People v Alvero

GR No. L-820; Apr 11, 1950


Aurelio Sevilla Alvero alias Reli was charged with treason on twenty-two (22) counts (Annex A) before the People's Court, After trial, said Court in a 45-page decision penned by Judge Jose S. Bautista, Associate Judge of said Court, concurred in by Associate Judges Dizon and Tancinco, found the defendant guilty on all counts except the 10th relative to his interview v/ith Leonardo Garcia, and the 18th which refers to his alleged ordering, helping in and causing the burning of the buildings west of Taft Avenue and south of Libertad street in Pasay, and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua with the accessories of the law, to pay a fine of P10,000 plus costs, crediting him with one-half of the preventive imprisonment; he has already suffered.

Appealing from that decision of conviction, Alvero in a 112-page brief, assails the decision, assigning forty-two (42) errors said to have been committed by the trial court, asking that the judgment of conviction be totally reversed and that he be acquitted.

The People's Court grouped the 22 counts under three main classifications: economic, political, and military collaboration. Under economic collaboration come counts 2 and 3 referring to appellant's business or trading activities, buying war materials and selling them to the enemy, under his company called ASA TRADING which trade-name stands for his name Aurelio Sevilla Alvero. In political, collaboration are included three groups, namely: the letter of congratulations to President Laurel relative to his declaration of war against the United States and Great Britain (count 4); defendants membership in the KALIBAPI (count 1); and the formation and organization of the New Leaders' Association (counts 6, 7, 8, 9, 12, 19, 21, and 22). Under military collaboration, come five groups, which are: defendant's relations with and membership in the MAKAPILI (counts 5 and 20); his organization of the "Bisig Bakal Ñg Tagala" (counts 13, 14, 15, 16, and 17); the meeting at the Ayuntamiento de Manila ([City Hall], count 17); organization of OUR PEOPLE'S OWN GUERRILLA ([O.P. O. G.], count 11); and the burning of buildings in Pasay (count 18), The last seven pages of the decision of the trial court ate devoted to discussion and findings on the appellant's adherence to the enemy.

Appellant also urges that the People's Court erred in holding that the Bisig Bakal Ñg Tagala was organized for treasonous activities or that it engaged in such treasonous activities. The very objectives of the Bisig Bakal Ñg Tagala, its organization into a military unit with arms, uniforms, and military discipline, its activities in taking over and guarding the barracks and installations and equipment left by the Japanese Army in the City of Manila and the offer made by the appellant of this Bisigbakal organization to help in the maintenance of peace and order which at that time included the suppression of the activities of the guerrillas which was then regarded as subversive by the Japanese, abundantly show that this organization which the appellant helped to found and to organize, was of a military character intended to and actually used to help the Japanese Armed Forces in their work of maintaining peace and order, suppressing the resistance movement and defending the City of Manila against the American Liberation Forces and their guerrilla colleagues.

Under his 3rd assigned error, appellant maintains that the People's Court erred in finding and holding that his desire and efforts to maintain peace and order constituted treason and in support thereof, he cites article 297 of the United States Rules of Land Warfare as regards the right of a military occupant to demand and enforce from the inhabitants of occupied territory such obedience as may be necessary for the security of its forces, and for 


Can the appellant’s treasonous sympathies and intention be translated into overt acts of treason?


YES. It is to be borne in mind however, that according to international law (Hague Conventions of 1907, Art. 43), the duty to maintain peace and order is imposed upon the military occupant and not upon the inhabitants of the occupied territory. In the present case, the appellant through his Bisig Bakal Ñg Tagala not only offered to assist but actually assisted in the maintenance of peace and order through his military organization. In so doing, his purpose according to himself was to relieve the Japanese Armed Forces of the necessity of detailing and assigning a portion of their forces for the maintenance of peace and order, so that they could concentrate on defending the City of Manila against those trying to enter it, who we all know were none other than the American Forces and their guerrilla colleagues. Furthermore, as already stated, the maintenance of peace and order at that time meant the suppression of the guerrillas who were regarded as subversive elements because they were killing Japanese soldiers and spies.

Adherence alone is not indictable. In a free and democratic country like the Philippines, there is freedom of thought and free and unhampered discussion and expression of sentiment. But when he translated such as joining the Makapili, establishing his military organization Bisig Bakal Ng Tagala and offering its services to take charge of the maintenance of peace and order, which included the suppression of the guerrillas, so that the Japanese could concentrate their forces in defending the City of Manila by fighting against the American and guerrilla forces trying to enter and liberate it, then he (appellant) breached as it were the walls of allegiance and loyalty which the treason law has erected to surround and protect the security and integrity of the nation, and he may then be held criminally liable.

Laurel v Misa

G.R. No. L-409; Jan 30, 1947


Anastacio Laurel, petitioner herein filed for a petition for habeas corpus based on a theory that a Filipino citizen who adhered to an enemy by giving them aid and comfort during the Japanese occupation cannot be prosecuted for the crime of treason for the reason that the sovereignty of the legitimate government in the Philippines was suspended, and that there was a change of sovereignty over the Philippine islands upon the proclamation of the Philippine Republic.


Was the sovereignty of the legitimate government in the Philippines suspended during the Japanese occupation?


NO. The Court ruled that the sovereignty of the government or sovereign de jure is not transferred to the occupier and must therefore necessarily remain vested in the legitimate government. The sovereignty vested in the titular government, which is the supreme power which governs a body politic or society which constitute the state, must be distinguished from the exercise of the rights inherent thereto, and may be destroyed, severed and transferred to another, but cannot be suspended because the existence of sovereignty cannot be suspended without putting it out of existence or divesting the possessor thereof. What may be suspended in this case is the exercise of the rights of sovereignty, as the control and government of the territory is temporarily passed on to the military occupant. As a corollary of the conclusion that the sovereignty itself is not suspended and subsists during the enemy occupation, the allegiance of the inhabitants to their legitimate government or sovereign subsists. Therefore there is no such thing as suspended allegiance. It is worth noting that while the offenses against public order to be preserved by the legitimate government were inapplicable as offenses against the invader, unless adopted by him, and also considered as inoperative as against the ousted government for the latter was not responsible for the preservation of the public order in the occupied territory, Article 114 of the Revised Penal Code will still be applicable in terms of treason committed against the national security of the legitimate government. It is because the inhabitants of the occupied territory are still bound by their allegiance to the legitimate government during the enemy occupation. It is therefore held that absolute and permanent allegiance of the inhabitants of a territory occupied by the enemy of their legitimate government or sovereign is not abrogated or severed by the enemy occupation. Hence the act of an inhabitant of an occupied territory giving aid and comfort to the military occupant, regardless if it was through force, threat or intimidation, is an act of treason punishable under Article 114 of the RPC.

Yamashita v Styler

GR No L-129; Dec 19, 1945


Tomoyuki Yamashita, erstwhile commanding general of the 14th army group of the Japanese Imperial Army in the Philippines, and now charged before an American Military Commission with the most monstrous crimes ever committed against the American and Filipino peoples, comes to this Court with a petition for habeas corpus and prohibition against Lt. Gen. Wilhelm D. Styer, Commanding General of the United States Army Forces, Western Pacific. It is alleged therein that petitioner after his surrender became a prisoner of war of the United States of America but was later removed from such status and placed in confinement as an accused war criminal charged before an American Military Commission constituted by respondent Lieutenant General Styer. He now asks that he be reinstated to his former status as prisoner of war


Can a petition for habeas corpus reinstate Yamashita to his former status as prisoner of war?


NO. The court believes and so holds that the petition for habeas corpus is untenable. It seeks no discharge of petitioner from confinement but merely his restoration to his former status as a prisoner of war, to be interned, not confined. The relative difference as to the degree of confinement in such cases is a matter of military measure, disciplinary in character, beyond the jurisdiction of civil courts. Neither may the petition for prohibition prosper against Lt. Gen. Wilhelm D. Styer. The military Commission is not made party respondent in this case, and although it may be acting, as alleged, without jurisdiction, no order may be issued in these case proceedings requiring it to refrain from trying the petitioner.

People v Agoncillo

G.R. No. L-985;  Jan 23, 1948


Under the theory of the prosecution, appellant's adherence to the enemy is inferable from the following alleged facts: (a) In the afternoon of September 20, 1944, while the appellant was taking a bath in the house of his neighbor Rufina Cepeda, Olimpio Do, examined appellant's clothes and found therein appellant's identification card written in Japanese and Chinese characters tending to show that the appellant was a Japanese undercover; and (b) In January, 1945, after a trip to Bohol, Rufina Cepeda told the appellant that there were guerrillas in Bohol and that Japanese notes were no longer accepted in said place. 

In the evening of the next day, Rufina Cepeda was arrested and asked about things she saw in Bohol. Rufina was detained for three days. After her release, the appellant came to her house and got some chickens for the consumption of the Japanese who arrested her. A Japanese also used to sleep once in a while in the appellant's house. 

Upon the other hand, appellant's alleged overt acts of giving aid and comfort to the enemy are summarized in the brief for the Government as follows: In the middle of April, 1944, the appellant sold about 300 kilos of alum crystals, at three pesos a kilo, to the Keribo, a construction company operated by the Japanese Army. 

Two or three weeks thereafter, he sold to the same entity some 100 pieces of water pipes, the price of which was not known then the appellant was seen on Jones Avenue helping push a handcart full of truck and auto tires, batteries and spare parts into the intermediate or high school premises then used by the Japanese Army as a motor pool.


Is Agoncillo guilty of treason?


NO. The Court held that the overt acts imputed to the appellant have not been duly proven. With respect to the sale of 300 kilos of alum crystals, the testimony of the prosecution witness Lorenzo Barria to the effect that the price was P3 a kilo, is not corroborated by any other witness. With respect to the alleged sale of 100 pieces of water pipes, counsel for the appellee admits that the price thereof was not known. An essential part of the overt act charged in the information was therefore lacking. 

The only detail that may at most be considered established by the prosecution refers to the fact that the appellant helped in pushing a handcart loaded with such articles, and the evidence is even uncertain in one respect, namely that the cart was brought either to the intermediate school premises or the high school building.

However even if the appellant had really sold alum crystals and water pipes, the same did not constitute treason. These items were not exclusively for war purposes, their sale did not necessarily carry an intention to adhere to the enemy. The theory of the prosecution is that the sale was treasonable in view of the other proven acts showing the appellant's adherence to the enemy. It appears that the alleged acts of adherence performed by the appellant took place after the overt act in question. It is not unlikely that at the time the appellant made the sale, his motive was purely personal gain, uninfluenced by any benefit inuring to the enemy. Where two probabilities arise from the evidence, the one compatible with the presumption of innocence will be adopted. (People vs. Agpangan, G. R. No. L-778, October 10, 1947.) Appellant is acquitted.

Gibbs v Rodriguez

GR No. L-1494; Aug 3, 1949


In 1941, Allison J. Gibbs, acting for himself and as attorney-in-fact for Allison D. Gibbs and Finley J. Gibbs, sold two parcels of land to Raymund Raymundo F. Navarro and R. F, Navarro & Co. for $125,000. Navarro paid $12,500 in cash and mortgaged the same property to Allison D. Gibbs and Finley J. property to Allison D. Gibbs and Finley J. Gibbs to Gibbs to secure the payment of the balance. The first installment was paid but none of the other installments were paid. Navarro sold the property to Eugelio Navarro sold the property to Eugelio Rodriguez Sr. for P40,000 who also assumed or P40,000 who also assumed the mortgage.  E. Rodriguez then assigned his rights to E. Rodriguez then assigned his rights to the property to Luzon Surety Co. for  P42,556.21 with the agreement that E.Rodriguez would remain jointly and remain jointly and severally and severally liable with Luzon Surety to be liable with Luzon Surety to the Gibbs.

The plaintiffs allege that during the Japanese occupation in 1943, Rodriguez and Luzon Surety unlawfully secured a cancellation of the mortgage. While the defendants allege that the Department of Enemy Property established by the Japanese Military Administration in the City of Manila required the defendants to pay to said department the debt due from them to use from them to the plaintiffs, who were considered as enemy nationals. Plaintiffs argued that the Department of Enemy Property had no authority to demand and had no authority to demand and accept payment. Meanwhile the defense produced evidence which showed that Gibbs agreed to consider the payment to the Japanese as war credit. This was shown through the affidavit of Luzon’s lawyer Arturo Tolentino, who visited Gibbs when the Japanese ordered the payment. Gibss stated that he understood the situation of Luzon and would consider the payment as war damage. The defendants had to take out a loan of P120,000 to pay the Japanese.  The CFI declared that the payment to the Japanese was invalid.


Was the payment to the Japanese as war damage valid?


YES. The Court ruled that the payment to the Japanese as war damage was valid. If the Japanese military occupant had power to sequestrate, as in this case it has sequestrated, the credit of an American creditor, it had subrogated itself into the rights, or stepped in the shoes, of the said creditor and, therefore, had the right to demand and accept, through the Japanese Enemy Property Custodian, the payment of all the debtor’s debt to said creditor in Japanese military notes without of course compelling the debtor to pay interests not yet then due, and completely released thereby said obligation, without prejudice to the creditor’s right to demand, through their government from the Japanese after the war, the reimbursement of the full value of their sequestered credit.

The present case is similar to the case of HSBC v Samanillo. In both cases, the question is whether or not the payment to the Japanese was a confiscation of the credit of the creditor. The Court also applied the ruling in Haw Pia v China Banking Corp. in the present case because they relied on the ruling in the Samanillo Case. In Haw Pia, the SC held that the collection by the Bank of Taiwan of the China Banking Corporation's credit from the latter's debtor by order of the order of the  Japanese Military Administration was not a confiscation but a sequestration of the enemy private personal property, and therefore the payment by the plaintiff Haw Pia to the Bank of Taiwan was valid and released plaintiff's obligation to the defendant bank. Therefore, they also have to reverse the decision of the lower court in the present case. The SC also stated that the plaintiff's contention that the debt of the defendants in the present case was payable in dollars or its equivalent in Philippine peso at the option of the plaintiffs is immaterial, because both the Philippine pesos and American dollars at the rate of one dollar for two one dollar for two pesos were then legal tender in the Philippines.

People v Godinez

GR No L-895; Dec 31, 1947


Godinez (herein accused-appellant) was a shipmaster in the Philippines coastwise trade before the Pacific War. After the Japanese invasion, from May, 1942 to June, 1943, he rendered services to the Japanese Navy, as pilot in the Port of Cebu, bringing their ships into harbor and otherwise performing work connected with navigation. He was paid monthly salaries. After a period of rest due to ill health, he was again engaged by the Japanese Army to do the same chores from May, 1943 to October, 1944, at varying rates of compensation. He was prosecuted and thereafter convicted for treason. The accused defended that he had to serve the Japanese because he was required by them to do so, that he could not give any valid excuses, that if he made any false statements he would be caught, and killed; and that even if he could escape, the many members of his immediate family would be left to their ruthless ill-will. It was contended however that Godinez’ help to the Japanese together with criminal intention to betray, render him guilty of treason. Proof of this traitorous intent is made to consist of five circumstances described in the brief of the Solicitor General: 1) Accused often went to the coffee shop of S. P. Banis and during the discussion between Banis and appellant, the latter always showed his pro-Japanese sentiments. On one occasion, Banis told him about the expected arrival of the Americans, and the appellant exclaimed that Banis was crazy in believing that the Americans were coming back to the Philippines, because according to the appellant, the American forces would never back to these Islands; 2) Appellant was seen inside his own automobile which carried a Japanese flag and on his left arm, appellant was wearing a band with Japanese characters; 3) When the Japanese landed in Cebu City, the accused with two other persons went up a Japanese ship anchored alongside the Pier, presented his respects to the Japanese officer in charge of the boat, handed to him a revolver which was examined by said Japanese officer. The appellant showed how the firearm worked by firing the pistol; 4) For about two years, the appellant had a Japanese flag placed on the door of his house situated at D. Jakosalem Street, Cebu City about a foot wide and about two feet long and on the left side of the door was a piece of board with Japanese Characters written on it; and 5) When American planes were dropping bombs in Cebu City, the appellant who was in the lawn of his house said, more or less, “Those sons of the bitches of Americans (referring to the American aviators) are the gangsters of the United States; they are drunk, they will go down".


Should Godinez be held guilty for treason?


NO. On the first point, the accused denied having stated the Americans could never come back, admitting, however, having expressed the belief that it was not easy for them to return, in view of the successive victories of the Imperial hordes at that time. The Court held that even if appellant had uttered the words attributed to him, it is doubtful whether they exhibited adherence to the foe, unless it is shown that he wanted, or rejoiced in the inability to return of the American forces. It is hard to believe appellant wished the defeat of our allies, because he had two sons in the guerrilla forces. Regarding the second point, although there was proof about a Nippon flag fluttering on the automobile the appellant rode, no evidence was adduced that the car belonged to him. On the third point, the Court held Godinez’ statement to be credible. Godinez swore that when the Japanese arrived in Cebu, they arrested him, and when they found, after investigation, that he was a marine officer they ordered him to report the next day to the Port Surveyor, bringing any firearms he had in his possession; that he did as directed and surrendered his pistol. On the Fourth point, it was admitted by the witness of the prosecution that after the fall of Cebu City the Japanese issued orders requiring every resident to hoist a Japanese flag in their houses and that refusal to obey meant death. The appellant then merely complied with the order. Lastly, Godinez did not make insulting statements against the American aviators that raided Cebu. The Court reaches the conclusion that the defendant's disloyal heart or treacherous mind has not been established beyond reasonable doubt. He is then absolved.

Wilson v Berkenkotter

GR No L-4476; Apr 20, 1953


In 1950, Wilson consigned in the Court of First Instance of Manila the sum of P625.51. He alleged that said amount consigned was the equivalent of P37,530.40 in Japanese currency which Berkenkotter paid for him in 1944 to the Chartered Bank of India, Australia and China. He alleged that had made an offer of payment of P625.51 to the defendant but the latter refused to accept payment without any justifiable cause. He prayed that after due hearing the court declare the consignation as properly made.

Berkenkotter in his answer alleged that in 1938 he and plaintiff Wilson and Gulick obtained a loan of P90,000 from the Chartered Bank of India, Australia and China, and that they signed a promissory note wherein they jointly and severally promised to pay said loan to the bank. During the occupation of the Philippines during the Pacific war the Japanese Military authorities placed the Chartered Bank of India, Australia and China and other enemy banks under liquidation and for that purpose designated the Bank of Taiwan as liquidator of enemy banks; that upon demand by the Bank of Taiwan Berkenkotter paid the sum of P112,591.22 in military notes as full payment of the P90,000 loan including interest from 1941 up to 1944, the date of payment. He made a demand on both Wilson and Gulick for the settlement of their shares in said obligation with a certain offer to which Gulick accepted the offer and paid P18,902 but Wilson refused to take advantage thereof and instead tendered the amount of P625.51 as payment of his share in the solidary and joint obligation. This tender of payment was refused and so he made demand upon Wilson for payment of his share of the P90,000 with interest but Wilson refused to make payment.

The trial court rule in favor of Wilson and ordered Berkenkotter to received the consigned amount as full payment of the indebtedness.


Can Berkenkotter be subrogated with the rights of the bank?


NO. Appellant does not, as claimed by his counsel, step into the shoes of the bank. He cannot enforce the original obligation created in 1938. The bank could collect the whole amount of the loan from any one of the solidary co-debtors, and in fact did from one of them. This, the appellant may not do just because he paid the entire loan. According to article 1145 of the Civil Code, payment by one of the solidary debtors entitles him to claim from his co-debtors only the share pertaining to each with interest on the amount advanced, and this is what the appellant is doing, only that he wants to collect the whole amount paid by him for Wilson in genuine Philippine currency instead of the equivalent thereof under the Ballantyne schedule. Moreover, on grounds of equity appellant may not be allowed to collect from the appellee more than the real value of what he paid for him, especially when the difference between the military notes and the genuine Philippine currency in November, 1944, was so great.

Raquiza v Bradford

G.R. No. L-44;  Sept 13, 1945


Alleging in their petition for a writ of habeas corpus, dated August 30, 1945, that they have been and are being "confined, restrained and deprived" of their liberty in the Correctional Institution for Women, petitioners, Lily Raquiza, Haydee Tee Han Kee and Emma Link Infante, pray that the officers therein named, to wit, Lt. Col. L.J. Bradford and Capt. Inez L. Twindle of the CIC, U.S. Army, "or whoever acts in her place or stead," be directed to appear before this Court and produce the bodies of petitioners, and to show cause why petitioners should not forthwith be set at liberty.

Respondent Lt. Col., Bradford, having been served with this Court's order to show cause dated August 31, 1945, made return thereto dated September 5, 1945, to which are attached as parts thereof certain commitment orders, the first and last emanating from the Headquarters of the Sixth Army, 306th Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment, and the second from that of the United States Army Forces in the Far East, 493rd Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment.Respondent Captain Caroline De Eason, WAC, having been served with this Court's order to show cause dated September 7, 1945, made return thereto dated on the same day.

It appears from these returns, as well as from the arguments of counsel, that by virtue of the proclamation issued by General of the Army MacArthur on December 29, 1944, petitioner Lily Raquiza was on March 13, 1945, arrested by the 306th Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment of the U.S. Sixth Army, and detained under Security Commitment Order No. 385 wherein she was charged “deemed a risk to the security of the U.S. Forces for the reasons set forth above. The commanding officer of any military stockade, jail, or comparable installation in which this person may be confined is authorized and directed to detain him in custody until released by competent military authority.”

In said Schedule A the specific complaint or charge against complaint or charge against petitioner Lily Raquiza is "Espionage activity for Japanese."As to petitioner Haydee Tee Han Kee, the specific complaint or charge against petitioner Tee Han Kee in Schedule A-2 is "Active collaboration with the enemy." With regard to petitioner Emma Link Infante, she was charged with "Active collaboration with the Japanese." 

General of the Army MacArthur therein published and declared it to be his purpose, among other things, to hold in restraint the persons referred to, when apprehended, "for the duration of the war; whereafter, I shall release them to the Philippine Government for its judgment upon their respective cases."


Was the war already terminated within the meaning of the proclamation made by General MacArthur?


NO. The war, in the legal sense, continues until, and terminates at the same time of, some formal proclamation of peace by an authority competent to proclaim it. It is the province of the political dept, & not the judicial dept, to determine if war has ended. Fact that delivery of certain persons under custody of the US Army has already begun doesn’t mean that the war has, in the legal sense, already terminated, w/c clearly it hasn’t. Delivery w/in power of military authorities to make even before was terminated.

As such, Civil Courts shouldn’t interfere. A foreign army permitted to march through a friendly country or to be stationed in it, is exempt from civil & criminal jurisdiction of the place. Grant of free passage implies a waiver of all jurisdiction over troops during passage (let them exercise their own discipline). Any attempt by our civil Courts to exercise jurisdiction over US troops would be a violation of our country’s faith. On the other hand, petitioners may have recourse to proper military authorities.

Haw Pia v  Banking Corp

GR No L-554; Apr 9, 1948


Haw Pia instituted an action against  Banking Corporation to cancel the mortgage on the property described in the complaint and to deliver to the plaintiff the TCT. The cause of action is that the plaintiff had a debt of P5,103.35 by way of overdraft in an account payable on demand from  Banking Corporation. This, together with its interests were paid on different occasions to the respondent through the Bank of Taiwan, Ttd., that was appointed by the Japanese Military authorities as liquidator of the  Banking Corp. After the hearing of the case, the trial court rendered a decision holding that, as there was no evidence presented to show that the defendant  Banking Corporation had authorized the Bank of Taiwan, Ltd., to accept the payment of the plaintiff's debt to the said defendant, and said Bank of Taiwan, as an agency of the Japanese invading army, was not authorized under the international law to liquidate the business of the  Banking Corporation, the payment has not extinguished the indebtedness of the plaintiff to the said defendant under article 1162 of the Civil Code.


1. Did the Japanese Military Administration have authority to order the liquidation or winding up of the business of defendant-appellee  Banking Corporation, and to appoint the Bank of Taiwan liquidator authorized as such to accept the payment by the plaintiff-appellant to said defendant-appellee? 

2. Did such payment by the plaintiff-appellant extinguish her obligation to said defendant-appellee? 


1. Yes. The Japanese military authorities had power, under the international law, to order the liquidation of the  Banking Corporation and to appoint and authorize the Bank of Taiwan as liquidator to accept the payment in question, because such liquidation is not confiscation of the properties of the bank appellee, but a mere sequestration of its assets which required the liquidation or winding up of the business of said bank. All the arguments to the contrary in support of the decision appealed from the predicated upon the erroneous assumption that the liquidation or winding up of the affairs of the  Banking Corporation, in order to determine its liabilities and net assets to be sequestrated or controlled, was an act of confiscation or appropriation of private property contrary to Article 46, section III of the Hague Regulations of 1907.

2. Yes. It having been shown above, that the Japanese Military Forces had power to sequestrate and impound the assets or funds of the  Banking Corporation, and for that purpose to liquidate it by collecting the debts due to said bank from its debtors, and paying its creditors, and therefore to appoint the Bank of Taiwan as liquidator with the consequent authority to make the collection, it follows evidently that the payments by the debtors to the Bank of Taiwan of their debts to the  Banking Corporation have extinguished their obligation to the latter. Said payments were made to a person, the Bank of Taiwan, authorized to receive them in the name of the bank creditor under article 1162, of the Civil Code. Because it is evident the words "a person authorized to receive it," as used therein, means not only a person authorized by the same creditor, but also a person authorized by law to do so, such as guardian, executor or administrator of estate of a deceased, and assignee or liquidator of a partnership or corporation, as well as any other who may be authorized to do so by law. The fact that the money with which that debts have been paid were Japanese war notes does not affect the validity of the payments. The provision of article 1170 of our Civil Code to the effect that "payment of debts of money must be made in the species stipulated and if it not to deliver such specie in silver or gold coins which is legal tender," is not applicable to the present case, because the contract between the parties was to pay Philippine pesos and not some specifically defined species of money. The Philippine peso and half-pesos including the Philippine Treasury Certificate was and is legal tender in the Philippines under section 612 of the Administrative Code, as amended by Act No. 4199.

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