facie showing that the Regional Trial Court committed an error of fact or law warranting the reversal or modification of the challenged judgment or final order.

● In contrast, the petition for certiorari under Rule 64 is similar to the petition for certiorari under Rule 65, and assails a judgment or final order of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), or the Commission on Audit (COA). The petition is not designed to correct only errors of jurisdiction, not errors of judgment.18 Questions of fact cannot be raised except to determine whether the COMELEC or the COA were guilty of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

● The reglementary periods under Rule42 and Rule 64 are different. In the former, the aggrieved party is allowed 15 days to file the petition for review from receipt of the assailed decision or final order, or from receipt of the denial of a motion for new trial or reconsideration.

● In the latter, the petition is filed within 30 days from notice of the judgment or final order or resolution sought to be reviewed. The filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration, if allowed under the procedural rules of the Commission concerned, interrupts the period; hence, should the motion be denied, the aggrieved party may file the petition within the remaining period, which shall not be less than five days in any event, reckoned from the notice of denial.

OSMEÑA v. COA

May 31, 2011 | GR No. 188818 | Ponente | Declaratory Relief; Timeliness of Filing Petition; Exception

PETITIONER: TOMAS R. OSMEÑA, in his personal capacity and in his capacity as City Mayor of Cebu City

RESPONDENTS: THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT

DOCTRINE:

The petition shall be filed within thirty (30) days from notice of the judgment or final order or resolution sought to be reviewed; except, for the most compelling reasons where

stubborn obedience to the Rules would defeat rather than serve the ends of justice.

PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:

RTC ● Ruled in favor of WCTI and DCDC.

● To satisfy the judgment debts, the Sanggunian finally passed the required appropriation

4. During the post-audit, the City Auditor issued two notices disallowing the payment of litigation expenses, damages, and attorney's fees to WTCI and DCDC. The City Auditor held that the damages, attorney's fees, and interest charges were unnecessary expenses for which the public officers should be held liable in their personal capacities pursuant to the law. On reconsideration, the auditor held that the payment of the amounts awarded as damages and attorney’s fees should solely be Osmeña’s liability.

COA ● Affirmed the notices of disallowance. Osmeña received a copy of the Decision on May 23, 2008.

● Eighteen days after or on June 10, 2008, Osmeña filed a motion for reconsideration of the May 6, 2008 COA Decision.

● To satisfy the judgment debts, the Sanggunian finally passed the required appropriation The COA denied Osmeña's motion via a Resolution dated June 8, 2009. The Office of the Mayor of Cebu City received the June 8, 2009 Resolution of the COA on June 29, 2009.

● A day before, however, Osmeña left for the United States of America for his check-up after his cancer surgery in April 2009 and returned to his office only on July 15, 2009. Thus, it was only on July 27, 2009 that Osmeña filed the present petition for certiorari under Rule 64 to assail COA’s decision.

ISSUE/S:

1. WON the petition may be granted — YES

RULING:

WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, we hereby GRANT the petitioner’s Petition for Certiorari filed under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court. The respondent’s Decision of May 6, 2008 and Resolution of June 8, 2009 are SET ASIDE.

RATIO:

1. YES

● Although, Section 3, Rule 64 of the Rules of Court states: “The petition shall be filed within thirty (30) days from notice of the judgment or final order or resolution sought to be reviewed. xxx”

● However, from time to time, the Supreme Court has recognized exceptions to the Rules but only for the most compelling reasons where stubborn obedience to the Rules would defeat rather than serve the ends of justice.

● Osmeña cites the mandatory medical check-ups he had to undergo in Houston, Texas after his cancer surgery in April 2009 as reason for the delay in filing his petition for certiorari. Due to his weakened state of health, he claims that he could not very well be expected to be bothered by the affairs of his office and had to focus only on his medical treatment. He could not require his office to attend to the case as he was being charged in his personal capacity. Moreover, a certiorari petition filed under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court must be verified which requires the petitioner to state under oath before an authorized officer that he has read the petition and that the allegations therein are true and correct of his personal knowledge. Given that Osmeña was out of the country to attend to his medical needs, he could not comply with the requirements to perfect his appeal of the Decision of the COA.

● While the Court has accepted verifications executed by a petitioner's counsel who personally knows the truth of the facts alleged in the pleading, this was an alternative not available to Osmeña, as he had yet to secure his own counsel. Osmeña could not avail of the services of the City Attorney, as the latter is authorized to represent city officials only in their official capacity. The COA pins liability for the amount of damages paid to WTCI and DCDC on Osmeña in his personal capacity.

● Thus, the reckoning date to count the remaining 12 days to file his Rule 64 petition should be counted from July 15, 2009, the date Osmeña had actual knowledge of the denial of his motion for reconsideration of the Decision of the COA and given the opportunity to competently file an appeal thereto before the Court. The present petition, filed on July 27, 2009, was filed within the reglementary period.

COLLADO v. VILLAR

December 1, 2020 | GR No. 193143 | Caguioa, J. | Rule 64 - Review on Judgments and Final Orders or Resolutions of the COA; Timeliness of Filing Petition

PETITIONER: Emerita A. Collado, Supply Officer III, Philippine Science High School, Diliman Campus, Quezon City

RESPONDENTS: Hon. Reynaldo A. Villar, Hon. Juanito G. Espino, Jr. [Commissioners, Commission On Audit] and The Director, Legal Services Sector, Adjudication And Legal Services Office, Commission On Audit

DOCTRINE:

The provision requires a petition for certiorari assailing a judgment of the COA to be filed within 30 days from notice thereof, which period shall only be interrupted by the filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration. And, if such motion is denied, the aggrieved party may only file the petition within the remainder of the 30-day period, which in any event shall not be less than five days from notice of such denial.

FACTS:

1. A contract was entered into by and between Philippine Science High School (PSHS) and N.C. Roxas, Inc. for the construction of the PSHS-Mindanao Campus Building Complex.

2. Despite the grant of extension of the contract time, the completion date of the project had elapsed and the same was subjected to liquidated damages.

3. The COA Auditor found the following persons solidarily liable:

a. N.C. Roxas, Inc., as payee

b. Evelyn B. Rabaca, Accountant III

c. Rufina E. Vasquez (Vasquez), Administrative Officer V, for her act of certifying the expense as necessary, lawful and incurred under her direct supervision, and

d. Petitioner Emerita Collado (Collado) for her act of computing the erroneous liquidated damages to be imposed.

4. Collado and Vasquez sought reconsideration of the Notices of Disallowance with the COA Auditor.

5. The COA Auditor Ma. Eleanor C. A. Calo, in a Reply-Letter, denied reconsideration of the Notices of Disallowance and affirmed the OCA Auditor's previous findings.

6. Unsatisfied, Collado and Vasquez appealed to the COA National Government Audit Office I (COA-NGAO) pursuant to Rule V of the 1997 COA Rules.

PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:

COA-NGAO ● Sustained the findings of the COA Auditors and affirmed the liability of Collado and Vasquez

○ Collado and Vasquez subsequently filed an MR

COA-CP (2002) ● Denied the MR with modification only as to additional persons liable

○ Collado and Vasquez then filed a Petiton for Review dated February 27, 2003 (Petition for Review) with the COA-CP again.

○ Thereafter, they both jointly filed a supplemental letter to the Petition for Review dated August 25, 2003.

COA-CP (2008) ● Affirmed the 2002 COA Decision with finality, treating the Petition for Review as an MR of the 2002 COA Decision

○ Collado and Vasquez, in a Letter dated June 10, 2008, again sought reconsideration of the 2002 COA Decision

LSS-ALS ● In a Letter dated March 1, 2010, it denied due course to the Letter dated June 10, 2008 for being a 2ND MR of the 2002 COA Decision – a prohibited pleading under Section 13, Rule IX of the 1997 COA Rules

○ In a Letter dated March 17, 2010, Collado, acting alone, disputed this finding insisting that the Letter dated June 10, 2008 was only the 1ST MR directed against the 2008 COA Decision and not a 2ND MR of the 2002 COA Decision.

● Denied Collado’s request for reconsideration

OSG ● Representing respondents, it filed its Comment submitting that the Petition was untimely filed.

ISSUE/S:

1. WON the Petition for Certiorari was filed on time pursuant to Section 3, Rule 64 of the ROC — NO

RULING:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is GRANTED IN PART. The Commission on Audit-Commission Proper Decision No. 2008-048 is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. Petitioner Emerita A. Collado is excused from solidary liability to return the total amount of the under-deducted liquidated damages. The Commission on Audit is hereby DIRECTED to institute the necessary claims against N.C. Roxas, Inc.

RATIO:

1. NO, the petition was filed outside the period prescribed in Rule 64 of the ROC.

● Section 3, Rule 64 of the ROC, which specifically governs the mode of review from judgments, final orders, or resolutions issued by the COA, provides that:

o SEC. 3. Time to file petition. — The petition shall be filed within thirty (30) days from notice of the judgment or final order or resolution sought to be reviewed. The filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration of said judgment or final order or resolution, if allowed under the procedural rules of the Commission concerned, shall interrupt the period herein fixed. If the motion is denied, the aggrieved party may file the petition within the remaining period, but which shall not be less than five (5) days in any event, reckoned from notice of denial. (n)

● The provision requires a petition for certiorari assailing a judgment of the COA to be filed within 30 days from notice thereof, which period shall only be interrupted by the filing of an MNT or MR.

● And, if such motion is denied, the aggrieved party may only file the petition within the remainder of the 30-day period, which in any event shall not be less than 5 days from notice of such denial.

● Unquestionably, the 2002 COA Decision was rendered by the COA-CP. It is therefore of no moment that the Petition for Review was denominated as such given that a “petition for review” under Rule V of the 1997 COA Rules is appropriate only for final decisions or orders issued by the Director.

● Thus, by filing the Petition for Review with the COA-CP, the very same body that rendered the 2002 COA Decision, Collado was actually seeking a reconsideration of the 2002 COA Decision.

● In this regard, in the 2008 COA Decision, the COA-CP was correct in treating the Petition for Review as a first motion for reconsideration.

o At that point, upon the denial of the first motion for reconsideration, Collado should have already filed a petition for certiorari within the period provided in Rule 64 of the Rules.

o Instead, Collado resorted to filing the Letter dated June 10, 2008, purportedly questioning the 2008 COA Decision, and thereafter filed another Letter dated March 17, 2010.

● The 2008 COA Decision was received by Collado on May 15, 2008. Following the last sentence of Section 3, Rule 64 of the Rules, Collado had only five days therefrom, or until May 20, 2008, within which to file the proper petition.

● Considering therefore that the instant Petition was filed only on August 20, 2010, or more than two years after Collado’s receipt of the 2008 COA Decision, the Petition was perforce filed out of time.

PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF DETECTIVE AND PROTECTIVE AGENCY OPERATORS (PADPAO), REGION 7 CHAPTER, INC. v. COMELEC

October 3, 2017 | G.R. No. 223505 | Caguioa, J.; En Banc | Rule 64, Timeliness of Petition

PETITIONER: Philippine Association of Detective and Protective Agency Operators, Region 7 Chapter, Inc., (PADPAO) - association of licensed security agencies and company security forces in Region 7 under RA 5487 (Private Security Agency Law)

RESPONDENTS: COMELEC and its Committee on the Ban on Firearms and Security Personnel (COMELEC/ CBFSP)

DOCTRINE:

The 30-day reglementary period under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 does not apply in assailing a COMELEC Resolution issued under its rule-making power under Section 7, Article IX-A of the Constitution.

FACTS:

1. In view of the upcoming May 2016 National and Local Elections, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 10015 which provided for the rules and regulations on the ban on bearing, carrying or transporting of firearms and other deadly weapons and the employment, availment or engagement of the services of security personnel or bodyguards during the election period (Gun Ban). The regulation covers not only the subject of firearms, but also the engagement of security services.

2. Under the COMELEC Resolution, private security agencies (PSAs) may obtain authority to bear, carry, and transport firearms outside their place of work or business and in public places during the election period after compliance with documentary requirements and under certain conditions.

3. PADPAO assails the constitutionality and validity of Section 2(e), Rule III of Resolution No. 10015 insofar as its application to PSAs is concerned.

PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:

SC ● Petition for certiorari under Rule 65, with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/ or temporary restraining order.

OSG’s comment ● That a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is the wrong remedy because Resolution No. 10015 was issued in the exercise of COMELEC's administrative function and not its quasi-judicial power. The petition is actually one for declaratory relief over which the Court has no original jurisdiction.

● Assuming arguendo that the PADPAO’s petition for certiorari is proper, it was filed out of time.

○ Under Section 3, Rule 64, a certiorari petition must be filed within 30 days from notice of a resolution. Resolution No. 10015 was promulgated on November 13, 2015 and was published on COMELEC's website10 on November 14, 2015.

○ However, the petition was filed only on April 8, 2016. Even assuming that the petition may be filed under Rule 65 under the Court's extraordinary jurisdiction, the petition is still filed beyond the 60- day period under the said Rule.

ISSUE: Is PADPAO’s petition for certiorari under Rule 65 proper and timely filed?

RULING:

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari with prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction/temporary restraining order are DENIED for lack of merit. The Court upholds Section 2(e), Rule III of COMELEC Resolution No. 10015 as valid and constitutional. (NB: SC exercised liberality in procedural matter but dismissed the petition on substantive matters.)

RATIO:

● Yes, as an exceptional case, the PADPAO’s petition for certiorari under Rule 65 proper and timely filed.

● On the propriety of the remedy and on the OSG’s argument that the appropriate case should have been a petition for declaratory relief before the RTC under Rule 63, COMELEC/ OSG’s position has merit. However, considering the very important and substantive issues raised that, as explained, are expected to recur, the Court resolves to set aside this technicality and rule on the substantive issue to put an end to this controversy.

● On the timeliness of the filing of the petition, the Court holds that the 30-day reglementary period under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 does not apply. The Court's power to review decisions of the COMELEC stems from the Constitution itself under Section 7, Article IX-A.

o Section 7. Each commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its members any case or matter brought before it within sixty days from the date of its submission for decision or resolution. A case or matter is deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the rules of the commission or by the commission itself. Unless otherwise provided by this constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof.

o This constitutional provision pertains final orders, rulings and decisions of the COMELEC en banc rendered in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers. This petition assails the validity of a COMELEC Resolution which was issued under its rule-making power, to implement the provisions of BP 881 and RA 7166. Thus, the period under Rule 64 does not apply.

NB: On the OSG’s comment hat the petition is moot and academic as Resolution No. 10015 is no longer in effect, since the election period already expired on June 8, 2016, the SC noted that the issue raised herein has not been rendered moot and academic by the conclusion of the 2016 elections. The present case falls within the fourth exception that “the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.”

BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF GSIS V. VELASCO

February 2, 2011 | GR No. 170463 | Carpio, J. | Scope of Enforceability of Writ

PETITIONER: The Board of Trustees of the Government Service Insurance System and Winston F. Garcia, in his capacity as GSIS President and General Manager

RESPONDENTS: Albert M. Velasco and Mario I. Molina

DOCTRINE:

In the issuance of writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction, which may be enforced in any part of their respective regions

FACTS:

1. Petitioners charged respondents administratively with grave misconduct and placed them under preventive suspension for 90 days. Respondents were charged for their alleged participation in the demonstration held by some GSIS employees denouncing the alleged corruption in the GSIS and calling for the ouster of its president and general manager, petitioner Winston F. Garcia. Respondent Mario I. Molina requested GSIS Senior Vice President Concepcion L. Madarang for the implementation of his step increment. SVP Madarang denied the request citing GSIS Board Resolution No. 372 issued by petitioner Board of Trustees of the GSIS. Respondents also asked that they be allowed to avail of the employee privileges under GSIS Board Resolution No. 306 approving Christmas raffle benefits for all GSIS officials and employees effective year 2002. Respondents’ request was again denied because of their pending administrative case. Subsequently, petitioner GSIS Board issued Board Resolution No. 197 approving to adopt the policy that an employee with pending administrative case shall be disqualified from promotion, step increment, performance-based bonus, and other benefits and privileges during the pendency of the case.

2. Respondents filed before the trial court a petition for prohibition with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction, claiming that they were denied the benefits which GSIS employees were entitled under Resolution No. 306. They also sought to restrain and prohibit petitioners from implementing Resolution Nos. 197 and 372.

3. The trial court granted respondents’ petition for prohibition and declared respondents’ Board Resolution No. 197 and No. 372 null and void. On the issue of jurisdiction, the trial court said it can take cognizance of the petition because the "territorial area" referred to in Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court "does not necessarily delimit to a particular locality but rather to the judicial region where the office or agency is situated so that the prohibitive writ can be enforced." On the merits of the case, the trial court ruled that respondents were entitled to all employee benefits as provided under the law by reason of their employment

PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:

RTC ● Respondents filed before the RTC a petition for prohibition with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction, claiming that they were denied the benefits which GSIS employees were entitled to under the various Resolutions mentioned above.

● The RTC granted the petition for prohibition. On the issue of jurisdiction, the trial court said it can take cognizance of the petition because the "territorial area" referred to in Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court "does not necessarily delimit to a particular locality but rather to the judicial region where the office or agency is situated so that the prohibitive writ can be enforced."

CSC On Civil Service Commission’s Jurisdiction

· Petitioners: The Civil Service Commission, not the trial court, has jurisdiction over the case because it involves claims of employee benefits.

ISSUE/S:

1. Whether the nullification of GSIS Board Resolutions is beyond an action for prohibition, and a writ of preliminary injunction cannot be made permanent without a decision ordering the issuance of a writ of prohibition

RULING:

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM with MODIFICATION the 24 September 2004 Decision and the 7 October 2005 Order of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 19 in Civil Case No. 03-108389.

RATIO:

The petition for prohibition filed by respondents is a special civil action which may be filed in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan or the regional trial court, as the case may be. It is also a personal action because it does not affect the title to, or possession of real property, or interest therein. Thus, it may be commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, at the election of the plaintiff. Since respondent Velasco, plaintiff before the trial court, is a resident of the City of Manila, the petition could properly be filed in the City of Manila. The choice of venue is sanctioned by Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court.

Moreover, Section 21(1) of BP 129 provides that, Regional Trial Courts shall exercise original jurisdiction in the issuance of writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction, which may be enforced in any part of their respective regions.

Since the National Capital Judicial Region is comprised of the cities of Manila, Quezon, Pasay, Caloocan, Malabon, Mandaluyong, Makati, Pasig, Marikina, Parañaque, Las Piñas, Muntinlupa, and Valenzuela and the municipalities of Navotas, San Juan, Pateros, and Taguig, a writ of prohibition issued by the regional trial court sitting in the City of Manila, is enforceable in Pasay City. Clearly, the RTC did not err when it took cognizance of respondents’ petition for prohibition because it had jurisdiction over the action and the venue was properly laid before it.

DE LIMA v. REYES

11 January 2016 | GR No. 209330| Leonen, J | SCA (Extraordinary Remedy; Requisites and when availed of)

PETITIONER: Sec. Leila De Lima, Asst. State Prosec. Allan Mariano, Asst. State Prosec. Vimar Barcellano, Asst. State Prosec. Gerard Gaerlan

RESPONDENTS: Mario Joel Reyes

DOCTRINE:

Any question on whether the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in affirming, reversing, or modifying the resolutions of prosecutors may be the subject of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

FACTS:

1. Dr. Gerardo Ortega was a veterinarian and anchor or several radio shows in Palawan

a. On 24 January 2011, at around 10:30 am, he was shot dead inside the Baguio Wagwagan Ukay-ukay in Puerto Princesa City, Palawan

2. After a brief chase with police officers, Marlon Recamata was arrested

a. On the same day, he made an extrajudicial confession admitting that he shot Dr. Ortega

b. He also implicated Rodolfo Edrad (Edrad), Dennis Aranas, and Armando Noel, Jr.

3. On 6 February 2011, Edrad executed a Sinumpaang Salaysay before the Counter-Terrorism Division of the NBI where he alleged that it was former Palawan Governor Mario Joel Reyes who ordered the killing of Dr. Ortega

4. On 7 February 2011, Secretary of Justice Leila De Lima issued DO No. 091 creating a special panel of prosecutors (First Panel) to conduct preliminary investigation

a. The First Panel was composed of Senior Asst. Prosec. Edwin Dayog, Asst. State Prosec. Bryan Jacinto Cacha, and Asst. State Prosec. John Benedict Medina

5. On 14 February 2011, Dr. Patria Gloria Inocencio-Ortega, Dr. Ortega’s wife, filed a Supplemental Affidavit-Complaint implicating former Governor Reyes as the mastermind of her husband’s murder

a. Former Governor Reyes’s brother, Coron Mayor Mario Reyes, Jr., former Marinduque Governor Jose Carreon, former Provincial Administrator Atty. Romeo Seratubias, Marlon Recamata, Dennis Aranas, Valentin Lesias, Arturo Regalado, Armando Noel, Rodolfo Edrad, and several John and Jane Does were also implicated

6. On 8 June 2011, the First Panel concluded its preliminary investigation and issued the Resolution dismissing the Affidavit-Complaint

7. On 28 June 2011, Dr. Inocencio-Ortega filed a Motion to Re-Open Preliminary Investigation, which, among others, sought the admission of mobile phone communications between former Governor Reyes and Edrad

8. On 7 July 2011, while the Motion to Re-Open was still pending, Dr. Inocencio-Ortega filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration Ad Cautelam of the Resolution dated 8 June 2011

a. Both motions were denied by the First Panel in the Resolution dated 2 September 2011

9. On 7 September 2011, the Secretary of Justice issued DO No. 710 creating a new panel of investigators (Second Panel) to conduct a reinvestigation of the case

a. The Second Panel was composed of Asst. State Prosec. Steward Allan Mariano, Asst. State Prosec. Vimar Barcellano, and Asst. State Prosec. Gerard Gaerlan

10. DO No. 710 ordered the reinvestigation of the case “in the interest of service and due process” to address the offer of addition evidence denied by the First Panel in its Resolution dated 2 September 2911

a. The DO also revoked DO No. 091

11. Pursuant to DO No. 710, the Second Panel issued a Subpoena requiring former Governor Reyes to appear before them on 6 and 13 October 2011 and to submit his counter-affidavit and supporting evidence

12. On 29 September 2011, Dr. Inocencio-Ortega filed before the Secretary of Justice a Petition for Review (Ad Cautelam) assailing the First Panel’s Resolution dated 2 September 2011

13. On 3 October 2011, former Governor Reyes filed before the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order assailing the creation of the Second Panel

a. He argued that the Secretary of Justice gravely abused her discretion when she constituted a new panel

b. He also argued that the parties were already afforded due process and that the evidence to be addressed by the reinvestigation was neither new nor material to the case

14. On 12 March 2012, the Second Panel issued the Resolution finding probable cause and recommending the filing of informations on all accused, including former Governor Reyes

15. Branch 52 of the RTC of Palawan subsequently issued warrants of arrest on 27 March 2012

a. However, the warrants against former Governor Reyes and his brother were ineffective since the two allegedly left the country days before the warrants could be served

16. On 29 March 2012, former Governor Reyes filed before the Secretary of Justice a Petition for Review Ad Cautelam assailing the Second Panel’s Resolution dated 12 March 2012

a. On 2 April 2012, he also filed before the CA a Supplemental Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order impleading Branch 52 of the RTC of Palawan

i. He argued that the RTC could not enforce the Second Panel’s Resolution dated 12 March 2012 and proceed with the prosecution of his case since this Resolution was void

PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:

RTC ● Issued warrants of arrest against all accused

● A Supplemental Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order with the CA impleading Branch 52 of the RTC of Palawan

CA ● On 19 March 2013, in a Special Division of Five, rendered a Decision

○ DO No. 710 is null and void and reinstated the First Panel’s Resolutions

○ The Secretary should have modified or reversed the Resolutions of the First Panel pursuant to the 2000 NPS Rule on Appeal instead of issuing DO No. 710 and creating the Second Panel

○ DO No. 710 did not set aside the First Panel’s Resolutions dated 8 June 2011 and 2 September 2011

○ DO No. 710 did not give the Second Panel the power to reverse, affirm, or modify the Resolutions of the First panel; therefore, the Second Panel did not have the authority to assess the admissibility and weight of any existing or additional evidence

● Denied the Motion for Reconsideration

ISSUE/S:

1. WON the issuance of DO No. 710 was an executive function beyond the scope of a petition for certiorari or prohibition - YES

RULING:

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DISMISSED for being moot. Branch 52 of the Regional Trial Court of Palawan is DIRECTED to proceed with prosecution of Criminal Case No. 26839.

RATIO:

1. YES

● Petitions for certiorari and prohibition are directed only to tribunals that exercise judicial or quasi-judicial functions

● The determination by the Department of Justice of the existence of probable cause is not a quasi-judicial proceeding. However, the actions of the Secretary of Justice in affirming or reversing the findings of prosecutors may still be subject to judicial review if it is tainted with grave abuse of discretion

● Under the Rules, a writ of certiorari is directed against “any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions”

o A quasi-judicial function if the “action, discretion, etc., of public administrative officers or bodies, who are required to investigate facts, or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them, as a basis for their official action and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature”

o Otherwise stated, an administrative agency performs quasi-judicial functions if it renders awards, determines the rights of opposing parties, or if their decisions have the same effect as the judgment of a court

● In a preliminary investigation, the prosecutor does not determine the guilt or innocence of an accused

o The prosecutor only determines “whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial”

■ As such, the prosecutor does not perform quasi-judicial functions

● A writ of prohibition is directed against “the proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions”

o The Department of Justice is not a court of law and its officers do not perform quasi-judicial functions

o The Secretary of Justice’s review of the resolutions of prosecutors is also not a ministerial function

● An act is considered ministerial if “an officer or tribunal performs in the context of a given set of facts, in a prescribed manner and without regard for the exercise of his or its own judgment, upon the proprietary or impropriety of the act done

o In contrast, an act is considered discretionary “if the law imposes a duty upon a public officer, and gives him the right to decide how or when the duty shall be performed

● Considering that “full discretionary authority has been delegated to the executive branch in the determination of probable cause during a preliminary investigation,” the functions of the prosecutors and the Secretary of Justice are not ministerial

● Therefore, any question on whether the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in affirming, reversing, or modifying the resolutions of prosecutors may be the subject of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court

JOSON V OMBUDSMAN

Date | GR No. 2010220-21 | Ponente | Enforceability of Writ

PETITIONER: Joson

RESPONDENTS: Ombudsman

DOCTRINE:

While the prosecutor, or in this case, the investigating officers of the Office of the Ombudsman, may err or even abuse the discretion lodged in them by law, such error or abuse alone does not render their act amenable to correction and annulment by the extraordinary remedy of certiorari

FACTS:

1. Petitioner Thomas Joson filed a complaint before the Ombudsman charging respondents–Gov. Umali, consultant Atty. Abesamis, provincial treasurer Pancho, OIC Roxas with violation of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and unlawful appointment under Art. 244 of the RPC due to the alleged appointment of Atty. Abesamis as consultant-technical assistance in Nueva Ecija.

2. Petitioner alleged that Nueva Ecija, through Gov. Umali, entered in a contract of consultancy with Atty. Abesamis, which was later renewed, despite knowledge of the latter’s disqualification for appointment or re-employment, claiming that Atty. Abesamis was dismissed as a senior prosecutor of the DOJ pursuant to AO. No. 14, which carries a penalty of perpetual disqualification. Thus, his legal consultant appointment was illegal.

3. In his counter-affidavit, Gov. Umalis averred that consultancy services could not be considered as government service.

4. Atty. Abesamis, in his counter-affidavit, argued that although his dismissal was not yet final as his MR had not yet been resolved at the time of his appointment, his service with the LGU could not be construed as to create a public office.

PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:

Ombudsman ● Dismissed the criminal and administrative complaints

SC ● Petitioner filed a certiorari petition for grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Ombudsman for dismissing the case.

ISSUE/S: Whether the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it dismissed the charges –NO

RULING:

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

RATIO:

● The Ombudsman is endowed with wide latitude, in the exercise of its investigatory and prosecutory powers, to pass upon criminal complaints involving public officials and employees. Specifically, the determination of whether probable cause exists or not is a function that belongs to the Ombudsman. In other words, the Ombudsman has the discretion to determine whether a criminal case, given its attendant facts and circumstances, should be filed or not.

● It falls upon the petitioner to discharge the burden of proving there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Ombudsman, in accordance with the definition and standards set by law and jurisprudence. "Not every error in the proceedings, or every erroneous conclusion of law or fact, constitutes grave abuse of discretion. While the prosecutor, or in this case, the investigating officers of the Office of the Ombudsman, may err or even abuse the discretion lodged in them by law, such error or abuse alone does not render their act amenable to correction and annulment by the extraordinary remedy of certiorari." The requirement for judicial intrusion is still for the petitioner to show clearly that the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Joson, in this case, failed to do so. On the contrary, the record reveals that the Ombudsman carefully perused and studied the documents and meticulously weighed the evidence submitted by the parties before issuing the assailed joint resolution and joint order which strongly negated any averment that they were issued capriciously, whimsically, arbitrarily, or in a despotic manner

DAGAN V. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN

November 19, 2013 | GR No. 184083 | Perez, J. | Extraordinary Remedy; Requisites and when availed of

PETITIONER: William C. Dagan

RESPONDENTS: represented by Hon. Rogelio A. Ringpis, Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer II, Jaime Dilag y Agoncillo, Eduardo Jose y Bautista, Vergel Cruz y Aquino, Eduardo Domingo y Cosculluela, Rogelio Tandiama y Arespacochaga, Reynaldo Fernando y Galang, and Romeo Buencamino y Francisco

DOCTRINE:

Decisions of administrative or quasi-administrative agencies which are declared by law final and unappealable are subject to judicial review if they fail the test of arbitrariness, or upon proof of gross abuse of discretion, fraud or error of law. When such administrative or quasi-judicial bodies grossly misappreciate evidence of such nature as to compel a contrary conclusion, the Court will not hesitate to reverse the factual findings. Thus, the decision of the Ombudsman may be reviewed, modified or reversed via petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, on a finding that it had no jurisdiction over the complaint, or of grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction.

FACTS:

1. Petitioner is the owner of several racehorses that participated in horse races at the Philippine Racing Club, Inc. and Manila Jockey Club, Inc., while respondents were the former Chairman and Commissioners of the Philippine Racing Commission (Philracom).

2. Petitioner filed a complaint before the Office of the Ombudsman against respondents for violation of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; malversation; violation of Republic Act No. 6713 or the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards of Public Officials and Employees; falsification of public document; dishonesty and grave misconduct.

3. The complaint dealt with the following administrative charges: (1) overpayment; (2) iimproper hiring of media consultant; (3) oppressive scratching out of racehorses; (4) malversation/illegal use of funds; (5) unlawful purchases of employees' uniform and Coggins tests equipment and medicines; (6) conflict of interest and non-divestment of business interest; and (7) refusal to implement the law on drug-testing.

PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:

OMB ● Rendered a decision absolving the respondents of the charges of grave misconduct, oppression, dishonesty, serious irregularities and violation of laws.

● Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration/reinvestigation but was denied for lack of merit.

CA ● Petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.

● The CA dismissed the petition for failure of petitioner to avail of the correct mode of appeal.

○ Citing Fabian v. Hon. Desierto, the appellate court ruled that since the assailed issuances of the Ombudsman are administrative in nature, the proper remedy is through a petition for review under Rule 43.

● Petitioner sought reconsideration but the same was denied.

ISSUE/S:

1. WON the CA erred when it held that the assailed issuances of the Ombudsman are administrative in nature, hence the proper remedy is through a petition for review under Rule 43—NO

RULING:

WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit.

RATIO:

● Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 or otherwise known as "The Ombudsman Act of 1989," provides that Any order, directive or decision imposing the penalty of public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one (1) month's salary shall be final and unappealable.

o The above provision logically implies that where the respondent is absolved of the charge, the decision shall be final and unappealable. Although the provision does not mention absolution, it can be inferred that since decisions imposing light penalties are final and unappealable, with greater reason should decisions absolving the respondent of the charge be final and unappealable.

● However, petitioner is not left without any remedy. In Republic v. Francisco, the Court ruled that decisions of administrative or quasi-administrative agencies which are declared by law final and unappealable are subject to judicial review if they fail the test of arbitrariness, or upon proof of gross abuse of discretion, fraud or error of law. When such administrative or quasi-judicial bodies grossly misappreciate evidence of such nature as to compel a contrary conclusion, the Court will not hesitate to reverse the factual findings. Thus, the decision of the Ombudsman may be reviewed, modified or reversed via petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, on a finding that it had no jurisdiction over the complaint, or of grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction.

o That said, there still is the question which court has jurisdiction over a certiorari petition under Rule 65.

■ Considering that a special civil action for certiorari is within the concurrent original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals, such petition should be initially filed with the Court of Appeals in observance of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. The Court reiterated in Heirs of Teofilo Gaudiano v. Benemerito, that concurrence of jurisdiction should not to be taken to mean as granting parties seeking any of the writs an absolute and unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to which an application will be directed. It is an established policy that a direct invocation of the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only when there are special, important and compelling reasons, clearly and specifically spelled out in the petition.

● In the same vein, while petitioner employed the correct mode of review in this case, i.e., a special civil action for certiorari before the Court of Appeals, petitioner failed to show grave abuse of discretion committed by the Office of the Ombudsman. Hence, the petition must fail.

ESTRADA vs. DISIERTO ET AL.

December 9, 2004 | GR No. 156160 | CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:| Extraordinary Remedy; Requisites and when availed of |En Banc

PETITIONER: ESTRADA

RESPONDENTS: HON. ANIANO A. DESIERTO, in his capacity as Ombudsman, PAUL ELMER CLEMENTE, JENNIFER A. AGUSTIN-SE, PELAGIO S. APOSTOL and ROBERTO E. KALLOS, in their capacities as EPIB officers, LILIAN B. HEFTI, PACITA M. EQUILLOS, ARCHANGEL A. ALBIENTO, ANICETO T. DAGDAG, JR., RIZA P. DEL ROSARIO, VICTOR Q. LIM and CATHERINE WEIR

Former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada's complaint against BIR officials and Citibank officers for violating the Foreign Currency Deposits Act was dismissed by the Office of the Ombudsman, and the Court of Appeals ruled that it does not have jurisdiction to entertain original petitions for certiorari in criminal cases, with the proper remedy being to file an original action for certiorari with the Supreme Court.

FACTS:

1. On January 23, 2001, the BIR placed Estrada's foreign currency deposit account at Citibank Greenhills Branch under constructive distraint.

2. Estrada filed a complaint against BIR officials and Citibank officers on January 31, 2001, alleging that they violated the Foreign Currency Deposits Act.

3. The Office of the Ombudsman, through the Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation Bureau (EPIB), issued a resolution on September 17, 2001, recommending the dismissal of Estrada's complaint for lack of probable cause.

4. On November 19, 2001, the Acting Director of the Office of the Chief Legal Counsel approved the EPIB's recommendation.

5. Estrada filed a motion for reconsideration on February 15, 2002, which was denied on February 26, 2002.

6. He then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals on July 12, 2002, which was dismissed on July 29, 2002, for lack of jurisdiction.

7. Estrada filed a motion for reconsideration, which was also dismissed on November 20, 2002.

8. He then filed a petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court on December 20, 2002.

PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:

OMBUDSMAN ● On 17 September 2001, the Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation Bureau (EPIB) of the Office of the Ombudsman issued a Resolution recommending the dismissal of the aforesaid complaint for want of probable cause to indict respondent bank and BIR officials;

● On 19 November 2001, Paul Elmer Clemente, Legal Counsel, Acting Director–Office of the Chief Legal Counsel (OCLC), issued a Memorandum approving EPIB’s recommendation, a copy of which was received by petitioner on 01 February 2002;

● On 15 February 2002, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of said Resolution, upon the ground that errors of fact and law were committed prejudicial to the interest of petitioner;

CA ● On 12 July 2002, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 654 before the Court of Appeals;

● On 29 July 2002, the Court of Appeals promulgated the assailed resolution dismissing the petition on the ground that it did not fall under its jurisdiction pursuant to Rep. Act No. 6770. The Court of Appeals held —

● Considering the allegations of the petition for certiorari, the Court Resolved to DISMISS the same in the light of Our view that the petition does not fall under any law as coming within the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals.

● Under the Fabian versus Desierto case (295 SCRA 470), there is the remedy of appeal from the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases, in line with the regulatory philosophy adopted in appeals from quasi-judicial agencies in Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Stated in another way, the Court of Appeals is now vested with exclusive appellate jurisdiction involving a review of decisions or orders of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases only.

. . .

● Since jurisdiction must exist as a matter of law, and there is no law whatsoever expressly extending the remedy of this so-called special civil action of certiorari from the Office of the Ombudsman to the Court of Appeals, petitioner in this case could not invoke this remedy of certiorari. By the passage of Republic Act No. 6770, this Court is expressly divested of any jurisdiction over the subject matter of these controversies.5

● On 15 August 2002, petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the Court of Appeals resolution;

● On 20 November 2002, the Court of Appeals dismissed the motion for reconsideration reiterating its earlier ruling on the ground that petitioner’s arguments were not substantial enough to warrant the reversal of the earlier resolution;

● On 11 December 2002, petitioner filed with this Court a Motion for Extension of Time of fifteen (15) days to file Petition for Review which was granted on 14 January 2003; and

● The instant petition for review on certiorari was filed on 20 December 2002 praying that the Court of Appeals take cognizance of the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 filed therein by petitioner.

ISSUE/S:

1. Whether the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to entertain original petitions for certiorari from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in criminal cases.

RULING:

NO The Court of Appeals does not have jurisdiction to entertain original petitions for certiorari from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in criminal cases.

The proper remedy for aggrieved parties is to file an original action for certiorari with the Supreme Court.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit and the resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 71722 dated 29 July 2002 and 20 November 2002 are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

● The Court based its ruling on the principle of stare decisis, stating that the issue of jurisdiction had already been resolved in previous cases.

● The Court cited previous cases, including Fabian v. Desierto and Mendoza-Arce v. Office of the Ombudsman, which established that the remedy of certiorari under Rule 65 should be filed with the Supreme Court and not with the Court of Appeals.

● The Court emphasized that a constitutional issue should only be passed upon if essential to the decision of a case or controversy.

● The Court held that the Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing Estrada's petition for certiorari for lack of jurisdiction.

● The Court found no clear case of abuse of discretion on the part of the public respondents in dismissing Estrada's complaint.

● The Court deferred to the policy of non-interference in the Ombudsman's exercise of discretion in conducting preliminary investigations.

● The Court stated that it will only interfere in the Ombudsman's findings of fact and conclusions of law in clear cases of grave abuse of discretion.

● Therefore, the Court dismissed Estrada's petition for lack of merit and affirmed the resolutions of the Court of Appeals.

FABIAN V. DESIERTO

16 September 1998 | GG.R. No. 129742 | Regalado, J | | Extraordinary Remedy; Requisites and when availed of Writ

PETITIONER: Teresita G. Fabian

RESPONDENTS: HON. ANIANO A. DESIERTO, in his capacity as Ombudsman; HON. JESUS F. GUERRERO, in his capacity as Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon; and NESTOR V. AGUSTIN,

DOCTRINE:

Only the procedure by which the appeal is to be made or decided has been changed. The rationale for this is that no litigant has a vested right in a particular remedy, which may be changed by substitution without impairing vested rights, hence he can have none in rules of procedure which relate to the remedy.

FACTS:

1. Promat participated in the bidding for government construction project including those under the FMED, and private respondent. In the course of their amorous relationship, private respondents gifted PROMAT with public works contracts and interceded for it in problems concerning the same in his office. Later, petitioner tried to terminate their relationship, private respondent refused and resisted her attempts to do so to the extent of employing acts of harassment, intimidation and threats. An administrative case was filed against Agustin which eventually led an appeal to the Ombudsman. It was ruled in favor of Agustin and he said the decision is final and executory.

2. Fabian appealed the case to the Supreme Court. She averred that Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989) is unconstitutional. She points out that under Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07 (Rules of Procedure of the office of the Ombudsman),[2] when a respondent is absolved of the charges in an administrative proceeding decision of the ombudsman is final and unappealable.

3. She accordingly submits that the office of the ombudsman has no authority under the law to restrict, in the manner provided in its aforesaid Rules, the right of appeal allowed by Republic Act No. 6770, nor to limit the power of review of this Court. Because of the aforecited provision in those Rules of Procedure, she claims that she found it "necessary to take an alternative recourse under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, because of the doubt it creates on the availability of appeals under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:

CSC ● The Court discusses the jurisdiction of both the Civil Service Commission and the Office of the Ombudsman over the administrative liability of public officials.

● It notes that in some cases, the same administrative case could fall under the jurisdiction of both bodies.

● The Court suggests that consolidation of cases in the Court of Appeals would be more efficient

SC ● The Court transfers the case to the Court of Appeals for final disposition.

●

ISSUE/S:

1. Can the Court resolve the constitutionality of Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 not raised in the trial? — YES

2. Is Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 unconstitutional? — YES

3. Whether or not administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court.

RULING:

Thus, it has been generally held that rules or statutes involving a transfer of cases from one court to another, are procedural and remedial merely and that, as such, they are applicable to actions pending at the time the statute went into effect or, in the case at bar, when its invalidity was declared. Accordingly, even from the standpoint of jurisdiction ex hypothesi, the validity of the transfer of appeals in said cases to the Court of Appeals can be sustained.

WHEREFORE, Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989), together with Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07 (Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman), and any other provision of law or issuance implementing the aforesaid Act and insofar as they provide for appeals in administrative disciplinary cases from the Office of the Ombudsman to the Supreme Court, are hereby declared INVALID and of no further force and effect.

RATIO:

YES

● Constitutional questions, not raised in the regular and orderly procedure in the trial are ordinarily rejected unless the jurisdiction of the court below or that of the appellate court is involved in which case it may be raised at any time or on the court’s own motion. The Court ex mero motu may take cognizance of lack of jurisdiction at any point in the case where that fact is developed. The court has a clearly recognized right to determine its own jurisdiction in any proceeding

YES

● Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 cannot validly authorize an appeal to this Court from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases. It consequently violates the proscription in Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution against a law which increases the appellate jurisdiction of this Court. No countervailing argument has been cogently presented to justify such disregard of the constitutional prohibition which, as correctly explained in First Lepanto Ceramics, Inc. vs. The Court of Appeals, et al. was intended to give this Court a measure of control over cases placed under its appellate jurisdiction. Otherwise, the indiscriminate enactment of legislation enlarging its appellate jurisdiction would unnecessarily burden the Court.

● As a consequence of our ratiocination that Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 should be struck down as unconstitutional, and in line with the regulatory philosophy adopted in appeals from quasi-judicial agencies in the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, appeals from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases should be taken to the Court of Appeals under the provisions of Rule 43.

● In determining whether a rule prescribed by the Supreme Court, for the practice and procedure of the lower courts, abridges, enlarges, or modifies any substantive right, the test is whether the rule really regulates procedure, that is, the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly administering remedy and redress for a disregard or infraction of them. If the rule takes away a vested right, it is no; procedural. If the rule creates a right such as the right to appeal, it may be classified as a substantive matter; but if it operates as a means of implementing an existing right then the rule deals merely with procedure.

● In the situation under consideration, a transfer by the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power, of pending cases involving a review of decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary actions to the Court of Appeals which shall now be vested with exclusive appellate jurisdiction thereover, relates to procedure only. This is so because it is not the right to appeal of an aggrieved party which is affected by the law. That right has been preserved. Only the procedure by which the appeal is to be made or decided has been changed. The rationale for this is that no litigant has a vested right in a particular remedy, which may be changed by substitution without impairing vested rights, hence he can have none in rules of procedure which relate to the remedy.

No. Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989) pertinently provides that:

In all administrative diciplinary cases, orders, directives or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a petition for certiorari within ten (10) days from receipt of the written notice of the order, directive or decision or denial of the motion for reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

It cannot validly authorize an appeal to this Court from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases. It consequently violates the proscription in Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution against a law which increases the Appellate jurisdiction of this Court. No countervailing argument has been cogently presented to justify such disregard of the constitutional prohibition which, as correctly explained in First Leparto Ceramics, Inc. vs. The Court of Appeals, et al. was intended to give this Court a measure of control over cases placed under its appellate Jurisdiction. Otherwise, the indiscriminate enactment of legislation enlarging its appellate jurisdiction would unnecessarily burden the Court.

xxx

As a consequence of our ratiocination that Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 should be struck down as unconstitutional, and in line with the regulatory philosophy adopted in appeals from quasi-judicial agencies in the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, appeals from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases should be taken to the Court of Appeals under the provisions of Rule 43.

There is an intimation in the pleadings, however, that said Section 27 refers to appellate jurisdiction which, being substantive in nature, cannot be disregarded by this Court under its rule-making power, especially if it results in a diminution, increase or modification of substantive rights. Obviously, however, where the law is procedural in essence and purpose, the foregoing consideration would not pose a proscriptive issue against the exercise of the rule-making power of this Court. This brings to fore the question of whether Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 is substantive or procedural.

It will be noted that no definitive line can be drawn between those rules or statutes which are procedural, hence within the scope of this Court's rule-making power, and those which are substantive. In fact, a particular rule may be procedural in one context and substantive in another.[29] It is admitted that what is procedural and what is substantive is frequently a question of great difficulty.[30] It is not, however, an insurmountable problem if a rational and pragmatic approach is taken within the context of our own procedural and jurisdictional system.

In determining whether a rule prescribed by the Supreme Court, for the practice and procedure of the lower courts, abridges, enlarges, or modifies any substantive right, the test is whether the rule really regulates procedure, that is, the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly administering remedy and redress for a disregard or infraction of them.[31] If the rule takes away a vested right, it is not procedural. If the rule creates a right such as the right to appeal, it may be classified as a substantive matter; but if it operates as a means o implementing an existing right then the rule deals merely with procedure.[32]

In the situation under consideration, a transfer by the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power, of pending cases involving a review of decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary actions to the Court of Appeals which shall now be vested with exclusive appellate jurisdiction thereover, relates to procedure only.[33] This is so because it is not the right to appeal of an aggrieved party which is affected by the law. That right has been preserved. Only the procedure by which the appeal is to be made or decided has been changed. The rationale for this is that litigant has a vested right in a particular remedy, which may be changed by substitution without impairing vested rights, hence he can have none in rules of procedure which relate to the remedy.[34]

Furthermore, it cannot be said that transfer of appellate jurisdiction to the Court of Appeals in this case is an act of creating a new right of appeal because such power of the Supreme Court to transfer appeals to subordinate appellate courts is purely a procedural and not a substantive power. Neither can we consider such transfer as impairing a vested right because the parties have still a remedy and still a competent tribunal to administer that remedy.[35]

Thus, it has been generally held that rules or statutes involving a transfer of cases from one court to another, are procedural and remedial merely and that, as such, they are applicable to actions pending at the time the statute went into effect[36] or, in the case at bar, when its invalidity was declared. Accordingly, even from the standpoint of jurisdiction ex hypothesi the validity of the transfer of appeals in said cases to the Court of Appeals can be sustained.

Ong v. People

October 9, 2000 | GR No. 140904 | Ostrand | Certiorari as an Extraordinary Remedy; Requisites and when availed of

DOCTRINE:

GR: The extraordinary writ of certiorari is not available to challenge the denial of interlocutory orders (e.g. denial of motion for demurrer like in this case).

XPN: When the assailed interlocutory orders are patently erroneous or issued with grave abuse of discretion, the remedy of certiorari lies.

FACTS:

1. In February 1993, Zeny Alfonso purchased a paper bag making machine for P362,000 from the Solid Cement Corporation. When she went to the corporation’s Antipolo plant, no machine could be given to her as the machine sold had been earlier mortgaged to a creditor, who refused to release the mortgage. The petitioners offered to return the money paid by Mrs. Alfonso but she refused and instead filed a criminal complaint.

2. The City Prosecutor dismissed the complaint on the ground that liability, if any, would be civil and not criminal in nature. This dismissal was, however, reversed by the Department of Justice. In October 1994, an Information for estafa and other deceit based on Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code was filed with the MeTC of Makati City.

3. After pre-trial, the prosecution presented as its sole witness complainant Zeny Alfonso. The prosecution then formally offered its documentary evidence and rested its case. The admissibility of these documents was questioned by petitioners. The disputed documents are alleged photocopies. The defense objected to the admission of these pieces of evidence, claiming that the same were only unauthenticated photocopies of the originals.

4. In July 1996, petitioners filed a motion for leave to file a demurrer to evidence and attaching their demurrer as well as claiming that the uncertified photocopies bearing unidentified or unauthenticated signatures were inadmissible in evidence.

5. The MeTC denied the motion.

6. The petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition, the RTC reversed the ruling of MeTC.

7. Meanwhile, the CA reversed the decision of RTC.

ISSUE: WON the CA is correct that petitioners, after the denial by the MeTC of their demurrer to evidence, should not have filed a petition for certiorari with the RTC but presented their evidence or appealed the same to the RTC — NO, the case is one of the exceptions to the general rule that an interlocutory order cannot be subject of certiorari since the present case involves an allegation of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the lower court.

RULING:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals dated April 8, 1999 setting aside the Regional Trial Court's resolution dated May 19, 1997, as well as respondent appellate court's Resolution dated November 16, 1999 denying reconsideration of its decision, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The dismissal of Criminal Case No. 157290 entitled "People of the Philippines v. Rene S. Ong, et al. is AFFIRMED, without prejudice to the filing of an appropriate civil action.

SO ORDERED.

RATIO:

NO, the case is one of the exceptions to the general rule that an interlocutory order cannot be subject of certiorari since the present case involves an allegation of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the lower court.

● The general rule that the extraordinary writ of certiorari is not available to challenge (the denial of the demurrer to evidence) may be subject to exceptions. When the assailed interlocutory orders are patently erroneous or issued with grave abuse of discretion, the remedy of certiorari lies.

● Likewise, in Gutib v. Court of Appeals (312 SCRA 365 [1999]), we declared that “the rule is not absolute and admits of an exception. Thus where, as in the instant case, the denial of the motion to dismiss by the trial court was tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the aggrieved party may assail the order of denial on certiorari”

● In the instant case, there is no competent and sufficient evidence to sustain the indictment or to support a verdict of guilt against petitioners. As pointed out by petitioners, all documentary evidence submitted by the private complainant were uncertified photocopies of certain documents, the signatures on which were either unidentified or unauthenticated.

● A painstaking perusal of the testimony of the prosecution’s sole witness reveals, however, that the due execution and authenticity of these documents were never proved. In fact, the prosecution took no effort to prove the due execution and authenticity of these documents during the presentation of their sole witness. Absent such proof, these documents are incompetent as evidence. It is elementary that this Court cannot rightly appreciate firsthand the genuineness of an unverified and unidentified document; much less, accord it evidentiary value (People v. Sumalpong, 284 SCRA 464 [1998]). In People v. Gamiao (240 SCRA 254 [1995]), we declared, “[p]arenthetically, appellant failed to present in evidence the originals or the xerox copies of the documents hereinbefore discussed. The requirements for the admission of such secondary evidence in court were not satisfied. The Rules of Court provide that private documents require proof of their due execution and authentication before they can be received in evidence. When there is no such proof, the substitutionary documents may be excluded.”

● With our ruling that the documentary evidence submitted by the prosecution is inadmissible in evidence, the prosecution’s evidence against petitioners is grossly and patently insufficient to support a finding of guilt. Withal, it was grave abuse of discretion for the MeTC to consider that there was a prima facie case against petitioners warranting a trial on the merits given the paucity of evidence against petitioners.

● Moreover, in ruling against petitioners, the appellate court also held that petitioners could not avail of their constitutional right against double jeopardy, allegedly because the regional trial court's reversal of the MeTC denial of their demurrer to evidence is a "fruit" emerging from grave abuse of discretion. It declared that Judge Guadiz could not decide in the special civil action filed before him whether or not the evidence adduced by the prosecution had established beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of petitioners, factual matters not being proper for consideration in certiorari proceedings.

● It is true that the prerogative writ of certiorari does not lie to correct every controversial interlocutory order but is confined merely to questions of jurisdiction. Its function is to keep an inferior court within its jurisdiction and to relieve persons from arbitrary acts, meaning acts which courts or judges have no power or authority in law to perform. It is not designed to correct procedural errors or the court's erroneous findings and conclusions.

o However, certiorari can be properly resorted to where the factual findings complained of are not supported by the evidence on record.

● As earlier observed, with the inadmissibility of the prosecution's documentary evidence, the trial court's finding of a prima facie case against petitioners is glaringly unsupported by the sole testimony of private complainant, hence the RTC resolution reversing the MeTC's denial of the demurrer to evidence cannot be said to be the "fruit" of grave abuse of discretion. Since the factual findings of the MeTC are devoid of support in the evidence on record, it was proper for the RTC to review said findings. Moreover, in order to determine whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion in denying the demurrer to evidence, the RTC had to inquire into the admissibility and sufficiency of the documentary and testimonial evidence submitted by the prosecution.

o With the grant by the RTC of the demurrer to evidence, the same constituted a valid acquittal and any further prosecution of petitioners on the same charge would expose them to being put twice in jeopardy for the same offense. A dismissal of a criminal case by the grant of a demurrer to evidence is not appealable as the accused would thereby be placed in double jeopardy.

● Lastly, it has been said that a wide breadth of discretion is granted a court of justice in certiorari proceedings. The cases in which certiorari will issue cannot be defined, because to do so would be to destroy its comprehensiveness and usefulness. So wide is the discretion that in the exercise of our superintending control over other courts, we are to be guided by all the circumstances of each particular case "as the ends of justice may require."

o The case at bar presents one such instance calling for this appropriate remedy. As discussed, petitioners have satisfactorily demonstrated in their demurrer that the prosecution failed to prove the crime charged against them, hence, there remains no reason to hold them for trial. Indeed, an accused is always presumed innocent until the contrary is proved. Parenthetically, petitioners have the right to be protected against hasty, malicious, and oppressive prosecution; to be secure from an open and public accusation of a crime; and, from the trouble, expenses and anxiety of a public trial.

GERARDO F. RIVERA, ET AL. vs. HON. EDGARDO ESPIRITU, ET AL.

. January 23, 2002 | GR No. 135547 | J. Quisumbing | Special Civil Actions

PETITIONER: GERARDO F. RIVERA, ALFRED A. RAMISO, AMBROCIO PALAD, DENNIS R. ARANAS, DAVID SORIMA, JR., JORGE P. DELA ROSA, and ISAGANI ALDEA

RESPONDENTS: HON. EDGARDO ESPIRITU in his capacity as Chairman of the PAL Inter-Agency Task Force created under Administrative Order No. 16; HON. BIENVENIDO LAGUESMA in his capacity as Secretary of Labor and Employment; PHILIPPINE AIRLINES (PAL), LUCIO TAN, HENRY SO UY, ANTONIO V. OCAMPO, MANOLO E. AQUINO, JAIME J. BAUTISTA, and ALEXANDER O. BARRIENTOS

DOCTRINE:

The essential requisites for a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 are: (1) the writ is directed against a tribunal, a board, or an officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) such tribunal, board, or officer has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. For writs of prohibition, the requisites are: (1) the impugned act must be that of a "tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions"; and (2) there is no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law."

FACTS:

1. On June 5, 1998, PAL pilots went on a three-week strike, causing serious losses to the financially beleaguered flag carrier. As a result, PAL's financial situation went from bad to worse.

2. Faced with bankruptcy, PAL adopted a rehabilitation plan and downsized its labor force by more than one-third.

3. On July 22, 1998, PALEA went on strike to protest the retrenchment measures. The strike ended four days later, when PAL and PALEA agreed to a more systematic reduction in PAL's work force and the payment of separation benefits to all retrenched employees.

4. On August 28, 1998, then Pres.Estrada issued A.O. No. 16 creating an Inter-Agency Task Force to address the problems of the ailing flag carrier.

5. Public respondent Edgardo Espiritu, then the Secretary of Finance, was designated chairman of the Task Force.

6. On September 4, 1998, PAL management submitted to the Task Force an offer by private respondent Lucio Tan, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of PAL, of a plan to transfer shares of stock to its employees.

7. On September 10, 1998, the Board of Directors of PALEA voted to accept Tan's offer and requested the Task Force's assistance in implementing the same. Union members, however, rejected Tan's offer.

8. On September 17, 1998, PAL informed the Task Force that it was shutting down its operations effective September 23, 1998, claiming that given its labor problems, rehabilitation was no longer feasible, and hence, the airline had no alternative but to close shop.

9. On September 18, 1998, PALEA sought the intervention of the Office of the President to prevent the imminent closure of PAL. On September 19, 1998, PALEA informed the DOLE that it had no objection to a referendum on the Tan's offer.

10. 2,799 out of 6,738 PALEA members cast their votes. Of the votes cast, 1,055 voted in favor of Tan's offer while 1,371 rejected it. On September 23, 1998, PAL ceased its operations and sent notices of termination to its employees.

11. Two days later, the PALEA board wrote President Estrada anew, seeking his intervention. PALEA offered a 10-year moratorium on strikes and similar actions and a waiver of some of the economic benefits in the existing CBA. Tan, however, rejected this counter-offer.

12. Among the signatories to the letter were herein petitioners Rivera, Ramiso, and Aranas, as officers and/or members of the PALEA Board of Directors.

13. PAL management accepted the PALEA proposal and the necessary referendum was scheduled. On October 2, 1998, 5,324 PALEA members cast their votes in a DOLE-supervised referendum. Of the votes cast, 61% were in favor of accepting the PAL-PALEA agreement, while 34% rejected it.

14. On October 7, 1998, PAL resumed domestic operations.

15. On the same date, seven officers and members of PALEA filed this instant petition for certiorari to annul the September 27, 1998 agreement entered into between PAL and PALEA.

PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:

ISSUE/S: WON an original action for certiorari and prohibition the proper remedy - NO

RULING:

In sum, we are of the view that the PAL-PALEA agreement dated September 27, 1998, is a valid exercise of the freedom to contract. Under the principle of inviolability of contracts guaranteed by the Constitution, the contract must be upheld.

WHEREFORE, there being no grave abuse of discretion shown, the instant petition is DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.

RATIO:

1. The essential requisites for a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 are:

● (1) the writ is directed against a tribunal, a board, or an officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions;

● (2) such tribunal, board, or officer has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and

● (3) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

2. For writs of prohibition, the requisites are:

● (1) the impugned act must be that of a "tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions;" and

● (2) there is no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law."

3. The assailed agreement is clearly not the act of a tribunal, board, officer, or person exercising judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial functions. It is not the act of public respondents Finance Secretary Edgardo Espiritu and Labor Secretary Bienvenido Laguesma as functionaries of the Task Force.

4. Neither is there a judgment, order, or resolution of either public respondents involved. Instead, what exists is a contract between a private firm and one of its labor unions, albeit entered into with the assistance of the Task Force.

5. The first and second requisites for certiorari and prohibition are therefore not present in this case.

6. Furthermore, there is available to petitioners a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. While the petition is denominated as one for certiorari and prohibition, its object is actually the nullification of the PAL-PALEA agreement.

7. As such, petitioners' proper remedy is an ordinary civil action for annulment of contract, an action which properly falls under the jurisdiction of the regional trial courts.

8. Neither certiorari nor prohibition is the remedy in the present case. Petitioners further assert that public respondents were partial towards PAL management. They allegedly pressured the PALEA leaders into accepting the agreement.

9. Petitioners ask this Court to examine the circumstances that led to the signing of said agreement. This would involve review of the facts and factual issues raised in a special civil action for certiorari which is not the function of this Court.

10. Nevertheless, considering the prayer of the parties principally we shall look into the substance of the petition, in the higher interest of justice and in view of the public interest involved, inasmuch as what is at stake here is industrial

UY v. SANTIAGO

July 31, 2000 | GR No.131237 | Ynares-Santiago, J. | Extraordinary Remedy; Requisites and when availed of

PETITIONERS: ROSENDO T. UY, MEDRING SIOCO, BOBBY BERNARD S. UY and LUISA T. UY

RESPONDENTS: HONORABLE PEDRO T. SANTIAGO, as Judge of Branch 101, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City; BENITO PALOMADO, PIO BERMEJO and SANTOS NGALIO

DOCTRINE:

Finding the issuance of the writ of execution pending appeal a clear duty of respondent Judge under the law, mandamus can and should lie against him. Indeed, mandamus will lie to compel a judge or other public official to perform a duty specifically enjoined by law once it is shown that the judge or public official has unlawfully neglected the performance thereof.

FACTS:

1. In this case, respondent Judge rendered a decision in favor of petitioners in four consolidated ejectment cases. Three of the cases were appealed, in which Branch 101 of RTC Quezon City affirmed in toto the decision of the respondent Judge.

2. A week after, petitioners filed a Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution Pending appeal, which was denied by the respondent Judge.

PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:

RTC ● As basis for denying petitioners' Motion for Execution Pending Appeal, respondent Judge cited private respondents' compliance with the requirements to stay immediate execution of judgment, namely: (1) perfection of appeal; (2) filing of a supersedeas bond; and (3) periodic deposit of the rentals falling due during the pendency of the appeal.

● Hence, the instant Petition for Mandamus for the issuance of a writ of execution pending appeal, which according to petitioners is the mandatory duty of respondent Judge.

ISSUE/S:

1. Whether or not decisions of RTCs in appealed ejectment cases pending appeal with the Court of Appeals are immediately executory and cannot be stayed. – YES.

RULING:

WHEREFORE, for the reasons aforestated, the instant Petition for Mandamus is hereby GRANTED. The Orders, dated August 12, 1997 and October 7, 1997 issued by respondent Judge Pedro T. Santiago in Civil Cases Nos. Q-30362-64 are hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent Judge is hereby ordered to cause the immediate issuance of a writ of execution pending appeal in said Civil Cases Nos. Q-30362-64. No pronouncement as to costs.

RATIO:

● This issue of whether or not decisions of Regional Trial Courts in appealed ejectment cases pending appeal with the Court of Appeals are immediately executory and cannot be stayed has been answered in the recent case of Northcastle Properties & Estate Corp. v. Judge Paas.

● From the foregoing, it is clear that it is only execution of the Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Courts' judgment pending appeal with the Regional Trial Court which may be stayed by a compliance with the requisites provided in Rule 70, Section 19 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure. On the other hand, once the Regional Trial Court has rendered a decision in its appellate jurisdiction, such decision shall, under Rule 70, Section 21 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure, be immediately executory, without prejudice to an appeal, via a Petition for Review, before the Court of Appeals and/or Supreme Court.

● Private respondents' argument that execution pending appeal would deprive them of their right to due process of law as it would render moot and academic their Petition for Review before the Court of Appeals deserves scant consideration. We must stress that what is in issue is only the propriety of issuing a writ of execution pending appeal. It is not conclusive on the right of possession of the land and shall not have any effect on the merits of the ejectment suit still on appeal. Moreover, it must be remembered that ejectment cases are summary in nature for they involve perturbation of social order which must be restored as promptly as possible.

● Finding the issuance of the writ of execution pending appeal a clear duty of respondent Judge under the law, mandamus can and should lie against him. Indeed, mandamus will lie to compel a judge or other public official to perform a duty specifically enjoined by law once it is shown that the judge or public official has unlawfully neglected the performance thereof.

SEGOVIA v. CLIMATE CHANGE COMMISSION

March 7, 2017 | GR No. 211010 | Caguioa, J. | Writ of Kalikasan

PETITIONER: VICTORIA SEGOVIA, RUEL LAGO, CLARIESSE JAMI CHAN, REPRESENTING THE CARLESS PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, et al.

RESPONDENTS: THE CLIMATE CHANGE COMMISSION, REPRESENTED BY ITS CHAIRMAN, HIS EXCELLENCY BENIGNO S. AQUINO III, et al.

DOCTRINE:

Under the RPEC, the writ of kalikasan is an extraordinary remedy covering environmental damage of such magnitude that will prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces. It is designed for a narrow but special purpose: to accord a stronger protection for environmental rights, aiming, among others, to provide a speedy and effective resolution of a case involving the violation of one's constitutional right to a healthful and balanced ecology that transcends political and territorial boundaries, and to address the potentially exponential nature of large-scale ecological threats.

FACTS:

1. Petitioners are Carless People of the Philippines, parents, representing their children, who in turn represent "Children of the Future, and Car-owners who would rather not have cars if good public transportation were safe, convenient, accessible, available, and reliable." They claim that they are entitled to the issuance of the extraordinary writ of kalikasan and continuing mandamus due to the alleged failure and refusal of respondents to perform an act mandated by environmental laws, and violation of environmental laws resulting in environmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health and property of all Filipinos.

2. Respondents assert that petitioners are not entitled to a writ of kalikasan because they failed to show that the public respondents are guilty of an unlawful act or omission; state the environmental law/s violated; show environmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants of two or more cities; and prove that non implementation of Road Sharing Principle will cause environmental damage.

ISSUE/S:

1. WON a Writ of Kalikasan should issue - NO

RULING:

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

RATIO:

1. NO

● We find that the petitioners failed to establish the requisites for the issuance of the writs prayed for.

o For a writ of kalikasan to issue, the following requisites must concur:

1. there is an actual or threatened violation of the constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology;

2. the actual or threatened violation arises from an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or private individual or entity; and

3. the actual or threatened violation involves or will lead to an environmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces.

● It is well-settled that a party claiming the privilege for the issuance of a writ of kalikasan has to show that a law, rule or regulation was violated or would be violated.

○ In this case, apart from repeated invocation of the constitutional right to health and to a balanced and healthful ecology and bare allegations that their right was violated, the petitioners failed to show that public respondents are guilty of any unlawful act or omission that constitutes a violation of the petitioners' right to a balanced and healthful ecology.

○ In fact, apart from adducing expert testimony on the adverse effects of air pollution on public health, the petitioners did not go beyond mere allegation in establishing the unlawful acts or omissions on the part of the public respondents that have a causal link or reasonable connection to the actual or threatened violation of the constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology of the magnitude contemplated under the Rules, as required of petitions of this nature.

GREENPEACE SOUTHEAST ASIA (PHILS).

8 December 2015 | GR Nos. 209271, 209276, 209301 & 209430 | J. Perlas - Bernabe | Writ of Kalikasan

PETITIONER: International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-Biotech Applications, Inc.

RESPONDENTS: Greenpeace Southeast Asia (Philippines)

DOCTRINE:

Rule 20 of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases states that "[w]hen there is a lack of full scientific certainty in establishing a causal link between human activity and environmental effect, the court shall apply the precautionary principle in resolving the case before it,".

FACTS:

From 2007 to 2009, International Service for the Acquisition of AgriBiotech Applications, Inc. (ISAAA) and the University of the Philippines Los Baños (UPLB) conducted a contained experiment for the Bt Talong experiment under the supervision of the National Committee on Biosafety of the Philippines (NCBP).

“BT Talong” are eggplants containing bacillus thuringiensis. Bacillus thuringiensis is a soil bacterium which produces the Cry1Ac protein that is toxic to the lepidopteran larvae. The lepidopterean larvae is the most destructive pest to eggplants. Hence, the experiment was created to control pest destruction to eggplants so that they can be fully maximized.

In 2010, the BCBP issued a Certificate after the contained experiment certifying that all biosafety measures where complied with. The Bureau of Plant Industries also issued two Biosafety Permits which will expire in 2012 for the commencement of the field testing.

By 2012, after the expiration of the Biosafety Permits and the termination of the field testing, Greenpeace Southeast Asia – Philippines, Magsasaka At Siyentipiko Sa Pagpapaunlad Ng Agrikultura (MASIPAG) filed a Petition for Writ of Continuing Mandamus and Writ of Kalikasan and for a Temporary Environmental

Protection Order against ISAAA alleging that the Bt Talong field trials violated their right to health and a balanced ecology.

In 2015, the Supreme Court En Banc speaking through Justice Villarama, Jr., granted the petition of Greenpeace and permanently enjoined the conduct of Bt talong field trials. It held that the precautionary principle applies because the risk of harm from the field trials of Bt Talong remains uncertain and there exists a possibility of serious and irreversible harm. It found that since eggplants are a staple vegetable in the country that is mostly grown by small-scale farmers who are poor and marginalized; thus, given the country's rich biodiversity, the consequences of contamination and genetic pollution would be disastrous and irreversible.

DAO 08-2002, the guidelines followed by ICAAA and UPLB in conducting the contained experiment and field testing, was rendered void for failing to consider the provisions in the National Biosafety Framework under EO No. 514. It was declared unconstitutional for not heeding the requirement of public participation in all stages of biosafety decision-making, pursuant to the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, also enshrined in National Biosafety Framework under EO No. 514; and that field testing should have been subjected to Environmental Impact Assessment, pursuant to Cartagena Protocol.

The Supreme Court in 2015 also did not find the issue moot. It found the case of exceptional character and paramount public interest is involved, and it is likewise capable of repetition yet evading review.

In 2016, ISAAA filed a Motion for Reconsideration arguing that the petition should have been dismissed for mootness in view of the termination and completion of the Bt Talong field trials, and the expiration of the Biosafety Permits. It also argued that the SC erred in relying on studies which were not offered in evidence, and involved Bt Corn, not Bt Talong, therefore the precautionary principle is wrongly applied.

Greenpeace and MASIPAG argued that Bt Talong is a regulated article under DAO 08-2002. Bt Talong is then presumed to be harmful to human health and the environment. They pointed out that there is no independent, peer-reviewed study showing its safety for human consumption and the environment. Since the scientific evidence as to the safety of Bt Talong remained insufficient or uncertain, and that preliminary scientific evaluation shows reasonable grounds for concern, the precautionary principle should be applied and, thereby, the field trials be enjoined. They also pointed out that the requirements of an Environment Compliance Certificate, under PD No. 1151, and prior public consultations as provided in section 27 of the Local Government Code were not complied with.

The ISAAA argued in their verified return to the Writ of Kalikasan that the safety of Bt talong for human consumption is irrelevant because none of the eggplants will be consumed by humans or animals and all materials not used for analyses will be chopped, boiled, and buried following the conditions of the Biosafety Permits.They insisted that the issue is moot due to the termination of the field trials and the expiration of the biosafety permits.

PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:

RTC ● The Court issued a Writ of Kalikasan against petitioners (except UPLB) and UPMFI, ordering them to make a verified return.

CA ● CA ruled in favor of the respondents and directed the petitioners to permanently cease and desist from conducting the Bt talong field trials.

● It then held that the precautionary principle set forth under Section 1,38 Rule 20 of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases is relevant, considering the Philippines' rich biodiversity and uncertainty surrounding the safety of Bt talong. It noted the possible irreversible effects of the field trials and the introduction of Bt talong to the market, and found the existing regulations issued by the DA and DOST insufficient to guarantee the safety of the environment and the health of the people.

2015 SC ● The Court denied the petitions and accordingly, affirmed with modification the ruling of the CA. It permanently enjoined the field testing of Bt talong. In addition, it declared DAO 08-2002 null and void for failure to consider the provisions of the NBF. The Court also temporarily enjoined any application for contained use, field testing, propagation, commercialization, and importation of genetically modified organisms until a new administrative order is promulgated in accordance with law.

ISSUE/S:

1. Whether the petition for Writ of Kalikasan against the BT Talong field trials alleged to be infringing on the people's right to a healthful ecology be dismissed on the ground of mootness.

RULING:

1. YES. It is argued that this case has been mooted by the termination of all field trials on August 10, 2012. In fact, the validity of all Biosafety permits issued to UPLB expired in June 2012.

An action is considered 'moot' when it no longer presents a justiciable controversy because the issues involved have become academic or dead, or when the matter in dispute has already been resolved and hence, one is not entitled to judicial intervention unless the issue is likely to be raised again between the parties. Time and again, courts have refrained from even expressing an opinion in a case where the issues have become moot and academic, there being no more justiciable controversy to speak of, so that a determination thereof would be of no practical use or value.

The termination of the field trials and the expiration of the biosafety permits effectively negated the petition for Writ of Kalikasan as there was no longer any field test to enjoin. As the event never went beyond the field testing phase, none of the foregoing tasks related to propagation were pursued or the requirements therefor complied with. Thus, there are no guaranteed after effects to the already concluded Bt Talong field trials that demand an adjudication from which the public may perceivably benefit. Any future threat to the right of the public to a healthful and balanced ecology is therefore more imagined than real.

The Supreme Court further did not find the event capable of repetition yet evading review, which is an exemption to the rule on dismissing petitions on the ground of mootness, because DAO 08-2002 has already been superseded by JDC 01-2016, a new regulation governing genetically modified organisms’ (GMO) release to the market.

WEST TOWER CONDOMINIUM V. FIRST PHIL INDUSTRIAL CORP

16 June 2015 | GR No. 194239 | VELASCO, JR., J.. | Writ of Kalikasan

PETITIONER: WEST TOWER CONDOMINIUM CORPORATION, on behalf of the Residents of West Tower Condominium and in representation of Barangay Bangkal, and others, including minors and generations yet unborn

RESPONDENTS: FIRST PHILIPPINE INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION, FIRST GEN CORPORATION and their RESPECTIVE BOARD OF DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS, JOHN DOES, and RICHARD DOES

DOCTRINE:

Filing of a petition for the issuance of a writ of kalikasan under Sec. 1, Rule 745 of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases does not require that a petitioner be directly affected by an environmental disaster. The rule clearly allows juridical persons to file the petition on behalf of persons whose constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology is violated, or threatened with violation.

FACTS:

1. Respondent FPIC operates two pipelines since 1969, (1) the White Oil Pipeline (WOPL) System, which covers and (b) the Black Oil Pipeline (BOPL) System.

2. In May 2010, however, a leakage from one of the pipelines was suspected after the residents of West Tower Condominium started to smell gas within the condominium. What started as a two-drum leak at the initial stages became a 15-20 drum a day affair. The sump pit of the condominium was ordered shut down by the City of Makati to prevent the discharge of contaminated water into the drainage system of Barangay Bangkal. Eventually, the fumes compelled the residents of West Tower to abandon their respective units and the condo’s power was shut down.

3. On November 15, 2010, West Tower Condominium Corporation interposed the present Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Kalikasan on behalf of the residents of West Tower and in representation of the surrounding communities in Barangay Bangkal, Makati City. West Tower Corp. also alleged that it is joined by the civil society and several people’s organizations, non-governmental organizations and public interest groups who have expressed their intent to join the suit because of the magnitude of the environmental issues involved.

4. On November 19, 2010, the Court issued the Writ of Kalikasan with a Temporary Environmental Protection Order (TEPO). After the Court’s issuance of the Writ of Kalikasan and the TEPO, FPIC has ceased operations on both the WOPL and the BOPL. Respondents prayed for the dismissal of the Petition and the denial of the Writ of Kalikasan. They alleged that: petitioners had no legal capacity to institute the petition; there is no allegation that the environmental damage affected the inhabitants of two (2) or more cities or provinces; and the continued operation of the pipeline should be allowed in the interest of maintaining adequate petroleum supply to the public. Further, they claimed that not all requirements for the issuance of the Writ of Kalikasan are present and there is no showing that West Tower Corp. was authorized by all those it claimed to represent.

5. On May 31, 2011, however, the Court, answering a query of the DOE, clarified and confirmed that what is covered by the Writ of Kalikasan and TEPO is only the WOPL System of FPIC; thus, FPIC can resume operation of its BOPL System.

PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:

CA ● Petitioners filed their Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the CA’s Report. On July 30, 2013, the Court issued a Resolution adopting the recommendation of the CA in its Report and Recommendation that FPIC be ordered to secure a certification from the DOE Secretary before the WOPL may resume its operations.

ISSUE/S:

1. Whether or not the Petitioner and other interested groups are parties in interest.

2. Whether or not the Court is fully equipped with the knowledge to finally resolve the Writ of Kalikasan or should it avail of the special knowledge and expertise of administrative bodies under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction?

RULING:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Motion for Partial Reconsideration is hereby DENIED. The Motion for Reconsideration with Motion for Clarification is PARTLY GRANTED.

RATIO:

1. YES.

As defined, a real party-in-interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Generally, every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real parties-in-interest. In other words, the action must be brought by the person who, by substantive law, possesses the right sought to be enforced.

In the case at bar, there can be no quibble that the oil leak from the WOPL affected all the condominium unit owners and residents of West Tower as, in fact, all had to evacuate their units at the wee hours in the morning of July 23, 2010, when the condominium's electrical power was shut down. Until now, the unit owners and residents of West Tower could still not return to their condominium units. Thus, there is no gainsaying that the residents of West Tower are real parties-in-interest.

It is of no moment that only five residents of West Tower signed their acquiescence to the filing of the petition for the issuance of the Writ of Kalikasan, as the merits of such petition is, as aptly put by the CA, not measured by the number of persons who signified their assent thereto, but on the existence of a prima facie case of a massive environmental disaster.

As for the other interested parties, filing of a petition for the issuance of a writ of kalikasan under Sec. 1, Rule 745 of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases does not require that a petitioner be directly affected by an environmental disaster. The rule clearly allows juridical persons to file the petition on behalf of persons whose constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology is violated, or threatened with violation.

2. IT DEPENDS.

Courts, although they may have jurisdiction and power to decide cases, can utilize the findings and recommendations of the administrative agency on questions that demand "the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience, and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact."

The DOE is specially equipped to consider FPIC's proper implementation and compliance with its PIMS and to evaluate the result of the various tests conducted on the pipeline. The DOE is empowered by Sec. 12(b)(l), RA 7638 to formulate and implement policies for the efficient and economical "distribution, transportation, and storage of petroleum, coal, natural gas." Thus, it cannot be gainsaid that the DOE possesses technical knowledge and special expertise with respect to practices in the transportation of oil through pipelines.

Moreover, it is notable that the DOE did not only limit itself to the knowledge and proficiency available within its offices, it has also rallied around the assistance of pertinent bureaus of the other administrative agencies: the ITDI of the DOST, which is mandated to undertake technical services including standards, analytical and calibration services; the MIRDC, also of the DOST, which is the sole government entity directly supporting the metals and engineering industry; the EMB of the DENR, the agency mandated to implement, among others, RA 6969 (Toxic Substances and Hazardous and Nuclear Waste Control Act of 1990) and RA 9275 (Philippine Clean Water Act of 2004); and the BOD of the DPWH, which is mandated to conduct, supervise, and review the technical design aspects of projects of government agencies.

The specialized knowledge and expertise of the foregoing agencies must, therefore, be availed of to arrive at a judicious decision on the propriety of allowing the immediate resumption of the WOPL's operation. In a host of cases, this Court held that when the adjudication of a controversy requires the resolution of issues within the expertise of an administrative body, such issues must be investigated and resolved by the administrative body equipped with the specialized knowledge and the technical expertise

DOLOT vs PAJE

August 27, 2013 | GR No. 199199 |Reyes, J. | Writ of Continuing Mandamus

PETITIONER: Maricris D. Dolot, Chairman of the Bagong Alyansang Makabayan

RESPONDENTS: Hon. Ramon Paje, in his capacity as the Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, Reynulfo A. Juan, Regional Director, Mines and Geosciences Bureau, DENR, Hon Raul R. Lee, Governor, Province of Sorsogon, Antonio C. Ocampo, Jr. Victoria A. Ajero, Alfredo M. Aguilar, and Juan M. Aguilar, Antones Enterprises, Global Summit Mines Dev’t Corp, and TR Ore

DOCTRINE:

Continuing mandamus is a writ issued by a court in an environmental case directing any agency or instrumentality of the government or officer thereof to perform an act or series of acts decreed by final judgment which shall remain effective until judgment is fully satisfied.

FACTS:

1. The Petitioners protested the iron ore mining operations being conducted by Antones Enterprises, Global Summit Mines Development Corporation and TR Ore in Brgy. Balocawe and Bon-ot Daco, located in the Municipality of Matnog.

2. Matnog is located in the southern tip of Luzon and there is a need to protect, preserve and maintain the geological foundation of the municipality. Matnog is susceptible to flooding and landslides, and confronted with the environmental dangers of flood hazard, liquefaction, ground settlement, ground subsidence and landslide hazard.

3. After investigation they learned that the mining operators did not have the required permit to operate. ) Sorsogon Governor Raul Lee and his predecessor Sally Lee issued to the operators a small-scale mining permit, which they did not have authority to issue.

4. Representatives of the Presidential Management Staff and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), despite knowledge, did not do anything to protect the interest of the people of Matnog

5. The respondents violated Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7076 or the People’s Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991, R.A. No. 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995, and the Local Government Code.

6. Petitioners prayed for the following reliefs: (1) the issuance of a writ commanding the respondents to immediately stop the mining operations in the Municipality of Matnog; (2) the issuance of a temporary environment protection order or TEPO; (3) the creation of an inter-agency group to undertake the rehabilitation of the mining site; (4) award of damages; and (5) return of the iron ore, among others.

7. The case was referred by the Executive Judge to the RTC of Sorsogon, and was summarily dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The RTC ruled that: (1) there was no final court decree, order or decision yet that the public officials allegedly failed to act on, which is a condition for the issuance of the writ of continuing mandamus; (2) the case was prematurely filed as the petitioners therein failed to exhaust their administrative remedies; and (3) they also failed to attach judicial affidavits and furnish a copy of the complaint to the government or appropriate agency, as required by the rules

SEGOVIA V. CLIMATE CHANGE COMMISSION

March 7, 2017 | G.R. No. 211010| Caguioa, J. | Continuing Mandamus

PETITIONER: Segovia

RESPONDENTS: Climate Change Commission

DOCTRINE:

There is no showing of unlawful neglect on the part of the respondents to perform any act that the law specifically enjoins as a duty – there being nothing in the executive issuances relied upon by the petitioners that specifically enjoins the bifurcation of roads to implement the Road Sharing Principle. To the opposite, the respondents were able to show that they were and are actively implementing projects and programs that seek to improve air quality. Also, the petitioners failed to prove direct or personal injury arising from acts attributable to the respondents to be entitled to the writ.

FACTS:

Former president Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo addressed the climate change through a more tangible response by issuing AO 171 which created the Presidential Task Force on Climate Change on Feb 20, 2007. This body was reorganized through BO774, which designated the President as Chairperson , and cabinet secretaries as members of the Task Force. EO774 Sec 9(a) or road sharing principle states: Section 9. Task Group on Fossil Fuels. - (a) To reduce the consumption of fossil fuels, the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC) shall lead a Task Group to reform the transportation sector. The new paradigm in the movement of men and things must follow a simple principle: "Those who have less in wheels must have more in road." For this purpose, the system shall favor nonmotorized locomotion and collective transportation system (walking, bicycling, and the man-powered mini-train). In 2009. AO 254 was issued, mandating DOC as lead agency for the Task Group on Fossil Fuels (TGFF) to formulate a national Environment Sustainable Transport Strategy for the Philippines

SECTION 4. Functions of the TGFF- In addition to the functions provided in EO 774, the TGFF shall initiate

and pursue the formulation of the National EST Strategy for the Philippines.

Specifically, the TGFF shall perform the following functions:

(a) Reform the transport sector to reduce the consumption of fossil fuels. The new paradigm in the movement

of men and things must follow a simple principle: "Those who have less in wheels must have more in road."

For this purpose, the system shall favor non-motorized locomotion and collective transportation system

(walking, bicycling, and the manpowered mini-train).

Later that year, Congress passed the Climate Change Act. It created the Climate Change Commission which absorbed the functions of PTFCC and became t he lead policy-making body of the government which shall be tasked to coordinate, monitor and evaluate the programs and action plans of the government relating to climate change. Petitioners are Carless People of the Philippines, parents, representing their children, who in turn represent "Children of the Future, and Car-owners who would rather not have cars if good public transportation were safe, convenient, accessible, available, and reliable". They claim that they are entitled to the issuance of the extraordinary writs due to the alleged failure and refusal of respondents to perform an act mandated by environmental laws, and violation of environmental laws resulting in environmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health and property of all Filipinos.

ISSUE/S:

Whether or not the writ of continuing mandamus can be issued.

RULING:

No. First the petitioners failed to prove direct or personal injury arising from acts attributable to the respondents to be entitled to the writ. Second, the Road Sharing Principle is precisely as it is denominated – a principle. It cannot be considered an absolute imposition to encroach upon the province of public respondents to determine the manner by which this principle is applied or considered in their policy decisions. Mandamus lies to compel the performance of duties that are purely ministerial in nature, not those that are discretionary, and the official can only be directed by mandamus to act but not to act one way or the other. The duty being enjoined in mandamus must be one according to the terms provided in the law itself. Thus, the recognized rule is that, in the performance of an official duty or act involving discretion, the corresponding official can only be directed by mandamus to act, but not to act one way or the other. In this case, there is no showing of unlawful neglect on the part of the respondents to perform any act that the law specifically enjoins as a duty - there being nothing in the executive issuances relied upon by the petitioners that specifically enjoins the bifurcation of roads to implement the Road Sharing Principle. To the opposite, the respondents were able to show that they were and are actively implementing projects and programs that seek to improve air quality. At its core, what the petitioners are seeking to compel is not the performance of a ministerial act, but a discretionary act - the manner of implementation of the Road Sharing Principle. Clearly, petitioners' preferred specific course of action (i.e. the bifurcation of roads to devote for all-weather sidewalk and bicycling and Filipino-made transport vehicles) to implement the Road Sharing Principle finds no textual basis in law or executive issuances for it to be considered an act enjoined by law as a duty, leading to the necessary conclusion that the continuing mandamus prayed for seeks not the implementation of an environmental law, rule or regulation, but to control the exercise of discretion of the executive as to how the principle enunciated in an executive issuance relating to the environment is best implemented.

Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Concerned Residents of Manila Bay

15 February 2011 | G.R. Nos. 171947-48 | | WRIT OF CONTINUING MANDAMUS

PETITIONER: Metropolitan Manila Development Authority

RESPONDENTS: Concerned Residents of Manila Bay

DOCTRINE:

The submission of periodic reports is sanctioned by Secs. 7 and 8, Rule 8 of the Rules

of Procedure for Environmental cases.

With the final and executory judgment in MMDA, the writ of continuing mandamus issued

in MMDA means that until petitioner-agencies have shown full compliance with the

Court’s orders, the Court exercises continuing jurisdiction over them until full execution

of the judgment.

FACTS:

6. In the earlier decision, the Court has rendered a decision ordering the petitioners to clean up, rehabilitate and preserve Manila Bay in their different capacities. The portion of the decision read:

7. “The heads of petitioners-agencies MMDA, DENR, DepEd, DOH, DA, DPWH, DBM, PCG, PNP Maritime Group, DILG, and also of MWSS, LWUA, and PPA, in line with the principle of "continuing mandamus," shall, from finality of this Decision, each submit to the Court a quarterly progressive report of the activities undertaken in accordance with this Decision.”

9. The government agencies did not file any motion for reconsideration and the Decision became final in January 2009. The case is now in the execution phase of the final and executory December 18, 2008 Decision. The Manila Bay Advisory Committee was created to receive and evaluate the quarterly progressive reports on the activities undertaken by the agencies in accordance with said decision and to monitor the execution phase. In the absence of specific completion periods, the Committee recommended that time frames be set for the agencies to perform their assigned tasks. Petitioners contended that this may be viewed as an encroachment over the powers and functions of the Executive Branch headed by the President of the Philippines.

ISSUE/S:

3. Whether there was an encroachment over executive functions by reason of the requirement to submit periodic reports.

RULING:

No, there was no encroachment. The submission of periodic reports is sanctioned by Secs. 7 and 8, Rule 8 of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental cases:

Sec. 7. Judgment.––If warranted, the court shall grant the privilege of the writ of continuing mandamus requiring respondent to perform an act or series of acts until the judgment is fully satisfied and to grant such other reliefs as may be warranted resulting from the wrongful or illegal acts of the respondent. The court shall require the respondent to submit periodic reports detailing the progress and execution of the judgment, and the court may, by itself or through a commissioner or the appropriate government agency, evaluate and monitor compliance. The petitioner may submit its comments or observations on the execution of the judgment.

Sec. 8. Return of the writ.––The periodic reports submitted by the respondent detailing compliance with the judgment shall be contained in partial returns of the writ. Upon full satisfaction of the judgment, a final return of the writ shall be made to the court by the respondent. If the court finds that the judgment has been fully implemented, the satisfaction of judgment shall be entered in the court docket.

With the final and executory judgment in MMDA, the writ of continuing mandamus issued in MMDA means that until petitioner-agencies have shown full compliance with the Court’s orders, the Court exercises continuing jurisdiction over them until full execution of the judgment.

Another point of view as why the periodic reports are not encroachment by the Court over executive functions:

The issuance of subsequent resolutions by the Court is simply an exercise of judicial power under Art. VIII of the Constitution, because the execution of the Decision is but an integral part of the adjudicative function of the Court. While additional activities are required of the agencies like submission of plans of action, data or status reports, these directives are but part and parcel of the execution stage of a final decision under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. The final judgment includes not only what appears upon its face to have been so adjudged but also those matters "actually and necessarily included therein or necessary thereto." Certainly, any activity that is needed to fully implement a final judgment is necessarily encompassed by said judgment.

TORRES v. QUINTOS

April 5, 1951 | GR No. L-3304 | Paras, C.J. | (Indicate if En Banc; if not erase this part) | Timeliness of filing Petition

PETITIONER: Antonio Torres

RESPONDENTS: Eduardo Quintos

DOCTRINE:

The period fixed in the ROC is a condition precedent to the existence of the cause of action, "with the result that, if a complaint is not filed within one year, it cannot prosper although the matter is not set up in the answer or motion to dismiss.

FACTS:

Torres held the position of chief of police of the City of Manila from March 3, 1936, until the coming of the American liberation forces when Col. Marcus E. Jones, assumed the functions of the office on orders of Gen. Douglas MacArthur upon request of President Osmeña. He served as assistant to Col. Jones until March 15, 1945, when he left the post at his own request. Col. Jones was relieved by Col. J. W. Holland, who remained as Manila chief of police until March 1, 1946, when Lt. Col. Angel Tuason, was appointed acting chief of police by the President of the Philippines. In the meantime, on March 18, 1945, the petitioner was taken into custody by C. I. C. and subsequently indicted for treason in the People’s Court which, however, acquitted him on January 16, 1948. During the pendency of the criminal case against Torres, several police officers were appointed ast Manila Chief of Police, including Quintos, who qualified for the position on January 12, 1948, and has remained in said office. The appointments of Col. Javalera and Quintos were both confirmed by the Commission on Appointments.

After his acquittal, or on February 6, 1948, the petitioner addressed a letter to the Mayor of Manila inquiring about his official status and impliedly asserting his right to be reinstated as chief of police, which claim was turned down. The petitioner, on July 7, 1948, sent a letter to the President of the Philippines reiterating his claim to the position. On January 17, 1949, the petitioner was advised by the Secretary of Justice to bring his case before the courts of justice. On January 26, 1949, the petitioner filed in the Supreme Court a petition for quo warranto against the respondent, but the same was dismissed on January 28, 1949, without prejudice to its filing in the Court of First Instance.

Thus, Torres filed a petition for quo warranto on February 1, 1949 with CFI of Manila.

PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:

RTC ● CFI: Dismissed the petition on the ground that the same was not commenced within one year after the cause of respondent’s ouster or Torres’ right to hold office arose in accordance with the ROC.

CA ●

ISSUE/S:

Whether or not Torres filed the petition for quo warranto within the prescriptive period.

RULING:

The appealed judgment is hereby affirmed with costs against the petitioner-appellant. So ordered.

RATIO:

No. There is every ground to hold that the petitioner’s right to hold the disputed office, if at all, arose in May, 1945, when he was replaced by Col. Jones and when he was arrested by the CIC and thereafter prosecuted for treason in the People’s Court. As a matter of fact, the petitioner admits, in his brief, that he had been deprived of said office "first by the arbitrary action of the Counter Intelligence Corps of the United States Army and, later on, during the pendency of the treason case in the People’s Court by his own sense of propriety."

And it is noteworthy that in Casin v. Caluag, the Court held that a special civil action for quo warranto may be tried and decided independently of a pending criminal case for treason. Hence, excessively more than one ear had elapsed before the proper quo warranto petition was commenced. Assuming, however, that the petitioner’s cause of action arose only on January 12, 1948, when the respondent qualified for the position of the Manila chief of police, or on January 16, 1948, when the petitioner was acquitted by the People’s Court, the petition for quo warranto filed in the Supreme Court on January 28, 1949, is still beyond the one-year period prescribed in section 16 of Rule 68.

The reason is obvious. While it may be desirable that administrative remedies be first resorted to, no one is compelled or bound to do so; and as said remedies neither are prerequisite to nor bar the institution of quo warranto proceedings, it follows that he who claims the right to hold a public office allegedly usurped by another and who desires to seek redress in the courts, should file the proper judicial action within the reglementary period.

SEPARATE OPINIONS:

BAUTISTA ANGELO, J., dissenting:

As may be seen, the court did not find the relator Black guilty of laches in spite of the lapse of time between the attempted ouster and the bringing of the proceedings for quo warranto. He was found to have at all times proceeded diligently to have the title to his office determined and all the steps taken by him were found to have been done in good faith under the belief that he was adopting the correct procedure to protect his right. While the case was decided on the principle of laches and not on that of prescription, the case acquires importance here in view of the considerations made on the steps, erroneously or otherwise, taken by the relator in protecting his right which were found to be satisfactory and justifiable. The element of time is of the essence in the defense of laches as well as in the defense of prescription. In my opinion, the Bailey case is also of persuasive force and effect in the case under consideration.

For the foregoing reasons, I am of the opinion that the herein petitioner has not yet lost his right to have his title to office determined by this Court, and that, therefore, he should have been given the benefit of a judgment on the merits. This is what this Court should have done: to decide the case on the merits. For these reasons, I dissent.

REPUBLIC V. SERENO

May 11, 2018 | G.R. No. 237428 | DELOS SANTOS, J | Quo Warranto

PETITIONER: Republic of the Philippines, represented by Solicitor General Jose C. Calida

RESPONDENTS: Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno

DOCTRINE:

While the hierarchy of courts serves as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs, a direct invocation of the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to issue such writs is allowed when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition.

Quo warranto and impeachment are not mutually exclusive remedies and may proceed simultaneously.

FACTS:

1. When the position of the Chief Justice became vacant in 2012, upon the impeachment of then Chief Justice Renato C. Corona, the Judicial and Bar Council issued an announcement for the opening of the Chief Justice position. Included in the documents required to be submitted were the SALNs of the applicant: All previous SALNs for those in the government or SALN as of 31 December 2011 for those from the private sector.

2. As an applicant for the Chief Justice position, respondent Maria Lourdes Sereno submitted to the JBC her SALNs only for the years 2009, 2010, and 2011, despite being in government service for 20 years (1986-2006) as a professor at the University of the Philippines College of Law. The Certification dated 8 December 2017 of Director Escoto of the UP Human Resources Development Office stated that based on the 201 files of respondent under the custody of the UP HRDO, between the period of 2000 to 2009, the respondent's SALN on file is only as of 31 December 2002. Based on the records, it appears that while employed at the UP College of Law, respondent only submitted her SALNs for the years 1985, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, and 2002.

3. Subsequently, an impeachment complaint was filed by Atty. Larry Gadon against respondent with the Committee on Justice of the House of Representatives (House Committee on Justice) for culpable violation of the Constitution, corruption, high crimes, and betrayal of public trust. The complaint also alleged that respondent failed to make truthful declarations in her SALNs. The HC proposed for the SC to investigate on the proceedings of the JBC relative to the nomination of respondent as Chief Justice, and requested for the OSG, in representation of the Republic, initiate a quo warranto proceeding against respondent.

4. A petition for quo warranto has been filed by the Solicitor General Jose C. Calida seeking to oust respondent Sereno. Briefly stated, the thesis of the Solicitor General is that the respondent, appointed by former President Benigno S. Aquino III as the 24th Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Philippines, is not qualified to hold such post and therefore, should be ousted because she is not a person of "proven integrity" in view of her failure to file — as well as to submit before the Judicial and Bar Council—her Statement of Assets, Liabilities, and Net Worth (SALN) as prescribed by law.

5. The Republic claims that an action for quo warranto is the proper remedy to question the validity of respondent's appointment. It alleges that the instant petition is seasonably filed within the one-year reglementary period under Section 11, Rule 66, of the Rules of Court since respondent's transgressions only came to light during the proceedings of the House Committee on Justice on the allegations of the impeachment complaint filed against her. The Republic argues that petition for quo warranto is different from the impeachment proceedings because the writ of quo warranto is being sought to question the validity of her appointment, while the impeachment complaint accuses her of committing culpable violation of the Constitution and betrayal of public trust while in office. According to the Republic, because respondent failed to fulfill the JBC requirement of filing the complete SALNs, her integrity remains unproven.

PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:

House Committee on Justice (HOR) ● HC proposed for the SC to investigate on the proceedings of the JBC relative to the nomination of respondent as Chief Justice.

● HC requested for the OSG, in representation of the Republic, initiate a quo warranto proceeding against the respondent.

SC ● SC granted the Petition for Quo Warranto.

ISSUE/S:

1. Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the instant petition for Quo Warranto.—YES

2. Whether or not a Quo Warranto and an Impeachment can proceed independently.—YES

3. Whether the petition is outrightly dismissible on the ground of prescription.—NO

4. Whether to take cognizance of the quo warranto proceeding is violative of the principle of separation of powers.—NO

RULING:

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Quo Warranto is GRANTED. Respondent Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno is found DISQUALIFIED from and is hereby adjudged GUILTY of UNLAWFULLY HOLDING and EXERCISING the OFFICE OF THE CHIEF JUSTICE. Accordingly, Respondent Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno is OUSTED and EXCLUDED therefrom.

RATIO:

1. YES

● Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution, in part, provides that the Supreme Court shall exercise original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus. The SC have concurrent jurisdiction with the CA and RTC to issue the extraordinary writs, including quo warranto. Relatedly, Section 7, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court provides that the venue of an action for quo warranto, when commenced by the Solicitor General, is either the Regional Trial Court in the City of Manila, in the Court of Appeals, or in the Supreme Court.

● While the hierarchy of courts serves as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs, a direct invocation of the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to issue such writs is allowed when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. In the instant case, direct resort to the Court is justified considering that the action for quo warranto questions the qualification of no less than a Member of the Court. The issue of whether a person usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public office is a matter of public concern over which the government takes special interest as it obviously cannot allow an intruder or impostor to occupy a public position.

● Granting that the petition is likewise of transcendental importance and has far-reaching implications, the Court is empowered to exercise its power of judicial review. To exercise restraint in reviewing an impeachable officer’s appointment is a clear renunciation of a judicial duty. An outright dismissal of the petition based on speculation that Sereno will eventually be tried on impeachment is a clear abdication of the Court’s duty to settle actual controversy squarely presented before it. Quo warranto proceedings are essentially judicial in character – it calls for the exercise of the Supreme Court’s constitutional duty and power to decide cases and settle actual controversies. This constitutional duty cannot be abdicated or transferred in favor of, or in deference to, any other branch of the government including the Congress, even as it acts as an impeachment court through the Senate.

2. YES

● Quo warranto and impeachment are not mutually exclusive remedies and may proceed simultaneously. The existence of other remedies against the usurper does not prevent the State from commencing quo warranto proceeding. Under the Rules on quo warranto, "when the respondent is found guilty of usurping, intruding into, or unlawfully holding or exercising public office, judgment shall be rendered that such respondent be ousted and altogether excluded therefrom." In short, respondent in quo warranto proceeding shall be adjudged to cease from holding public office, which he/she is ineligible to hold. On the other hand, in impeachment, conviction for the charges of impeachable offenses shall result in the removal of the respondent from the public office that he/she is legally holding. It is not legally possible to impeach or remove a person from an office that he/she, in the first place, does not and cannot legally hold or occupy.

● The crux of the controversy in this quo warranto proceedings is the determination of whether or not Sereno legally holds the Chief Justice position to be considered as an impeachable officer in the first place. On the other hand, impeachment is for the respondent's prosecution for certain impeachable offenses. Simply put, while Sereno’s title to hold a public office is the issue in quo warranto proceedings, impeachment necessarily presupposes that Sereno legally holds the public office and thus, is an impeachable officer, the only issue being whether or not she committed impeachable offenses to warrant her removal from office.

● Respondent in a quo warranto proceeding shall be adjudged to cease from holding a public office, which he/she is ineligible to hold. In impeachment, a conviction for the charges of impeachable offenses shall result to the removal of the respondent from the public office that he/she is legally holding. It is not legally possible to impeach or remove a person from an office that he/she, in the first place, does not and cannot legally hold or occupy.

● There can be no forum shopping because the impeachment proceedings before the House is not the impeachment case proper, since it is only a determination of probable cause. The impeachment case is yet to be initiated by the filing of the Articles of Impeachment before the Senate. Thus, at the moment, there is no pending impeachment case against Sereno. The process before the House is merely inquisitorial and is merely a means of discovering if a person may be reasonably charged with a crime.

3. NO

● The rules on quo warranto provides that “nothing contained in this Rule shall be construed to authorize an action against a public officer or employee for his ouster from office unless the same be commenced within one (1) year after the cause of such ouster, or the right of the petitioner to hold such office or position, arose”. Previously, the one-year prescriptive period has been applied in cases where private individuals assert their right of office, unlike the instant case where no private individual claims title to the Office of the Chief Justice. Instead, it is the government itself which commenced the present petition for quo warranto and puts in issue the qualification of the person holding the highest position in the Judiciary.

● Section 2 of Rule 66 provides that “the Solicitor General or a public prosecutor, when directed by the President of the Philippines, or when upon complaint or otherwise he has good reason to believe that any case specified in the preceding section can be established by proof must commence such action.” It may be stated that ordinary statutes of limitation, civil or penal, have no application to quo warranto proceeding brought to enforce a public right. There is no limitation or prescription of action in an action for quo warranto, neither could there be, for the reason that it was an action by the Government and prescription could not be plead as a defense to an action by the Government.

● That prescription does not lie in this case can also be deduced from the very purpose of an action for quo warranto. Because quo warranto serves to end a continuous usurpation, no statute of limitations applies to the action. Needless to say, no prudent and just court would allow an unqualified person to hold public office, much more the highest position in the Judiciary. Moreover, the Republic cannot be faulted for questioning Sereno’s qualification· for office only upon discovery of the cause of ouster because even up to the present, Sereno has not been candid on whether she filed the required SALNs or not. The defect on Sereno’s appointment was therefore not discernible, but was, on the contrary, deliberately rendered obscure.

4. NO

● The Court cited Section 3(1) and 3(6), Article XI, of the Constitution that respectively provides that the House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment while the Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment. There is no argument that the constitutionally-defined instrumentality which is given the power to try impeachment cases is the Senate. The Court furthered stated that its exercise of judicial review over laws does not preclude Congress from undertaking its own remedial measures by appropriately amending laws, the viability of quo warranto in the instant cases does not preclude Congress from enforcing its own prerogative by abrogating the legislative franchises of respondents should it be distressed enough by the franchisees' violation of the franchises extended to them.

● The Court ruled in Divinagracia v. Consolidated Broadcasting System, Inc., that the role of the courts, through quo warranto proceedings, neatly complements the traditional separation of powers that come to bear in our analysis. The courts are entrusted with the adjudication of the legal status of persons, the final arbiter of their rights and obligations under law.

SEPARATE OPINIONS:

1. CARPIO, J., dissenting:

- I vote to DISMISS the petition and to refer to the Congress of the Philippines for possible inclusion of the acts constituting culpable violation of the Constitution and betrayal of public trust, as found in the present case, in the ongoing impeachment proceedings against respondent Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno.

-The repeated failure to file SALNs constitutes culpable violation of the Constitution and betrayal of public trust, grounds for removing an impeachable officer. While the failure to file SALNs may also raise questions on the integrity, and thus the qualification, of an applicant for Justice of the Supreme Court, the relevant applicable violation, for purposes of removing such impeachable officer once already in office, is culpable violation of the Constitution and betrayal of public trust. Only Congress, through the impeachment process, can remove an impeachable officer on these grounds. The Court should treat the present quo warranto petition as an administrative investigation by this Court of one of its members. The resolution of this Court should be to refer its findings and recommendation against respondent to Congress.

2. LEONEN, J., dissenting:

This Petition should have been dismissed outright and not given due course. It does not deserve space in judicial deliberation within our constitutional democratic space. Even if the Chief Justice has failed our expectations, quo warranto, as a process to oust an impeachable officer and a sitting member of the Supreme Court, is a legal abomination. It creates a precedent that gravely diminishes judicial independence and threatens the ability of this Court to assert the fundamental rights of our people. We render this Court subservient to an aggressive Solicitor General. We render those who present dissenting opinions unnecessarily vulnerable to powerful interests. The general grant of original jurisdiction for quo warranto actions to this Court in Article VIII, Section 5 (1) 1 should be read in the context of the provisions of Article XI, Sections 2 2 and 3, 3 as well as the principles of judicial independence and integrity inherent in a constitutional order implied in Article VIII, Sections 1, 3, 4, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, and 13 4 of the Constitution.

Quo warranto is, therefore, presented as not exclusive of impeachment. This is a distinction which cannot be found in the Constitution. It is likewise contrary to its principles. Tecson v. Commission on Elections defined quo warranto proceedings as "an action against a person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public office." A petition for quo warranto under Rule 66 of the Rules of Court is required to be brought under the name of the Republic of the Philippines through a verified petition. It may be instituted by an individual claiming a right to an office in his or her own name or by the Solicitor General or public prosecutor. Even assuming that this Court can take cognizance of the petition, an action for quo warranto is limited in time regardless of who institutes the action. It can only be instituted within one (1) year after the cause of action arises. Rule 66, Section 11 of the Rules of Court is clear and leaves no room for interpretation. It is in the public's best interest that questions regarding title to public office be resolved and laid to rest as soon as possible. This is the rationale behind the one (1)-year prescriptive period. Public service demands stability and consistency.

3. CAGUIOA, J., dissenting:

Contrary to the decision reached by the majority, it is my view that the quo warranto must fail for the following reasons:

1. Quo warranto, except only as explicitly allowed by the Constitution to be filed against the President or Vice President under the rules promulgated by the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET), is not available as a mode of removal from office for impeachable officers by the clear command of Article XI, Section 2 of the Constitution;

2. Even assuming that quo warranto is available, the alleged non-submission or incomplete submission of SALN to the JBC is not a valid ground to question the eligibility of the respondent, the SALN not being a constitutional requirement for the position of Chief Justice. 3. 4. 5. 6. Â Even assuming that quo warranto is available, and that the non-submission or incomplete submission of the SALN to the JBC can somehow be raised to a level of a constitutional requirement, the one-year prescriptive period for the filing of quo warranto lapsed one year after the appointment of or assumption of office by the respondent as Chief Justice in 2012;

3. Even assuming again, that the non-submission or incomplete submission of the SALN to the JBC is a ground to disqualify the respondent from being placed in the short list, the records show that the JBC considered the submissions of the respondent Chief Justice as substantial compliance. Any defect in the exercise of discretion by the JBC should have been assailed via certiorari, prior to the respondent's appointment. This was not done and can no longer be done through this quo warranto petition.

4. Even assuming again, that the non-filing of the SALN under R.A. No. 6713 may lead to the removal from office of an impeachable officer, it cannot be done by quo warranto, but through the procedure in Section 11 of R.A. No. 6713.

5. And finally, even assuming that quo warranto is available to remove an impeachable officer for violation of R.A. No. 6713 separate from the procedure provided in that law, the Solicitor General failed to prove the nonf iling of SALN by the respondent — the evidentiary value of the Certifications from the University of the Philippines Human Resources Development Office (UP HRDO) and the Office of the Ombudsman having been destroyed by the discovery of other SALNs filed that were not found in the custodian's possession.

-The ponencia concludes that both may proceed independently and simultaneously in order to cause the removal of the respondent, who, in turn, is a sitting member of the Supreme Court. Caguioa completely disagree for reasons grounded upon the principle of separation of powers. The present action for quo warranto against the respondent constitutes an institutional attack on the Supreme Court, as it enlists the Court's participation in the erosion of its own independence through the circumvention of the very document it has been tasked to uphold. To my mind, the Court's duty to exercise restraint has never been so glaring.

-Assuming that quo warranto is available, it is time-barred.

4. DEL CASTILLO, J., dissenting:

My position is anchored on a holistic reading of the Constitution, which leads me to no other conclusion but that the intent of the framers is to ensure that the principles of separation of powers and checks and balance, and the independence of constitutional offices be maintained. I maintain that impeachment, not quo warranto, is the mode of removal from office of an appointive impeachable officer who does not possess the qualifications required by the Constitution for the position.

5. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J., concurring:

-I DENY the motion for my inhibition and concur with the GRANT of the Petition for Quo Warranto.

-Respondent's Motion for Inhibition against me utterly lacks basis.

-The petition for quo warranto is granted as respondent's appointment is void from the beginning. Respondent was included in the shortlist of qualified nominees for the vacant post of Supreme Court Chief Justice despite her failure to comply with the documentary requirements of the JBC for the said position, particularly, the submission of her SALNs for the years she worked for the government in the 10-year period prior to her application, because of her deceptive and misleading letter of July 23, 2012 to the JBC.

6. BERSAMIN, J., concurring:

-Quo warranto is a proper remedy to oust the respondent as an ineligible impeachable public officer.

-The Republic's petition is not time barred. That statutes of limitation do not apply against the State in quo warranto suits is now settled. The reason is that the State is thereby enforcing a public right.

-The burden of proof in a petition for quo warranto rests upon respondent. The general rule under American jurisprudence is that the burden of proof is on respondent when the action is brought by the attorney general to test the right to public office.

- I posit that the 1-year prescriptive period to file a petition for quo warranto should commence from the time of discovery of the cause for the ouster from public office, especially in cases where the ground for disqualification is not apparent or is concealed.

7. PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

-To my mind, the fundamental flaw in the OSG's position on quo warranto is its failure to consider that the qualification being assailed in this petition is a subjective qualification that has been priorly determined based on certain criteria set by the JBC. As may be gathered throughout this discourse, it could not have been intended that the subjective qualifications of any judge or justice be directly assailed before a court of law; otherwise, that court would be basically supplanting the Council's determination thereof, and in so doing, effectively assume the latter's role incongruous toand disruptive of the current structure of the Constitution. This is not to say that the JBC's determination of an appointee's integrity, competence, probity, and independence is completely insulated from judicial intervention.

-Rule 66 of the Rules of Court only mirrors the primeval concept of quo warranto and thus, partakes of a remedy to test the title of an alleged usurper to a public office. As such, time and again, writs of quo warranto have been issued as a means to determine which of two claimants is entitled to an office. In this specific instance, the OSG, however, questions respondent's integrity as an eligibility qualification ; this exact qualification had already been resolved by the constitutional body particularly tasked for the purpose. Hence, until the JBC's resolution is validly assailed, an appointee's title to office carries with it constitutional imprimatur and thus, he or she cannot — as of yet — be tagged as a "usurper." This peculiar scenario properly extricates this case and cases similar thereto from the pale of quo warranto. Consequently, given that impeachment and quo warranto are not the proper remedies under these circumstances, it is therefore unnecessary to address the other ancillary issues related to these remedies, among others, the issue of prescription.

8. MARTIRES, J.:

-The Solicitor General may institute on his own the petition for quo warranto. Under Sections 3 and 5 of Rule 66, there are two different parties who may commence the action for quo warranto: (1) the Solicitor General or public prosecutor, and (2) a private individual who claims to be entitled to the public office usurped. The action shall be brought against the person who allegedly usurped, intruded into or is unlawfully holding or exercising such office.

RIVERA V. COMELEC

April 19 2016 | GR No. 210273 & 213069 | Reyes, J | En Banc | Quo Warranto Omnibus Election Code vs. Rules of Court

PETITIONER: BIBIANO C. RIVERA AND LUIS K. LOKIN, JR.

RESPONDENTS: COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (COMELEC), THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SHERWIN N. TUGNA AND CINCHONA C. CRUZ-GONZALES

DOCTRINE:

Once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as Member of the House of Representatives, the COMELEC's jurisdiction over election contests relating to his election, returns, and qualifications ends, and the HRET's own jurisdiction begins.

FACTS:

1. CIBAC was registered as a multi-sectoral party with the COMELEC under the Party List System Act. Villanueva and Maria Blanca both claimed to be CIBAC’s President and sent their nominees. COMELEC conducted a summary hearing to settle the issue of whose nominees should represent CIBAC in the 2013 elections. In the meantime, the COMELEC issued the National Board of Canvassers (NBOC) Resolution No. 0011-13[16] recognizing as CIBAC's nominees those names listed in its Certificate of Nomination, without expressly resolving Villanueva's clarificatory motion.

2. In G.R. No. 210273, Rivera and Luis filed a petition for certiorari seeking to nullify the assailed COMELEC resolutions. The petitioners argued that the CIBAC National Council had become defunct and that the nominees of the CIBAC Foundation should be considered as the legitimate nominees.

3. In G.R. No. 213069, CIBAC Foundation filed a petition for quo warranto arguing in the main that the CIBAC National Council lost its legal existence following the registration of CIBAC with the SEC as CIBAC Foundation by reason of which it is now governed by a BOT. By recognizing the nominees of CIBAC National Council, CIBAC Foundation insists that the COMELEC unlawfully deprived it of its right and authority to represent CIBAC in Congress.

ISSUE/S:

WON the COMELEC has jurisdiction over the quo warranto case— NO

Next issue—YES

RULING:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petitions are DISMISSED.

RATIO:

● The Court reminds the petitioners that under Section 17 of Article IV of the 1987 Constitution, the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the Members of the House of Representatives is the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET). Section 17 reads

o Section 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members

● Because the nominees of CIBAC National Council, Tugna and Gonzales, assumed their seats in Congress on June 26, 2013 and July 22, 2013, respectively, G.R. No. 213069 should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. It should be noted that since they had been already proclaimed, the jurisdiction to resolve all election contests lies with the HRET as it is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of its Members.

● In a long line of cases] and more recently in Reyes v. COMELEC, et al., the Court has held that once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as Member of the House of Representatives, the COMELEC's jurisdiction over election contests relating to his election, returns, and qualifications ends, and the HRET's own jurisdiction begins. Since the nominees of CIBAC National Council have already assumed their seats in Congress, the quo warranto petition should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

SEPARATE OPINIONS:

J. Carpio, concurring

● Once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a Member of the House of Representatives, the jurisdiction of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal begins

● Evidently, the Court's doctrine in Reyes is in hew with jurisprudence. The Court merely adhered to its long-standing criteria for membership in Congress that all three indispensable requirements—a valid proclamation, a proper oath, and assumption of office—must concur.

● To recall, the quo warranto case was filed on the postulation that petitioners are the rightful and legitimate representatives of CIBAC party-list in Congress. Raising grounds for the allowance of the petition similar to those in the certiorari case, petitioners argued in the main that CIBAC National Council has already lost its legal existence, and that CIBAC Foundation, Inc.'s BOT is the governing body of CIBAC party-list.

● Clearly, petitioners' case for quo warranto presupposes that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in recognizing CIBAC National Council's list of nominees, thereby allegedly depriving petitioners of their right to represent CIBAC in Congress.

● Guilty of reiteration, it has already been resolved that it is the CIBAC National Council, not the CIBAC Foundation, Inc.'s BOT, which can validly nominate CIBAC party-list representatives to Congress. This holding in G.R. No. 193808, as now affirmed in G.R. No. 210273, automatically renders petitioners' contentions meritless and their claimed right to field party-list nominees, illusory.

REPUBLIC v. SERENO

May 11, 2018 | GR No. 237428 | Ponente | Quo Warranto; Parties, Legal Standing

PETITIONER: REPUBLIC of the PHILIPPINES, represented by SOLICITOR GENERAL JOSE C. CALIDA

RESPONDENTS: MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

DOCTRINE:

Quo warranto and impeachment are not mutually exclusive remedies and may even proceed simultaneously. The existence of other remedies against the usurper does not prevent the State from commencing a quo warranto proceeding.

When the government is the real party in interest, and is proceeding mainly to assert its rights, there can be no defense on the ground of laches or prescription.

FACTS:

1. For a period of 20 years, respondent served as a member of the faculty of U.P. College of Law, initially as a temporary faculty member (from November 1986 to December 31, 1991) and thereafter, as a permanent faculty member until her resignation therefrom on June 1, 2006. As a regular faculty member, the respondent was paid by month by U.P.

2. After having served as a professor at the U.P. College of Law until 2006, and thereafter as practitioner in various outfits including as legal counsel for the Republic until 2009, the respondent submitted her application for the position of Associate Justice of the Supreme Court in July 2010. Thereafter, respondent was appointed by then President Benigno C. Aquino III (President Aquino III) as Associate Justice, and on August 16, 2010, respondent took her oath of office as such.

3. When the position of the Chief Justice was declared vacant in 2012, the JBC announced the opening for application and recommendation of the position of Chief Justice. The JBC announcement was preceded by an En Banc meeting wherein the JBC agreed to require the applicants for the Chief Justice position to submit, instead of the usual submission of the SALNs for the last two years of public service, all previous SALNs up to December 31, 2011 for those in government service. A month after respondent's acceptance of her nomination, or on August 24, 2012, respondent was appointed by then President Aquino III as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.

4. Five years after the respondent's appointment as Chief Justice, an impeachment complaint was filed by Atty. Larry Gadon (Atty. Gadon) against the respondent with the Committee on Justice of the House of Representatives (House Committee on Justice) for culpable violation of the Constitution, corruption, high crimes, and betrayal of public trust. The complaint also alleged that respondent failed to make truthful declarations in her SALNs.

5. During the hearing, it was revealed that respondent purportedly failed to file her SALNs while she was a member of the faculty of the U.P. College of Law and that she filed her SALN only for the years 1998, 2002 and 2006. Thus, quo warranto proceeding was initiated against the respondent.

6. The Republic, through OSG, claims that an action for quo warranto is the proper remedy to question the validity of the respondent's appointment. It alleges that the instant petition is seasonably filed within the one- year reglementary period under Section 11, Rule 66, of the Rules of Court since respondent's transgressions only came to light during the proceedings of the House Committee on Justice on the allegations of the impeachment complaint filed against her. Alternatively, the Republic claims that it has an imprescriptible right to bring a quo warranto petition under the maxim nullum tempus occurit regi. In justifying resort to a petition for quo warranto, the Republic argues that quo warranto is available as a remedy even as against impeachable officers, like the respondent. The Republic argues that a petition for quo warranto is different from the impeachment proceedings because the writ of quo warranto is being sought to question the validity of her appointment, while the impeachment complaint accuses her of committing culpable violation of the Constitution and betrayal of public trust while in office. Also, the Republic contends that respondent's failure to submit her SALNs as required by the JBC disqualifies her from being a candidate for the position of Chief Justice. Lacking her SALNs, respondent has not proven her integrity which is a requirement under the Constitution. The Republic thus concludes that since respondent is ineligible for the position of Chief Justice for lack of proven integrity, she has no right to hold office and may therefore be ousted via quo warranto.

7. Respondent argues that, on the strength of Section 2, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, the Chief Justice may be ousted from office only by impeachment. Respondent contends that the use of the phrase "may be removed from office" in Section 2, Article XI of the Constitution does not signify that Members of the Supreme Court may be removed through modes other than impeachment. Also, respondent argues that the present petition is time-barred as Section 11, Rule 66 provides that a petition for quo warranto must be filed within 1 year from the "cause of ouster" and not from the "discovery" of the disqualification. Respondent contends that the supposed "failure" to file the required SALNs allegedly took place for several years from 1986 to 2006, thus, the "cause of ouster" existed even before the respondent was appointed as Chief Justice on August 24, 2012. Therefore, as early as her appointment, the Republic, through the OSG, already had a cause of action to seek her ouster. Even assuming that the one-year prescriptive period may be counted from the Republic's "discovery" of the disqualification, the petition would still be time-barred since the Republic would have made such a "discovery" through U.P., considering that the U.P. HRDO is required to submit a list of employees who failed to file their SALNs.

ISSUE/S:

1. WON the Court can assume jurisdiction and give due course to the instant petition for quo warranto against respondent. — YES

2. WON the respondent may be removed through warranto proceeding. — YES

3. WON the petition is outrightly dismissible on the ground of prescription.— NO

RULING:

RATIO:

1. YES

● Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution, in part, provides that the Supreme Court shall exercise original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus. This Court, the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts have concurrent jurisdiction to issue the extraordinary writs, including quo warranto. Relatedly, Section 7, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court provides that the venue of an action for quo warranto, when commenced by the Solicitor General, is either the Regional Trial Court in the City of Manila, in the Court of Appeals, or in the Supreme Court.

● While the hierarchy of courts serves as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs, a direct invocation of the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to issue such writs is allowed when there are special and important reasons therefore, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. In the instant case, direct resort to the Court is justified considering that the action for quo warranto questions the qualification of no less than a Member of the Court. The issue of whether a person usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public office is a matter of public concern over which the government takes special interest as it obviously cannot allow an intruder or impostor to occupy a public position.

2. YES

● While both impeachment and quo warranto may result in the ouster of the public official, the two proceedings materially differ. At its most basic, impeachment proceedings are political in nature, while an action for quo warranto is judicial or a proceeding traditionally lodged in the courts.

● It appears that impeachment is a proceeding exercised by the legislative, as representatives of the sovereign, to vindicate the breach of the trust reposed by the people in the hands of the public officer by determining the public officer's fitness to stay in the office. Meanwhile, an action for quo warranto, involves a judicial determination of the eligibility or validity of the election or appointment of a public official based on predetermined rules.

● Aside from the difference in their origin and nature, quo warranto and impeachment may proceed independently of each other as these remedies are distinct as to (1) jurisdiction (2) grounds, (3) applicable rules pertaining to initiation, filing and dismissal, and (4) limitations.

● Quo warranto and impeachment are not mutually exclusive remedies and may even proceed simultaneously. The existence of other remedies against the usurper does not prevent the State from commencing a quo warranto proceeding.

● In quo warranto, the cause of action lies on the usurping, intruding, or unlawfully holding or exercising of a public office. The crux of the controversy in this quo warranto proceedings is the determination of whether or not the respondent legally holds the Chief Justice position to be considered as an impeachable officer in the first place. To be sure, the respondent is not being prosecuted herein for such impeachable offenses enumerated in the Articles of Impeachment. Instead, the resolution of this case shall be based on established facts and related laws. Simply put, while respondent's title to hold a public office is the issue in quo warranto proceedings, impeachment necessarily presupposes that respondent legally holds the public office and thus, is an impeachable officer, the only issue being whether or not she committed impeachable offenses to warrant her removal from office.

● Given the nature and effect of an action for quo warranto, such remedy is unavailing to determine whether or not an official has committed misconduct in office nor is it the proper legal vehicle to evaluate the person's performance in the office. Apropos, an action for quo warranto does not try a person's culpability of an impeachment offense, neither does a writ of quo warranto conclusively pronounce such culpability.

3. NO

● The rules on quo warranto, specifically Section 11, Rule 66, provides:

o Limitations. — Nothing contained in this Rule shall be construed to authorize an action against a public officer or employee for his ouster from office unless the same be commenced within one (1) year after the cause of such ouster, or the right of the petitioner to hold such office or position, arose.

● In Agcaoili v. Suguitan, the Court ruled that there was no limitation or prescription of action in an action for quo warranto, neither could there be, for the reason that it was an action by the Government and prescription could not be plead as a defense to an action by the Government. As a general principle it may be stated that ordinary statutes of limitation, civil or penal, have no application to quo warranto proceeding brought to enforce a public right. Also, it is the general rule that laches, acquiescence, or unreasonable delay in the performance of duty on the part of the officers of the state, is not imputable to the state when acting in its character as a sovereign.

● Indeed, when the government is the real party in interest, and is proceeding mainly to assert its rights, there can be no defense on the ground of laches or prescription. Indubitably, the basic principle that "prescription does not lie against the State" which finds textual basis under Article 1108 (4) of the Civil Code, applies in this case.

● Moreover, there can be no acquiescence or inaction, in this case, on the part of the Republic as would amount to an abandonment of its right to seek redress against a public wrong and vindicate public interest. Neither can delay be attributed to the Republic in commencing the action since respondent deliberately concealed the fact of her disqualification to the position. Prescription, therefore, cannot be pleaded against the Republic.

MENDOZA v. OLORES

February 4, 1999 | GR No. 131977 | Puno, J. | Rule 66 - Quo Warranto; Parties; Legal Standing

PETITIONER: Pedro Mendoza

RESPONDENTS: Ray Allas and Godofredo Olores

DOCTRINE:

Ordinarily, a judgment against a public officer in regard to a public right binds his successor in office. This rule, however, is not applicable in quo warranto cases. A judgment in quo warranto does not bind the respondent's successor in office, even though such successor may trace his title to the same source.

FACTS:

1. Petitioner Mendoza joined the Bureau of Customs (BOC) in 1972 and held the following positions:

a. Port Security Chief (March 1972 - August 1972);

b. Deputy Commissioner of Customs (August 1972 - September 1975);

c. Acting Commissioner of Customs (Septmber 1975 - April 1977); and

d. Customs Operations Chief (October 1987 - February 1988).

2. On March 1, 1988, he was appointed Customs Service Chief of the Customs Intelligence and Investigation Service (CIIS) which was reclassified by the Civil Service as "Director III".

3. On April 22, 1993, petitioner was temporarily designated as Acting District Collector, Collection District X, Cagayan de Oro City.

4. In his place, respondent Allas was appointed as "Acting Director III" of the CIIS.

5. In September 1994, petitioner received a letter from Deputy Customs Commissioner Cesar Z. Dario, informing him of his termination from the BOC, in view of respondent Allas' appointment as Director III by President Fidel V. Ramos.

6. Petitioner wrote the Customs Commissioner demanding his reinstatement with full back wages and without loss of seniority rights. No reply was made.

7. Petitioner filed a petition for quo warranto against respondent Allas before the RTC.

PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:

RTC ● Found that Mendoza was illegally terminated from office

● Held the appointment of Allas to the same office as void ab initio

● Directed the reinstatement of Mendoza

CA ● Pending appeal, Allas was promoted by President FVR to the position of Deputy Commissioner of Customs for Assessment and Operations

● Granted the motion to dismiss

SC ● Mendoza filed a Motion for Execution of the decision.

● Denied the motion on the ground that the contested position vacated by Allas was now being occupied by respondent Godofredo Olores, who was not a party to the quo warranto petition

● Petitioner filed a special civil action for certiorari and mandamus with the CA, questioning the order of the trial court, which was however dismissed.

ISSUE/S:

1. WON the petition for quo warranto can be enforced against Godofredo Olores who is Allas’ successor in office — NO

RULING:

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is denied and the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 41801 is affirmed.

RATIO:

1. NO, the petition for quo warranto cannot be enforced against Olores.

● Ordinarily, a judgment against a public officer in regard to a public right binds his successor in office. This rule, however, is not applicable in quo warranto cases.

● A judgment in quo warranto does not bind the respondent's successor in office, even though such successor may trace his title to the same source.

o This follows from the nature of the writ of quo warranto itself. It is never directed to an officer as such, but always against the person — to determine whether he is constitutionally and legally authorized to perform any act in, or exercise any function of the office to which he lays claim.

● In the case at bar, the petition for quo warranto was filed by Mendoza solely against Allas. What was threshed out before the trial court was the qualification and right of Mendoza to the contested position as against Allas, not against Olores. The Court of Appeals did not err in denying execution of the trial court's decision.

● Allas cannot be held personally liable for Mendoza’s back salaries and benefits.

o He was merely appointed to the subject position by President FVR in the exercise of his constitutional power as Chief Executive.

● Neither can the Bureau of Customs be compelled to pay the said back salaries and benefits of Mendoza.

o The Bureau of Customs was not a party to the petition for quo warranto.

PLDT v. NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION (NTC)

October 18, 1990| G.R. No. 88404 | Melencio-Herrera, J.; En Banc | Quo Warranto: Parties, Legal Standing

PETITIONER: PLDT

RESPONDENTS: National Telecommunications Commission (NTC); and, Express Telecommunications Co., Inc. (ETCI)

DOCTRINE:

The determination of the right to the exercise of a franchise, or whether the right to enjoy such privilege has been forfeited by non-user, is more properly the subject of the prerogative writ of quo warranto, the right to assert which, as a rule, belongs to the State "upon complaint or otherwise," the reason being that the abuse of a franchise is a public wrong and not a private injury. A forfeiture of a franchise will have to be declared in a direct proceeding for the purpose brought by the State because a franchise is granted by law and its unlawful exercise is primarily a concern of Government.

FACTS:

1. FACI (the predecessor company of ETCI) was granted franchise by the Congress in 1958 (RA 2090).

2. In 1987, the NTC granted ETCI’s application for certificate of public convenience and necessity (CPCN) for its Cellular Mobile Telephone System and an Alpha Numeric Paging System in Metro Manila and in the Southern Luzon regions.

PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:

RTC ● PLDT opposed the grant of CPCN.

● NTC granted provisional authority to ETC.

● NTC denied the opposition and the MR.

○ NTC declared that the ETCI Franchise of 1958 should be liberally construed as to include among the services under said franchise the operation of a cellular mobile telephone service.

SC ● PLDT assailed the two NTC Orders by way of certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65.

○ Likewise, PLDT alleged that the ETCI franchise had lapsed into nonexistence for failure of the franchise holder to begin and complete construction of the radio system authorized under the franchise as explicitly required in Section 4 of its franchise, RA 2090.

○ PLDT also invokes Pres. Decree No. 36, enacted on 2 November 1972, which legislates the mandatory cancellation or invalidation of all franchises for the operation of communications services, which have not been availed of or used by the party or parties in whose name they were issued.

●

ISSUE: Is it proper for the PLDT to attack the validity of the ETCI’s franchise?

RULING:

WHEREFORE, finding no grave abuse of discretion, tantamount to lack of or excess of jurisdiction, on the part of the National Telecommunications Commission in issuing its challenged Orders of 12 December 1988 and 8 May 1989 in NTC Case No. 87-39, this Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Temporary Restraining Order heretofore issued is LIFTED. The bond issued as a condition for the issuance of said restraining Order is declared forfeited in favor of private respondent Express Telecommunications Co., Inc. Costs against petitioner.

RATIO:

● No, PLDT had no legal standing to attack the validity of ETCI’s franchise.

● PLDT's allegation partakes of a Collateral attack on a franchise RA 2090, which is not allowed.

○ A franchise is a property right and cannot be revoked or forfeited without due process of law. The determination of the right to the exercise of a franchise, or whether the right to enjoy such privilege has been forfeited by non-user, is more properly the subject of the prerogative writ of quo warranto, the right to assert which, as a rule, belongs to the State “upon complaint or otherwise,” the reason being that the abuse of a franchise is a public wrong and not a private injury.

○ A forfeiture of a franchise will have to be declared in a direct proceeding for the purpose brought by the State because a franchise is granted by law and its unlawful exercise is primarily a concern of Government.

○ A franchise is granted by law, and its unlawful exercise is the concern primarily of the Government. Hence, the Government as a rule is the party called upon to bring the action for such unlawful exercise of franchise.

● Whether ETCI has offended against a provision of its franchise, or has subjected it to misuse or abuse, may more properly be inquired into in quo warranto proceedings instituted by the State. It is the condition of every franchise that it is subject to amendment, alteration, or repeal when the common good so requires (1987 Constitution, Article XII, Section 11).

SEPARATE OPINIONS:

Gutierrez, Jr., J., dissenting:

● There is no dispute that a legislative franchise is necessary for the operation of a telephone system. The NTC has no jurisdiction to grant the authority. The fact that ETCI has to rely on a 1958 legislative franchise shows that only Congress can give the franchise which will empower NTC to issue the certificate or CPCN.

● The most liberal interpretation can not possibly read in a 1958 franchise for radio stations, the authority for a mobile cellular system vintage 1990. No amount of liberal interpretation can supply the missing requirement. And besides, we are not interpreting a Constitution which is intended to cover changing situations and must be read liberally. Legislative franchises are always construed strictly against the franchise.

● The remedy is for ETCI to go to Congress. I regret that in dismissing this petition, we may be withholding from Congress the courtesy we owe to it as a co-equal body and denigrating its power to examine whether or not ETCI really deserves a legislative franchise.

● There is also a sudden resurrection of a dead franchise and its coming to life in an entirely different form-no longer a radio station but a modern telephone company. I have searched the records in vain for any plan of ETCI to operate radio stations. It has not operated and does not plan to operate radio stations. Its sole objective is to set up a telephone company. For that purpose, it should go to Congress and get a franchise for a telephone company. NTC cannot give it such a franchise.

NB: The separate opinion of J. Cruz did not tackle procedural grounds. It only attacked the propriety of taking of private property and how it offended due process (constitutional law grounds): “I feel there is no due process where private property is taken by the Government from one private person [PLDT] and given to another private person [ETCI] for the latter's direct benefit. The fact that compensation is paid is immaterial; the flaw lies in the taking itself. The circumstance that PLDT is a public utility is no warrant for taking undue liberties with its property, which is protected by the Bill of Rights. ‘Public need’ cannot be a blanket justification for favoring one investor against another in contravention of the system of free enterprise. If PLDT has misused its franchise, I should think the solution is to revoke its authority, not to force it to share its resources with its private competitors.”

DIVINAGRACIA V. CONSOLIDATED BROADCASTING SYSTEM, INC.

: April 7, 2009 | GR No. 162272 | Tinga, J. | Parties, Legal Standing

PETITIONER: Santiago C. Divinagracia

RESPONDENTS: Consolidated Broadcasting System, Inc. and People’s Broadcasting Service, Inc.

DOCTRINE:

By allowing the NTC to countermand State policy by revoking respondent’s vested legal right to operate broadcast stations unduly gives to a mere administrative agency veto power over the implementation of the law and the enforcement of especially vested legal rights

FACTS:

1. Respondents Consolidated Broadcasting System, Inc. (CBS) and People’s Broadcasting Service, Inc. (PBS) were incorporated in 1961 and 1965, respectively. Both are involved in the operation of radio broadcasting services in the Philippines, they being the grantees of legislative franchises by virtue of two laws, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7477 and R.A. No. 7582.

2. NTC issued four (4) Provisional Authorities to PBS and six (6) Provisional Authorities to CBS, allowing them to install, operate and maintain various AM and FM broadcast stations in various locations throughout the nation.

3. Petitioner Santiago C. Divinagracia filed two complaints both dated 1 March 1999 with the NTC, respectively lodged against PBS7 and CBS. He alleged that he was "the actual and beneficial owner of Twelve percent (12%) of the shares of stock" of PBS and CBS separately, and that despite the provisions in R.A. No. 7477 and R.A. No. 7582 mandating the public offering of at least 30% of the common stocks of PBS and CBS, both entities had failed to make such offering.

4. NTC issued a consolidated decision dismissing both complaints

5. CA: agreed with the earlier conclusion that the complaints were indeed a collateral attack on the legislative franchises of CBS and PBS and that a quo warranto action was the proper mode to thresh out the issues raised in the complaints.

PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:

NTC ● NTC dismissed complaints: while it had jurisdiction to grant the prayer of the complainant, the complaints were collateral attacks on the legislative franchise which must be subject on an action for quo warranto pursuant to Rule 66.

CA The appellate court agreed with the earlier conclusion that the complaints were indeed a collateral attack on the legislative franchises of CBS and PBS and that a quo warranto action was the proper mode to thresh out the issues raised in the complaints.

ISSUE/S:

1. Whether the NTC, with its regulatory powers, is powerless to cancel Provisional Authorities and Certificates of Public Convenience it issued to legislative franchise holders. YES

RULING:

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. No pronouncement as to costs.

RATIO:

If the courts conclude that private respondents have violated the terms of their franchise and thus issue the writs of quo warranto against them, then the NTC is obliged to cancel any existing licenses and CPCs since these permits draw strength from the possession of a valid franchise. If the point has not already been made clear, then licenses issued by the NTC such as CPCs and provisional authorities are junior to the legislative franchise enacted by Congress. The licensing authority of the NTC is not on equal footing with the franchising authority of the State through Congress. The issuance of licenses by the NTC implements the legislative franchises established by Congress, in the same manner that the executive branch implements the laws of Congress rather than creates its own laws. And similar to the inability of the executive branch to prevent the implementation of laws by Congress, the NTC cannot, without clear and proper delegation by Congress, prevent the exercise of a legislative franchise by withholding or canceling the licenses of the franchisee.

And the role of the courts, through quo warranto proceedings, neatly complements the traditional separation of powers that come to bear in our analysis. The courts are entrusted with the adjudication of the legal status of persons, the final arbiter of their rights and obligations under law.

Allowing the NTC to countermand State policy by revoking respondent's vested legal right to operate broadcast stations unduly gives to a mere administrative agency veto power over the implementation of the law and the enforcement of especially vested legal rights. That concern would not arise if Congress had similarly empowered the NTC with the power to revoke a franchisee's right to operate broadcast stations. But as earlier stated, there is no such expression in the law, and by presuming such right the Court will be acting contrary to the stated State interest as expressed in respondents' legislative franchises.

GONZALES v. CHAVEZ

4 February 1992 | G.R. No. 97351 | Romero, J | Rule 66 (Parties, Legal Standing)

PETITIONER: Ramon Gonzales (Gonzalees)

RESPONDENTS: Hon. Francisco Chavez, in his capacity as Solicitor General; Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG); and Commission on Audit (CoA)

DOCTRINE:

The requisite of clear legal right accruing to the petitioner is present, as his petition is anchored in the right of the people, through the PCGG and the Republic, to be represented in court by the public officer duly authorized by law. The requirement of personal interest is satisfied by the mere fact that the petitioner is a citizen and hence, part of the public which possesses the right.

The writ of prohibition, however, may not be similarly treated and granted in this petition. The said writ, being intended to prevent the doing of some act that is about to be done, it may not provide a remedy for acts which are already fait accompli.

FACTS:

1. Ramon Gonzales, as a citizen and taxpayer, filed the petition as a class suit under §12 Rule 3 of the Rules of Court on the ground that the subject matters involved are of common and general interest to all Filipino citizens and taxpayers as they pertain to the enforcement of a public duty and the prevention of unlawful expenditure of public funds

2. According to Gonzales, the SolGen is the counsel for the Republic and the PCGG in 33 cases before this Court, 109 cases in the Sandiganbayan, 1 case in the NLRC, and another case in the MTC, or a total of 144 cases

3. In December 1990, the SolGen withdrew as counsel in said cases through a pleading entitled “Withdrawal of Appearance with Reservation”

a. The SolGen filed a substantially similar pleading in the cases where the Republic is a party

4. As a result of his withdrawal, the PCGG hired 40 private lawyers, 19 of whom are trial lawyers

a. They would receive a monthly compensation of at least Php 10,000 plus appearance fee of Php 1,700 in actual trial and/or Php 500 if trial is postponed

5. Gonzales contends that since the SolGen’s withdrawal of appearance was made without any reason, it implied that it was “within the absolute discretion” of said public official

a. §1 of PD 478 and §35 of the Administrative Code of 1987, however, mandatorily requires the SolGen to stand in the place of, and act for the Republic and the PCGG inn court

b. Therefore, the SolGen has “no discretion to reject by withdrawing” as counsel for said entities

ISSUE/S:

1. WQN a petition for mandamus is proper - YES

RULING:

WHEREFORE, the petition for a writ of mandamus is hereby GRANTED. The Solicitor General is DIRECTED to immediately re-enter his appearance in the cases where he had filed a motion to withdraw appearance and the PCGG shall terminate the services of the lawyers it had employed but not before paying them the reasonable fees due them in accordance with rules and regulations of the Commission on Audit.

RATIO:

1. YES

● Being a public officer, the SolGen is “invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public”

● Another role of the SolGen is an officer of the Court, in which case he is called upon “to share in the tas and responsibility of dispensing justice and resolving disputes”

o Therefore, he may be enjoined in the same manner that a special prosecutor was sought enjoined by this Court from committing any act which may tend to “obstruct, pervert or impede and degrade the administration of justice”

● Considering the spirit and the letter of the law, there can bo no other logical interpretation of §35 of the Administrative Code than that is, indeed, mandatory upon the OSG to “represent the Government of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of a lawyer”

● The SolGen’s withdrawal of his appearance on behalf of the PCGG was beyond the scope of his authority in the management of a case

● As a public official, it is his sworn duty to provide legal services to the Government, particularly to represent it in litigations

o Such duty may be enjoined upon him by the writ of mandamus

● In view of the foregoing, there need be no proof adduced that the petitioner has a personal interest in the case, as his petition is anchored in the right of the people, through the PCGG and the Republic, to be represented in court by the public officer duly authorized by law

o The requirement of personal interest is satisfied by the mere fact that the petitioner is a citizen and hence, part of the public which possesses the right

● The right of prohibition, however, may not be similarly treated and granted in this petition

o The said right, being intended to prevent the doing of some act that is about to be done, it may not provide a remedy for acts which are already fait accompli

HON. GENERAL v HON. URRO

Date March 29, 2011 | GR No. 191560 | Ponente Brion J| | Quo Warranto

PETITIONER: Hon. General

RESPONDENTS: Hon. Urro

DOCTRINE:

An acting appointee has no cause of action for quo warranto against the new appointee

FACTS:

1. In 2006, PGMA appointed Imelda Roces as NAPOLCOM Commissioner. She was reappointed to the same position in 2007.

2. When Roces died, petitioner was appointed in 2008 as acting NAPOLCOM Commissioner. On the same date, PGMA appointed Escueta as acting NAPOLCOM Commissioner and designated him as NAPOLCOM Vice Chairman

3. Later, PGMA appointed Urro in placde of petitioner. Urro’s appointment paper was dated March 5, 2010 wheil the appointment of De Guzman and Escueta were dated March 8, 2010.

4. In a letter dated March 19, 2010, DILG Head Veron Cruz issued a congratulatory letter to respondent.

5. After being copy-furnished of the congratulatory letter, petitioner filed the present quo warranto petition questioning the validity of the respondent’s appointment on the ground of midnight appointment.

6. On March 25, 2010 Urro took his oath of office.

7. On July 30, 2010, then Pres. Aquino issued EO No. 2 recalling, withdrawing, and revoking the appointments of PGMA for violating the ban on midnight appointments.

8. Petitioner claims that Roces was supposed to serve a full term of 6 years, since she failed to finish her term due to her death, then the petitioner is entitled to serve the unexpired portion or until October 2010. He explains that until a presidential appointment is officially released, there is no appointment to speak of. Since the appointment paper of Urro, while bearing a date prior to the effectivity of the constitutional ban on appointments was officially released when the appointment ban was in effect, then the petitioner’s appointment though temporary should remain effective as no new and valid appointment was effectively made.

9. Respondents pray for the TRO to stop the implementation of EO No. 2

PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:

OSG ● It recognized the appointments as within the scope of midnight appointments but submits that the petitioner is not entitled to quo warranto

ISSUE/S:

Whether petitioner has a cause of action to institute and mainte the quo warranto against Urro. –NO

RULING:

WHEREFORE, The petition is DISMISSED

RATIO:

While a quo warranto is a special civil action, the existence of a cause of action is not any less required since both special and ordinary civil actions are governed by the rules on ordinary civil actions subject only to the rules prescribed specifically for a particular special civil action. |||

We stress that the person instituting the quo warranto proceedings in his own behalf must show that he is entitled to the office in dispute; otherwise, the action may be dismissed at any stage. Emphatically, Section 6, Rule 66 of the same Rules requires the petitioner to state in the petition his right to the public office and the respondent's unlawful possession of the disputed position.|||

Since the petitioner merely holds an acting appointment (and an expired one at that), he clearly does not have a cause of action to maintain the present petition.The essence of an acting appointment is its temporariness and its consequent revocability at any time by the appointing authority. The petitioner in a quo warranto proceeding who seeks reinstatement to an office, on the ground of usurpation or illegal deprivation, must prove his clear right to the office for his suit to succeed; otherwise, his petition must fail.

From this perspective, the petitioner must first clearly establish his own right to the disputed office as a condition precedent to the consideration of the unconstitutionality of the respondents' appointments.

RUBY SHELTER BUILDERS V. FORMARAN

February 10, 2009 | GR No. 175914 | Chico-Nazario, J. | Expropriation - Jurisdiction, BP 129 as amended by RA 11576

PETITIONER: Ruby Shelter Builders and Realty Development Corporation

RESPONDENTS: Hon. Pablo C. Formaran III, Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court Branch 21

DOCTRINE:

The court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fee. Hence, the payment of docket fees is not only mandatory, but also jurisdictional.

FACTS:

1. Petitioner obtained a loan in the total amount of P95,700,620.00 from respondents Romeo Y. Tan and Roberto L. Obiedo, secured by real estate mortgages over five parcels of land, all located in Triangulo, Naga City. When petitioner was unable to pay the loan when it became due and demandable, respondents Tan and Obiedo agreed to an extension of the same.

2. In a Memorandum of Agreement, Tan and Obiedo granted petitioner until 31 December 2005 to settle its indebtedness, and condoned the interests, penalties and surcharges accruing thereon. The MOA required that petitioner execute simultaneously with the said Memorandum, "by way of dacion en pago", Deeds of Absolute Sale in favor of respondents Tan and Obiedo, covering the same parcels of land subject of the mortgages.

3. Pursuant to the MOA, petitioner, executed separate Deeds of Absolute Sale, over the five parcels of land, in favor of respondents Tan and Obiedo.

4. Without payment having been made by petitioner, respondents Tan and Obiedo presented the Deeds of Absolute Sale before the Register of Deeds of Naga City, as a result of which, they were able to secure TCTs over the five parcels of land in their names.

PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:

RTC ● Petitioner filed before the RTC a Complaint against respondents Tan, Obiedo, and Atty. Reyes, for declaration of nullity of deeds of sales and damages, with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order (TRO).

● Upon filing its Complaint with the RTC, petitioner paid the sum of P13,644.25 for docket and other legal fees. The Clerk of Court initially considered the case as an action incapable of pecuniary estimation and computed the docket and other legal fees due thereon according to Section 7 (b) (1), Rule 141 of the Rules of Court.

● Respondent Tan filed an Omnibus Motion in which he contended that the petitioner did not pay the appropriate docket fees, for which should be computed in accordance with Section 7 (a), not Section 7 (b) (1), of Rule 141 of the ROC. Thus the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the said case. Tan asked the RTC to issue an order requiring petitioner to pay the correct and accurate docket fees. The RTC granted the Motion.

○ Petitioner moved for partial reconsideration but the same was denied.

CA ● Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the CA. According to petitioner, the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, when it issued its Orders mandating that the docket/filing fees, an action for annulment of deeds of sale, be assessed under Section 7 (a), Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as amended. The CA denied the petition.

ISSUE/S:

1. WON the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the case—NO

RULING:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Review is hereby DENIED.

RATIO:

● In Manchester Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, the Court explicitly pronounced that "the court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fee". Hence, the payment of docket fees is not only mandatory, but also jurisdictional.

● In Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. (SIOL) v. Asuncion, the Court laid down guidelines for the implementation of its previous pronouncement in Manchester under particular circumstances, to wit:

1. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of the prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action. Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.

2. The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims, third-party claims and similar pleadings, which shall not be considered filed until and unless the filing fee prescribed therefor is paid. The court may also allow payment of said fee within a reasonable time but also in no case beyond its applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.

3. Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of the appropriate pleading and payment of the prescribed filing fee but, subsequently, the judgment awards a claim not specified in the pleading, or if specified the same has been left for determination by the court, the additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall be the responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his duly authorized deputy to enforce said lien and assess and collect the additional fee.

● In the Petition at bar, the RTC found, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, that petitioner did not pay the correct amount of docket fees for the case. According to both the trial and appellate courts, petitioner should pay docket fees in accordance with Section 7 (a), Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as amended. Consistent with the liberal tenor of Sun Insurance, the RTC, instead of dismissing outright petitioner's Complaint in Civil Case No. 2006-0030, granted petitioner time to pay the additional docket fees. Despite the seeming munificence of the RTC, petitioner refused to pay the additional docket fees assessed against it, believing that it had already paid the correct amount before, pursuant to Section 7 (b) (1), Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as amended.

● The docket fees under Section 7 (a), Rule 141, in cases involving real property depend on the fair market value of the same: the higher the value of the real property, the higher the docket fees due. In contrast, Section 7 (b) (1), Rule 141 imposes a fixed or flat rate of docket fees on actions incapable of pecuniary estimation.

BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Petitioner, vs. HON. JUDGE AGAPITO L. HONTANOSAS,

JR., REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 16, CEBU CITY, SILVERIO BORBON, SPOUSES XERXES

AND ERLINDA FACULTAD, AND XM FACULTAD & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,

June 25, 2014 | G.R. No. |157163|BERSAMIN, J.:| Expropriation

PETITIONER:BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS.,

RESPONDENTS: HON. JUDGE AGAPITO L. HONTANOSAS, JR., REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 16, CEBU CITY, SILVERIO BORBON, SPOUSES XERXES AND ERLINDA FACULTAD, AND XM FACULTAD & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION

Injunction should not issue except upon a clear showing that the applicant has a right in esse to be protected, and that the acts sought to be enjoined are violative of such right. A preliminary injunction should not determine the merits of a case, or decide controverted facts, for, being a preventive remedy, it only seeks to prevent threatened wrong, further injury, and irreparable harm or injustice until the rights of the parties can be settled.

FACTS:

1. Respondents Spouses Silverio et.al. filed a case against BPI to seek the declaration of the nullity of the promissory notes, real estate and chattel mortgages and continuing surety agreement they had executed in favor of the petitioner.

2. They further sought damages and attorney’s fees, and applied for a temporary restraining order (TRO) or writ of preliminary injunction to prevent the petitioner from foreclosing on the mortgages against their properties.

3. The complaint alleged that the respondents had obtained a loan from the petitioner, and had executed promissory notes binding themselves solidarily. and constituted real estate mortgages on several parcels of land in favor of the petitioner; and that they had been made to sign a continuing surety agreement and a chattel mortgage on their Mitsubishi Pajero as security.

4. The petitioner required them to issue postdated checks to cover the loan under threat of foreclosing on the mortgages.

5. Petitioner filed its answer with affirmative defenses and counterclaim, as well as its opposition to the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction, contending that the foreclosure of the mortgages was within its legal right to do.

PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:

RTC ● A motion to dismiss was filed by Petitione, but was denied. RTC granted the application for Preliminary Injunction.

CA ● Petitioner appealed to the CA. CA affirmed the RTC decision.

ISSUE/S:

1. Whether or not the RTC erred in the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction. NO

RULING:

WHEREFORE, the Court PARTIALLY GRANTS the petition for review on certiorari; MODIFIES the decision promulgated on July 9, 2002 by annulling and setting aside the writ of preliminary injunction in Civil Case No. CEB-26468 issued by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 16, in Cebu City for being devoid of factual and legal bases; ORDERS the Regional Trial Court, Branch 16, in Cebu City to proceed with dispatch in Civil Case No. CEB-26468; and DIRECTS the respondents to pay the costs of suit.

1. The RTC’s issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the petitioner from proceeding with the foreclosure of the mortgages was plainly erroneous and unwarranted.

2. The issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction upon the application of the respondents was improper.

a. They had admittedly constituted the real estate and chattel mortgages to secure the performance of their loan obligation to the petitioner, and, as such, they were fully aware of the consequences on their rights in the properties given as collaterals should the loan secured be unpaid.

b. The foreclosure of the mortgages would be the remedy provided by law for the mortgagee to exact payment. In fact, they did not dispute the petitioner’s allegations that they had not fully paid their obligation.

c. Civil Case No. CEB-26468 was precisely brought by them in order to stave off the impending foreclosure of the mortgages based on their claim that they had been compelled to sign pre-printed standard bank loan forms and mortgage agreements.

3. Injunction only seeks to prevent threatened wrong, further injury, and irreparable harm or injustice until the rights of the parties can be settled. The respondents failed to prove that they would suffer an irreparable injury. Fear of potential loss of possession and ownership, or facing a criminal prosecution did not constitute the requisite irreparable injury that could have warranted the issuance of the writ of injunction.

4. As a general rule, the courts will not issue writs of prohibition or injunction – whether preliminary or final – in order to enjoin or restrain any criminal prosecution. But there are extreme cases in which exceptions to the general rule have been recognized, including:

a. When the injunction is necessary to afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the accused;

b. When it is necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or multiplicity of actions;

c. When there is a prejudicial question that is sub judice;

d. When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority;

e. When the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation;

f. When double jeopardy is clearly apparent;

g. When the court has no jurisdiction over the offense;

h. When it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution;

i. When the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance; and (

j. When there is clearly no prima faciecase against the accused and a motion to quash on that ground has been denied.

k. However, the respondents did not sufficiently show that Civil Case No. CEB-26468 came under any of the foregoing exceptions. Hence, the issuance by the RTC of the writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the petitioner from instituting criminal complaints for violation of BP No. 22 against the respondents was unwarranted.

BARRIDO V. NONATO

20 October 2014 | G.R. No. 176492 | Peralta, J | | Expropriation, Jurisdiction, BP 129 as amended by RA 11576

PETITIONER: MARIETTA N. BARRIDO

RESPONDENTS: LEONARDO V. NONATO

DOCTRINE:

In the absence of proof, properties acquired while they lived together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. A party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have been contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former’s efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household.

FACTS:

1. In the course of the marriage of respondent Leonardo V. Nonato and petitioner Marietta N. Barrido,they were able to acquire a property situated in Eroreco, Bacolod City, consisting of a house and lot.

2. On March 15, 1996, their marriage was declared void on the ground of psychological incapacity. Since there was no more reason to maintain their co-ownership over the property, Nonato asked Barrido for partition, but the latter refused.

3. Thus, Nonato filed a Complaint for partition before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Bacolod City. Barrido claimed, by way of affirmative defense, that the subject property had already been sold to their children, Joseph Raymund and Joseph Leo.

4. She likewise moved for the dismissal of the complaint because the MTCC lacked jurisdiction, the partition case being an action incapable of pecuniary estimation. The Bacolod MTCC rendered a Decision, applying Article 129 of the Family Code.

5. It ruled in that the conjugal property of the spouses be adjudicated to the defendant Marietta Nonato, the spouse with whom the majority of the common children choose to remain.

6. Nonato appealed the MTCC Decision.

7. The Bacolod RTC reversed the ruling of the MTCC.

8. It found that even though the MTCC aptly applied Article 129 of the Family Code, it nevertheless made a reversible error in adjudicating the subject property to Barrido.

9. Upon appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC Decision. It held that since the property’s assessed value was only ₱8,080.00, it clearly fell within the MTCC’s jurisdiction.

10. Also, although the RTC erred in relying on Article 129 of the Family Code, instead of Article 147, the dispositive portion of its decision still correctly ordered the equitable partition of the property.

11. Barrido filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was, however, denied for lack of merit.

PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:

MTCC ● The MTCC of Bacolod City entered a decision on September 17, 2003, ordering the conjugal property to be adjudicated to petitioner Marietta Barrido, the spouse with whom the majority of the common children chose to remain.

CA ● CA reversed the MTCC ruling and ordered the partition of the house and lot, applying Art. 147 of the Family Code, which governs the property relations of spouses of void marriages.

● CA held that the property was acquired by the joint efforts of the spouses and should be owned by them in equal shares.

ISSUE/S:

1. WON MTCC has Jurisdiction - YES

RULING:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated November 16, 2006, as well as its Resolution dated January 24, 2007 in CA-G.R. SP No. 00235, are hereby AFFIRMED.

RATIO:

YES

● Contrary to Barrido’s contention, the MTCC has jurisdiction to take cognizance of real actions or those affecting title to real property, or for the recovery of possession, or for the partition or condemnation of, or foreclosure of a mortgage on real property. Section 33 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 provides:

● Section 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in civil cases.– Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit

● Trial Courts shall exercise:

x x x x

● (3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of the property or interest therein does not exceed Twenty thousand pesos (₱20,000.00)or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed Fifty thousand pesos (₱50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs: Provided, That value of such property shall be determined by the assessed value of the adjacent lots. (as amended by R.A. No. 7691)

● Here, the subject property’s assessed value was merely ₱8,080.00, an amount which certainly does not exceed the required limit of ₱20,000.00 for civil actions outside Metro Manila tofall within the jurisdiction of the MTCC. Therefore, the lower court correctly took cognizance of the instant case.

BARANGAY SAN ROQUE, TALISAY, CEBU vs. Heirs of FRANCISCO PASTOR

June 20, 2000 | GR No. 138896 | J. Quisumbing | Special Civil Actions

PETITIONER: BARANGAY SAN ROQUE, TALISAY, CEBU

RESPONDENTS: EUGENIO SYLIANCO, TEODORO SYLIANCO, ISABEL SYLIANCO, EUGENIA S. ONG, LAWRENCE SYLIANCO, LAWSON SYLIANCO, LAWINA S. NOTARIO, LEONARDO SYLIANCO, JR. and LAWFORD SYLIANCO

DOCTRINE:

The test to determine whether a suit is incapable of pecuniary estimation was laid down by the Court in this wise: "If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the courts of first instance would depend on the amount of the claim. However, where the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money, or where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought, like in suits to have the defendant perform his part of the contract (specific performance) and in actions for support, or for annulment of a judgment or to foreclose a mortgage, this Court has considered such actions as cases where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and are cognizable exclusively by courts of first instance.”

FACTS:

1. Petitioner filed before the MTC of Talisay, Cebu a Complaint to expropriate a property of the respondents.

2. MTC dismissed the Complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. It reasoned that "in an action for eminent domain, the principal cause of action is the exercise of such power or right. The fact that the action also involves real property is merely incidental. An action for eminent domain is therefore within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court and not with this Court."

3. The RTC also dismissed the Complaint when filed before it, holding that an action for eminent domain affected title to real property; hence, the value of the property to be expropriated would determine whether the case should be filed before the MTC or the RTC.

● Concluding that the action should have been filed before the MTC since the value of the subject property was less than P20,000

● It appears from the current Tax declaration of the land involved that its assessed value is only P1,740.00.

● Pursuant to Section 3, paragraph (3), of Republic Act No. 7691, all civil actions involving title to, or possession of, real property with an assessed value of less than P20,000.00 are within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Courts.

4. Aggrieved, petitioner appealed directly to this Court, raising a pure question of law.

5. In a Resolution dated July 28, 1999, the Court denied the Petition for Review "for being posted out of time on July 2, 1999, the due date being June 2, 1999, as the motion for extension of time to file petition was denied in the resolution of July 14, 1999."

6. In a subsequent Resolution dated October 6, 1999, the Court reinstated the Petition.

PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:

MTC ● Diismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction

○ Case is one incapable of pecuniary estimation

RTC ● Dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction

○ Value of the property determines whether jurisdiction belongs to the MTC or RTC

ISSUE/S: Which court, MTC or RTC, has jurisdiction over cases for eminent domain or expropriation where the assessed value of the subject property is below P20,000? - RTC

RULING:

Indeed, it is not a question of who has a better title or right, for the government does not even claim that it has a title to the property. It merely asserts its inherent sovereign power to "appropriate and control individual property for the public benefit, as the public necessity, convenience or welfare may demand."

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED and the assailed Orders SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court is directed to HEAR the case. No costs.

RATIO:

1. We agree with the petitioner that an expropriation suit is incapable of pecuniary estimation.

2. The test to determine whether it is so was laid down by the Court in this wise: "If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the courts of first instance would depend on the amount of the claim.

3. However, where the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money, or where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought, like in suits to have the defendant perform his part of the contract (specific performance) and in actions for support, or for annulment of a judgment or to foreclose a mortgage, this Court has considered such actions as cases where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and are cognizable exclusively by courts of first instance.

4. The rationale of the rule is plainly that the second class cases, besides the determination of damages, demand an inquiry into other factors which the law has deemed to be more within the competence of courts of first instance, which were the lowest courts of record at the time that the first organic laws of the Judiciary were enacted allocating jurisdiction

5. In the present case, an expropriation suit does not involve the recovery of a sum of money. Rather, it deals with the exercise by the government of its authority and right to take private property for public use.

6. It should be stressed that the primary consideration in an expropriation suit is whether the government or any of its instrumentalities has complied with the requisites for the taking of private property. Hence, the courts determine the authority of the government entity, the necessity of the expropriation, and the observance of due process.

7. In the main, the subject of an expropriation suit is the government's exercise of eminent domain, a matter that is incapable of pecuniary estimation. True, the value of the property to be expropriated is estimated in monetary terms, for the court is duty-bound to determine the just compensation for it. This, however, is merely incidental to the expropriation suit.

8. Indeed, that amount is determined only after the court is satisfied with the propriety of the expropriation.

9. We are not persuaded by respondents' argument that the present action involves the title to or possession of a parcel of land. They cite the observation of retired Justice Jose Y. Feria, an eminent authority in remedial law, that condemnation or expropriation proceedings are examples of real actions that affect the title to or possession of a parcel of land.

10. Their reliance is misplaced. Justice Feria sought merely to distinguish between real and personal actions. His discussion on this point pertained to the nature of actions, not to the jurisdiction of courts. In fact, in his pre-bar lectures, he emphasizes that jurisdiction over eminent domain cases is still within the RTCs under the 1997 Rules.

NTC v. BERMUDA DEVELOPMENT CORP.,

April 03, 2019 | GR No.214782 | Caguioa, J. | Jurisdiction, BP 129 as amended by RA 11576

PETITIONER: NATIONAL TRANSMISSION CORPORATION

RESPONDENT: BERMUDA DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION

DOCTRINE:

The proper recourse is for the ejectment court: (1) to dismiss the case without prejudice to the landowner filing the proper action for recovery of just compensation and consequential damages; or (2) to dismiss the case and direct the public utility corporation to institute the proper expropriation or condemnation proceedings and to pay the justcompensation and consequential damages assessed therein; or (3) to continue with the case asif it were an expropriation case and determine the just compensation and consequential damages pursuant to Rule 67 (Expropriation) of the Rules of Court, if the ejectment court has jurisdiction over the value of the subject land.

FACTS:

1. In this case, on 22 December 2009, Respondent Bermuda Development Corporation (BDC) filed a case for Unlawful Detainer against Petitioner National Transmission Corporation (TransCo) with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Cabuyao. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 2498.The MTC rendered a Decision in favor of plaintiff and against defendant and ordered the defendants to vacate the subject lot and remove all structures thereon, known as Lot 10-B, Psd.043404- 058243 consisting of 8,920 square meters located at Barangay Banlic, Cabuyao,Laguna and covered by TCT No. T-258244 of the Registry of Deeds of the Province of Laguna and peacefully surrender possession thereof to plaintiff.

2. On 17 September 2009, Petitioner (TransCo) filed an appeal before the RTC, Branch 24 of Biñan, Laguna.

3. On 21 January 2010, Petitioner (TransCo) filed a Complaint for Expropriation of the parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 258244, (the same property subject of the Unlawful Detainer Case) before the RTC of Biñan, Laguna. The case was raffled to and eventually heard by Branch 25 thereof, and docketed as Civil Case B-7972. Subsequently, on 25 February 2010, Petitioner (TransCo) filed with RTC Branch 25 an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Possession. Petitioner (Transco) then deposited the amount of P10,704,000.00 with the Landbank of the Philippines, purportedly representing the provisional value of the property sought to be expropriated. Consequently, on 29 March 2010, RTC Branch 25 issued an Order granting Petitioner’s Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Possession.

PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:

RTC ● RTC Branch 24 dismissed Petitioner (TransCo’s) appeal in the unlawful detainer case for being “moot and academic” because with the filing of an expropriation proceeding covering subject property by defendant-appellant TRANSCO (NTC) and possession thereof having been formally delivered to it already per Sheriff's Report dated July 7, 2010 of Sheriff IV Andrew A. Santos, this Court is of the considered opinion that the issue in this appealed case which is also possession has become moot and academic. In filing said expropriation proceeding, defendant-appellant TRANSCO may also be considered to have abandoned its appeal.

CA ● TransCo then filed a Petition for Review under Rule 42, which was dismissed by the CA. The CA affirmed the Orders issued by RTC Branch 24.

● The CA reasoned out that it would be circuitous for the CA to require TransCo to first vacate the subject property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-258244 in view of the adverse judgment in the unlawful detainer case of the Municipal Trial Court of Cabuyao (MTC), and then soon thereafter, restore it again in possession of the property on account of the writ of possession issued by the RTC, Branch 25, the court where the expropriation case is pending.

ISSUE/S:

1. Whether or not the RTC erred in dismissing TransCo’s appeal allegedly because it has become moot and academic and with the filing of the expropriation complaint involving the same property subject of the unlawful detainer case – YES.

RULING:

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated May 29, 2014 and Resolution dated October 7, 2014 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 120310 as well as the Decision dated August 24, 2009 of the Municipal Trial Court of Cabuyao, Laguna in Civil Case No. 2498 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaint for unlawful detainer filed before the Municipal Trial Court of Cabuyao, Laguna in Civil Case No. 2498 is DISMISSED.

RATIO:

● Thus, it is well-settled that a case filed by a landowner for recovery of possession or ejectment against a public utility corporation, endowed with the power of eminent domain, which has occupied the land belonging to the former in the interest of public service without prior acquisition of title thereto by negotiated purchase or expropriation proceedings, will not prosper. Any action to compel the public utility corporation to vacate such property is unavailing since the landowner is denied the remedies of ejectment and injunction for reasons of public policy and public necessity as well as equitable estoppel.

● The proper recourse is for the ejectment court: (1) to dismiss the case without prejudice to the landowner filing the proper action for recovery of just compensation and consequential damages; or (2) to dismiss the case and direct the public utility corporation to institute the proper expropriation or condemnation proceedings and to pay the just compensation and consequential damages assessed therein; or (3) to continue with the case as if it were an expropriation case and determine the just compensation and consequential damages pursuant to Rule 67 (Expropriation) of the Rules of Court, if the ejectment court has jurisdiction over the value of the subject land.

● The MTC being bereft of jurisdiction to entertain the unlawful detainer case, its Decision mandating TransCo to vacate the subject property and remove all structures thereon and to pay BDC P10,350,000.00 as reasonable rental computed from December 13, 2008 is without legal basis.

● The subsequent filing by TransCo of the expropriation proceedings could not have rendered the unlawful detainer case moot and academic inasmuch as the MTC erred in proceeding with the unlawful detainer case and not dismissing it following the prevailing jurisprudence.

REPUBLIC v. PHIL-VILLE DEVELOPMENT AND HOUSING CORP

June 26, 2007 | GR No. 172243 | Garcia, J. | Expropriation Stages/Phases; Inverse Condemnation

PETITIONER: REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the TOLL REGULATORY BOARD

RESPONDENTS: . PHIL-VILLE DEVELOPMENT AND HOUSING CORPORATION and SY CHI SIONG AND CO., INC.

DOCTRINE:

Under the Rules, there are two (2) stages in every action for expropriation, namely: 1. Determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts involved in the suit; and 2. Determination by the court of the just compensation for the property sought to be taken. Payment of just compensation is not a condition sine qua non to the issuance of an order of expropriation. In expropriation proceedings, it is the transfer of title to the land expropriated that must wait until the indemnity is actually paid.

FACTS:

1. In an effort to ease traffic congestion on the North Luzon Expressway, petitioner Republic, through the Toll Regulatory Board, sought to widen the Balintawak Toll Plaza which would necessarily affect two (2) parcels of land registered under the names of herein respondents Phil-Ville Development and Housing Corporation (Phil-Ville, for brevity) and Sy Chi Siong and Co., Inc. (Sy Chi Siong, for short).

2. Petitioner filed a complaint for expropriation before the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City for the acquisition of the aforedescribed parcels of land.

3. After filing an Amended Complaint to reflect the proper schedule of valuation of the properties sought to be expropriated, petitioner deposited with the Land Bank of the Philippines the amount of Two Million Three Hundred Eleven Thousand Two Hundred Pesos (P2,311,200.00), representing the total zonal value of the properties under expropriation. Thereafter, it filed with the court a Motion for Issuance of Writ of Possession.

4. Both respondents separately moved to dismiss the complaint on the main ground that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the res.

PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:

RTC Trial court denied both motions and asserted jurisdiction over the case and directed the issuance of a writ of possession in favor of petitioner and required the respondents to file their respective answers to the complaint.

○ Of the two respondents impleaded as defendants in the complaint, only Sy Chi Siong filed its Answer, thereunder reiterating the grounds pleaded in its earlier motion to dismiss. In the alternative, it prayed for just compensation.

Thereafter, petitioner filed a Motion for Issuance of Order of Expropriation and Appointment of Commissioners on the rationale that the respondents had never challenged its right to expropriate their properties subject of the suit.

○ The trial court, even as it found the aforementioned motion meritorious, deferred action on the petitioner's prayer for an order of expropriation and instead set the same motion for hearing "so that the parties may nominate the commissioners who will ascertain and report to the court the just compensation for the aforementioned properties."

■ Petitioner filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the above Order but was it was denied.

CA Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in insisting on the payment of just compensation before an order of expropriation may be issued.

● CA upheld the trial court.

ISSUE/S:

1. WON a final determination of just compensation in an expropriation proceedings must first be made before an order of expropriation may be issued by the court - NO

RULING:

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the assailed decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the trial court is directed to issue an order of expropriation in favor of petitioner Republic.

RATIO:

1. NO

● Under the Rules, there are two (2) stages in every action for expropriation, namely: 1. Determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts involved in the suit; and 2. Determination by the court of the just compensation for the property sought to be taken.

○ During the first stage, if the defendant had denied or objected to the plaintiff's right to expropriate, a hearing would have been held to decide upon whether the land was private, and whether the purpose was, in fact, public. However, once the objections and defenses against the right of the plaintiff to expropriate are overruled, an order of expropriation may issue.

■ With all the more reason must this be so when, as in this case, there is no contest or objection by either of the herein respondents as to the petitioner's right to expropriate. Neither respondent raised an issue as to petitioner's right to expropriate its parcels of land, or the public purpose of the expropriation.

● Petitioner Republic is correct in saying that an order of expropriation denotes the end of the first stage of expropriation. Its end then paves the way for the second stage — the determination of just compensation, and, ultimately, payment.

○ An order of expropriation puts an end to any ambiguity regarding the right of the petitioner to condemn the respondents' properties. Because an order of expropriation merely determines the authority to exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety of such exercise, its issuance does not hinge on the payment of just compensation.

■ In this case, after the trial court determined the right of petitioner to condemn the subject properties for the expansion and rehabilitation of the North Luzon Expressway, the first stage of the expropriation proceedings should have been properly terminated with the issuance of an order of expropriation declaring that petitioner has the right to take the properties

DE YNCHAUSTI v. MANILA ELECTRIC RAILROAD & LIGHT CO.

26 September 1917 | GR No. 11647| J. Carson | Stages/Phases; Inverse Condemnation

PETITIONER: Rafael C. De Ynchausti

RESPONDENTS: Manila Electric Railroad & Light Co.

DOCTRINE:

It is clear, therefore, that with relation to lands which a railroad corporation is authorized under its charter to have condemned for its sue, and which have been entered upon and occupied by the railroad corporation, under a claim of right and in good faith, but without first instituting the appropriate condemnation proceedings, the right of election secured to the landowner in articles 361 and 453 of the Civil Code has, in substance and effect, been destroyed by the enactment of the legislation conferring the power upon the railroad corporation to take possession in condemnation proceedings.

The only right secured to the landowner in such cases is the right to compensation for the lands taken, and resultant damages to his lands not taken, which right he may enforce in an ordinary action to compel the corporation to pay the value of the land under the terms of article 361 of the Code, or, if he so desires, by the institution of appropriate proceedings to compel the corporation and damages assessed in the course of the condemnation proceedings.

FACTS:

Manila Electric Railroad and Light Company was duly authorized by the Director of Public Works, acting on behalf of the Government of the Philippine Islands and of the Province of Rizal, to construct an electric railroad track upon the provincial highway running from the city of Manila to the municipality of Parañaque. The precise location of the tract was designated by that official, who authorized and required the company to construct its track along the side of the road.

The track was completed toward the end of the year 1912, and thereafter some question appears to have arisen as to the width of the highway, the plaintiff in this action insisting that the ancient highway was not as wide by 3 meters as was claimed by the Director of Public Works; and further, that the railroad company had encroached on his land, and is now occupying a strip thereof some 200 meters long and 3 meters broad. The prayer of the complaint is for recovery of possession of this strip of land and for damages for the alleged unlawful taking and detention, in the sum of P1,000.

Under the terms of article 361 of the Civil Code, which is as follows:

"The owner of the land on which building, sowing, or planting is done in good faith shall have the right to appropriate as his own the work, sowing, or planting after the indemnity mentioned in articles 453 and 454, or, to oblige the person who has built or planted, to pay to him the value of the land and to force the person who sowed to pay the proper rent."

PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:

RTC ● Declined to give judgment for possession but entered the judgment an amount equal to the assessed value of the land.

ISSUE/S:

1. Whether the trial judge erred in denying plaintiff’s prayer for possession.

2. Whether the trial judge erred in entering judgment for the plaintiff and against the defendant in an amount equal to the assessed value of the land.

RULING:

1. No. It is clear that the trial judge correctly declined to give judgment for possession; but the court think he erred in entering judgment for the plaintiff and against the defendant in an amount equal to the assessed value of the land.

If the railroad corporation were not clothed with any special or exceptional rights under its charter, touching the condemnation of lands necessary for its use, it is clear that under the general provisions of law, the plaintiff would be entitled to elect, either to recover the value of the lands thus taken, or to recover possession of these lands, upon condition that he first reimburse the corporation for the expenditures made upon the land while in its possession.

However, it is clear, therefore, that with relation to lands which a railroad corporation is authorized under its charter to have condemned for its use, and which have been entered upon and occupied by the railroad corporation, under a claim of right and in good faith, but without first instituting the appropriate condemnation proceedings, the right of election secured to the landowner in articles 361 and 453 of the Civil Code has, in substance and effect, been destroyed by the enactment of the legislation conferring the power upon the railroad corporation to take possession in condemnation proceedings. The only right secured to the landowner in such case is the right to his lands not taken, which right he may enforce in an ordinary action to compel the corporation to pay the value of the land under the terms of article 361 of the Code, or, if he so desires, by the institution of appropriate proceedings to compel the corporation to have the land condemned and to pay the compensation and damages assessed in the course of the condemnation proceedings.

2. Yes.. The trial judge appears to have assumed, without proof, that the assessed value of the land might be taken as its true market value; and however this may be, it is a fact that there is no evidence in the record upon which to base a finding as to the true value of the land, even if a judgment could properly be entered in favor of the plaintiff for damages the amount of which he did not allege or make any attempt to prove at the trial.

The Court concluded that the judgment entered in the court below should be reversed without costs in this instance, and that the complaint in this action praying for possession and for damages for the alleged unlawful detention of the land in question should be dismissed with the costs in first instance against the plaintiff; but that such dismissal of the complaint in this action should be without prejudice to the right of the plaintiff to institute the appropriate proceedings to recover the value of the lands actually taken, or to compel the railroad corporation to take the necessary steps to secure the condemnation of the land and to pay the amount of the compensation and damages assessed in the condemnation proceedings.

NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION V. MANUBAY-AGRO INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION

18 August 2004 | GR No. 150936 | PANGANIBAN, J. | Expropriation: Stages/ Phases; Inverse Condemnation

PETITIONER: NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION

RESPONDENTS: MANUBAY AGRO-INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION

DOCTRINE:

The nature and character of the land at the time of its taking is the principal criterion for determining how much just compensation should be given to the landowner. All the facts as to the condition of the property and its surroundings, as well as its improvements and capabilities, should be considered.

FACTS:

1. Petitioner National Power Corporation commenced its 350 KV Leyte-Luzon HVDC Power Transmission Project which aims to transmit the excess electrical generating capacity coming from Leyte Geothermal Plant to Luzon and various load centers in its vision to interconnect the entire country into a single power grid. In order to carry out this project, it is imperative for the petitioner’s transmission lines to cross over certain lands owned by private individuals and entities, one of which is owned by respondent Manubay Agro-Industrial Development Corporation.

2. Hence, Petitioner filed a complaint for expropriation before the Regional Trial Court of Naga City against respondent in order to acquire an easement of right of way over the land which the latter owns.

3. Thereafter, the court a quo issued an order authorizing the immediate issuance of a writ of possession and directing Ex-Officio Provincial Sheriff to immediately place petitioner in possession of the subject land. Subsequently, the court a quo directed the issuance of a writ of condemnation in favor of Petitioner through an order. Likewise, for the purpose of determining the fair and just compensation due to Respondent, the court appointed three commissioners composed of one representative of the petitioner, one for the respondent and the other from the court,

PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:

RTC ● Taking into consideration the condition, the surroundings and the potentials of respondent’s expropriated property, the RTC approved of the recommended amount of P550 per square meter as just compensation for the property. Further, the RTC held that it was not bound by the provision cited by petitioner — Section 3-A of Republic Act 6395, as amended by Presidential Decree 938, as the determination of just compensation in eminent domain cases is a judicial function. Thus, valuations made by the executive branch or the legislature are at best initial or preliminary only.

CA ● The CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC. The CA said that the respondent is entitled to a just compensation, which should be neither more nor less than the monetary equivalent of the property taken because high-powered electric lines traversing respondent’s property would necessarily diminish — if not damage entirely — the value and the use of the affected property and would endanger lives and limbs because of the high-tension current conveyed through the lines. Accordingly, the appellate found the award of P550 per square meter to be proper and reasonable

ISSUE/S:

1. Whether or not compensation should be a simple easement fee.

RULING:

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED, and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED.

RATIO:

NO.

Compensation should be for the full value of the property. Granting arguendo that what petitioner acquired over respondent’s property was purely an easement of a right of way, still, we cannot sustain its view that it should pay only an easement fee, and not the full value of the property. The acquisition of such an easement falls within the purview of the power of eminent domain. This conclusion finds support in similar cases in which the Supreme Court sustained the award of just compensation for private property condemned for public use. Republic v. PLDT held thus:

"x x x. Normally, of course, the power of eminent domain results in the taking or appropriation of title to, and possession of, the expropriated property; but no cogent reason appears why the said power may not be availed of to impose only a burden upon the owner of condemned property, without loss of title and possession. It is unquestionable that real property may, through expropriation, be subjected to an easement of right of way."

True, an easement of a right of way transmits no rights except the easement itself, and respondent retains full ownership of the property. The acquisition of such easement is, nevertheless, not gratis. As correctly observed by the CA, considering the nature and the effect of the installation power lines, the limitations on the use of the land for an indefinite period would deprive respondent of normal use of the property. For this reason, the latter is entitled to payment of a just compensation, which must be neither more nor less than the monetary equivalent of the land.

Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator. The measure is not the taker’s gain, but the owner’s loss. The word "just" is used to intensify the meaning of the word "compensation" and to convey thereby the idea that the equivalent to be rendered for the property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full and ample.

In eminent domain or expropriation proceedings, the just compensation to which the owner of a condemned property is entitled is generally the market value. Market value is "that sum of money which a person desirous but not compelled to buy, and an owner willing but not compelled to sell, would agree on as a price to be given and received therefor." Such amount is not limited to the assessed value of the property or to the schedule of market values determined by the provincial or city appraisal committee. However, these values may serve as factors to be considered in the judicial valuation of the property.

METROPOLITAN WATER DISTRICT V. DE LOS ANGELES

1931 | 55 Phil. 776| Johnson, J. | Inverse Condemnation

DOCTRINE:

The fundamental basis then of all actions brought for the expropriation of lands, under the power of eminent domain, is public use. That being true, the very moment that it appears at any stage of the proceedings that the expropriation is not for a public use, the action must necessarily fail and should be dismissed, for the reason that the action cannot be maintained at all except when the expropriation is for some public use. That must be true even during the pendency of the appeal or at any other stage of the proceedings.

FACTS:

The plaintiff is a public corporation, with its central office in the City of Manila. It was organized under and by virtue of Act No. 2832, for the purpose of furnishing an adequate water supply to the City of Manila and the nearby municipalities. The purpose of the action was to secure the expropriation of the land of the defendants situated in the municipality of Montalban, Province of Rizal, with an area of 171.8861 hectares. The plaintiff alleged that said land was necessary in the construction of the Angat Waterworks System, and that a portion of said waterworks, to wit, the watershed, was definitely located by the plaintiff over and through said land of the defendants. Upon petition of the plaintiff the Court of First Instance of Rizal on October 27, 1926, fixed the provisional value of the land at P2,000, and authorized the plaintiff to enter into and take possession of the land upon deposit of P2,000 with the provincial treasurer of Rizal. The court appointed three commissioners to hear the parties, view the premises, fix the value thereof, and assess damages and to make a full and complete report of their proceedings to the court. The majority of the commissioners submitted their report fixing the value of the land at P58,750.60 and the improvements at P15,510, or a total of P74,260.60. They also recommended 6 per cent, as damages, of the value of the land and improvements and 6 percent interest per annum on the total amount allowed in favor of the defendants. The lower court rendered a judgment in accordance with the recommendation of the majority of commissioners, ordered the plaintiff to pay said amounts to the defendants with interest at 6 percent per annum. From that judgment both parties appealed. During the pendency of this appeal, the Metropolitan Water District Board passed a resolution requesting the Attorney-General to petition the proper court to quash these condemnation proceedings. Acting upon said resolution the Attorney-General filed a petition praying that the Metropolitan Water District be allowed to discontinue the condemnation proceedings and that the complaint filed in this case be dismissed. Said petition reads as follows:

"That the Metropolitan Water District Board, in its meeting of the 14th instant, decided to discontinue this proceeding, the land subject thereby not being indispensably necessary in the maintenance and operation of its system of waterworks. A copy of the extracts of the minutes of the meeting of said board is attached hereto, marked Exhibit A.” To said petition the defendants filed a vigorous opposition contending that it would be improper and unjust for this court to set aside and quash all the proceedings had after five years of litigation, during which time the plaintiff has been in possession of the land, and after the defendants have incurred heavy expenses and other troubles incident to long litigation.

ISSUE/S:

Whether or not the petitioner has the right to have the complaint dismissed after admitting that the expropriation of the land in question is no longer necessary for public use.

RULING:

YES. "The right of the plaintiff to dismiss his action with the consent of the court is universally recognized with certain well- defined exceptions. If the plaintiff discovers that the action which he commenced was brought for the purpose of enforcing a right or a benefit, the advisability or necessity of which he later discovers no longer exists, or that the result of the action would be different from what he had intended, then he should be permitted to withdraw the same, subject to the approval of the court. Litigation should be discouraged and not encouraged.” (City of Manila vs. Ruymann, 37 Phil., 421.) There is no question raised concerning the right of the plaintiff here to acquire the land under the power of eminent domain. That power was expressly granted it by its charter. The power of eminent domain is a right reserved to the people or Government to take property for public use. It is the right of the state, through its regular organization, to reassert either temporarily or permanently its dominion over any portion of the soil of the state on account of public necessity and for the public good. The right of eminent domain is the right which the Government or the people retain over the estates of individuals to resume them for public use. It is the right of the people, or the sovereign, to dispose, in case of public necessity and for the public safety, of all the wealth contained in the state. It is not denied that the purpose of the plaintiff was to acquire the land in question for a public use. The fundamental basis then of all actions brought for the expropriation of lands, under the power of eminent domain, is public use. That being true, the very moment that it appears at any stage of the proceedings that the expropriation is not for a public use, the action must necessarily fail and should be dismissed, for the reason that the action cannot be maintained at all except when the expropriation is for some public use. That must be true even during the pendency of the appeal or at any other stage of the proceedings.

In the present case the petitioner admits that the expropriation of the land in question is no longer necessary for public use. Had that admission been made in the trial court the case should have been dismissed there. It now appears positively, by resolution of the plaintiff, that the expropriation is not necessary for public use, the action should be dismissed even without a motion on the part of the plaintiff. The moment it appears in whatever stage of the proceedings that the expropriation is not for a public use the complaint should be dismissed and all the parties thereto should be relieved from further annoyance or litigation. It will be remembered that the defendants contend that they have been greatly annoyed and have suffered great damages by this litigation. They have been dispossessed of their property for a number of years; they have been deprived of their right to reap the rents and profits from said land. It is alleged that certain damages have been occasioned to the land by destruction of improvements thereon; that they have been compelled to incur great expense in the employment of attorneys, etc. Should not the plaintiff, for causing such damages to the defendants, be required under the facts in the present case to answer for all the damages so occasioned to the defendants? That question must certainly be answered in the affirmative. Therefore, in view of all of the facts of the record, we are forced to the conclusion that the motion to dismiss the action should be, and is hereby granted, with costs, upon the following conditions:

a) That the record be returned to the lower court and that a writ of possession issue, ordering and directing the petitioner to return to the defendants the possession of the land in question immediately, and that the defendants be permitted to have, whatever damages they have suffered, determined either in this or a separate action instituted for that purpose, which claim for damages must be presented within a period of thirty days from the return of this record to the court of its origin and notice thereof; and

(b) That whether the question of the determination of damages be in this or a separate action the lower court should take into consideration, for the purpose of determining the amount of damages.

De Knecht v. Court of Appeals

20 May 1998 | G.R. Nos. 108015 & 109234 | PUNO, J | Expropriation: Parties

PETITIONER: CRISTINA DE KNECHT and RENE KNECHT

RESPONDENTS: HON. COURT OF APPEALS;

DOCTRINE:

The defendants in an expropriation case are not limited to the owners of the property condemned. They include all other persons owning, occupying or claiming to own the property. When a parcel of land is taken by eminent domain, the owner of the fee is not necessarily the only person who is entitled to compensation.

FACTS:

4. The instant case is an unending sequel to several suits commenced almost twenty years ago over the same subject matter. This involves a parcel of land owned by petitioners Cristina de Knecht and her son where they constructed eight houses of strong materials, 7 of which were leased out and 1 was occupied as their residence.

5. In 1982, the City Treasurer of Pasay discovered that the Knechts failed to pay real estate taxes on the property from 1980 to 1982.

6. Consequently, the City Treasurer sold the property at public auction to the highest bidders, the Babieras and the Sangalangs allegedly without notice to the Knechts.

7. The petitioners failed to redeem the property within one year from the date of sale. Thereafter, new titles were issued in the names of the buyers Sangalang and Babiera and then to Salem Investment Corporation to which the land was later sold.

8. With the passage of B.P. Blg. 340 authorizing the national government to expropriate certain properties in Pasay City for the EDSA extension, the property of the Knechts became part of those expropriated.

9. The Knechts filed Civil Case No. 2961-P praying for the reconveyance, annulment of the tax sale and the titles of the Babieras and Sangalangs on the basis of absence of the required notices to the tax sale.

10. The case, however, was later dismissed by the court on the ground of apparent lack of interest of the plaintiffs to prosecute the case.

11. The Knechts appealed their case, but it was dismissed by the Court of Appeals as well as the Supreme Court.

12. Three months later, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General, filed before the RTC of Pasay City an action for the determination of just compensation of the lands expropriated under B.P. Blg. 340, docketed as Civil Case No. 7327.

13. After the writ of possession was issued by the trial court, the government took possession of the portion of land on which seven of the eight houses of the Knechts were demolished.

PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:

MTC ● Since the Knechts refused to vacate their remaining house, Salem instituted against them a civil case for unlawful detainer before the Municipal Trial Court of Pasay City. The court granted the complaint and ordered the Knechts' ejectment.

● Meanwhile, Civil Case No. 7327 prospered and the court issued an order fixing the compensation of all the lands sought to be expropriated by the government. Here, the Knechts filed a "Motion for Intervention and to Implead Additional Parties," alleging that they still occupied the property and therefore should have been joined as defendants in the expropriation proceedings. It was denied by the court. The new owners of the land, therefore, prayed for and were granted the release of the just compensation fixed by the court. The Knechts questioned it and claimed that, as occupants of the land at the time of expropriation, they are entitled to a share in the just compensation.

CA ● The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition and held that the Knechts had no right to intervene in Civil Case No. 7327 for lack of any legal right or interest in the property subject of expropriation. The appellate court also declared that Civil Case No. 7327 was not an expropriation proceeding under Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court but merely a case for the fixing of just compensation.

●

ISSUE/S:

2. Whether or not the CA erred in declaring that Civil Case No. 7327 was not an expropriation case.

RULING:

Yes, the CA erred in declaring that Civil Case No. 7327 was not an expropriation case. It was precisely in the exercise of the state's power of eminent domain under B.P. Blg. 340 that expropriation proceedings were instituted against the owners of the lots sought to be expropriated.

The power of eminent domain is exercised by the filing of a complaint which shall join as defendants all persons owning or claiming to own, or occupying, any part of the expropriated land or interest therein. If a known owner is not joined as defendant, he is entitled to intervene in the proceeding; or if he is joined but not served with process and the proceeding is already closed before he came to know of the condemnation, he may maintain an independent suit for damages.

In the American jurisdiction, the term "owner" when employed in statutes relating to eminent domain to designate the persons who are to be made parties to the proceeding, refers, as is the rule in respect of those entitled to compensation, to all those who have lawful interest in the property to be condemned, including a mortgagee, a lessee and a vendee in possession under an executory contract.

Every person having an estate or interest at law or in equity in the land taken is entitled to share in the award. If a person claiming an interest in the land sought to be condemned is not made a party, he is given the right to intervene and lay claim to the compensation.

BIGLANG-AWA v. BACALLA

November 22, 2000 | GR No. 139927 and 138836 | Gonzaga-Reyes, J: | Third Division | Right to Entry/ Writ of Posession

PETITIONER: Salvador Biglang-Awa

RESPONDENTS: Hon Judge Marciano I. Bacalla

DOCTRINE:

The trial court’s issuance of Writ of Possession becomes ministerial, once the provisional compensation mentioned in the 1997 Rule is Deposited. Thus, in the instant case the trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it granted the NPC’s Motion for issuance of the Writ, despite the absence of hearing on the amount of the provisional deposit.

FACTS:

Petitioners Remedios and Salvador Biglang-awa are the registered owners of certain parcel of land situated at Talipapa, Novaliches, Quezon City. Remedios owned 769 sqm land while Salvador has 2151 sqm land. Both are covered of TCT. The government needed to expropriate 558sqm of the aforesaid property of petitioner Remedios and 881 sqm of Salvador for the construction of Mindano Avenue Extension, Stages II-B and II-C.

On August 29, 1996- Remedios received a Notice from the respondent Republic, through DPWH, requiring her to submit the documents necessary to determine the just compensation for her property.

On October 15, 1996, Final notice was given to them, to submit within 5 days the pertinent documents, otherwise expropriation proceedings would be filed against their properties. As the petitioners failed to comply with these notices, DPWH filed with RTC-QC separate cases for expropriation. After a few days, DPWH deposited with Land Bank, the amount of 3,964,500 and 2,511,000 for the properties of Salvador and Remedios based on the appraisal report of Quezon Committee.

Republic filed separate motion for the issuance of writ of possession. The court issued orders giving the petitioner, through Atty. Lucero, 10 days within which to submit their Opposition. The petitioner failed to file their Opposition to the Motion which resulted to the issuance of Writs of possession, and subsequently Notice to Vacate.

On January 25, 1999, the petitioners filed a joint manifestation with the respondent court to the effect that they were retaining the law firm of Gumpa and Valenzuela, in lieu of Atty Lucero inaction and abandonment of their cases.

On May 19, 1999, petitioner, through their new counsel, move for reconsideration of the respondent orders of granting writ of possession, mainly on the ground that Republic failed to comply with provisions of EO 1035, relating to the conduct of feasibility studies, information campaign, detailed engineering/surveys, and negotiation prior to the acquisition of, or entry into the property being expropriated. The respondent court denied the MR.

The petitioner filed a petition for certiorari

ISSUE/S:

Whether or not the court should issue writ of possession

RULING:

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

RATIO:

Yes. Although the complaint for expropriation was filed on June 6, 1997, the motion for the issuance of the writ of possession was filed on July 28, 1997; thus, the issuance of writ is covered by 1997 rules. Procedural Rules are given immediate effect and are applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time they are passed new court rules apply to proceedings that take place after the date of their effectivity. Therefore, Sec 2, Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, is the prevailing and governing law in this case.

With the revision of the Rules, the trial court’s issuance of Writ of Possession becomes ministerial, once the provisional compensation mentioned in the 1997 Rule is Deposited. Thus, in the instant case the trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it granted the NPC’s Motion for issuance of the Writ, despite the absence of hearing on the amount of the provisional deposit.

ROBERN DEVELOPMENT CORP. V. QUITAIN

September 23, 1999 | G.R. No. 135042 | PANGANIBAN, J | Right to Entry/ Writ of Possession

PETITIONER: Robern Development Corporation

RESPONDENTS: Judge Jesus V. Quitain, Regional Trial Court Of Davao City, Br. 15; and National Power Corporation

DOCTRINE:

A writ of possession may be issued when there is a deposit in an amount equivalent to the full assessed value of the property to be condemned, without the need of a hearing.

An answer, not a motion to dismiss, is the responsive pleading to a complaint in eminent domain.

FACTS:

1. Robern Development Corporation is the registered owner of a parcel of land which the National Power Corporation is seeking to expropriate. The property forms part of a proposed low-cost housing project. NPC filed a complaint for eminent domain against Robern. Instead of filing an answer, Petitioner countered with a Motion to Dismiss, alleging, among other things, that the choice of property to be expropriated was improper.

2. Before this Motion could be resolved, NPC filed a Motion for the Issuance of Writ of Possession based on Presidential Decree No. 42. NPC deposited P6,121.20 at the Philippine National Bank.

3. The trial court denied the petitioner's Motion to Dismiss declaring that the NPC has the privilege as a utility to use the power of eminent domain.

4. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, pointing out that (a) the issues raised in the Motion to Dismiss could be resolved without trial, as they could be readily appreciated on the face of the Complaint itself vis-à-vis the applicable.. provisions of law on the matter; and (b) the grounds relied upon for dismissing the Complaint did not require evidence aliunde.

5. The trial court denied the Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order. Without awaiting the outcome of the Motion for Reconsideration, NPC filed a Motion to Implement the Writ of Possession. The trial court issued a Writ of Possession. NPC occupied the disputed property.

PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:

RTC ● RTC denied the petitioner's Motion to Dismiss

RTC ● RTC denied the Motion for Reconsideration.

● RTC issued a Writ of Possession.

CA ● CA affirmed the RTC's denial of its Motion to Dismiss.

ISSUE/S:

1. Whether or not the Writ of Possession was validly issued, considering that the trial court had not conducted any hearing on the amount to be deposited.—NO

2. Whether or not the filing of the motion to dismiss was proper. —NO

RULING:

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS: (1) petitioner is granted a period of ten days from the f inality of this Decision within which to file its answer, in accordance with Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Court; (2) NPC shall deposit, also within ten days from the finality if this Decision, the full amount required under the aforecited Rule; and (3) the trial court shall, in its final decision, fix the rental for the use and the occupation of the disputed property, from the date of NPC's entry until its deposit of the full amount required under the 1997 Rules.

RATIO:

1. NO

In the present case, although the Complaint for expropriation was filed on June 6, 1997, the Motion for the Issuance of the Writ of Possession was f iled on July 28, 1997; thus, the issuance of the Writ is covered by the 1997 Rules. The procedural rules are given immediate effect and are applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time they are passed; new court rules apply to proceedings that take place after the date of their effectivity. Therefore, Section 2, Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, is the prevailing and governing law in this case.

With the revision of the Rules, the trial court's issuance of the Writ of Possession becomes ministerial, once the provisional compensation in the 1997 Rule is deposited. Under Section 2, Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules, the provisional deposit should be in an amount equivalent to the full assessed value of the property to be condemned, not merely ten percent of it. Therefore, the provisional deposit of NPC is insufficient. The amount of the provisional deposit should be increased, in order to conform to the requirement that it should be equivalent to the assessed value of the property. Since it seeks to expropriate portions, the provisional deposit should be computed based on the Tax Declarations of the property.

The trial court may issue a writ of possession once the plaintiff deposits an amount equivalent to the assessed value of the property, pursuant to Section 2 of said Rule, without need of a hearing to determine the provisional sum to be deposited.

In the interest of justice, NPC should in the meantime pay Robern reasonable rental, to be fixed by the trial court in its final decision, for the use and occupation of the disputed property from the date of entry until the deposit of the full assessed value of the property, as mandated by Rule 67.

2. NO

No, but the petitioner's argument in this case is premised on the old rule. Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure no longer requires extraordinary motion to dismiss.

The issues raised by the petitioner are affirmative defenses that should be alleged in an answer, since they require presentation of evidence aliunde. Section 3 of Rule 67 provides that "if a defendant has any objection to the filing of or the allegations in the complaint, or any objection or defense to the taking of his property," he should include them in his answer. Naturally, these issues will have to be fully ventilated in a full-blown trial and hearing. The Court ruled that although the Revised Rules has just taken effect, the petitioner should be given an opportunity to file its answer in accordance with Section 3 of Rule 67.

MANILA ELECTRIC CO. V. PINEDA

February 13, 1992 | GR No. L-59791 | J. Medialdea | Mandatory Appointment of Commissioners; Exception

PETITIONER: MANILA ELECTRIC CO

RESPONDENTS: THE HONORABLE GREGORIO G. PINEDA, Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XXI, Pasig, Metro Manila, TEOFILO ARAYON, SR., GIL DE GUZMAN, LUCITO SANTIAGO and TERESA BAUTISTA

DOCTRINE:

While it is true that the findings of commissioners may be disregarded and the court may substitute its own estimate of the value, the latter may only do so for valid reasons, i.e., where the Commissioners have applied illegal principles to the evidence submitted to them or where they have disregarded a clear preponderance of evidence, or where the amount allowed is either grossly inadequate or excessive

FACTS:

1. A complaint for eminent domain was filed by petitioner MERALCO against forty-two (42) defendants with the RTC of Pasig

2. It alleges that for the purpose of constructing a 230 KV Transmission line from Barrio Malaya to Tower No. 220 at Pililla, Rizal, petitioner needs portions of the land of the private respondents consisting of an aggregate area of 237,321 square meters. Despite the petitioner's offers to pay compensation and attempts to negotiate with the respondents', the parties failed to reach an agreement.

3. The RTC issued an Order authorizing the petitioner to take or enter upon the possession of the property sought to be expropriated.

4. On February 11, 1980, respondent court issued an Order appointing the members of the Board of Commissioners to make an appraisal of the properties.

5. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it has lost all its interests over the transmission lines and properties under expropriation because of their sale to the Napocor. In view of this motion, the work of the Commissioners was suspended.

6. Private respondents filed another motion dated January 8, 1982 praying that petitioner be ordered to pay the sum of P169, 200.00.

7. Petitioner filed an opposition alleging that private respondents are not entitled to payment of just compensation at this stage of the proceeding because there is still no appraisal and valuation of the property.

PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:

RTC ● Rtc denied the opposition and motion cite respondent in contempt.

○ Furthermore, the respondent court stressed in said order that "at this stage, the Court starts to appoint commissioners to determine just compensation or dispenses with them and adopts the testimony of a credible real estate broker, or the judge himself would exercise his right to formulate an opinion of his own as to the value of the land in question. Nevertheless, if he formulates such an opinion, he must base it upon competent evidence."

ISSUE/S:

WON the court can dispense with the assistance of a Board of Commissioners in an expropriation proceeding and determine for itself the just compensation.—Yes

RULING:

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is GRANTED and the order dated February 9, 1982 issued by the respondent judge insofar as it finally determined the amount of just compensation is nullified. This case is hereby ordered remanded to the lower court for trial with the assistance of a Board of Commissioners. Further, the National Power Corporation is impleaded as party plaintiff therein.

RATIO:

YES

● Respondent judge, in the case at bar, arrived at the valuation of P40.00 per square meter on a property declared for real estate tax purposes at P2.50 per hectare on the basis of a "Joint Venture Agreement on Subdivision and Housing Projects" executed by A.B.A Homes and private respondents on June 1, 1972. This agreement was merely attached to the motion to withdraw from petitioner's deposit

■ Respondent judge arrived at the amount of just compensation on its own, without the proper reception of evidence before the Board of Commissioners.

● In an expropriation case such as this one where the principal issue is the determination of just compensation, a trial before the Commissioners is indispensable to allow the parties to present evidence on the issue of just compensation.

● While it is true that the findings of commissioners may be disregarded and the court may substitute its own estimate of the value, the latter may only do so for valid reasons, i.e., where the Commissioners have applied illegal principles to the evidence submitted to them or where they have disregarded a clear preponderance of evidence, or where the amount allowed is either grossly inadequate or excessive

● Thus, trial with the aid of the commissioners is a substantial right that may not be done away with capriciously or for no reason at all. Moreover, in such instances, where the report of the commissioners may be disregarded, the trial court may make its own estimate of value from competent evidence that may be gathered from the record. The aforesaid joint venture agreement relied upon by the respondent judge, in the absence of any other proof of valuation of said properties, is incompetent to determine just compensation.

NATIONAL POWER CORP. v. CA

August 12, 2004 | GR No. 106804 | Carpio, J. | Expropriation; Mandatory Appointment of Commissioners; Exceptions

PETITIONER: NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION

RESPONDENTS: COURT OF APPEALS and ANTONINO POBRE

DOCTRINE:

This case ceased to be an action for expropriation when NPC dismissed its complaint for expropriation. Since this case has been reduced to a simple case of recovery of damages, the provisions of the Rules of Court on the ascertainment of the just compensation to be paid were no longer applicable. A trial before commissioners, for instance, was dispensable.

FACTS:

1. NPC is a public corporation created to generate geothermal, hydroelectric, nuclear and other power and to transmit electric power nationwide. NPC is authorized by law to acquire property and exercise the right of eminent domain.

2. Private respondent Antonino Pobre is the owner of a 68,969 square-meter land located in Barangay Bano, Municipality of Tiwi, Albay. The Property is covered by TCT No. 4067 and Subdivision Plan 11-9709. In 1963, he began developing the Property as a resort-subdivision, which he named as "Tiwi Hot Springs Resort Subdivision." Later, the CFI approved the subdivision plan of the property. The Register of Deeds thus cancelled TCT No. 4067 and issued independent titles for the approved lots. In 1969, Pobre started advertising and selling the lots.

3. On 4 August 1965, the Commission on Volcanology certified that thermal mineral water and steam were present beneath the Property. The Commission on Volcanology found the thermal mineral water and steam suitable for domestic use and potentially for commercial or industrial use.

4. NPC then became involved with Pobre’s Property in three instances.

a. First was on 18 February 1972 when Pobre leased to NPC for one year eleven lots from the approved subdivision plan.

b. Second was sometime in 1977, the first time that NPC filed its expropriation case against Pobre to acquire an 8,311.60 square-meter portion of the Property.

c. Third was on 1 September 1979, when NPC filed its second expropriation case against Pobre to acquire an additional 5,554 square meters of the Property. This is the subject of this petition.

5. Pobre filed a motion to dismiss the second complaint for expropriation. He claimed that the NPC damaged his Property and prayed for just compensation of all the lots affected by NPC’s actions and for the payment of damages.

6. Thereafter, NPC also filed a motion to dismiss the second expropriation case on the ground that NPC had found an alternative site and that NPC had already abandoned in 1981 the project within the Property due to Pobre’s opposition.

7. The CFI granted the motion to dismiss but allowed Pobre to adduce evidence on his claim of damages. The trial court admitted the evidence since NPC failed to object. The case was deemed submitted for decision. NPC filed for MR but it was denied. Thus, it filed a petition for certiorari with the IAC.

8. The IAC dismissed NPC’s petition but directed the trial court to rule on NPC’s objections to Pobre’s documentary exhibits. The CFI admitted all the exhibits.

PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:

CFI ● The trial court ruled that NPC should pay the entire property in view of the damages that it sustained

CA ● Affirmed

ISSUE/S:

1. WON the trial by commissioners is still needed in the case at bar. — NO

RULING:

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition for lack of merit. The appealed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 30 March 1992 in CA-G.R. CV No. 16930 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. National Power Corporation is ordered to pay Antonino Pobre P3,448,450 as just compensation for the 68,969 square-meter Property at P50 per square meter. National Power Corporation is directed to pay legal interest at 6% per annum on the amount adjudged from 6 September 1979 until fully paid. Upon National Power Corporation's payment of the full amount, Antonino Pobre is ordered to execute a Deed of Conveyance of the Property in National Power Corporation's favor. National Power Corporation is further ordered to pay temperate and exemplary damages of P50,000 and P100,000, respectively. No costs.

RATIO:

1. NO

● Here, NPC appropriated Pobre’s Property without resort to expropriation proceedings. NPC dismissed its own complaint for the second expropriation. At no point did NPC institute expropriation proceedings for the lots outside the 5,554 square-meter portion subject of the second expropriation. The only issues that the trial court had to settle were the amount of just compensation and damages that NPC had to pay Pobre.

● This case ceased to be an action for expropriation when NPC dismissed its complaint for expropriation. Since this case has been reduced to a simple case of recovery of damages, the provisions of the Rules of Court on the ascertainment of the just compensation to be paid were no longer applicable. A trial before commissioners, for instance, was dispensable.

PROVINCE OF DAVAO DEL NORTE v. BUENAVENTURA-NAVARRO

February 27, 2019 | GR No. 208771 (Notice) | First Division (Ponente N/A) | Rule 67 - Expropriation; Mandatory Appointment of Commissioners; Exception

PETITIONER: The Province of Davao Del Norte, represented by its Governor, Hon. Rodolfo P. Del Rosario

RESPONDENTS: Lina Buenaventura-Navarro

DOCTRINE:

Rule 67 presupposes a prior filing with the appropriate court of a complaint for eminent domain by the expropriator. If no such complaint is filed, the expropriator is considered to have violated procedural requirements and, hence, has waived the usual procedure prescribed in Rule 67, including the appointment of commissioners to ascertain just compensation.

FACTS:

1. Respondent Lina Buenaventura-Navarro (Lina) is the registered owner of a parcel of land.

2. Allegedly, the Municipal Government of Carmen, Davao del Norte, constructed a barangay road at Barrio La Paz, Carmen, appropriating a 3,587 square-meter portion of Lina’s property without just compensation being paid to her. (This road is now a provincial road and is maintained by the Province of Davao Del Norte (petitioner).)

3. Lina sent formal demand letters to petitioner and to the local government of Carmen, Davao del Norte for back rentals and payment of just compensation. The two local governments ignored her demands.

4. Lina thus filed an action for just compensation, back rentals, and attorney's fees.

PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:

RTC ● Petitioner was declared in default for its failure to file a pre-trial brief and to appear during pre-trial conference.

● RTC rendered a Decision (June 30 2004 Decision) in favor of Lina and against petitioner and issued a writ of execution.

● Petitioner filed the instant petition for relief from judgment with prayer for TRO and preliminary injunction.

● RTC dismissed the petition for lack of merit (June 5 2006 Order).

○ Petitioner failed to avail of all the legal remedies available at all stages of the proceedings in the lower court:

■ It failed to file a motion to lift the order of default.

■ It failed to file the necessary pleading within the reglementary period to assail the decision of the RTC.

■ It failed to file an MNT/MR of the said decision.

● RTC issued an entry of final judgment certifying that the June 30 2004 Decision had become final on August 4, 2006.

● Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the June 5, 2006 Order, which the RTC denied.

● Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the CA.

CA ● Denied the petition for certiorari and affirmed the RTC’s dismissal of the petition for relief from judgment

● Held that the issue of whether the RTC erred in rendering the June 30, 2004 Decision is no longer within the realm of the petition for certiorari

○ The non-appointment of a commissioner to determine the just compensation for the subject road is not an error reviewable under certiorari.

● Petitioner moved for reconsideration of this decision, which the CA denied. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE/S:

1. WON the RTC should have appointed commissioner/s for the determination of just compensation pursuant to Sec. 5, Rule 67 of the ROC — NO

RULING:

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The January 8, 2013 Decision and June 19, 2013 Resolution of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. SP No. 01690-MIN are hereby AFFIRMED.

RATIO:

1. NO. The provisions on ascertainment of just compensation are no longer applicable and a trial before commissioners is dispensable.

● Rule 67 presupposes a prior filing with the appropriate court of a complaint for eminent domain by the expropriator.

● If no such complaint is filed, the expropriator is considered to have violated procedural requirements and, hence, has waived the usual procedure prescribed in Rule 67, including the appointment of commissioners to ascertain just compensation.

● When there is no action for expropriation and the case involves only a complaint for damages or just compensation, the provisions of the Rules of Court on ascertainment of just compensation (i.e., provisions of Rule 67) are no longer applicable, and a trial before commissioners is dispensable.

o Since the initial proceedings before the lower court were not for expropriation but for payment of just compensation, petitioner is considered to have violated procedural requirements and has waived the usual procedure prescribed in Rule 67.

REPUBLIC v. CARMEN M. VDA. DE CASTELLVI, ET AL.

August 15, 1974 | G.R. No. L-20620 | Zaldivar, J.; En Banc | Just Compensation

PETITIONER: Republic of the Philippines (the Republic), exercising its power of eminent domain

RESPONDENTS: Carmen M. Vda. de Castellvi, judicial administratrix of the estate of the late Alfonso de Castellvi (Castellvi)

DOCTRINE:

When the taking of the property sought to be expropriated coincides with the commencement of the expropriation proceedings, or takes place subsequent to the filing of the complaint for eminent domain, the just compensation should be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint.

The report of the commissioners of appraisal in condemnation proceedings are not binding, but merely advisory in character, as far as the court is concerned.

FACTS:

1. On 26 June 1959, the Republic filed a complaint for eminent domain against Castellvi over a parcel of land situated in Floridablanca, Pampanga.

2. The Republic alleged, among other things, that the FMV of the parcels of land, according to the Committee on Appraisal for the Province of Pampanga, was not more than P2,000 per hectare, or a total market value of P259,669.10. It prayed that the provisional value of the lands be fixed at P259.669.10; that the court authorizes the Republic to take immediate possession of the lands upon deposit of that amount with the Pampanga Provincial Treasurer; that the court appoints three commissioners to ascertain and report to the court the just compensation for the property sought to be expropriated; and, that the court issues thereafter a final order of condemnation.

3. The CFI Pampanga issued an order fixing the provisional value of the lands at P259,669.10.

4. In her “motion to dismiss,” Castellvi alleged, among other things, that the land under her administration, being a residential land, had a fair market value of P15.00 per square meter, so it had a total market value of P11,389,485.00; that the Republic, through the AFP, particularly the PAF, had been, despite repeated demands, illegally occupying her property since July 1, 1956, thereby preventing her from using and disposing of it, thus causing her damages by way of unrealized profits. Castellvi prayed that the complaint be dismissed, or that the Republic be ordered to pay her P15.00 per square meter, or a total of P11,389,485.00, plus interest thereon at 6% per annum from July 1, 1956; that the Republic be ordered to pay her P5,000,000.00 as unrealized profits, and the costs of the suit.

5. The CFI Pampanga appointed three commissioners, and after having qualified themselves, proceeded to the performance of their duties.

6. The Commissioners had determined that the lands sought to be expropriated were residential lands and recommended unanimously that the lowest price that should be paid was P10.00 per square meter, for both the lands of Castellvi and Toledo-Gozun; that an additional P5,000.00 be paid to Toledo-Gozun for improvements found on her land; that legal interest on the compensation, computed from August 10, 1959, be paid after deducting the amounts already paid to the owners, and that no consequential damages be awarded.

7. The Commissioners' report was objected to by all the parties in the case — by Castellvi and intervenors Toledo-Gozun, who insisted that the FMVs their lands should be fixed at P15.00 per square meter; and by the Republic, which insisted that the price to be paid for the lands should be fixed at P0.20 per square meter.

PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:

CFI (RTC) ● The CFI Pampanga upheld the valuations of the commissioners as fair and just. It denied the motion for new trial/ reconsideration of the Republic.

● The CFI Pampanga issued an order, stating that “in the interest of expediency, the questions raised may be properly and finally determined by the Supreme Court.”

SC ● Appeal from the decision of the CFI of Pampanga in its expropriation proceeding.

● The Republic contended that the CFI erred, among others:

○ In finding the price of P10 per square meter of the lands subject of the instant proceedings as just compensation;

○ In holding that the "taking" of the properties under expropriation commenced with the filing of this action – it argued that the “taking” should be reckoned from the year 1947 when by virtue of a special lease agreement between the Republic and Castellvi, the Republic was granted the "right and privilege" to buy the property should the lessor wish to terminate the lease, and that in the event of such sale, it was stipulated that the FMV should be as of the time of occupancy; and that the permanent improvements amounting to more that half a million pesos constructed during a period of 12 years on the land, subject of expropriation, were indicative of an agreed pattern of permanency and stability of occupancy by the PAF in the interest of national Security; and,

○ In ordering the Republic to pay 6% interest on the adjudged value of the Castellvi property to start from July of 1956.

● Castellvi, on the other hand, maintained that the “taking” of property under the power of eminent domain requires two essential elements, to wit: (1) entrance and occupation by condemn or upon the private property for more than a momentary or limited period, and (2) devoting it to a public use in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of the property.

● Castellvi argued that the first element is wanting, for the contract of lease relied upon provides for a lease from year to year; that the second element is also wanting, because the Republic was paying the lessor Castellvi a monthly rental of P445.58; and that the contract of lease does not grant the Republic the "right and privilege" to buy the premises "at the value at the time of occupancy."

ISSUE/S: Is 1947 the reckoning period in determining the act of “taking” for the purpose of just compensation? - NO

RULING:

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is modified, as follows:

(a) the lands of appellees Carmen Vda. de Castellvi and Maria Nieves Toledo-Gozun, as described in the complaint, are declared expropriated for public use;

(b) the fair market value of the lands of the appellees is fixed at P5.00 per square meter;

(c) the Republic must pay appellee Castellvi the sum of P3,796,495.00 as just compensation for her one parcel of land that has an area of 759,299 square meters, minus the sum of P151,859.80 that she withdrew out of the amount that was deposited in court as the provisional value of the land, with interest at the rate of 6% per annum from July 10, 1959 until the day full payment is made or deposited in court;

(d) the Republic must pay appellee Toledo-Gozun the sum of P2,695,225.00 as the just compensation for her two parcels of land that have a total area of 539,045 square meters, minus the sum of P107,809.00 that she withdrew out of the amount that was deposited in court as the provisional value of her lands, with interest at the rate of 6%, per annum from July 10, 1959 until the day full payment is made or deposited in court; (e) the attorney's lien of Atty. Alberto Cacnio is enforced; and

(f) the costs should be paid by appellant Republic of the Philippines, as provided in Section 12, Rule 67, and in Section 13, Rule 141, of the Rules of Court.

RATIO:

No, the “taking” of Catellvi’s property for purposes of eminent domain cannot be considered to have taken place in 1947 when the Republic commenced to occupy the property as lessee thereof.

● The two essential elements in the “taking” of property under the power of eminent domain, namely: (1) that the entrance and occupation by the condemnor must be for a permanent, or indefinite period, and (2) that in devoting the property to public use the owner was ousted from the property and deprived of its beneficial use, were not present when the Republic entered and occupied the Castellvi property in 1947.

● The just compensation to be paid for the Castellvi property should not be determined based on the value of the property as of the year 1947. The CFI did not commit an error when it held that the “taking” of the property under expropriation commenced with the filing of the complaint in this case.

● When the taking of the property sought to be expropriated coincides with the commencement of the expropriation proceedings, or takes place subsequent to the filing of the complaint for eminent domain, the just compensation should be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint. In this case, it is undisputed that the Republic was placed in possession of the Castellvi property, by authority of the court, on August 10, 1959. The “taking” of the Castellvi property for the purposes of determining the just compensation to be paid must, therefore, be reckoned as of June 26, 1959 when the complaint for eminent domain was filed.

● Regarding the two parcels of land of Toledo-Gozun, also sought to be expropriated, which had never been under lease to the Republic, the Republic was placed in possession of said lands, also by authority of the court, on August 10, 1959. The taking of those lands, therefore, must also be reckoned as of June 26, 1959, the date of the filing of the complaint for eminent domain.

● The lands in question had ceased to be devoted to the production of agricultural crops, that they had become adaptable for residential purposes, and that the appellees had actually taken steps to convert their lands into residential subdivisions even before the Republic filed the complaint for eminent domain.

● In expropriation proceedings, the owner of the land has the right to its value for the use for which it would bring the most in the market. The owner may thus show every advantage that his property possesses, present and prospective, in order that the price it could be sold for in the market may be satisfactorily determined. The owner may also show that the property is suitable for division into village or town lots.

● The report of the commissioners of appraisal in condemnation proceedings are not binding, but merely advisory in character, as far as the court is concerned.

● The important factor in expropriation proceeding is that the owner is awarded the just compensation for his property. Considering the circumstances, the price of P10.00 per square meter, as recommended by the commissioners and adopted by the lower court, is quite high. The price of P5.00 per square meter would be a fair valuation of the lands in question and would constitute a just compensation to the owners thereof. In arriving at this conclusion, the resolution of the Provincial Committee on Appraisal of the province of Pampanga informing, among others, that in the year 1959 the land of Castellvi could be sold for from P3.00 to P4.00 per square meter, while the land of Toledo-Gozun could be sold for from P2.50 to P3.00 per square meter, was considered. The Court has weighed all the circumstances relating to this expropriations proceedings, and in fixing the price of the lands that are being expropriated the Court arrived at a happy medium between the price as recommended by the commissioners and approved by the court, and the price advocated by the Republic. This Court has also taken judicial notice of the fact that the value of the Philippine peso has considerably gone down since the year 1959.

B.H. BERKENKOTTER & CO.. V.. COURT OF APPEALS

December 14, 1992 | GR No. 89980 | Tijam, J. | Just Compensation

PETITIONER: B.H. Berkenkotter & Co., through its President George E. Berkenkotter

RESPONDENTS: Court of Appeals and the Republic of the Philippines

DOCTRINE:

“According to Section 8 of Rule 67, the Court is not bound by the commissioners’ report. It may make such order or render such judgment as shall secure to the plaintiff the property essential to the exercise of his right of condemnation, and to the defendant just compensation for the property expropriated. This Court may substitute its own estimate of the value as gathered from the record.”

FACTS:

1. The property in this case belongs to B.H. Berkenkotter & Co., the herein petitioner. On June 18, 1982, Vicente Viray, president of the said school, sent the owner a written offer to buy the land in line with the 5-year expansion program of ARASOF. In reply, Berkenkotter expressed its willingness to sell &t P50.00 per square meter payable in cash. At Viray’s request, the Provincial Appraisal Committee, Office of the Provincial Assessor, Batangas City, appraised the land and fixed its market value at P32.00 per square meter. Viray then wrote Berkenkotter another letter and offered to buy the property at the said price. The latter stuck to its original valuation; later it said that the property had in fact appreciated to as much as P100.00 per square meter. Further negotiations failed to resolve the impasse between ARASOF and the petitioner. In the end, expropriation proceedings were commenced against the petitioner by the Republic of the Philippines on behalf of ARASOF.

2. In a complaint by the Republic, it invoked the assessment made by the Provincial Appraisal Committee at P32,00 per square meter and sought possession of the property upon payment of the 10% deposit required by P.D. 48. Berkenkotter originally questioned the purpose of the expropriation but later abandoned this objection and concentrated only on

PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:

RTC · The RTC rendered a judgment affirming the right of the plaintiff to expropriate the subject land upon payment to the owner of just compensation at the rate of P85.00 per square meter, for a total of P904,400.00.

CA The Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the decision of the RTC. The CA ruled that the trial court disregarded the fact that Berkenkotter sold three parcels of lands to different private entities for only P 19.18 per sqm, and that the report of the panel of commissioners relied on hearsay and gratuitous opinions. The CA set aside the trial court's compensation and ordered the property to be paid at a rate of P19.18 per square meter, totaling P204,075.20, including the deposit made by the Republic when it took possession of the land.

ISSUE/S:

Whether or not the court is bound by the report of the panel of commissioners in determining the just compensation of the expropriated land.

RULING:

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, and it is hereby affirmed that the just compensation for the subject land should be computed at the rated of P19.18 per square meter. Costs against the petitioner

RATIO:

No.

The panel of commissioners, which included experts and ocular inspectors, did not provide conclusive findings on the property's value. The Court has the discretion to make its assessment of the land, and the findings of the commission were merely at best advisory and persuasive, and by no means final or binding. The Court is not bound by the commissioners' report and can make an order or render judgment to secure the property essential to the exercise of the plaintiff's right of condemnation and the defendant's just compensation for the property expropriated

Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property sought to be expropriated. The measure is not the taker's gain but the owner's loss. The compensation, to be just, must be fair not only to the owner but also to the taker. Even as undervaluation would deprive the owner of his property without due process, so too would its overvaluation unduly favor him to the prejudice of the public.

To determine just compensation, the trial court should first ascertain the market value of the property, to which should be added the consequential damages after deducting therefrom the consequential benefits which may arise from the expropriation. If the consequential benefits exceed the consequential damages, these items should be disregarded altogether as the basic value of the property should be paid in every case

EVERGREEN MANUFACTURING CORP. v. REPUBLIC

6 September 2017 | GR Nos. 218628, 218631 | Carpio, Acting C.J | Rule 67 (Just Compensation)

PETITIONER: Evergreen Manufacturing Corporation (Evergreen)

RESPONDENTS: Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Department of Public Works and Highways (Republic-DPWH)

DOCTRINE:

Just compensation in expropriation cases is defined “as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator. x x x the true measure is not the taker’s gain but the owner’s loss x x x”

Just compensation must be the value of the property at the time of taking.

FACTS:

1. Evergreen is the registered owner of a parcel of land situated in Brgy. Santolan, Pasig City, which covers an area of 1,428.68 square meters and is covered by TCT No. PT-114857 (Subject Property)

2. Republic-DPWH seeks to expropriate a portion of the Subject Property covering 173.08 square meters (Subject Premises) which will be used for a public purpose - the construction of Package 3, Marikina Bridge and Access Road, Metro Manila Urban Transport Integration Project

3. Based on the zonal, industrial classification and valuation of the BIR of the real properties situated in Brgy. Santolan, where the Subject Property is situated, the properties have an appraised value of P6,000.00 per square meter

a. While Republic-DPWH offered to acquire the Subject Premises by negotiated sale, Evergreen declined this offer

4. Republic-DPWH then filed a complaint for expropriation on 22 March 2004

5. Evergreen, in opposing the complaint, alleged that the conditions for filing a complaint for expropriation have not been met, and that there is no necessity for expropriation, arguing that expropriation of the Subject Premises would impair the rights of leaseholders in gross violation of the constitutional proscription against impairment of the obligation of contracts

a. Evergreen prayed for the dismissal of the complaint for failure to state a cause of action

b. In the alternative, in the possibility that expropriation is deemed proper, Evergreen prayed that in addition to the payment of just compensation, Republic-DPWH be ordered to:

i. Cause a re-survey of the remaining areas of the Subject Property and draw a new lot plan and vicinity plan for each area

ii. Draw up a new technical description of the remaining areas for approval of the proper government agencies

iii. Cause the issuance of new titles for the remaining lots

iv. Provide new tax declaration for the new title

v. Pay incidental expenses relative to the titling of the expropriated areas

6. On 19 August 2004, Republic-DPWH deposited P1,038,480.00, which is equivalent to 100% of the value of the Subject Premises based on the BIR zonal valuation of P6,000.00 per square meter

a. It then filed a Motion for the issuance of a Writ of Possession

b. On 6 December 2004, a Writ of Possession was issued by the RTC

7. On 14 September 2004, Republic-DPWH filed a Motion for Issuance of a New Writ of Possession as the first writ was not implemented

8. On 2 March 2006, Evergreen filed a Motion to Withdraw the Initial Deposit

a. This was opposed by Republic-DPWH as it was not yet allowed entry into the Subject Premises

9. On 21 April 2006, the parties entered into an agreement allowing Republic-DPWH to enter into and/or possess the Subject Premises

10. On 15 November 2006, the RTC granted the Motion to Withdraw Initial Deposit

11. During the pre-trial, Evergreen and Republic-DPWH agreed that the issue to be resolved in the expropriation complaint was the amount of just compensation

a. Three real estate brokers/appraisers were appointed as commissioners to determine the current fair market value of the Subject Premises

12. On 15 October 2007, the RTC appointed the members of the Board of Commissioners:

a. Norviendo Ramos, Jr. (later replaced by Atty. Jade Ferrer Wy)

b. The City Assessor or his representative

c. The RTC Clerk of Court of Pasig City

13. The Commissioners submitted separate Appraisal Reports

a. The City Assessor recommended the payment of P15,000.00 per square meter

b. Atty. Wy recommended P37,500.00 per square meter

c. Atty. Pablita Migriño of the Officer of the RTC CoC of Pasig City recommended P30,000.00 per square meter

PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:

RTC ● On 30 June 2011, fixed the just compensation for the Subject Premises at P25,000.00 per square meter

● Directed Republic-DPWH to pay Evergreen the amount of P3,288.520, which was the amount due after deducting the deposit made by Republic-DPWH which had already been withdrawn by Evergreen

● Both parties filed their respective Motions for Partial Reconsideration

○ Republic-DPWH argued that the just compensation should be fixed at P15,000.00

○ Evergreen argued that the RTC erred in fixing the just compensation at merely P25,000.00

■ Further asked for the payment of consequential damages as a result of its lost income with its billboard lessee and decrease in value of the Subject Property and legal interest on the amount of just compensation

● Denied both motions in an Order dated 3 November 2011

CA ● In a Decision dated 26 June 2014, increased the amount of just compensation at P35,000.00 per square meter, or a total of P6,057,800.00

● However, denied the claim of consequential damages or interest by Evergreen

○ The Subject Premises expropriated did not include and would not encroach on the residential building and billboard owned by Evergreen

○ Evergreen also failed to present any evidence to prove that its remaining properties would be adversely affected or damaged by the expropriation

○ Evergreen was not entitled to interest on the amount of just compensation until final payment, as Republic-DPWH’s payment was deposited in the account of Evergreen months before it was able to take possession of the Subject Premises pursuant to the Writ of Possession issued by the RTC

● Denied both Motions for Partial Reconsideration in a Resolution dated 25 May 2015

ISSUE/S:

1. WQN the amount of just compensation set by the CA was proper - NO

2. WON Evergreen is entitled to legal interest on the balance of the just compensation - YES

RULING:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves as follows:

1. The petition in G.R. No. 218631 is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The assailed decisions of the Court of Appeals and Regional Trial Court are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the just compensation for the 173.08 square meters of the expropriated property is P33,050.00 per square meter, or a total of P5,720,294.00.

2. The petition in G.R. No. 218628 is PARTIALLY GRANTED.

a. The claim for legal interest on the difference between the final amount of just compensation of P5,720,294.00 and the initial deposit made by the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Department of Public Works and Highways, in the amount of P1,038,480.00 shall earn legal interest of 12% per annum from the date of taking or 21 April 2006 until 30 June 2013.

b. The difference between the total amount of just compensation and the initial deposit shall earn legal interest of 6% per annum from 1 July 2013 until the finality of the Decision.

c. The total amount of just compensation shall earn legal interest of 6% per annum from the finality of this Decision until full payment thereof.

RATIO:

1. NO

● Just compensation has been defined as the fair and full equivalent of the loss

o Just compensation in expropriation cases is defined “as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator. The Court repeatedly stressed that the true measure is not the taker’s gain but the owner’s loss. The word ‘just’ is used to modify the meaning of the word ‘compensation’ to convey the idea that the equivalent to be given for the property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full and ample”

● The determination of just compensation in expropriation proceedings is essentially a judicial prerogative

● Both the RTC and CA erred in relying on the reports of commissioners Atty. Wy and Atty. Migriño, as the commissioners relied on several documents to support their finding of just compensation, but the Court found these to be insufficient and misleading

o The commissioners relied on the BIR Zonal Valuation for the year 2000, and the 2000 decisions of the trial court in Light Rail Transit Authority (LRTA) v. Clayton Industrial Corporation and Alfonso Chua and LRTA v. Rodolfo L. See, et al.

● The cases relied on by the commissioners were decided in the year 2000, while the taking of the Subject Premises in this case happened in 2004, when Republic-DPWH filed a case for expropriation against Evergreen

o Moreover, the BIR Zonal Valuations considered by the commissioners were also for the year 2000. Evidently, these reflect the value of the Subject Property in 2000. Just compensation must be the value of the property at the time of the taking

o If there were other documentary evidence to show the value of the property at a point nearer to the time of the taking, in this case 2004, then consideration of the year 2000 documents would not be fatal. However, if the only documents to support the finding of just compensation are from a year which is not the year when the talking of the expropriated property took place, then this would be plainly inaccurate

● The commissioners and lower courts correctly identified the Subject Premises as commercial, based on the value and character of the land at the time of the taking. There was sufficient evidence – documentary and those obtained through ocular inspection – to support a finding of just compensation. However, the Court found that the lower courts and the commissioners failed to consider the time of taking when they arrived at their respective findings on the amount of just compensation

2. YES

● Just compensation should be made at the time of taking, and the amount of payment should be the fair and equivalent value of the property. In this case, Republic-DPWH was able to take possession of the Subject Premises even before making a full and fair payment of just compensation because RA 8974 allowed for the possession of the property merely upon the initial payment which forms part of the just compensation

● The delay in the payment of just compensation is a forbearance of money

○ As such, this is necessarily entitled to earn interest

● The difference in the amount between the final amount as adjudged by the court and the initial payment made by the government – which is part of the just compensation due to the property owner – should earn legal interest as a forbearance of money

NAPOCOR V HEIRS OF SANGKAY

Date Aug. 2011 | GR No. 165828 | Ponente Bersamin J | Just compensation in expropriation

PETITIONER: NAPOCOR

RESPONDENTS: Heirs of Macabangkit Sangkay

DOCTRINE:

Compensable taking includes destruction, restriction, diminution, or interruption of the rights of ownership or of the common and necessary use and enjoyment of the property in a lawful manner, lessening or destroying its value. It is neither necessary that the owner be wholly deprived of the use of his property, nor material whether the property is removed from he possession of the owner, or in any respect changes hands.

FACTS:

1. Pursuant to RA 6395 an Act Revising the Charger of NAPOCOR, NPC undertook the Agus River Power Plant Project to generate electricity in Mindanao.

2. Respondents, all surnamed Macabangkit, as owners of the land in Iligan sued NPC in the RTC for recovery of damages and payment of just compensation alleged that one of the tunnels of NPC traversed their land. The presence of the tunnel deprived them commercial, agricultural, and industrial value and that their land had become unsafe place for habitat due to the loud sound of the water rushing through the tunnel.

PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:

RTC ● Ruled in favor of the heirs and for their payment of P113, 532, 400 for actual damages or just compensation

○ It found that NPC concealed the construction of tunnel to the heirs and acted in bad faith

● It issued a supplemental decision that the heirs’ land shall be condemned in favor of NAPOCOR upon its just payment

CA ● Affirmed the RTC’s supplemental decision

ISSUE/S:

Whether NPC is liable for the payment of just compensation –YES

RULING:

WHEREFORE, The Court AFFIRMS the decision of the CA with modifications on the rate per annum and and award of P30,000 for rental fee, and P200,000 as moral damages as DELETED.

RATIO: YES

● NPC’s construction of the tunnel constituted taking of the land, and entitled the owners to just compensation.

● The action to recover just compensation from the State or its expropriating agency differs from the action for damages. The former, also known as inverse condemnation, has the objective to recover the value of property taken in fact by the governmental defendant, even though no formal exercise of the power of eminent domain has been attempted by the taking agency.

● Just compensation is the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator. The measure is not the taker's gain, but the owner's loss. The word just is used to intensify the meaning of the word compensation in order to convey the idea that the equivalent to be rendered for the property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full, and ample.

● On the other hand, the latter action seeks to vindicate a legal wrong through damages, which may be actual, moral, nominal, temperate, liquidated, or exemplary. When a right is exercised in a manner not conformable with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and like provisions on human relations in the Civil Code, and the exercise results to the damage of another, a legal wrong is committed and the wrongdoer is held responsible|||

● We agree with both the RTC and the CA that there was a full taking on the part of NPC, notwithstanding that the owners were not completely and actually dispossessed. It is settled that the taking of private property for public use, to be compensable, need not be an actual physical taking or appropriation Indeed, the expropriator's action may be short of acquisition of title, physical possession, or occupancy but may still amount to a taking. Compensable taking includes destruction, restriction, diminution, or interruption of the rights of ownership or of the common and necessary use and enjoyment of the property in a lawful manner, lessening or destroying its value. It is neither necessary that the owner be wholly deprived of the use of his property, nor material whether the property is removed from the possession of the owner, or in any respect changes hands.||| (National Power Corp. v. Heirs of Sangkay, G.R. No. 165828, [August 24, 2011], 671 PHIL 569-609)

REPUBLIC V. SALVADOR

June 7, 2017 | GR No. 205428 | Del Castillo, J. | Just Compensation

PETITIONER: Republic of the Philippines, represented by DPWH

RESPONDENTS: Spouses Senado F. Salvador and Josefina R. Salvador

DOCTRINE:

The transfer of property through expropriation proceedings is a sale or exchange within the meaning of Sections 24 (D) and 56 (A) (3) of the National Internal Revenue Code, and profit from the transaction constitutes capital gain.

Since capital gains tax is a tax on passive income, it is the seller, or respondents in this case, who are liable to shoulder the tax.

FACTS:

1. Respondents are the registered owners of a parcel of land located in Kaingin Street, Barangay Parada, Valenzuela City.

2. The Republic, represented by the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH), filed a verified Complaint before the RTC for the expropriation of 83 square meters of said parcel of land, as well as the improvements thereon, for the construction of the C-5 Northern Link Road Project Phase 2 (Segment 9) from the North Luzon Expressway (NLEX) to McArthur Highway.

3. Respondents received two checks from the DPWH representing 100% of the zonal value of the subject property and the cost of the one-storey semi-concrete residential house erected on the property. The RTC thereafter issued the corresponding Writ of Possession in favor of the Republic.

4. The respondents signified in open court that they recognized the purpose for which their property is being expropriated and interposed no objection thereto. They also manifested that they have already received the sum from the DPWH and are therefore no longer intending to claim any just compensation.

PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:

RTC ● The RTC rendered judgment in favor of the Republic condemning the subject property for the purpose of implementing the construction of the C-5 Northern Link Road Project Phase 2 (Segment 9) from NLEX to McArthur Highway, Valenzuela City.

● The RTC directed the Republic to pay respondents consequential damages equivalent to the value of the capital gains tax and other taxes necessary for the transfer of the subject property in the Republic's name.

● The Republic moved for partial reconsideration, specifically on the issue relating to the payment of the capital gains tax, but the RTC denied the motion. The RTC also found no justifiable basis to reconsider its award of consequential damages in favor of respondents, as the payment of capital gains tax and other transfer taxes is but a consequence of the expropriation proceedings.

ISSUE/S:

1. WON the capital gains tax on the transfer of the expropriated property can be considered as consequential damages that may be awarded to respondents—NO

RULING:

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the Petition for Review on Certiorari.The Decision dated August 23, 2012 and the Order dated January 10, 2013 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 270, Valenzuela City, in Civil Case No. 175-V-11, are hereby MODIFIED, in that the award of consequential damages is DELETED.In addition, spouses Senando F. Salvador and Josefina R. Salvador are hereby ORDERED to pay for the capital gains tax due on the transfer of the expropriated property.

RATIO:

● In order to determine just compensation, the trial court should first ascertain the market value of the property by considering the cost of acquisition, the current value of like properties, its actual or potential uses, and in the particular case of lands, their size, shape, location, and the tax declarations thereon. If as a result of the expropriation, the remaining lot suffers from an impairment or decrease in value, consequential damages may be awarded by the trial court, provided that the consequential benefits which may arise from the expropriation do not exceed said damages suffered by the owner of the property.

● The transfer of property through expropriation proceedings is a sale or exchange within the meaning of Sections 24 (D) and 56 (A) (3) of the National Internal Revenue Code, and profit from the transaction constitutes capital gain.

o Since capital gains tax is a tax on passive income, it is the seller, or respondents in this case, who are liable to shoulder the tax.

● The BIR, in BIR Ruling No. 476-2013 dated December 18, 2013, has constituted the DPWH as a withholding agent tasked to withhold the 6% final withholding tax in the expropriation of real property for infrastructure projects. Thus, as far as the government is concerned, the capital gains tax in expropriation proceedings remains a liability of the seller, as it is a tax on the seller's gain from the sale of real property.

● Consequential damages are only awarded if as a result of the expropriation, the remaining property of the owner suffers from an impairment or decrease in value. In this case, no evidence was submitted to prove any impairment or decrease in value of the subject property as a result of the expropriation. More significantly, given that the payment of capital gains tax on the transfer of the subject property has no effect on the increase or decrease in value of the remaining property, it can hardly be considered as consequential damages that may be awarded to respondents.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE REGIONAL EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, REGION X, DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS, Petitioner

vs.

BENJOHN FETALVERO

February 4, 2019

| G.R. No. 198008|LEONEN, J.:| Just Compensation

PETITIONER:BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS.,

RESPONDENTS: HON. JUDGE AGAPITO L. HONTANOSAS, JR., REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 16, CEBU CITY, SILVERIO BORBON, SPOUSES XERXES AND ERLINDA FACULTAD, AND XM FACULTAD & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION

under Article III, Section 9 of the 1987 Constitution, "[p]rivate property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation."92

This Court notes that for almost 20 years now, petitioner had been enjoying the use of respondent's property without paying the full amount of just compensation under the Compromise Agreement. Respondent had been deprived of his property for almost two (2) decades. In keeping with substantial justice, this Court imposes the payment of legal interest on the remaining just compensation due to respondent. Consistent with this Court's ruling in Nacar v. Gallery Frames,93 this Court imposes interest at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum from the time of taking until June 30, 2013, and six percent (6%) per annum from July 1, 2013 until fully paid

FACTS:

1. Respondent, Benjohn Fetalvero, owned a 2,787-square meter parcel of land in Iligan City, Lanao del Norte.

2. In 1999, the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) took 569 square meters of Fetalvero's property for a flood control project. Fetalvero demanded payment for the entire area at P15,000.00 per square meter.

3. The Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Regional Executive Director of DPWH, filed a Complaint for expropriation against Fetalvero in 2008.

4. The case was raffled to Branch 3 of the Regional Trial Court.

5. The parties entered into a Compromise Agreement, stating that the area involved was 1,428 square meters and the price per square meter was P9,500.00.

6. The agreement also provided for interest at 12% per annum and expenses for documentation and transfer to the account of the plaintiff.

7. The trial court approved the Compromise Agreement in 2008, and the Republic received a copy of the order.

8. The Office of the Solicitor General claimed that the agreement was void because it was not submitted to their office for review and approval.

9. The Republic argued that the amount of just compensation was grossly disadvantageous to the government.

10. Fetalvero filed a motion for the issuance of an order for a writ of garnishment to enforce the trial court's order.

PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:

RTC ● The trial court granted the motion, stating that the Office of the Solicitor General had received a copy of the order and was bound by it.

CA ● The Republic filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals, but it was denied.

ISSUE/S:

1. Whether the amount of just compensation agreed upon in the Compromise Agreement is grossly disadvantageous to the government. NO

RULING:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Court of Appeals July 29, 2011 Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 03710-MIN is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, insofar as it affirmed the September 22, 2009 and April 23, 2010 Orders of the Regional Trial Court in granting respondent Benjohn Fetalvero's Motion for the Issuance of an Order for a Writ of Garnishment. This is without prejudice to his filing of adjusted money claim before the Commission on Audit.

The remaining just compensation due to Benjohn Fetalvero under the Compromise Agreement is subject to interest at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum from the time of taking until June 30, 2013, and six percent (6%) per annum from July 1, 2013 until the allowance of the money claim by the Commission on Audit. SCaITA

SO ORDERED.

● The Compromise Agreement should have been submitted to the Office of the Solicitor General for review, but the government is still bound by it due to laches.

● Government funds may be seized under a writ of execution or garnishment if there is an existing appropriation for the payment of just compensation.

● Money claims against the government must first be filed before the Commission on Audit before they can be entertained by the courts through a writ of execution.

● The Court partially granted the petition, reversing the Court of Appeals' decision insofar as it affirmed the trial court's order for a writ of garnishment.

● Fetalvero is ordered to file an adjusted money claim before the Commission on Audit and interest is imposed on the remaining just compensation due to him.

● Ratio:

● The Compromise Agreement should have been submitted to the Office of the Solicitor General for review and approval. However, the government is still bound by it due to laches, which means that the government's failure to assert its rights in a timely manner has resulted in prejudice to the other party.

● Government funds may be seized under a writ of execution or garnishment if there is an existing appropriation for the payment of just compensation. This means that if there is a specific allocation of funds for the purpose of paying just compensation, those funds can be used to satisfy the judgment.

● Money claims against the government must first be filed before the Commission on Audit before they can be entertained by the courts through a writ of execution. This is to ensure that the government's financial transactions are properly audited and accounted for.

● The Court partially granted the petition, reversing the Court of Appeals' decision insofar as it affirmed the trial court's order for a writ of garnishment. This means that the order for a writ of garnishment is no longer valid.

● Fetalvero is ordered to file an adjusted money claim before the Commission on Audit. This means that Fetalvero needs to submit a revised claim for just compensation to the Commission on Audit for their review and approval.

● Interest is imposed on the remaining just compensation due to Fetalvero. This means that Fetalvero is entitled to receive interest on the amount of just compensation that has not yet been paid to him.

Star Special Watchman & Detective Agency, Inc. v. Puerto Princesa City

21 April 2014| G.R. No. 181792. | Mendoza, J| LGU expropriation

PETITIONER: Star Special Watchman & Detective Agency, Inc.

RESPONDENTS: Puerto Princesa City

DOCTRINE:

Mandamus is not a proper remedy to execute money judgments against the LGU.

FACTS:

1. Star Special Watchman and Detective Agency, Inc., Celso A. Fernandez and Manuel V. Fernandez (petitioners) were the owners of two (2) parcels of land located in Puerto Princesa City.

2. Before Puerto Princesa became a city the national government established a military camp in Puerto Princesa known as the Western Command. In building the command’s facilities and road network encroachment on several properties of petitioners resulted.

3. Among the properties taken for the build-up of the Western Command Headquarters was Lot 7, consisting of 5,942 square meters and covered by TCT No. 13680. Petitioners' property was used as a road right-of-way leading to the military camp.

PETITIONERS FILE PAYMENT OF JUST COMPENSATION

4. In view of the encroachment, petitioners filed an action for Payment of Just Compensation against the respondents before the RTC, Branch 78, Quezon City (RTC-Br 78), praying that the mart render judgment ordering respondents to pay petitioners for the fair market value of their land and a monthly rental fee until fully paid.

RTC ● After the RTC-Br. 78 Decision became final and executory, a writ of execution, dated February 17, 1994, was issued which directed respondents to satisfy the money judgment contained in the said decision.

Pursuant thereto, respondents initially appropriated the amount of P2 million representing the initial payment of petitioners' claim. On January 30, 1996, U3P Check No. 0496467 was drawn in the name of Celso Fernandez which the latter received in February 1996. Thereafter, respondents enacted Sangguniang Panlungsod Resolution No. 292-96,8 "A Resolution Authorizing the Release of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS Monthly as Payment to the Claim of Star Special Watchman and Detective Agency, Inc. for the Parcel of Land Traversed by The City Road."

NO PAYMENT NEXT

PETITIONER DEMANDED PAYMENT

5. However, Celso Fernandez wrote a letter informing respondents that after petitioners received the amount of P2 million from them in February 1996, there were no more payments received for the months of March, April and May 1996. He also requested respondents to enact a continuing resolution for the P500,000.00 monthly payment until the full payment of the remaining balance of P10 million. Otherwise, petitioners would, within the first week of June 1996, set aside the verbal agreement with Atty. Rocamora and respondents would be required to pay the total amount of P16,234,690.21.

RTC PETITIONERS FILED AGAIN FOR COLLECTION OF UNPAID JUST COMPENSATION • Nevertheless, on November 27, 2001, petitioners filed a complaint before the RTC-Br. 223 (Civil Case No. Q-01-45668) against respondents for collection of unpaid just compensation, including interests and rentals, in accordance with the RTC-Br. 78 Decision. Petitioners averred, among others, that respondents indeed paid a total amount of P12 million, but not on time;

RTC RULE IN FAVOR OF THE PETITIONER WRIT OF EXECUTION

Subsequently, petitioners filed two (2) motions, dated May 4, 2005 and July 20, 2005, both asking the RTC-Br. 223 1] to order the Land Bank of the Philippines to deliver the garnished account of respondents; and/or 2] to order respondents to appropriate funds for the payment of the money judgment rendered against them and in favor of petitioners.

RTC-BR. 223 DENY GARNISHMENT BUT SAYS THAT RESPONDENT IS OBLIGED TO PAY THE PETITIONER

On October 27, 2005, the RTC-Br. 223 issued an order denying both motions on the ground that pursuant to Section 305(a) of the Local Government Code,15 government funds could not be subjected to execution and levy, or to garnishment for that matter, unless there was a corresponding appropriation law or ordinance.

The RTC-Br. 223, however, stated that respondents must still honor their obligation and that petitioners were entitled to a full and just compensation considering that its decision had long become final and executory. Accordingly, it directed respondents to comply with its decision and to immediately pay petitioners the sums of money specified in the said decision.

PETITIONERS WROTE LETTER TO COMMISSION ON AUDIT petitioners wrote a letter to the Commission On Audit (COA) requesting that it order respondents to pay petitioners the amount adjudged in the November 18, 2003 decision of the RTC-Br. 223. Subsequently, on July 13, 2007, petitioners filed a formal claim18 with the COA praying that it issue an order directing respondents to appropriate/allocate the necessary funds for the full satisfaction of the said decision including the corresponding interests and rentals which as of June 26, 2007 amounted to P21,235,894.41.

COA COA, through its Legal and Adjudication Office-Local, wrote a letter to petitioner Celso Fernandez informing him that it could not act upon his request to order respondents to pay petitioners the amount adjudged in the November 18, 2003 decision because it had no jurisdiction over the matter as the case was already in the execution stage.

OMBUDSMAN PETITIONERS FILE ALSO WITH the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon and to the Office of the Undersecretary of the Department of Interior and Local Government

PETITIONER COME TO THE SUPREME COURT VIA PETITION FOR MANDAMUS

Respondents contend that Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 10-2000, dated October 25, 2000, as implemented further by COA Circular No. 2001-002, laid down the proper procedure to enforce the November 18, 2003 decision of the RTC-Br. 223 and the writ of execution it issued. The said circular mandates that "...upon_ determination of crate liability, the prosecution, enforcement, or satisfaction thereof must still be pursued in accordance with the rules and procedures laid down in P.D. No. 1445. otherwise known as the Government Auditing code of the Philippines, All money claims against the Government must first be filed with the Commission on Audit which must act upon it within sixty (60) days..."

ISSUE/S:

1. WON mandamus is the proper remedy to compel the respondents to pay the just compensation. — NO

RULING:

WHEREFORE, the petition for mandamus is DENIED. Petitioners are enjoined to refile its claim with the Commission on Audit pursuant to P.D. No. 1445.

RATIO:

Mandamus is NOT the proper remedy to compel the respondents to pay the just compensation. Mandamus is a command issuing from a court of law of competent jurisdiction, in the name of the state of the sovereign, directed to some inferior court, tribunal, or board, or to some corporation or person requiring the performance of a particular duty therein specified, which duty results from the operation of the party to whom the writ is directed or from operation of law. This definition recognizes the public character of the remedy, and clearly excludes the idea that it may be resorted to for the purpose of enforcing the performance of dues in which the public has no interest. The writ is a proper recourse for citizens who seek to enforce a public right and to compel the performance of a public duty, most especially when the public right involved is mandated by the Constitution. As the quoted provision instructs, mandamus will lie if the tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station.

The writ of mandamus, however, will not issue to compel an official to do anything which is not his duty to do or which it is his duty not to do, or to give to the applicant anything to which he is not entitled bylaw. Nor will mandamus issue to enforce a right which is in substantial dispute or as to which substantial doubt exists, although objection raising a mere technical question will be disregarded if the right is clear and the case is meritorious. As a rule, mandamus will not lie in the absence of any of the following grounds:

[a] that the court, officer, board, or person against whom the action is taken unlawfully neglected the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from office, trust, or station; or

[b] that such court, officer, board, or person has unlawfully excluded petitioner/relator from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which he is entitled.

On the part of the realtor, it is essential to the issuance of a writ of mandamus that he should have a clear legal right to the thing demanded and it must be the imperative duty of respondent to perform the act required.

Recognized further in this jurisdiction is the principle that mandamus cannot be used to enforce contractual obligations. Generally, mandamus will not lie to enforce purely private contract rights, and will not lie against an individual unless some obligation in the nature of a public or quasi-public duty is imposed. The writ is not appropriate to enforce a private right against an individual. The writ of mandamus lies to enforce the execution of an act, when, otherwise, justice would be obstructed; and, regularly, issues only in cases relating to the public and to the government; hence, it is called prerogative writ. To preserve its prerogative character, mandamus is not used for the redress of private wrongs, but only in matters relating to the public.

The Court cannot blame petitioners for resorting to the remedy of mandamus because they have done everything in the books to satisfy their just and demandable claim. They went to the courts, the COA, theOmbudsman, and the DILG. They resorted to the remedy of mandamus because in at least three (3)cases, the Court sanctioned the remedy in cases of final judgments rendered against a local government unit (LGU).

Moreover, an important principle followed in the issuance of the writ is that there should be no plain,speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law other than the remedy of mandamus being invoked. In other words, mandamus can be issued only in cases where the usual modes of procedure and forms of remedy are powerless to afford relief. Although classified as a legal remedy, mandamus is equitable in its nature and its issuance is generally controlled by equitable principles. Indeed, the grant of the writ of mandamus lies in the sound discretion of the court.

The legal remedy is to seek relief with the COA pursuant to Supreme Court Administrative Circular 10-2000 dated October 25, 2000, which enjoined judges to observe utmost caution, prudence and judiciousness in the issuance of writs of execution to satisfy money judgments against government agencies and local government units. Under Commonwealth Act No. 327, as amended by Section 26 ofP.D. No. 1445, it is the COA which has primary jurisdiction to examine, audit and sele "all debts and claims of any sort" due from or owing the Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies and instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries.

The settlement of the monetary claim was still subject to the primary jurisdiction of the COA despite the final decision of the RTC having already validated the claim. As such, the claimants had no alternative except to first seek the approval of the COA of their monetary claim. Considering that the COA still retained its primary jurisdiction to adjudicate money claim, petitioners should have led a petition for certiorari with this Court pursuant to Section 50 of P.D. No. 1445. Hence, the COA's refusal to act did not leave the petitioners without any remedy at all.

Hence, peon for mandamus is not proper. Petitioners are enjoined to file its claim with theCommission on Audit.

NORLINDA S. MARILAG vs. MARCELINO B. MARTINEZ

July 22, 2015 | GR No. 201892 | J. Perlas-Bernabe | Special Civil Actions

PETITIONER: NORLINDA S. MARILAG

RESPONDENTS: MARCELINO B. MARTINEZ

DOCTRINE:

In loan contracts secured by a real estate mortgage, the rule is that the creditor-mortgagee has a single cause of action against the debtor-mortgagor, i.e. , to recover the debt, through the filing of a personal action for collection of sum of money or the institution of a real action to foreclose on the mortgage security. The two remedies are alternative, not cumulative or successive, and each remedy is complete by itself.

FACTS:

1. On July 30, 1992, Rafael Martinez, respondent's father, obtained from petitioner a loan in the amount of P160,000.00, with a stipulated monthly interest of 5% payable within a period of 6 months.

2. The loan was secured by a real estate mortgage over a parcel of land.

3. Rafael failed to settle his obligation upon maturity and despite repeated demands, prompting petitioner to file a Complaint for Judicial Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgage before the RTC-Imus on November 10, 1995.

4. Rafael failed to file his answer was declared in default.

5. The RTC-Imus issued a Decision dated January 30, 1998, in the foreclosure case, declaring the stipulated 5% monthly interest to be usurious and reducing the same to 12% per annum.

6. Accordingly, it ordered Rafael to pay petitioner the principal amount of the loan plus accrued interest

7. Records do not show that this Decision had already attained finality.

8. Meanwhile, prior to Rafael's notice of the above decision, respondent Marcelo Martinez agreed to pay Rafael's obligation to petitioner which was pegged at P689,000.00.

9. After making a total payment of P400,000.00, he executed a promissory note dated February 20, 1998, binding himself to pay on or before March 31, 1998 the remaining balance.

10. After learning of the January 30, 1998 Decision, respondent refused to pay the amount covered by the subject PN despite demands, prompting petitioner to file a complaint for sum of money and damages before the court a quo on July 2, 1998..

11. Respondent filed his answer, contending that petitioner has no cause of action against him.

12. He averred that he has fully settled Rafael's obligation and that he committed a mistake in paying more than the amount due under the loan, i.e., the amount of P229,200.00 as adjudged by the RTC-Imus in the judicial foreclosure case which, thus, warranted the return of the excess payment.

13. He therefore prayed for the dismissal of the complaint, and interposed a compulsory counterclaim for the release of the mortgage, the return of the excess payment, and the payment of moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees and litigation expenses.

14. The Court A Quo denied recovery on the subject PN. It found that the consideration for its execution was Rafael's indebtedness to petitioner, the extinguishment of which necessarily results in the consequent extinguishment of the cause therefor.

15. Considering that the RTC-Imus had adjudged Rafael liable to petitioner only for the amount of P229,200.00, for which a total of P400,000.00 had already been paid, the court a quo found no valid or compelling reason to allow petitioner to recover further on the subject PN.

● There being an excess payment of P171,000.00, it directed petitioner to return the said amount to respondent, plus 6% interest p.a. reckoned from the date of judicial demand until fully paid, and to pay attorney's fees and the costs of suit.

16. In an Order dated November 3, 2003, however, the court a quo granted petitioner's motion for reconsideration, and recalled and set aside its August 28, 2003 Decision.

17. It declared that the causes of action in the collection and foreclosure cases are distinct, and respondent's failure to comply with his obligation under the subject PN justifies petitioner to seek judicial relief.

18. It further opined that the stipulated 5% monthly interest is no longer usurious and is binding on respondent considering the suspension of the Usury Law.

19. Aggrieved, respondent filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied in an Order dated January 14, 2004, prompting him to elevate the matter to the CA.

20. The CA recalled and set aside the court a quo's Orders, and reinstated the August 28, 2003 Decision. It held that the doctrine of res judicata finds application in the instant case, considering that both the judicial foreclosure and collection cases were filed as a consequence of the non-payment of Rafael's loan, which was the principal obligation secured by the real estate mortgage and the primary consideration for the execution of the subject PN. and conclusive on the collection case.

21. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution dated May 14, 2012; hence, this petition.

PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:

RTC ● Initially ruled in favor of Martinez

● Upon MR, it set aside its previous ruling af issued another in favor of Marasigan

CA ● Applied Res Judicata, dismissed the appeal

ISSUE/S: Which doctrine applied to the foreclosure case - Res Judicata or Litis Pendentia? Res Judicata

RULING:

The principle of res judicata does not apply in this case. The principle of litis pendentia applies in this case. Marilag is barred from filing a separate collection case since she had already pursued the foreclosure remedy. Martinez is entitled to the return of excess payments made. The interest rate should be reduced from 5% to 1% per month. The award of attorney's fees should be deleted.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated November 4, 2011 and the Resolution dated May 14, 2012 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 81258 reinstating the court a quo's Decision dated August 28, 2003 in Civil Case No. 98-0156 are hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATIONS: (a) directing petitioner Norlinda S. Marilag to return to respondent Marcelino B. Martinez the latter's excess payments in the total amount of P134,400.00, plus legal interest at the rate of 6% p.a. from the filing of the Answer on August.

RATIO:

1. A case is barred by prior judgment or res judicata when the following elements concur:

● (a) the judgment sought to bar the new action must be final;

● (b) the decision must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties;

● (c) the disposition of the case must be a judgment on the merits; and

● (d) there must be as between the first and second action, identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action.

2. The Court finds the principle of res judicata to be inapplicable to the present case. This is because the records are bereft of any indication that the August 28, 2003 Decision in the judicial foreclosure case had already attained finality, evidenced, for instance, by a copy of the entry of judgment in the said case.

3. Accordingly, with the very first element of res judicata missing, said principle cannot be made to obtain.

4. For the bar of litis pendentia to be invoked, the following requisites must concur:

● (a) identity of parties, or at least such parties as represent the same interests in both actions;

● (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and

● (c) the identity of the two preceding particulars is such that any judgment rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party is successful would amount to res judicata in the other.

5. In loan contracts secured by a real estate mortgage, the rule is that the creditor-mortgagee has a single cause of action against the debtor-mortgagor, i.e. , to recover the debt, through the filing of a personal action for collection of sum of money or the institution of a real action to foreclose on the mortgage security.

6. The two remedies are alternative, not cumulative or successive, and each remedy is complete by itself.

7. In the present case, records show that petitioner, as creditor-mortgagee, instituted an action for judicial foreclosure pursuant to the provisions of Rule 68 of the Rules of Court in order to recover on Rafael's debt.

8. In light of the foregoing discussion, the availment of such remedy thus bars recourse to the subsequent filing of a personal action for collection of the same debt, in this case, under the principle of litis pendentia, considering that the foreclosure case only remains pending as it was not shown to have attained finality.

9. Records show that other than the matter of interest, the principal loan obligation and the payments made were not disputed by the parties. Nonetheless, the Court finds the stipulated 5% monthly interest to be excessive and unconscionable.

10. While Central Bank Circular No. 905-82 effectively removed the ceiling on interest rates for both secured and unsecured loans, regardless of maturity, nothing in the said circular could possibly be read as granting carte blanche authority to lenders to raise interest rates to levels which would either enslave their borrowers or lead to a hemorrhaging of their assets.

11. Since the stipulation on the interest rate is void for being contrary to morals, if not against the law, it is as if there was no express contract on said interest rate; thus, the interest rate may be reduced as reason and equity demand.

12. As such, the stipulated 5% monthly interest should be equitably reduced to 1% per month or 12% p.a. reckoned from the execution of the real estate mortgage on July 30, 1992.

13. Consequently, petitioner must return to respondent the excess payments in the total amount of P134,400.00, with legal interest at the rate of 6% p.a. from the filing of the Answer on August 6, 1998 62 interposing a counterclaim for such overpayment, until fully settled.

14. Finally, in the absence of showing that the courta quo's award of the costs of suit in favor of respondent was patently capricious, the Court finds no reason to disturb the same.

BACHRACH MOTOR CO., INC. V. ICARANGAL

1939 | 68 Phil. 287 | Moran, J. | Nature and Definition; Compare with Extrajudicial Foreclosure - Act No. 3135

PLAINTIFF: BACHRACH MOTOR CO., INC.

DEFENDANTS: ESTEBAN ICARAÑGAL and ORIENTAL COMMERCIAL CO., INC.

DOCTRINE:

For non-payment of a note secured by mortgage, the creditor has a single cause of action against the debtor. This single cause of action consists in the recovery of the credit with execution of the security. In other words, the creditor in his action may make two demands, the payment of the debt and the foreclosure of his mortgage. But both demands arise from the same cause, the non-payment of the debt, and, for that reason, they constitute a single cause of action.

Though the debt and the mortgage constitute separate agreements, the latter is subsidiary to the former, and both refer to one and the same obligation. Consequently, there exists only one cause of action for a single breach of that obligation.

FACTS:

1. In this case, on June 11, 1930, defendant herein, Esteban Icarañgal, with one Jacinto Figueroa, for value received,executed in favor of the plaintiff, Bachrach Motor Co., Inc., a promissory note for P1,614, and in security for its payment, said Esteban Icarañgal executed a real estate mortgage on a parcel of land in Pañgil, Laguna, which was duly registered on August 5, 1931, in the registry of deeds of the Province of Laguna.

2. Thereafter, promissor defaulted in the payment of the agreed monthly installments; wherefore, plaintiff instituted in the Court of FirstInstance of Manila an action for the collection of the amount due on the note. Judgment was rendered for the plaintiff. A writ of execution was subsequently issued and, in pursuance thereof, the provincial sheriff of Laguna, at the indication of the plaintiff, levied on the properties of the defendants, including that which has been mortgaged by Esteban Icarañgal in favor of the plaintiff.

3. The other defendant herein, Oriental Commercial Co., Inc., interposed a third-party claim, alleging that by virtue of a writ of execution issued in civil case No. 88253 of the municipal court of the City of Manila, the property which was the subject of the mortgage and which has been levied upon by the sheriff, had already been acquired by it at the public auction on May 12, 1933. By reason of this third-party claim, the sheriff desisted from the sale of the property and, in consequence thereof, the judgment rendered in favor of the plaintiff remained unsatisfied.Whereupon, plaintiff instituted an action to foreclose the mortgage.

PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:

RTC ● The trial court dismissed the complaint and, from the judgment thus rendered plaintiff took the present appeal.

ISSUE/S:

1. Whether or not plaintiff-appellant is barred from foreclosing the real estate mortgage after it has elected to sue and obtain a personal judgment against the defendant-appellee on the promissory note for the payment of which the mortgage was constituted as a security – YES.

RULING:

Judgment is affirmed, with costs against the appellant.

RATIO:

● For non-payment of a note secured by mortgage, the creditor has a single cause of action against the debtor. This single cause of action consists in the recovery of the credit with execution of the security. In other words, the creditor in his action may make two demands, the payment of the debt and the foreclosure of his mortgage. But both demands arise from the same cause, the non-payment of the debt, and, for that reason, they constitute a single cause of action.

● Though the debt and the mortgage constitute separate agreements, the latter is subsidiary to the former, and both refer to one and the same obligation. Consequently, there exists only one cause of action for a single breach of that obligation

● Plaintiff, then, by applying the rule above stated, cannot split up his single cause of action by filing a complaint for payment of the debt, and thereafter another complaint for foreclosure of the mortgage. If he does so, the filing of the first complaint will bar the subsequent complaint. By allowing the creditor to file two separate complaints simultaneously or successively, one to recover his credit and another to foreclose his mortgage, we will, in effect, be authorizing him plural redress for a single breach of contract at so much cost to the courts and with so much vexation and oppression to the debtor.

● We hold, therefore, that, in the absence of express statutory provisions, a mortgage creditor may institute against the mortgage debtor either a personal action for debt or real action to foreclose the mortgage. In other words, he may pursue either of the two remedies, but not both. By such election, his cause of action can by no means be impaired, for each of the two remedies is complete in itself. Thus, an election to bring personal action will leave open to him all the properties of the debtor for attachment and execution, even including the mortgaged property itself.

ATTY. BULATAO v. ESTONACTOC

December 10, 2019 | GR No. 235020 | Caguioa, J. | Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgage: Nature and Definition; Compare with Extrajudicial Foreclosure

PETITIONER: ATTY. LEONARD FLORENT O. BULATAO

RESPONDENTS: ZENAIDA C. ESTONACTOC

DOCTRINE:

As to the validity of the foreclosure, jurisprudence on the effect of the nullity of the loan's interest rate on the foreclosure of the mortgage securing the loan abounds.

FACTS:

1. Respondent Zenaida executed a Deed of Mortgage of Real Property (DMRP) in favor of Petitioner Atty. Bulatao covering a parcel of land located in Pongpong, Sto. Tomas, La Union, with an area of 42,727 square meters (subject property), as security for a loan in the amount of P200,000.00.

2. When [Zenaida] defaulted in her obligation, [Atty. Bulatao] foreclosed the mortgage and petitioned the court for the sale of the subject property in a public auction. The Notice of Sale on Extra Judicial Foreclosure of Property/ies was issued by the Office of the Clerk of Court of the trial court in Agoo, La Union.

3. By reason of the impending sale of the subject property, [Zenaida] filed a Complaint for Injunction, Annulment of Deed of Real Estate Mortgage and Damages against Atty. Bulatao, seeking to declare the [DMRP] as illegal, inexistent and null and void, and to make the contract unenforceable. She asserted that Atty. Bulatao took advantage of her financial distress and urgent financial needs by imposing in the [DMRP] an interest of five percent (5%) per month which is excessive, iniquitous, unconscionable, exorbitant and contrary to public policy, rendering the contract null and void. Additionally, the DMRP falsely indicated that [Zenaida] is the registered owner of the subject property despite the fact that it is co-owned by [Zenaida] with her late husband, Adolfo T. Estonactoc;

4. In response thereto, [Atty. Bulatao] filed an Answer wherein he denied all the allegations made against him.

5. Subsequently, the complaint was amended to include the declaration of nullity of the foreclosure sale of the subject property as a cause of action by reason of the subsequent sale thereof in a public auction and the consequent issuance of a certificate of sale of real property in favor of [Atty. Bulatao]

PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:

RTC The trial court ruled that [Zenaida] is bound by the terms and stipulations in the contract of loan and real estate mortgage which she executed in favor of Atty. Bulatao.

● Moreover, the trial court declared that [Atty. Bulatao] is an innocent mortgagee for value, who merely relied on the alleged sole ownership of [Zenaida] over the subject property as demonstrated in the tax declaration.

○ The trial court concluded that considering the validity of the loan and real estate mortgage, the subsequent foreclosure of the mortgage on the subject property and the issuance of certificate of sale as a consequence thereof are likewise valid considering that the foreclosure was made by proper authorities, who enjoy the presumption of regularity of performance of their official duties.

CA The CA found Zenaida's appeal partly meritorious.

● Regarding the real estate mortgage, the CA ruled that Zenaida, being a co-owner of the subject property, could validly convey through sale or mortgage the portion belonging to her and, thus, the real estate mortgage in favor of Atty. Bulatao is not entirely void.

● On the interest rate, the CA ruled that the 5% monthly interest imposed upon by Atty. Bulatao in the Deed of Mortgage of Real Property (DMRP) is excessive, unconscionable and exorbitant, which renders the stipulation on interest void for being contrary to morals, if not against the law.

● The CA further observed that while the nullity of the stipulation on the usurious interest did not affect the lender's right to recover the principal obligation or the terms of the real estate mortgage, the foreclosure proceedings held in this case could not be given effect.

ISSUE/S:

1. WON the Deed of Mortgage of Real Property was valid - YES but only with respect to the share of Zenaida Estonactoc

2. WON the foreclosure sale and the Certificate of Sale issued in favor of Atty. Bulatao were valid - NO

RULING:

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby PARTLY GRANTED. Accordingly, the Decision dated October 19, 2017 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 105581 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION:

1. The Deed of Mortgage of Real Property dated June 3, 2008 is DECLARED VALID only with respect to the share of Zenaida C. Estonactoc

2. The monthly interest rate stipulated in the Deed of Mortgage of Real Property is DECLARED VOID

3. The monthly interest rate stipulated in the Deed of Mortgage of Real Property is DECLARED VOID

4. Zenaida C. Estonactoc is ORDERED to pay Atty. Leonard Florent O. Bulatao the amount of P200,000.00 that the former borrowed from the latter with interest at the rate of 12% per annum from June 3, 2008 to June 30, 2013 and at the rate of 6% per annum from July 1, 2013 until full payment

5. Interest due on the principal amount of P200,000.00 accruing as of judicial demand (i.e., filing of the counterclaim of Atty. Leonard Florent O. Bulatao) shall separately earn legal interest at the rate of 12% per annum until June 30, 2013 and at the rate of 6%per annum from July 1, 2013 until full payment.

RATIO:

1. YES but only with respect to the share of Zenaida Estonactoc

● The Court ruled that the principle of estoppel bars the disposing co-owner from disavowing the sale to the full extent of his undivided or pro-indiviso share or part in the co-ownership, subject to the outcome of the partition, which, using the terminology of Article 493 of the Civil Code, limits the effect of the alienation or mortgage to the portion that may be allotted to him in the division upon termination of the co-ownership.

○ Given the foregoing, the CA was correct when it limited the validity of the DMRP only to the portion belonging to Zenaida. Unfortunately, the dispositive portion reflected differently: "The Deed of Mortgage of Real Property dated June 4, 2008 is DECLARED as VOID only with respect to the share of deceased Adolfo T. Estonactoc." Accordingly, a modification thereof is warranted to reflect that it is valid only to the share pertaining to Zenaida.

■ As to the share of Zenaida, Atty. Bulatao is correct that Zenaida is a co-owner to the extent of 3/4 undivided portion (1/2 portion representing her share in the conjugal property and 1/4 portion as her legitime in the estate of her husband Adolfo Estonactoc) of the subject property, with the remaining 1/4 undivided portion being co-owned by her son Jose Rafael Estonactoc. However, Atty. Bulatao has yet no right to foreclose Zenaida's 3/4 undivided share inasmuch as the foreclosure proceedings that he initiated have been declared void in the present proceedings.

2. NO

● It was ruled in one case that the extra-judicial foreclosure sale of a mortgaged property, which was foreclosed due to the non-payment of a loan, was invalid because the interest rates imposed on the loan were found to be null and void due to their unconscionability.

○ As correctly observed by the CA, the foreclosure proceedings held cannot be given effect even if the terms of the Real Estate Mortgage remain effective. In the Notice of Extra-Judicial Sale and in the Certificate of Sale, the amount designated as mortgage indebtedness amounted to P560,000.00. Likewise, in the demand letter defendant-appellee demanded from plaintiff-appellant the amount of P540,000.00 for the unpaid loan. Since the debt due is limited to the principal of P200,000.00 with 12% per annum as legal interest, the previous demand for payment of the amount of P540,000.00 cannot be considered as a valid demand for payment.

■ For an obligation to become due, there must be a valid demand. Nor can the foreclosure proceedings be considered valid since the total amount of the indebtedness during the foreclosure proceedings was pegged at P560,000.00 which included interest and which this Court now nullifies for being excessive, iniquitous, and exorbitant.

■ If the foreclosure proceedings were considered valid, it would result in an inequitable situation wherein plaintiff-appellant will have her land foreclosed for failure to pay an over-inflated loan only a small part of which she was obligated to pay.

CUYCO v. CUYCO

19 April 2006 | GR No. 168736 | J. Ynares- Santiago | Stages/Phases; Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgage

PETITIONER: Sps. Adelina S. Cuyco and Feliciano U. Cuyco

RESPONDENTS: Sps. Renato Cuyco and Filipina Cuyco

DOCTRINE:

As a general rule, a mortgage liability is usually limited to the amount mentioned in the contract. However, the amounts named as consideration in a contract of mortgage do not limit the amount for which the mortgage may stand as security if from the four corners of the instrument the intent to secure future and other indebtedness can be gathered. This stipulation is valid and binding between the parties and is known in American Jurisprudence as the "blanket mortgage clause," also known as a "dragnet clause.”

A "dragnet clause" operates as a convenience and accommodation to the borrowers as it makes available additional funds without their having to execute additional security documents, thereby saving time, travel, loan closing costs, costs of extra legal services, recording fees, et cetera.

While a real estate mortgage may exceptionally secure future loans or advancements, these future debts must be sufficiently described in the mortgage contract. An obligation is not secured by a mortgage unless it comes fairly within the terms of the mortgage contract.

FACTS:

Petitioners, spouses Adelina and Feliciano Cuyco, obtained a loan in the amount of P1,500,000.00 from respondents, spouses Renato and Filipina Cuyco, payable within one year at 18% interest per annum, and secured by a Real Estate Mortgage over a parcel of land with improvements thereon situated in Cubao, Quezon City covered by TCT No. RT-43723 (188321).

Subsequently, petitioners obtained additional loans from the respondents in the aggregate amount of P1,250,000.00, broken down as follows: (1) P150,000.00 on May 30, 1992; (2) P150,000.00 on July 1, 1992; (3) P500,000.00 on September 5, 1992; (4) P200,000.00 on October 29, 1992; and (5) P250,000.00 on January 13, 1993.

Petitioners made payments amounting to P291,700.00, but failed to settle their outstanding loan obligations. Thus, on September 10, 1997, respondents filed a complaint for foreclosure of mortgage with the RTC of Quezon City, which was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-97-32130. They alleged that petitioners' loans were secured by the real estate mortgage; that as of August 31, 1997, their indebtedness amounted to P6,967,241.14, inclusive of the 18% interest compounded monthly; and that petitioners' refusal to settle the same entitles the respondents to foreclose the real estate mortgage.

Petitioners appealed to the CA reiterating their previous claim that only the amount of P1,500,000.00 was secured by the real estate mortgage. They also contended that the RTC erred in ordering the foreclosure of the real estate mortgage to satisfy the total indebtedness of P6,532,019.84, as of January 10, 1999, plus interest until fully paid, and in imposing legal interest of 12% per annum on the stipulated interest of 18% from the filing of the case until fully paid.

PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:

RTC ● Rendered in favor of the respondents.

CA ● Partially granted the petition and modified the RTC decision insofar as the amount of the loan obligations secured by the real estate mortgage.

It held that by express intention of the parties, the real estate mortgage secured the original P1,500,000.00 loan and the subsequent loans of P150,000.00 and P500,000.00 obtained on July 1, 1992 and September 5, 1992, respectively.

As regards the loans obtained on May 31, 1992, October 29, 1992 and January 13, 1993 in the amounts of P150,000.00, P200,000.00 and P250,000.00, respectively, the appellate tribunal held that the parties never intended the same to be secured by the real estate mortgage.

ISSUE/S:

1. Whether all the subsequent loans were secured by the real estate mortgage. (No)

2. Whetherthe payment of the principal obligation and 18% interest is sufficient to discharge the mortgage obligation. (No)

RULING:

1. No. It is clear from a perusal of the aforequoted real estate mortgage that there is no stipulation that the mortgaged realty shall also secure future loans and advancements. Thus, what applies is the general rule above stated.

Even if the parties intended the additional loans of P150,000.00 obtained on May 30, 1992, P150,000.00 obtained on July 1, 1992, and P500,00.00 obtained on September 5, 1992 to be secured by the same real estate mortgage, as shown in the acknowledgement receipts, it is not sufficient in law to bind the realty for it was not made substantially in the form prescribed by law.

In order to constitute a legal mortgage, it must be executed in a public document, besides being recorded. A provision in a private document, although denominating the agreement as one of mortgage, cannot be considered as it is not susceptible of inscription in the property registry. A mortgage in legal form is not constituted by a private document, even if such mortgage be accompanied with delivery of possession of the mortgage property. Besides, by express provisions of Section 127 of Act No. 496, a mortgage affecting land, whether registered under said Act or not registered at all, is not deemed to be sufficient in law nor may it be effective to encumber or bind the land unless made substantially in the form therein prescribed. It is required, among other things, that the document be signed by the mortgagor executing the same, in the presence of two witnesses, and acknowledged as his free act and deed before a notary public. A mortgage constituted by means of a private document obviously does not comply with such legal requirements.

What the parties could have done in order to bind the realty for the additional loans was to execute a new real estate mortgage or to amend the old mortgage conformably with the form prescribed by the law. Failing to do so, the realty cannot be bound by such additional loans, which may be recovered by the respondents in an ordinary action for collection of sums of money.

2. No. Section 2, Rule 68 of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 2. Judgment on foreclosure for payment or sale. — If upon the trial in such action the court shall find the facts set forth in the complaint to be true, it shall ascertain the amount due to the plaintiff upon the mortgage debt or obligation, including interest and other charges as approved by the court, and costs, and shall render judgment for the sum so found due and order that the same be paid to the court or to the judgment obligee within a period of not less than ninety (90) days nor more than one hundred twenty (120) days from the entry of judgment, and that in default of such payment the property shall be sold at public auction to satisfy the judgment. (Emphasis added)

Indeed, the above provision of the Rules of Court provides that the mortgaged property may be charged not only for the mortgage debt or obligation but also for the interest, other charges and costs approved by the court.

Thus, to discharge the real estate mortgage, petitioners must pay the respondents

(1) the total amount due, as computed in accordance with the formula indicated above, that is, the principal loan of P1,500,000.00, the stipulated interest of 18%, the interest on the stipulated interest due of 12% computed from the filing of the complaint until finality of the decision less partial payments made,

(2) the 12% legal interest on the total amount due from finality until fully satisfied,

(3) the reasonable attorney's fees of P25,000.00 and

(4) the costs of suit, within the period specified by the Rules. Should the petitioners default in the payment thereof, the property shall be sold at public auction to satisfy the judgment.|

REHABILITATION FINANCE CORPORATION V,. ALTO SURETY & INSURANCE CO

March 24, 1960 | GR No. L- 14303 | BARRERA, J. | Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgage

PETITIONER: REHABILITATION FINANCE CORPORATION

RESPONDENTS: ALTO SURETY and INSURANCE COMPANY, INC.

DOCTRINE:

The proceedings provided in the Land Registration Act being summary in nature, they are inadequate for the litigation of issues properly pertaining to ordinary civil actions, thus, questions involving ownership of or title to a real property, or relating to the validity or cancellation or discharge of a mortgage should properly be ventilated in an ordinary proceeding.

FACTS:

1. Eustaquio Palma, owner of a parcel of land, executed a first mortgage to secure a loan of P20,000.00, in favor of the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation (RFC), and subsequently, with the consent of the RFC, a second mortgage over the same property, in favor of Alto Surety & Insurance Company, Inc. (Alto). Both mortgages were duly registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds and annotated on the corresponding certificate of title.

2. Upon failure of the mortgagor to settle the loan, RFC foreclosed the mortgage extrajudicially, in favor of mortgagee RFC as the highest bidder for the sum of P11,211.68

3. Six months later, Palma assigned all his rights to the property to the spouses Anacleto Trinidad and Rosa S. de Trinidad, who assumed the obligation of paying the repurchase price. Alto, as the junior encumbrancer, inquired about the status of the property subject to redemption and was informed by RFC that it had already been sold to the Trinidad spouses under a deed of redemption on the installment plan.

4. However, RFC executed an affidavit consolidating ownership of the property and registered it, resulting in the cancellation of the original certificate of title and the issuance of a new one in RFC's name. The second mortgage in favor of Alto, however, was carried and annotated at the back of the new title.

5. RFC filed a petition to cancel the annotation of the second mortgage, arguing that with the consolidation and transfer of the mortgagee's rights to RFC, the junior encumbrancer's lien on the property had ceased. Alto opposed the petition, contending that the execution of the Deed of Resale between RFC and the Trinidad spouses released the property from the first mortgage and automatically transformed the second mortgage into a first lien.

ISSUE/S:

1. Whether the annotation of the second mortgage on the property should be canceled.

RULING:

In view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from denying the first mortgagee's petition to cancel the annotation of the second mortgage at the back of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 1155, is hereby affirmed, without prejudice to the proper adjudication, in an appropriate ordinary action, of the respective rights of the parties herein as a result of the execution of the Deed of Resale, Exhibit J. The petitioner-appellant shall pay the costs. It is so ordered.

RATIO:

YES.

The court a quo acted correctly in denying, under the circumstances, the petition to cancel the annotation of the second mortgage at the back of the title covering the property originally owned by Eustaquio Palma.

It has been consistently held by this Court, that the relief afforded by Section 112 of the Land Registration Act may only be allowed if "there is a unanimity among the parties, or there is no adverse claim or serious objection on the part of any party in interest; otherwise, the case becomes controversial and should be threshed out in an ordinary case. In another case, this Court has held that "Section 112 authorizes, in our opinion, only alterations which do not impair rights recorded in the decree, or alterations which, if they do prejudice such rights, are consented to by all parties concerned or alterations to correct obvious mistakes".

This doctrine is but sound and proper. The proceedings provided in the Land Registration Act being summary in nature, they are inadequate for the litigation of issues properly pertaining to ordinary civil actions, thus, questions involving ownership of or title to a real property, or relating to the validity or cancellation or discharge of a mortgage should properly be ventilated in an ordinary proceeding."

There is another reason why the petition must be denied. Granting arguendo that the extrajudicial foreclosure proceeding instituted by the RFC is proper and justified, since the junior encumbrancer was admittedly not notified thereof, the foreclosure of the first mortgage cannot be considered to have terminated or extinguished the rights of said junior encumbrancer over the property.

An interest in the mortgaged property acquired subsequent to the (first) mortgage may be divested or barred only by making the holder thereof a party to the proceedings to foreclose (Kurz vs. Pappas, 146 So. 100, 107 Fla. 861; Mediterranean Corp. vs. Pappas, 146 So. 106, 107 Fla. 876).

While as a general rule, the junior encumbrancer is not a necessary party to a suit to foreclose by a senior mortgagee, it is always proper and prudent to join him as a defendant, both to give an opportunity to defend and to extinguish his right of redemption (Lee vs. Slemons, 150 So. 792, 112 Fla. 675; Woodward vs. Householder, 289 S.W. 571, 315 Mo. 1155).

When a senior mortgagee forecloses and becomes the purchaser at his own foreclosure sale, but the holder of a subsequent mortgage or other subordinate interest has not been joined or has been eliminated from the proceeding, equity will keep the senior mortgage alive against the subsequent encumbrance and the senior mortgagee will be entitled to an action de novo to reforeclose the mortgage as to the omitted persons (Van Meter vs. Field, 159 P. 2d 546, 195 Okl. 55; Rives vs. Stanford, 106 P. 2d 1101).

MARILAG V. MARTINEZ

July 22, 2015 | G.R. NO. 2018922| Perlas-Bernabe, J. | Nature of Foreclosure

DOCTRINE:

In loan contracts secured by a real estate mortgage, the rule is that the creditor-mortgagee has a single cause of action against the debtor-mortgagor, i.e., to recover the debt, through the filing of a personal action for collection of sum of money or the institution of a real action to foreclose on the mortgage security. The two remedies are alternative, not cumulative or successive, and each remedy is complete by itself.

FACTS:

Rafael Martinez (Rafael), respondent's father, obtained from the petitioner a loan in the amount of P160,000.00, with a stipulated monthly 5% interest, payable within a period of six (6) months. The loan was secured by a real estate mortgage over a parcel of land. Rafael failed to settle his obligation upon maturity and despite repeated demands, prompting petitioner to file a Complaint for Judicial Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgage before the RTC of Imus, Cavite. Rafael failed to file his answer hence, was declared in default. After an ex parte presentation of petitioner's evidence, the RTC-Imus issued a Decision declaring the stipulated 5% monthly interest to be usurious and reducing the same to 12% per annum (p.a.). Accordingly, it ordered Rafael to pay petitioner the amount of P229,200.00, consisting of the principal of P160,000.00 and accrued interest of P59,200.00 from July 30, 1992 to September 30, 1995. Records do not show that this Decision had already attained finality. Meanwhile, prior to Rafael's notice of the above decision, respondent agreed to pay Rafael's obligation to petitioner which was pegged at P689,000.00. After making a total payment of P400,000.00, he executed a promissory note in the amount of P289,000.00, for the balance. After learning of the January 30, 1998 Decision, respondent refused to pay the amount covered by the subject PN despite demands, prompting petitioner to file a complaint for sum of money and damages before the court a quo on July 2, 1998, docketedas Civil Case No. 98-0156 (collection case). Respondent prayed for the dismissal of the case and contends that petitioner has no cause of action against him. He averred that he has fully settled Rafael's obligation and that he committed a mistake in paying more than the amount due under the loan, i.e., the amount of P229,200.00 as adjudged by the RTC- Imus in the judicial foreclosure case which, thus, warranted the return of the excess payment.

ISSUE/S:

Whether or not the collection case should prosper.

RULING:

NO. In loan contracts secured by a real estate mortgage, the rule is that the creditor-mortgagee has a single cause of action against the debtor- mortgagor, i.e. , to recover the debt, through the filing of a personal action for collection of sum of money or the institution of a real action to foreclose on the mortgage security. The two remedies are alternative, not cumulative or successive, and each remedy is complete by itself. Thus, if the creditor-mortgagee opts to foreclose the real estate mortgage, he waives the action for the collection of the unpaid debt, except only for the recovery of whatever deficiency may remain in the outstanding obligation of the debtor-mortgagor after deducting the bid price in the public auction sale of the mortgaged properties. Accordingly, a deficiency judgment shall only issue after it is established that the mortgaged property was sold at public auction for an amount less than the outstanding obligation. In the present case, records show that petitioner, as creditor- mortgagee, instituted an action for judicial foreclosure pursuant to the provisions of Rule 68 of the Rules of Court in order to recover on Rafael's debt. In light of the foregoing discussion, the availment of such remedy thus bars recourse to the subsequent filing of a personal action for collection of the same debt, in this case, under the principle of litis pendentia, considering that the foreclosure case only remains pending as it was not shown to have attained finality. In fine, the dismissal of the collection case is in order. Considering, however, that respondent's claim for return of excess payment partakes of the nature of a compulsory counterclaim and, thus, survives the dismissal of petitioner's collection suit, the same should be resolved based on its own merits and evidentiary support.

Agarrado v. Librando-Agarrado

6 June 2018 | G.R No. 212413 | REYES, JR., J |

Partition - Phases/ Stages & Jurisdiction

PETITIONER: MA. ROSARIO AGARRADO, RUTH LIBRADA AGARRADO AND ROY AGARRADO

RESPONDENTS: CRISTITA LIBRANDO-AGARRADO AND ANA LOU AGARRADO-KING

DOCTRINE:

An action for partition of real estate is at once an action for the determination of the co-owners of the subject property and an action for the eventual conveyance of specific portions thereof to the co-owners. While this subject matter is incapable of pecuniary estimation, the proper court which would have jurisdiction over the action would still depend on the subject property's assessed values in accordance with Secs. 19(2) and 33(3) of The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended

FACTS:

6. Petitioners Ma. Rosario Agarrado (Ma. Rosario), Ruth Librada Agarrado (Ruth), and Roy Agarrado (Roy) are children of the late spouses Rodrigo (Rodrigo) and Emilia (Emilia) Agarrado, who, during their lifetime, acquired a 287-square meter land (subject property) in Bacolod City, Negros Occidental.

7. The subject property was registered in the name of the spouses Rodrigo and Emilia and was covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-29842-B. On August 18, 1978, Emilia died intestate, leaving Rodrigo and their children as her compulsory heirs.

8. Respondents Cristita and Ana Lou is the second family of Rodrigo where Ana Lou was conceived during his previous marriage to Emilia and was born one month after its death.

9. On December 8, 2000, Rodrigo died.

10. On January 23, 2003, respondents filed for an action for partition of the subject land which was granted by the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City Branch 44 despite the failure to indicate in the complaint the market value of the property.

ISSUE/S:

2. Whether the action for partition is incapable of pecuniary estimation justifying the trial court’s jurisdiction.

RULING:

No. Clearly, therefore, jurisprudence has ruled that an action for partition, while one not capable of pecuniary estimation, falls under the jurisdiction of either the first or second level courts depending on the amounts specified in Secs. 19(2) and 33(3) of B.P. 129, as amended. Consequently, a failure by the plaintiff to indicate the assessed value of the subject property in his/her complaint, or at the very least, in the attachments in the complaint as ruled in Foronda-Crystal, is dismissible because the court which would exercise jurisdiction over the same could not be identified.

Jurisdiction over cases for partition of real properties therefore, like all others, is determined by law. Particularly, the same is identified by Sections 19(2) and 33(3) of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended by Republic Act 7691.

The provisions state that in all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein, the RTC shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction where the assessed value of the property exceeds P20,000.00 or, for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such value exceeds P50,000.00. For those below the foregoing threshold amounts, exclusive jurisdiction lies with the Metropolitan Trial Courts (MeTC), Municipal Trial Courts (MTC), or Municipal Circuit Trial Courts (MCTC).

Thus, the determination of the assessed value of the property, which is the subject matter of the partition, is essential. This, the courts could identify through an examination of the allegations of the complaint.

HEIRS OF ERNESTO MORALES v. AGUSTIN

June 6, 2018 | GR No. 224849 | REYES, JR., J.: | SECOND DIVISION | Partition- Nature and Definition

PETITIONER: HEIRS OF ENRESTO MORALES

RESPONDENTS: ASTRID AGUSTIN

DOCTRINE:

The ordinary action for partition therefore is meant to take the place of the special proceeding on the settlement of the estate. The reason is that, if the deceased dies without pending obligations, there is no necessity for the appointment of an administrator to administer the estate for the heirs and the creditors, much less, the necessity to deprive the real owners of their possession to which they are immediately entitled.

FACTS:

Astrid Morales Agustin, is a grandchild of Jayme Morales, who was the registered owner of a parcel of land with improvements. The respondent initiated the instant complaint, originally together with Lydia Morales, another one of Jayme's grandchildren and the respondent's cousin, for the partition of Jayme's property. They alleged that they, together with the petitioners and their other cousins, were co-owners of the subject property by virtue of their

successional rights as heirs of Jayme.

Ernesto Morales, as one of the heirs of Vicente Morales, filed an Answer with Motion to Dismiss and Compulsory Counter-claims. He alleged that herein respondent has no cause of action against the petitioners because: (1) the proper remedy should not be a complaint for partition but an action for the settlement of the intestate estate of Jayme and his wife; and (2) herein respondent has no more right of participation over the subject property because the same has long been conveyed to Ernesto Morales (as substituted by herein petitioners) by the respondent's parents, Simeon and Leonila Morales.

Meanwhile, summons to the heirs of Martina Morales-Enriquez, who were at that time residing abroad, were allowed to be served personally. They were subsequently declared to be in default. In response, one of Martina Morales-Enriquez's heirs, Emeterio Enriquez, filed a Motion to Dismiss and alleged that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over his person because he was not furnished with a copy of the Amended Complaint.

PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:

RTC ● The RTC ruled that: (1) the estate of a deceased who died intestate may be partitioned without need of any settlement or administration proceeding; 15 and (2) the RTC properly and lawfully rendered summary judgment despite the absence of any motion from any of the parties praying for the application of the rules thereon

CA Aggrieved, the petitioners elevated the case to the CA, which thereafter dismissed the appeal and affirmed the RTC Decision on August 13, 2015.

The CA opined that the settlement of the entire estate of the late spouses Jayme and Telesfora is "of no moment in the instant case of partition" 17 because the respondent was "asserting her right as a co-owner of the subject property by virtue of her successional right from her deceased father Simeon Morales, who was once a co-owner of the said property, and not from Jayme and Telesfora Morales." 18

Further, the CA ruled that an action for partition under Rule 69 of the Rules of Court is an action quasi in rem, and thus, "jurisdiction over the impleaded defendants-heirs is not required since the trial court has jurisdiction over the res or the subject property which is the subject matter of the action for partition." 19

Finally, the CA ruled that summary judgment in this case is proper despite the absence of any motion from any of the parties. In support hereto, the CA ratiocinated that the parties prayed for resolution of all "pending motions/incidents" during the hearing on September 18, 2013, and acceded to the RTC pronouncement therein that its resolution "shall be considered as a decision in the said case for partition." 20

The fallo of the CA decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 12, Laoag City dated November 22, 2013 is AFFIRMED.

Despite the petitioners' motion for reconsideration, the CA affirmed its decision via a Resolution dated April 21, 2016. 21

Hence, this petition

ISSUE/S:

1. Whether or not the proceedings in the trial court are void considering that not all the defendants who are indispensable parties were ever served with summons in violation of due process.- NO

2. Whether or not the estate of the parties’ intestate predecessors (i.e., Spouses Jayme and Telesfora Morales) be determined and settled first before the distribution and/or partition of any of the properties which form part of said estate.- NO

RULING:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 101991 dated August 13, 2015 and April 21, 2016, respectively, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is ORDERED REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 12, of Laoag City for further proceedings. The trial court judge is ORDERED to hear the case with dispatch.

RATIO:

1. NO. There is proper service of summons to the defendants. The partition of real estate is an action quasi in rem. For the court to acquire jurisdiction in actions quasi in rem, it is necessary only that it has jurisdiction over the res. In the case of Macasaet vs. Co, Jr., the Court stated that "[j]urisdiction over the defendant in an action in rem or quasi in rem is not required, and the court acquires jurisdiction over an action as long as it acquires jurisdiction over the res that is the subject matter of the action."

The court may acquire jurisdiction over the thing by actually or constructively seizing or placing it under the court's custody. Jurisdiction over the property which is the subject of the litigation may result either from a seizure of the property under legal process, whereby it is brought into the actual custody of the law, or it may result from the institution of legal proceedings wherein, under special provisions of law, the power of the court over the property is recognized and made effective.

In this case, the filing of the complaint before the RTC which sought to partition the subject property effectively placed the latter under the power of the court. On this front, none of the parties challenged the RTC's jurisdiction. But more than this, there is in this case proper service of summons to the defendants. The CA found that: (1) the heirs of Vicente Morales received summons, filed an Answer, and actively participated in the trial; (2) the heirs of Jose Morales filed their Answer and admitted to the allegations in the complaint; and (3) the heirs of Martina Morales were duly served with summons, copies of the complaint, and actively participated in the trial.

2. NO.

The Court, nonetheless, agrees that the trial court should have collated Jayme's other properties, if any, prior to the promulgation of any judgment of partition in accordance with the laws on Succession. Generally, an action for partition may be seen to simultaneously present two issues: first, there is the issue of whether the plaintiff is indeed a co-owner of the property sought to be partitioned; and second, assuming that the plaintiff successfully hurdles the first issue, there is the secondary issue of how the property is to be divided between the plaintiff and defendants, i.e., what portion should go to which co-owner.

This definition does not take into account the difference between (1) an action of partition based on the successional rights of the heirs of a decedent, and (2) an ordinary action of partition among co- owners. While oftentimes interchanged with one another, and although in many ways similar, these two partitions draw legal basis from two different sets of legal provisions in the Civil Code. To begin with, the laws governing the partition of inheritance draws basis from Article 777 of the Civil Code, which states that the rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent.

As such, from that moment, the heirs, legatees, and devisees' successional rights are vested, and they are considered to own in common the inheritance left by the decedent. Under the law, partition of the inheritance may only be effected by (1) the heirs themselves extrajudicially, (2) by the court in an ordinary action for partition, or in the course of administration proceedings, (3) by the testator himself, and (4) by the third person designated by the testator.

A reading of the enumeration set above would reveal instances when the appointment of an executor or administrator is dispensed with. One is through the execution of a public instrument by the heirs in an extrajudicial settlement of the estate. Another, which is the focal point of this case, is through the ordinary action of partition.

Thus, an action for partition with regard to the inheritance of the heirs should conform to the law governing the partition and distribution of the estate, and not only to the law governing ordinary partition. These pertinent provisions of the law could be found in Title IV (Succession), Chapter 4 (Provisions Common to Testate and Intestate Successions), Section 6 (Partition and Distribution of the Estate) of the Civil Code.

Particularly, according to Article 1078 of the Civil Code, where there are two or more heirs, the whole estate of the decedent is owned in common by such heirs, subject to the payment of debts of the deceased. Partition, the Civil Code adds, is the separation, division and assignment of a thing held in common among those to whom it may belong. Thus, every act which is intended to put an end to indivision among co- heirs and legatees or devisees is deemed to be a partition, although it should purport to be a sale, an exchange, a compromise, or any other transaction.

In addition, Article 1061 of the Civil Code requires the parties to collate the properties of the decedent which they may have received by way of gratuitous title prior to the former's death.

In contrast, an ordinary partition of co-owned property, specifically of real property, is governed by Title III of the Civil Code on Co-ownership.

Article 484 of the Civil Code provides that there is co-ownership whenever the ownership of an undivided thing or right belongs to different persons. No co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership; each co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the thing owned in common, insofar as his share is concerned.

This partition may be made by agreement between the parties, or by judicial proceedings, which, like the procedural aspect of the partition by virtue of successional rights, is governed by Rule 69 of the Rules of Court.

Thus, while both partitions make use of Rule 69 as the procedural rule that would govern the manner of partition, the foregoing disquisitions explicitly elaborate that the bases of the ownership are different, and the subject matters concerned are also different — one speaks of the partition of the estate to distribute the inheritance to the heirs, legatees, or devisees, whereas the other speaks of partition of any undivided thing or right to distribute to the co-owners thereof.

In the case at hand, the parties are the heirs of the late Jayme Morales. The land being sought to be divided was a property duly registered under Jayme's name. Necessarily, therefore, the partition invoked by the respondents is the partition of the estate of the deceased Jayme.

As such, when the petitioners alleged in their answer that there is yet another property that needs to be partitioned among the parties, they were actually invoking the Civil Code provisions, not on Co-ownership, but on Succession, which necessarily includes Article 1061 of the Civil Code — the provision on collation. It is therefore proper for the trial court to have delved into this issue presented by the petitioner instead of disregarding the same and limiting itself only to that singular property submitted by the respondent for partition.

Nonetheless, the law does not prohibit partial partition. In administration proceedings, have allowed partition for special instances but the Court should caution that this power should be exercised sparingly. This is because a partial partition and distribution of the estate does not put to rest the question of the division of the entire estate.

In this case, there is no cogent reason to render the partition of one of Jayme's properties and totally ignore the others, if any. Absent any circumstance that would warrant the partial partition and distribution of Jayme's estate, the prudent remedy is to settle the entirety of the estate in the partition proceedings in the court a quo.

DE PEDRO V. ROMASAN DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION

November 26, 2014 | G.R. No. 194751 | LEONEN, J | Partition

PETITIONER: Aurora N. De Pedro

RESPONDENTS: Romasan Development Corporation

DOCTRINE:

A petition for annulment of judgment is allowed only in exceptional cases and cannot be used by a losing party to make a mockery of a duly promulgated decision long final and executory. The remedy may not be invoked where the party has availed himself of the remedy of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedy and lost, or where he has failed to avail himself of those remedies through his own fault or negligence.

FACTS:

1. Complaints for nullification of free patent and original certificates of title were filed by respondent Romasan Development Corporation before the RTC against plaintiffs on the ground that respondent discovered that De Pedro put up fences in its property. The respondent also found out free patent was issued by DENR in favor of the petitioner, in which such free patent was used for the issuance of title by the Register of Deeds. Respondent further alleged that the government could not legally issue the free patents because at the time of their issuance, the land was already released for disposition to private individuals.

2. Respondent filed a motion to serve summons and the complaint by publication and was granted by the RTC. The summons and the complaint were published. For failure to file answer, respondent moved to declare de Pedro in default and be allowed to present evidence ex parte. The RTC granted the motions. RTC found that the title and free patent issued to De Pedro were void.

3. De Pedro filed before the Regional Trial Court a motion for new trial, arguing that the Regional Trial Court did not acquire jurisdiction over her person because of improper and defective service of summons. Regional Trial Court issued an order denying De Pedro’s motion for new trial and ruled that summons was validly served upon De Pedro through publication.

4. De Pedro filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals, alleging that the Regional Trial Court committed grave abuse of discretion when it denied her motion for new trial. CA dismissed the petition for certiorari for lack of merit, and affirmed the denial of De Pedro’s motion for new trial. De Pedro’s motion for reconsideration was denied.

5. De Pedro filed before the Court of Appeals a petition for annulment of the judgment of the RTC on grounds of lack of jurisdiction, litis pendentia, and for having been dispossessed of her property without due process. Court of Appeals promulgated its decision denying De Pedro’s petition for annulment of judgment.

6. De Pedro filed before this court a Rule 45 petition seeking the reversal of the decision of CA.

PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:

RTC ● RTC denied De Pedro’s motion for new trial

CA ● CA denied petition for certiorari.

CA ● CA denied De Pedro's petition for annulment of judgment.

ISSUE/S:

1. Whether or not the filing a motion for new trial and petition for certiorari is a bar from filing a petition for annulment of judgment.—YES

2. Whether or not the trial court failed to acquire jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner.—NO

RULING:

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

RATIO:

1. YES

Petitioner is already barred from filing a petition for annulment of judgment. An action for annulment of judgment “may not be invoked” where the party has availed himself of the remedy of new trial, appeal, petition for relief, or other appropriate remedy and lost. In this case, petitioner’s main grounds for filing the action for annulment are lack of jurisdiction over her person, and litis pendentia. These are the same grounds that were raised in the motion for new trial filed before and denied by the Regional Trial Court. The Court of Appeals did not err in denying petitioner’s petition for annulment of the Regional Trial Court’s judgment. Petitioner had already filed a motion for new trial and petition for certiorari invoking lack of jurisdiction as ground.

A petition for annulment of judgment is a recourse that is equitable in character. It is independent of the case and is “allowed only in exceptional cases where there is no available or other adequate remedy.

SC ruled that the Court of Appeals did not err in denying petitioner’s petition for annulment of the Regional Trial Court’s judgment. Petitioner had already filed a motion for new trial and petition for certiorari invoking lack of jurisdiction as ground.

Petitioner’s filing of the petition for annulment of judgment after she had filed a motion for new trial and lost, with both actions raising the same grounds, reveals an intent to secure a judgment in her favor by abusing and making a mockery of the legal remedies provided by law. This kind of abuse is what this court tries to guard against when it limited its application, and stated in some of the cases that an action for annulment of judgment cannot be invoked when other remedies had already been availed. An action for annulment of judgment cannot be used by petitioner who has lost her case through fault of her own, to make “a complete farce of a duly promulgated decision that has long become final and executory.”

2. NO

Failure to serve summons will mean that the court failed to acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. However, the filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration is tantamount to voluntary appearance. It cannot be denied the fact that petitioner was already notified of respondent’s action for annulment of petitioner’s title when she filed a motion for new trial and, later, a petition for certiorari. At that time, petitioner was deemed, for purposes of due process, to have been properly notified of the action involving her title to the property. Lack of jurisdiction could have already been raised in an action for annulment of judgment. Thus, when petitioner erroneously filed her motion for new trial and petition for certiorari instead of an action for annulment of judgment, she was deemed to have voluntarily participated in the proceedings against her title. The actions and remedies she chose to avail bound her. Petitioner’s failure to file an action for annulment of judgment at this time was fatal to her cause. We cannot conclude now that she was denied due process.

June 06, 2018 | G.R. No. 224849 | J Reyes Jr.| Partition - Nature and Definition

PETITIONER: Heirs of Ernesto Morales

RESPONDENTS: STRID MORALES AGUSTIN, REPRESENTED BY HER ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, EDGARDO TORRES

DOCTRINE:

The procedural rule that would govern the manner of partition, the foregoing disquisitions explicitly elaborate that the bases of the ownership are different, and the subject matters concerned are also different—one speaks of the partition of the estate to distribute the inheritance to the heirs, legatees, or devisees, whereas the other speaks of partition of any undivided thing or right to distribute to the co-owners thereof.

FACTS:

1. The respondent, Astrid Morales Agustin, is a grandchild of Jayme Morales (Jayme), who was the registered owner of a parcel of land with improvements in Laoag City.

2. The respondent initiated the instant complaint, originally together with Lydia Morales, another one of Jayme's grandchildren and the respondent's cousin, for the partition of Jayme's property. They alleged that they, together with the petitioners and their other cousins, were co-owners of the subject property by virtue of their successional rights as heirs of Jayme.

3. Heirs of Jose Morales filed an answer, which admitted the allegations in the complaint, and interposed no objection to the partition.

4. On the other hand, Ernesto Morales, as one of the heirs of Vicente Morales, filed an Answer with Motion to Dismiss and Compulsory Counter-claims.

PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:

RTC ● RTC rendered its decision via summary judgment in favor of respondent

○ The RTC ruled that: (1) the estate of a deceased who died intestate may be partitioned without need of any settlement or administration proceeding; and (2) the RTC properly and lawfully rendered summary judgment despite the absence of any motion from any of the parties praying for the application of the rules thereon.

CA ● Dismissed appeal and affirmed ruling.

ISSUE/S:

Whether or not the partition of the subject property is proper despite the absence of the settlement of the estate of the deceased registered owner thereof— YES

RULING:

WHEREFORE, The decision of the lower court is reversed, and judgment is hereby rendered plaintiff for the sum of P3,290.25, and for the costs of both instances.

RATIO:

● In the case at hand, the parties are the heirs of the late Jayme Morales. The land being sought to be divided was a property duly registered under Jayme's name. Necessarily, therefore, the partition invoked by the respondents is the partition of the estate of the deceased Jayme.

o As such, when the petitioners alleged in their answer that there is yet another property that needs to be partitioned among the parties, they were actually invoking the Civil Code provisions, not on Co-ownership, but on Succession,

It is therefore proper for the trial court to have delved into this issue presented by the petitioner instead of disregarding the same and limiting itself only to that singular property submitted by the respondent for partition.

● In case the defendants assert in their Answer exclusive title in themselves adversely to the plaintiff, the court should not dismiss the plaintiff's action for partition but, on the contrary and in the exercise of its general jurisdiction, resolve the question of whether the plaintiff is co-owner or not.

● Nonetheless, lest it be misunderstood, the law does not prohibit partial partition. In fact, the Court, in administration proceedings, have allowed partition for special instances. But the Court should caution that this power should be exercised sparingly. This is because a partial partition and distribution of the estate does not put to rest the question of the division of the entire estate.

● In this case, the Court is of the opinion that there is no cogent reason to render the partition of one of Jayme's properties and totally ignore the others, if any. Absent any circumstance that would warrant the partial partition and distribution of Jayme's estate, the prudent remedy is to settle the entirety of the estate in the partition proceedings in the court a quo. Besides, as stated by the Court in Gulang, it is quite unnecessary to require the plaintiff to file another action, separate and independent from that of partition originally instituted.

OSMEÑA v. COA

July 12, 2017 | GR No. 213192 | Peralta, J. | Partition; Phases/Stages

PETITIONER: TERESA R. IGNACIO

RESPONDENTS: RAMON REYES, FLORENCIO REYES, JR., ROSARIO R. DU AND CARMELITA R. PASTOR

DOCTRINE:

The first stage of an action for judicial partition and/or accounting is concerned with the determination of whether or not a co-ownership in fact exists and a partition is proper, that is, it is not otherwise legally proscribed and may be made by voluntary agreement of all the parties interested in the property.

FACTS:

1. Angel Reyes and Oliva Arevalo filed before the then CFI of Rizal (now RTC of Pasig City), the intestate court, a Petition for Letters of Administration of the Estate of their father Florencio Reyes, Sr. who died on June 23, 1967, and enumerated therein the surviving heirs.

2. The intestate court appointed Oliva as the special administratrix of the estate of Florencio Sr., and then as the regular administratrix. Florencio, Jr. replaced Oliva in 1982.

3. Thereafter, Teresa became the administratrix of the Florencio Sr. estate in 1994. Teresa executed a lease contract over a parcel of land located in Baguio City known as Magsaysay property in favor of Gonzalo Ong, Virginia Lim, Nino Yu, Francisco Lim and Simona Go.

4. The intestate court approved the lease contract upon Teresa's motion. The intestate court also allowed Teresa to enter into a lease contract over a parcel of land located in Baguio City known as Session Road property to Famous Realty Corporation (FRC). In January 1997, Teresa also leased the properties Loakan and Military Cut-off properties, in favor of ATC Wonderland, Inc. and, subsequently, to Gloria de Guzman and Sonshine Pre-School for a period of 10 years.

5. In 2001, respondents Ramon, Florencio Jr., Rosario and Carmelita, and the Heirs of Amparo, Intestate Estate of Soledad, Jose and Intestate Estate of Angel (plaintiffs) filed before the Baguio RTC, three complaints for partition, annulment of lease contract, accounting and damages with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction against Teresa and the lessees of the subject Baguio properties.

6. The plaintiffs alleged in their Complaints that, with the exception of the lessees, the parties and the Florencio Sr. estate own one-tenth (1/10) of each of the Session Road, Loakan and Military Cut-off, and Magsaysay properties. They claimed that Teresa misrepresented that the Florencio Sr. estate is the sole owner of the properties and leased the same to the other parties without their conformity. They also asserted in one of their complaints that the Florencio Sr. estate is different from the Heirs of Florencio Sr. and Heirs of Salud. They averred that, as co-owners, they have not received their share in the monthly rentals of the properties aforementioned due to Teresa's failure to duly account for the same. Thus, they are asking for the partition of the properties, for the accounting of all the rentals, income or profits derived, and deliver the same to the plaintiffs, for the annulment of the lease contracts and order the lessees to vacate the premises, and for the payment of damages.

PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:

RTC ● Directed and commissioned a team of auditors to conduct an accounting of the properties. Based on the Report, Teresa, as administratrix of the Florencio Sr. estate, had a total cash accountability amounting to P15,238,066.51.

● The Baguio RTC manifested that it shall await a Request Order from the intestate court regarding the possible distribution of the subject properties.

● However, the intestate court denied the motion stating that the former cannot allow the Baguio court to partition the property of the estate because the intestate court already has jurisdiction over the matter.

CA ● Aggrieved, the respondents filed before the CA a petition for certiorari assailing the Orders of the intestate court disallowing the partition of the Baguio properties.

● The CA granted the petition and annulled and set aside the assailed Orders of the intestate court.

ISSUE/S:

1. WON the CA erred in granting respondents’ motion to allow partition and distribution of shares over properties Co-Owned by the Estate and the Heirs located in Baguio City.the trial by commissioners is still needed in the case at bar. — NO

RULING:

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioner Teresa R. Ignacio is hereby DENIED. The Decision and Resolution, dated March 27, 2014 and June 27, 2014, respectively, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 127151 are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION, such that the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 3 is DIRECTED to RESUME trial on the merits in Special Civil Action Nos. 5055-R, 5056-R, and 5057-R to determine the ownership of the subject properties and to partition as co-owners, if proper.

RATIO:

1. NO

● An action for partition under Rule 69 of the Rules of Court is typically brought by a person claiming to be the owner of a specified property against a defendant or defendants whom the plaintiff recognizes to be his co- owners, and is premised on the existence or non-existence of co ownership between the parties.

● As discussed in Lim De Mesa v. Court of Appeals, the determination of the existence of co-ownership is the first stage to accord with the remedy of judicial partition, thus:

o The first stage of an action for judicial partition and/or accounting is concerned with the determination of whether or not a co-ownership in fact exists and a partition is proper, that is, it is not otherwise legally proscribed and may be made by voluntary agreement of all the parties interested in the property. This phase may end in a declaration that the plaintiff is not entitled to the desired partition either because a co- ownership does not exist or a partition is legally prohibited. It may also end, on the other hand, with an adjudgment that a co-ownership does in truth exist, that partition is proper in the premises, and that an accounting of rents and profits received by the defendant from the real estate in question is in order. In the latter case, "the parties may, if they are able to agree, make partition among themselves by proper instruments of conveyance, and the court shall confirm the partition so agreed upon by all the parties." In either case, whether the action is dismissed or partition and/or accounting is decreed, the order is a final one and may be appealed by any party aggrieved thereby.

● The Baguio RTC shirked from its duty when it deferred the trial to await a request order from the intestate court regarding the possible distribution. In fact, it has not yet made a definite ruling on the existence of co-ownership. There was no declaration of entitlement to the desired partition either because a co-ownership exists or a partition is not legally prohibited. As the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts, it is for the trial court to proceed and determine once and for all if there is co-ownership and to partition the subject properties if there is no legal prohibition. It is also best for the Baguio RTC to settle whether the respondents are claiming ownership over the properties by virtue of their title adverse to that of their late father and his estate and not by any right of inheritance.

QUILATAN v. HEIRS OF QUILATAN

August 28, 2009 | GR No. 183059 | Ynares-Santiago, J. | Rule 69 - Partition; Phases/Stages

PETITIONER: Ely Quilatan & Rosvida Quilatan-Elias

RESPONDENTS: Heirs Of Lorenzo Quilatan, namely Nenita Quilatan-Yumping, Librada Quilatan-San Pedro, Florenda Quilatan-Estebran and Godofredo Quilatan and The Municipal Assessor Of Taguig, Metro Manila (Now Taguig City)

DOCTRINE:

In an action for partition of real estate, it is the plaintiff who is mandated by the Rules to implead all the indispensable parties, considering that the absence of one such party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present.

FACTS:

1. Petitioners filed a case for nullification of Tax Declaration Nos. D-014-00330 and D-014-00204 and Partition of the Estate of the late Pedro Quilatan with damages against respondent heirs. They claim that:

a. During his lifetime, Pedro owned 2 parcels of land covered by Tax Declarations No. 1680 and 2301.

b. Said tax declarations were cancelled without their knowledge and new ones were issued (Tax Declaration Nos. D-014-00330 and D-014-00204) under the name of Sps. Lorenzo Quilata and Anita Lizertiquez as owners thereof.

PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:

RTC ● Declared as void the cancellation of Tax Declaration Nos. 1680 and 2301 and ordered the partition of the subject properties in 3 equal shares among the heirs of Francisco, Ciriaco and Lorenzo

CA ● Reversed without prejudice the RTC Decision

○ Petitioners failed to implead other co-heirs who are indispensable parties to the case.

○ Thus, judgment of the RTC was null and void for lack of jurisdiction.

● Petitioners filed an MR but it was denied, hence this Petition for Review on the ff grounds:

○ The issue of failure to implead indispensable parties was a mere afterthought.

■ Respondents did not raise the same in their Answer but only for the first time in their MR of the RTC Decision.

○ The order of dismissal without prejudice and the re-filing of the case in order to implead the heirs of Ciriaco only invite multiplicity of suits as the second action would be a repetition of the first action.

ISSUE/S:

WON the CA erred in ordering the dismissal of the case without prejudice on the ground of failure to implead all the indispensable parties— NO

RULING:

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is hereby DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated March 17, 2008 in CA-G.R. CV No. 88851 which reversed the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 266, for want of jurisdiction for failure to implead all indispensable parties is AFFIRMED. The case is REMANDED to the trial court which is hereby DIRECTED to implead all indispensable parties.

RATIO:

NO, the CA did not err in its Decision.

● The CA correctly applied Section 1, Rule 69 and Section 7, Rule 3 of the ROC, to wit:

o SECTION 1. Complaint in action for partition of real estate. — A person having the right to compel the partition of real estate may do so as in this rule prescribed, setting forth in his complaint the nature and extent of his title and an adequate description of the real estate of which partition is demanded and joining as defendants all the other persons interested in the property.

o SECTION 7. Compulsory joinder of indispensable parties. — Parties in interest without whom no final determination can be had of an action shall be joined either as plaintiffs or defendants.

● The responsibility of impleading all the indispensable parties rests on the petitioner/plaintiff. (Commissioner Domingo v. Scheer)

● In this case, respondents could not be blamed if they did not raise this issue in their Answer because in an action for partition of real estate, it is the plaintiff who is mandated by the Rules to implead all the indispensable parties, considering that the absence of one such party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present.

● On the issue of multiplicity of suits, the CA correctly ordered the dismissal of the case without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction.

o The dismissal could have been avoided had petitioners, instead of merely stating in their complaint the unimpleaded indispensable parties, joined them as parties to the case in order to have a complete and final determination of the action.

MAGLUCOT-AW V. MAGLUCOT

March 28, 2000 | GR No. 132518 | Kapunan, J. |Phases/Stages

PETITIONER: Gavina Maglucot-Aw, Catalina Orcullo, Richard Estano, Nida Maglucot, Melania Maglucot-Catubig, Emiliano Catubig, Ladislao Salma

RESPONDENTS: Leopoldo Maglucot, Severo Maglucot, Wilfreda Maglucot-Alejo and Constancio Alejo

DOCTRINE:

Parties to a partition proceeding, who elected to take under partition, and who took possession of the portion allotted to them, are estopped to question title to portion allotted to another party. A person cannot claim both under and against the same instrument. In other words, they accepted the lands awarded them by its provisions, and they cannot accept the decree in part, and repudiate it in part. They must accept all or none. Parties who had received the property assigned to them are precluded from subsequently attacking its validity of any part of it.

FACTS:

1. Petitioners filed with the RTC a complaint for recovery of possession and damages alleging that they are the owners of Lot No. 1639-D, which was originally part of Lot No. 1639. Tomas Maglucot, one of the owners and respondent’s predecessor-in-interest, filed a petition to subdivide Lot No. 1639 on April 19, 1952. Guillermo, Leopoldo and Severo Maglucot also rented portions the lot where they built houses and paid the rental amount P100 per annum to Ruperta Salma, who represented the heirs of Roberto Maglucot, the owner of Lot No. 1639-D and petitioners’ predecessor-in-interest. In December 1992, the respondents stopped paying rentals claiming ownership over the lot, resulting to the petitioners to file a complaint.

2. The trial court rendered the judgment in favor of the petitioners as Tomas Maglucot took active part in the partition as it was he who commenced the action for partition. While there was no court order showing that Lot No. 1639 was partitioned, its absence could not be used by Tomas or respondents successors-in-interest, to deny the existence of an approved partition.

3. The CA reversed the decision of the RTC, stating that there was no partition of Lot No. 1639.

PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:

RTC ● Lower court rendered judmgnet in favor of petitioners.

○ It found that the existence of tax declarations in the names of Hermogenes Olis and Pascual Olis (lots a-b) were indubitable proof that there was a subdivision of the lot. It likewise found that Tomas Maglucot (lot F), took active part in the partition, and that it was he who commenced the action for partition.

● The court cited Article 1431 of the Civil Code which states that "[t]hrough estoppel an admission or representation is rendered conclusive upon the person making it, and cannot be denied or disproved as against the person relying thereon." Applying said provision of law, it held that while there was no court order showing that Lot No. 1639 was partitioned, its absence could not be used by Tomas Maglucot, or respondents as his successors-in-interest, to deny the existence of an approved partition against the other co-owners who claim that there was one. Said court, likewise, ruled that the tax declarations over the houses of respondents, expressly stating that the same are constructed on the lots of Roberto Maglucot, constitute a conclusive admission by them of the ownership of the subject lot by the latter

CA · CA reversed the RTC decision, stating that the sketch plan and the tax declarations relied upon by the petitioners were not conclusive, and that the prescribed procedure under rule 69 was not followed, thus there was no partition of the lot, hence this petition.

ISSUE/S:

Whether a partition of the lot had actually been effected in 1952? (Petitioners contend that there was, hence they are entitled to exclusive ownership and possession of Lot D (originally a part of the whole LOT 1639), while private respondents deny such partition, hence, they are co-owners) – YES, there was already partition

RULING:

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals is SET ASIDE and the decision of the Regional Trial Court is hereby REINSTATED.

RATIO:

In this jurisdiction, an action for partition is comprised of two phases: first, an order for partition which determines whether a co-ownership in fact exists, and whether partition is proper; and, second, a decision confirming the sketch or subdivision submitted by the parties or the commissioners appointed by the court, as the case may be. The first phase of a partition and/or accounting suit is taken up with the determination of whether or not a co-ownership in fact exists, (i.e., not otherwise legally proscribed) and may be made by voluntary agreement of all the parties interested in the property. This phase may end with a declaration that plaintiff is not entitled to have a partition either because a co-ownership does not exist, or partition is legally prohibited. It may end, upon the other hand, with an adjudgment that a co-ownership does in truth exist, partition is proper in the premises and an accounting of rents and profits received by the defendant from the real estate in question is in order. In the latter case, the parties may, if they are able to agree, make partition among themselves by proper instruments of conveyance, and the court shall confirm the partition so agreed upon. In either case i.e., either the action is dismissed or partition and/or accounting is decreed the order is a final one, and may be appealed by any party aggrieved thereby.

The second phase commences when it appears that "the parties are unable to agree upon the partition" directed by the court. In that event, partition shall be done for the parties by the court with the assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners. This second stage may well also deal with the rendition of the accounting itself and its approval by the court after the parties have been accorded opportunity to be heard thereon, and an award for the recovery by the party or parties thereto entitled of their just share in the rents and profits of the real estate in question. Such an order is, to be sure, final and appealable.

The present rule on the question of finality and appealability of a decision or order decreeing partition is that it is final and appealable. The order of partition is a final determination of the co-ownership over Lot No. 1639 by the parties and the propriety of the partition thereof. Hence, if the present rule were applied, the order not having been appealed or questioned by any of the parties to the case, it has become final and executory and cannot now be disturbed.

The true test to ascertain whether or not an order or a judgment is interlocutory or final is: Does it leave something to be done in the trial court with respect to the merits of the case? If it does, it is interlocutory; if it does not, it is final. The key test to what is interlocutory is when there is something more to be done on the merits of the case. An order for partition is final and not interlocutory and, hence, appealable because it decides the rights of the parties upon the issue submitted.

DE MESA v. COURT OF APPEALS

25 April 1994 | GR No. 109387 | Regalado, J | Rule 68 (Phases/Stages)

PETITIONER: Leonardo Lim de Mesa

RESPONDENTS: Hon. Court of Appeals; Hon. Rodrigo Cosico, as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Biñan, Laguna; Rogelio Molina, Branch Sheriff; and Alfredo, Numeriano, Zenaida, Rogelio, Yolanda, Olivia, Benjamin, Teresita, and Wilson, all surnamed Lim de Mesa

DOCTRINE:

If the parties are unable to agree upon the partition, the court shall by order appoint not more than 3 competent and disinterested persons as commissioners to make the partition, commanding them to set off to the plaintiff and to each party in interest such part and proportion of the property as the court in such order shall direct.

FACTS:

1. The Private Respondents filed an action for partition against Leonardo

a. They prayed for the partition of the property left by their parents, Manuel de Mesa and Lucia Lim, consisting of a house and lot in Sta. Rosa Estate Subdivision, Laguna and a funeral parlor; that Leonardo be compelled to render an accounting of the income of the funeral parlor business from 24 October 1980, the date when the mother of the parties died; and that Rogelio be declared the owner of 8/10 of the entire estate, as the other heirs had assigned their interests to him

2. Leonardo admitted that their deceased parents left the house and lot described in the complaint, but claimed that the funeral parlor, known as Lim de Mesa Memorial Chapel, was solely owned by him

a. He also alleged that their deceased parents left other properties and businesses which are in the possession and under the management of the two other plaintiffs

3. The private respondents then filed a motion for execution which was granted by the lower court

a. It was returned unsatisfied due to Leonardo’s refusal to comply with the same

4. The private respondents then filed a motion to enforce judgment which was granted

5. Leonardo filed a motion to be furnished copies of the basic pleadings and/or orders

a. The private respondents filed their opposition thereto, arguing that he was not entitled to the relief prayed for since they were entitled to execution as a matter of right, and that all incidental matters flowing therefrom may be resolved motu proprio without prior notice and hearing to him

PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:

RTC ● Ordered the partition of the estate in the following proportions

○ Rogelio - 9.8787872/13 shares representing the sum total of his participations plus all the shares sold to him by co-heirs

○ Leonardo - 0.6515151/13 share

○ Leticia - 1.81818181/13 share

○ Wilson - 0.6515151/13 share

● As regards the property of the estate, namely, Lot No. 329 and the residential house of strong material(s) erected therein

○ Rogelio - 8/11 shares

○ Leonardo - 1/11 shares

○ Leticia - 1/11 shares

○ Wilson - 1/11 shares

CA ● Affirmed the RTC’s judgment with some modifications

○ Deleted those portions directing Leonardo and Leticia, aside from Wilson, to execute a deed confirming the extrajudicial partition with sale and the reformation of instrument, and to pay the awards for moral damages and attorney’s fees

ISSUE/S:

1. WQN the writ of execution issued by the trial court is null since it was issued without prior notice and hearing - NO

2. WON the trial court can compel Leonardo to sign the extrajudicial deed of partition - NO

RULING:

WHEREFORE, the assailed resolution of respondent Court of Appeals is hereby MODIFIED and the questioned orders of the trial court dated October 14, 1992 and November 25, 1992 are hereby SET ASIDE. The court a quo is directed to immediately appoint and constitute the necessary number of commissioners who shall expeditiously effect the partition of the subject property in accordance with Rule 69 of the Rules of Court.

RATIO:

1. NO

● A judgment ordering partition with damages is final and duly appealable, notwithstanding the fact, which petitioner seeks to capitalize on, that further proceedings will still have to take place in the trial court

● There are 2 stages involved in the special civil action of judicial partition and accounting under R69 of the Rules of Court

■ This phase may end in a declaration that plaintiff is not entitled to the desired partition either because a co-ownership does not exist or a partition is legally prohibited

■ It may also end, on the other hand, with an adjudgment that a co-ownership does in truth exist, that partition is proper in the premises, and that an accounting of rents and profits received by the defendant from the real estate in question is in order

■ In either case, whether the action is dismissed or partition and/or accounting is decreed, the order is a final one and may be appealed by any party aggrieved thereby

o The second stage commences when the parties are unable to agree upon the partition ordered by the court. In that event, partition shall be effected for the parties by the court with the assistance of not more than 3 commissioners

■ This phase may also deal with the rendition of the accounting itself and its approval by the Court after the parties have been accorded the opportunity to be heard thereon, and an award for the recovery by the part or parties thereto entitled of their just shares in the rents and profits of the real estate in question. Such an order is, to be sure, also final and appealable

● In the decision ordering partition, the execution of that part of the judgment which will not necessitate any further proceedings may be enforced

● The decision ordering partition and rendition of accounting had already been final and executory. The execution thereof thus became a matter of right on the part of the plaintiffs, herein private respondents, and is a mandatory and ministerial duty on the part of the court

● On the bases of the foregoing considerations, therefore, the Court of Appeals acted correctly in holding that the failure to serve a copy of the motion for execution on petitioner is not a fatal defect. In fact, there was no necessity for such service

2. NO

● The trial court cannot compel herein petitioner to sign the extrajudicial deed of partition prepared solely by private respondents

○ Concomitantly, it cannot issue a writ of possession pursuant to the said extrajudicial partition

● After a judgment is rendered in an action for partition declaring that the property in question shall be divided among the parties thereto, the procedure provided by law thereafter is that, if the parties can agree among themselves, then the partition can be made by them through the proper instruments of conveyance which shall be submitted for approval of the court, and such partition with the court order confirming the same shall be recorder in the office of the proper registry of deeds

● But if the parties are unable to agree upon the partition, the court shall by order appoint not more than 3 competent and disinterested persons as commissioners to make the partition, commanding them to set off to the plaintiff and to each party in interest such part and proportion of the property as the court in such order shall direct

DADIZON V BERNADES

Date JUNE 2009 | GR No. 172367 | Ponente | partition phases/stages

PETITIONER: Dadizon

RESPONDENTS: Bernades

DOCTRINE:

There are, thus, two ways in which a partition can take place under Rule 69: by agreement under Section 2, and through commissioners when such agreement cannot be reached under Sections 3 to 6.||

FACTS:

1. Petitioners and respondents are the children and representatives of deceased children of late Diosdado Bernadas Sr. who died intestate in 1977 leaving in co-ownership with then surviving spouse, Eustaqua who died in 2000, several lands in Biliran.

2. Respondents filed a complaint against petitioner to compel the partition of the ½ conjugal share of the properties left by their late father, alleging that petitioner Felicidad Dadizon was in possesion of the subject properties and refused to the demands of partition.

3. In their Answer, petitioners averred that the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition which respondents sought to enforce was revoked, arguing that the land included in respondents’ complaint had long been disposed.

4. In their Reply, respondents contented that the Deed was a product of malice directed against respondent Soccorro Bernadas for not all of the heirs of their late father participated in the execution of the alleged deed of partition.

5. The counsel of respondent filed Project of Partition but it was not signed by all the heirs.

6. The Project was discussed by the parties and the RTc ordered petitioners to comment but failed.

7. The RTC issued an Order approving the Project

8. Petitioners filed for MR but was denied, noting that the petitioenr failed to file any comment to the Project.

9. Thus, petitioner filed an appeal to the CA alleging that RTC erred in finding that their counsel agreed to the Project of Partition.

PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:

RTC ● Approved the project of partition of the subject lands between the parties

CA ● It denied the appeal as to be without merit hence this Petition

ISSUE/S:

Whether the CA erred in affirming the RTC –YES

RULING:

WHEREFORE, In view thereof the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED.

RATIO:

YES.

● .There are two stages in every action for partition under Rule 69 of the Rules of Court.

● The first stage is the determination of whether or not a co-ownership in fact exists and a partition is proper (i.e., not otherwise legally proscribed) and may be made by voluntary agreement of all the parties interested in the property.

● The second stage commences when it appears that "the parties are unable to agree upon the partition" directed by the court. In that event, partition shall be done for the parties by the court with the assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners.

● There are, thus, two ways in which a partition can take place under Rule 69: by agreement under Section 2, and through commissioners when such agreement cannot be reached under Sections 3 to 6.

● A careful study of the records of this case reveals that the RTC departed from the foregoing procedure mandated by Rule 69.

● In its Order dated July 23, 2001, the RTC noted that both parties filed the Project of Partition dated October 23, 2000 that it approved. 28 In its Order dated September 5, 2001 denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration, the RTC reiterated that both parties filed the same. 29 However, the records show that the Project of Partition dated October 23, 2000 was filed only by respondents' counsel, 30 and that the same was not signed by the respondents or all of the parties.

● The RTC had no authority to approve the Project of Partition dated October 23, 2000, which did not bear all of the signatures of the parties, on the premise that they had all agreed to the same. Likewise, the failure to file any comment or suggestion as to manner of distribution of the subject properties does not justify the RTC's non-observance of the procedure mandated by Rule 69. When the parties were unable to submit the signed Project of Partition despite being ordered to do so, the RTC should have ordered the appointment of commissioners to make the partition as mandated by Section 3, Rule 69.

● In partition proceedings, reference to commissioners is required as a procedural step in the action and is not discretionary on the part of the court.|||

DOMAGAS V. JENSEN

January 17, 2005 | GR No. 158407 | Callejo, Sr., J. | Forcible Entry and Unlawful Detainer

PETITIONER: Filomena Domagas

RESPONDENTS: Vivian Layno Jensen

DOCTRINE:

An action for unlawful detainer or forcible entry is a real action and in personam because the plaintiff seeks to enforce a personal obligation or liability on the defendant under Article 539 of the New Civil Code, for the latter to vacate the property subject of the action, restore physical possession thereof to the plaintiff, and pay actual damages by way of reasonable compensation for his use or occupation of the property.

FACTS:

1. Petitioner Filomena Domagas filed a complaint for forcible entry against respondent Vivian Jensen before the MTC of Calasiao, Pangasinan. The petitioner alleged that she was the registered owner of a parcel of land situated in Barangay Buenlag, Calasiao, Pangasinan, with an area of 827 square meters.

2. On January 9, 1999 the respondent, by means of force, strategy and stealth, gained entry into the petitioner's property by excavating a portion thereof and constructing a fence thereon. As such, the petitioner was deprived of a 68-square meter portion of her property along the boundary line.

3. The summons and the complaint were not served on the respondent because the latter was out of the country. This was relayed to the Sheriff by her (the respondent's) brother, Oscar Layno, who was then in the respondent's house at No. 572 Barangay Buenlag, Calasiao, Pangasinan. The Sheriff left the summons and complaint with Oscar Layno, who received the same.

PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:

MTC ● The MTC ruled in favor of the plaintiff.

● The respondent failed to appeal the decision. Consequently, a writ of execution was issued.

RTC ● The respondent filed a complaint against the petitioner before the RTC of Dagupan City for the annulment of the decision of the MTC on the ground that due to the Sheriff's failure to serve the complaint and summons on her, the MTC never acquired jurisdiction over her person.

○ The respondent further alleged that the MTC had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint because the petitioner failed to show prior possession of the property.

○ The RTC ruled in favor of the respondent.

CA ● On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC’s decision. The CA ruled that the complaint filed by petitioner was one for ejectment, which is an action quasi in rem. The appellate court ruled that since the defendant therein was temporarily out of the country, the summons and the complaint should have been served via extraterritorial service.

ISSUE/S:

1. WON the action of the petitioner in the MTC against the respondent is an action in personam or quasi in rem—ACTION IN PERSONAM

RULING:

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.

RATIO:

● An action for unlawful detainer or forcible entry is a real action and in personam because the plaintiff seeks to enforce a personal obligation or liability on the defendant under Article 539 of the New Civil Code, for the latter to vacate the property subject of the action, restore physical possession thereof to the plaintiff, and pay actual damages by way of reasonable compensation for his use or occupation of the property.

● The settled rule is that the aim and object of an action determine its character. Whether a proceeding is in rem, or in personam, or quasi in rem for that matter, is determined by its nature and purpose, and by these only. A proceeding in personam is a proceeding to enforce personal rights and obligations brought against the person and is based on the jurisdiction of the person, although it may involve his right to, or the exercise of ownership of, specific property, or seek to compel him to control or dispose of it in accordance with the mandate of the court. The purpose of a proceeding in personam is to impose, through the judgment of a court, some responsibility or liability directly upon the person of the defendant. Of this character are suits to compel a defendant to specifically perform some act or actions to fasten a pecuniary liability on him. An action in personam is said to be one which has for its object a judgment against the person, as distinguished from a judgment against the propriety to determine its state. It has been held that an action in personam is a proceeding to enforce personal rights or obligations; such action is brought against the person.

● On the other hand, a proceeding quasi in rem is one brought against persons seeking to subject the property of such persons to the discharge of the claims assailed. In an action quasi in rem, an individual is named as defendant and the purpose of the proceeding is to subject his interests therein to the obligation or loan burdening the property. Actions quasi in rem deal with the status, ownership or liability of a particular property but which are intended to operate on these questions only as between the particular parties to the proceedings and not to ascertain or cut off the rights or interests of all possible claimants. The judgments therein are binding only upon the parties who joined in the action.

HILADO vs. CHAVEZ

February 4, 2019

September 22, 2004 | G.R. No. 134742 |CALLEJO, SR., J.:| Unlawful Detainer

PETITIONER: MELCHOR HILADO, CESAR ARAL, ADELA ARAL, ARTURO VILLARENA, TARCELO MIRANO, ROBERTO PEDUHAN, ANTONIO SOLITO, MANUEL CANIENDO, FELIX ORTEGA, ANTONIO BALLENTOS, SALVADOR MIRANO, VICENTE ONLAYAO, FEDERICO ORLANO, ROGELIO SEMILLANO, SALVADOR DE GUZMAN, PACIFICO TALIBUTAB, NESTOR BELLIRAN, SALUSTIANO BELLIRAN,EDGARDO CABRA, and YOLANDA LESTINO

RESPONDENTS: HON. ROLANDO CHAVEZ, PERPETUAL HELP DEVELOPMENT AND REALTY CORP., represented by the Chairman of the Board JULIETA C. SALGADO

While it is true that MTC, MCTC MTCC have exclusive jurisdiction over unlawful detainer cases, they however, have no original jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian disputes under Rep. Act No. 6657, as amended, and the Rules of Procedure issued by the DARAB implementing said laws, which are within the exclusive original and appellate jurisdiction of the DARAB.

FACTS:

1. The petitioners in the case are Melchor Hilado, Cesar Aral, Adela Aral, Arturo Villarena, Tarcelo Mirano, Roberto Peduhan, Antonio Solito, Manuel Caniendo, Felix Ortega, Antonio Ballentos, Salvador Mirano, Vicente Onlayao, Federico Orlano, Rogelio Semillano, Salvador de Guzman, Pacifico Talibutab, Nestor Belliran, Salustiano Belliran, Edgardo Cabra, and Yolanda Lestino.

2. The respondents in the case are Hon. Rolando Chavez and Perpetual Help Development and Realty Corp., represented by the Chairman of the Board Julieta C. Salgado.

3. The decision of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) in Civil Case No. 034-97 was declared null and void for lack of jurisdiction.

4. The decisions of the lower courts were set aside, while affirming the validity of the Emancipation Patents issued to the petitioners.

5. The Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) was established as the primary jurisdiction for agrarian disputes.

6. The case involves a dispute over agricultural land located in Kabankalan Poblacion, Negros Occidental.

7. The property was originally owned by Celso "Nene" Zayco and was mortgaged to the Pacific Banking Corporation.

8. The bank foreclosed the mortgage and became the highest bidder at a public auction.

9. The bank consolidated its title on the property and issued a new Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) in its favor.

10. The bank sold the property to Julieta C. Salgado, who became the new owner and obtained a new TCT.

11. The Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) granted Emancipation Patents to the tenants on the property.

12. The Sangguniang Bayan ng Kabankalan reclassified the property as partly for light industry and partly residential.

13. The respondent filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against the petitioners, alleging that they were not agricultural tenants and that the property had been reclassified.

14. The petitioners argued that they were bonafide tenant-tillers and had been issued Emancipation Patents, making them owners of the land.

PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:

MTCC ● The Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) ruled in favor of the respondent, ordering the petitioners to vacate the property.

● The petitioners filed a notice of appeal, but the MTCC disapproved it and issued a writ of execution.

RTC ● The petitioners filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) to annul the decision of the MTCC.

● The RTC dismissed the petition, affirming the jurisdiction of the MTCC and the validity of its decision.

ISSUE/S:

WON MTCC had exclusive Jurisdiction over the case. NO

RULING:

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The decisions of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities and the Regional Trial Court are SET ASIDE and declared NULL and VOID. The writ of execution issued by the MTCC is also set aside. No costs.

● While it is true that MTC, MCTC MTCC have exclusive jurisdiction over unlawful detainer cases, they however, have no original jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian disputes under Rep. Act No. 6657, as amended, and the Rules of Procedure issued by the DARAB implementing said laws, which are within the exclusive original and appellate jurisdiction of the DARAB.

It is understood that the aforementioned cases, complaints or petitions were filed with the DARAB after August 29, 1987.

● Matters involving strictly the administrative implementation of Republic Act No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (sic) (CARP) of 1988 and other agrarian laws as enunciated by pertinent rules shall be the exclusive prerogative of and cognizable by the Secretary of the DAR.

● The well-entrenched principle is that the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter of the action is determined by the material allegations of the complaint and the law, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover all or some of the claims or reliefs sought therein.In Movers-Baseco Integrated Port Services, Inc. v. Cyborg Leasing Corporation, the SC ruled that the jurisdiction of the court over the nature of the action and the subject matter thereof cannot be made to depend upon the defenses set up in the court or upon a motion to dismiss for, otherwise, the question of jurisdiction would depend almost entirely on the defendant. Once jurisdiction is vested, the same is retained up to the end of the litigation.

● In this case, even on the basis of the material allegations of the complaint, more so if the answer with motion to dismiss the petition and position papers of the parties are considered, the DARAB, and not the MTCC, had primary and original jurisdiction over the action of the respondent. The latter alleged, in its complaint, that seven (7) of the petitioners were issued Emancipation Patents which were annotated at the dorsal portion of TCT No. 133298, a copy of which is appended to the complaint.

● The foregoing annotation confirmed the claim of the petitioners in their answer with motion to dismiss that the entirety of the landholding had been placed under the Operation Land Transfer program under P.D. No. 27 and that the petitioners to whom the said patents were granted by the government became the owners of the property covered by the said patents. In fact, TCT No. 133298 had been partially cancelled by the said patents. Consequently, the petitioners who were the beneficiaries under the Emancipation Patents are entitled to possess the property covered by said patents. It must be underscored that the said patents were already annotated at the dorsal portion of TCT No. 133298 long before the respondent filed its complaint with the MTCC against the petitioners.

● The petitioners appended to their petition in the RTC a Certification of the Register of Deeds indicating that thirteen (13) of the petitioners were issued transfer certificates of title based on the Emancipation Patents filed with said office, made of record in the Primary Entry Book on September 16, 20, and 22, 1998; and an LBP certificate stating that eighteen (18) of the petitioners had made advance payments for the portions of the landholding occupied by them. And yet, the RTC dismissed the petition and affirmed the ruling of the MTCC that it had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint.

● It is evident from the face of the complaint and the pleadings of the parties and the appendages thereof that the issue of possession of the subject property was inextricably interwoven with the issue of whether the Emancipation Patents issued by the DAR to the petitioners were valid. Under the DAR Rules of Procedure, the DARAB has primary and exclusive original jurisdiction over cases involving the issuance and cancellation of Emancipation Patents. Moreover, the respondent claimed possession over the property based on TCT No. 133298, which had already been partially cancelled by the Emancipation Patents and Torrens titles issued to the petitioners.

ESPIRITU vs. COURT OF APPEALS

June 29, 1999 | GR No. 125473| J. Bellosillo | Unlawful Detainer

PETITIONER: CONSTANCIO ESPIRITU

RESPONDENTS: COURT OF APPEALS, HON. AMADO CALDERON, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, RTC - Br. 8, Malolos, GIDEON NATIVIDAD and JOSE CAYSIP

DOCTRINE:

In forcible entry the deprivation of physical possession of land or building is effected through force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth. In unlawful detainer the unlawful withholding of possession is made after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession under any contract, express or implied. In forcible entry the possession is illegal from the beginning and the issue centers on who was in prior possession de facto. In unlawful detainer the possession was originally lawful but became unlawful upon the expiration or termination of the right to possess the subject property.

FACTS:

1. On 6 January 1994 petitioner Espiritu lodged a complaint against private respondents Gideon Natividad and Jose Caysip with the MTC-Baliuag for unlawful detainer and recovery of reasonable rentals for the use of the land plus attorney's fees and litigation expenses.

2. The land in controversy has an area of 101 square meters, more or less, covered by TCT No. 31808 issued by the Register of Deeds on 6 April 1993 in the name of the heirs of Agustin Espiritu and Apolonia dela Rama, and petitioner claims to be one of the heirs.

3. Petitioner alleged that private respondents Natividad and Caysip had been illegally occupying/squatting on his land by building a chapel thereon although no building permit was ever issued for its construction.

4. He also claimed that notices and demands for the removal of the chapel were made but private respondents failed to comply therewith.

5. Private respondents, on the other hand, averred that petitioner had no valid cause of action against them as the property in question was donated to their congregation, the Church of Christ, and thus owned by their church and not by them.

6. They further claimed that the MTC-Baliuag, did not acquire jurisdiction over the case as it did not fall within the meaning of "any action" under Rule 72 (now Rule 70) of the Revised Rules of Court.

7. They maintained that since petitioner failed to allege that he had prior possession and was deprived thereof through any of the means specified in Sec. 1, Rule 72 (now Rule 70), petitioner should ventilate his right of possession by way of an action other than unlawful detainer or forcible entry.

8. On 23 May 1994 the MTC rendered its decision in favor of petitioner and against private respondents.

● The trial court declared that it had jurisdiction over the case because what determined which court had jurisdiction over the case as well as the nature of the action were the allegations in the complaint.

● Moreover, a court was not deprived of its jurisdiction over an action for ejectment simply because defendants set up a claim different from that alleged by plaintiff.

9. It upheld the right of petitioner to eject private respondents from the subject property for failure of the latter to substantiate their claim that the property had been donated to their church or that there was an existing contract of lease between them.

● Thus, their possession of the subject property was deemed to be one of mere tolerance with an implied understanding that they would vacate the premises upon demand.

10. Private respondents appealed to the RTC which, however, dismissed the complaint without prejudice to its refiling with the proper court.

● The lower court noted that TCT No. 31808 was issued in the name of the heirs of Agustin Espiritu and Apolonia dela Rama only on 16 April 1993 while the property was in the possession of private respondents since 1954 or for more than forty (40) years.

● It ruled that it was mandated by Sec. 1, Rule 70, Rules of Court that ejectment cases should be filed within 1 year from the unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession.

● Since private respondents had deprived petitioner of possession of subject property for more than 1 year, the filing of the complaint before the MTC was inappropriate.

11. Petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals by way of a petition for review under Rule 42 of the Revised Rules of Court.

● RTC erred in holding that the MTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the complaint as it failed to allege facts constitutive of unlawful detainer or forcible entry.

● RTC erred in not acting upon his Motion for Execution pending appeal.

12. In its challenged decision, the Court of Appeals declared the petition devoid of merit based mainly on the ground that the MTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the complaint, which consequently deprived the Regional Trial Court of its appellate jurisdiction.

13. The issue on the Motion for Execution pending appeal was not dealt with considering that the Municipal Trial Court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case in the first place.

14. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration on 20 February 1996 and a Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration on 22 February 1996, but the Court of Appeals denied the motions for lack of merit; hence, this petition.

PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:

MTC ● Decided in favor of the petitioner

RTC ● Dismissed due to prescription

CA ● Petition for Review under R42

○ Dismissed Petition

ISSUE/S: Whether the appellate court erred in dismissing the petition for alleged jurisdictional infirmities.

RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals nullifying the decision of the Municipal Trial Court of Baliuag, Bulacan, in Civil Case No. 1809, and of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 8, Malolos, Bulacan, in Civil Case No. 586-M-94, for lack of jurisdiction is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

RATIO:

1. Petitioner, maintaining that what determines the jurisdiction of the court as well as the nature of the action are the allegations made by the plaintiff in his complaint, argues that the complaint was clearly one for unlawful detainer; consequently, allegation of prior possession of the property not be made. Petitioner's contention is devoid of merit.

2. While petitioner is correct in stating that the nature of an action as well as the jurisdiction of a court is determined by the allegations in the complaint, a careful scrutiny of the complaint reveals that petitioner's cause of action is neither for unlawful detainer nor for forcible entry but some other action involving recovery of possession.

3. In forcible entry the deprivation of physical possession of land or building is effected through force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth.

4. In unlawful detainer the unlawful withholding of possession is made after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession under any contract, express or implied. In forcible entry the possession is illegal from the beginning and the issue centers on who was in prior possession de facto.

5. In unlawful detainer the possession was originally lawful but became unlawful upon the expiration or termination of the right to possess the subject property.

6. Clearly, the complaint failed to aver facts constitutive of either forcible entry or unlawful detainer.

7. Forcible entry must be ruled out as there was no allegation that petitioner was denied possession of the land in question through any of the means stated in Sec. 1, Rule 70, Rules of Court.

8. Neither was the action one for unlawful detainer as there was no lease agreement between the parties, and the demand to vacate by petitioner on private respondents did not make the latter tenants of the former.

9. Petitioner should therefore avail of other remedies provided for by law to recover possession of subject property. Since the complaint did not satisfy the jurisdictional requirements to constitute a valid cause for forcible entry or unlawful detainer, the Court of Appeals was correct in holding that the Municipal Trial Court as well as the Regional Trial Court were without jurisdiction to hear and decide the case.

10. The matter of prescription and laches taken up by the Court of Appeals in its assailed decision must be disregarded as they deal with the issue of ownership which cannot be raised in the original complaint before the Municipal Trial Court. All other issues raised in the petition need not be discussed since resolving them would be an exercise in futility considering that, from the inception of the case, the Municipal Trial Court never acquired jurisdiction over it.

SPOUSES MUNOZ V. COURT OF APPEALS

September 23, 1992 | G.R. No. 102693 | Medialdea, J. | Unlawful Detainer

PETITIONERS: SPOUSES AGOSTO MUÑOZ AND ROSARIO MUÑOZ, SPS. JESSIE (JESUS) CAGUIOA AND EMMA FUMAR, SPS. RICARDO LOPEZ AND APOLONIA FABIAN, ZACARIA MARCELINO, MR. CRISANTO CLARIN, MR. HONORIO YUMUL, MR. EDUARDO YUMUL, MRS. VICTORIA CAYANAN, MR. ALEXANDER FABIAN AND MR. DIOSDADO SANTOS

RESPONDENTS: THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND NICOLAS P. GARCIA

DOCTRINE:

The summary actions for unlawful detainer and forcible entry may be distinguished from each other, as follows: "a. In forcible entry, the possession of the land by the defendant is unlawful from the beginning as he acquires possession thereof by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth; while in unlawful detainer, the possession of the defendant is inceptively lawful but it becomes illegal by reason of the termination of his right to the possession of the property under his contract with the plaintiff; b. In forcible entry, the law does not require a previous demand for the defendant to vacate the premises; but in unlawful detainer, the plaintiff must first make such demand, which is jurisdictional in nature; c). In forcible entry, the plaintiff must prove that he was in prior physical possession of the premises until he was deprived thereof by the defendant; in unlawful detainer, the plaintiff need not have been in prior physical possession; and d. In forcible entry, the one-year period is generally counted from the date of actual entry on the land; in unlawful detainer, from the date of last demand.

FACTS:

1. In this case, herein respondent filed a complaint for unlawful detainer before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, alleging that petitioners constructed their houses on a portion of the land without the knowledge and consent of the owners, and claiming that he and his co-owners acquired the subject land through succession from their deceased father

2. Respondent alleged that he sent demand letters to the petitioners to vacate the premises, but they refused to do so.

PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:

MCTC ● The trial court dismissed the complaint and, from the judgment thus rendered plaintiff took the present appeal.

● It ordered the petitioners to remove their houses from the land and surrender possession to the respondent..

RTC ● Reversed the decision of the MCTC, ruling that the complaint should have been filed as an accion publiciana before the RTC instead of a summary proceeding for unlawful detainer.

CA ● Reinstated the decision of the MCTC, ruling that the complaint was indeed for unlawful detainer and not accion publiciana.

● The court stated that the possession of the petitioners was illegal from the beginning, as they acquired possession through stealth

● It rejected the argument that the respondent should have filed an accion publiciana, as the possession of the property cannot be wrested from another who had been in possession for more than twelve years through a summary action for ejectment.

ISSUE/S:

1. Whether or not the complaint filed by the private respondent before the MCTC was for the summary proceeding of forcible entry or unlawful detainer or an accion publiciana– FORCIBLE ENTRY

RULING:

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals is SET ASIDE and the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Macabebe, Pampanga is REINSTATED.

RATIO:

● The complaint subject of this case was captioned as "unlawful detainer." However, the private respondent alleged therein that from the start, the possession of the petitioner was unlawful as it was stated that the defendants have constructed their houses on the questioned premises stealthily, that is, without the knowledge and consent of his co-owners. This allegation clearly characterized the complaint as one for forcible entry and not for unlawful detainer.

● The respondent appellate court erred in holding that this case is one for unlawful detainer. It failed to consider the basic distinction that in forcible entry, possession is illegal at the inception while in unlawful detainer, possession is legal until demand is made to recover such possession or until the possessor does or fails to do an act which makes his continued possession of the premises illegal. The fact that a demand was made by the private respondent for the petitioners to vacate the subject premises cannot change the nature of the latter's possession of the property and convert the former's action from forcible entry to one for unlawful detainer. The respondent appellate court likewise erred in applying in this case the doctrine that — "a person who occupies the land of another at the latter's tolerance or permission, without any contract between them, is necessarily bound by the implied promise that he will vacate upon demand, failing which, a summary action for ejectment is proper remedy against them" — because, as We have said here, the possession by defendants was illegal at the inception as alleged in the complaint, hence, there was no tolerance.

● The summary actions for unlawful detainer and forcible entry may be distinguished from each other, as follows: "a. In forcible entry, the possession of the land by the defendant is unlawful from the beginning as he acquires possession thereof by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth; while in unlawful detainer, the possession of the defendant is inceptively lawful but it becomes illegal by reason of the termination of his right to the possession of the property under his contract with the plaintiff; b. In forcible entry, the law does not require a previous demand for the defendant to vacate the premises; but in unlawful detainer, the plaintiff must first make such demand, which is jurisdictional in nature; c). In forcible entry, the plaintiff must prove that he was in prior physical possession of the premises until he was deprived thereof by the defendant; in unlawful detainer, the plaintiff need not have been in prior physical possession; and d. In forcible entry, the one-year period is generally counted from the date of actual entry on the land; in unlawful detainer, from the date of last demand

VILLEGAS v. COURT OF APPEALS

December 20, 1988 | GR No. 76880 | Paras, J. | Unlawful Detainer

PETITIONER: ILUMINADA N. VILLEGAS

RESPONDENTS: THE COURT OF APPEALS & RUFO QUEMUEL

DOCTRINE:

Under Sec. 1, Rule 70 of the Revised Rules of Court, it is provided that the act of withholding possession which could be the subject matter of an ejectment suit is that which results from any (emphasis supplied) contract. In other words an unlawful detainer case can spring not only from a contract of lease but may also spring from a compromise agreement which is also a contract.

FACTS:

1. The subject property is allocated by petitioner Iluminada Villegas, (the only child of plaintiff Senedela Nazareth and the late Felino Nazareth, the registered owner of said property) to her son Ramon Villegas as his residence.

2. Private respondent Rufo Quemuel (defendant therein) is a lessee of said property.

3. Records show that a case for Unlawful Detainer was instituted by Senedela Nazareth (now deceased) against the lessee Quemuel when the latter refused to pay the increase in rent or to vacate the premises but it was subsequently dismissed upon motion of Nazareth.

4. After the dismissal and after the receipt from lessor of a letter of demand, lessee Quemuel entered into an agreement with Senedela Nazareth and Iluminada Villegas, which provided among others the condonation of all unpaid rentals, if Quemuel leaves voluntarily and surrenders peacefully the leased premises without need of further demand.

5. Quemuel requested from Ramon Villegas an extension of three (3) months within which to comply with the agreement, which request was granted.

6. In a letter of Iluminada Villegas and Senedela Nazareth to Rufo Quemuel, demand to comply with the terms of the agreement was made after the latter (Rufo Quemuel) failed to comply despite the extension given.

7. Before any action was filed in court, the dispute was brought before the Barangay Office which issued a Certificate to File Action as no settlement could be reached between the parties.

8. A complaint for Unlawful Detainer and Damages was filed by Iluminada Villegas and Senedela Nazareth in the Court of First Instance of Manila to enforce the agreement. However, after the Answer of Rufo Quemuel, said case was withdrawn by motion of plaintiffs which was granted by the court.

9. Meanwhile, before the aforementioned motion to withdraw was granted, the lessors Iluminada Villegas and Senedela Nazareth filed before the City Court of Manila, an ejectment case against Rufo Quemuel.

PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:

City Court of Manila The City Court ordered respondent Quemuel to vacate the premises and pay back rentals to the plaintiffs.

RTC of Manila Defendant appealed to the Regional Trial Court of Manila but the RTC affirmed the ruling of the lower court.

CA In the Petition for Review, the CA reversed the rulings of the lower courts.

● It ruled that subject compromise agreement is not a lease contract violations with which may entitle lessor to the judicial ejectment of the lessee; but one which is incapable of pecuniary estimation and litigable before the Regional Trial Courts under Section 19 (1), BP Blg. 129.

● Where the litigants raised not merely the question of who among them was entitled to the possession but also prayed that the court rule on their respective rights under the documents upon which they predicated their claims to the possession, the case is converted from one of unlawful detainer suit into one that is incapable of pecuniary estimation, which can only be addressed to the original jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance.

○ Thus, the CA declared that the decisions of the City Court and the RTC were void for want of jurisdiction.

ISSUE/S:

1. WON the CA erred in ruling that the case is one which is incapable of pecuniary estimation - YES

RULING:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed judgment is hereby SET ASIDE and the judgment of the Regional Trial Court affirming with modification the judgment of the Metropolitan Trial Court in Civil Case No. 069239-CW is hereby REINSTATED.

RATIO:

1. YES

● Unlawful detainer is defined as the act of withholding the possession of land or building from another who is entitled to it after the expiration or termination of the right of the illegal detainer to hold possession by virtue of a contract, express or implied, when one year had not yet elapsed from the time the original possession had become illegal.

● Under Sec. 1, Rule 70 of the Revised Rules of Court, it is provided that the act of withholding possession which could be the subject matter of an ejectment suit is that which results from any contract. In other words an unlawful detainer case can spring not only from a contract of lease but may also spring from a compromise agreement which is also a contract such as in the case at bar.

○ In this case, it was admitted that Rufo Quemuel was a lessee of the subject property. He voluntarily entered into a compromise agreement with the lessors after he refused to pay the increase in rent of the leased premises. His right to stay therein as a lessee expired after he had failed to pay the rent. No demand was necessary for him to vacate the premises as this was specifically provided for in the agreement that lessee Quemuel should vacate the leased premises without the necessity of further demand upon failure to comply with the terms of the agreement. Since the expiration of the period granting him an extension of time to comply with the terms of the agreement, Quemuel was already unlawfully withholding possession of the leased premises from his lessor, herein petitioner.

■ To remedy this situation, the law grants the petitioner-lessor the right of filing a case of unlawful detainer against herein lessee and under Section 33 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 otherwise known as the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, the Metropolitan Trial Court shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over such case.

JAVELOSA v. COURT OF APPEALS

10 December 1996 | GR No. 124292 | J. Puno | Unlawful Detainer

PETITIONER: Gregorio C. Javelosa

RESPONDENTS: CA, Heirs of Jesus Jalbuena ( SPOUSES CORAZON J. DE LEON & MELVIN DE LEON, SPOUSES KRISTINE SOLINAP & ALFONSO SOLINAP, MARLINA J. BALLEZA, MYRNA J. SERVANDO)

DOCTRINE:

It held that the complaint for unlawful detainer was filed on time for the prescriptive period should be counted not from the issuance of title in the name of plaintiffs (private respondents herein), but from the date of the last demand to vacate made against the defendant.

FACTS:

1. The subject land, with an area of 2,061 square meters, situated in Jaro, Iloilo City, was originally owned by petitioner Gregorio Javelosa. Sometime in the 70's, petitioner mortgaged said land to Jesus Jalbuena to secure several loans. Petitioner failed to pay his loans and Jalbuena, as mortgagee, foreclosed on the land and purchased it as highest bidder at the foreclosure sale.

2. During the one-year period of redemption, petitioner-mortgagor filed an action against the mortgagee at the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iloilo City to annul the mortgage contracts and public auction sale (Civil Case No. 16460). He claimed that the mortgage contracts were illegal and the conduct of the foreclosure sale was irregular.

3. While the case was pending, the period of redemption prescribed. Consequently, the mortgagee consolidated title over the land, caused the cancellation of the mortgagor's title and the issuance of a new title in his name. Thereafter, petitioner obtained an Order from the RTC in Civil Case No. 16460 restraining the mortgagee from further effecting the foreclosure sale of the property.

4. In the early part of December 1986, the mortgagee divided the subject land among his married daughters (private respondents herein).On December 27, 1986, the mortgagee died. He was substituted by his heirs, private respondents, in the pending RTC case for annulment of mortgage and foreclosure sale. On January 19, 1987, title to the subject lot was issued in the names of private respondents.

5. In the meantime, the RTC case for annulment of mortgage and foreclosure sale continued to drag on. On June 1, 1993, private respondents, as registered owners, sent a letter to petitioner-mortgagor demanding that he vacate the subject premises within ten (10) days from receipt thereof. Despite receipt of the demand letter on June 4, 1993, petitioner-mortgagor refused to vacate said lot. Thus, on August 6, 1993, private respondents filed a complaint for illegal detainer before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) in Cities, Iloilo City, and sought to eject petitioner from the premises.

6. Petitioner, in his Answer, asserted his ownership over the disputed land. He claimed that he had a TCT in his name but that the mortgagee (father and predecessor-in-interest of private respondents), in bad faith, was able to cause his title to be cancelled and a new title issued in his name despite the pendency of the RTC case questioning the award of the subject land to the mortgagee in the foreclosure proceedings. Thus, petitioner denied he was illegally occupying the land. He claimed that he was legally entitled to the continued possession thereof by virtue of pending legal incidents in his RTC case for annulment of mortgage and foreclosure sale, from which transactions the mortgagee (predecessor-in-interest of private respondents) derived his title.

7. The MTC decided the unlawful detainer case in favor of private respondents and ordered petitioner to vacate the premises and pay reasonable rental. Petitioner elevated the case to the RTC. He alleged that the ejectment case was improperly filed with the MTC for private respondents (plaintiffs therein) should have prayed instead for the issuance of a writ of possession with the RTC where the case for annulment of mortgage and foreclosure sale was pending. CA reversed RTC and affirmed MTC.

PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:

MTC ● decided the unlawful detainer case in favor of private respondents and ordered petitioner to vacate the premises and pay reasonable rental. The MTC held that the pendency of the case for annulment of mortgage in the RTC would not abate the proceedings in the unlawful detainer case filed before it for the issues in these cases are distinct from each other.

RTC ● reversed the MTC decision on a different ground. It held that the complaint was filed out of time for under Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, an unlawful detainer case must be filed within one year from the time title was issued in private respondents' name, i.e., from January 19, 1987, and not from the last demand to vacate made by private respondents (plaintiffs therein). Thus, the ejectment case initiated on August 6, 1993 was filed beyond the one-year prescriptive period. The RTC dismissed the ejectment case.

CA ● The Court of Appeals reversed the RTC decision and reinstated the decision of the MTC. It held that the complaint for unlawful detainer was filed on time for the prescriptive period should be counted not from the issuance of title in the name of plaintiffs (private respondents herein), but from the date of the last demand to vacate made against the defendant. Moreover, the fact that private respondents were never in prior physical possession of the subject land is of no moment for prior physical possession is necessary only in forcible entry cases. The Court of Appeals thus ordered the petitioner (defendant in the ejectment case) to vacate the premises and pay reasonable rentals.

ISSUE/S:

1. Whether the private respondents’ allegation was sufficient to constitute as an unlawful detainer case. (YES)

2. Whether the action for unlawful detainer was timely filed. (YES)

3. Whether the Joven v. CA was applicable in the case at bar. (NO)

RULING:

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated January 17, 1996, is AFFIRMED in toto.No costs.

1. Yes. Clearly, private respondents (as plaintiffs therein) alleged in their complaint that they are the registered owners of the subject land and therefore, entitled to possession thereof; that petitioners were illegally occupying the premises without their consent and thus unlawfully withholding possession from them; and, despite receipt of their demand to vacate the premises, petitioner refused to leave the property. On the face of the complaint, it also appears that private respondents were seeking to recover merely the physical possession or possession de facto of the subject land.Private respondents did not allege the incidents respecting the mortgage of the land and the pending RTC case questioning the mortgage contract as the issue involved therein is ownership which has no place in an ejectment case. In fine, the allegations in the complaint make out a case for unlawful detainer.

We have ruled in a long line of cases that "in an action for unlawful detainer, a simple allegation that defendant is unlawfully withholding possession from plaintiff is ...sufficient for the words 'unlawfully withholding' imply possession on the part of defendant, which was legal in the beginning, having no other source than a contract, express or implied, possession which has later expired as a right and is being withheld by defendant." Thus, in the case at bar, private respondents' allegation in their complaint that petitioner was unlawfully withholding possession of the land from them is sufficient to make out a case for unlawful detainer.

Under the Rules, if the mortgaged property is not redeemed within one year from the foreclosure sale, the purchaser at public auction is entitled to possession of the property. To obtain possession, the vendee or purchaser may either ask for a writ of possession or bring an appropriate independent action, such as a suit for ejectment, which private respondents did. The RTC case assailing the public auction sale of the property and seeking annulment of mortgages did not preclude the filing of an ejectment case against petitioner. We have consistently ruled that the pendency of an action for annulment of sale and reconveyance (which necessarily involves the issue of ownership) may not be successfully pleaded in abatement of an action for ejectment, the issue in the latter being merely physical possession. To be sure, private respondents' most effective remedy was to file a separate action for unlawful detainer against petitioner. They cannot ask for a writ of possession from the RTC where the case for annulment of mortgage and foreclosure sale is pending because after the mortgagee was able to consolidate his title on the land and a new title issued in his name, petitioner was able to obtain an Order from the RTC directing the mortgagee (predecessor-in-interest of private respondents) to desist from further enforcing the foreclosure proceedings.

2. Yes. In forcible entry cases, the prescriptive period is counted from the date of defendant's actual entry on the land; in unlawful detainer, from the date of the last demand to vacate. Hence, to determine whether the case was filed on time, there was a necessity to ascertain whether the complaint was one for forcible entry or for unlawful detainer.

3.No. The case of Joven v. Court of Appeals cited by petitioner is not on all fours with the case at bar. In Joven,DBP as mortgagee was not able to consolidate its title over the foreclosed land nor cause the cancellation of title in the mortgagor's name.Although the title was still in the name of the mortgagor, DBP sold the land to private respondents and the latter, without first securing a court order, took the law into their own hands and entered said land. Hence, it was the mortgagor who filed and successfully maintained an action for forcible entry against private respondents, the transferees of the mortgagee.

The mortgagee (predecessor-in-interest of private respondents) was able to consolidate his ownership over the foreclosed land, cause the cancellation of title in the name of petitioner-mortgagor and the issuance of a new title in his own name.It was this title that he passed on to his daughters, private respondents herein. As aforestated, a restraining order was issued by the RTC where the case for annulment of foreclosure sale is pending after the mortgagee had consolidated his ownership over the land, hence, private respondents were left with no choice but to file a separate and independent action for unlawful detainer to recover physical possession of the property.Unlike in the Joven case,private respondents did not take the law into their own hands and entered the property without the benefit of a court order. They sought the aid of the court precisely to settle the issue of physical possession or possession de facto of the land when they filed the ejectment case with the MTC.

We find that private respondents have adequately proved that they are entitled to possess the subject land as the registered owners thereof. The age-old rule is that the person who has a torrens title over a land is entitled to possession thereof . Except for the bare claim that the title of private respondents was obtained in bad faith, petitioner has pointed to no right to justify his continued possession of the subject property.

ECHANES V. SPOUSES HAILAR

10 August 2016 | GR No. 203880 | PERALTA, J. | Provisional Determination of Ownership

PETITIONER: VICTORIA ECHANES

RESPONDENTS: SPOUSES PATRICIO HAILAR AND ADORACION HAILAR

DOCTRINE:

In an action for forcible entry and detainer, if plaintiff can prove prior physical possession in himself, he may recover such possession even from the owner, but, on the other hand, if he cannot prove such prior physical possession, he has no right of action for forcible entry and detainer even if he should be the owner of the property

FACTS:

1. The late Eduardo Cuenta was the owner of an unregistered parcel of land in Ilocos Sur. Subsequently, the heirs of Eduardo Cuenta executed an Extrajudicial Settlement dividing and adjudicating unto themselves such parcel of land.

2. A portion of the lot was adjudicated to petitioner who is one of the heirs (granddaughter) of Eduardo Cuenta. Thereafter, petitioner applied for a free patent over. Accordingly, an Original Certificate of Title was issued in her name by the Register of Deeds of Ilocos Sur.

3. However, portion of Lot is currently occupied by respondents Spouses Hailar. Since petitioner's children are in need of the area currently occupied by respondents, petitioner sent respondents a Notice to Vacate. The demand letter was received by the respondents on March 13, 2009. Despite receipt of said demand letter, respondents refused to vacate the premises.

4. Thus, Petitioner filed a Complaint for Ejectment with Damages before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC).

PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:

MCTC ● The Court rendered a Decision in favor of respondents.

RTC ● The RTC reversed and set aside the Decision of the MCTC.

CA ● CA reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC and reinstated and affirmed the decision of the MCTC.

ISSUE/S:

1. Whether or not the Respondents are entitled to the physical or material possession of the property in dispute?

RULING:

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated March 23, 2012, and its Resolution dated October 9, 2012, in CA-G.R. SPNo. 115688 are AFFIRMED.

RATIO:

YES.

Section 16, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court allows the courts to provisionally determine the issue of ownership for the sole purpose of resolving the issue of physical possession. Otherwise stated, when the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership is to be resolved only to determine the issue of possession.

Settled rule in an unlawful detainer case, the sole issue for resolution is the physical or material possession of the property involved independent of any claim of ownership by any of the party ligants. Where the issue of ownership is raised by any of the pares, the courts may pass upon the same in order to determine who has the right to possess the property. The adjudication is, however, merely provisional and would not bar or prejudice an action between the same pares involving the to the property. Therefore, since the issue of ownership is raised in this unlawful detainer case, its resolution boils down to which of the parties' respective evidence deserves more weight. Further, in an action for forcible entry and detainer, if plaintiff can prove prior physical possession in himself, he may recover such possession even from the owner, but, on the other hand, if he cannot prove such prior physical possession, he has no right of action for forcible entry and detainer even if he should be the owner of the property.

There is no dispute that the respondents had continuously and openly occupied and possessed, in the concept of an owner, the subject property from the time they purchased it from Eduardo Cuenta. They segregated and declared for taxation purposes as early as 1959 the portion of Lot No. 2297-A. The property was consistently declared for taxation purposes until 2007. While tax declarations and realty tax payments are not conclusive proofs of possession, they are good indicia of possession in the concept of an owner based on the presumption that no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not his possession. At the very least, they constitute proof that the holder has a claim of title over the property.

The summary character of the proceedings in an action for forcible entry or unlawful detainer is designed to quicken the determination of possession de facto in the interest of preserving the peace of the community, but the summary proceedings may not be proper to resolve ownership of the property. Consequently, any issue on ownership arising in forcible entry or unlawful detainer is resolved only provisionally for the purpose of determining the principal issue of possession.48 On the other hand, regardless of the actual condition of the title to the property and whatever may be the character of the plaintiffs prior possession, if it has in its favor priority in time, it has the security that entitles it to remain on the property until it is lawfully ejected through an accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria by another having a better right.

Thus, the unlawful detainer and forcible entry suits, under Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, are designed to summarily restore physical possession of a piece of land or building to one who has been illegally or forcibly deprived thereof, without prejudice to the settlement of the parties' opposing claims of juridical possession in appropriate proceedings.

SPOUSES APOSTOL V. CA

June 17, 2004 | G.R. NO. 125375| Callejo, Sr., J. | Unlawful Detainer

DOCTRINE:

The fact that the respondents were never in prior physical possession of the subject land is of no moment, as prior physical possession is necessary only in forcible entry cases. A certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified or cancelled, except in a direct proceeding for that purpose is accordance with law. The issue of the validity of the title of the respondents can only be assailed in an action expressly instituted for that purpose. Whether or not the petitioners have the right to claim ownership over the property is beyond the power of the court a quo to determine in an action for unlawful detainer.

FACTS:

Respondents, the Spouses Chua, filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against the petitioners, the Spouses Apostol, in the MeTC of Metro Manila alleging that despite demands, petitioners refused to vacate their property. Respondents had contracted with the Spouses Pascua for the purchase of a parcel of land and petitioners who were present during the negotiations, verbally assured the respondents that they would vacate the property within ten (10) days from the execution of the sale as they acknowledged that their stay in the property was only upon the tolerance of its former owners. Spouses Pascua executed a Deed of Absolute Sale over the property and the improvements thereon in favor of the respondents for ₱1,000,000 and were issued Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) over the property.

The petitioners filed a complaint against the respondents, the Spouses Pascua, and the Register of Deeds in the RTC of Quezon City, for annulment of deed of sale and the TCT, and for reconveyance with damages. The petitioners alleged that their adverse claim over the property was annotated on June 20, 1979 and that Paulo Pascua did not inherit the property because the same had already been sold to the respondents. They cited that they have executed a memorandum agreement with Luz Pascua, the registered owner prior to Spouses Pascua, covering the property where the respondents agreed that the balance of the purchase price would be paid in installments.

The MeTC ruled in favor of respondents on the ground of having acquired the property from the Spouses Pascua, and being the registered owners of the property, the respondents are entitled to the possession thereof. In this case, defendants were able to establish the fact that they have been in physical and material possession of the subject premises from the time they purchased the same from Luz B. Pascua on July 8, 1976. Defendants, therefore, are in possession of the property in the concept of an owner, and under the law, a possessor in the concept of an owner has in his favor the legal presumption that he possesses with a just title and he cannot be obliged to show or prove it (Art. 541, NCC).

The petitioners filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals, which later rendered judgment reversing the decision of the RTC and reinstated the decision of the MeTC. The CA held that in ruling against the petitioners, who were the registered owners of the property, the RTC thereby violated the prescription against the collateral attack of a torrens title.

ISSUE/S:

Whether or not respondent court erred in dismissing the action for unlawful detainer on the sole ground that the private respondents are possessors in the concept of an owner of the subject premises and cannot, thus, be dispossessed of the same.

RULING:

NO. It is an accepted rule that a person who has a torrens title over the property, such as the respondents, is entitled to the possession thereof. Registered owners are entitled to the possession of the property covered by the said title from the time such title was issued in their favor. Moreover, the fact that the respondents were never in prior physical possession of the subject land is of no moment, as prior physical possession is necessary only in forcible entry cases.

The petitioners claim that, as alleged in their answer to the complaint for unlawful detainer, the respondents’ title over the property is a nullity; hence, the complaint for unlawful detainer against the petitioners should be dismissed for lack of merit. Such allegation does not help their present recourse. Under Section 48 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, a certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified or cancelled, except in a direct proceeding for that purpose in accordance with law. The issue of the validity of the title of the respondents can only be assailed in an action expressly instituted for that purpose. Whether or not the petitioners have the right to claim ownership over the property is beyond the power of the court a quo to determine in an action for unlawful detainer.

Keppel Bank Philippines, Inc. v. Adao

19 October 2005 | G.R. No. 15822 | QUISUMBING, J. | FEUD -Pleadings allowed and prohibited

PETITIONER: KEPPEL BANK PHILIPPINES, INC

RESPONDENTS: PHILIP ADAO

DOCTRINE:

In cases of non-payment, the unpaid seller can avail of the remedy of ejectment since he

retains ownership of the property.

Even though ejectment cases are governed by the Rules on Summary Procedure, there is still

need to present substantial evidence to support respondent’s claim of full payment. Section 9

of the Rules on Summary Procedure provides that parties shall submit, together with their

position papers, the affidavits of their witnesses and other evidence on the factual issues

defined. His lone affidavit is self-serving, and cannot be considered as substantial evidence.

Even where the petitioner alleged non-payment, the general rule is that the burden rests on

the respondent to prove payment, rather than on the petitioner to prove non-payment.

Keppel Bank Philippines, Inc. filed an ejectment case against Philip Adao. The bank acquired the property through a court-approved Compromise Agreement with Project Movers Realty and Development Corporation (PMRDC).

PMRDC transferred several properties to the bank, including the property occupied by Adao.

The bank sent a written demand to Adao to vacate the property, but he refused and offered to purchase it instead.

The bank filed a civil case for ejectment against Adao when he did not comply with the demand.

The Supreme Court clarified that the only issue for resolution in an ejectment case. The Supreme Court ruled that petitioner is bound by the contract to sell, even though it was not annotated in the certificate of title. However, the contract to sell does not give respondent the right to possess the property until full payment is made.

Respondent failed to prove full payment of the purchase price. The Supreme Court ordered respondent to vacate the property. The adjudication of ownership in the ejectment case is only provisional and does not prejudice an action between the same parties involving title to the property.

FACTS:

5. Keppel Bank entered into a Compromise Agreement with Project Movers Realty and Development Corporation (PMRDC).

6. As part of the agreement, PMRDC transferred twenty-five properties to Keppel Bank through dacion en pago.

7. Dacion en pago is a mode of payment where the debtor transfers ownership of a property to the creditor to settle a debt.

8. Keppel Bank obtained Condominium Certificates of Title for the properties.

9. Keppel Bank discovered that Adao was occupying one of the properties.

10. The bank sent a written demand for Adao to vacate the property, but he refused and offered to purchase it instead.

11. The parties failed to reach an agreement, and Keppel Bank sent a final demand to Adao to vacate.

12. When Adao did not comply, Keppel Bank filed a civil case for ejectment against him.

13. Adao claimed that he had a Contract to Sell with PMRDC dating back to 1995.

14. He argued that he had already paid a significant amount towards the purchase price and offered to pay the remaining balance.

15. Adao contended that Keppel Bank's remedy was to demand PMRDC to replace the property as stated in the Compromise Agreement and dacion en pago

PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:

MeTC ● The Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) dismissed Keppel Bank's complaint, ruling that Adao was the lawful possessor of the property.

●

RTC ● Keppel Bank appealed to the Regional Trial Court (RTC), which affirmed the MeTC's decision.

● The RTC held that Keppel Bank must respect the Contract to Sell between Adao and PMRDC.

● The RTC also stated that Keppel Bank failed to prove non-payment by Adao and that ejectment was not the proper remedy in case of non-payment.

CA ● Keppel Bank appealed to the Court of Appeals, which upheld the RTC's decision.

● The Court of Appeals ruled that Keppel Bank must respect the Contract to Sell, even though it was not annotated in the Certificate of Title.

● The court also held that Keppel Bank was not a purchaser in good faith and could only rescind the contract under Article 1526 of the Civil Code.

● The Court of Appeals further stated that the issue of ownership did not need to be resolved in an ejectment case.

ISSUE/S:

2. Whether or not the remedy of ejectment is available to petitioner.

RULING:

Yes.

In cases of non-payment, the unpaid seller can avail of the remedy of ejectment since he retains ownership of the property.

Respondent avers that since ejectment cases are decided merely on the basis of affidavits and position papers, his affidavit before the MeTC sufficiently proves his full payment of the purchase price. Nothing could be more erroneous because even though ejectment cases are governed by the Rules on Summary Procedure, there is still need to present substantial evidence to support respondent’s claim of full payment. Section 9 of the Rules on Summary Procedure provides that parties shall submit, together with their position papers, the affidavits of their witnesses and other evidence on the factual issues defined. His lone affidavit is self-serving, and cannot be considered as substantial evidence. As a general rule, one who pleads payment has the burden of proving it. Even where the petitioner alleged non-payment, the general rule is that the burden rests on the respondent to prove payment, rather than on the petitioner to prove non-payment.

Considering that respondent failed to discharge the burden of proving payment, he cannot claim ownership of the property and his possession thereof was by mere tolerance. His continued possession became unlawful upon the owner’s demand to vacate the property. We stress, however, that this adjudication, is only a provisional determination of ownership for the purpose of settling the issue of and does not bar or prejudice an action between the possession, same parties involving title to the property.

RAMOS v. COURT OF APPEALS

July 26, 1988 | GR No. 81354 | Sarmiento, J. |Second Division | Preliminary Injunction and Preliminary Mandatory Injunction

PETITIONER: HUGO RAMOS

RESPONDENTS: CA

DOCTRINE:

The dissolution of the writ of injunction, it must be noted, was fundamentally upon the well settled principle that injunction does not lie to take property away from one and give it to another. The function of injunction, generally is to preserve the status quo ante. The exception is provided in Section 3 of Rule 70, of the Rules of Court, governing forcible entries, in which the court may issue preliminary mandatory injunction, and by Section 9 thereof, involving leases, in which the court may, on appeal, grant similar mandatory injunctive relief. The exception, it should be noted, applies to ejectment cases alone, cases exclusively cognizable by the Municipal Court. It does not apply to the proceeding below, and accion publiciana, jurisdiction over which is vested in the Regional Trial Court.

FACTS:

Rufino Clemente, Rufina Clemente, Ligaya Clemente, Francisco Clemente, Erlinda Clemente, Ofelia Quinto, and Medolina Quinto were the co-owners of a fishpond located in Malolos, Bulacan. The co-owners executed a contract of lease in favor of petitioner Ramos (alongside 2 others, a certain Honesto Bernal and Borlongan) for a period of ten years. The lease contract would be extended for another 3 years. On March 15, 1975, the Quintos executed a “KASUNDUAN NG SANLAAN NA MAYROONG PAGBIBILE (Real Estate Mortgage With Sale)” over their 7/14 share therein in favor of the petitioner. Afterwards, Medolina Quinto conveyed her 1/4 participation in favor of the petitioner pursuant to a KASUNDUAN NG PAGPAPATIBAY NG BILIHANG PATULUYAN. It would be alleged by petitioner Ramos that Lourdes Bernal (niece of Honesto Bernal) illegally took material and physical possession of the fishpond.

PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:

RTC ● This led petitioner to file an accion publiciana before the RTC of Bulacan.

● Pending proceedings, the trial court issued a writ of preliminary injunction directed against said Lourdes Bernal.

CA ● Bernal elevated the incident to the Court of Appeals on certiorari. The Appellate Court set aside the writ. Upon remand, the RTC issued the challenged orders restoring Bernal in possession. Hence, the present petition.

ISSUE/S:

1. Whether or not the RTC erred in restoring Bernal into possession.

RULING:

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan, Branch 18 (Civil Case No. 7201-M), for further proceedings.

|||

RATIO:

NO. The RTC did not err.

The dissolution of the writ of injunction, it must be noted, was fundamentally upon the well-settled principle that injunction does not lie to take property away from one and give it to another. The function of injunction, generally is to preserve the status quo ante. The exception is provided in Section 3 of Rule 70, of the Rules of Court, governing forcible entries, in which the court may issue preliminary mandatory injunction, and by Section 9 thereof, involving leases, in which the court may, on appeal, grant similar mandatory injunctive relief. The exception, it should be noted, applies to ejectment cases alone, cases exclusively cognizable by the Municipal Court. The aforementioned provisions are not applicable because the present action is one of accion publiciana. It was noted by the Supreme Court that Bernal was being restored into possession by the RTC not because they ruled that she was entitled thereto but merely to maintain the status quo.

The fact moreover that the petitioner is in possession of alleged conveyance instruments is not, by itself, an argument to justify Bernal's outright dispossession. Said deeds are matters of evidence that should be presented at the trial. Bernal has the burden of proving his allegations. That Bernal had entered into the fishpond "illegally" is, obviously, a conclusion of fact that is yet to be established at the trial. The

KASUNDUANs in question, apart from being evidentiary in character, are not necessarily fatal to Bernal's claim. The distinction between the right of possession ( jus possesionis) and that of ownership is well established in this jurisdiction. The owner cannot eject one who holds the property by an independent right of possession, pursuant, say, to a contract of lease. In this case, the petitioner must demonstrate that Bernal is in fact a mere usurper. But he cannot rely on the bare provisions of the KASUNDUANs to oust Bernal from possession. The determination of the parties’ rights must be determined in a trial.

It should likewise be noted that the KASUNDUANs themselves are disputed by Bernal. According to her, the Quintos had merely mortgaged their shares to the petitioner, and pending foreclosure, it cannot be said that he had acquired ownership. In short, the petitioner cannot say that he has a clear right to the fishpond, when that right itself is controverted, to warrant the ejectment of Bernal. What is plain, finally, is that, assuming that the KASUNDUANs did vest ownership of the fishpond to the petitioner, they vested in him only-half therefor (consisting of the Quintos' combined shares). He cannot therefore lay claim to all of it. Hence, petition is dismissed.

RURAL BANK OF MALALAG, INC. V. JUDGE SEGUNDINO D. MANIWANG

May 18, 1994 | A.M. No. MTJ-93-799 | QUIASON, J | Judgment

PETITIONER: Rural Bank of Malalag, Inc.

RESPONDENTS: Judge Segundino D. Maniwang

DOCTRINE:

The court emphasized the importance of adhering to the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, which provides for a simplified and expeditious

process for the resolution of small claims. It clarified that the court cannot resort to clarificatory procedures or issue subpoenas duces tecum

unless the parties have submitted their affidavits and position papers as required by the rule.

FACTS:

1. The Rural Bank of Malalag Inc. charged Judge Segundino D. Maniwang of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Malalag-Sulop, Davao del Sur, with undue delay in the disposition of six collection cases, namely Civil Cases Nos. 226, 227, 228, 229, 230 and 231.

2. Civil Cases Nos. 226, 227 and 228 were filed on September 10, 1991. Complainant alleged that no action was taken by respondent with respect to these civil actions except for the pre-trial conference. Respondent admitted that he did not take any action but he claimed that two of the cases were not triable under the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure.

3. Civil Cases Nos. 229, 230 and 231 were filed on November 15, 1991. The defendants were served with summons but no answers were filed. The complainant filed a motion for the resolution of said cases.

4. The defendants filed a motion to admit their answers. Respondent admitted the answers and denied the motion for resolution on the grounds that the answers raised "factual matters which need to be clarified in a formal hearing."

5. The judge conducted "clarificatory hearings.” Rural Bank alleged that he deviated from the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure by conducting regular trials instead of summary proceedings.

PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:

MCTC ● MCTC admitted the answers of defendants and denied the motion for resolution of the complainant.

MCTC ● MCTC denied complainant's motion to declare defendants in default.

MCTC ● MCTC denied complainant's motion to resolve, stating that there was a need to conduct a hearing in order to resolve the factual issues.

MCTC ● MCTC denied complainant's motion to declare defendants in default.

ISSUE/S:

1. Whether or not the judge failed to resolve the cases in accordance with the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure.—YES

RULING:

WHEREFORE, the Court Resolved to IMPOSE on respondent a FINE of P5,000.00, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar offense will be dealt with more severely.

RATIO:

1. YES

The judge did not follow the provisions of the rule, particularly in the following: rendering judgment after the defendants failed to file their answers and position papers; held "clarificatory hearings" and allowed the submission of additional evidence, which is not allowed under the summary procedure; and admitted the answers filed by the defendants, even though they were filed after the prescribed period, and allowed the submission of additional evidence.

It is true that the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure does not apply where the total amount of the plaintiff's claim exceeds P10,000.00, exclusive of interests and costs. But if Civil Cases Nos. 226 and 227 cannot be heard summarily, the respondent has not explained why he failed to set these cases for trial in accordance with the regular procedure. From the date of the pre-trial up to the date of the filing of the administrative complaint, there was no action taken. Respondent has not explained either why Civil Case No. 228, which involved only the amount of P7,390.95, was not heard under the summary procedure.

As to Civil Cases Nos. 229, 230 and 231, respondent has not explained why after the defendants failed to file their answer, he did not follow Section 6 of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, which provides: "Effect of failure to answer. — Should the defendants fail to answer the complaint within the period above provided, the court, motu proprio, or on motion of the plaintiff, shall render judgment as may be warranted by the facts alleged in the complaint and limited to what is prayed for therein: Provided, however, that the court may in its discretion reduce the amount of damages and attorney's fees claimed for being excessive or otherwise unconscionable.

He has not explained the justification for allowing the admission of the answers, which were filed more than five months after their due date. He has not explained why he did not decide the cases after the defendants failed to submit the affidavits of their witnesses on the factual issues defined in the orders, together with their position papers setting forth the law and the facts relied upon by them.

Section 9 of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure is very explicit that: "Within ten (10) days from receipt of the order mentioned in the next preceding section, the parties shall submit the affidavits of their witnesses and other evidence on the factual issues defined in the order, together with their position papers setting forth the law and the facts relied upon by them."

Section 9 should be read together with Section 10 of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, the first paragraph of which provides: "Within thirty (30) days after receipt of the last affidavits and position papers, or the expiration of the period for filing the same, the court shall render judgment." xxx xxx xxx While the third paragraph of Section 10 of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure allows the court, should it find it necessary to clarify certain material facts, to issue "an order specifying the matters to be clarified, and require the parties to submit affidavits or other evidence on the said matters within ten (10) days from receipt of said order," it has to render judgment "within fifteen (15) days after the receipt of the last clarificatory affidavits or the expiration of the period for filing the same."

It is clear from said provisions, that a court cannot resort to "clarificatory procedure," when the parties fail to submit their affidavits and position paper as required by Section 9 of the Rule. The courts cannot issue subpoena duces tecum in cases triable summarily merely on the basis of the answers. It is only after evaluating the affidavits and position papers submitted by the parties that the court can determine whether he should resort to the "clarificatory procedure" provided in Section 10 of the Rule. If any of the parties fail to submit their evidence and position paper within the reglementary period, the court cannot thereby set the "clarificatory procedure" into motion. Otherwise, a party can derail the proceedings and defeat the purpose of the summary procedure by not filing the affidavits of his witnesses and his position paper, thus forcing the court to resort to said procedure.

PROVINCE OF CAMARINES SUR V. BODEGA GLASSWARE

March 22, 2017 | GR No. 194199 | Jardalez J. | Judgment

PETITIONER: PROVINCE OF CAMARINES SUR

RESPONDENTS: BODEGA GLASSWARE

DOCTRINE:

Where a donation has an automatic revocation clause, the occurrence of the condition agreed to by the parties as to cause the revocation, is sufficient for a party to consider the donation revoked without need of any judicial action. A judicial finding that the revocation is proper is only necessary when the other party actually goes to court for the specific purpose of challenging the propriety of the revocation.

FACTS:

1. Petitioner donated around 600 square meters of parcel of land to the Camarines Sur Teachers' Association, Inc. (CASTEA) through a Deed of Donation Inter Vivos, which included a revocation clause.

2. CASTEA accepted the donation in accordance with the formalities of law and complied with the conditions stated in the deed. However, CASTEA entered into a Contract of Lease with Bodega over the donated property.

3. The Provincial Legal Officer requested Bodega to show proof of ownership or any other legal document as legal basis for his possession. Bodega failed to present any proof. Nevertheless, petitioner left Bodega undisturbed and merely tolerated its possession of the property.

4. as it now intended to use the property for its developmental projects, petitioner demanded that Bodega vacate the property and surrender its peaceful possession. Bodega refused to comply with the demand.

5. Provincial Governor Luis Raymund F. Villafuerte, Jr., revoked its donation through a Deed of Revocation of Donation

6. Petitioner filed an action for unlawful detainer against Bodega before the MTC Naga City.

PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:

MTC ● Ruled in favor of petitioner

■ It prayed that Bodega be ordered to vacate the property and surrender to petitioner its peaceful possession.

RTC ● Reversed

○ Dismissed the case

CA ● Affirmed decision of RTC

○ petitioner cannot demand that Bodega vacate the property.

ISSUE/S:

Whether Bodega has the right to the actual physical possession of the property. -- NO

RULING:

WHEREFORE, the petltwn is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated May 31, 2010 which AFFIRMED the Decision of the RTC of Naga City Branch 26 dated May 13, 2009 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the MTC Naga City is REINSTATED.

RATIO:

● Where a donation has an automatic revocation clause, the occurrence of the condition agreed to by the parties as to cause the revocation, is sufficient for a party to consider the donation revoked without need of any judicial action. A judicial finding that the revocation is proper is only necessary when the other party actually goes to court for the specific purpose of challenging the propriety of the revocation.

● if a contract of donation provides for automatic rescission or reversion in case of a breach of a condition and the donee violates it or fails to comply with it, the property donated automatically reverts back to the donor without need of any judicial declaration.

● The provision identifies three conditions for the donation: (1) that the property shall be used for "no other purpose except the construction of its building to be owned and to be constructed by the above-named DONEE to house its offices to be used by the said Camarines Sur Teachers' Association, Inc., in connection with its functions under its charter and by-laws and the Naga City Teachers' Association as well as the Camarines Sur High School Alumni Association," (2) CASTEA shall "not sell, mortgage or incumber the property herein donated including any and all improvements thereon in favor of any party," and (3) "the construction of the building or buildings referred to above shall be commenced within a period of one (1) year from and after the execution." The last clause of this paragraph states that "otherwise, this donation shall be deemed automatically revoked x x x." We read the final clause of this provision as an automatic revocation clause which pertains to all three conditions of the donation.

● Thus, as petitioner validly considered the donation revoked and CASTEA never contested it, the property donated effectively reverted back to it as owner.

D.O. PLAZA MANAGEMENT CORP. v. CO-OWNER HEIRS OF ANDRES ATEGA

December 16, 2004 | GR No. 158526 | Puno, J. | Forcible Entry/Unlawful Detainer; Judgment

PETITIONER: D.O. PLAZA MANAGEMENT CORP.

RESPONDENTS: CO-OWNERS HEIRS OF ANDRES ATEGA

DOCTRINE:

We have defined fair rental value as the reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the leased property. There is no hard and fast rule in determining the reasonableness of the rental charged. In Manila Bay Club Corporation vs. CA we considered: (a) the prevailing rates in the vicinity; (b) location of the property; (c) use of the property; (d) inflation rate; and (e) the testimony of one of the private respondents. In Umali vs. The City of Naga we added a catch- all phrase that "other minor factors" should be taken into consideration.

FACTS:

1. The respondents alleged that they, as lessors, entered into a contract of lease with petitioner, as lessee, over two (2) adjoining parcels of land situated, one having an area of 1.70 hectares and the other with an area of 2,312 square meters. The Lease Contract was for a term of five years, commencing on December 16, 1986 up to December 15, 1991, renewable upon mutual agreement of the parties. It provided for a monthly rental of P3,000 for the first year, P3,500 for the second year, P4,000 for the third year, P4,500 for the fourth year, and P5,000 for the fifth year, with a proviso that "the LESSORS reserve the right to increase the rental proportionate to any increase in real estate taxes, assessments, levies or additional charges on the real property which may be imposed by national or local governments or proportionate to any further devaluation of the Philippine peso." The parties also agreed that "improvements made by the LESSEE shall, after the term of [the] contract, or in case of its termination, automatically accrue to the LESSORS as owners without need of any formal deed of conveyance in any form, save only those which can be removed by the LESSEE without impairing or causing damage to the land or improvements.

2. After the expiration of the contract, petitioner allegedly proposed to extend the lease. Respondents agreed to reduce the area leased from 19,213 sq. m. to 9,205 sq. m. but increased the rent to P3.50 per square meter or P32,217.50 per month. They gave petitioner seven days within which to reply, in vain. In April 1994, petitioner's representative allegedly met with respondents' counsel, during which, the former offered to pay at a rental rate of P10,000.00 per month. This offer was rejected by respondents' counsel. Respondents sent their last letter to petitioner on June 7, 1994, reiterating their demand for it to pay unpaid rentals amounting to P934,307.50 and to vacate the leased premises, together with the occupants therein, within ten days. Petitioner refused to heed their demands. In its answer with counterclaim, petitioner admitted the contents of the Lease Contract but denied proposing to, or receiving a proposal from, the respondents to extend the lease. It contended that the leased lots it occupied were "within [the] 30-meter river bank protection which bank protection cannot be owned by any person, it belong[ing] to the government of the Republic of the Philippines." Petitioner also alleged that the "astronomical sum" of P32,217.50 is not a valid demand. It appended the affidavit of Ireneo G. Boca, a geodetic engineer, and the subdivision plan he prepared, to prove that the actual area occupied by petitioner was only 4,302 sq. m. It also attached the affidavit of its employee, Hidulfo A. Maghuyop, who attested that the leased land:

a. is "barren" except for the buildings constructed by petitioner;

b. "adjoins a river bank" and "can easily be inundated by knee-deep flood when there is a rain;" and

c. is "far from commercial centers of Butuan City."

PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:

MTCC ● Rendered a decision in favor of respondents.

● In allowing the increased monthly rental of P32,217.50, the MTCC considered the fact that under the lease contract, respondents, as lessors, have become the owners of the improvements introduced to the leased lots upon the termination of the lease contract.

● It took note of the improvements in the lots. It held that "b]eing the co-owners not only of the land but also of the improvements therein, it is [respondents'] veritable right to demand the increase of the use of the land and buildings from the [petitioner] corporation."

RTC ● Affirmed with modifications, reducing the monthly rental to P14,000.

CA ● Modified the RTC's decision and reinstated the MTCC's ruling, ordering the petitioner to pay the original monthly rental of P32,217.50.

ISSUE/S:

1. WON the reasonable monthly rental value is P32,217.50, as found by the CA and the MTCC. — YES

RULING:

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the instant petition is DISMISSED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated May 21, 2003 in CA-G.R. SP No. 48987 is AFFIRMED.

RATIO:

1. YES

● We have defined fair rental value as the reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the leased property. There is no hard and fast rule in determining the reasonableness of the rental charged.

● In Manila Bay Club Corporation vs. CA , we considered: (a) the prevailing rates in the vicinity; (b) location of the property; (c) use of the property; (d) inflation rate; and (e) the testimony of one of the private respondents.

● In Umali vs. The City of Naga, we added a catch-all phrase that "other minor factors" should be taken into consideration.

● In the case at bar, the CA correctly considered the following factors in pegging the reasonable monthly rental at P32,217.50, viz :

o First, the old rate did not reflect the fair value of the subject premises. It was kept artificially low as a concession to respondent which undertook to introduce improvements into the property, ownership of which would automatically accrue to petitioners at the end of the term of the lease.

o Second, while the new lease shall cover a reduced area of 9,205 square meters only, a higher rate is still justified because the new lease will affect not only the land but also units of buildings and houses, ownership of which, as provided in the lease contract, automatically accrued to them at the end of the term of the lease. These structures include buildings used for commercial and industrial purposes and residential houses. Based on the tax declarations covering the land and improvements, the total market value thereof is over six million pesos.

o Third, the new rate is equivalent to PhP3.50 per square meter. This is the prevailing rental rate in the nearby Municipality of Cabadbaran. On the other hand, the subject premises are located in Butuan City where rental rates are definitely higher. The rate in Cabadbaran is being applied to the subject premises only as a concession to respondent.

o Finally, inflation has diminished the value of rental payments on the subject premises. It would appear that respondent, through its predecessor-in-interest, first leased the premises in 1973 at only Php0.03 per square meter. The lease was renewed many times over but always at concession rates on account of the close ties between the parties.

DUMO v. ESPINAS

August 28, 2009 | GR No. 141962 | Austria-Martinez, J. | Rule 70 - Forcible Entry and Unlawful Detainer; Judgment

PETITIONER: Danilo Dumo and Suprema Dumo

RESPONDENTS: Erlinda Espinas, Jhean Pacio, Phol Pacio, Manny Jubinal, Carlito Campos, and Severa Espinas

DOCTRINE:

There is no basis for the MTC to award actual, moral and exemplary damages in view of the settled rule that in ejectment cases, the only damage that can be recovered is the fair rental value or the reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the property.

FACTS:

1. Danilo and Suprema Dumo (petitioners) alleged that they are the owners-possessors of a parcel of sandy land (subject property) with all the improvements standing thereon, located in Paringao, Bauang, La Union.

2. Severa Espinas (Severa) filed a complaint entitled "Quieting of Title and/or Ownership and Possession" (Civil Case No. 857) against spouses Sandy and Presnida Saldana (Sps. Saldana) over the same subject property.

a. Although a decision has been rendered against Sps. Saldana, the same was not enforced as per the sheriff’s return.

b. All defendants acting for the interest of Severa then took it upon themselves, employing force, intimidation, and threat, to enter the subject property, successfully driving out the plaintiffs despite their protests, and took over the premises.

3. Petitioners filed complaint for forcible entry with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or preliminary injunction (WPI) against Erlinda Espinas, Jhean Pacio, Phol Pacio, Manny Jubinal, Carlito Campos and Severa Espinas (respondents) with the MTC of Bauang, La Union. They prayed for the payment of actual damages, lost earnings, moral damages and attorney’s fees.

4. The MTC issued a TRO directing the defendants to cease and desist from destroying or demolishing the improvements found of the subject property and from putting up structures thereon, and later on likewise issued a WPI.

5. On the other hand, respondents contended that:

a. Sps. Marcelino and Severa Espina purchased the subject property from one Carlos Calica.

b. The subject property has been declared for taxation purposes under their name and the real estate taxes have been religiously paid;

c. The subject property has been surveyed, which Plan Psu-202273 is duly approved by the Director of Land, with an area of 1,065 sq. m. more or less;

d. To remove and clear all doubts and cloud over the ownership of said parcel of land, Civil Case No. 857 was filed and after hearing, decision was rendered declaring herein defendants the lawful owners of said parcel of land;

e. Under and by virtue of said Decision, defendants entered, occupied and possessed said land, and in the exercise of their right of ownership, cleaned the same of illegally constructed structures which were done without the knowledge and consent of herein respondents.

PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:

MTC ● Rendered judgment in favor of petitioners, holding that petitioners were able to prove their right of possession over the subject property

● Respondents appealed

RTC ● Reversed and set aside the MTC Decision and dismissed the case filed by the petitioners

● Petitioners filed a Petition for Review with the CA

CA ● Set aside the RTC judgment, reinstating with modification the MTC Decision by deleting the awards for actual, moral and exemplary damages

● Petitioners filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration but the same was denied by the CA, hence this petition for review on certiorari

ISSUE/S:

WON actual, moral and exemplary damages may be awarded in ejectment cases — NO

RULING:

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated October 14, 1999 and February 18, 2000, respectively, are AFFIRMED.

RATIO:

NO, the CA did not err in modifying the MTC Decision to delete the awards for actual, moral and exemplary damages.

● An appellate court is clothed with ample authority to review rulings even if they are not assigned as errors. This is especially so if the court finds that their consideration is necessary in arriving at a just decision of the case before it.

● An unassigned error closely related to an error properly assigned, or upon which a determination of the question raised by the error properly assigned is dependent, will be considered by the appellate court notwithstanding the failure to assign it as an error.

● Petitioners admit in the present petition that herein respondents, in their appeal with the RTC, raised the question of whether or not the prevailing party may be awarded damages.

o It was only logical and natural for the RTC to deal with the question of whether petitioners are indeed entitled to the damages awarded by the MTC.

o Considering that the RTC judgment reversed the decision of the MTC, it is not erroneous on the part of the RTC to delete the award of damages in the MTC decision.

o It would be the height of inconsistency if the RTC sustained the award of damages in favor of herein petitioners when, in the same decision, it reversed the MTC judgment and dismissed the complaint of petitioners.

[MOST IMPORTANT RULING IN RE FEUD]

● We agree with the CA and the RTC that there is no basis for the MTC to award actual, moral and exemplary damages in view of the settled rule that in ejectment cases, the only damage that can be recovered is the fair rental value or the reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the property.

● Considering that the only issue raised in ejectment is that of rightful possession, damages which could be recovered are those which the plaintiff could have sustained as a mere possessor, or those caused by the loss of the use and occupation of the property, and not the damages which he may have suffered but which have no direct relation to his loss of material possession.

● In this case, although the MTC's order for the reimbursement to petitioners of their alleged lost earnings over the subject premises, which is a beach resort, could have been considered as compensation for their loss of the use and occupation of the property while it was in the possession of the respondents, records do not show any evidence to sustain the same.

SPS. FELISILDA v. JUDGE NAPOLEON D. VILLANUEVA, et al.

October 29, 1985 | G.R. No. L-60372 | Aquino, J. | Judgment

PETITIONER: Buenaventura Felisilda and Irenea Felisilda (Sps. Felisilda)

RESPONDENTS: Judge Napoleon Villanueva of Butuan City; Casiano Angchangco, Jr., as Deputy Provincial and City Sheriff of Agusan Del Norte and Butuan City; Arturo Ricaforte, as Register of Deeds of Butuan City, and Vicente Galeon

DOCTRINE:

The only damages that can be recovered in an ejectment suit are the fair rental value or the reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the real property. Other damages must be claimed in an ordinary action.

FACTS:

1. The Butuan City Court ordered the Sps. Felisilda to vacate a lot covered by an OCT in the name of Dr. Vicente C. Galeon, to pay him P300 a month as compensation for the use of the land from January 1971 until the said land is vacated, P7,000 as moral and exemplary damages and P3,000 as attorney's fees and litigation expenses.

PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:

BUTUAN CITY COURT ● Ejectment suit

● Ruled against Sps. Felicilda and in favor of Galeon, awarding to Galeon moral and exemplary damages.

SC ● (not specified in the case)

ISSUE/S: Is the Butuan City Court's adjudication of P7,000 moral and exemplary damages in Galeon’s favor in the ejectment suit proper? – NO.

RULING:

WHEREFORE, the petition is granted. The execution set aside. Costs against sale of the two lots in question is respondent Galeon.

RATIO:

● NO, the city court's adjudication of P7,000 moral and exemplary damages in Galeon’s favor in the ejectment suit was manifestly erroneous. Trial judges have a reprehensible propensity to adjudge moral and exemplary damages without any justification. Mere vexation or mental anguish is not sufficient to warrant moral damages. The case must come within the terms of articles 2217 to 2220 of the Civil Code.

● The only damages that can be recovered in an ejectment suit are the fair rental value or the reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the real property. Other damages must be claimed in an ordinary action.

NB: the SC discussed the propriety of award of moral and exemplary damages “in passing.” The actual issue centered on the validity of the execution sale which was attacked by Sps. Felisilda. Sps. Felisilda said that the sale was void for lack of publication. The SC rejected their claim noting that there was actually publication in Mindanao newspaper.

CGR CORPORATION V. TREYES

April 27, 2017 | GR No. 170916 |Carpio Morales, J. |Judgment

PETITIONER: CGR Corporation herein represented by its President Alberto Ramos, III, Herman M. Benedicto and Alberto R. Benedicto

RESPONDENTS: Ernesto L. Treyes, Jr.

DOCTRINE:

RULE 70 SEC. 17. Judgment. — If after trial the court finds that the allegations of the complaint are true, it shall render judgment in favor of the plaintiff for the restitution of the premises, the sum justly due as arrears of rent or as reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the premises, attorney's fees and costs. If it finds that said allegations are not true, it shall render judgment for the defendant to recover his costs. If a counterclaim is established, the court shall render judgment for the sum found in arrears from either party and award costs as justice requires.

FACTS:

1. CGR Co, Herman and Alberto Benedicto (petitioners) claimed to have occupied 37.33 hectares of public land in Sagay City, Negros Occidental evident in a notarized separate fishpond lease agreement which was approved by the Secretary of Agriculture for a period of 25 years. On November 18,2000, Treyes Jr (respondent) allegedly forcibly and unlawfully entered the leased properties and once inside barricaded the entrance to the fishponds, and harvested several tons of milkfish, fry and fingerlings owned by the petitioners. This prompt the petitioners to file with MTC a separate complaints for forcible entry with TRO and/or Preliminary Injunction and Damages, docketed as Civil Cases nos, 1331, 1332 and 1333 against Treyes, Sr and Jr.

2. Also in a separate move, petitioners filed in March 2004 with Bacolod RTC a complaint for damages against respondent. It alleges: That on succeeding days, defendant's men continued their forage on the fishponds of the plaintiffs by carting and taking away the remaining full-grown milkfish, fry and fingerlings and other marine products in the fishponds. Even the chapel built by plaintiff CGR Corporation was ransacked and destroyed and the materials taken away by defendant's men. Religious icons were also stolen and as an extreme act of sacrilege, even decapitated the heads of some of these icons that Respondent filed a motion to Dismiss (complaint for damages) on the grounds of litis pendentia, res judicata and forum shopping. RTC Bacolod dismissed petitioner complaint on the ground of prematurity, stating that a complaint for damages may only be maintained after a final determination on forcible entry cases has been made

PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:

RTC ● During the pendency of the case, the lessee filed an action for damages before the RTC, drawing Progressive to file a motion to dismiss based on litis pendentia. The RTC denied the motion.

CA · The Court of Appeals sustained the RTC order denying the motion to dismiss.

ISSUE/S:

Whether a complainant in a forcible entry case can file an independent action for damages arising after the act of dispossession had occurred. YES

RULING:

WHEREFORE, the Orders dated August 26, 2005 and January 2, 2006 issued by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 43, Bacolod City, in Civil Case No. 04-12284 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

RATIO:

Section 17, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 17. Judgment. – If after trial the court finds that the allegations of the complaint are true, it shall render judgment in favor of the plaintiff for the restitution of the premises, the sum justly due as arrears of rent or as reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the premises, attorney’s fees and costs. If it finds that said allegations are not true, it shall render judgment for the defendant to recover his costs. If a counterclaim is established, the court shall render judgment for the sum found in arrears from either party and award costs as justice requires. (Emphasis supplied)

The recoverable damages in forcible entry and detainer cases thus refer to "rents" or "the reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the premises" or "fair rental value of the property" and attorney’s fees and costs.

Surely, one of the elements of litis pendentia - that the identity between the pending actions, with respect to the parties, rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, is such that any judgment rendered on one action will, regardless of which is successful, amount to res judicata in the action under consideration - is not present, hence, it may not be invoked to dismiss petitioners’ complaint for damages.

Res judicata may not apply because the court in a forcible entry case has no jurisdiction over claims for damages other than the use and occupation of the premises and attorney's fees.

Neither may forum-shopping justify a dismissal of the complaint for damages, the elements

of litis pendentia not being present, or where a final judgment in the forcible entry case will not amount to res judicata in the former.

Petitioners' filing of an independent action for damages other than those sustained as a result of their dispossession or those caused by the loss of their use and occupation of their properties could not thus be considered as splitting of a cause of action.

OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR v. CORPUZ

24 September 2003 | A.M. No. P-00-1418 | Carpio, J | Rule 70 (Immediate Execution of Judgment; stay of execution)

PETITIONER: Office of the Court Administrator (OCA)

RESPONDENTS: Celestina Corpuz (Corpuz), Clerk of Court IV, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Urdaneta City, Pangasinan

DOCTRINE:

Although execution is immediately executory, judgment may be stayed by perfecting an appeal, filing a supersedeas bond approved by the court and periodically paying the rents during the pendency of the appeal.

The losing party is not in a position to stay execution unless he receives notice of the filing of a motion for execution.

FACTS:

1. Francisco Lu (Lu) was the defendant in a civil case for ejectment raffled to Judge Orlanda Siapno (Judge Siapno) of the MTC-Urdaneta

2. On 7 September 1995, Judge Siapno rendered a decision against Lu

3. Lu’s counsel received the decision on 13 September 1995

a. He filed a Notice of Appeal on the same day

4. Meanwhile, on 11 September 1995, Corpuz issued a writ of execution, which Sheriff Domingo Lopez (Sheriff Lopez) implemented on the same date by forcibly ejecting Lu from the premises

5. Lu elevated the case to the RTC of Urdaneta, Pangasinan, Branch 47 (RTC-Branch 47)

a. While on appeal, RTC-Branch 47 issued a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction and declared void the writ of execution earlier issued by the MTC-Urdaneta

6. On 5 February 1996, RTC-Branch 47 rendered a judgment modifying the MTC decision by deleting the paragraph “in accordance with the Rules, let a Writ of Execution be issued”

7. Lu filed an administrative case against Judge Siapno, Sheriff Lopez, and the private prosecutor, Atty. Joselino Viray

a. Lu charged Judge Siapno with

i. Gross incompetence in the performance of his duties for not dismissing his civil case

ii. Gross ignorance of the law for rendering a decision providing in its dispositive portion the issuance of a writ of execution without notice and hearing

iii. Abdication of official function

iv. Gross misconduct

8. The Court, in its Decision dated 6 July 2000, found Judge Siapno guilty of gross ignorance of the law for declaring, in the dispositive portion, the immediate execution of his decision

a. The Court thus fined Judge Siapno P5,000

9. The Court also found Sheriff Lopez guilty of gross abuse of authority and fined him P5,000

10. The Court forwarded the charge against Aty. Viray to the Office of the Bar Confidant for appropriate action

11. The Court directed the OCA to institute the appropriate administrative case against Corpuz who was not impleaded in the administrative case

a. Thus, in the administrative complaint dated 10 August 2000, the OCA charged Corpuz with Ignorance of the Law, Abuse of Authority and Grave Misconduct

12. On 11 September 2000, the Court required Corpuz to comment on the administrative complaint against her

13. In her Comment dated 17 October 2000, Corpuz denies the charges against her

a. She alleges that she never signed any court process or writ without instruction from her superior

b. She claims that Judge Siapno “angrily” told her to implement the decision as it already directed the issuance of a writ of execution

i. She feared that Judge Siapno might cite her for insubordination

c. She admits that she issued the writ of execution, however, she claims that it was issued with the knowledge of Judge Siapno who instructed her to sign the writ

d. She further claims that the stenographer had already typed the writ when it was presented to her for her signature

14. The Court referred the administrative case against Corpuz to Executive Judge Joven Costales (Investigating Judge Costales) of the RTC-Urdaneta, Pangasinan, Branch 45, for investigation, report and recommendation

PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:

Investigating Judge ● Corpuz admitted that there were several instances when she issued writs of execution immediately after Judge Siapno promulgated the decisions

○ There were 3 ejectment cases wherein the decisions and the writs of execution were signed, promulgated and issued on the same dates

● Investigating Judge Costales deduced that Judge Siapno did not force or coerce Corpuz into signing the writ of execution previously prepared by the stenographer

○ There was no reason for Judge Siapno to force or coerce Corpuz into signing the writ of execution because this was their practice as shown by the 3 ejectment cases she mentioned

● Investigating Judge Costales observed that Corpuz took literally what Judge Siapno declared in his Decision that “in accordance with the Rules, let a Writ of Execution be issued”

● He believed that as second in command in the office, Corpuz should have guided or assisted her presiding judge

● Corpuz should have read the rules and procedure regarding the issuance of a writ of execution and could not simply reason out that she was doing a ministerial duty

● Recommended that Corpuz be fined P2,000

OCA ● Agrees with the findings and recommendation of investigating Judge Costales

● The acts of signing and issuing a writ of execution without a motion for execution or a hearing prior to the issuance of the writ indicate irresponsibility and incompetence

● Corpuz, having been a clerk of court for years, should have been conversant with the specific requirements of the Rules of Court on the signing and the issuance of the writ of execution

● Agrees with the recommendation that Corpuz be fined P2,000

ISSUE/S:

1. WQN a writ of execution in an ejectment case can be issued motu proprio - NO

RULING:

WHEREFORE, we find the recommendations of Investigating Judge Joven F. Costales and the Office of the Court Administration well-taken. Respondent Celestina B. Corpuz is FINED Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000) for gross ignorance of the Rules of Court and abuse of authority. This fine shall be deducted from her retirement benefits.

RATIO:

1. NO

● There is an improper procedure because the clerk of court issued the writ of execution before the losing party received the decision

o Lu’s counsel received the MTC decision on 13 September 1995 and filed a notice of appeal on the same day

o Corpuz issued the writ of execution on 11 September 1995 and Sheriff Lopez implemented the same

■ At least 2 days before Lu’s counsel received the MTC decision

● The losing party must first receive notice of the judgment before the court or its personnel can execute the judgment

o If such judgment is immediately executed without prior notice to the losing party, then such party has no remedy if the evidence or law does not support the judgment

● Even if the MTC decision itself ordered that “a writ of execution be issued,” this does not mean that notice of the motion for execution to the adverse party is unnecessary

● The court cannot direct the issuance of a writ of execution motu proprio

● §8 R70 explicitly provides that although execution is immediately executory, judgment may be stayed by perfecting an appeal, filing a supersedeas bond approved by the court and periodically paying the rents during the pendency of the appeal

o A party is not in a position to stay execution unless he receives notice of the filing of a motion for execution

■ After all, a party has 15 days to perfect his appeal and stay execution by filing a notice of appeal and supersedeas bond and periodically paying the rentals

o Unless he receives a motion for execution, he cannot take these steps to stay execution

● While the MTC decision authorized Copruz to issue a writ of execution, its issuance prior to receipt by Lu of the decision was precipitate and against all sense of fair play. Clearly, Corpuz abused her authority

AIR TRANSPORT OFFICE V CA

Date Oct. 17, 1992 | GR No. 172426 | Ponente Quisumbing J | Immediate execution of judgment

PETITIONER: ATO

RESPONDENTS: Bernie Miaque

DOCTRINE:

Conformably to Section 19, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, concurrence of all the following requisites must be present to stay the immediate execution of judgment pending appeal in ejectment cases, to wit: (a) defendant perfects his appeal, (b) he files a supersedeas bond, and (c) he periodically deposits the rentals falling due during the pendency of the appeal. Failure of the defendant to comply with any of these requirements is a ground for the outright execution of judgment despite appeal, the duty of the Court in this respect being mandatory and ministerial

FACTS:

2. Private respondent Bernie Miaque filed an action for enforcement of contract, injunction with TRO/ preliminary injunction against petitioner alleging that petitioner was making improvements in the concession area it leased to him.

3. RTC nullified the concession permit issued by petitioner ATO manager Edmundo Gerochi

4. Miaque resumed business over the concession area despite petitioner’s protest and also operated a carwash service, which was not part of the concession permit.

5. Petitioner filed an amended complaint for unlawful detainer against private respondent. Both parties admitted that ATO manager Gerochi issued to Miaque a concession permit to operate a parking space and taxi service in Iloilo Airport for 15 years. But petitioner pointed that the concession expired already.

6. MTCC ordered respondent to vacate and deliver to ATO the concession area

7. MTCC ordered the issuance of writ of exectuion pending appeal and gave due course to petitioner’s notice of appeal and elevated the records to the RTC

8. Writ of Exectuion was issued and a notice to vacate

9. Private respondent filed an urgent motion to nullify writ of execution and notice to vacate in the RTC and filed an urgent supplemental motion for the issuance of the TRO to restrain the implementation.

10. Private respondent filed with CA a petition for certiorar with prayer for injunction.

PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:

RTC ●

CA ● Issued the assailed TRO restraining the implementation of the writ of execution

● It clarified in its Resolution that the status quo ante to be observed in the TRO is the last peaceable possession of the premises before the unlawful detainer case

ISSUE/S: Whether CA acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing a TRO to restrain the RTC from implementing and enforcing the writ of execution of the MTCC –YES

RULING:

WHEREFORE, The assailed Resolution of the CA are hereby SET ASIDE.

RATIO: YES

o Court has consistently held that a judgment in favor of plaintiff in an unlawful detainer suit is immediately executory to prevent further damage to him arising from the loss of possession of his property.

o Conformably to Section 19, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, concurrence of all the following requisites must be present to stay the immediate execution of judgment pending appeal in ejectment cases, to wit: (a) defendant perfects his appeal, (b) he files a supersedeas bond, and (c) he periodically deposits the rentals falling due during the pendency of the appeal. Failure of the defendant to comply with any of these requirements is a ground for the outright execution of judgment despite appeal, the duty of the Court in this respect being mandatory and ministerial|||

o was therefore the ministerial duty of the MTCC to issue in this case the writ of execution upon failure of private respondent to file a supersedeas bond and to deposit the accruing rentals. By issuing the TRO enjoining the eviction of private respondent, the Court of Appeals allowed him to extend his stay in the premises despite the mandatory provision of Section 19, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court.|||

TOLENTINO V. ROCES

June 18, 2018 | GR No. 210864 | | Immediate Execution of Judgment; stay of execution

PETITIONER: Gelarda M. Tolentino

RESPONDENTS: Nancy B. Roces

DOCTRINE:

An exception to the rule is where the trial court did not make any findings with respect to any amount in arrears, damages or costs against the defendant, in which case no bond is necessary to stay the execution of the judgment.

FACTS:

1. Petitioner is the registered owner of a parcel of land with residential building thereon at Barangay Singkamas, Makati City. The subject property was originally covered by a TCT in the name of Corazon Sta. Brigida. However, the ownership of the subject property was transferred to petitioner through a Deed of Absolute Sale executed between her and Corazon.

2. Petitioner sent a demand letter requesting the respondent and all persons claiming rights under her to vacate and surrender the possession of the second floor of the subject property. However, respondent refused to heed to such demand.

PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:

MTC ● Petitioner filed a Complaint for Ejectment against respondent.

● Respondent, one of the children of Corazon, justified her possession of the second floor of the subject property by refusing to recognize the Deed of Absolute Sale between Corazon and petitioner on the ground of fraud.

● The MeTC ruled in favor of the petitioner.

RTC ● Respondent filed a Notice of Appeal and the case was elevated to the RTC.

● Petitioner filed an Urgent Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution. The RTC granted the motion.

○ The RTC ruled that respondent's non-filing of a supersedeas bond will not prevent the issuance of a writ of execution. Otherwise, respondent would continue using the premises of the subject property without paying any rent.

CA ● Respondent appealed via a petition for certiorari, the CA granted such.

○ The CA maintained that the perfection of an appeal is enough to stay the execution of the MeTC decision in cases when there is no award of rent for the reasonable use of the property, damages for the dispossession or costs against petitioner.

● The petitioner’s Motion for reconsideration was denied.

ISSUE/S:

1. WON the respondent's non-filing of a supersedeas bond stays the execution pending appeal in the absence of any award of rent for the reasonable use of the subject property's premises—YES

RULING:

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

RATIO:

● In ejectment cases, execution issues immediately if judgment is rendered in favor of defendant subject to the conditions found in Section 19 of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court.

● "To stay the immediate execution of the said judgment while the appeal is pending the foregoing provision requires that the following requisites must concur: (1) the defendant perfects his appeal; (2) he files a supersedeas bond; and (3) he periodically deposits the rentals which become due during the pendency of the appeal."

o However, this rule is not without any exception. In the case of Aznar Brothers Realty Co. v. Court of Appeals, this Court categorically stated that "an exception is where the trial court did not make any findings with respect to any amount in arrears, damages or costs against the defendant, in which case no bond is necessary to stay the execution of the judgment."

● In this case, it must be noted that there was no award of rental payment for the reasonable use and occupation of the subject property. The only monetary award given by the MeTC is the award of attorney's fees and costs, which, following the aforementioned pronouncement of this Court, is not within the contemplation of the law under Section 19 of Rule 70.

o Thus, respondent's filing of a supersedeas bond is not necessary to stay the execution of judgment as the perfection of her appeal is enough for the same.

AZNAR BROTHERS REALTY COMPANY vs. LAURENCIO AYING

February 4, 2019

Mar 7, 2000| G.R. No. 144773 |DAVIDE, JR., C.J:| Immediate Execution of Judgment; stay of execution

PETITIONER: AZNAR BROTHERS REALTY COMPANY

RESPONDENTS:LAURENCIO AYING, IN HIS OWN BEHALF AND IN BEHALF OF THE OTHER HEIRS OF EMILIANO AYING, PAULINO AYING, IN HIS OWN BEHALF AND IN BEHALF OF THE OTHER HEIRS OF SIMEON AYING, AND WENCESLAO SUMALINOG, IN HIS OWN BEHALF AND IN BEHALF OF THE OTHER HEIRS OF ROBERTA AYING

At any rate, pursuant to Section 21 of the Revised Rules of Summary Procedure, the decision of the RTC affirming the decision of the MTCC has become immediately executory, without prejudice to the appeal before the Court of Appeals. The said Section repealed Section 10 of the Rules of Court allowing during the pendency of the appeal with the Court of Appeals a stay of execution of the RTC judgment with respect to the restoration of possession where the defendant makes a periodic deposit of rentals. Thus, immediate execution of the judgment becomes a ministerial duty of the court. No new writ of execution was, however, issued. Nevertheless, the writ of demolition thereafter issued was sufficient to constitute a writ of execution, as it substantially complied with the form and contents of a writ of execution as provided for under Section 8 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.

FACTS:

1. The case was heard by the First Division of the Supreme Court of the Philippines.

2. The case number is G.R. No. 128102.

3. The petitioner is Aznar Brothers Realty Company, while the respondents are Luis Aying, Demetrio Sida, Felomino Augusto, Federico Abing, and Romeo Augusto.

4. The petitioner was represented by Rolando A. Navarro, while the private respondents were represented by Fernandez Carillo Ponce Seguerra Osano Law Forum and Santos Pilapil & Associates.

5. The petitioner acquired a lot located in Brgy. Mactan, Lapu-Lapu City, from the heirs of Crisanta Maloloy-on through an Extrajudicial Partition of Real Estate with Deed of Absolute Sale. The deed was registered with the Register of Deeds of Lapu-Lapu City.

6. The private respondents claimed to be the successors and descendants of the eight children of Crisanta Maloloy-on, who were listed as the registered owners in the Original Certificate of Title No. RC-2856. They alleged that they had been residing and occupying the land in question since the time of their parents and grandparents.

7. The private respondents were allegedly allowed by the petitioner to occupy portions of the land by mere tolerance, with the condition that they would vacate the land if the petitioner needed it for its purposes.

8. The petitioner entered into a joint venture with Sta. Lucia Realty Development Corporation for the development of the land into a housing subdivision and beach resort.

9. When the private respondents refused to vacate the land, the petitioner filed a case for unlawful detainer and damages with the Municipal Trial Court (MTCC) of Lapu-Lapu City.

PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:

MTCC ● The MTCC ruled in favor of the petitioner, ordering the private respondents to vacate the land and pay attorney's fees and litigation expenses.

RTC ● The private respondents appealed the decision to the Regional Trial Court (RTC), which affirmed the decision of the MTCC and ordered the issuance of a writ of demolition.

CA ● The private respondents further appealed to the Court of Appeals, which reversed the decision of the RTC and declared the private respondents as the rightful possessors of the land.

● The Court of Appeals noted that the private respondents had been in possession of the land peacefully, continuously, adversely, and notoriously since time immemorial. The petitioner had no evidence of prior possession.

ISSUE/S:

Whether AZNAR has the right to terminate the private respondents' possession of the land and order the demolition of their houses. YES

RULING:

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The challenged decision of public respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 35060 is hereby REVERSED, and the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 27, Lapu-Lapu City, is REINSTATED

● The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and reinstated the decision of the RTC.

● The Supreme Court held that AZNAR has the right to terminate the private respondents' possession of the land and order the demolition of their houses.

● Prior physical possession by the plaintiff is not an indispensable requirement in unlawful detainer cases.

● AZNAR's lack of prior physical possession was of no consequence.

● The Extrajudicial Partition with Deed of Absolute Sale was valid and binding, as it was a notarized document and the private respondents failed to prove forgery.

● The non-registration of the deed did not render it legally defective, as registration is not necessary to give a conveyance legal effect between the parties.

● AZNAR had the right to terminate the private respondents' possession of the land and ordered the private respondents to vacate and allow the demolition of their houses.

PEOPLE vs . DANNY GODOY

December 6, 1995 | GR No.115908-09 | Regalado | En Banc | Contempt

PETITIONER: People of the Philippines

RESPONDENTS: Danny Godoy

DOCTRINE:

The basic rule remains that in all criminal prosecutions without regard to the nature of the defense which the accused may raise, the burden of proof remains at all times upon the prosecution to establish his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. If the accused raises a sufficient doubt as to any material element, and the prosecution is then unable to overcome this evidence, the prosecution has failed to carry its burden of proof of the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt and the accused must be acquitted.

FACTS:

1. Accused-appellant Danny Godoy was charged in two separate informations filed before the RTC with rape and kidnapping with serious illegal detention:

● Rape:

○ That on or about the evening day of January 21, 1994, at Brgy. Pulot Center, Brooke's Point, Palawan, the said accused by means of force, threat and intimidation, by using a knife and by means of deceit, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with one Mia Taha to her damage and prejudice.

● Kidnapping with Serious Illegal Detention:

○ That on or about January 22, 1994 at Brgy. Ipilan, Brooke's Point, Palawan, the said accused, being a teacher of the victim, Mia Taha, and by means of deceit did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnap or detained said girl of 17 years old, for 5 days

2. During the time of alleged involuntary detention, a police blotter had already been placed. She was later released by Godoy after a certain Naem interceded and only after her parents agreed to settle the case.

3. After Mia’s return, her parents accompanied her to a medico-legal which found lacerations in her vagina concluding that “she just had sexual intercourse.”

4. Godoy denied that he raped Mia Taha. He admitted having had sex with her and that they indeed stayed in Sunset Gardens and in Edward’s Subdivision, but it was because they were lovers and that Mia had consented to their having sex.

5. To support his claim, he presented two letters supposedly delivered to him by Mia’s cousin, Lorna, in the provincial jail while he was detained. There Mia explained that it was her parents who forced her to testify against him.

6. The delivery of the letters was denied by Lorna but the defense presented the provincial jail guard on duty on the supposed dates of the delivery and testified that indeed Lorna had visited Godoy on said dates.

7. Several witnesses were also presented including two former teachers of Mia who knew the handwriting on the two said letters as belonging to Mia.

8. Other witnesses attested that they saw the two together in a manner that was affectionate and cordial, prior to the said “kidnapping” and even during such.

9. On May 20, 1994, the court a quo rendered judgment finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of rape and kidnapping with serious illegal detention, and sentencing him to the maximum penalty of death in both cases.

10. By reason of the nature of the penalty imposed, these cases were elevated to this Court on automatic review

PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:

RTC ● Found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape and kidnapping

○ Maximum penalty of death in both cases

○ Case elevated to the SC

ISSUE/S: WON the trial prosecution was able to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt - NO

RULING: No, the prosecution failed to prove guilt of Godoy. The Supreme Court acquitted Danny Godoy.

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and accused-appellant Danny Godoy is hereby ACQUITTED of the crimes of rape and kidnapping with serious illegal detention charged in Criminal Cases 11640 and 11641 of the Regional Trial Court for Palawan and Puerto Princesa City, Branch 49. It is hereby ORDERED that he be released forthwith, unless he is otherwise detained for any other valid cause.

RATIO:

1. The basic rule remains that in all criminal prosecutions without regard to the nature of the defense which the accused may raise, the burden of proof remains at all times upon the prosecution to establish his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

2. If the accused raises a sufficient doubt as to any material element, and the prosecution is then unable to overcome this evidence, the prosecution has failed to carry its burden of proof of the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt and the accused must be acquitted.

3. In finding that the crime of rape was committed, the lower court took into account only that portion of the testimony of complainant regarding the incident and conveniently deleted the rest.

4. Three guiding principles in the appellate review of the evidence of the prosecution for the crime of rape, namely:

a. while rape is a most detestable crime, it must be borne in mind that it is an accusation easy to be made, hard to be proved, but harder to be defended by the party accused, though innocent;

b. the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and

c. that the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense

5. Mia claimed that the appellant always carried a knife but it was never explained how she was threatened with the same in such a manner that she was allegedly always cowed into giving in to his innumerable sexual demands.

● In taking judicial notice, the Supreme Court said that it is not unaware that in rape cases, the claim of the complainant of having been threatened appears to be a common testimonial expedient and face-saving subterfuge.

● But it had not been duly corroborated by other evidence nor proved that the accused indeed always carried a knife.

6. Likewise, complainant testified that appellant raped her through the use of force and intimidation. However, the element of force was not sufficiently established.

● the medico-legal findings neither support nor confirm the charge that rape was so committed through forcible means by appellant ( there were no scratches or bruises, but only a week-old laceration).

7. While the "sweetheart theory" does not often gain favor with this Court, such is not always the case if the hard fact is that the accused and the supposed victim are, in truth, intimately related

● except when either the relationship is illicit or the victim's parents are against it.

8. Appellant's claim that he and complainant were lovers is fortified by the highly credible testimonies of several witnesses for the defense

9. The SC also takes judicial cognizance of the fact that in rural areas (such as in Palawan) young ladies are strictly required to act with circumspection and prudence.

SANTIAGO v. ANUNCIACION

April 03, 1990 | G.R. No. 89318 | Sarmiento, J. | Contempt

PETITIONER: ATTY. MARIANO R. SANTIAGO

RESPONDENTS: HON. K. CASIANO P. ANUNCIACION, JR., HON. LUIS TUAZON, JR., and ATTY. ELEAZAR FERRY

DOCTRINE:

It is well-settled that a contempt charge partakes the nature of a penal proceeding. Being so, it is subject to the rules on criminal procedure and the rules on the intervention of the offended party in criminal actions. The rule is that: SEC. 16. Intervention of the offended party in criminal action. — Unless the offended party has waived the civil action or expressly reserved the right to institute it separately from the criminal action, and subject to the provision of Section 5 hereof, he may intervene by counsel in the prosecution of the offense. Aside from the above exceptions, the intervention of the offended party is subject to the direction and control of the fiscal, and for the sole purpose of enforcing the civil liability of the accused, and as we have held, "not of demanding punishment of the accused." Thus: Consequently, where from the nature of the offense, or where the law defining and punishing the offense charged does not provide for an indemnity, the offended party may not intervene in the prosecution of the offense.

FACTS:

1. This case originated from an incident in Criminal Case No. 89-XI-01 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch XI, wherein Atty. Santiago was the counsel for Rene Peralta, the accused in Criminal Case No. 89-3854 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, for the kidnapping of Amylie Rosalie Orozco.

2. In the course of the proceedings, Amylie came forward and claimed that she was not kidnapped and went voluntarily with Rene Peralta, her boyfriend and the father of her child. The assistant city prosecutor was scheduled to submit Amylie's sworn statement and recommend the dismissal of the kidnapping charge

3. On the same date, Amylie's mother, Carolina Orozco, filed charges for "disobedience" against Amylie with the respondent court. When Amylie arrived at the courthouse, she was intercepted by alleged CIS agents and Quezon City policemen to serve a warrant of arrest in connection with the "disobedience" charge.

4. Atty. Santiago allegedly requested the peace officers to defer the service of the warrant until after Amylie had testified in court. They agreed to present her to Judge Velasco, who interviewed her and her mother in his chamber.

5. An accusation of indirect contempt was brought against Atty. Santiago for obstructing the implementation of the warrant of arrest against Amylie.

PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:

RTC ● The respondent judge, Hon. K. Casiano P. Anunciacion, Jr., directed Atty. Santiago to answer Mrs. Orozco's motion.

● Atty. Santiago filed a motion to dismiss, which the respondent judge considered as an answer.

● During the hearing, Atty. Ferry appeared as a private prosecutor on behalf of Mrs. Orozco

● Atty. Santiago objected to Atty. Ferry's appearance, arguing that there was no damage claim for which the intervention of the offended party was warranted.

● The respondent judge overruled the petitioner, for which the latter asked for time to raise the matter to a higher court. The judge denied his motion.

ISSUE/S:

1. Whether or not the appearance of the private prosecutor in question is proper and warranted– NO.

RULING:

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The respondent judge is ordered to proceed with the instant contempt proceedings, to be prosecuted by the fiscal, without any further delay. Accordingly, the Temporary Restraining Order is hereby LIFTED.

RATIO:

● It is well-settled that a contempt charge partakes the nature of a penal proceeding. Being so, it is subject to the rules on criminal procedure and the rules on the intervention of the offended party in criminal actions. The rule is that: SEC. 16. Intervention of the offended party in criminal action. — Unless the offended party has waived the civil action or expressly reserved the right to institute it separately from the criminal action, and subject to the provision of Section 5 hereof, he may intervene by counsel in the prosecution of the offense. Aside from the above exceptions, the intervention of the offended party is subject to the direction and control of the fiscal, and for the sole purpose of enforcing the civil liability of the accused, and as we have held, "not of demanding punishment of the accused." Thus: Consequently, where from the nature of the offense, or where the law defining and punishing the offense charged does not provide for an indemnity, the offended party may not intervene in the prosecution of the offense.

● Contempt was said to be "criminal" "when the purpose is to vindicate the authority of the court and protect its outraged dignity." It is "civil" "when there is failure to do something ordered by a court to be done for the benefit of a party. But whether the first or the second, contempt is still a criminal proceeding in which acquittal, for instance, is a bar to a second prosecution. The distinction is for the purpose only of determining the character of punishment to be administered.

● For civil contempts, the punishment is remedial and for the benefit of the complainant, and a pardon cannot stop it. For criminal contempts, the sentence is punitive in the public interest to vindicate the authority of the court and to deter other like derelictions.

● In the case at bar, there is no justification for the prosecution of the case by a private prosecutor. In this instance, the kind of contempt (indirect) for which the petitioner is sought to be held liable provides for no indemnity because the alleged "obstruction" committed was an offense against the State, the respondent court in particular, which involves no private party. Thus, the appearance of Atty. Eleazar Ferry, on behalf of Mrs. Carolina Orozco, was unwarranted.

LEONIDAS v. SUPNET

February 21, 2003 | A.M. No. MTJ-02-1433 | Carpio, J. | Direct Contempt

PETITIONER: TOMAS R. LEONIDAS

RESPONDENTS: FRANCISCO G. SUPNET, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 47, Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasay City

DOCTRINE:

The rule is well-settled that a court should be informed of the pendency of a similar proceeding a party has filed. The responsibility cannot be taken lightly because of the harsh penalties the law prescribes for non-compliance. As provided in Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, failure to comply with the requirements prescribed in Section 5 may cause one to be declared in indirect contempt of court. Moreover, if the non-compliance is willful and deliberate, then such person may even be declared guilty of direct contempt of court.

FACTS:

1. Union Bank of the Philippines ("Union Bank" for brevity), with petitioner Atty. Tomas R. Leonidas ("petitioner" for brevity) as counsel, filed a complaint before Branch 109 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City ("Pasay RTC" for brevity) against the spouses Eddie Tamondong and Eliza Tamondong ("Tamondong Spouses" for brevity) to collect the latter's unpaid loan secured from Union Bank to buy a motor vehicle. Union Bank prayed for the issuance of a writ of replevin.

2. For failure to prosecute, the Pasay RTC dismissed the case.

3. Union Bank, with petitioner again as counsel, filed a case before Branch 47 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasay City ("Pasay MTC" for brevity) presided by respondent Judge Francisco G. Supnet ("respondent judge" for brevity) against the Tamondong Spouses another complaint to collect the same unpaid loan with a prayer for a writ of replevin.

4. The Pasay MTC issued a writ of replevin.

5. The Tamondong Spouses, in response to Union Bank's action moved to cite Union Bank and its counsel for contempt of court for forum shopping and for misleading the court.

6. Thereafter, Pasay MTC dismissed the case, recalled the order of the writ of replevin, and ordered Union Bank to return immediately the motor vehicle to the Tamondong Spouses. Moreover, for violating the rule against forum shopping and for making a false certification against forum shopping, the Pasay MTC cited Union Bank, its collection officer Desi Tomas and petitioner in contempt of court. This was the first contempt order of the court.

7. The Pasay MTC denied the motion for reconsideration but made no mention of Union Bank's notice of dismissal. Moreover, the Pasay MTC ordered Union Bank to show cause why it should not be held in contempt for failing to return the vehicle of the Tamondong Spouses as earlier directed by the court.

8. Union Bank questioned the manner in which the Tamondong Spouses commenced the contempt charge for it supposedly did not conform to the proper procedure. It prayed that the Tamondong Spouses' motion to cite the bank in contempt be denied due course and dismissed.

9. The Pasay MTC issued a writ of execution to enforce payment of the original contempt fine imposed upon Union Bank's collection officer Tomas and petitioner. The Pasay MTC also ordered Union Bank again to immediately return the replevied motor vehicle. For Union Bank's failure to comply with its Order, the Pasay MTC again cited collection officer Tomas and petitioner in contempt and ordered them to pay another fine of P5,000.00 each. This is the second contempt order issued by respondent judge.

10. Hence, petitioner filed the present administrative case for gross ignorance of the law, grave abuse of authority, misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the proper administration of justice. Petitioner states that respondent judge cited him in contempt for refusing to return the replevied motor vehicle to the Tamondong Spouses.

11. Petitioner, however, claims that it was erroneous for respondent judge to have done so since the Order of May 9, 2000 was addressed to Union Bank alone. The May 9, 2000 Order did not direct petitioner, but rather Union Bank alone, to return the replevied vehicle.

12. Petitioner further maintains that he should not be held responsible for submitting a false certificate against forum shopping for the simple reason that he did not sign the certification. As gleaned from the pleadings, it is Union Bank collection officer Tomas whose signature appears on the certification against forum shopping.

PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:

OCA On the first order which declared petitioner in direct contempt of court, the OCA found no reason to hold respondent judge administratively liable.

● Respondent judge cited petitioner in contempt for the first act, that is, for filing Civil Case No. 342-00, which was exactly the same case as Civil Case No. 98-0717 which the Pasay RTC had already dismissed.

○ Thus, the OCA opined that petitioner's act constitutes direct contempt which respondent judge may punish summarily pursuant to Section 1, Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

ISSUE/S:

1. WON respondent judge erred in finding the petitioner liable for direct contempt in the first contempt order - NO

RULING:

WHEREFORE, the Court RESOLVES to adopt the recommendation of the Court Administrator with modification. Judge Francisco G. Supnet is FINED in the amount of THREE THOUSAND PESOS (P3,000.00) for gross ignorance of the law. This fine may be deducted from his accrued leave credits. (This was based on the second contempt order, to be discussed in the Indirect Contempt part)

RATIO:

1. NO

● Courts are vested with the power to penalize a party for filing an action raising the same basic issues as one still pending or already disposed of which the same party has filed in another court. Such an act is deemed an abuse of the processes of the court. To curb and punish such abuses, courts are vested with the power to declare the guilty party in contempt. A counsel who participates in such abuse of court processes can also be held in contempt.

● The contempt power is a means by which the court exercises its authority over those within its jurisdiction, as well as enables the court to enforce its decisions effectively.

● The rule is well-settled that a court should be informed of the pendency of a similar proceeding a party has filed. The responsibility cannot be taken lightly because of the harsh penalties the law prescribes for noncompliance. As provided in Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, failure to comply with the requirements prescribed in Section 5 may cause one to be declared in indirect contempt of court. Moreover, if the non-compliance is willful and deliberate, then such person may even be declared guilty of direct contempt of court.

○ Neither Union Bank nor petitioner as its counsel bothered to inform the Pasay MTC that the Pasay RTC had previously dismissed a case of the same nature and involving the same parties. The Tamondong Spouses were the ones who brought it to the attention of the Pasay MTC.

● Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Court specifically mandates that either the "plaintiff or principal party filing the initiatory pleading" must disclose to the court the pendency of another proceeding concerning the same case. Obviously, since Union Bank initiated the case, it was its duty to make such disclosure.

○ In this case, Union Bank failed to discharge such obligation — an action tantamount to contempt of court.

■ Petitioner argues that respondent judge's order citing him in contempt for executing a false certification against forum shopping is erroneous. Petitioner claims that it was Union Bank's collection officer Tomas who signed the certificate. Petitioner argues that the certification should be signed by a Union Bank officer and not by counsel.

● As stated in Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, "if the acts of the party or his counsel clearly constitute willful and deliberate forum shopping, the same shall be ground for summary dismissal with prejudice and shall constitute direct contempt, as well as a cause for administrative sanctions."

○ This shows that even if the petitioner did not sign the certification, if from the circumstances one can infer a willful and deliberate attempt to mislead the courts, he can still be held in direct contempt.

TABAO v. GACOTT

30 November 2006 | GR No. 170720 | J. Chico - Nazario | Direct Contempt

PETITIONER: ATTY. ERNESTO P. TABAO and HEIRS OF CANDIDA CANOZA

RESPONDENTS: HON. JUDGE EUSTAQUIO GACOTT, JR. and SPOUSES LUCY DEMAALA and CLARITO DEMAALA, JR.

DOCTRINE:

A pleading containing derogatory, offensive or malicious statements when submitted before a court or judge in which the proceedings are pending is direct contempt because it is equivalent to a misbehavior committed in the presence of so near a court or judge as to interrupt the administration of justice.|

A judge may not hold a party in contempt for expressing concern on his impartiality even if the judge may have been insulted therein. Moreover, a judge should never allow himself to be moved by pride, prejudice, passion, or pettiness in the performance of his duties. The courts must exercise the power to punish for contempt for purposes that are impersonal because that power is intended as a safeguard not for the judges as persons but for the functions that they exercise.|

FACTS:

Clarito Demaala, Jr., the incumbent mayor of Narra, Palawan, and his wife Lucy Demaala filed a complaint for sum of money with prayer for the issuance of writ of preliminary attachment against the heirs of Candida Canoza before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Palawan and Puerto Princesa City.

The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 2921 and was raffled to Branch 47 presided by Judge Eustaquio Z. Gacott, Jr. the RTC issued a Writ of Preliminary Attachment. Upon a motion filed by the heirs of Candida, it issued an Order dated January 10, 1997 for the discharge of the writ after the approval of the counterbond in the amount of P1,500,000.00.

On July 14, 1997, the heirs of Candida, through their counsel, petitioner Atty. Ernesto P. Tabao, filed a Motion seeking the inhibition of respondent Judge from proceeding with the trial of the case.

1. That herein plaintiffs have been heard to brag about their close ties with the Honorable Judge of this Court, hence, creating the impression that he can get any order or decision that he wants, without any sweat;

2. That as proof of such words, the plaintiff has been claiming that despite the fact that the subject matter of this case did not even reach one million pesos, he managed to get an order of attachment on the whole estate, with an estimated amount of several millions of pesos, far exceeding their claim thereon;

3. That despite the fact that the whole of the estate is under attachment, he managed to isolate some respondents to be declared in contempt of court for violation of the standing order, while freeing some for the same liability, as if the Court can only see what the plaintiffs want it to see;

4. That such actions of this Honorable Court has been alleged to have been realized due to some promise of consideration that would be taken from the amount that may be elicited from herein defendants in anticipation of the promised victory in this case;

5. That most, if not all, cases of the plaintiffs has been deliberately raffled to be assigned to the Honorable Judge of this Court and that most, if not all of them, has been victorious due to a strong bond existing between Mayor Demaala and the Honorable Judge of this Court;

6. That such ties has been heard to have originated from their common sponsor to their respective positions which has been known to be the former Speaker of the House of Representatives, Ramon Mitra;

7. That although the undersigned counsel is not in the position to lend credence to such allusions against the integrity of this Honorable Court which is presumed to be immaculate, this representation is constrained to ask for this inhibition so as not to destroy the image and integrity of this tribunal, which in the minds of herein defendants has been put to question by the foregoing circumstances;

8. That this motion is being made so as to eradicate existing notion of the defendants that they are bound to lose this case, even before it begins.

On July 14, 1997, the motion to inhibit was heard, during which petitioner Tabao was made to explain why he should not be held in contempt of court for the statements he made therein.

His explanation, however, did not satisfy respondent Judge; thus, on the same day, the latter issued an Order declaring petitioner Tabao guilty of contempt of court. Respondent judge asserted that petitioner's statements are false, baseless and malicious, degraded his person and the court, and undermined the faith of the people in the administration of justice.

Petitioners maintain that respondent Judge clearly committed a grave abuse of his discretion when he issued the Order holding petitioner Tabao in direct contempt and imposing a penalty not in accord with the provisions of Section 1, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court. They assert that respondent cited petitioner Tabao in contempt as a personal vendetta against him; hence, the order of contempt is a patent nullity. Petitioners stress that the power to punish for contempt must be exercised in the preservative not vindictive principle, and on the corrective not retaliatory idea of punishment. They insist that courts must exercise the power of contempt for purposes that are impersonal because that power is intended as a safeguard not for the judges but for the functions they exercise.

Moreover, petitioners aver that petitioner Tabao did not make any contemptuous statement in the Motion to Inhibit. He was not privy to all the allegations stated therein and merely wrote down what had been relayed to him by his clients who, in turn, received the information from the plaintiffs, herein private respondents. They assert that petitioner Tabao, in fact, made this clear when he stated in paragraph 7 of the motion that he "is not in the position to lend credence to such allusions against the integrity of this Honorable Court which is presumed to be immaculate."

Petitioners claim that petitioner Tabao did not make any disrespectful allusions in the Motion to Inhibit. No statement therein can be considered to have directly accused respondent Judge of anything, as all informations raised therein were premised on mere allegations or products of hearsay which his clients, the defendants, heard from the plaintiffs. They stress that petitioner Tabao was constrained to file the Motion to Inhibit because his clients were losing confidence in the judicial system as a result of what the plaintiffs had told them. Petitioner Tabao claims that his clients' apprehension is not without any basis, and the fact that respondent Judge ordered the attachment of the defendants' properties worth several millions of pesos for a mere P944,000.00 claim on a P300,000.00 bond is enough to raise some doubts. What is more disturbing is that respondent Judge required a counterbond of P1,500,000.00 from his clients to free their assets from attachment.

For their part, private respondents aver that the appellate court did not err in sustaining the contempt order because petitioner had indeed employed words and statements in the Motion to Inhibit which are offensive and derogatory to the honor, dignity and reputation of respondent Judge. Petitioners' allegations in the motion were unsubstantiated and unfounded, hence, contemptuous.

PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:

RTC ● Declared petitioner Tabao guilty of contempt of court.

● He is ordered to pay a fine of TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00), Philippine Currency, to be paid immediately to the Clerk of Court with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to suffer an imprisonment of FIFTEEN (15) DAYS.

CA ● The CA held that there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent judge in holding petitioner Tabao guilty of direct contempt for the unfounded accusations the latter made in his motion for inhibition against the former.

● The appellate court found that the imputations were unsubstantiated thereby constituting derogatory remarks, unwarranted criticism and language disrespectful to the court, hence, contemptuous. However, the CA modified the judgment by dispensing with the jail sentence and reducing the fine to P2,000.00 which is the maximum amount provided for in the Rules of Court.

ISSUE/S:

1. Whether Atty. Tabao’s being held in contempt of court was proper. (NO)

RULING:

WHEREFORE premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals' Decision of September 16, 2005 and Resolution of December 2, 2005 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The July 14, 1997 Order of the Regional Trial Court of Palawan and Puerto Princesa City declaring petitioner Atty. Ernesto P. Tabao in contempt of court is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.

1. No. At first glance, the motion to inhibit would seem to contain disdainful and unfounded accusations against the respondent. However, a closer look thereof would reveal that petitioner was not actually imputing upon the respondent the acts which were mentioned therein. He was merely stating the reasons why his clients were losing hope of getting a fair trial in respondent Judge's court, which was precisely the ground for the motion for inhibition filed by petitioner. This is evident from his statement in the motion that he is "constrained to ask for this inhibition so as not to destroy the image and integrity of this tribunal, which in the minds of herein defendants has been put to question by the foregoing circumstances." Hence, applying the parameter set in the Patricio case, it cannot be said that petitioner Tabao is guilty of contempt since there was clearly no intention to debase the dignity of the court.

AUSTRIA V. MASAQUEL

31 August 1967 | GR No. L-22356 | ZALDIVAR, J. | Direct Contempt

PETITIONER: DOMINGO V. AUSTRIA

RESPONDENTS: HON. ANTONIO C. MASAQUEL, in his capacity as the Presiding Judge of Branch II of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan

DOCTRINE:

"The power to punish for contempt of court should be exercised on the preservative and not on the vindictive principle. Only occasionally should the court invoke its inherent power in order to retain that respect without which the administration of justice must falter or fail." The power to punish for contempt, being drastic and extraordinary in its nature, should not be resorted to unless necessary in the interest of justice.

FACTS:

1. Austria was the plaintiff in a civil case involving 3 parcels of land in Pangasinan against Pedro Bravo. Respondent Judge Masaquel rendered a decision declaring the plaintiffs the owners of the land in question and ordering the defendant to vacate the lands. The plaintiffs filed a motion for the immediate execution of the judgment — which motion was granted by the respondent Judge.

2. Atty. Mariano C. Sicat, a former assistant or associate of the respondent Judge, entered his appearance as the new counsel for the defendant. Pedro Bravo, the defendant in the civil case, boasts to his neighbors that with his new lawyer, he will surely win the case.

3. Before the opening of the court's session, Atty. Daniel Macaraeg, counsel for petitioner, saw respondent Judge in his chamber and verbally transmitted to him the request of petitioner that he (the Judge) inhibit himself from further hearing the case upon the ground that the new counsel for the defendant, Atty. Sikat, was his former associate. The respondent Judge, however, rejected the request because, according to him, the reason for the request of his inhibition is not one of the grounds for disqualification of a judge provided for in the Rules of Court.

4. When the case was called for hearing, the Presiding Judge called on one of the plaintiffs who was present, Domingo Austria, and inquired from the latter if it was true that he asked his lawyer Atty. Macaraeg to approach the Judge in chambers and to ask him to disqualify himself from trying this case because defendant's lawyer, Atty. Sicat was formerly associated with the said Judge. To this query Domingo Austria answered in the affirmative.

5. The Court considers the actuation of the plaintiff Domingo Austria, in the premises, as offensive, insulting and a reflection on the integrity and honesty of the Presiding Judge of this Court and shows his lack of respect to the Court. Thus, the Presiding Judge declared said plaintiff Domingo Austria in direct contempt of court and he was ordered to pay a fine of P50.00

ISSUE/S:

1. Whether or not the order citing Petitioner Austria in direct contempt valid

RULING:

WHEREFORE, the order of respondent Judge dated February 10, 1964, in Civil Case No. 13259 of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, declaring petitioner in direct contempt of court and ordering him to pay a fine of P50.00, is hereby annulled and set aside; and it is ordered that the sum of P50.00, paid under protest by petitioner as a fine, be refunded to him. No costs. It is so ordered.

RATIO:

NO.

It is our considered view that when the petitioner requested respondent Judge to inhibit himself from further trying the case upon the ground that the counsel for the opposite party was the former associate of the respondent Judge, petitioner did so because he was impelled by a justifiable apprehension which can occur in the mind of a litigant who sees what seems to be an advantage on the part of his adversary; and that the petitioner made his request in a manner that was not disrespectful, much less insulting or offensive to the respondent Judge or to the court.

The apprehension of petitioner regarding the probable bias of respondent Judge does not appear to be groundless or entirely devoid of reason. The respondent Judge had decided the case in favor of petitioner and his co-plaintiffs, and that upon plaintiffs' timely motion and filing of bond they were already placed in possession of the lands in question pending appeal. It was when Atty. Sicat took over as new counsel for defendant that the latter was given back the properties, upon a motion to stay the execution of the judgment which was filed by said counsel and was granted by respondent Judge over the opposition of petitioner's counsel. Again, when the same counsel for defendant filed a motion for a new trial, said motion was granted by respondent Judge in spite of the vigorous objection of counsel for the petitioner and his co-plaintiffs. And then the petitioner became aware of the fact that his adversary, the defendant Pedro Bravo, had been boasting in San Carlos that he was sure to win his case because of his new lawyer.

While We consider it improper for a litigant or counsel to see a judge in chambers and talk to him about a matter related to the case pending in the court of said judge, in the case now before Us We do not consider it as an act of contempt of court when petitioner asked his counsel to see respondent Judge in his chamber and request him to disqualify himself upon a ground which respondent Judge might consider just or valid. It is one thing to act not in accordance with the rules, and another thing to act in a manner which would amount to a disrespect or an affront to the dignity of the court or judge. We believe that the circumstances that led respondent Judge to declare petitioner in direct contempt of court do not indicate any deliberate design on the part of petitioner to disrespect respondent Judge or to cast aspersion against his integrity as a judge. On the contrary, it may be said that petitioner wanted to avoid cause for any one to doubt the integrity of respondent Judge.

Hence, while it may be conceded that in requesting the disqualification of a judge by reason of his relation with a party or counsel there is some implication of the probability of his being partial to one side, the request can not constitute contempt of court if done honestly and in a respectful manner, as was done by petitioner in the present case. Perhaps the fault of petitioner, if at all, is his having asked his counsel to make the request to respondent Judge inside the latter's chamber.

OCLARIT V. PADERANGA

January 24, 2001 | G.R. NO. 139519| Pardo, J. | Direct Contempt

DOCTRINE:

The presiding judge must state expressly in the order the facts constituting the contemptuous behavior of petitioner and declaring him in direct contempt of court. Moreover, an order of direct contempt is not immediately executory or enforceable. The contemner must be afforded a reasonable remedy to extricate or purge himself of the contempt. A person adjudged in direct contempt by any court may not appeal therefrom, but may avail himself of certiorari or prohibition. In such case, the execution of the judgment shall be suspended pending resolution of such petition provided the contemner files a bond fixed by the court which rendered the judgment and conditioned that he will abide by and perform the judgment should the petition be decided against him.

FACTS:

Petitioner is a lawyer engaged in the private practice of law principally in the City of Cagayan de Oro and the province of Misamis Oriental. Petitioner was counsel for the plaintiffs in the case-entitled, spouses Gregorio and Pelegrina Babatido v. Elnora and Teodoro Abella, et al., which was filed before the Regional Trial Court, Misamis Oriental, Branch 38 wherein Judge Maximo G. W. Paderanga was the presiding judge.

The aforecited case was scheduled for continuation of pre-trial before the lower court. When the case was first heard on pre-trial, petitioner filed a motion to approve compromise agreement entered into by the parties pointing out that the compromise agreement was reached before a barangay captain. Counsel for the defendants opposed the motion because the defendants were placed in a disadvantageous condition, arguing that the case was before the court, not before the barangay. The court ruled that the compromise agreement was not before the barangay captain but before the court. The parties settled before the barangay captain. At this point, petitioner informed the court that the compromise agreement was signed and was explaining further when the court told him repeatedly to "shut up." Then petitioner requested the court to stop shouting at him. The court rhetorically asked: "why should the court precisely not cite you for contempt for doing that," that is, for settling the case before the barangay captain.

Consequently, the presiding judge cited petitioner in contempt of court and imposed on him a fine of P1,000.00. Petitioner remarked that the presiding judge was becoming very arrogant. In reply to that, respondent judge declared: "I will put you in jail. Get a policeman." At that moment, the court issued a verbal order holding petitioner for direct contempt of court and sentencing petitioner to serve one (1) day in jail and to pay a fine of P1,000.00. Respondent judge issued a "detention commitment" to the Jail Warden, City Jail, Cagayan de Oro City, committing the person of petitioner Oclarit for direct contempt. Hence, petitioner filed the instant petition.

ISSUE/S:

1. Whether or not petitioner was guilty of direct contempt of court

2. Whether or not the respondent judge may declare petitioner guilty by an order without stating the facts on which it is based and imposing upon him the corresponding penalty.

3. Whether or not the order finding petitioner guilty of direct contempt of court is immediately executory

RULING:

1. NO. Petitioner Oclarit was not guilty of direct contempt of court. There was nothing contumacious in the submission to the court of a motion for approval of compromise agreement reached before a barangay captain in a case pending before the court. It is not required that a compromise agreement be