IN THE MATTER TO DECLARE IN CONTEMPT OF COURT HON. DUMATONG
04 August 2006 | GR No. 150274 | Prospective/Retroactive Effect of the RoC
PETITIONER: IN THE MATTER TO DECLARE IN CONTEMPT OF COURT HON. SIMEON A. DATUMANONG in the latter’s capacity as Secretary of the Department of Public Works and Highways. JIMMIE F. TEL-EQUEN
DOCTRINE:
Well-settled is the rule that procedural laws are construed to be applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage, and are deemed retroactive in that sense and to that extent. As a general rule, the retroactive application of procedural laws cannot be considered violative of any personal rights because no vested right may attach to nor arise therefrom.
FACTS:
1. The Ombudsman Task Force on Public Works and Highways filed with the OMB an administrative complaint against petitioner Tel-Equen and several others, relative to the anomalous payment of the bailey bridge components owned by the government. The Administrative Adjudication Bureau of the OMB found respondents guilty of dishonesty, falsification of public documents, misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and ordered their dismissal from the service with accessory penalties pursuant to Section 23 of Rule XIV, Book V of Executive Order No. 292 (Revised Administrative Code of 1987).
2. The Motions for Reconsideration were denied. Three (3) consolidated petitions were filed before the Court of Appeals affirmed with modification of the Administrative Adjudication Bureau of the Office of the Ombudsman.
3. Petitioner, together with his two co-accused, appealed (docketed as G.R. No. 144694). Pending the appeal, Sec. Datumanong issued the assailed Memorandum Order, dated 05 October 2001, where petitioners were ordered to be dropped or dismissed from the service.
4. Hence, the instant petition to cite Sec. Datumanong in contempt of court.
a. Petitioner contends that in issuing the Memorandum Order despite knowledge of the pendency of G.R. No. 144694, Sec. Datumanong committed a contumacious act, a gross and blatant display of abuse and an unlawful interference with the proceedings before the Court.
5. Under Section 27 of RA 6770 and Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, the punishment imposed upon petitioner, i.e. suspension without pay for one year, is not among those listed as final and unappealable, hence, immediately executory. An appeal timely filed, such as the one filed in the instant case, will stay the immediate implementation of the decision.
PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:
CA ● Affirmed with modification the decision of the AAB-OMB
ISSUE/S:
1. WON Sec. Datumanong should be cited in contempt of court for issuing the Memorandum Order despite the pendency of Tel-Equen’s appeal - NO
RULING:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition to cite former Secretary Simeon A. Datumanong of the Department of Public Works and Highways in contempt of court for issuing Memorandum Order dated October 5, 2001 dismissing petitioner Jimmie F. Tel-Equen from the service is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
RATIO:
1. NO.
● The issuance of the Memorandum Order by Secretary Datumanong was not a contumacious conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct or degrade the administration of justice. The remedy of the petitioner is not to file a petition to cite him in contempt of court but to elevate the error to the higher court for review and correction. At most, it may be considered only an error of judgment or a result of confusion considering the different rules regarding execution of decisions pending appeal.
● However, two events supervened since the filing of this petition that would support its dismissal.
o First, on March 28, 2005, the Court in G.R. No. 144694 affirmed the decisions of the Court of Appeals and Administrative Adjudication Bureau of the Office of the Ombudsman ordering petitioner dismissed from the service for dishonesty, falsification of public documents, misconduct, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
o Second, Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman was amended by Administrative Order No. 17 wherein the pertinent provision on the execution of decisions pending appeal is now essentially similar to Section 47 of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service and other related laws.
o “Section 7. Finality and execution of decision. - Where the respondent is absolved of the charge, and in case of conviction where the penalty imposed is public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one month, or a fine equivalent to one month salary, the decision shall be final, executory and unappealable. In all other cases, the decision may be appealed to the Court of Appeals on a verified petition for review under the requirements and conditions set forth in Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the written Notice of the Decision or Order denying the Motion for Reconsideration. x x x”
● Well-settled is the rule that procedural laws are construed to be applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage, and are deemed retroactive in that sense and to that extent. As a general rule, the retroactive application of procedural laws cannot be considered violative of any personal rights because no vested right may attach to nor arise therefrom.
● In the case at bar, the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman are clearly procedural and no vested right of the petitioner is violated as he is considered preventively suspended while his case is on appeal. Moreover, in the event he wins on appeal, he shall be paid the salary and such other emoluments that he did not receive by reason of the suspension or removal. Besides, there is no such thing as a vested interest in an office, or even an absolute right to hold office. Excepting constitutional offices which provide for special immunity as regards salary and tenure, no one can be said to have any vested right in an office.
COLMENAR V. COLMENAR
June 21, 2021 | G.R. No. 252467 | LAZARO-JAVIER, J | Prospective/Retroactive Application of Rules of Court; Applicability to pending actions
PETITIONER: Frank Colmenar
RESPONDENTS: Apollo A. Colmenar, Jeannie Colmenar Mendoza, Victoria Jet Colmenar, Philippine Estates Corporation, Amaia Land Corporation, Crisanta Realty Development Corporation, Property Company of Friends, and The Register of Deeds of the Province of Cavite
DOCTRINE:
The 2019 Amendments to the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure shall apply to all pending cases, except when their application is not feasible or would work injustice. And as with all things new, precedence is generally scarce, hence, its application must be done with utmost caution and in strict adherence to its provisions.
FACTS:
1. Petitioner Frank Colmenar, a legitimate son of the late Francisco Jesus Colmenar, filed a complaint against Apollo Colmenar, Jeannie Colmenar Mendoza, Victoria Jet Colmenar, and several corporations over the nullity of deeds of extrajudicial settlements, deeds of sale, cancellation of titles, and damages resulting from transactions involving his late father’s estate. The complaint averred that the individual respondents executed extrajudicial settlements that excluded Frank Colmenar from his lawfully inherited property, resulting in a series of property sales to the respondent corporations without his knowledge and consent.
2. ProFriends invoked as affirmative defense lack of cause of action, while PEC, Crisanta Realty, and Amaia averred that the complaint failed to state a cause of action against them. Apollo and Amaia, on the other hand, filed their respective motions to dismiss.
3. In the meantime, the 2019 amendment to the Rules of Court took effect on May 1, 2020. The Regional Trial Court dismissed the complaint and applied the 2019 Amendments to the 1997 Revised Rules on Civil Procedure. The RTC issued an order dismissing the Complaint against PEC, Crisanta Realty, Amaia, and ProFriends applying Sec. 12, Rule 8 of the 2019 Amendments to the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. Judge Gill resolved motu proprio the affirmative defense of failure to state a cause of action.
4. Frank Colmenar, consequently, filed for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court. He faults Judge Gill for applying the 2019 Rules on Civil Procedure to the case, and based thereon, motu proprio acted on the affirmative defenses of respondent companies despite the clear injustice it caused to him.
PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:
RTC ● RTC dismissed the complaint and applied the 2019 Amendments to the 1997 Revised Rules on Civil Procedure.
SC ● SC granted the petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not the RTC committed a reversible error when it applied the 2019 Amendments to the 1997 Revised Rules on Civil Procedure to resolve the affirmative defenses pleaded by respondent.—YES
RULING:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the Order of the Regional Trial Court REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Complaint is REINSTATED as against Philippine Estates Corporation, Crisanta Realty Development Corporation, Amaia Land Corporation, and Property Company of Friends. The trial court is DIRECTED to PROCEED with the resolution of the case with UTMOST DISPATCH.
RATIO:
1. YES
The 2019 Amendments have been incorporated into the 1997 Revised Rules on Civil Procedure, now known as the 2019 Rules on Civil Procedure. And as with all things new, precedence is generally scarce, hence, its application must be done with utmost caution and in strict adherence to its provisions.
Rule 144 of the 2019 Rules, provides:
The 2019 Proposed Amendments to the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure shall govern all cases filed after their effectivity on May 1, 2020, and also all pending proceedings, except to the extent that in the opinion of the court, their application would not be feasible or would work injustice, in which case the procedure under which the cases were filed shall govern.
As worded, the 2019 Amendments shall also govern all pending cases commenced before they took effect on May 1, 2020, except to the extent that in the opinion of the court, their application would not be feasible or would work injustice, in which case, the procedure under which the cases were filed shall govern. Here, the case commenced with the filing of the complaint in September 2018 and remained pending when the 2019 Amendments took effect.
As it was, Judge Gill applied Section 12, Rule 8 of the 2019 Amendments when she supposedly resolved motu proprio the affirmative defense of respondent companies, that is, the complaint failed to state a cause of action. The records though readily show that when Judge Gill motu proprio resolved the affirmative defenses on May 22, 2020, the prescribed thirty (30)-day period had long expired. ProFriends filed its answer with affirmative defense in December 2018; PEC and Crisanta Realty on January 3, 2019; and Amaia on February 27, 2020. Judge Gill should have, therefore, desisted from applying the 2019 Amendments to the case, specifically Section 12, Rule 8 because when she did, the same was no longer feasible.
It was inaccurate for Judge Gill to say that she was motu proprio acting on the affirmative defenses. In truth, she had already resolved this common affirmative defense of failure to state a cause of action, together with the other affirmative defenses in her Omnibus Order. There, she denied the motions to dismiss and motions to set the affirmative defenses for hearing. Instead of applying the 2019 Amendments, Judge Gill could have simply resolved the pending motions for reconsiderations of PEC, Crisanta Realty, and Amaia.
The worst part is when Judge Gill ignored the injustice caused by the application of the 2019 Amendments to the case. For as a consequence, petitioner lost his substantial right to be heard on the common affirmative defense of PEC, Crisanta Realty, and Amaia, and his right to seek a reconsideration of the order of dismissal which were both granted him under the 1997 Revised Rules on Civil Procedure.
LABAO VS. FLORES (capitalized)
November 15, 2010 | GR No. 187984 | Brion, J | Power of the Supreme Court to suspend the Rules of Court
PETITIONER: LABAO
RESPONDENTS: FLORES
DOCTRINE:
There are recognized exceptions to the strict observance of procedural rules. However, there should be an effort on the part of the parts invoking liberalits to advance a reasonable and meritorious explanation for hisher failure to comply with the rules. In this case, respondents’ petition for certiorari was filed twenty eight days late from Atty. Plando’s October 13, 2016 receipt of the September 29, 2016 resolution. The failure of a party’s counsel to notify him on time of the adverse judgment, to enable him to appeal therefrom, is negligence that is not excusable. Notice sent to counsel of record is binding upon the client, and the neglect or failure of counsel to inform him of an adverse judgment resulting in the loss of his right to appeal is not a ground for setting aside a judgment valid and regular on its face.
FACTS:
1. SMPSA issued a memorandum requiring all security guards to submit their updated documents for reevaluation in connection with the SMPSA's new service contract with the NPC-MRC. When respondents failed to comply with the petitioner's directive despite several notices to do so, the petitioner relieved them from NPC-MRC duty and ordered them to report to the Senior Operations Officer, Nemesio Sombilon, for new assignments. Sometime in March and April 2005, the respondents filed individual complaints with NLRC for illegal dismissal and money claims, claiming they were constructively dismissed when they were not given new assignments for a period of over 6 months, despite repeated requests for NPC-MRC redeployment and for new assignments.
2. The petitioner and SMPSA denied the charge of constructive dismissal, contending that the respondents' relief from NPC-MRC duty was a valid exercise of its management prerogative. Furthermore, they issued a notice directing the respondents to report to SMPSA's main office for new assignments, but the latter failed or refused to comply without any valid reasons.
3. The respondents filed a petition for certiorari before the CA and the CA set aside the NLRC resolution finding that the respondents were constructively dismissed.
PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:
LA ● Dismissed
○ Labor Arbiter dismissed the consolidated complaints for lack of merit, holding that respondents' relief from NPC-MRC duty was a legitimate exercise of NPC-MRC's management prerogative.
NLRC ● Affirmed
○ The NLRC affirmed the LA decision, noting that respondents' temporary off-detail did not exceed the 6-month period permitted by law
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not the CA erred in not dismissing the petition for certiorari despite its late filing (the respondents‘ petition for certiorari was filed twenty-eight (28) days late from Atty. Plando‘s October 13, 2006 receipt of the resolution) — YES
RULING:
WHEREFORE, the present petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 01472-MIN are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The decision of the Labor Arbiter is REINSTATED. No pronouncement as to costs.
RATIO:
Yes, CA erred in acting on the respondents' petition for certiorari despite its late filing.
● Section 4 of Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that certiorari should be instituted within a period of 60 days from notice of the judgment, order, or resolution sought to be assailed. The 60-day period is inextendible to avoid any unreasonable delay that would violate the constitutional rights of parties to a speedy disposition of their case.
● Time and again, we have stressed that procedural rules do not exist for the convenience of the litigants; the rules were established primarily to provide order to, and enhance the efficiency of, our judicial system. While procedural rules are liberally construed, the provisions on reglementary periods are strictly applied, indispensable as they are to the prevention of needless delays, and are necessary to the orderly and speedy discharge of judicial business.
● In the present case, the respondents‘ petition for certiorari was filed twenty-eight (28) days late from Atty. Plando‘s October 13, 2006 receipt of the September 29, 2006 resolution. The respondents insist that they should not suffer for Atty. Plando‘s negligence in failing to inform them of the resolution, and the reckoning date for the 60-day period should be their December 6, 2006 notice.
● The general rule is that a client is bound by the acts, even mistakes, of his counsel in the realm of procedural technique. The exception to this rule is when the negligence of counsel is so gross, reckless and inexcusable that the client is deprived of his day in court. The failure of a party‘s counsel to notify him on time of the adverse judgment, to enable him to appeal therefrom, is negligence that is not excusable. We have repeatedly held that notice sent to counsel of record is binding upon the client, and the neglect or failure of counsel to inform him of an adverse judgment resulting in the loss of his right to appeal is not a ground for setting aside a judgment valid and regular on its face.
GIOS-SAMAR v. DOTC
12 March 2019 | GR No. 217158 | Jardaleza, J. | Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts
PETITIONER: GIOS-SAMAR, INC., REPRESENTED BY ITS CHAIRPERSON GERARDO M. MALINAO
RESPONDENTS: DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS AND CIVIL AVIATION AUTHORITY OF THE PHILIPPINE
DOCTRINE:
The doctrine of hierarchy of courts dictates that direct recourse to this Court is allowed only to resolve questions of law, notwithstanding the invocation of paramount or transcendental importance of the action. This doctrine is not mere policy, rather, it is a constitutional filtering
mechanism designed to enable the Court to focus on the more fundamental and essential tasks assigned to it by the highest law of the land.
FACTS:
1. Respondent DOTC, together with the Civil Aviation Authority of the Philippines (CAAP) posted an invitation to pre-qualify, and bid for the development, operations, and maintenance of the airports, which are now bundled into two groups which includes: Bundle 1- Bacolod-Silay and Iloilo; and Bundle 2 - Davao, Laguindingan, and New Bohol.
2. On March 27, 2015, petitioner GIOS-SAMAR, Inc.,
3. represented by its Chairperson Gerardo M. Malinao (petitioner), suing as a taxpayer and invoking the transcendental importance of the issue, filed the present petition for prohibition.
4. Petitioner alleges that it is a non-governmental organization composed of subsistence farmers and fisherfolk from Samar, who are among the victims of Typhoon Yolanda relying on government assistance for the rehabilitation of their industry and livelihood. It assails the constitutionality of the bundling of the Projects and seeks to enjoin the DOTC and the CAAP from proceeding with the bidding of the same.
5. In its part, the CAAP asserts that the petition violated the basic fundamental principle of hierarchy of courts. Petitioner had not alleged any special and compelling reason to allow it to seek relief directly from the Court. The case should have been filed with the trial court, because it raises factual issues which need to be threshed out in a full-blown trial. The CAAP also maintains that petitioner has neither legal capacity nor authority to file the suit and that the petition has no cause of action.
ISSUE/S:
1. WON it was proper for the petitioner to file the present petition for prohibition directly to the Supreme Court— NO
RULING:
WHEREFORE,, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is DISMISSED.
RATIO:
1. NO
● Petitioner's arguments against the constitutionality of the bundling of the Projects are inextricably intertwined with underlying questions of fact, the determination of which require the reception of evidence. This Court, however, is not a trier of fact. We cannot resolve these factual issues at the first instance. Petitioner has not alleged ultimate facts to support its claim that bundling will create a monopoly, in violation of the Constitution. By merely stating legal conclusions, petitioner did not present any sufficient allegation upon which the Court could grant the relief petitioner prayed for are already barred from raising the same because petitioners did not appeal from the decision of the court a quo granting private respondents the right
● Strict observance of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts should not be a matter of mere policy. It is a constitutional imperative given (1) the structure of our judicial system and (2) the requirements of due process. The doctrine of hierarchy of courts recognizes the various levels of courts in the country as they are established under the Constitution and by law, their ranking and effect of their rulings in relation with one another, and how these different levels of court interact with one another. When litigants seek relief directly from the Court, they bypass the judicial structure and open themselves to the risk of presenting incomplete or disputed facts. This consequently hampers the resolution of controversies before the Court. Without the necessary facts, the Court cannot authoritatively determine the rights and obligations of the parties. It is for this reason that a substantial part of the adjective law in this jurisdiction is occupied with assuring that all the facts are indeed presented to the Court; for obviously, to the extent that adjudication is made on the basis of incomplete facts, to that extent there is faultiness in the approximation of objective justice. It is thus the obligation of lawyers no less than of judges to see that this objective is attained; that is to say, that there no suppression, obscuration, misrepresentation or distortion of the facts; and that no party be unaware of any fact material and relevant to the action, or surprised by any factual detail suddenly brought to his attention during the trial.
● The 1987 Constitution, the Supreme Court was granted with the following: (1) the power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights; and (2) the power to disapprove rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies. The 1987 Constitution also took away the power of Congress to repeal, alter, or supplement rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure.
● The doctrine of hierarchy of courts dictates that direct recourse to the Supreme Court is allowed only to resolve questions of law, notwithstanding the invocation of paramount or transcendental importance of the action. This doctrine is not mere policy, rather, it is a constitutional altering mechanism designed to enable the Court to focus on the more fundamental and essential tasks assigned to it by the highest law of the land.
COA v. FERRER
November 24, 2020 | GR No. 218870 | Zalameda, J. | Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction; Exceptions
PETITIONERS: The Commission on Audit, Atty. Eleanor V. Echano, Felizardo B. Toquero, Jr., Tita B. Embestro, Susie S. Laureano, Johanson V. Disuanco, and Adela A. Tabuzo
RESPONDENTS: Hon. Erwin Virgilio R. Ferrer, Acting Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 33, Pili, Camarines Sur, and Luis Raymund F. Villafuerte, Jr., former Governor of Camarines Sur
DOCTRINE:
Before a party may seek the intervention of the court, he or she should first avail of all the means afforded him by administrative processes.
FACTS:
1. Luis Raymund F. Villafuerte, Jr. (Villafuerte, Jr.) was the former Governor of the Province of Camarines Sur.
2. During his term, he approved several disbursements for various activities and projects of the provincial government.
3. The Commission on Audit (COA) issued 10 Notices of Disallowance (NDs) on Villafuerte Jr. for several deficiencies and unnecessary expenditures.
4. Villafuerte Jr., did not question the NDs before the COA. Thus, Notices of Finality Decision (NFDs) were issued.
5. Villafuerte Jr. filed 2 petitions for certiorari and prohibition, assailing the NFDs issued by COA and seeking injunctive relief against COA’s orders of execution of the NDs.
PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:
RTC ● Issued a 72-hour TRO and set a summary hearing for its possible extension
○ TRO was subsequently extended for another 17 days
● Set the hearing on the application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction (WPI)
○ COA, through the OSG, opposed the prayer for WPI on the ff grounds:
■ RTC has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the petitions;
■ NDs have already become final and executory pursuant to the Government Auditing Code of the Philippines (PD 1445) and the 2009 Revised Rules of Procedure of the COA (COA-RRP);
■ Respondents failed to exhaust administrative remedies, a condition precedent for the filing of the petitions; and
■ Requisites for the issuance of WPI are not present.
● Issued nonetheless a WPI enjoining COA from implementing any writ of execution pursuant to the NDs
○ COA moved to dismiss the 2 petitions on the ground of lack of jurisdiction and failure to exhaust administrative remedies
● Denied COA’s motion to dismiss citing Section 4, Rule XII of the COA-RRP
● Ruled that only decisions, rulings, or resolutions of the commission proper can be brought to the Supreme Court via petition for certiorari
● Affirmed its jurisdiction over the petitions despite the non-exhaustion of administrative remedies since they raise a purely legal question, i.e., Villafuerte’s personal liability on the NDs
○ COA filed an MR, which Villafurte Jr. opposed. COA filed their Consolidated Comment.
● Through Acting Presiding Judge Virgilio P. Ferrer (Ferrer), denied COA’s MR and set the case for pre-trial conference
ISSUE/S:
1. WON Villafuerte Jr.’s recourse to the RTC to assail the provincial auditor’s NDs is proper — NO
RULING:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The petitions docketed as Special Civil Action Nos. P-155-2014 and P-156-2014 before Branch 33, Regional Trial Court of Pili, Camarines Sur are hereby DISMISSED. Accordingly, COA Notices of Disallowances are hereby AFFIRMED and declared FINAL and EXECUTORY. Accordingly, execution may be issued against the persons identified in the aforesaid notices of disallowances.
RATIO:
1. NO, COA has primary jurisdiction over issues involving disallowances.
● The jurisdiction of courts and quasi-judicial bodies is determined by the Constitution and the law. The matter of allowing or disallowing the requests for payment is within the primary power of COA to decide.
o Section 2, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution states that the COA shall have ”the power, authority, and duty to examine, audit, and settle all accounts pertaining to the revenue and receipts of, and expenditures or uses of funds and property, owned or held in trust by, or pertaining to, the Government.”
o Likewise, under CA No. 327, as amended by Sec. 26 of PD 1445, it is the COA which has primary jurisdiction over money claims against the government agencies and instrumentalities.
The authority to conduct a limited judicial review of acts, decisions or resolutions of the COA is only vested by law to the Supreme Court.
● Section 7, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution states that ”unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof.”
● Thus, this Court cannot uphold Villafuerte’s resort to the RTC.
○ There is nothing in law or jurisprudence that grants it the authority to directly determine questions on COA's grave abuse of discretion.
○ Allowing trial courts to issue writs of certiorari against NDs issued by provincial or district auditors concurrently with this Court would cause unnecessary delay in the audit process, thereby weakening the authority of the COA.
The exceptions to the rule on primary jurisdiction DO NOT apply in case at bar.
● In certain instances, this Court has recognized exceptions to the rules. However, this is done only for the most compelling reasons, where strict adherence to the rules would defeat rather than serve the ends of justice.
● A liberal construction of the rules requires, at least, an explanation on why the party-litigant failed to comply with the rules and by a justification for the requested liberal construction.
● In this case, the records are bereft of any explanation for Villafuerte Jr.’s failure to question the disallowances before the COA Commission Proper. He merely insists on the availability of judicial relief with the RTC after the lapse of the reglementary period.
● Villafuerte Jr. cites public welfare, advancement of public policy, and broader interests of justice to justify his recourse to the RTC. However, he miserably failed to establish how a belated judicial review of the NDs would advance the interests of public policy and/or justice.
The issue on Villafuerte Jr.’s personal liability is NOT a purely legal issue.
● Determination of liability to return the disallowed amounts is not purely a legal issue, but would also require determination of good faith of the parties.
● The SC has previously upheld the courts' jurisdiction over money claims against the government if they involve:
○ interpretation of the Constitution,
○ determination of contractual rights and obligations, or
○ if there was unreasonable delay and official inaction on the part of COA.
● However, private respondent's petitions did not raise the same issues and merely dwelt on the supposed impropriety of the NDs.
The assailed NDs have become final and executory.
● Section 48 of PD 1445 lays down the procedure to appeal notices of disallowance issued by agency auditors, viz.:
○ Appeal from decision of auditors. — Any person aggrieved by the decision of an auditor of any government agency in the settlement of an account or claim may within six months from receipt of a copy of the decision appeal in writing to the Commission.
● Villafuerte Jr. should have explained the supposed propriety of the provincial government's disbursements in an appeal before the COA Commission Proper within the reglementary period.
● Given that the disallowances have become final and executory, the RTC could no longer alter the same. It should have dismissed Villafuerte Jr.’s petitions.
● The Doctrine of Immutability of Judgments bars courts from modifying decisions that have already attained finality, even if the purpose of the modification is to correct errors of fact or law, and whether it be made by the court that rendered it or by the Highest Court of the land. Any act which violates this principle must immediately be struck down.
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THE ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF MALOLOS, INC., THE MOST REV. BISHOP JOSE F. OLIVEROS, D.D. v. THE HEIRS OF MARIANO MARCOS, REPRESENTED BY FRANCISCA MARCOS ALIAS KIKAY
June 17, 2020 | G.R. No. G.R. No. 225971 | Caguioa, J. | Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
PETITIONER: Roman Catholic Bishop of Malolos, Inc. (RCBMI) - RCBMI is the registered owner of a parcel of land subject of land reform and litigation
RESPONDENTS: Heirs of Mariano Marcos – the heirs of Mariano Marcos (Marcos) who was awarded a portion of RCBMI’s land under the land reform program (PD 27 - Tenants Emancipation Decree)
DOCTRINE:
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, in and of itself, is grounded on practical reasons, including allowing the administrative agencies concerned to take every opportunity to correct its own errors, as well as affording the litigants the opportunity to avail of speedy relief through the administrative processes and sparing them of the laborious and costly resort to courts. However, this principle is not inflexible, and admits of several exceptions that include situations where the very rationale of the doctrine has been defeated
FACTS:
1. Roman Catholic Bishop of Malolos, Inc. (RCBMI) is the registered owner of a parcel of land. On October 21, 1972, Mariano Marcos (Marcos) was awarded a portion of RCBMI’s land under the land reform program of PD 27 (Tenants Emancipation Decree). Mariano Marcos was succeeded by his heirs (Heirs of Marcos).
2. The Ministry of Agrarian Reform granted RCBMI’s petition and cancelled the award to Marcos on the ground that the lot it covered was vacant and uncultivated upon PD 27’s issuance, and hence exempted from the PD 27’s coverage.
3. Three years after, Marcos filed for a MR, but the same was denied in a January 29, 1986 Order, holding that the order of cancellation had long become final and executory. Despite said cancellation, however, the Heirs of Marcos allegedly refused to surrender possession of the subject property.
4. RCBMI filed a Complaint for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and damages on February 2, 1994 before the Bulacan Office of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD). PARAD ruled in favor of RCBMI, and issued an order for the Heirs of Marcos to vacate the subject property along with a declaration of nullity of any sale made by the Heirs of Marcos involving the same.
5. The Heirs of Marcos appealed to the DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB), which affirmed the PARAD's Decision and restated the order for the Heirs of Marcos to vacate.
6. The Heirs of Marcos appealed the matter to the CA via a petition for review under Rule 43. The CA denied the petition which then became final and executory.
8. Yet even with an entry of judgment, the records of the case were not remanded to the PARAD for purposes of execution. Met with this new delay, RCBMI filed before the CA an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Remand. Over three years later, a certification remanding records of the case to the PARAD for execution was finally issued.
9. Thereafter, on March 10, 2008, RCBMI filed a Motion for the Issuance of Writ of Execution before the PARAD, submitting that the 1982 MAR Order it sought to have executed had long become final and executory, and that the writ of execution should have issued as a matter of right.
10. The Heirs of Marcos filed an Opposition, alleging that a supervening event made the execution of the 1982 MAR Order impossible or illegal, the same being the placement of the subject property under the coverage of RA 6657 (Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988).
11. On May 6, 2010, the PARAD granted RCBMI's Motion for the Issuance of Writ of Execution and held that "[t]he rule has always been to the effect that 'once a decision becomes final and executory, it is the ministerial duty of the court to order its execution.[']."
12. On September 20, 2010, the PARAD granted the Heirs of Marcos' MR, and held in abeyance the resolution of the Motion for the Issuance of Writ of Execution, until the DAR Secretary had finally decided on the supervening CARP matter involving the subject property.
13. On May 5, 2011, then DAR Secretary Delos Reyes dismissed the Heirs of Marcos’ petition for coverage of the subject property under the CARP Law, declaring the said parcel of land exempt from CARP coverage.
14. On February 17, 2012, the PARAD denied the Heirs of Marcos’ MR, and finally granting RCBMI’s Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Execution.
15. As no writ of execution had been issued thereafter, RCBMI had to file three Motions to Resolve before the PARAD finally issued one on December 16, 2014.
16. The Heirs of Marcos filed a Motion to Quash the Writ of Execution arguing that the five-year period from the date of promulgation of the 1982 MAR Order within which to execute the same, as required by Section 4, Rule 20 of the 1989 DARAB Revised Rules of Procedure46 (1989 DARAB Rules) had already lapsed. This was opposed by RCBMI, claiming that the delay of the execution of the decision could only be attributed to the Heirs of Marcos themselves.
17. On August 19, 2015, the PARAD granted the Heirs of Marcos' Motion to Quash, chiefly ruling that due to the lapse of the five-year period, RCBMI could only enforce the 1982 MAR Order sought to be executed via an action. In RCBMI’s Motion for Partial Reconsideration, it argued that the five-year period should have been suspended when the Heirs of Marcos filed their Opposition to RCBMI's Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Execution. It likewise argued that the astonishing delay in execution was caused by the actions of the Heirs of Marcos, through their abuse of the rules of procedure which resulted in an overall suspension of the proceedings. RCBMI’s MR was denied by the PARAD.
PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:
PARAD ● The PARAD granted RCBMI's Motion for the Issuance of Writ of Execution and held that "[t]he rule has always been to the effect that 'once a decision becomes final and executory, it is the ministerial duty of the court to order its execution.[']."
● However, the PARAD granted the Heirs of Marcos’ MR, and held in abeyance the resolution of the Motion for the Issuance of Writ of Execution, until the DAR Secretary had finally decided on the supervening CARP matter involving the subject property.
DAR SECRETARY ● On May 5, 2011, then DAR Secretary Delos Reyes dismissed the Heirs of Marcos’ petition for coverage of the subject property under the CARP Law, declaring the said parcel of land exempt from CARP coverage.
PARAD (after determination by PARAD) ● On February 17, 2012, the PARAD denied the Heirs of Marcos’ MR, and finally granting RCBMI’s Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Execution.
● RCBMI filed three (3) Motions to Resolve before the PARAD finally issued one on December 16, 2014.
● The Heirs of Marcos filed a Motion to Quash the Writ of Execution arguing that the five-year period from the date of promulgation of the 1982 MAR Order within which to execute the same, as required by 1989 DARAB Rules had already lapsed. This was opposed by RCBMI, claiming that the delay of the execution of the decision could only be attributed to the Heirs of Marcos themselves.
● On August 19, 2015, the PARAD granted the Heirs of Marcos' Motion to Quash, chiefly ruling that due to the lapse of the five-year period, RCBMI could only enforce the 1982 MAR Order sought to be executed via an action. In RCBMI’s Motion for Partial Reconsideration, it argued that the five-year period should have been suspended when the Heirs of Marcos filed their Opposition to RCBMI's Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Execution. It likewise argued that the astonishing delay in execution was caused by the actions of the Heirs of Marcos, through their abuse of the rules of procedure which resulted in an overall suspension of the proceedings. RCBMI’s MR was denied by the PARAD.
CA ● RCBMI filed a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus under Rule 65 on February 26, 2016.
● The CA dismissed RCBMI’s petition for its non-exhaustion of administrative remedies, noting that RCBMI should have first filed an appeal before the DARAB, pursuant to DARAB Rules, and thus, failed to exhaust administrative remedies.
● The CA concluded that RCBMI should have first appealed the PARAD's quashal of the writ of execution before the DARAB, for the exhaustion of the administrative remedies available to it.
SC ● RCBMI filed Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 seeking, among others, the reversal of the CA Resolutions.
ISSUE: Is the CA correct in dismissing RCBMI's petition for certiorari and mandamus under Rule 65 for its non-exhaustion of administrative remedies? -NO
RULING:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is GRANTED. The Resolutions dated April 8, 2016 and July 20, 2016 of Court of Appeals, Ninth Division, in CA-G.R. SP No. 144354, are REVERSED. The Office, of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator's Order dated February 17, 2012, which granted the Roman Catholic Bishop of Malolos, Inc.'s Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Execution, is REINSTATED.
The PARAD is further ORDERED to proceed with the execution with dispatch, and inform the Court within five days of the action/s it has taken to this end.
RATIO:
● NO, the CA is not correct in dismissing RCBMI's petition for certiorari and mandamus under Rule 65 for its non-exhaustion of administrative remedies, as the RCBMI's action falls within the exemptions to this principle.
● The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, in and of itself, is grounded on practical reasons, including allowing the administrative agencies concerned to take every opportunity to correct its own errors, as well as affording the litigants the opportunity to avail of speedy relief through the administrative processes and sparing them of the laborious and costly resort to courts. However, this principle is not inflexible, and admits of several exceptions that include situations where the very rationale of the doctrine has been defeated.
● The doctrines of primary jurisdiction and exhaustion of administrative remedies are subject to certain exceptions, to wit:
○ (a) where there is estoppel on the part of the party invoking the doctrine;
○ (b) where the challenged administrative act is patently illegal, amounting to lack of jurisdiction;
○ (c) where there is unreasonable delay or official inaction that will irretrievably prejudice the complainant;
○ (d) where the amount involved is relatively so small as to make the rule impractical and oppressive;
○ (e) where the question involved is purely legal and will ultimately have to be decided by the courts of justice;
○ (f) where judicial intervention is urgent;
○ (g) where the application of the doctrine may cause great and irreparable damage;
○ (h) where the controverted acts violate due process;
○ (i) where the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered moot;
○ (j) where there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy;
○ (k) where strong public interest is involved; and,
○ (l) in quo warranto proceedings.
● With the peculiar length of time with which this case has lasted, the RCBMI's action falls within the temporal exempting circumstance, or where there is unreasonable delay or official inaction that will irretrievably prejudice the complainant. Specifically, the exempting circumstance is the suspension of RCBMI's enjoyment of its legal victory, which was awarded to it by the MAR in 1982, but to date, 37 years later, remains to be executed.
● RCBMI's resort to the DARAB to appeal the PARAD's quashal would not only be time-consuming but more so wasteful, as the relief it prays for the DARAB is not clothed with the authority to grant. This is largely because the cases over which the DARAB has primary, original and appellate jurisdiction, as enumerated in Section 1, Rule II of the 1989 DARAB Rules, are more merit-focused in nature, with their application to the substantive issues of an agrarian dispute. Therefore, a resort to it may only take more time, but ultimately not grant for RCBMI the redress it seeks.
● This is precisely the kind of long-drawn, circuitous, agrarian dispute, with high human and economic costs, that the creation of the DARAB sought to remedy. This length of delay for the DAR's decision, i.e., the 1982 MAR Order to be carried out in the case at bar is baffling, ridicules the very logic underlying the creation of the DARAB and its adjudicators, and therefore cannot be countenanced.
TERESITA TAN vs. JOVENCIO F. CINCO
June 15, 2016| GR No. 213054 | Perlas-Bernabe, J | General Principles
PETITIONER: Teresita Tan
RESPONDENTS: Jovencio F. Cinco, Simon Lori Holdings, INC, Pentacapital investment corporation, Fortunato G. Pe, Raymund G. Pe, Jose Revilla Reyes, Jr. and Deputy Sheriff Rommel Ignacio
DOCTRINE: The doctrine of judicial stability or noninterference in the regular courts or judgments of a co-equal court is an elementary principle in the administration of justice: no court can interfere by injunction with the judgments or orders of another court of concurrent jurisdiction having the power to grant the relief sought by the injunction
FACTS:
1. Respondents Simon Lori Holdings, Inc. (SLHI), Fortunato G. Pe, Raymundo G. Pe, Jovencio F. Cinco, and Jose Revilla Reyes, Jr. (individual lenders) extended a loan to one Dante Tan (Dante) in the amount of P50,000,000.00. The loan was facilitated by PentaCapital Investment Corporation (PentaCapital) and was secured by Dante's shares in Best World Resources Corporation (BWRC).
2. When Dante failed to pay the loan upon maturity and despite demands, he proposed to settle the same by selling his shares in BWRC and assigning the proceeds to SLHI, the individual lenders, and PentaCapital
3. However, when he was due to execute the corresponding deeds of assignment, Dante disappeared, leaving his obligations unpaid. Hence, respondents filed an action for sum of money against him before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 146
PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:
RTC ● RTC Makati: ordering Dante to pay respondents the sum of P100,100,000.00 with legal interest. Dante's attempts to reverse the decision on appeal proved futile, thus, a Writ of Execution 12 (writ) was issued. An auction sale was then conducted.
● Parañaque RTC initially dismissed 27 the nullification case on the ground of res judicata, ruling that the issues raised therein had already been passed upon by the Makati RTC with Teresita's active and voluntary participation
● However on MR, reversed its initial disposition and instead, nullied the auction sale, the certificate of sale, and the Final Deed of Sale in favor of respondents
CA ● CA granted the petition and directed the Parañaque RTC to allow respondents' Notice of Appeal.
● Citing the doctrine of judicial stability or non-interference in the regular orders or judgments of a co-equal court, it found that the affirmance of the Parañaque RTC's assailed issuances would allow Teresita's husband, Dante, to continue to evade his obligations which was already finally adjudicated by the Makati RTC, a co-equal court and the first one to take cognizance of the controversy, on the basis of technicality.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the Parañaque RTC violated the doctrine of judicial stability when it took cognizance of the nullification case filed by Teresita and declared as null and void the auction sale, the certificate of sale, and the Final Deed of Sale in favor of respondents.
RULING:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Order dated January 6, 2011 rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque City, Branch 257 in Civil Case No. 07-0134, the proceedings therein, as well as all orders issued thereafter are hereby declared NULL and VOID for lack of jurisdiction. YES
RATIO:
● The doctrine of judicial stability or non-interference in the regular orders or judgments of a co-equal court is an elementary principle in the administration of justice: no court can interfere by injunction with the judgments or orders of another court of concurrent jurisdiction having the power to grant the relief sought by the injunction.
● The rationale for the rule is founded on the concept of jurisdiction: a court that acquires jurisdiction over the case and renders judgment therein has jurisdiction over its judgment, to the exclusion of all other coordinate courts, for its execution and over all its incidents, and to control, in furtherance of justice, the conduct of ministerial officers acting in connection with this judgment.
● In this case, the Court finds that the Parañaque RTC violated the doctrine of judicial stability when it took cognizance of Teresita's nullification case despite the fact that the collection case from which it emanated falls within the jurisdiction of the Makati RTC.
● Verily, the nullification case ought to have been dismissed at the outset for lack of jurisdiction, as the Parañaque RTC is bereft of authority to nullify the levy and sale of the subject property that was legitimately ordered by the Makati RTC, a coordinate and co-equal court
● To reiterate, the determination of whether or not the levy and sale of a property in the execution of a judgment was valid properly falls within the jurisdiction of the court that rendered the judgment and issued the writ of execution.
● Thus, Teresita's nullification case filed before the Parañaque RTC was improper and in glaring violation of the doctrine of judicial stability. The judgment rendered by the Makati RTC in the collection case, as well as the execution thereof, and all other incidents arising therefrom, may not be interfered with by the Parañaque RTC, a court of concurrent jurisdiction, for the simple reason that the power to open, modify, or vacate the said judgment or order is not only possessed but is restricted to the court in which the judgment or order is rendered or issued.
● Consequently, the Parañaque RTC lacked jurisdiction over the same, rendering all the proceedings therein, as well as the Decision and other orders issued thereon, void for lack of jurisdiction
VDA BALLESTEROS v RURAL BANK
Nov. 21, 2010 | GR No. | Mendoza | adherence of jurisdiciton
PETITIONER: Lucia Barrameda de Ballesteros
RESPONDENTS: represented by liquidator, PDIC
DOCTRINE:
The requirement that all claims against bank be pursued in the liquidaiton proceeding filed by the Central Bank is intended to prevent multiplicity of suits and establish due process.
FACTS:
1. Petitioner filed Annulment of Deed of Extrajudicial Partition with prayer for preliminary injunction against her children and Rural Bank of Canaman Inc. (RCBI) before the RTC Iriga alleging that here husband left 2 lands in Camarines Sur. Without her consent, her children partition the property.
2. One of her children mortgaged parcel B in favor of RBCI without her knowledged, which was foreclosed for failure to settle the loan
3. During the pre-trial, RCBI filed a motion to withdraw after being informed that PDIC would handle the case as RCBI was under receivership
4. PDIC filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of RTC pursuant to RA 7653 or the New Central Bank Act, which should fall with the exclusive jurisdiction of RTC Makati after it constituted itself per order.
5. RTC Iriga granted the MTD.
6. Petitioner appealed to the CA on the ground of error under the rule on adherence of jurisdiction.
7. CA dismissed hence the case at bar.
PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:
RTC ● Dismissed
CA ● Dismissed, RTC Makati has jurisdiction
ISSUE/S:
WoN RTC Iriga is vested with jurisdiciton to continue trying the case
RULING:
WHEREFORE, The petition is DENIED. So ordered.
RATIO:
NO
Indeed, the Court recognizes the doctrine on adherence of jurisdiction. Lucia, however, must be reminded that such principle is not without exceptions. It is well to quote the ruling of the CA on this matter, thus:
This Court is not unmindful nor unaware of the doctrine on the adherence of jurisdiction. However, the rule on adherence of jurisdiction is not absolute and has exceptions. One of the exceptions is that when the change in jurisdiction is curative in character
For sure, Section 30, R.A. 7653 is curative in character when it declared that the liquidation court shall have jurisdiction in the same proceedings to assist in the adjudication of the disputed claims against the Bank. The interpretation of this Section (formerly Section 29, R.A. 265) becomes more obvious in the light of its intent. In Manalo v. Court of Appeals (366 SCRA 752, [2001]), the Supreme Court says:
. . . The requirement that all claims against the bank be pursued in the liquidation proceedings filed by the Central Bank is intended to prevent multiplicity of actions against the insolvent bank and designed to establish due process and orderliness in the liquidation of the bank, to obviate the proliferation of litigations and to avoid injustice and arbitrariness (citing Ong v. CA, 253 SCRA 105 [1996]). The lawmaking body contemplated that for convenience, only one court, if possible, should pass upon the claims against the insolvent bank and that the liquidation court should assist the Superintendents of Banks and regulate his operations (citing Central Bank of the Philippines, et al. v. CA, et al., 163 SCRA 482 ||
CANG V. COURT OF APPEALS
September 25, 1998 | GR No. 105308 | Romero, J. | Statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action
PETITIONER: Herbert Cang
RESPONDENTS: Court of Appeals and Spouses Ronald V. Clavano and Maria Clara V. Clavano
DOCTRINE:
Jurisdiction being a matter of substantive law, the established rule is that the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action determines the jurisdiction of the court.
FACTS:
1. Petitioner Herbert Cang and Anna Marie Clavano were married on January 27, 1973, and begot three children, namely: Keith, Charmaine, and Joseph Anthony.
2. Anna Marie later learned of her husband's alleged extramarital affair with Wilma Soco, a family friend of the Clavanos. Thereafter, Anna Marie filed a petition for legal separation with alimony pendente, to which the Court approved.
3. Petitioner left for the United States where he sought a divorce. The court issued the divorce decree and granted sole custody of the three minor children to Anna Marie. Petitioner then took an American wife and thus became a naturalized American citizen. He divorced his American wife and never remarried.
4. Meanwhile, private respondents Sps. Clavano, the brother and sister-in-law of Anna Marie, filed a petition for the adoption of the three minor Cang children. The petition bears the signature of then 14-year-old Keith signifying consent to his adoption. Anna Marie likewise filed an affidavit of consent alleging that her husband had "evaded his legal obligation to support" his children.
5. Upon learning of the petition for adoption, petitioner immediately returned to the Philippines and filed an opposition thereto. Pending resolution of the petition for adoption, petitioner moved to reacquire custody over his children.
6. During the pendency of the petition for adoption or on August 3, 1988, the Family Code which amended the Child and Youth Welfare Code took effect.
PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:
RTC ● The RTC issued an order finding that Anna Marie had, in effect, relinquished custody over the children and, therefore, such custody should be transferred to the father.
○ The court directed the Clavanos to deliver custody over the minors to petitioner.
● Meanwhile, the RTC before which the adoption case is pending, issued a decree of adoption.
CA ● On appeal, the petitioner alleged that the petition for adoption was fatally defective as it did not have his written consent as a natural father as required by Article 31 (2) of Presidential Decree No. 603, the Child and Youth Welfare Code, and Article 188 (2) of the Family Code.
○ The CA affirmed the RTC’s decision stating that the Family Code requires the written consent of the natural parents of the child to be adopted. It has been held however that the consent of the parent who has abandoned the child is not necessary.
● Petitioner moved to reconsider the decision of the CA but was denied.
ISSUE/S:
1. WON the provisions of the Family Code applies to the case at bar —YES
RULING:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is hereby GRANTED.
RATIO:
● Jurisdiction being a matter of substantive law, the established rule is that the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action determines the jurisdiction of the court. As such, when private respondents filed the petition for adoption on September 25, 1987, the applicable law was the Child and Youth Welfare Code, as amended by Executive Order No. 91.
● During the pendency of the petition for adoption or on August 3, 1988, the Family Code which amended the Child and Youth Welfare Code took effect. Article 256 of the Family Code provides for its retroactivity "insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws."
HEIRS OF TOMAS DOLLETON, HERACLIO ORCULLO, REMEDIOS SAN PEDRO, HEIRS OF BERNARDO MILLAMA, HEIRS OF AGAPITO VILLANUEVA, HEIRS OF HILARION GARCIA, SERAFINA SP ARGANA, and HEIRS OF MARIANO VILLANUEVA
vs.
FIL-ESTATE MANAGEMENT INC., ET AL. AND THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF LAS PIÑAS CITY
April 7, 2009 | GR No. GR 170750 |CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: |Jurisdiction
PETITIONER: HEIRS OF TOMAS DOLLETON, HERACLIO ORCULLO, REMEDIOS SAN PEDRO, HEIRS OF BERNARDO MILLAMA, HEIRS OF AGAPITO VILLANUEVA, HEIRS OF HILARION GARCIA, SERAFINA SP ARGANA, and HEIRS OF MARIANO VILLANUEVA
RESPONDENTS: FIL-ESTATE MANAGEMENT INC., ET AL. AND THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF LAS PIÑAS CITY
DOCTRINE:
The elementary test for failure to state a cause of action is whether the complaint alleges facts which if true would justify the relief demanded. The inquiry is into the sufficiency, not the veracity, of the material allegations.
FACTS:
1. The Heirs of Tomas Dolleton, Heraclio Orcullo, Remedios San Pedro, et al., Heirs of Bernardo Millama, Heirs of Agapito Villanueva, et al., Heirs of Hilarion Garcia, et al., Serafina SP Argana, et al., and Heirs of Mariano Villanueva, et al. filed before the RTC separate Complaints for Quieting of Title and/or Recovery of Ownership and Possession with Preliminary Injunction/Restraining Order and Damages against Fil-Estate Management Inc., Spouses Arturo E. Dy and Susan Dy, Megatop Realty Development, Inc., and the Register of Deeds of Las Piñas.
2. The Complaints were later consolidated.
3. The eight Complaints were similarly worded and contained substantially identical allegations.
4. That they had been in continuous, open, and exclusive possession of the subject properties for more than 90 years until they were forcibly ousted by armed men.
5. They had cultivated the subject properties and religiously paid the real estate taxes for the same.
6. Spouses Dy cannot rely on Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs) issued by the Registry of Deeds of Las Piñas in their names, because the subject properties were not covered by said certificates.
7. Respondents filed before the RTC a Motion to Dismiss and Opposition to Application for a Temporary Restraining Order/Writ of Preliminary Injunction. They moved for the dismissal of the eight Complaints on the grounds of (1) prescription; (2) laches; (3) lack of cause of action; and (4) res judicata.
PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY: C
RTC ● RTC: Granted respondents Motion to Dismiss for all the complaints. The trial court determined that the subject properties were already registered in the names of respondents, and that petitioners were unable to prove by clear and convincing evidence their title to the said properties.
CA ● CA: Denied the appeal and affirmed the RTC Resolutions stating that the titles to the subject properties were indefeasible because they were registered under the Torrens system. Thus, it could not be said that any claim on the subject properties casts a cloud on their title when they failed to demonstrate a legal or an equitable title to the same.
ISSUE/S:
1. W/N the RTC properly granted respondents motion to dismiss
RULING:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant Petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated 16 September 2005 and Resolution dated 9 December 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 80927 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Let the records of the case be remanded for further proceedings to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 253, of Las Piñas City, which is hereby ordered to try and decide the case with deliberate speed.
RATIO:
NO
● Respondents seek the dismissal of petitioners Complaints for failure to state a cause of action.
● This contention is untenable.
● Respondents mistakenly construe the allegations in petitioners Complaints. What petitioners alleged in their Complaints was that while the subject properties were not covered by respondents’ certificates of title, nevertheless, respondents forcibly evicted petitioners therefrom.
● It is not simply a question of whether petitioners’ possession can defeat respondents’ title to registered land. Instead, an initial determination has to be made on whether the subject properties were in fact covered by respondents’ certificates of title.
● Section 2, Rule 2 of the Rules of Civil Procedure defines a cause of action as the act or omission by which a party violates the right of another.
● Its essential elements are as follows: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; (2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and (3) an act or omission on the part of such defendant in violation of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff, for which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages or other appropriate relief.
● The elementary test for failure to state a cause of action is whether the complaint alleges facts which if true would justify the relief demanded. The inquiry is into the sufficiency, not the veracity, of the material allegations.
● This Court is convinced that each of the Complaints filed by petitioners sufficiently stated a cause of action. The Complaints alleged that petitioners are the owners of the subject properties by acquisitive prescription. As owners thereof, they have the right to remain in peaceful possession of the said properties and, if deprived thereof, they may recover the same.
Thornton v. Thornton
16 August 2004 | G.R. No. 154598 | Corona, J. | Jurisdiction - Family Courts – RA 8639
PETITIONER: In The Matter Of Application For The Issuance Of A Writ Of Habeas CorpusRichard Brian Thornton For And In Behalf Of The Minor Child Sequeira Jennifer Delle Francisco Thornton
RESPONDENTS: Adelfa Francisco Thornton
DOCTRINE:
SC holds that the Family Code of 1997 did not empower the family courts to exclusively issue writs of habeas corpus and it did not revoke the capacity of SC and CA to issue writs of habeas corpus.
In relation to the word – exclusive, although it is assumed that the language of the laws should follow common understanding, the spirit of the law and intention of the law makers come first than the legal technicalities.
FACTS:
1. Review on the resolution of CA dismissing the petition of habeas corpus on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction and lack of substance.
2. Petitioner, an American and respondent, a Filipino was married in the Philippines and has a daughter.
3. After 3 years, whenever the petitioner was out of the country, the respondent was also often out with her friends, leaving her daughter in the care of the househelp.
4. 2001, respondent left the family home with her daughter without notifying her husband and told the servant that she is bringing the child to Basilan.
PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:
RTC ● Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus in the Family Court of Makati but was dismissed due to lack of jurisdiction since the child is in Basilan.
CA ● Petitioner went to Basilan and searched, but was unsuccessful. He again filed writ of Habeas Corpus in the Court of Appeals but was denied on the ground that it did not have jurisdiction over the case.
● CA ruled that R.A. 8369 (The Family Courts Act of 1997) gave family courts exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions for habeas corpus, it impliedly repealed by R.A. 7902 An Act Expanding the Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals) and Batas Pambansa 129 (The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980).
ISSUE/S:
1. WON the CA has jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus in cases involving custody of minors.
RULING:
That the serving officer will have to "search for the child all over the country" does not represent an insurmountable or unreasonable obstacle, since such a task is no more different from or difficult than the duty of the peace officer in effecting a warrant of arrest, since the latter is likewise enforceable anywhere within the Philippines.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The petition for habeas corpus in CA-G.R.-SP-No. 70501 is hereby REINSTATED and REMANDED to the Court of Appeals, Sixteenth Division.
RATIO:
YES
1. The Court of Appeals should take cognizance of the case since there is nothing in RA 8369 that revoked its jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus involving the custody of minors.
2. The Court of Appeals opines that RA 8369 impliedly repealed RA 7902 and BP 129 since, by giving family courts exclusive jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases, the lawmakers intended it to be the sole court which can issue writs of habeas corpus.
3. To the court a quo, the word 'exclusive apparently cannot be construed any other way.
4. We disagree with the CA's reasoning because it will result in an iniquitous situation, leaving individuals like petitioner without legal recourse in obtaining custody of their children.
5. Individuals who do not know the whereabouts of minors they are looking for would be helpless since they cannot seek redress from family courts whose writs are enforceable only in their respective territorial jurisdictions.
6. Thus, if a minor is being transferred from one place to another, which seems to be the case here, the petitioner in a habeas corpus case will be left without legal remedy. This lack of recourse could not have been the intention of the lawmakers when they passed the Family Courts Act of 1997. As observed by the Solicitor General:
Under the Family Courts Act of 1997, the avowed policy of the State is to "protect the rights and promote the welfare of children." The creation of the Family Court is geared towards addressing three major issues regarding children's welfare cases, as expressed by the legislators during the deliberations for the law. The legislative intent behind giving Family Courts exclusive and original jurisdiction over such cases was to avoid further clogging of regular court dockets, ensure greater sensitivity and specialization in view of the nature of the case and the parties, as well as to guarantee that the privacy of the children party to the case remains protected.
MANCHESTER DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION v. COURT OF APPEALS
August 4, 2006 | GR No. 75919 | Gancayco | Docket and Filing Fees
DOCTRINE:
The Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fee. An amendment of the complaint or similar pleading will not thereby vest jurisdiction in the Court, much less the payment of the docket fee based on the amounts sought in the amended pleading. The ruling in the Magaspi case in so far as it is inconsistent with this pronouncement is overturned and reversed.
FACTS:
1. A complaint for specific performance was filed by Manchester Development Corporation against City Land Development Corporation to compel the latter to execute a deed of sale in favor of Manchester.
2. Manchester also alleged that City Land forfeited the former’s tender of payment for a certain transaction thereby causing damages to Manchester amounting to P78,750,000.00. This amount was alleged in the BODY of their Complaint but it was not reiterated in the Prayer of same complaint.
3. Manchester paid a docket fee of P410.00 only. Said docket fee is premised on the allegation of Manchester that their action is primarily for specific performance hence it is incapable of pecuniary estimation.
4. The lower court ruled that there is an under assessment of docket fees hence it ordered Manchester to amend its complaint.
5. Manchester complied but what it did was to lower the amount of claim for damages to P10M. Said amount was however again not stated in the prayer.
ISSUE: WON the amended complaint should be admitted? – NO
RULING:
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is denied for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
RATIO:
NO. The docket fee, its computation, should be based on the original complaint. A case is deemed filed only upon payment of the appropriate docket fee regardless of the actual date of filing in court.
● Here, since the proper docket fee was not paid for the original complaint, it’s as if there is no complaint to speak of. As a consequence, there is no original complaint duly filed which can be amended. So, any subsequent proceeding taken in consideration of the amended complaint is void.
● Manchester’s defense that this case is primarily an action for specific performance is not merited.
● The Supreme Court ruled that based on the allegations and the prayer of the complaint, this case is an action for damages and for specific performance. Hence, it is capable of pecuniary estimation.
● Further, the amount for damages in the original complaint was already provided in the body of the complaint.
● Its omission in the prayer clearly constitutes an attempt to evade the payment of the proper filing fees. To stop the happenstance of similar irregularities in the future, the Supreme Court ruled that from this case on, all complaints, petitions, answers and other similar pleadings should specify the amount of damages being prayed for not only in the body of the pleading but also in the prayer, and said damages shall be considered in the assessment of the filing fees in any case.
● Any pleading that fails to comply with this requirement shall not be accepted nor admitted, or shall otherwise be expunged from the record.
SUN INSURANCE vs. HON. MAXIMIANO C. ASUNCION, et al
February 13, 1989 | GR No. 79937-38 | J. Gancayco | En Banc | Docket and Filing Fees
PETITIONER: SUN INSURANCE OFFICE, LTD., E.B. PHILIPPS AND D.J. WARBY
RESPONDENTS: HON. MAXIMIANO C. ASUNCION, Presiding Judge, Branch 104, Regional Trial Court, Quezon City and MANUEL CHUA UY PO TIONG
DOCTRINE:
It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of the prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject- matter or nature of the action. Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.
FACTS:
1. On February 28, 1984, petitioner Sun Insurance filed a complaint with the RTC-Makati for the consignation of a premium refund on a fire insurance policy with a prayer for the judicial declaration of its nullity against private respondent Manuel Uy Po Tiong.
2. Private respondent was declared in default for failure to file the required answer.
3. On the other hand, on March 28, 1984, private respondent filed a complaint in the RTC-QC for the refund of premiums and the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment against petitioner Sun Insurance
4. Although the prayer in the complaint did not quantify the amount of damages sought, the said amount may be inferred to be about P50M.
● Only the amount of P210 was paid by as docket fee which prompted petitioners' counsel to raise his objection.
● Said objection was disregarded by presiding Judge Castro
5. Upon the order of this Court after investigation, the case was re-raffled to Branch 104, a sala which was then vacant.
6. On October 15, 1985, the Court en banc issued a Resolution directing the judges to reassess the docket fees and that in case of deficiency, to order its payment.
● The Resolution also requires all clerks of court to issue certificates of re-assessment of docket fees.
● All litigants were likewise required to specify in their pleadings the amount sought to be recovered.
7. On December 16, 1985, Judge Antonio Solano, to whose sala the case was temporarily assigned, ordered the Clerk of Court to issue a certificate of assessment of the docket fee paid by private respondent and, in case of deficiency, to include the same in said certificate.
8. On January 7, 1984, to forestall a default, a cautionary answer was filed by petitioners.
9. On August 30, 1984, an amended complaint was filed by private respondent including the two additional defendants - E.B. Philipps and D.J. Warby
10. Judge Maximiano C. Asuncion, to whom the case was thereafter assigned, required the parties in the case to comment on the Clerk of Court's letter-report signifying her difficulty in complying with the Resolution since the pleadings filed by private respondent did not indicate the exact amount sought to be recovered.
11. On January 23, 1986, private respondent filed a "Compliance" and a "Re-Amended Complaint" stating therein a claim of "not less than P10M as actual compensatory damages" in the prayer. In the body of the said second amended complaint however, private respondent alleges actual and compensatory damages and attorney's fees in the total amount of about P44,601,623.70.
12. On January 24, 1986, Judge Asuncion admitted the second amended complaint.
13. The reassessment by the Clerk of Court bases on private respondent's claim of "not less than P10,000,000.00 as actual and compensatory damages" amounted to P39,786.00 as docket fee. This was subsequently paid by private respondent.
14. Petitioners then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals questioning the said order of Judge Asuncion admitting the second complaint.
15. On April 24, 1986, private respondent filed a supplemental complaint alleging an additional claim of P20,000,000.00 as damages so the total claim amounts to about P64,601,623.70.
16. On October 16, 1986, or some seven months after filing the supplemental complaint, the private respondent paid the additional docket fee of P80,396.
17. On August 13, 1987, the Court of Appeals denied the petition insofar as it seeks annulment of the order.
● it denied petitioners' motion to dismiss the complaint
● granted the writ of preliminary attachment, but giving due course to the portion thereof questioning the reassessment of the docketing fee, and required the lower court to reassess the docketing fee to be paid by private respondent on the basis of the amount of P25,401,707.00.
18. Hence, the instant petition.
● During the pendency of this petition and in conformity with the said judgment of respondent court, private respondent paid the additional docket fee of P62,432.90 on April 28, 1988
PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:
RTC ● Case was re-raffled after determination of wrongful assessment of docket fees of several cases under Judge Castro
● Judge Assuncion admitted the second/amended complaint
CA ● Denied petition for Certiorari
○ Denied motion to dismiss
○ Gave due course to the question of reassessment of docket fees
ISSUE/S: Whether or not a court acquires jurisdiction over a case when the correct and proper docket fee has not been paid - NO
RULING:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Clerk of Court of the court a quo is hereby instructed to reassess and determine the additional filing fee that should be paid by private respondent considering the total amount of the claim sought in the original complaint and the supplemental complaint as may be gleaned from the allegations and the prayer thereof and to require private respondent to pay the deficiency, if any, without pronouncement as to costs.
RATIO:
1. Petitioners allege that while it may be true that private respondent had paid the amount of P182,824.90 as docket fee, and considering that the total amount sought to be recovered in the amended and supplemental complaint is P64,601,623.70 the docket fee that should be paid by private respondent is P257,810.49, more or less.
2. Not having paid the same, petitioners contend that the complaint should be dismissed and all incidents arising therefrom should be annulled.
3. The principle in Manchester could very well be applied in the present case. The pattern and the intent to defraud the government of the docket fee due it is obvious not only in the filing of the original complaint but also in the filing of the second amended complaint.
4. However, in Manchester, petitioner did not pay any additional docket fee until the case was decided by this Court on May 7, 1987. Thus, in Manchester, due to the fraud committed on the government, this Court held that the court a quo did not acquire jurisdiction over the case and that the amended complaint could not have been admitted inasmuch as the original complaint was null and void.
5. In the present case, a more liberal interpretation of the rules is called for considering that, unlike Manchester, private respondent demonstrated his willingness to abide by the rules by paying the additional docket fees as required.
6. It triggered his change for stance by manifesting his willingness to pay such additional docket fee as may be ordered. Nevertheless, petitioners contend that the docket fee that was paid is still insufficient considering the total amount of the claim.
7. Thus, the Court rules as follows:
● It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of the prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action. Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.
● The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims, third-party claims and similar pleadings, which shall not be considered filed until and unless the filing fee prescribed therefore is paid. The court may also allow payment of said fee within a reasonable time but also in no case beyond its applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.
● Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of the appropriate pleading and payment of the prescribed filing fee but, subsequently, the judgment awards a claim not specified in the pleading, or if specified the same has been left for determination by the court, the additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall be the responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his duly authorized deputy to enforce said lien and assess and collect the additional fee.
INTERCONTINENTAL BROADCASTING CORP. (IBC-13) V. ALONZO LEGASTO
April 18, 2006 | G.R. No. 169108 | J YNARES-SANTIAGO | Docket and filing fees
PETITIONER: INTERCONTINENTAL BROADCASTING CORP.
RESPONDENTS:ALONZO LEGASTO
DOCTRINE:
To put a stop to this irregularity, henceforth all complaints, petitions, answers and other similar pleadings should specify the amount of damages being prayed for not only in the body of the pleading but also in the prayer, and said damages shall be considered in the assessment of the filing fees in any case. Any pleading that fails to comply with this requirement shall not be accepted nor admitted, or shall otherwise be expunged from the record.
The Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fee. An amendment of the complaint or similar pleading will not thereby vest jurisdiction in the Court, much less the payment of the docket fee based on the amounts sought in the amended pleading.
FACTS:
1. For the purpose of putting an end to the suit for a sum of money before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, petitioner and private respondent Antonio Salvador entered into a Compromise Agreement
2. Contending that petitioner unjustifiably refused to comply with its obligation under paragraph 4 of the selfsame Compromise Agreement, on the other hand, private respondent filed the 5 January 2001 complaint for Specific Performance and Damages against petitioner, its President, Boots Anson Roa, and Legal Counsel and Corporate Secretary, Atty. Azucena Garcia. Docketed as Civil Case No. Q-01-43036 before Branch 220 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City
3. Petitioner contends that respondent failed to pay the correct docket fees thus the trial court never acquired the requisite jurisdiction over the case; that granting the lower court never lost its jurisdiction notwithstanding the deficiency assessment, it should have, in the interest of prudence and fair play, at least ordered the suspension of proceedings pending payment of the appropriate docket fees.
PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:
RTC ● denying petitioner’s motion to dismiss and/or suspension of all proceedings pending payment by respondent of the appropriate docket fees.
CA ● found no abuse of discretion in the denial of petitioner’s motion to dismiss and/or suspend the proceedings.
ISSUE/S:
WON jurisdiction was acquired in this case.-YES
RULING:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED.
RATIO:
● Plainly, while the payment of the prescribed docket fees is a jurisdictional requirement, even its non-payment at the time of filing does not automatically cause the dismissal of the case, as long as the fees is paid within the applicable prescriptive or reglemantary period, more so when the party involved demonstrates a willingness to abide by the rules prescribing such payment. Thus, when insufficient filing fees were initially paid by the plaintiffs and there was no intention to defraud the government, the Manchester rule does not apply.
● The foregoing indicate that respondent did not have a clear basis in computing the exact quantitative value of paragraph 4 of the Compromise Agreement.
● On the other hand, the P8,517.00 docket fees were computed on the basis of what was legally quantifiable at the time of the filing of the complaint. Upon proof of payment of the assessed fees by the respondent, the trial court properly acquired jurisdiction over the complaint. Jurisdiction once acquired is never lost, it continues until the case is terminated.
● In the case at bar, the respondent relied on the assessment made by the docket clerk which turned out to be incorrect. The payment of the docket fees, as assessed, negates any imputation of bad faith or an intent to defraud the government by the respondent. Thus, when insufficient filing fees were initially paid by the respondent and there was no intention to defraud the government, the Manchester rule does not apply. Hence, the trial court properly acquired jurisdiction over the instant suit.
FORONDA-CRYSTAL v. SON
November 29, 2017 | G.R. No. 221815 | Reyes, Jr., J. | Docket and Filing Fees
Naga, Rey Jude Christian C.
PETITIONER: GLYNNA FORONDA-CRYSTAL
RESPONDENT: ANIANA LAWAS SON
DOCTRINE:
The determination of the amount of prescribed filing and docket fees are now based on the following: (a) the fair market value of the real property in litigation stated in the current tax declaration or current zonal valuation of the Bureau of Internal Revenue; or (b) the stated value of the real or personal property in litigation as alleged by the claimant.
FACTS:
1. In this case, petitioner is the daughter of Eddie Foronda, the registered owner of a parcel of land in Barrio Magay, Compostela, Cebu, by virtue of a successful grant of a Free Patent.
2. Respondent filed an action for reconveyance and damages against petitioner alleging that for 12 ½ years, she has been the lawful owner and possessor of the said property, and that she purchased the same from a certain Eleno Arias. She also alleged that she has been religiously paying real property taxes, as evidenced by a tax declaration issued under her name.
3. Moreover, she alleged that the issuance of the free patent in favor of Eddie was due to gross error, and that there is no tax declaration in the name of Eddie Foronda.
4. Petitioner then filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction, improper venue, prescription of action, and lack of cause of action.
PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:
RTC ● Issued an Order dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction, ruling that the jurisdiction lies with the MCTC of Liloan-Compostela, Cebu based on the market value of the subject property in the tax declaration, amounting to P2,830.00.
● After the filing of MR, the RTC issued another order, in which it set aside its earlier ruling.
● After trial on the merits, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of respondent, and it ordered the Register of Deeds of Cebu to cancel OCT No. OP-37324, and to issue a new one under the name of the respondent.
CA ● Upon appeal, the CA rendered a decision affirming the RTC’s decision.
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not the RTC should have dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. - YES
RULING:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 02226 dated March 12, 2015, and the Resolution dated October 19, 2015 of the Court of Appeals, as well as the Decision dated November 24, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 55 of Mandaue City, are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE for being issued without jurisdiction. This is without prejudice to the filing of the parties of the proper action before the proper court.
RATIO:
● Jurisdiction is defined as the power and authority of a court to hear, try, and decide a case. What is relevant in this case, therefore, is the delineation provided for by law which separates the jurisdictions of the second level courts—the Regional Trial Courts—and the first level courts—the Metropolitan Trial Courts (MeTC), Municipal Trial Courts (MTC), Municipal Circuit Trial Courts (MCTC), and Municipal Trial Courts in the Cities (MTCC).
● This can be easily ascertained through a reading of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended by Republic Act No. 7691. According to this law, in all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein, the RTC shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction where the assessed value of the property exceeds P20,000.00 or, for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such value exceeds P50,000.00.
● For those below the foregoing threshold amounts, exclusive jurisdiction lies with the MeTC, MTC, MCTC, or MTCC.
● In here, the respondent failed to allege in her complaint the assessed value of the subject property. Rather, what she included therein was an allegation of its market value amounting to P200,000.00.
● In the course of the trial, the petitioner asserted that the assessed value of the property as stated in the tax declaration was merely P1,030.00, and therefore the RTC lacked jurisdiction.That the complaint in the present case did not aver the assessed value of the property is a violation of the law, and generally would be dismissed because the court which would exercise jurisdiction over the case could not be identified.
● In this instance, the complaint referred to Tax Declaration No. 16408A, attached therein as Annex "B," which naturally would contain the assessed value of the property. A perusal thereof would reveal that the property was valued at P2,826.00.
On this basis, it is clear that it is the MTC, and not the RTC, that has jurisdiction over the case.
● Discussion of the SC regarding docket fees and filing fees : The determination of the amount of prescribed filing and docket fees are now based on the following: (a) the fair market value of the real property in litigation stated in the current tax declaration or current zonal valuation of the Bureau of Internal Revenue; or (b) the stated value of the real or personal property in litigation as alleged by the claimant
RADIO COMMUNICATIONS v. CA
August 1, 2002 | GR No. 136109 | YNARES-SANTIAGO, J | Jurisdiction over the Subject Matter
PETITIONER: RADIO COMMUNICATIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC.
RESPONDENTS: COURT OF APPEALS and MANUEL DULAWON
DOCTRINE:
It is axiomatic that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and is determined by the allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief sought, irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to all or some of the claims asserted therein.
FACTS:
1. Private respondent Manuel Dulawon filed with the Regional Trial Court of Tabuk, Kalinga, Branch 25, a complaint for breach of contract of lease with damages against petitioner Radio Communications of the Philippines, Inc. (RCPI). It alleged, among others, that the defendant surreptitiously removed its equipments and other personalities from the leased premises and failed to pay rentals due for the months of January to March 1997 to the damage and prejudice of plaintiff.
2. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction contending that it is the Municipal Trial Court which has jurisdiction as the complaint is basically one for collection of unpaid rentals in the sum of P84,000.00, which does not exceed the jurisdictional amount of P100,000.00 for Regional Trial Courts.
PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:
RTC ● Denied the motion to dismiss, as well as petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
CA ● CA likewise dismissed the petition.
ISSUE/S:
1. WON the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the complaint filed by private respondent - YES
RULING:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the petition is DENIED and the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 45987 is AFFIRMED.
RATIO:
1. YES
● Under Sec. 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended, Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation.
● In one case, the Court held that in determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary estimation, the nature of the principal action or remedy sought must first be ascertained.
o If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and jurisdiction over the action will depend on the amount of the claim. However, where the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money, where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought, the action is one where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, which is cognizable exclusively by Regional Trial Courts.
● It is axiomatic that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and is determined by the allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief sought, irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to all or some of the claims asserted therein.
o In the case at bar, the allegations in the complaint plainly show that private respondent's cause of action is breach of contract.
● It is settled that a breach of contract is a cause of action either for specific performance or rescission of contracts.
o Here, the averments in the complaint reveal that the suit filed by private respondent was primarily one for specific performance as it was aimed to enforce their three-year lease contract which would incidentally entitle him to monetary awards if the court should find that the subject contract of lease was breached.
■ As alleged therein, petitioner's failure to pay rentals due for the period from January to March 1997, constituted a violation of their contract which had the effect of accelerating the payment of monthly rentals for the years 1997 and 1998. The same complaint likewise implied a premature and unilateral termination of the term of the lease with the closure of and removal of all communication equipment in the leased premises.
o Under the circumstances, the court has to scrutinize the facts and the applicable laws in order to determine whether there was indeed a violation of their lease agreement that would justify the award of rentals and damages.
■ The prayer, therefore, for the payment of unpaid rentals in the amount of P84,000.00 plus damages consequent to the breach is merely incidental to the main action for specific performance.
● Clearly, the action for specific performance case, irrespective of the amount of rentals and damages sought to be recovered, is incapable of pecuniary estimation, hence cognizable exclusively by the Regional Trial Court.
Sps. Erorita v. Sps. Dumlao
January 25, 2016 | GR No. 195477 | BRION, J. | Jurisdiction
PETITIONER: SPOUSES HERMINIO E. ERORITA and EDITHA C. ERORITA
RESPONDENTS: SPOUSES LIGAYA DUMLAO and ANTONIO DUMLAO
DOCTRINE:
Although the complaint bears the caption "recovery of
possession," its allegations contain the jurisdictional facts for an unlawful
detainer case. Under RA 7691, an action for unlawful detainer is within the
MTC's exclusive jurisdiction regardless of the property's assessed value.
FACTS:
● Spouses Antonio and Ligaya Dumlao (Spouses Dumlao) are the registered owners of a parcel of land located at Barangay San Mariano, Roxas, Oriental Mindoro, and covered by TCT No. T-53000. The San Mariano Academy structures are built on the property.
● The Spouses Dumlao bought the property in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale on April 25, 1990. Because the former owners, SpousesHerminio and Editha Erorita (Spouses Erorita), failed to redeem it, the title was consolidated in the buyers' name.
● The Spouses Dumlao agreed to allow the petitioners to continue to operate the school on the property. The Spouses Erorita appointed Hernan and Susan Erorita as the San Mariano Academy's administrators. The Spouses Dumlao alleged that the Eroritas agreed on a monthly rent of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00), but had failed to pay rentals since 1990. The Spouses Erorita countered that the Dumlaos allowed them to continue to run the school without rental out of goodwill and friendship.
● On December 16, 2002, the Spouses Dumlao asked the petitioners to vacate the property. Although the Spouses Erorita wanted to comply, they could not immediately close the school without clearance from the Department of Education, Culture, and Sports to whom they are accountable.
● On March 4, 2004, the Spouses Dumlao filed a complaint for recovery of possession before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) against the defendants Hernan, Susan, and the Spouses Erorita.
PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:
RTC ● The RTC decided in the Spouses Dumlao's favor. It ordered the defendants (1) to immediately vacate the property and turn it over to the Spouses Dumlao, and (2) to pay accumulated rentals, damages, and attorney's fees. The RTC also prohibited the defendants from accepting enrollees to the San Mariano Academy.
CA ● The defendants Erorita appealed to the CA arguing that the complaint patently shows a case for unlawful detainer. Thus, the RTC had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case.
● CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.
ISSUE/S:
1. WON the action should have been filed as a case for unlawful detainer.
2. WON the RTC had jurisdiction
RULING:
WHEREFORE, we hereby GRANT the petition. The July 28, 2010 decision and January 4, 2011 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR CV No. 92770 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, we DECLARE the June 4, 2007 decision of the RTC in Civil Case No. C-492 void for lack of jurisdiction.
RATIO:
YES.
● To make a case for unlawful detainer, the complaint must allege that: (a) initially, the defendant lawfully possessed the property, either by contract or by plaintiff's tolerance; (b) the plaintiff notified the defendant that his right of possession is terminated; (c) the defendant remained in possession and deprived plaintiff of its enjoyment; and (d) the plaintiff filed a complaint within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property. A complaint for accion publiciana or recovery of possession of real property will not be considered as an action for unlawful detainer if any of these special jurisdictional facts is omitted.
● A review of the complaint shows that: (a) the owners, Spouses Dumlao, agreed to allow the petitioners to continue operating the school on the disputed property; (b) in a demand letter dated February 12, 2004, the Spouses Dumlao told the petitioners to pay and/or vacate the property; (c) the respondents refused to vacate the property; and (d) the Spouses Dumlao filed the complaint (March 4, 2004) within a year from the last demand to vacate (February 12, 2004).
● Thus, although the complaint bears the caption "recovery of possession," its allegations contain the jurisdictional facts for an unlawful detainer case. Under RA 7691, an action for unlawful detainer is within the MTC's exclusive jurisdiction regardless of the property's assessed value.
NO
● The CA incorrectly applied our ruling in Barbosa. In that case, the complaint did not state that (i) possession was unlawfully withheld and (ii) the complaint was filed within a year from the last demand. Because these special jurisdictional facts for an unlawful detainer case were lacking, we held that the case should be accion publiciana over which the RTC has jurisdiction.
● In the present case, however, the complaint clearly contained the elements of an unlawful detainer case. Thus, the case should have been filed with the MTC. The RTC had no jurisdiction over this case.
HEIRS OF ALFREDO BAUTISTA v. LINDO
March 10, 2014 | G.R. No. 208232 | Velasco, J. | Jurisdiction over the Subject Matter
PETITIONERS: Surviving Heirs of Alfredo Baustista, namely: Epifania G. Bautista and Zoey G. Bautista
RESPONDENTS: Francisco Lindo, et. al.
DOCTRINE:
Settled jurisprudence considers some civil actions as incapable of pecuniary estimation, viz.: 1) Actions for specific performance; 2) Actions for support which will require the determination of the civil status; 3) The right to support of the plaintiff; 4) Those for the annulment of decisions of lower courts; 5) Those for the rescission or reformation of contracts; and 6) Interpretation of a contractual stipulation.
FACTS:
1. Alfredo R. Bautista (Bautista), petitioner's predecessor, inherited in 1983 a free-patent land located in Poblacion, Lupon, Davao Oriental covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. (1572) P-6144. A few years later, he subdivided the property and sold it to several vendees, herein respondents, via a notarized deed of absolute sale.
2. Two months later, OCT No. (1572) P-6144 was canceled and Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs) were issued in favor of the vendees. Three years after the sale, Bautista filed a complaint for repurchase against respondents before the RTC. Respondents, in their Answer, raised lack of cause of action, estoppel, prescription, and laches, as defenses.
3. Meanwhile, during the pendency of the case, Bautista died and was substituted by petitioner Epifania G. Bautista (Epifania).
4. Respondents Francisco and Welhilmina Lindo later entered into a compromise agreement with petitioners, whereby they agreed to cede to Epifania a 3,230 sq.m.-portion of the property as well as to waive, abandon, surrender, and withdraw all claims and counterclaims against each other. The compromise was approved by the RTC.
5. Other respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss, alleging that the complaint failed to state the value of the property sought to be recovered. Moreover, they asserted that the total selling price of all the properties is only P16,500, and the selling price or market value of a property is always higher than its assessed value.
PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:
RTC ● The RTC issued the assailed order dismissing the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. It found that Bautista failed to allege in his complaint that the value of the subject property exceeds P20,000.
● Furthermore, what was only stated therein was that the total and full refund of the purchase price of the property is P16,500. This omission was considered by the RTC as fatal to the case considering that in real actions, jurisdictional amount is determinative of whether it is the municipal trial court or the RTC that has jurisdiction over the case.
SC ● This Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 was filed by the petitioners.
ISSUE/S:
1. WON the RTC erred in granting the motion for the dismissal of the case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. – YES
RULING:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The Regional Trial Court l is ORDERED to proceed with dispatch in resolving the civil case.
RATIO:
1. YES.
● Jurisdiction of courts is granted by the Constitution and pertinent laws.
o The jurisdiction of RTCs is provided in Sec. 19 of BP 129. On the other hand, the jurisdiction of first level courts is prescribed in Sec. 33 of BP 129.
● In this case, the complaint to redeem a land subject of a free patent is a civil action incapable of pecuniary estimation.
o It is a well-settled rule that jurisdiction of the court is determined by the allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief sought.
o In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary estimation this Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the principal action or remedy sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the RTCs would depend on the amount of the claim.
o But where the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money, where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought, this Court has considered such actions as cases where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and, hence, are incapable of pecuniary estimation. These cases are cognizable exclusively by RTCs.
● Settled jurisprudence considers some civil actions as incapable of pecuniary estimation, viz.: 1) Actions for specific performance; 2) Actions for support which will require the determination of the civil status; 3) The right to support of the plaintiff; 4) Those for the annulment of decisions of lower courts; 5) Those for the rescission or reformation of contracts; and 6) Interpretation of a contractual stipulation.
● The Court finds that the instant cause of action to redeem the land is one for specific performance.
o The facts are clear that Bautista sold to respondents his lots which were covered by a free patent. While the deeds of sale do not explicitly contain the stipulation that the sale is subject to repurchase by the applicant within a period of 5 years from the date of conveyance pursuant to Sec. 119 of CA 141, still, such legal provision is deemed integrated and made part of the deed of sale as prescribed by law. It is basic that the law is deemed written into every contract.
o Although a contract is the law between the parties, the provisions of positive law which regulate contracts are deemed written therein and shall limit and govern the relations between the parties. Thus, it is a binding prestation in favor of Bautista which he may seek to enforce.
o That is precisely what he did. He filed a complaint to enforce his right granted by law to recover the lot subject of free patent. Ergo, it is clear that his action is for specific performance, or if not strictly such action, then it is akin or analogous to one of specific performance. Such being the case, his action for specific performance is incapable of pecuniary estimation and cognizable by the RTC.
● At first blush, it appears that the action filed by Bautista involves title to or possession of the lots he sold to respondents.
o This proposition is incorrect for the re-acquisition of the lots by Bautista or herein successors-in-interests, the present petitioners, is but incidental to and an offshoot of the exercise of the right by the latter to redeem said lots pursuant to Sec. 119 of CA 141.
o The reconveyance of the title to petitioners is solely dependent on the exercise of such right to repurchase the lots in question and is not the principal or main relief or remedy sought. Thus, the action of petitioners is, in reality, incapable of pecuniary estimation, and the reconveyance of the lot is merely the outcome of the performance of the obligation to return the property conformably to the express provision of CA 141.
HEIRS OF JULAO V. DE JESUS
September 29 2014 | GR No. 176020 | September 29 2014 | Jurisdiction over the Subject Matter
PETITIONER: HEIRS OF TELESFORO JULAO, namely, ANITA VDA. DE ENRIQUEZ, SONIA J. TOLENTINO and RODERICK JULAO
RESPONDENTS: SPOUSES ALEJANDRO and MORENITA DE JESUS
DOCTRINE:
In this case, for the RTC to exercise jurisdiction, the assessed value of the subject property must exceed P20,000.00. Since petitioners failed to allege in their Complaint the assessed value of the subject property, the CA correctly dismissed the Complaint as petitioners failed to establish that the RTC had jurisdiction over it. In fact, since the assessed value of the property was not alleged, it cannot be determined which trial court had original and exclusive jurisdiction over the case.
FACTS:
● Sometime in the 1960‘s, Telesforo Julao filed before the DENR two Townsite Sales
Applications.
● Upon his death in 1971, his applications were transferred to his heirs.
● In 1979, Solito Julao executed a Deed of transfer of Rights, transferring his hereditary share in the property to Spouses Alejandro and Morenita De Jesus.
● In 1983, spouses constructed a house on the property they acquired from Solito.
● In 1986, Solito went missing.
● On 1996, DENR issued an order rejection and transfer of sales right appearing that Julao is a holder of 2 applications in violation with established policy in the disposition of public lands, thus, one of the Townsite Sales Applications was dropped from records.
● Consequently, on 1998 Original Certificate of Title covering a 641-square meter property,was issued in favor of the heirs of Telesforo.
● In 1999, petitioners, representing themselves to be the heirs of Telesforo, filed before the RTC a complaint for recovery of Possession of Real Property against respondent spouses.
● Petitioners alleged that they are the true and lawful owners of a 641-square meter parcel of land. During the trial, petitioners disputed the validity of the Deed of Transfer of Right executed by Solito and presented evidence to prove that Solito had no hereditary share in the estate of Telesforo because Solito was not Telesforo‘s biological son, but his stepson, and that Solito‘s real name was Francisco Bognot.
PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:
RTC ● The RTC found that although petitioners failed to prove their allegation that Solito was not an heir of Telesforo, they were nevertheless able to convincingly show that Telesforo filed with the DENR two applications.
CA x The CA reversed the ruling of the RTC.
x The CA pointed out that the Complaint failed to establish that the RTC had jurisdiction over the case as petitioners failed to allege the assessed value of the subject property.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the complaint. -NO
RULING:
All told, we find no error on the part of the CA in dismissing the Complaint for lack of jurisdiction and for failing to identify the property sought to be recovered.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated December 4, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 72845 is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
RATIO:
No, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the complaint. It is clear that in an action for recovery of possession, the assessed value of the property sought to be recovered determines the court‘s jurisdiction. In this case, for the RTC to exercise jurisdiction, the assessed value of the subject property must exceed P20,000.00. Since petitioners failed to allege in their Complaint the assessed value of the subject property, the CA correctly dismissed the Complaint as petitioners failed to establish that the RTC had jurisdiction over it. In fact, since the assesse value of the property was not alleged, it cannot be determined which trial court had original and exclusive jurisdiction over the case. Moreover, the fact that it was raised for the first time on appeal is of no moment.
The defense of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even for the first time on appeal. In fact, the court may motu proprio dismiss a complaint at any time when it appears from the pleadings or the evidence on record that lack of jurisdiction exists.
PALMIANO - SALVADOR v. ANGELES
3 September 2012 | GR No. 171219 | Peralta, J | Jurisdiction over the Parties
PETITIONER: ATTY. FE Q. PALMIANO-SALVADOR
RESPONDENTS: CONSTANTINO ANGELES, substituted by LUZ G. ANGELES
DOCTRINE:
"[i]f a complaint is filed for and in behalf of the plaintiff [by one] who is not authorized to do so, the complaint is not deemed filed. An unauthorized complaint does not produce any legal effect. Hence, the court should dismiss the complaint on the ground that it has no jurisdiction over the complaint and the plaintiff."
FACTS:
1. Respondent-appellee ANGELES is one of the registered owners of a parcel of land located at 1287 Castanos Street, Sampaloc, Manila, evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 150872. The subject parcel of land was occupied by one Jelly Galiga (GALIGA) from 1979 up to 1993, as a lessee with a lease contract. Subsequently, Fe Salvador (SALVADOR) alleged that she bought on September 7, 1993 the subject parcel of land from GALIGA who represented that he was the owner, being one in possession. Petitioner-appellant SALVADOR remained in possession of said subject property from November 1993 up to the present.
2. On November 18, 1993, the registered owner, the respondent-appellee ANGELES, sent a letter to petitioner-appellant SALVADOR demanding that the latter vacate the subject property, which was not heeded by petitioner-appellant SALVADOR. Respondent-appellee ANGELES, thru one Rosauro Diaz, Jr. (DIAZ), filed a complaint for ejectment on October 12, 1994 with the Metropolitan Trial Court [MeTC] of Manila, Branch 16, docketed as Civil Case No. 146190-CV.
3. METC and CA ruled in favor of ANGELES.
4. Hence, the present petition, where one of the important issues for resolution is the effect of Rosauro Diaz's (respondent's representative) failure to present proof of his authority to represent respondent (plaintiff before the MeTC) in filing the complaint. This basic issue has been ignored by the MeTC and the RTC, while the CA absolutely failed to address it, despite petitioner's insistence on it from the very beginning, i.e., in her Answer filed with the MeTC. This is quite unfortunate, because this threshold issue should have been resolved at the outset as it is determinative of the court's jurisdiction over the complaint and the plaintiff.
5.
Note that the complaint before the MeTC was filed in the name of respondent, but it was one Rosauro Diaz who executed the verification and certification dated October 12, 1994, alleging therein that he was respondent's attorney-in-fact. There was, however, no copy of any document attached to the complaint to prove Diaz's allegation regarding the authority supposedly granted to him. This prompted petitioner to raise in her Answer and in her Position Paper, the issue of Diaz's authority to file the case.
6. On December 11, 1995, more than a year after the complaint was filed, respondent attached to his Reply and/or Comment to Respondent's (herein petitioner) Position Paper, a document entitled Special Power of Attorney (SPA) 5 supposedly executed by respondent in favor of Rosauro Diaz. However, said SPA was executed only on November 16, 1994, or more than a month after the complaint was filed, appearing to have been notarized by one Robert F. McGuire of Santa Clara County. Observe, further, that there was no certification from the Philippine Consulate General in San Francisco, California, U.S.A., that said person is indeed a notary public in Santa Clara County, California. Verily, the court cannot give full faith and credit to the official acts of said Robert McGuire, and hence, no evidentiary weight or value can be attached to the document designated as an SPA dated November 16, 1994. Thus, there is nothing on record to show that Diaz had been authorized by respondent to initiate the action against petitioner.
PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:
METC ● ruled in favor of ANGELES
RTC ● ruled in favor of ANGELES
CA ● CA dismissed the petition for review and affirmed METC ruling; that Galiga, the person who supposedly sold the subject premises to petitioner, was a mere lessee of respondent, the registered owner of the land in question. Such being the case, the lower court ruled that Galiga could not have validly transferred ownership of subject property to herein petitioner.
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether the METC have validly acquired jurisdiction over the parties.
RULING:
NO. IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court in Civil Case No. 146190, dated November 29, 1999; the Decision of the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. 00-96344, dated March 12, 2003; and the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 83467, are SET ASIDE AND NULLIFIED. The complaint filed by respondent before the Metropolitan Trial Court is hereby DISMISSED.
"[i]n order for the court to have authority to dispose of the case on the merits, it must acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties. Courts acquire jurisdiction over the plaintiffs upon the filing of the complaint, and to be bound by a decision, a party should first be subjected to the court's jurisdiction. Clearly, since no valid complaint was ever filed with the [MeTC], the same did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of respondent [plaintiff before the lower court]."
Pursuant to the foregoing rulings, therefore, the MeTC never acquired jurisdiction over this case and all proceedings before it were null and void. The courts could not have delved into the very merits of the case, because legally, there was no complaint to speak of. The court's jurisdiction cannot be deemed to have been invoked at all.
DENILA V. REPUBLIC
July 15, 2020 | GR No. 206077 | GESMUNDO, J. | Jurisdiction over the Issues
PETITIONER: HELEN P. DENILA
RESPONDENTS: REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
DOCTRINE:
Failure to comply with any of the jurisdictional requirements for a petition for reconstitution or other special proceedings renders the whole proceedings null and void, as it fails to confer proper jurisdiction over the trial courts
FACTS:
1. The Original Certificate of Titles (OCT) for several parcels of land owned by Constancio and Isabel Luna was lost sometime after the Second World War when both passed away with no direct heirs.
2. In 2001, the Heirs of Constancio Guzman, Inc. (HCGI), a corporation whose stakeholders were great nieces and nephews of Constancio, filed for petitions of Reconstitution for the parcels of land, which was denied by Davao’s acting Register of Deeds for the reason that the OCTs being reconstituted were not mutilated, destroyed nor lost but had been subject to a series of transfers.The RTC likewise dismissed the petition for the same reason.
3. Aggrieved, HCGI directly elevated the case to this Court via Petition for Review on Certiorari, but was denied for the disregard for the hierarchy of courts and the lack of proof that the OCTs were destroyed or lost.
4. An amended reconstitution petition for the same lots was filed by petitioner Denila, who alleged that a portion of Constancio’s estate belonged to her after a Bellie Artigas, who was entitled to 40% of the land as Constancio’s attorney-in-fact, sold her the share. The RTC granted her petition and reconstitution was ordered
PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:
RTC ● The Republic through the OSG filed a Petition for Relief from Judgment with the RTC seeking to set aside the March 4, 2008 Decision.
● The Petition of relief was denied by the courts as the petition had been filed 16 days after the reglementary period.
CA ● The respondent then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals in consideration of the HCGI ruling, and the fact that the petition for relief was valid as the days were counted from the receipt of the OSG and not the Davao City’s Office of the City Prosecutor.
● The petition prospered and the Court of Appeals ruled that the judge in the amended reconstitution case acted with grave abuse of discretion for the misruling and the denial of the respondent’s petition for relief.
● The respondent’s petition is granted and the previous decisions are voided and set aside.
● The petitioner, raised to this court a petition for certiorari stating that the Court of Appeals committed a grave abuse of discretion by reversing the RTC’s denial of the petition for relief and that they committed an error in nullifying the granting of her reconstitution petition.
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not the RTC exceeded its jurisdiction in granting petitioner’s reconstitution petition despite her failure to comply with some jurisdictional requirements
RULING:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, this Court DENIES the Petition.
RATIO:
YES.
● Jurisdiction is the basic foundation of judicial proceedings. It is simply defined as the power and authority — conferred by the Constitution or statute — of a court to hear and decide a case. Without jurisdiction, a judgment rendered by a court is null and void and may be attacked anytime. Indeed, a void judgment is no judgment at all — it can neither be the source of any right nor the creator of any obligation; all acts performed pursuant to it and all claims emanating from it have no legal effect.
● In adjudication, the concept of jurisdiction has several aspects, namely: (a) jurisdiction over the subject matter; (b) jurisdiction over the parties; (c) jurisdiction over the issues of the case; and (d) in cases involving property, jurisdiction over the res or the thing which is the subject of the litigation. Additionally, a court must also acquire jurisdiction over the remedy in order for it to exercise its powers validly and with binding effect.
● Jurisdiction over the issues pertains to a tribunal's power and authority to decide over matters which are either disputed by the parties or simply under consideration. This aspect of jurisdiction is closely tied to jurisdiction over the remedy and over the subject matter which, in turn, is generally determined in the allegations of the initiatory pleading (complaint or petition) and not the result of proof. However, unlike jurisdiction over the subject-matter, jurisdiction over the issues may be conferred by either express or implied consent of the parties.
● Furthermore, the Supreme Court delves in the nature of special proceedings in comparison to ordinary civil actions. Where in ordinary actions there is a definition to the parties involved, ie. the existence of a complainant which seeks the enforcement or protection of a right, parties in special proceedings often seek to declare or make valid a status, right or fact. As such, the trial court must have jurisdiction to take cognizance of such petition or application in compliance with the specific procedure provided by law. The authority to proceed is conferred by a statute which is why the manner of obtaining jurisdiction is mandatory and the same must be strictly complied with.
● Since reconstitution of a title is a special proceeding, the petitioner must first allege and prove certain jurisdictional facts before a trial court may acquire jurisdiction.
● In the case at bar, the Supreme Court finds that the petitioner was unable to strictly comply with the jurisdictional fact requirement prescribed by law. As such, non-compliance of the same in special proceedings such as the reconstitution, affects the trial court’s jurisdiction over the issue.
PLDT COMPANY V. CITI APPLIANCE M.C. CORPORATION
October 9, 2019 | GR No. 214546 | LEONEN, J. | Jurisdiction over the Remedy
PETITIONER: PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY
RESPONDENTS: CITI APPLIANCE M.C. CORPORATION
DOCTRINE:
Jurisdiction over the remedy is different from jurisdiction over the subject matter. Jurisdiction over the remedy pertains to the court's competence over the process. This should not be confused with the relief, that which the party filing the case wants the court to declare, and which addresses the breach of the right or obligation.
Generally, jurisdiction over the remedy is provided by the Rules of Court. Thus, it is mainly a procedural matter which this Court — the authority that promulgates the Rules of Court — may change ad hoc, or clarify the application or interpretation of, in proper cases.
FACTS:
1. The Cebu City Zoning Board required Citi Appliance to construct a one-level parking area. In April 2003, it discovered telephone lines, cables, and manholes underground, which had been placed there by PLDT preventing it from excavating the land.
2. On April 2004, Citi Appliance wrote PLDT, demanding that it remove the underground telephone lines, cables, and manholes, or to shoulder the parking exemption fee. On May 2004, tt then made a final demand on PLDT to comply. But since it refused to comply, Citi Appliance filed a complaint for ejectment against PLDT on Oct. 1, 2004.
3. In its Answer, PLDT alleged that its telephone lines, cables, and manholes did not encroach on Citi Appliance's property as they were properly positioned alongside and underneath a public sidewalk. It later filed an Amended Answer, arguing that the case should be dismissed since the action for forcible entry had prescribed. It expounded in its Position Paper that the one-year prescriptive period within which to bring an action for forcible entry based on stealth should be reckoned from the discovery of the alleged unlawful entry, not the last demand to vacate.
PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:
MTCC ● WHEREFORE, premises considered, this complaint for EJECTMENT is hereby GRANTED. Defendants are hereby ordered to comply with the demand of the plaintiff to either realign its transmission lines as to allow the plaintiff to be able to implement its planned construction works on its own land or to pay the rent to the plaintiffs at the rate of P15,000.00 per month. Costs de oficio.
● Complaint for forcible entry was timely filed. It held that when unlawful entry was made clandestinely, the one-year prescriptive period should be counted from the last demand to vacate.
RTC ● Affirmed with modification the MTCC Decision.
CA ● Affirmed the lower tribunals' findings.
● Ordered PLDT to realign its transmission lines and restitute the premises to Citi Appliance M.C. Corporation and payment of rents in arrears.
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether the issue on lack of jurisdiction was deemed waived by petitioner for failure to raise the issue in its Answer. - NO
2. Whether the MTCC has jurisdiction over the case since respondent Citi Appliance's action for forcible entry had prescribed. - NO
RULING:
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The January 14, 2014 Decision and July 21, 2014 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB SP No. 06366 are SET ASIDE.
RATIO:
1. NO. Petitioner is not barred from raising the issue of lack of jurisdiction. It raised the issue when it filed its Amended Answer with leave of court before the MTCC. As it seasonably raised the court's lack of jurisdiction, there is neither waiver of the jurisdictional issue nor estoppel against petitioner.
● Courts are vested with jurisdiction over the remedy and jurisdiction over the subject matter. These types of jurisdiction may not be waived by the parties.
● Jurisdiction over the remedy is different from jurisdiction over the subject matter. Jurisdiction over the remedy pertains to the court's competence over the process. This should not be confused with the relief, that which the party filing the case wants the court to declare, and which addresses the breach of the right or obligation.
● The source of jurisdiction is important. Generally, jurisdiction over the remedy is provided by the Rules of Court. Thus, it is mainly a procedural matter which this Court — the authority that promulgates the Rules of Court — may change ad hoc, or clarify the application or interpretation of, in proper cases.
● The key to the first issue in this case is, therefore, determining whether the one-year requirement within which to file forcible entry or unlawful detainer is provided only by the Rules of Court rather than by law. Certainly, this pertains to jurisdiction over the remedy. Generally, therefore, objections to this type of jurisdiction must be seasonably made.
● In cases of forcible entry or unlawful detainer, the Rules of Court provides the one-year prescriptive period. Under Rule 70, Section 1, a party may file a complaint for forcible entry or unlawful detainer "at any time within one (1) year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession, . . . against the person or persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of possession, or any person or persons claiming under them, for the restitution of such possession[.]"
2. NO. The Municipal Court had no jurisdiction over the ejectment suit because the reckoning point of the prescriptive period is the date of dispossession, not the date of demand to vacate.
TIJAM V. SIBONGHANOY
April 15, 1968 | G.R. No. L-21450| Dizon, J. | Estoppel Jurisdiction
DOCTRINE:
Laches, generally, is failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do that which by exercising due diligence could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.
FACTS:
An action for collection of a sum of money in the sum of P 1,908.00, exclusive of interest was filed by Serafin Tijam and Felicitas Tagalog against Spouses Magdaleno Sibonghanoy and Lucia Baguio which was originally instituted in the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Cebu on July 19, 1948. A month prior to the filing of the complaint, the RA 296 or otherwise known as Judiciary Act of 1948 took effect which deprives the CFI of original jurisdiction over cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest, is not more than P 2,000.00 (Secs. 44[c.] and 86[b.], R.A. 296.) Now, the case has already been pending now for almost 15 years, and throughout the entire proceeding, the appellant never raised the question of jurisdiction until the receipt of the Court of Appeals’ adverse decision. Consequently, considering that the Supreme Court has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all cases in which the jurisdiction of any inferior court is in issue, the Court of Appeals certified the case to the Supreme Court along with the records of the case.
ISSUE/S:
Whether the appellant’s motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the CFI during the pendency of the appeal will prosper.
RULING:
No. The appellant’s motion to dismiss cannot prosper. The Court discussed the following principles in arriving at its decision. A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in different ways and for different reasons. As such, it speaks of estoppel in pais, or estoppel by deed or by record, and of estoppel by laches. Laches, generally, is failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do that which by exercising due diligence could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.
The doctrine of laches or of “stale demands” is based upon grounds of public policy which requires, for the peace of society, the discouragement of stale claims and, unlike the statute of limitations, is not a mere question of time but is principally a question of the inequity or unfairness of permitting a right or claim to be enforced or asserted. “In one case, it has been held that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to sure affirmative relief against his opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction”. “Furthermore, in another case, it has also been held that after voluntarily submitting a cause and encountering an adverse decision on the merits, it is too late for the loser to question the jurisdiction or power of the court. “ “And, the Court said that it is not right for a party who has affirmed and invoked the jurisdiction of a court in a particular matter to secure an affirmative relief, to afterward deny that same jurisdiction to escape a penalty.”
The above principle is what the Court has said in the three cases mentioned in the resolution of the Court of Appeals of May 20, 1963 (supra) — to the effect that the Court frown upon the “undesirable practice” of a party submitting his case for decision and then accepting the judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when adverse.
The facts of this case show that from the time the Surety became a quasi-party on July 31, 1948, it could have raised the question of the lack of jurisdiction of the CFI of Cebu to take cognizance of the present action by reason of the sum of money involved which, according to the law then in force, was within the original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts. It failed to do so. Instead, at several stages of the proceedings in the court a quo as well as in the Court of Appeals, it invoked the jurisdiction of said courts to obtain affirmative relief and submitted its case for a final adjudication on the merits. It was only after an adverse decision was rendered by the Court of Appeals that it finally woke up to raise the question of jurisdiction. Were the Court to sanction such conduct on its part, it would in effect be declaring as useless all the proceedings had in the present case since it was commenced on July 19, 1948 and compel the judgment creditors to go up their Calvary once more. The inequity and unfairness of this are not only patent but revolting. Thus, the Court affirmed the decision rendered by the Court of Appeals.
SPOUSES ERORITA V. SPOUSES DUMLAO
January 25, 2016 | GR No. 195477 | Brion, J | Estoppel Jurisdiction
PETITIONER: Spouses Hermino E. Erorita and Editha C. Erorita
RESPONDENTS: Spouses Ligaya Dumlao and Antonio Dumlao
DOCTRINE:
As a general rule, lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter may be raised at any time, or even for the first time on appeal. An exception to this rule is the principle of estoppel by laches.
Estoppel by laches may only be invoked to bar the defense of lack of jurisdiction if the factual milieu is analogous to Tijam v Sibonghanoy. In that case, lack of jurisdiction was raised for the first time after almost 15 years after the questioned ruling had been rendered and after the movant actively participated in several stages of the proceedings. It was only invoked too, after the CA rendered a decision adverse to the movant.
FACTS:
1. Spouses Dumlao are the registered owners of the parcel of land where the San Mariano Academy structures are built on the property. They purchased the same in an extrajudicial foreclosure because the former owners, Spouses Erorita failed to redeem it.
2. The Spouses Dumlao allowed the petitoners to operate the school on their property, and the latter appointed Hernan and Susan Erorita as the school’s administrators.
3. The Spouses Dumlao alleged that they agreed at a rental fee of Php 20,000 pesos which the Petitioners failed to pay since 1990. The Spouses Erorita countered that they were allowed to operate the school based on goodwill and friendship.
4. The Spouses Dumlao filed a complaint for recovery of possession before the RTC against Hernan, Susan and the Spouses Erorita. However, the latter could not immediately close the school without clearance from DECS. Thus a complaint for recovery of possession was filed against them with the RTC
5. The Spouses Erorirata did not appear during the pre-trial, and were declared in Default.
PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY: (For labor cases, please change RTC and CA to LA and NLRC or whatever else tribunal/CBA system is applicable)
RTC RTC decided in the Spouses Dumlao’s favor. It ordered the defendants (1) to immediately vacate the property and turn it over to the Spouses Dumlao, and (2) to pay accumulated rentals, damages, and attorney’s fees. The RTC also prohibited the defendants from accepting enrolees to the San Mariano Academy
CA CA ruled that the applicable law on jurisdiction when the complaint was filed, was Republic Act No. 7691. his law provides that in civil actions involving a real property’s title or possession, jurisdiction depends on the property’s assessed value and location – if the assessed value exceeds fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) in Metro Manila, and twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) outside of Metro Manila, the RTC has jurisdiction. tax declaration showed that the assessed value of the property and its improvements exceeded P20,000.00, the CA concluded that the RTC had jurisdiction
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether the RTC had jurisdiction.
RULING:
As a general rule, lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter may be raised at any time, or even for the first time on appeal. An exception is the principle of estoppel by laches.
Estoppel by laches may only be invoked to bar the defense of lack of jurisdiction if the factual milieu is analogous to Tijam and Sibonghanoy. In that case lack of jurisdiction was raised for the first time after almost fifteen (15) years after the questioned ruling had been rendered and after the movant actively participated in several stages of the proceedings. It was only invoked, too, after the CA rendered a decision adverse to the movant.
The factual setting of this present case is not similar to Tijam so as to trigger the application of the estoppel by laches doctrine.1âwphi1 As in Figueroa, the present petitioners assailed the RTC’s jurisdiction in their appeal before the CA. Asserting lack of jurisdiction on appeal before the CA does not constitute laches. Furthermore, the filing of an answer and the failure to attend the pre-trial do not constitute the active participation in judicial proceedings contemplated in Tijam.
Thus, the general rule should apply.1âwphi1 The petitioners timely questioned the RTC's jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, we hereby GRANT the petition. The July 28, 2010 decision and January 4, 2011 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR CV No. 92770 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, we DECLARE the June 4, 2007 decision of the RTC in Civil Case No. C-492 void for lack of jurisdiction.
Lansangan v. Caisip
6 August 2018 | G.R. No. 212987 | PERLAS-BERNABE, J | Katarungang Pambarangay
PETITIONER: ELIZABETH M. LANSANGAN
RESPONDENTS: ANTONIO S. CAISIP
DOCTRINE:
As a general rule, the grounds for Motion to Dismiss under Section 1, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court must be invoked by the party-litigant at the earliest opportunity, as in a motion to dismiss or in the answer; otherwise, such grounds are deemed waived.
FACTS:
5. Respondent, a resident of Barangay Sto. Niño, Concepcion, Tarlac, executed a promissory note in favor of petitioner in the amount of €2,522.00 payable in three (3) installments.
6. As respondent defaulted in his obligation under the promissory note and refused to heed petitioner's demands to comply therewith, the latter was constrained to file a Complaint for Sum of Money and Damages before the 2nd Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Capas-Bamban-Concepcion, Tarlac (MCTC)
7. Since respondent failed to file any responsive pleading, petitioner moved to declare him in default and for the MCTC to render judgment, which was granted in an Order 10 dated August 28, 2012. Accordingly, the case was submitted for resolution.
PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:
MCTC MCTC motu proprio dismissed without prejudice the complaint for failure to comply with the provisions of Republic Act No. (RA) 7160, otherwise known as "The Local Government Code of 1991," which requires the prior referral of the dispute between residents of the same barangay for conciliation proceedings before the filing of a case in court.
MCTC opined that petitioner's failure to refer the matter for barangay conciliation proceedings rendered it without jurisdiction to rule on her complaint.
Aggrieved, she filed a petition for certiorari before the RTC.
RTC ● RTC upheld the motu proprio dismissal of petitioner's complaint.
● It ruled that prior barangay conciliation proceedings before the filing of the instant complaint is jurisdictional; thus, non-compliance therewith warrants its dismissal.
CA ● CA affirmed the RTC Ruling.
● It held that since the party-litigants are both residents of Concepcion, Tarlac, petitioner's complaint should have undergone the mandatory barangay conciliation proceedings before raising the matter before the courts.
ISSUE/S:
2. Whether or not the CA erred in upholding the motu proprio dismissal of petitioner's complaint?
RULING:
Yes. CA should not have dismissed petitioner’s complaint for failure to refer the matter for barangay conciliation proceedings which in certain instances, is a condition precedent before filing a case in court.
As a general rule, the grounds for Motion to Dismiss under Section 1, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court must be invoked by the party-litigant at the earliest opportunity, as in a motion to dismiss or in the answer; otherwise, such grounds are deemed waived. As an exception, however, the courts may order the motu proprio dismissal of a case on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, litis pendentia, res judicata, and prescription of action, pursuant to Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court.
As Section 412 (a) of RA 7160 provides, the conduct of barangay conciliation proceedings is a pre-condition to the filing of a complaint involving any matter within the authority of the lupon.
Under Section 409 (a) of RA 7160, "[d]isputes between persons actually residing in the same barangay [(as in the parties in this case)] shall be brought for amicable settlement before the lupon of said barangay."
Lifted from Presidential Decree No. 1508, 28 otherwise known as the "Katarungang Pambarangay Law," the primordial objective of a prior barangay conciliation is to reduce the number of court litigations and prevent the deterioration of the quality of justice which has been brought by the indiscriminate filing of cases in courts. Subject to certain exemptions, a party's failure to comply with this requirement before filing a case in court would render his complaint dismissible on the ground of failure to comply with a condition precedent, pursuant to Section 1 (j), Rule 16 of the Rules of Court. 30
Notably, in Aquino v. Aure the Court clarified that such conciliation process is not a jurisdictional requirement, such that non-compliance therewith cannot affect the jurisdiction which the court has otherwise acquired over the subject matter or over the person of the defendant,32 viz.:
Ordinarily, non-compliance with the condition precedent [of prior barangay conciliation] could affect the sufficiency of the plaintiff's cause of action and make his complaint vulnerable to dismissal on [the] ground of lack of cause of action or prematurity; but the same would not prevent a court of competent jurisdiction from exercising its power of adjudication over the case before it, where the defendants, as in this case, failed to object to such exercise of jurisdiction in their answer and even during the entire proceedings a quo.33
Here, the ground of non-compliance with a condition precedent, i.e.,undergoing prior barangay conciliation proceedings, was not invoked at the earliest opportunity, as in fact, respondent was declared in default for failure to file a responsive pleading despite due notice. Therefore, it was grave error for the courts a quo to order the dismissal of petitioner's complaint on said ground. Hence, in order to rectify the situation, the Court finds it proper that the case be reinstated and remanded to the MCTC, which is the court of origin, for its resolution on the merits.
ABAGATNAN v. SPS. CLARITO
August 27, 2017 | GR No. 211966 | Del Castillo. J., | First Division | Katarungang Pambarangay
PETITIONER: Wenceslao Abagatnan
RESPONDENTS: SPS. Clarito
DOCTRINE:
In Pascual v. Pascual, the Court ruled that the express statutory requirement of actual residency in the LGC pertains specifically to the real parties in interest in the case. It further explained that said requirement cannot be construed to apply to the attorney-in-fact of the party-plaintiff, as doing so would abrogate the meaning of a "real party in interest" as defined in Section 2, in relation to Section 3, of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court.
FACTS:
Wenceslao Abagatnan and his late wife Lydia Capote acquired a parcel of land designated as Lot 1472-B located at Brgy. Cogon, Roxas City.
In 1990, respondents allegedly asked for Wenceslao‘s permission to allow them to construct a residential house to which the latter agreed but subject to the condition that respondents will vacate the subject property should he need the same for his own use.
When Lydia died in 1999, her children (co-petitioners in this case) succeeded into the ownership of her conjugal share of said property.
In 2006, the petitioners decided to sell portions of Lot 1472B including the subject property which was then still being occupied by respondents. Said portion was first offered to the respondents, but the latter declined.
Thereafter, a Demand letter was sent to the respondents requiring them to vacate the subject property within 15 days from receipt.
For failure to heed such demand, petitioners filed a Complaint for Unlawful detainer and Damages before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 2, Roxas City. Notably, the Complaint alleged that prior barangay conciliation proceedings are not required as a precondition for the filing of the case given that not all petitioners are resident of Roxas City (Jimmy resided in Laguna; Jenalyn resided in Pasig).
In their answer with counterclaim, respondents argued that prior barangay conciliation is mandatory requirement that cannot be dispensed with considering that Jimmy and Jenalyn had already executed a SPA in favor of co-petitioner and sister Josephine, who is a resident of Roxas City.
PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:
RTC ● The RTC denied respondent‘s appeal ruling that since the parties raised the issue of ownership to justify their claims of possession, and the evidence of ownership is preponderant on petitioners, the MTCC was justified in ruling the case in the latter's favor.
CA ● Granted respondent’s petition for review for lack of prior referral to the Katarungang Pambarangay. CA also denied petitioner’s MR. Hence, this present petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not there is still a need to comply for a prior barangay conciliation requirement under Sec. 412 of LGC despite the fact that not all real parties in interest resided in the same city or municipality. - NO
RULING:
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the Petition for Review on Certiorari. The Decision dated June 20, 2013 and the Resolution dated February 3, 2014 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 03283 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision dated January 15, 2008 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 19, Roxas City in Civil Case No. V-47-07 is REINSTATED. SO ORDERED.
RATIO:
■ NO.
■ Section 412 of the LGC requires the parties to undergo a conciliation process before the Lupon Chairman as a precondition to the filing of a complaint. Also, the LGC further provides that the ―lupon of each barangay shall have authority to bring together the parties actually residing in the same city or municipality for amicable settlement of all disputes‖. One exception would be in cases where the dispute involves parties who actually reside in barangays of different cities or municipalities, unless said barangay units adjoin each other and the parties thereto agree to submit to their differences to amicable settlement by an appropriate lupon.”
■ In the present case, the Complaint filed before the MTCC specifically alleged that not all the real parties in interest in the case actually reside in Roxas City. As such, the lupon has no jurisdiction over their dispute, and prior referral of the case for barangay conciliation is not a pre-condition to its filing in court.
■ This is true regardless of the fact that Jimmy and Jenalyn had already authorized their sister and copetitioner, Josephine, to act as their attorney-in-fact in the ejectment proceedings before the MTCC.
■ In Pascual v. Pascual, the Court ruled that the express statutory requirement of actual residency in the LGC pertains specifically to the real parties in interest in the case. It further explained that said requirement cannot be construed to apply to the attorney-in-fact of the party-plaintiff, as doing so would abrogate the meaning of a "real party in interest" as defined in Section 2, in relation to Section 3, of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court
CHAVEZ v. COURT of APPEALS.
18 March 2005 | GR No. 159411| Puno, J. | Katarungang Pambarangay
PETITIONER: Teodoro I. Chavez
RESPONDENTS: Hon. Court of Appeals and Jacinto S. Trillana
DOCTRINE:
Although the "Kasunduan" (or settlement) executed by the parties before the Office of the Barangay Captain had the force and effect of a final judgment of a court, petitioner's non-compliance paved the way for the application of Art. 2041 under which respondent may either enforce the compromise, following the procedure laid out in the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law, or regard it as rescinded and insist upon his original demand. In exercising the second option under Art. 2041, the aggrieved party may, if he chooses, bring the suit contemplated or involved in his original demand, as if there had never been any compromise agreement, without bringing an action for rescission. This is because he may regard the compromise as already rescinded by the breach thereof of the other party.
FACTS:
1. In October 1994, petitioner Teodoro Chavez and respondent Jacinto Trillana entered into a contract of lease. Teodoro Chavez leased to the Jacinto Trillana his fishpond at Sitio Pariahan, Taliptip, Bulacan, Bulacan, for six (6) years from October 23, 1994 to October 23, 2000. The rental for the whole term was P2,240,000.00.
2. Paragraph 5 of the contract provided that respondent shall undertake all construction and preservation of improvements in the fishpond that may be destroyed during the period of the lease, at his expense, without reimbursement from petitioner.
3. In August 1996, a powerful typhoon hit the country which damaged the subject fishpond. Respondent did not immediately undertake the necessary repairs as the water level was still high. Three (3) weeks later, respondent was informed by a barangay councilor that major repairs were being undertaken in the fishpond with the use of a crane; that the repairs were at the instance of petitioner who had grown impatient with his delay in commencing the work.
4. Respondent, then, filed a complaint before the Office of the Barangay Captain of Taliptip, Bulacan, Bulacan. He complained about the unauthorized repairs undertaken by petitioner, the ouster of his personnel from the leased premises and its unlawful taking by petitioner despite their valid and subsisting lease contract.
5. After such, an agreement or “kasunduan” has been reached between them, wherein:
a. Chavez shall return the amount of Php 150,000 as payment for the rest of the lease;
b. that if Chavez were able to give Php 100,000 before September 23 of the same year, the same constitutes full payment, instead of the Php 150,000. But if 100,000 cannot be paid, the full payment shall remain 150,000.
6. Thereafter, respondent filed a complaint against petitioner before the RTC of Valenzuela City alleging non-compliance by petitioner with their lease contract and the foregoing "Kasunduan."
7. Petitioner filed his answer but failed to submit the required pre-trial brief and to attend the pretrial conference. Respondent was allowed to present his evidence ex-parte before the Acting Branch Clerk of Court.
PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:
RTC ● Ruled in favor of the respondent
CA ● Modified the RTC’s decision
○ MR was denied
● Petitioner’s Contention:
○ That the CA erred in ruling that the RTC of Valenzuela City had jurisdiction over the action filed by respondent considering that the subject matter thereof, his alleged violation of the lease contract with respondent, was already amicably settled before the Office of the Barangay Captain of Taliptip, Bulacan, Bulacan.
○ That respondent should have followed the procedure for enforcement of the amicable settlement as provided for in the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law.
ISSUE/S:
1. WON RTC Valenzuela City has jurisdiction over the action filed by the respondent despite the presence of an amicable settlement between the parties in the Office of Barangay Captain of Taliptip, Bulacan – YES
RULING:
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated April 2, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 59023 is modified by deleting the award of ₱300,000.00 as reimbursement of advance rentals. The assailed Decision is AFFIRMED in all other respects. SO ORDERED.
RATIO:
1. YES.
● Respondent, by instituting the Civil Case for recovery of unrealized profits and reimbursement of advance rentals, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees, chose to regard the compromise between him and the petitioner as rescinded; and chose to insist upon his original demand.
● Indeed, under the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law and as enunciated in Article 2037 of the Civil Code, a compromise has upon the parties the effect and authority of res judicata. However, the Court has clarified in Heirs of Zari, et al. v. Santos that the broad precept enunciated in Article 2037 of the Civil Code is qualified by Article 2041 of the Civil Code which provides that if one of the parties fails or refuses to abide by the compromise, the other party may either enforce the compromise or regard it as rescinded and insist upon his original demand.
● In exercising the second option under Art. 2041, the aggrieved party may, if he chooses, bring the suit contemplated or involved in his original demand, as if there had never been any compromise agreement, without bringing an action for rescission. This is because he may regard the compromise as already rescinded by the breach thereof of the other party.
● In the case at bar, the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law provides for a two-tiered mode of enforcement of an amicable settlement, to wit: (a) by execution by the Punong Barangay which is quasi-judicial and summary in nature on mere motion of the party entitled thereto; and (b) an action in regular form, which remedy is judicial.
● However, the mode of enforcement does not rule out the right of rescission under Art. 2041 of the Civil Code. The availability of the right of rescission is apparent from the wording of Sec. 417 itself which provides that the amicable settlement "may" be enforced by execution by the lupon within six (6) months from its date or by action in the appropriate city or municipal court, if beyond that period. The use of the word "may" clearly makes the procedure provided in the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law directory or merely optional in nature.
● Thus, although the "Kasunduan" executed by petitioner and respondent before the Office of the Barangay Captain had the force and effect of a final judgment of a court, petitioner's non-compliance paved the way for the application of Art. 2041 under which respondent may either enforce the compromise, following the procedure laid out in the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law, or regard it as rescinded and insist upon his original demand.
● Respondent chose the latter option when he instituted Civil Case for recovery of unrealized profits and reimbursement of advance rentals, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees.
● Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law provides that an amicable settlement reached after barangay conciliation proceedings has the force and effect of a final judgment of a court if not repudiated or a petition to nullify the same is filed before the proper city or municipal court within ten (10) days from its date. It further provides that the settlement may be enforced by execution by the lupong tagapamayapa within six (6) months from its date, or by action in the appropriate city or municipal court, if beyond the six-month period.
● This special provision follows the general precept enunciated in Article 2037 of the Civil Code, which states that a compromise has upon the parties the effect and authority of res judicata; but there shall be no execution except in compliance with a judicial compromise.
MACASAET v. CO
05 June 2013 | GR No. 150274 | Rule 1
PETITIONER: ALLEN A. MACASAET, NICOLAS V. QUIJANO, JR., ISAIAS ALBANO, LILY REYES, JANET BAY, JESUS R. GALANG, AND RANDY HAGOS
RESPONDENT: FRANCISCO R. CO, JR.
DOCTRINE:
Jurisdiction over the person, or jurisdiction in personam –the power of the court to render a personal judgment or to subject the parties in a particular action to the judgment and other rulings rendered in the action – is an element of due process that is essential in all actions, civil as well as criminal, except in actions in rem or quasi in rem.
FACTS:
1. On July 3, 2000, respondent, a retired police officer assigned at the Western Police District in Manila, sued Abante Tonite, a daily tabloid of general circulation; its Publisher Allen A. Macasaet; its Managing Director Nicolas V. Quijano; its Circulation Manager Isaias Albano; its Editors Janet Bay, Jesus R. Galang and Randy Hagos; and its Columnist/Reporter Lily Reyes (petitioners), claiming damages because of an allegedly libelous article petitioners published in the June 6, 2000 issue of Abante Tonite.
2. The suit, docketed as Civil Case No. 00-97907, was raffled to Branch 51 of the RTC, which in due course issued summons to be served on each defendant, including Abante Tonite, at their business address at Monica Publishing Corporation, 301-305 3rd Floor, BF Condominium Building, Solana Street corner A. Soriano Street, Intramuros, Manila.
3. RTC Sheriff Raul Medina proceeded to the stated address to effect the personal service of the summons on the defendants. But his efforts to personally serve each defendant in the address were futile because the defendants were then out of the office and unavailable. He returned in the afternoon of that day to make a second attempt at serving the summons, but he was informed that petitioners were still out of the office. He decided to resort to substituted service of the summons, and explained in his sheriff’s return why he could not serve the summons in person.
4. Petitioners moved for the dismissal of the complaint through counsel’s special appearance on their behalf, alleging lack of jurisdiction over their persons because of the invalid and ineffectual substituted service of summons. They contended that the sheriff had made no prior attempt to serve the summons personally on each of them in accordance with Section 6 and Section 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court.
PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:
RTC ● Denied the motion to dismiss and directed the petitioners to file their answers to the complaint within the remaining period allowed by the Rules of Court.
○ Considering that summonses cannot be served within a reasonable time to the persons of all the defendants, hence substituted service of summonses was validly applied. Secretary of the President who is duly authorized to receive such document, the wife of the defendant and the Editorial Assistant of the defendant, were considered competent persons with sufficient discretion to realize the importance of the legal papers served upon them and to relay the same to the defendants named therein (Sec. 7, Rule 14, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure).
● Denied the MR
CA ● Dismissed the petition for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus by the petitioners
ISSUE/S:
1. WON jurisdiction over the petitioners had been acquired - YES
RULING:
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on March 8, 2002; and ORDERS petitioners to pay the costs of suit.
RATIO:
1. YES.
● Jurisdiction over the person, or jurisdiction in personam – the power of the court to render a personal judgment or to subject the parties in a particular action to the judgment and other rulings rendered in the action – is an element of due process that is essential in all actions, civil as well as criminal, except in actions in rem or quasi in rem. Jurisdiction over the defendant in an action in rem or quasi in rem is not required, and the court acquires jurisdiction over an action as long as it acquires jurisdiction over the res that is the subject matter of the action. The purpose of summons in such action is not the acquisition of jurisdiction over the defendant but mainly to satisfy the constitutional requirement of due process.
● The distinctions that need to be perceived between an action in personam, on the one hand, and an action in rem or quasi in rem, on the other hand, are aptly delineated in Domagas v. Jensen, thusly:
o The settled rule is that the aim and object of an action determine its character. Whether a proceeding is in rem, or in personam, or quasi in rem for that matter, is determined by its nature and purpose, and by these only. A proceeding in personam is a proceeding to enforce personal rights and obligations brought against the person and is based on the jurisdiction of the person, although it may involve his right to, or the exercise of ownership of, specific property, or seek to compel him to control or dispose of it in accordance with the mandate of the court. On the other hand, a proceeding quasi in rem is one brought against persons seeking to subject the property of such persons to the discharge of the claims assailed. In an action quasi in rem, an individual is named as defendant and the purpose of the proceeding is to subject his interests therein to the obligation or loan burdening the property.
● Actions quasi in rem deal with the status, ownership or liability of a particular property but which are intended to operate on these questions only as between the particular parties to the proceedings and not to ascertain or cut off the rights or interests of all possible claimants. The judgments therein are binding only upon the parties who joined in the action.
● As a rule, Philippine courts cannot try any case against a defendant who does not reside and is not found in the Philippines because of the impossibility of acquiring jurisdiction over his person unless he voluntarily appears in court; but when the case is an action in rem or quasi in rem enumerated in Section 15, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, Philippine courts have jurisdiction to hear and decide the case because they have jurisdiction over the res, and jurisdiction over the person of the non-resident defendant is not essential. In the latter instance, extraterritorial service of summons can be made upon the defendant, and such extraterritorial service of summons is not for the purpose of vesting the court with jurisdiction, but for the purpose of complying with the requirements of fair play or due process, so that the defendant will be informed of the pendency of the action against him and the possibility that property in the Philippines belonging to him or in which he has an interest may be subjected to a judgment in favor of the plaintiff, and he can thereby take steps to protect his interest if he is so minded. On the other hand, when the defendant in an action in personam does not reside and is not found in the Philippines, our courts cannot try the case against him because of the impossibility of acquiring jurisdiction over his person unless he voluntarily appears in court.
● The service of the summons fulfills two fundamental objectives, namely: (a) to vest in the court jurisdiction over the person of the defendant; and (b) to afford to the defendant the opportunity to be heard on the claim brought against him. As to the former, when jurisdiction in personam is not acquired in a civil action through the proper service of the summons or upon a valid waiver of such proper service, the ensuing trial and judgment are void. If the defendant knowingly does an act inconsistent with the right to object to the lack of personal jurisdiction as to him, like voluntarily appearing in the action, he is deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court.
● Under the Rules of Court, the service of the summons should firstly be effected on the defendant himself whenever practicable. Such personal service consists either in handing a copy of the summons to the defendant in person, or, if the defendant refuses to receive and sign for it, in tendering it to him. The rule on personal service is to be rigidly enforced in order to ensure the realization of the two fundamental objectives earlier mentioned. If, for justifiable reasons, the defendant cannot be served in person within a reasonable time, the service of the summons may then be effected either (a) by leaving a copy of the summons at his residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copy at his office or regular place of business with some competent person in charge thereof. The latter mode of service is known as substituted service because the service of the summons on the defendant is made through his substitute.
● There is no question that Sheriff Medina twice attempted to serve the summons upon each of petitioners in person at their office address, the first in the morning of September 18, 2000 and the second in the afternoon of the same date. Each attempt failed because Macasaet and Quijano were “always out and not available” and the other petitioners were “always roving outside and gathering news.” After Medina learned from those present in the office address on his second attempt that there was no likelihood of any of petitioners going to the office during the business hours of that or any other day, he concluded that further attempts to serve them in person within a reasonable time would be futile. The circumstances fully warranted his conclusion. He was not expected or required as the serving officer to effect personal service by all means and at all times, considering that he was expressly authorized to resort to substituted service should he be unable to effect the personal service within a reasonable time.
HEIRS OF TOMAS DOLLETON V. FIL- ESTATE MANAGEMENT, INC.
April 7, 2009 | G.R. No. 170750 | CHICO-NAZARIO, J | Cause of Action
PETITIONER: Heirs of Tomas Dolleton, Heraclio Orcullo, Remedios San Pedro, Heirs of Bernardo Millama, Heirs of Agapito Villanueva, Heirs of Hilarion Garcia, Serafina Sp Argana, And Heirs of Mariano Villanueva
RESPONDENTS: Fil-Estate Management, Inc., et al and the Register of Deeds of Las Piñas City
DOCTRINE:
The elementary test for failure to state a cause of action is whether the complaint alleges facts which if true would justify the relief demanded. The inquiry is into the sufficiency, not the veracity, of the material allegations. If the allegations in the complaint furnish sufficient basis on which it can be maintained, it should not be dismissed regardless of the defense that may be presented by the defendant.
FACTS:
1. The petitioners filed before the RTC separate Complaints for Quieting of Title and/or Recovery of Ownership and Possession with Preliminary Injunction/Restraining Order and Damages against Fil-Estate Management Inc., Spouses Arturo E. Dy and Susan Dy, Megatop Realty Development, Inc., and the Register of Deeds of Las Piñas. The Complaints were later consolidated. The eight Complaints were similarly worded and contained substantially identical allegations. That they had been in continuous, open, and exclusive possession of the subject properties for more than 90 years until they were forcibly ousted by armed men. They had cultivated the subject properties and religiously paid the real estate taxes for the same. Spouses Dy cannot rely on Transfer Certificates of Title issued by the Registry of Deeds of Las Piñas in their names, because the subject properties were not covered by said certificates.
2. Respondents filed before the RTC a Motion to Dismiss and Opposition to Application for a Temporary Restraining Order/Writ of Preliminary Injunction. They moved for the dismissal of the eight Complaints on the grounds of (1) prescription; (2) laches; (3) lack of cause of action; and (4) res judicata.
3. The RTC granted the Motion to Dismiss of respondents. The RTC determined that the subject properties were already registered in the names of respondents, and that petitioners were unable to prove by clear and convincing evidence their title to the said properties.
4. The CA denied the appeal and affirmed the RTC Resolutions stating that the titles to the subject properties were indefeasible because they were registered under the Torrens system. Thus, it could not be said that any claim on the subject properties casts a cloud on their title when they failed to demonstrate a legal or an equitable title to the same. o In addition, actions had already been prescribed. PD 1529 requires that an action assailing a certificate of title should be filed within one year after its issuance and actions assailing fraudulent titles should be filed within 10 years after the said titles were issued but in this case, it took 30 years before petitioners filed their case.
PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:
RTC ● RTC granted Motion to Dismiss.
CA ● The CA affirmed the dismissal of the case.
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not the RTC properly granted respondents' motion to dismiss.—NO
RULING:
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is GRANTED.
(Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court)
RATIO:
1. NO
Section 2, Rule 2 of the Rules of Civil Procedure defines a cause of action as the act or omission by which a party violates the right of another. Its essential elements are as follows: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; (2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and (3) an act or omission on the part of such defendant in violation of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff, for which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages or other appropriate relief.
The elementary test for failure to state a cause of action is whether the complaint alleges facts which if true would justify the relief demanded. The inquiry is into the sufficiency, not the veracity, of the material allegations. If the allegations in the complaint furnish sufficient basis on which it can be maintained, it should not be dismissed regardless of the defense that may be presented by the defendant.
Respondents mistakenly construe the allegations in petitioners Complaints. What petitioners alleged in their Complaints was that while the subject properties were not covered by respondents’ certificates of title, nevertheless, respondents forcibly evicted petitioners therefrom.
It is not simply a question of whether petitioners’ possession can defeat respondents’ title to registered land. Instead, an initial determination has to be made on whether the subject properties were in fact covered by respondents’ certificates of title.
The Court is convinced that each of the Complaints filed by petitioners sufficiently stated a cause of action. The Complaints alleged that petitioners are the owners of the subject properties by acquisitive prescription. As owners thereof, they have the right to remain in peaceful possession of the said properties and, if deprived thereof, they may recover the same.
Multi-Realty Development Corporation vs. Makati Tuscany Condominium Corporation
June 16, 2006| GR No. 146726 | Callejo Sr. J | Right of Action
PETITIONER: Multi-Realty Development Corporation
RESPONDENTS: Makati Tuscany Condominium Corporation
DOCTRINE:
The right of action springs from the cause of action, but does not accrue until all the facts which constitute the cause of action have occurred. One has a right of action to file a complaint/petition for reformation of an instrument when his legal right is denied, challenged or refused by another; or when there is an antagonistic assertion of his legal right and the denial thereof by another concerning a real question or issue; when there is a real, definitive and substantive controversy between the parties touching on their legal relations having adverse legal interests.
FACTS:
1. Petitioner Multi-Realty is a domestic corporation engaged in real estate, and in development and construction of condominiums. In 1970s, it built the 26-storey Makati Tuscany Condominium which consisted of 160 units, 4 of which are penthouse units in the top floor. 270 parking slots were also built, 164 of which are allotted to its unit owners, with each unit being allotted 1 slot each, and each penthouse unit with 2 slots. 8 of the parking slots were designated for guests, while 98 were retained for sale to unit owners who want to have additional slots.
2. Pursuant to the Condominium Act (RA 4726), Makati Tuscany Condominium Corp. (MATUSCO) was created to manage the condominium units. A Master Deed and Declaration of Restrictions (Master Deed) was executed between MultiRealty and MATUSCO, and was filed with the Register of Deeds in 1977.
3. Multi-Realty then executed a Deed of Transfer to MATUSCO over the common areas. Subsequently, Multi-Realty sold 26 of the 98 parking slots from 1977 to 1986 to which, MATUSCO did not object. In 1979, MATUSCO’s President, Jovencio Cinco, informed the Board members of Multi-Realty’s proposal to sell all of the unassigned slots at a price of P15,000 per lot against its prevailing price at that time of P33,000 each. In the meantime, the fair market value of each slot is P250,000 each.
4. In 1989, Multi-Realty requested that 2 of its executives be allowed to park in two of the remaining 72 slots, but MATUSCO denied the request, asserting, for the first time, their ownership over the common areas. While MATUSCO later on offered the requested slots, Multi-Realty rejected it.
5. MATUSCO alleged that Multi-Realty had no cause of action against it for reformation since Multi-Realty, by its own admission, sold parking slots to third parties despite knowledge that such slots, other than those mentioned in Sec. 5 of the Master Deed, belonged to MATUSCO
PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:
RTC ● Denied
○ There is a cause of action.j
CA
○ CA dismissed Multi-Realty’s appeal on the ground of prescription, and said that it could review errors not assigned on appeal, but Multi-Realty asserted that the CA misapplied Sec. 8, Rule 51 because 1964 Rules of Court was still in effect
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not Multi-Realty had a cause of action against MATUSCO since its action for reformation had not yet prescribed. - YES
RULING:
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 44696 is SET ASIDE. The Court of Appeals is directed to resolve petitioner’s appeal with reasonable dispatch. No costs.
RATIO:
YES
● The term "right of action" is the right to commence and maintain an action. In the law of pleadings, right of action is distinguished from a cause of action in that the former is a remedial right belonging to some persons while the latter is a formal statement of the operational facts that give rise to such remedial right. The former is a matter of right and depends on the substantive law while the latter is a matter of statute and is governed by the law of procedure. The right of action springs from the cause of action, but does not accrue until all the facts which constitute the cause of action have occurred.
● A cause of action must always consist of two elements: (1) the plaintiff's primary right and the defendant's corresponding primary duty, whatever may be the subject to which they relate — person, character, property or contract; and (2) the delict or wrongful act or omission of the defendant, by which the primary right and duty have been violated. To determine when all the facts which constitute a cause of action for reformation of an instrument may be brought and when the right of the petitioner to file such action accrues, the second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 63, must be considered because an action for the reformation of an instrument may be brought under said Rule.
● The statute of limitations then does not begin to run against an equitable cause of action for the reformation of an instrument because of mistake until the mistake has been discovered or ought to have been discovered. In this case, petitioner only became of aware of respondent’s denial of its right under their true contract after MATUSCO’s denial of its request; hence, Multi-Realty’s cause of action only arose during this time. For a petition for declaratory relief to prosper, the following conditions sine qua non must concur: (1) there must be a justiciable controversy; (2) the controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) the party seeking declaratory relief must have a legal interest in the controversy; and (4) the issue involved must be ripe for judicial determination.
● The judicial controversy in this case did not arise until the doubt of the plaintiff gets translated into a claim of right which is actually contested. Applying Art. 1144 of the New Civil Code providing a ten-year prescriptive period for written contracts, the prescriptive period for reformation had not yet lapsed when Multi-Realty filed the complaint in 1990. Hence; it was also incorrect for CA to dismiss the case on the basis of prescription, instead of resolving it on the merits when prescription was not a ground raised by the parties.
CONSULAR AREA RESIDENTS ASSOCIATION, INC. v. CASANOVA
April 12, 2016 | GR No. 202618 | Perlas-Bernabe | Cause of Action
PETITIONER: CONSULAR AREA RESIDENTS ASSOCIATION, INC., REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT BENJAMIN V. ZABAT, ROMEO JUGADO, JR., AND NANCY QUINO
RESPONDENTS: ARNEL PACIANO D. CASANOVA, ENGR. TOMAS Y. MACROHON, LOCAL HOUSING BOARD OF TAGUIG CITY, AND THE CITY GOVERNMENT OF TAGUIG
DOCTRINE:
Section 2, Rule 2 of the Rules of Civil Procedure defines a cause of action as the act or omission by which a party violates the right of another. Its essential elements are as follows: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; (2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and (3) an act or omission on the part of such defendant in violation of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff, for which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages or other appropriate relief.
FACTS:
1. Congress enacted Republic Act No. (RA) 7227, otherwise known as the Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992, which, inter alia, created the BCDA in order to "accelerate the sound and balanced conversion into alternative productive uses of the Clark and Subic military reservations and their extensions (i.e., John Hay Station, Wallace Air Station, O'Donnell Transmitter Station, San Miguel Naval Communications Station, and Capas Relay Station)" and "to raise funds by the sale of portions of Metro Manila military camps."
2. Executive Order (EO) No. 40, Series of 1992 was issued, identifying Fort Bonifacio as one of the military camps earmarked for development and disposition to raise funds for BCDA projects.
3. The Local Housing Board of Taguig City issued a Certificate of Compliance on Demolition declaring that the BCDA had complied with the requirement of "Just and Humane Demolition and Eviction," prescribed under Section 28 of RA 7279, otherwise known as the "Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992," for the demolition of structures within the JUSMAG Area.
4. Respondent Casanova sent a Letter informing petitioner and its members that they should, within a seven (7)-day period, coordinate with BCDA officials should they choose to either accept the relocation package being offered to them, or voluntarily dismantle their structures and peacefully vacate the property.
5. Petitioner filed the present case to enjoin the demolition of their structures which they claimed are within the Diplomatic and Consular Area, and not the JUSMAG Area.
6. Respondents Casanova and Engr. Macrohon maintained that the clearing operations undertaken by the BCDA covered only the JUSMAG area, on which the structures possessed by petitioner's members are located. They also argued that under Section 28 (b) of RA 7279, eviction or demolition is allowed when government infrastructure projects with available funding are about to be implemented, even in the absence of a court order.
ISSUE/S:
1. WON the demolition should be enjoined — NO
RULING:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
RATIO:
1. NO
● It is a fundamental rule of procedural law that it is not the caption of the pleading that determines the nature of the complaint but rather its allegations.
● Hence, considering the above-discussed allegations, the petition, albeit denominated as one for prohibition, is essentially an action for injunction, which means that Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court would not apply.
● Instead, it is Section 21 of RA 7227, which solely authorizes the Supreme Court to issue injunctions to restrain or enjoin "the implementation of the projects for the conversion into alternative productive uses of the military reservations," that would govern.
● In this case, the Court finds that the petitioner has failed to prove that the structures for which they seek protection against demolition fall within the Diplomatic and Consular Area. Its supposition is anchored on two (2) documents, namely: (a) a printed copy of BCDA's declaration in its website that the Diplomatic and Consular Area is a non-BCDA property; and (b) a map of the South Bonifacio Properties showing the metes and bounds of the properties of the BCDA as well as the properties contiguous to them. However, none of these documents substantiate petitioner's claim: the website posting is a mere statement that the Diplomatic Consular Area is supposedly a non-BCDA property, whereas the map only depicts the metes and bounds of the BCDA's properties.
● Jurisprudence teaches that in order for a writ of injunction to issue, the petitioner should be able to establish: (a) a right in esse or a clear and unmistakable right to be protected; (b) a violation of that right; and (c) that there is an urgent and permanent act and urgent necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. In the absence of a clear legal right, the writ must not issue. A restraining order or an injunction is a preservative remedy aimed at protecting substantial rights and interests, and it is not designed to protect contingent or future rights. Verily, the possibility of irreparable damage without proof of adequate existing rights is not a ground for injunction.
DANFOSS INC. v. CONTINENTAL CEMENT CORP.
September 9, 2005 | GR No. 143788 | Corona, J. | Rule 2 - Cause of Action
PETITIONERS: Danfoss, Inc.
RESPONDENTS: Continental Cement Corporation (CCC)
DOCTRINE:
In order to sustain a dismissal on the ground of lack of cause of action, the insufficiency must appear on the face of the complaint.
FACTS:
1. CCC purchased from Mechatronics Instruments and Controls, Inc. (MINCI) 2 unit 132 KW Danfoss Brand Frequency Converter/Inverter covered by purchase order (PO) No. 36625.
a. Under the PO’s terms and conditions, the frequency converter/inverter is to be delivered within 8 to 10 weeks from the opening of the letter of credit.
2. MINCI immediately relayed CCC’s PO to Danfoss.
a. On Sept. 17, 1997, MINCI informed CCC that the frequency converter/inverter was ready for shipment. It likewise requested for the amendment of the letter of credit to indicate the change of port of origin from Singapore to Denmark.
b. CCC amended the letter of credit in compliance with MINCI’s request.
c. On Nov. 6, 1997, MINCI informed CCC that Danfoss Industries Pte. Ltd. was still checking the shipment status of the frequency converter/inverter with Danfoss Denmark.
d. On Nov. 9, 1997, Danfoss informed MINCI, with a copy furnished to CCC, that the reason why Danfoss has delivery problems was issues with some components which do not comply with the agreed quality standard, hence the need to canvass for another supplier.
e. No clear message as to when normal production will resume was given.
3. Due to this information received, CCC surmised that MINIC and Danfoss would not be able to deliver the frequency converter/inverter within the period agreed upon.
4. Hence, CCC, through its Purchasing Manager, informed MINCI of its intention to cancel said order.
5. CCC filed a complaint for damages against Danfoss and MINCI before the RTC, alleging that it has suffered actual substantial production losses amounting to more than 8 million pesos due to the time lost and delay in the delivery of the said frequency converter/inverter.
6. Danfoss filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint did not state a case of action. It alleged that:
a. CCC’s right to demand delivery cannot arise earlier than November 19, 1997, which is the last day for Danfoss's principal (Danfoss Denmark) to deliver the frequency converter/inverter.
b. Danfoss's obligation to deliver is not yet demandable. The period of 8 to 10 weeks for the delivery of CCC’s PO was established for the benefit of both parties. As such, CCC cannot demand delivery before the period stipulated.
PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:
RTC ● Denied the motion to dismiss filed by Danfoss
○ CCC’s position is that the acts of MINCI and Danfoss had made compliance with their obligation to deliver within the period stipulated, impossible, hence, there was no need for a demand.
○ The issue at hand necessitates the presentation of evidence which has to be done during the hearing on the merits of the case, where the issue of damages incurred by either of the parties may well be taken up and judgment be rendered after presentation of evidence by the parties.
● Denied Danfoss’ subsequent MR
CA ● On appeal, denied Danfoss’ petition for lack of merit
● Denied Danfoss’ subsequent MR
○ Hence, this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
ISSUE/S:
1. WON the complaint failed to state a cause of action — YES
RULING:
WHEREFORE, we hereby GRANT the petition. The assailed decision and resolution of the CA are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Civil Case No. Q-98-35997 pending before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 80, is hereby DISMISSED.
RATIO:
1. YES, the complaint failed to state a cause of action.
● In order to sustain a dismissal on the ground of lack of cause of action, the insufficiency must appear on the face of the complaint.
● The test of the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint to constitute a cause of action is whether or not, admitting the facts alleged, the court can render a valid judgment thereon in accordance with the prayer of the complaint.
● For this purpose, the motion to dismiss must hypothetically admit the truth of the facts alleged in the complaint.
● In this case, after a careful perusal of the allegations in the CCC’s complaint for damages against Danfoss, we rule that the same failed to state a cause of action.
o When CCC sued Danfoss for damages, Danfoss had not violated any right of CCC from which a cause of action had arisen.
o CCC only surmised that Danfoss would not be able to deliver the frequency converter/inverter on the date agreed upon by them.
● The court a quo should not have denied Danfoss’ motion to dismiss the complaint (for its failure to state a cause of action) when, on its face, it was clear that Danfoss had not yet reneged on its obligation to deliver the frequency converter/inverter on the date mutually agreed upon by the parties.
● Moreover, the obligation itself was negated by no less than CCC’s own act of cancelling its order even before the prestation became due and demandable.
o The premature invocation of the court's intervention was fatal to CCC’s cause of action. Hence, the dismissal of CCC’s complaint was in order.
● In sum, since CCC’s fear that Danfoss might not be able to deliver the frequency converter/inverter on time was not the cause of action referred to by the Rules and jurisprudence, the motion to dismiss the respondent's complaint for damages for lack of cause of action should have been granted by the trial court.
FRANK COLMENAR, IN HIS CAPACITY AS AN HEIR OF THE LATE FRANCISCO COLMENAR v. APOLLO A. COLMENAR, JEANNIE COLMENAR MENDOZA, VICTORIA JET COLMENAR, PHILIPPINE ESTATES CORPORATION, AMAIA LAND CORPORATION, CRISANTA REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, PROPERTY COMPANY OF FRIENDS, AND THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF THE PROVINCE OF CAVITE,
June 21, 2021 | G.R. No. G.R. No. G.R. No. 252467 | Lazaro-Javier, J. | Failure to state cause of action distinguished from lack of cause of action
PETITIONERS: Frank Colmenar, in his capacity as an heir of the late Francisco Colmenar
RESPONDENTS: Apollo Colmenar (Apollo), Jeannie Colmenar Mendoza (Jeannie), and Victoria Jet Colmenar (Victoria) as the seller of the properties to different buyers, namely, Philippine Estates Corporation (PEC), Amaia Land Corporation (Amaia), Crisanta Realty Development Corporation (Crisanta Realty), and Property Company of Friends (ProFriends)
DOCTRINE:
The failure to state a cause of action and lack of cause of action are distinct and separate grounds to dismiss a particular action. Failure to state a cause of action refers to the insufficiency of the allegations in the pleading, while lack of cause of action refers to the insufficiency of the factual basis for the action. Failure to state a cause of action is not the same as lack of cause of action; the terms are not interchangeable.
FACTS:
1. The deceased Francisco Jesus Colmenar (Frank’s father) left several properties at General Trias, Cavite.
2. Frank learned that his siblings Apollo Colmenar (Apollo), Jeannie Colmenar Mendoza (Jeannie), and Victoria Jet Colmenar (Victoria) executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate of Francisco Jesus Colmenar dated May 16, 2008 and another Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate of Deceased Francisco Jesus Colmenar and Loida Colmenar dated July 8, 2011 where they made it appear that they were the surviving heirs of Francisco Jesus Colmenar, and by virtue thereof, allocated unto themselves the interests of his late father in the aforesaid properties.
3. Apollo, Jeannie, and Victoria sold certain lots [registered in the name of Francisco Jesus Colmenar] to ProFriends; to Crisanta Realty; and to PEC. Much later, PEC sold the lot it acquired from Apollo, et al. to Amaia.
4. According to Frank, these sales were made without his knowledge and consent. Apollo, et al. effectively deprived him of his successional rights under Philippine laws as a legitimate son of his late father.
5. Frank also averred that the Deeds of Sale in PEC’s favor are void because the Apollo, et al., not being heirs of Francisco Jesus Colmenar, had no rightful claim and interest over the property. Consequently, PEC also did not confer any right on Amaia when the former sold this property to the latter. For the same reason, the sale in favor of Crisanta Realty and ProFriends are also void.
6. Frank then filed an action for declaration of nullity of deeds of extrajudicial settlement of estate, deeds of sale, cancellation of titles, and damages against PEC, Amaia Land, Crisanta Realty, and ProFriends.
7. In his complaint against PEC, Amaia, and Crisanta Realty, Frank “essentially averred that: (a) he is the legitimate son and lawful heir of Francisco Jesus Colmenar; (b) his father left real properties in the Philippines, the rights and interests of which would legally pass on to his heirs upon his death; (c) the individual respondents [Apollo, et al.] are not the lawful heirs of Francisco Jesus Colmenar, thus, have no claim to the properties left by the latter; (d) the individual respondents [Apollo, et al.], nonetheless, despite being devoid of any right in or authority over the estate of his father, were able to effect a void extrajudicial settlement of his father's estate, and thereafter, a void sale of his father's properties in favor.”
8. PEC, Crisanta and Amaia argued that there was no cause of action. According to them, Frank did not allege in his complaint that they (PEC and Crisanta) are purchasers in bad faith or that they had notice of any defect in the titles of the properties they bought from Frank’s siblings Apollo, et al. who are also children of Francisco Jesus Colmenar, albeit, from a different wife. In effect, the complaint failed to state the particular right, if any, which they supposedly violated. They were innocent purchasers for value. They exercised the required diligence when they investigated the property before buying it. Their diligent investigation did not yield anything suspicious about the properties and their corresponding titles.
9. Thus, two (2) sets of affirmative defenses were raised in the RTC, namely: (1) the complaint failed to state a cause of action, raised by PEC, Amaia, and Crisanta Realty; and (2) lack of cause of action, raised by ProFriends.
PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:
RTC ● The RTC-Trece Martires City dismissed the complaint of Frank Colmenar on the ground that his [Colmenar’s] complaint failed to state a cause of action as against them.
● The RTC held that nowhere in the complaint did Frank alleged that the buyers are purchasers in bad faith or that it has notice of the defect in the title of his siblings Apollo, et al.
SC ● Frank Colmenar filed a petition for review on certiorari before the SC questioning the RTC’s decision.
● SC granted the petition and reversed the RTC decision.
ISSUE: Is Frank Colmenar’s complaint defective for failure to state a cause of action? – No.
RULING:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the Order dated May 22, 2020 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 23, Trece Martires, Cavite in Civil Case No. TMCV-062-18 REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Complaint is REINSTATED as against Philippine Estates Corporation, Crisanta Realty Development Corporation, Amaia Land Corporation, and Property Company of Friends. The trial court is DIRECTED to PROCEED with the resolution of the case with UTMOST DISPATCH.
RATIO:
● No, Frank Colmenar’s complaint is not defective. The complaint stated a cause of action against the companies-buyers.
● A cause of action is defined as an act or omission by which a party violates a right of another. A complaint states a cause of action if it sufficiently avers the existence of the three (3) essential elements of a cause of action, namely: (a) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; (b) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and (c) an act or omission on the part of the named defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages. If the allegations of the complaint do not state the concurrence of these elements, the complaint becomes vulnerable to a motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of action.
● The failure to state a cause of action and lack of cause of action are distinct and separate grounds to dismiss a particular action. Failure to state a cause of action refers to the insufficiency of the allegations in the pleading, while lack of cause of action refers to the insufficiency of the factual basis for the action. Failure to state a cause of action is not the same as lack of cause of action; the terms are not interchangeable.
● Consequently, the RTC erred in dismissing the complaint against ProFriends on ground that the complaint failed to state a cause of action, an affirmative defense it did not raise, and which is completely different from what it actually raised, i.e., lack of cause action. Strictly speaking, lack of cause of action may only be raised after the questions of fact have been resolved on the basis of stipulations or admissions or evidence presented by the plaintiff. Before then, it cannot be raised as a ground for dismissal; much less can the court dismiss the case on that ground.
● The test to determine whether a complaint states a cause of action against the defendants is - admitting hypothetically the truth of the allegations of fact made in the complaint, may a judge validly grant the relief demanded in the complaint? Here, assuming Frank’s allegations to be true, Frank as legitimate child and lawful heir of Francisco Jesus Colmenar has the right to the relief prayed for. i.e., to declare as void the extrajudicial settlement of estate effected by the individual respondents [Apollo, et al.] who, not being lawful heirs of his father, had no legal right to settle the estate; and to declare as void the subsequent deeds of sale executed by these individual respondents in favor of companies-buyers which consequently also did not derive any valid title from Apollo, et al.
● Hence, whether companies-buyers were buyers in bad faith or had knowledge of the defect in the title of the seller is not the issue nor the trigger that gave rise to the complaint. Frank’s causes of action hinged on his averment that the sellers Apollo, et al. are not the owners of the properties, hence, they cannot validly sell the same to companies-buyers, nor convey any title to the latter by reason of the invalid sale. The spring cannot rise above its source. The trial court cannot inject its own theory to take the place of the actual allegations in the complaint. Besides, where Frank in this case has no actual or personal knowledge of the good faith or bad faith of the buyers in the purchase of the properties, how could he possibly allege it in the complaint? In any event, good faith or lack of bad faith is a matter of defense for the buyers in this case. It can be pleaded in the answer and proved during the trial.
● All told, the trial court gravely erred when it held that the complaint failed to state a cause of action against companies-buyers, and based thereon, dismissed the complaint against them.
SANICO vs. COLIPANO
September 27, 2017| GR No. 209969 | Caguioa, J | Failure to state cause of action distinguished from lack of cause of action
PETITIONER: JOSE SANICO AND VICENTE CASTRO
RESPONDENTS: WERHERLINA P. COLIPANO
DOCTRINE:
Court finds that the Affidavit of Desistance and Release of Claim is not binding on plaintiff in the absence of proof that the contents thereof were sufficiently explained to her. It is clear from the plaintiff's circumstances that she is not able to understand English, more so stipulations stated in the said Affidavit and Release. It is understandable that in her pressing need, the plaintiff may have been easily convinced to sign the document with the promise that she will be compensated for her injuries
FACTS:
1. Colipano filed a breach of contract of carriage and damages against Sanico and Castro claiming
that at 4PM on Christmas Day, while paying the passengers in the jeepney operated by Sanico and driven by Castro, she was made to sit on an empty beer case at the edge of the entrance of the jeepney while her daughter was on her lap.
2. During the trip, the jeepney met an uphill incline and the jeepney, having no force to reach the top, slid backwards.
3. In her attempt to save her and her child, she pushed her heet at the step board to prevent being thrown out of the exit.
4. Unfortunately, the board was wet causing her foot to be crushed between the step board and a coconut tree which the jeepney bumped into.
5. Her leg was severely injured and was amputated.
6. Hence, her claims for actual damages, loss of income, moral damages, exemplary damages, and
attorney's fees.
7. Sanico and Castro claimed that it was Colipano’s fault because she panicked and tried to
disembark the vehicle causing her foot to be crushed in between the step board and the coconut
tree.
8. Sanico paid the medical expenses of Colipano and the latter executed an Affidavit of Desistance
and release of claim.
PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:
RTC ● The RTC found that Sanico and Castro breached the contract of carriage between them andColipano, but only awarded actual and compensatory damages in favor of Colipano
CA ● Only Sanico and Castro appealed to the CA, which affirmed with modification the RTC Decision.
ISSUE/S:
Whether the Affidavit of Desistance and Release of Claim is binding on Colipano
RULING:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review is hereby PARTLY GRANTED . As to petitioner Vicente Castro, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated September 30, 2013 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the complaint against him is dismissed for lack of cause of action. As to petitioner Jose Sanico, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS
RATIO:
Sanico cannot be exonerated from liability under the Affidavit of Desistance and Release of Claim and his payment of the hospital and medical bills of Colipano amounting to P44,900.00.
The RTC ruled that "the Affidavit of Desistance and Release of Claim is not binding on plaintiff [Colipano] in the absence of proof that the contents thereof were sufficiently translated and explained to her." The CA affirmed the findings of the RTC and ruled that the document was not binding on Colipano.
The Court finds no reason to depart from these findings of the CA and the RTC.
For there to be a valid waiver, the following requisites are essential:
(1) That the person making the waiver possesses the right, (2) that he has the capacity and power to dispose of the right, (3) that the waiver must be clear and unequivocal although it may be made expressly or impliedly, and (4) that the waiver is not contrary to law, public policy, public order, morals, good customs or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law.
MARILAG V MARTINEZ
JULY 22. 2015 | GR No. | 201783492 PERLAS BERNABE | SPLITTING OF CAUSE OF ACTION
PETITIONER: NORLINDA
RESPONDENTS: MARCELINO
DOCTRINE:
Petitioner cannot split her cause of action on unpaid loan obligation by filing a petition for the judicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage covering the said loan, and, thereafter, a personal action for the collection of the unpaid balance of said obligation not comprising a deficiency arising from foreclosure, without violating the proscription against splitting a single cause of action, where the ground for dismissal is either res judicata or litis pendentia,
FACTS:
1. Rafael Martinez, respondent’s father, obtained from petitioner a loan of P160K with 5% interest payable for 6 months, which was secured by REM over a land, which was then foreclosed due to failure to pay
2. Rafael failed to file his answer and was declared in default
3. RTC Imus ordered Rafael to pay the loan and interest that accrued. Records did not show that this Decision already attained finality.
4. Prior to the above, respondent agreed to pay Rafael’s obligation to petitioner, through a promissory note. Respondent, after learning of the Decision, refused to pay the amount despite demands promptiong Rafael to file a complaint for sum of money and damages.
5. Respondent filed his answer and argued there was no cause of action. He interposed a compulsory counterclaim for the return of his payment and damages.
6. Court granted petitioner’s MR and declared that the causes of action in the collection and foreclosure cases are different.
7. Respondent filed a MR that was denied and elevated the case to the CA which set aside the order and held that res judicata applied as the 2 cases were consequences of the nonpayment of Rafael’s loan.
ISSUE/S:
WoN CA committed error
RULING: NO
● After a punctilious review of the records, the Court finds the principle of res judicata to be inapplicable to the present case. This is because the records are bereft of any indication that the August 28, 2003 Decision in the judicial foreclosure case had already attained finality, evidenced, for instance, by a copy of the entry of judgment in the said case. Accordingly, with the very first element of res judicata missing, said principle cannot be made to obtain.||| (Marilag v. Martinez, G.R. No. 201892, [July 22, 2015], 764 PHIL 576-594)
● This notwithstanding, the Court holds that petitioner's prosecution of the collection case was barred, instead, by the principle of litis pendentia in view of the substantial identity of parties and singularity of the causes of action in the foreclosure and collection cases, such that the prior foreclosure case barred petitioner's recourse to the subsequent collection case. ||| (Marilag v. Martinez, G.R. No. 201892, [July 22, 2015], 764 PHIL 576-594)
● In this relation, it must be noted that the question of whether a cause of action is single and entire or separate is not always easy to determine and the same must often be resolved, not by the general rules, but by reference to the facts and circumstances of the particular case. The true rule, therefore, is whether the entire amount arises from one and the same act or contract which must, thus, be sued for in one action, or the several parts arise from distinct and different acts or contracts, for which a party may maintain separate suits||| (Marilag v. Martinez, G.R. No. 201892, [July 22, 2015], 764 PHIL 576-594)
● As such, there exists only one cause of action for a single breach of that obligation. Petitioner cannot split her cause of action on Rafael's unpaid loan obligation by filing a petition for the judicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage covering the said loan, and, thereafter, a personal action for the collection of the unpaid balance of said obligation not comprising a deficiency arising from foreclosure, without violating the proscription against splitting a single cause of action, where the ground for dismissal is either res judicata or litis pendentia, as in this case.||| (Marilag v. Martinez, G.R. No. 201892, [July 22, 2015], 764 PHIL 576-594)
WHEREFORE, The petition is DENIED.
YAP V. FIRST e-BANK CORPORATION
September 29, 2009 | GR No. 169889 | Corona, J. | Splitting of a single cause of action and its effects
PETITIONER: Spouses Simon Yap and Milagros Guevarra
RESPONDENTS: First e-Bank Corporation (previously known as PDCP Development Bank, Inc.)
DOCTRINE:
It is but logical that a creditor who obtains a personal judgment against the debtor on a loan waives his right to foreclose on the mortgage securing the loan. Otherwise, the creditor becomes guilty of splitting a single cause of action for the debtor's inability (or unjustified refusal) to pay his debt. Nemo debet bis vexare pro una et eadem causa. No man shall be twice vexed for one and the same cause.
FACTS:
1. Sammy Yap obtained a P2 million loan from PDCP. As security, petitioners (Sammy's parents) executed a third-party mortgage on their land and warehouse standing on it. The mortgage agreement provided that PDCP may extrajudicially foreclose the property in case Sammy failed to pay the loan.
2. Sammy issued a promissory note and six postdated checks in favor of PDCP as additional securities for the loan. Upon default, the PDCP presented the six checks to the drawee bank but the said checks were dishonored. This prompted PDCP to file a complaint against Sammy for six counts of violation of BP 22.
3. PDCP filed an application for extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage on the property of petitioners which served as principal security for Sammy's loan.
4. The BP 22 cases were thereafter provisionally dismissed.
5. Pursuant to the petition of PDCP for extrajudicial foreclosure, the extrajudicial sale was set.
PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:
RTC ● Petitioners filed a complaint for injunction against PDCP. The complaint sought to stop the foreclosure sale on the ground that PDCP waived its right to foreclose the mortgage on their property when it filed the BP 22 cases against Sammy.
○ The RTC ruled in favor of petitioners.
CA ● PDCP appealed to the CA.
○ The CA reversed the RTC.
ISSUE/S:
1. WON the respondent is guilty for splitting a single cause of action—NO
RULING:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.
RATIO:
● In this case, no judgment of conviction (which could have declared the criminal and civil liability of Sammy) was rendered because Sammy moved for the provisional dismissal of the case. Hence, PDCP could have still foreclosed on the mortgage or filed a collection suit.
● Nonetheless, records show that, during the pendency of the BP 22 case, Sammy had already paid PDCP the total amount of P1,783,582. Thus, to prevent unjust enrichment on the part of the creditor, any foreclosure by PDCP should only be for the unpaid balance.
● Second, it is undisputed that the BP 22 cases were provisionally dismissed at Sammy's instance. In other words, PDCP was prevented from recovering the whole amount by Sammy himself. To bar PDCP from foreclosing on petitioners' property for the balance of the indebtedness would be to penalize PDCP for the act of Sammy. That would not only be illogical and absurd but would also violate elementary rules of justice and fair play. In sum, PDCP has not yet effectively availed of and fully exhausted its remedy.
● While it can be argued that PDCP may revive the BP 22 cases anytime as their dismissal was only provisional, suffice it to state that the law gives the right of choice to PDCP, not to Sammy or to petitioners.
● Third, petitioners should be mindful that, by being third party mortgagors, they agreed that their property would stand as collateral to the loan of Sammy until the last centavo is paid to PDCP. That is a risk they willingly assumed. To release the mortgage just because they find it inconvenient would be the height of injustice against PDCP.
● So as not to create any misunderstanding, however, the point should be underscored that the creditor's obvious purpose when it forecloses on mortgaged property is to obtain payment for a loan which the debtor is unable or unjustifiably refuses to pay. The rationale is the same if the creditor opts to sue the debtor for collection. Thus, it is but logical that a creditor who obtains a personal judgment against the debtor on a loan waives his right to foreclose on the mortgage securing the loan. Otherwise, the creditor becomes guilty of splitting a single cause of action for the debtor's inability (or unjustified refusal) to pay his debt. Nemo debet bis vexare pro una et eadem causa. No man shall be twice vexed for one and the same cause.
GEORGE LEONARD S. UMALE
vs.
CANOGA PARK DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
July 20, 2011| G.R. No. 167246 |BRION, J.:Cause of Action
PETITIONER: GEORGE LEONARD S. UMALE
RESPONDENTS: CANOGA PARK DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
DOCTRINE:
Generally, a suit may only be instituted for a single cause of action. If two or more suits are instituted on the basis of the same cause of action, the filing of one or a judgment on the merits in any one is ground for the dismissal of the others.
FACTS:
1. On January 4, 2000, the parties entered into a Contract of Lease on an eight hundred sixty (860)-square-meter prime lot located in Ortigas Center, Pasig City owned by the respondent. The respondent acquired the subject lot from Ortigas & Co. Ltd. Partnership through a Deed of Absolute Sale, subject to the some conditions.
2. On October 10, 2000, before the lease contract expired, the respondent filed an unlawful detainer case against the petitioner before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC)-Branch 68, Pasig City. The respondent used as a ground for ejectment the petitioner’s violation of stipulations in the lease contract regarding the use of the property. MTC decide in favor of the respondent. RTC- Branch 155 affirmed. The case, however, was re-raffled to the RTC-Branch 267, granted the petitioner’s motion, thereby reversing and setting aside the MTC-Branch 68 decision. Accordingly, Civil Case No. 8084 was dismissed for being prematurely filed. Thus, the respondent filed a petition for review with the CA. During the pendency of the petition for review, the respondent filed on May 3, 2002 another case for unlawful detainer against the petitioner before the MTC. Respondent used as a ground for ejectment the expiration of the parties’ lease contract.
PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:
MTC ● MTC rendered a decision in favor of the respondent.
RTC ● RTC-Branch 68 reversed and set aside the decision of the MTC-Branch 71, and dismissed Civil Case No. 9210 on the ground of litis pendentia.
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not Civil Case Nos. 8084 and 9210 involve the same cause of action.
RULING:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated August 20, 2004 and Resolution dated February 23, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP. No. 78836 are AFFIRMED.
RATIO:
NO
● We rule that Civil Case Nos. 8084 and 9210 involve different causes of action. Generally, a suit may only be instituted for a single cause of action. If two or more suits are instituted on the basis of the same cause of action, the filing of one or a judgment on the merits in any one is ground for the dismissal of the others. Several tests exist to ascertain whether two suits relate to a single or common cause of action, such as whether the same evidence would support and sustain both the first and second causes of action (also known as the “same evidence” test), or whether the defenses in one case may be used to substantiate the complaint in the other. Also fundamental is the test of determining whether the cause of action in the second case existed at the time of the filing of the first complaint.
● Of the three tests cited, the third one is especially applicable to the present case, i.e., whether the cause of action in the second case existed at the time of the filing of the first complaint – and to which we answer in the negative. The facts clearly show that the filing of the firstejectment case was grounded on the petitioner’s violation of stipulations in the lease contract, while the filing of the second case was based on the expiration of the lease contract. At the time the respondent filed the first ejectment complaint on October 10, 2000, the lease contract between the parties was still in effect. The lease was fixed for a period of two (2) years, from January 16, 2000, and in the absence of a renewal agreed upon by the parties, the lease remained effective until January 15, 2002. It was only at the expiration of the lease contract that the cause of action in the second ejectment complaint accrued and made available to the respondent as a ground for ejecting the petitioner. Thus, the cause of action in the second case was not yet in existence at the time of filing of the first ejectment case. Thus, the respondent cannot be said to have committed a willful and deliberate forum shopping.
Perez v. Hermano
8 July 2005 | G.R. No. 147417 | Chico-Nazario, J | Joinder and misjoinder of causes of action
PETITIONER:SPS. VICTOR & MILAGROS PEREZ and CRISTINA AGRAVIADOR AVISO
RESPONDENTS: ANTONIO HERMANO
DOCTRINE:
It is best to remember that the joiner of causes of action may involve the same parties or different parties. If the joinder involves different parties, as in this case, there must be a question of fact or of law common to both parties joined, arising out of the same transaction or series of transactions.
FACTS:
1. Petitioner spouses and Aviso filed three causes of action based on the following allegations. Sometime in November 1997, the spouses Perez and Aviso entered into a Contract to Sell with Zecson Land Inc. as the buyer through its president Zenie Sales-Contreras. The subject properties were five parcels of land valued at P19, 104, 000. In the agreement entered into by the parties, Zecson Land Inc. shall pay a down payment to the spouses and Aviso, another portion of the purchase price will be given as cash advance upon the execution of the contract, while the rest shall be used by Zecson as payment for loans earlier contracted by the three from the company. This is the first cause of action.
2. In the second cause of action, the spouses Perez and Aviso contend that they were tricked to sign other documents simultaneous with the execution of the Contract to Sell. Two of the said documents were mortgage deeds over the same 5 properties in favor of respondent Hermano, whom they have never met. Sales-Contreras allegedly explained to them that “the mortgage contracts would merely serve to facilitate the payment of the price agreed upon in their Contract to Sell.” However, the spouses and Aviso assert that it was never their intention to mortgage their properties to Hermano and that they have never received a single centavo from mortgaging their properties to him. They now then seek a TRO against Hermano who informed them that he would be foreclosing the subject properties.
3. In their third cause of action, the spouses and Aviso pray for damages against Zecson Land, Inc. and/or Zenie Sales-Contreras, Atty. Perlita Vitan-Ele and Antonio Hermano. They claim that they are entitled to damages from the aforementioned defendants for Zecson and Contreras’ failure to comply with their obligations under their Contract to Sell and in misleading and misrepresenting them into mortgaging their properties to Hermano, who in turn, had not paid them the proceeds thereof.
PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:
RTC ● The first cause of action was for enforcement of contract to sell entered into between the spouses and Aviso and Zecson, the second was for annulment or rescission of two contracts of mortgage entered into between the spouses and Aviso and Hermano, while the last one was for damages against all the mentioned defendants. A joinder was made on these causes of action and a civil case for Enforcement of Contract and Damages with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Preliminary Injunction against Zescon Land, Inc. and/or its President Zenie Sales-Contreras, Atty. Perlita Vitan-Ele and against respondent herein Antonio Hermano was filed before the RTC.
● Hermano denied the spouses and Aviso’s allegations through his Answer with Counterclaim. Hermano also filed a “Motion with Leave to Dismiss the Complaint or Ordered Severed for Separate Trial" which was granted by the trial court on the ground that there was a misjoinder in the causes of action.
CA ● The spouses Perez and Aviso moved for reconsideration but was also denied by the trial court. So, they filed an original action for certiorari before the CA.
● The CA dismissed the petition "for having been filed beyond the reglementary period pursuant to Section 4, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure, as amended." The subsequent motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioners was also denied. Hence this petition.
ISSUE:
WON the trial court erred in dropping Hermano in the civil action and ruling that there was a misjoinder in the causes of action.
RULING:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated 19 October 2000 dismissing petitioners’ petition for certiorari and its Resolution dated 02 March 2001 denying petitioners’ motion for reconsideration are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The petition for certiorari is hereby GRANTED. The Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 224, dated 28 February 2000 and 25 May 2000 are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The RTC is further ordered to reinstate respondent Antonio Hermano as one of the defendants in Civil Case No. Q-98-34211. No costs.
RATIO:
YES
1. The statutory intent behind the provisions on joinder of causes of action is to encourage joinder of actions which could reasonably be said to involve kindred rights and wrongs, although the courts have not succeeded in giving a standard definition of the terms used or in developing a rule of universal application. The dominant idea is to permit joinder of causes of action, legal or equitable, where there is some substantial unity between them. While the rule allows a plaintiff to join as many separate claims as he may have, there should nevertheless be some unity in the problem presented and a common question of law and fact involved, subject always to the restriction thereon regarding jurisdiction, venue and joinder of parties. Unlimited joinder is not authorized.
2. What the SC gathered from the trial court’s Orders was that the trial court ruled that there was a misjoinder in the civil case filed because it did not comply with the conditions on joinder of parties.
3. It is well to remember that the joinder of causes of action may involve the same parties or different parties. If the joinder involves different parties, as in this case, there must be a question of fact or of law common to both parties joined, arising out of the same transaction or series of transaction.
4. It can be deduced from the averments made in the complaint that there are questions of fact and law common to both Zecson Land, Inc. and Hermano arising from a series of transaction over the same properties.
5. There is the question of fact, for example, of whether or not Zescon Land, Inc., indeed misled petitioners to sign the mortgage deeds in favor of respondent Hermano. There is also the question of which of the four contracts were validly entered into by the parties. Note that under Article 2085 of the Civil Code, for a mortgage to be valid, it is imperative that the mortgagor be the absolute owner of the thing mortgaged.
6. Thus, respondent Hermano will definitely be affected if it is subsequently declared that what was entered into by petitioners and Zescon Land, Inc., was a Contract of Sale (as evidenced by the Deed of Absolute Sale signed by them) because this would mean that the contracts of mortgage were void as petitioners were no longer the absolute owners of the properties mortgaged.
7. Finally, there is also the question of whether or not Zescon Land, Inc., as represented by Sales-Contreras, and respondent Hermano committed fraud against petitioners as to make them liable for damages.
Thus, the petition was granted, the Orders of the RTC were annulled and set aside, and the RTC was ordered to add respondent Antonio Hermano as one of the defendants in Civil Case filed by spouses Perez and Aviso.
PANTRANCO NORTH v STANDARD INSURANCE COMPANY INC
March 16, 2005 | GR No. 140746 | SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ | Joinder and Misjoinder of causes of action
DOCTRINE:
To determine identity of cause of action, it must be ascertained whether the same evidence which is necessary to sustain the second cause of action would have been sufficient to authorize a recovery in the first. Here, had respondents filed separate suits against petitioners, the same evidence would have been presented to sustain the same cause of action. Thus, the filing by both respondents of the complaint with the court below is in order. Such joinder of parties avoids multiplicity of suit and ensures the convenient, speedy and orderly administration of justice.
This paragraph embodies the "totality rule" as exemplified by Section 33 (1) of B.P. Blg. 129 which states, among others, that "where there are several claims or causes of action between the same or different parties, embodied in the same complaint, the amount of the demand shall be the totality of the claims in all the causes of action, irrespective of whether the causes of action arose out of the same or different transactions."
WON the joinder was proper - YES
In this case, there is a single transaction common to all, that is, Pantranco’s bus hitting the rear side of the jeepney. There is also a common question of fact, that is, whether petitioners are negligent. There being a single transaction common to both respondents, consequently, they have the same cause of action against petitioners. To determine identity of cause of action, it must be ascertained whether the same evidence which is necessary to sustain the second cause of action would have been sufficient to authorize a recovery in the first. Here, had respondents filed separate suits against petitioners, the same evidence would have been presented to sustain the same cause of action. Thus, the filing by both respondents of the complaint with the court below is in order. Such joinder of parties avoids multiplicity of suit and ensures the convenient, speedy and orderly administration of justice.
FACTS:
1. Crispin Gicale was driving the passenger jeepney owned by his mother Martina Gicale. Alexander Buncan, on the other hand, was driving a bus owned by Pantranco North Express Inc. Both drivers were travelling along the National Highway of Talavera, Nueva Ecija in a rainy afternoon. Buncan was driving the bus northbound while Cripin was trailing behind. When the two vehicles were negotiating a curve along the highway, the passenger bus overtook the jeepney. In so doing, the passenger bus hit the left rear side of the jeepney and sped away.
2. Crispin reported the incident to the police and to the insurer of their jeepney, Standard Insurance Co. The total cost of the repair amounted to P21, 415. Standard only paid P8,000 while Martina Gicale shouldered the remaining P13,415. Thereafter, Standard and Martina demanded reimbursements from Pantranco and Buncan, but the bus company and the driver refused. Thus, Standard and Martina were prompted to file a complaint for sum of money with the RTC of Manila. Pantranco and Buncan denied the allegations of the complaint and asserted that it is the MeTC which has jurisdiction over the case.
3. The RTC ruled in favor of Standard and Martina, and ordered Pantranco and Buncan to pay the former reimbursements with interests due thereon plus attorney's fees, and litigation expenses. Pantranco and Buncan argued that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the complaint.
4. Martina Gicale was claiming P13,415, while Standard was claiming P8,000. Their individual claims are below P20,000. Thus, the case falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the MTC, and thus there was a misjoinder of parties.
5. The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. Under the Totality Rule provided for under Sec. 19 of BP 129, it is the sum of the two claims that determines the jurisdictional amount. At the time this case was heard, cases involving money claims that amounts to more than P20,000 falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC.
6. Even assuming that there was a misjoinder of parties, it does not affect the jurisdiction of the court nor is it a ground to dismiss the complaint. The claims of Gicale and Standard arose from the same vehicular accident involving Pantranco's bus and Gicale's jeepney. Thus, there was a question of fact common to all parties. Hence, Pantranco and Buncan's motion for reconsideration was denied by the CA. There was no misjoinder of parties. Their individual claims arose from the same vehicular accident and involve a common question of fact and law. Thus, the RTC has jurisdiction over the case.
ISSUE: WON the joinder was proper - YES
RATIO:
YES, the joinder was proper since the requisites of a joinder were complied with.
●
● Permissive joinder of parties requires (as provided in Sec. 6, Rule 3, ROC):
○ The right to relief arises out of the same transaction or series of transactions
○ There is a question of law or fact common to all parties or defendants
○ Such joinder is not otherwise proscribed by the provisions of the Rules on jurisdiction and venue
● In this case, there is a single transaction common to all, that is, Pantranco’s bus hitting the rear side of the jeepney. There is also a question of fact, that is, whether petitioners are negligent. Having a single transaction, they have the same cause of action against petitioners.
● To determine identity of cause of action, it must be ascertained whether the same evidence which is necessary to sustain the second cause of action would have been sufficient to authorize a recovery in the first. Here, had respondents filed separate suits against petitioners, the same evidence would have been presented to sustain the same cause of action. Thus, the filing by both respondents of the complaint with the court below is in order. Such joinder of parties avoids multiplicity of suit and ensures the convenient, speedy and orderly administration of justice.
● There is no misjoinder of parties if the money sought to be claimed is in favor of the same plaintiff/s and against the same defendant/s. Moreover, Sec. 6, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court provides the following requirements for a permissive joinder of parties: (a) the right to relief arises out of the same transaction or series of transactions; (b) there is a question of law or fact common to all the plaintiffs or defendants; and (c) such joinder is not otherwise proscribed by the provisions of the Rules on jurisdiction and venue.
● Sec. 5(d), Rule 2 of ROC provides for Joinder of causes of action - Where the claims in all the causes of action are principally for recovery of money the aggregate amount claimed shall be the test of jurisdiction.
○ The above provision presupposes that the different causes of action which are joined accrue in favor of the same plaintiff/s and against the same defendants and that no misjoinder of parties is involved.
● Sec. 5(d), Rule 2 of ROC embodies the “totality rule” as exemplified by Sec. 33(1) of BP 129, “where there are several claims or causes of action between the same or different parties, embodied in the same complaint, the amount of the demand shall be the totality of the claims in all causes of action, irrespective of whether the causes of action arose out of the same or different transactions.”
● As respondents’ cause of action against petitioners arose from the same transaction, the amount of the demand shall be the totality of the claims.
● In this case, Standard’s claim is P8,000, while that of Gicale is P13, 415, or a total of P21,415. BP 129 provides that the RTC has exclusive original jurisdiction over all other cases, in which the demand, exclusive of interest and cost or the value of the property in controversy, amounts to more than P20,000.
SPOUSES DECENA vs. SPOUSES PIQUERO
March 31, 2005 | GR No. 155736 | J. Callejo, Sr. | Joinder and Misjoinder of Causes of Action
PETITIONER: SPOUSES DANILO and CRISTINA DECENA
RESPONDENTS: SPOUSES PEDRO and VALERIA PIQUERO
DOCTRINE:
The mere fact that the plaintiff prays for multiple reliefs does not indicate that he has stated more than one cause of action. The prayer may be an aid in interpreting the petition and in determining whether or not more than one cause of action is pleaded. If the allegations of the complaint show one primary right and one wrong, only one cause of action is alleged even though other matters are incidentally involved, and although different acts, methods, elements of injury, items of claims or theories of recovery are set forth. Where two or more primary rights and wrongs appear, there is a joinder of causes of action
FACTS:
1. The petitioners Decena were the owners of a parcel of land, located in Paranaque, with a house constructed thereon.
2. On September 7, 1997, the petitioners and the respondents executed a Memorandum of Agreement in which the former sold the property to the latter for the price of P940,250.00 payable in 6 installments via postdated checks. The vendees forthwith took possession of the property.
3. It appears in the MOA that the petitioners obliged themselves to transfer the property to the respondents upon the execution of the MOA with the condition that if two of the postdated checks would be dishonored by the drawee bank, the latter would be obliged to reconvey the property to the petitioners.
4. On May 17, 1999, the petitioners, then residents of Malolos, filed a Complaint against the respondents with the RTC-Malolos for the annulment of the sale/MOA, recovery of possession, and damages.
● The petitioners alleged that they did not transfer the property to respondents as vendees because the first two checks issued by them were dishonored by the drawee bank, and were not replaced with cash despite demands therefor.
5. The petitioners declared in their complaint that the property subject of the complaint was valued at P6.9M
6. The respondents filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground, inter alia, of improper venue and lack of jurisdiction over the property subject matter of the action.
● Respondents averred that the principal action of the petitioners for the rescission of the MOA, and the recovery of the possession of the property is a real action and not a personal one; hence, it should have been brought in the RTC of Parañaque City, where the property subject matter of the action was located
7. In opposition, the petitioners insisted that their action for damages and attorney's fees is a personal action and not a real action; hence, it may be filed in the RTC of Bulacan where they reside.
● They averred that while their second cause of action for the recovery of the possession is a real action, the same may, nevertheless, be joined with the rest of their causes of action for damages, conformably with Section 5(c), Rule 2 of the Rules of Court.
8. By way of reply, the respondents averred that Section 5(c), Rule 2 of the Rules of Court applies only when one or more of multiple causes of action falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the first level courts, and the other or others are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC, and the venue lies therein.
9. On February 9, 2000, the trial court denied the motion for lack of merit. It found that Section 5(c), Rule 2 was applicable.
10. In a Motion dated December 20, 2000, the respondents prayed for the reconsideration which was granted on October 16, 2001.
● Since the case was filed in the RTC of Bulacan where the petitioners reside, court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action, which means it must be dismissed.
11. Hence, the present recourse.
PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:
RTC ● Denied petition for lack of merit
● Reconsidered upon motion
ISSUE/S: Whether or not venue was properly laid by the petitioners in the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan. - NO
RULING: After due consideration of the foregoing, we find and so rule that Section 5(c), Rule 2 of the Rules of Court does not apply.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
RATIO:
1. Under Section 5, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court, a party may, in one pleading, assert, in the alternative or otherwise, as many causes of action as he may have against an opposing party subject to the conditions therein enumerated.
2. Explaining the aforequoted condition, Justice Jose Y. Feria declared:
● If one cause of action falls within the jurisdiction of the RTC and the other falls within the jurisdiction of a MTC, the action should be filed in the RTC.
● If the causes of action have different venues, they may be joined in any of the courts of proper venue.
○ Hence, a real action and a personal action may be joined either in the RTC of the place:
■ where the real property is located or
■ where the parties reside.
3. A cause of action is an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal right of the other which causes the latter injury. Essential elements are the following:
● (1) the existence of a legal right of the plaintiff;
● (2) a correlative legal duty of the defendant to respect one's right; and
● (3) an act or omission of the defendant in violation of the plaintiff's right.
4. A cause of action should not be confused with the remedies or reliefs prayed for. A cause of action is to be found in the facts alleged in the complaint and not in the prayer for relief. It is the substance and not the form that is controlling.
5. A party may have two or more causes of action against another party.
6. A joinder of causes of action is the uniting of two or more demands or right of action in a complaint. In declaring whether more than one cause of action is alleged, the main thrust is whether more than one primary right or subject of controversy is present.
● Other tests are whether recovery on one ground would bar recovery on the other, whether the same evidence would support the other different counts and whether separate actions could be maintained for separate relief; or whether more than one distinct primary right or subject of controversy is alleged for enforcement or adjudication.
7. A cause of action may be single although the plaintiff seeks a variety of remedies. The mere fact that the plaintiff prays for multiple reliefs does not indicate that he has stated more than one cause of action. The prayer may be an aid in interpreting the petition and in determining whether or not more than one cause of action is pleaded.
8. If the allegations of the complaint show one primary right and one wrong, only one cause of action is alleged even though other matters are incidentally involved, and although different acts, methods, elements of injury, items of claims or theories of recovery are set forth.
9. Where two or more primary rights and wrongs appear, there is a joinder of causes of action.
10. After due consideration of the foregoing, we find and so rule that Section 5(c), Rule 2 of the Rules of Court does not apply. This is so because the petitioners had only one cause of action, namely, the breach of the MOA and the return of possession of the real property, as well as the house constructed thereon occupied by the respondents.
11. The claim for damages, in the interim, as well as moral and exemplary damages are merely incidental to the main cause of action, and are not independent or separate causes of action.
12. The action of the petitioners for the rescission of the MOA and the latter's failure to return the premises, and the respondents' eviction therefrom is a real action.
13. As such, the action should have been filed in the proper court where the property is located, namely, in Parañaque City, conformably with Section 1, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court.
SANTOS VENTURA HOCORMA FOUNDATION, INC. V. MABALACAT INSTITUTE, INC.
September 29, 2021 | G.R. No. 211563 | J HERNANDO | Joinder and misjoinder of causes of action
PETITIONER:SANTOS VENTURA HOCORMA FOUNDATION, INC
RESPONDENTS:MABALACAT INSTITUTE, INC.
DOCTRINE:
Section 5, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court prohibits the joinder of an ordinary action, such as an action for collection of sum of money and a special civil action, such as an ejectment suit.
Note: Adjust bullet in the ruler
FACTS:
● Petitioner claimed that it is the registered and absolute owner of a land in Mabalacat.
● Respondent occupies said lot without paying any rent and only through its tolerance since 1983 until 14 March 2002.
● Nevertheless, Petitioner informed Respondent through a letter that beginning 1 April 2002, it will be charged a rental fee at the monthly rate of P50/sqm payable on or before the 5th of each month. Respondent refused to comply even after demand letters.
● Petitioner filed a complaint for collection of sum of money against respondent before the RTC Makati. Instead of filing an answer, respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the court a quo had not validly acquired jurisdiction because it was not properly served with summons.
● This was dismissed, prompting respondent to file a certiorari under Rule 65 before the CA. Also Denied.
● Respondent then filed an Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim with the RTC in the Collection Case. Thereafter, the case was set for pre-trial. However, prior to the scheduled pre-trial, MII filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of forum shopping arguing that Petitioner’s failure to inform the RTC that it filed an Ejectment Case while the proceedings were underway as required under Sec. 5(c), Rule 7 of the Rules was a willful and deliberate act of forum shopping. Respondent likewise charged petitioner with violating the rule on splitting of a single cause of action under Secs. 3 and 4, Rule 2.
PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:
RTC ● Dismissed the complaint for collection of sum of money against respondent
CA ● Denied petition for certiorari under rule 65
ISSUE/S: W/N An action for collection of sum of money may be joined with an ejectment suit - NO
RULING:
WHEREFORE, petitioner Santos Ventura Hocorma Foundation Inc.'s Petition for Review on Certiorari is GRANTED.
RATIO:
● Section 5, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court prohibits the joinder of an ordinary action, such as an action for collection of sum of money and a special civil action, such as an ejectment suit. Said provision reads:
Section 5. Joinder of causes of action. — A party may in one pleading assert, in the alternative or otherwise, as many causes of action as he may have against an opposing party, subject to the following conditions:
(a) The party joining the causes of action shall comply with the rules on joinder of parties;
(b) The joinder shall not include special civil actions or actions governed by special rules;
(c) Where the causes of action are between the same parties but pertain to different venues or jurisdictions, the joinder may be allowed in the Regional Trial Court provided one of the causes of action falls within the jurisdiction, of said court and the venue lies therein; and
(d) Where the claims in all the causes of action are principally for recovery of money, the aggregate amount claimed shall be the test of jurisdiction. (Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, in Lajave, We pointed out that "an action, for collection of sum of money may not be properly joined with the action for ejectment. The former is an ordinary civil action requiring a full-blown trial, while an action for unlawful detainer is a special civil action which requires a summary procedure."
● In the instant case, the Collection Case requires a full-blown trial for the parties to show evidence on the propriety of paying rent and its rightful amount. These may not be accomplished in an ejectment proceeding which is summary in nature.
GAFFNEY v. BUTLER
November 08, 2017 | G.R. No. 219408 | Caguioa, J. | Who may be parties
PETITIONER: DONALD FRANCIS GAFFNEY
RESPONDENT: GINA V. BUTLER
DOCTRINE:
A deceased person does not have the capacity to be sued and may not be made a defendant in a case. Section 1, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court unequivocally states that "only natural or juridical persons, or entities authorized by law may be parties in a civil action.”
FACTS:
1. In this case, Donald Gaffney filed a complaint against Gina Butler for collection of sum of money. He alleged that during 2006-2007, Gina and her husband, Anthony, invited him to invest in ActiveFun Corporation.
2. However, Anthony died in December 2009. Since the proposed investment never materialized, Donald demanded the return of his money from Gina.
3. Since there will be no relief that can be had against the Estate/Heirs of Anthony under the original complaint, Donald filed a Motion for Leave to Admit Amended Complaint for the purpose of impleading the estate of the heirs of the late Anthony as additional party-defendant, allegedly represented by Gina as the surviving spouse.
4. Gina filed a Motion to Dismiss, contending that only natural and juridical persons may be parties in an ordinary civil action.
PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:
RTC ● Denied the Motion to Dismiss, ruling that the inclusion of the estate of the late Anthony is necessary for a complete relief on the determination or settlement of the controversy raised in the case.
● RTC also denied the MR filed by Gina.
CA ● Upon appeal, the CA rendered a decision in favor of Gina, dismissing the entire complaint filed by Donald, ruling that under Section 1, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, only natural or juridical persons, or entities authorized by law may be parties in a civil action..
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the CA committed reversible error when it set aside the RTC’s ruling that the estate or heirs of Anthony, represented by his surviving spouse Gina, could be named as additional defendant in the present case. - NO
RULING:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Review is hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Decision dated February 6, 2015 and the Resolution dated July 14, 2015 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 133762 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION such that the Amended Complaint is REINSTATED insofar as Gina V. Butler is concerned.
The RTC is hereby ordered to proceed, expeditiously and without delay, in resolving Civil Case No. 73187 against Gina V. Butler.
RATIO:
● A deceased person does not have the capacity to be sued and may not be made a defendant in a case. Section 1, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court unequivocally states that "only natural or juridical persons, or entities authorized by law may be parties in a civil action.”
● In the case of Ventura v. Militante, the Court ruled: “Neither a dead person nor his estate may be a party plaintiff in a court action. A deceased person does not have such legal entity as is necessary to bring action so much so that a motion to substitute cannot lie and should be denied by the court.”
● Hence, there can be no doubt that a deceased person or his estate may not be impleaded as defendant in a civil action as they lack legal personality. Thus, when Anthony died, his legal personality ceased and he could no longer be impleaded as respondent in the present ordinary civil suit for collection. 28 As such, the complaint against him should be dismissed on the ground that the pleading asserting the claim states no cause of action or for failure to state a cause of action pursuant to Section 1 (g), Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, because a complaint cannot possibly state a cause of action against one who cannot be a party to a civil action.
● In sum, impleading the deceased Anthony or his estate in the present petition was improper. The action against him must be dismissed and the same may just be filed as a claim against his estate in a proper proceeding. The CA thus did not err in reversing the trial court.
EVANGELISTA v. SANTIAGO
April 29, 2005 | GR No. 157447 | CHICO-NAZARIO, J | Rule 3; Parties in Interest
PETITIONER: NEMENCIO C. EVANGELISTA, PASCUAL G. QUINTO, LUIS B. BUENA, EUSEBIA V. TABLADA, CANUTO G. TISBE, DAVID R. CARULLO, SOFONIAS E. COLEGADO, FELIX B. BUENA, TORIBIO C. EVANGELISTA, LEBRADA A. NICOLAS, ALECIA J. RAMOS, MILA G. DE LOS REYES, SALVADOR I. DE LA TORRE, MOISES CRUZ, RUFINO INFANTE, ALICIA ASTROLOGO, TRINIDAD LUMIQUED, LUZMINIDA QUINIQUINI, & TEODORA C. TEMERAS
RESPONDENTS: CARMELINO M. SANTIAGO
DOCTRINE:
The term "lack of capacity to sue" should not be confused with the term "lack of personality to sue". While the former refers to a plaintiff's general disability to sue, such as on account of minority, insanity, incompetence, lack of juridical personality or any other general disqualifications of a party, the latter refers to the fact that the plaintiff is not the real party-in-interest. Correspondingly, the first can be a ground for a motion to dismiss based on the ground of lack of legal capacity to sue; whereas the second can be used as a ground for a motion to dismiss based on the fact that the complaint, on the face thereof, evidently states no cause of action.
FACTS:
1. In their Complaint, petitioners alleged that they occupied and possessed parcels of land, located in Sitio Panayawan, Barangay San Rafael, Montalban (now Rodriguez), Province of Rizal (Subject Property), by virtue of several Deeds of Assignment executed by a certain Ismael Favila y Rodriguez.
2. According to the Deeds of Assignment, the Subject Property was part of a vast tract of land called "Hacienda Quibiga" awarded to Don Hermogenes Rodriguez by the Queen of Spain and evidenced by a Spanish title. Ismael Favila claimed to be one of the heirs and successors-in-interest of Don Hermogenes Rodriguez. Acting as Attorney-in-Fact, Ismael Favila signed the aforementioned Deeds of Assignment, assigning portions of the Subject Property to the petitioners in exchange for the labor and work done on the Subject Property by the petitioners and their predecessors.
3. Petitioners came by information that respondent was planning to evict them from the Subject Property. Two of the petitioners had actually received notices to vacate. Their investigations revealed that the Subject Property was included in Transfer Certificates of Titles (TCTs) No. 53028, No. 281660, No. N-39258 and No. 205270, all originating from OCT No. 670, and now in the name of respondent.
4. Petitioners filed with the trial court an action for declaration of nullity of respondent's certificates of title on the basis that OCT No. 670 was fake and spurious.
5. As an affirmative defense, respondent claimed that the petitioners had no legal capacity to file the Complaint, and thus, the Complaint stated no cause of action. Since OCT No. 670 was genuine and authentic on its face, then OCT No. 670 and all of respondent's land titles derived therefrom, are incontrovertible, indefeasible and conclusive against the petitioners and the whole world.
PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:
RTC ● The trial court dismissed the petition.
○ After the court found that plaintiffs were not the lawful owners of the land subject of this case, for they did not comply with PD 892, the said plaintiffs do not have the legal standing to bring before this Court the instant complaint.
CA ● The CA affirmed the trial court’s ruling.
ISSUE/S:
1. WON the Complaint filed before the trial court stated no cause of action - YES
RULING:
Wherefore, this Court DENIES the instant petition and AFFIRMS the Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated 29 July 2002, and the Order of the Regional Trial Court of San Mateo, Rizal, Branch 77, dated 05 February 1999, dismissing petitioners' Complaint for failure to state a cause of action.
RATIO:
1. YES
● The Court believes that the trial court rightfully dismissed petitioners' Complaint, but for reasons different from those relied upon by the trial court and the Court of Appeals.
o Before anything else, it should be clarified that "the plaintiff has no legal capacity to sue" and "the pleading asserting the claim states no cause of action" are two different grounds for a motion to dismiss or are two different affirmative defenses. The term "lack of capacity to sue" should not be confused with the term "lack of personality to sue." While the former refers to a plaintiff's general disability to sue, such as on account of minority, insanity, incompetence, lack of juridical personality or any other general disqualifications of a party, the latter refers to the fact that the plaintiff is not the real party-in-interest. Correspondingly, the first can be a ground for a motion to dismiss based on the ground of lack of legal capacity to sue; whereas the second can be used as a ground for a motion to dismiss based on the fact that the complaint, on the face thereof, evidently states no cause of action.
■ In the present case, this Court may assume that the respondent is raising the affirmative defense that the Complaint filed by the petitioners before the trial court stated no cause of action because the petitioners lacked the personality to sue, not being the real party-in-interest.
● In resolving whether or not the Complaint in the present case stated a cause of action, the trial court should have limited itself to examining the sufficiency of the allegations in the Complaint. It was proscribed from inquiring into the truth of the allegations in the Complaint or the authenticity of any of the documents referred or attached to the Complaint, since these are deemed hypothetically admitted by the respondent.
o In their Complaint, petitioners never alleged that the Subject Property was part of the public domain. On the contrary, petitioners asserted title over the Subject Property by virtue of their actual, physical, open, continuous and adverse possession thereof, in the concept of owners, by themselves and through their predecessors-in-interest, since time immemorial. The Deeds of Assignment executed in their favor and attached to their Complaint referred to a Spanish title granted by the Queen of Spain to their predecessor-in-interest, Don Hermogenes Rodriguez. Clearly, petitioners are asserting private title over the Subject Property, and consequently, their action could not be one for reversion.
■ In their instant Petition, petitioners further averred that rather than an action for nullity of respondent's certificates of title, theirs was more appropriately an action to remove a cloud on or to quiet their title over the Subject Property.
● Even as this Court agrees with the petitioners that their action was one for removal of a cloud on or quieting of title, it does arrive at the same conclusion as the trial court and the Court of Appeals that petitioners had no personality to file the said action, not being the parties-in-interest, and their Complaint should be dismissed for not stating a cause of action. According to Article 477 of the Civil Code, the plaintiff, in an action to remove a cloud on or to quiet title, must have legal or equitable title to, or interest in, the real property which is the subject matter of the action.
o In this case, petitioners failed to establish in their Complaint that they had any legal or equitable title to, or legitimate interest in, the Subject Property so as to justify their right to file an action to remove a cloud on or to quiet title.
■ In their Complaint, petitioners claimed title to the Subject Property by virtue of their actual and continuous possession of the same since time immemorial, by themselves and through their predecessors-in-interest. Yet, the Deeds of Assignment executed by Ismael Favila in their favor, attached to and an integral part of their Complaint, revealed that petitioners' predecessors-in-interest based their right to the Subject Property on the Spanish title awarded to Don Hermogenes Rodriguez. There existed a contradiction when petitioners based their claim of title to the Subject Property on their possession thereof since time immemorial, and at the same time, on the Spanish title granted to Don Hermogenes Rodriguez.
● Therefore, without legal or equitable title to the Subject Property, the petitioners lacked the personality to file an action for removal of a cloud on, or quieting of, title and their Complaint was properly dismissed for failing to state a cause of action.
V-Gent, Inc. v. Morning Star Travel & Tours, Inc
January 25, 2016 | GR No. 186305| BRION, J. | Real Parties in Interest / Agents
PETITIONER: V-GENT, INC.
RESPONDENTS: MORNING STAR TRAVEL and TOURS, INC.
DOCTRINE:
An agent may sue or be sued solely in its own name and without
joining the principal when the following elements concur:
(1) the agent acted in his own name during the transaction;
(2) the agent acted for the benefit of an undisclosed principal; and
(3) the transaction did not involve the property of the principal.
FACTS:
● Sometime in June and in September 1998, the petitioner V-Gent, Inc. (V-Gent) bought twenty-six (26) two-way plane tickets (Manila-Europe-Manila) from the respondent Morning Star Travel and Tours, Inc. (Morning Star).
● On June 24, 1998 and September 28, 1998, V-Gent returned a total of fifteen (15) unused tickets worth $8,747.50 to the defendant. Of the 15, Morning Star refunded only six (6) tickets worth $3,445.62. Morning Star refused to refund the remaining nine (9) unused tickets despite repeated demands.
● On December 15, 2000, petitioner V-Gent filed a money claim against Morning Star for payment of the unrefunded $5,301.88 plus attorney's fees.
PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:
MeTC MeTC dismissed the complaint because V-Gent failed to prove its claim by a preponderance of evidence.
RTC V-Gent appealed to the Regional Trial Court (RTC).
On September 25, 2006, the RTC granted the appeal after finding that V-Gent had established its claim by a preponderance of evidence. It set aside the MeTC's judgment and ordered Morning Star to pay V-Gent the value of the nine (9) unrefunded tickets plus attorney's fees.
CA ● Morning Star filed a petition for review with the CA.
● On November 11, 2008, the CA granted the petition for review and dismissed V-Gent's complaint.
● The CA held that V-Gent is not a real party-ininterest because it merely acted as an agent of the passengers who bought the tickets from Morning Star with their own money.
● V-Gent moved for reconsideration, which motion the CA denied on February 5, 2009, thus clearing the way for the present petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE/S:
● WON V-Gent, as an agent, may file the case against Morning Star
RULING:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the petition for lack of merit.
RATIO:
● No.
Every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-in-interest — the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit. In suits where an agent represents a party, the principal is the real party-in-interest; an agent cannot file a suit in his own name on behalf of the principal.
Rule 3, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides the exception when an agent may sue or be sued without joining the principal.
Section 3. Representatives as parties. — Where the action is allowed to be prosecuted and defended by a representative or someone acting in a fiduciary capacity, the beneficiary shall be included in the title of the case and shall be deemed to be the real party-in-interest. A representative may be a trustee of an express trust, a guardian, an executor or administrator, or a party authorized by law or these Rules. An agent acting in his own name and for the benefit of an undisclosed principal may sue or be sued without joining the principal except when the contract involves things belonging to the principal. (Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, an agent may sue or be sued solely in its own name and without joining the principal when the following elements concur: (1) the agent acted in his own name during the transaction; (2) the agent acted for the benefit of an undisclosed principal; and (3) the transaction did not involve the property of the principal.
OPOSA v. FACTORAN
July 30, 1993 | G.R. No. 101083 | Davide, J. | Rule 3
PETITIONER: Juan Antonio, Anna Rosario and Jose Alfonso, all surnamed Oposa, minors, and represented by their parents, et. al.
RESPONDENTS: Hon. Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr.
DOCTRINE:
Petitioners can, for themselves, for others of their generation and for the succeeding generations, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned.
FACTS:
1. This case arose from a civil case filed before the RTC.
a. The principal plaintiffs therein, now the principal petitioners, are all minors duly represented and joined by their respective parents. Impleaded as an additional plaintiff is the Philippine Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI), a domestic, non-stock and non-profit corporation organized for the purpose of, inter alia, engaging in concerted action geared for the protection of our environment and natural resources.
b. The original defendant was the Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., then Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).
2. The complaint was instituted as a taxpayers' class suit and alleged that the plaintiffs are all citizens of the Republic of the Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the country's virgin tropical rainforests.
a. The same was filed for themselves and others who are equally concerned about the preservation of said resource but are "so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all before the Court."
b. The minors further asserted that they "represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn.”
3. The original defendant, Secretary Factoran, Jr., filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint based on two (2) grounds, namely: (1) the plaintiffs have no cause of action against him and (2) the issue raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains to the legislative or executive branches of Government.
4. Respondent Judge issued an order granting the aforementioned motion to dismiss.
a. In the said order, not only was the defendant's claim — that the complaint states no cause of action against him and that it raises a political question — sustained, the respondent Judge further ruled that the granting of the reliefs prayed for would result in the impairment of contracts which is prohibited by the fundamental law of the land.
5. Thus, plaintiffs filed the instant special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court, praying that this Court rescind and set aside the dismissal order on the ground that the respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in dismissing the action.
PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:
RTC ● A taxpayers' class suit was filed by petitioners, who are all minors and who are represented by their parents.
● Upon motion, the RTC dismissed the class suit on the ground that the plaintiffs have no cause of action.
SC ● This instant special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 was filed by petitioners, praying that this Court rescind and set aside the dismissal order on the ground that the respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in dismissing the action.
ISSUE/S:
1. WON petitioners have personality to sue in behalf of their generation and succeeding generations. – YES
RULING:
WHEREFORE, being impressed with merit, the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED, and the challenged Order of respondent Judge of 18 July 1991 dismissing Civil Case No. 90-777 is hereby set aside.
RATIO:
1. YES.
● Petitioners can, for themselves, for others of their generation and for the succeeding generations, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned.
● Such a right considers the "rhythm and harmony of nature." Nature means the created world in its entirety. Such rhythm and harmony indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources to the end that their exploration, development and utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well as future generations.
● Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minors' assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come.
In the Matter of the Heirship of the Late Hermogenes Rodriguez
15 December 2010 | GR No. 182645 | Peralta, J | Indispensable Parties
PETITIONER: RENE B. PASCUAL
RESPONDENT: JAIME B. ROBLES
DOCTRINE:
The rule is settled that the non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for the dismissal of an action. The remedy is to implead the non-party claimed to be indispensable. Parties may be added by order of the court on motion of the party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action and/or at such times as are just. If petitioner refuses to implead an indispensable party despite the order of the court, the latter may dismiss the complaint/petition for the plaintiff's/petitioner's failure to comply therewith.
An indispensable party is a party-in-interest without whom no final determination can be had of an action, and who shall be joined either as plaintiffs or defendants. The joinder of indispensable parties is mandatory. The presence of indispensable parties is necessary to vest the court with jurisdiction, which is "the authority to hear and determine a cause, the right to act in a case." Thus, without the presence of indispensable parties to a suit or proceeding, judgment of a court cannot attain real finality. The absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present.
FACTS:
1. On 14 September 1989, a petition for Declaration of Heirship and Appointment of Administrator and Settlement of the Estates of the Late Hermogenes Rodriguez (Hermogenes) and Antonio Rodriguez (Antonio) was filed before the RTC [of Iriga City].
2. The petition, docketed as Special Proceeding No. IR-1110, was filed by Henry F. Rodriguez (Henry), Certeza F. Rodriguez (Certeza), and Rosalina R. Pellosis (Rosalina). Henry, Certeza and Rosalina sought that they be declared the sole and surviving heirs of the late Antonio Rodriguez and Hermogenes Rodriguez. They alleged they are the great grandchildren of Antonio based on the following genealogy: that Henry and Certeza are the surviving children of Delfin M. Rodriguez (Delfin) who died on 8 February 1981, while Rosalina is the surviving heir of Consuelo M. Rodriguez (Consuelo); that Delfin and Consuelo were the heirs of Macario J. Rodriguez (Macario) who died in 1976; that Macario and Flora Rodriguez were the heirs of Antonio; that Flora died without an issue in 1960 leaving Macario as her sole heir.
3. The RTC rendered a Partial Judgment dated 31 May 1990 declaring Henry, Certeza and Rosalina as heirs in the direct descending line of the late Antonio, Macario and Delfin and appointing Henry as regular administrator of the estate of the decedents Delfin, Macario and Antonio, and as special administrator to the estate of Hermogenes.
4. After hearing on Jamie Robles' application for appointment as regular administrator, the RTC issued an Order dated 15 December 1994 declaring him to be an heir and next of kin of decedent Hermogenes and thus qualified to be the administrator. However, the RTC reversed such order.
5. CA denied Jamie Robles' appeal.
6. The basic contention of Robles in the instant Motion is that he is a party-in-interest who stands to be adversely affected or injured or benefited by the judgment in the instant case. He also argues that the failure of service upon him of a copy of the instant petition as well as petitioner's memorandum, and the fact that he was not required or given the opportunity to file his comment or answer to the said petition nor served with any order, resolution or any other process issued by this Court in the instant petition, is a clear denial of his right to due process.
7. In his Comment and Opposition, petitioner contends that Robles has no legal standing to participate in the instant petition. Petitioner argues that in an original action for certiorari, the parties are the aggrieved party against the lower court and the prevailing party. Petitioner claims, however, that Robles was never impleaded, because he was not the prevailing party in the assailed Decision of the CA as well as the questioned Order of the RTC. Petitioner further avers that the inclusion of Robles' name as respondent in the caption of the instant petition was a result of a clerical error which was probably brought about by numerous cases filed with this Court involving Robles and the subject estate.
PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:
RTC ● Ordered that JAIIME ROBLES is qualified to be an administrator but subsequently reversed such order
CA ● Affirmed RTC
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether Jaime Robles is an indispensable party.
RULING:
YES. WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision dated December 4, 2009 is SET ASIDE. Petitioner is ORDERED to furnish Robles a copy of his petition for certiorari within a period of five (5) days from receipt of this Resolution. Thereafter, Robles is DIRECTED to file his comment on the petition within a period of ten (10) days from notice.
An indispensable party is a party-in-interest without whom no final determination can be had of an action, and who shall be joined either as plaintiffs or defendants. The joinder of indispensable parties is mandatory. The presence of indispensable parties is necessary to vest the court with jurisdiction, which is "the authority to hear and determine a cause, the right to act in a case." Thus, without the presence of indispensable parties to a suit or proceeding, judgment of a court cannot attain real finality. The absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present.
In the case at bar, Robles is an indispensable party. He stands to be injured or benefited by the outcome of the petition. He has an interest in the controversy that a final decree would necessarily affect his rights, such that the courts cannot proceed without his presence. Moreover, as provided for under the aforequoted Section 5, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, Robles is interested in sustaining the assailed CA Decision, considering that he would benefit from such judgment. As such, his non-inclusion would render the petition for certiorari defective.
Petitioner, thus, committed a mistake in failing to implead Robles as respondent.
The rule is settled that the non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for the dismissal of an action. The remedy is to implead the non-party claimed to be indispensable. Parties may be added by order of the court on motion of the party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action and/or at such times as are just. If petitioner refuses to implead an indispensable party despite the order of the court, the latter may dismiss the complaint/petition for the plaintiff's/petitioner's failure to comply therewith.
Resident Marine Mammals of Tanon Strait v. Reyes
April 21 2015| GR No. 180771 | Representatives as parties
PETITIONER: Consolidated petitions
RESPONDENTS: SECRETARY ANGELO REYES, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Energy (DOE), SECRETARY JOSE L. ATIENZA, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), LEONARDO R. SIBBALUCA, DENR Regional Director-Region VII and in his capacity as Chairperson of the Tañon Strait Protected Seascape Management Board, Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR), DIRECTOR MALCOLM J. SARMIENTO, JR., BFAR Regional Director for Region VII ANDRES M. BOJOS, JAPAN PETROLEUM EXPLORATION CO., LTD. (JAPEX), as represented by its Philippine Agent, SUPPLY OILFIELD SERVICES, INC.
DOCTRINE:
Citizen suit. To further encourage the protection of the environment, the Rules enable litigants enforcing environmental rights to file their cases as citizen suits. This provision liberalizes standing for all cases filed enforcing environmental laws and collapses the traditional rule on personal and direct interest, on the principle that humans are stewards of nature.
FACTS:
Petitioners in G.R. No. 180771, collectively referred to as the "Resident Marine Mammals" in the petition, are the toothed whales, dolphins, porpoises, and other cetacean species, which inhabit the waters in and around the Tañon Strait. They are joined by Gloria Estenzo Ramos (Ramos) and Rose- Liza Eisma-Osorio (Eisma-Osorio) as their legal guardians and as friends (to be collectively known as "the Stewards") who allegedly empathize with, and seek the protection of, the aforementioned marine species. Also impleaded as an unwilling co-petitioner is former President Gloria Macapagal- Arroyo, for her express declaration and undertaking in the ASEAN Charter to protect the Tañon Strait, among others.
On June 13, 2002, the Government of the Philippines, acting through the DOE, entered into a Geophysical Survey and Exploration Contract-102 (GSEC-102) with JAPEX. This contract involved geological and geophysical studies of the Tañon Strait. The studies included surface geology, sample analysis, and reprocessing of seismic and magnetic data. GSEC-102 was then converted into SC-46 for the exploration, development, and production of petroleum resources in a block covering approximately 2,850 square kilometers offshore the Tañon Strait.
JAPEX committed to drill one exploration well during the second sub-phase of the project. Since the well was to be drilled in the marine waters of Aloguinsan and Pinamungajan, where the Tañon Strait was declared a protected seascape in 1988, JAPEX agreed to comply with the Environmental Impact Assessment requirements pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1586, entitled "Establishing an Environmental Impact Statement System, Including Other Environmental Management Related Measures and for Other Purposes." On January 31, 2007, the Protected Area Management Board of the Tañon Strait (PAMB-Tañon Strait) issued Resolution No. 2007-001, wherein it adopted the Initial Environmental Examination (IEE) commissioned by JAPEX, and favorably recommended the approval of JAPEX's application for an ECC.
PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:
RTC ●
CA ●
ISSUE/S:
Whether petitioners have locus standi to file the instant petition.
RULING:
WHEREFORE, the Petitions in G.R. Nos. 180771 and 181527 are GRANTED, Service Contract No. 46 is hereby declared NULL AND VOID for violating the 1987 Constitution, Republic Act No. 7586, and Presidential Decree No. 1586.
SO ORDERED.
RATIO:
YES.The issue of whether or not animals or even inanimate objects should be given legal standing in actions before courts of law is not new in the field of animal rights and environmental law. The primary reason animal rights advocates and environmentalists seek to give animals and inanimate objects standing is due to the need to comply with the strict requirements in bringing a suit to court. Our own 1997 Rules of Court demand that parties to a suit be either natural or juridical persons, or entities authorized by law. It further necessitates the action to be brought in the name of the real party-in-interest, even if filed by a representative, viz.:
Rule 3
Parties to Civil Actions
Section 1. Who may be parties; plaintiff and defendant.— Only natural or juridical persons, or entities authorized by law may be parties in a civil action. The term "plaintiff" may refer to the claiming party, the counter-claimant, the cross- claimant, or the third (fourth, etc.)-party plaintiff. The term "defendant" may refer to the original defending party, the defendant in a counterclaim, the cross- defendant, or the third (fourth, etc.)-party defendant.
Sec. 2. Parties in interest.— A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless otherwise authorized by law or these Rules, every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest.
Sec. 3. Representatives as parties.— Where the action is allowed to be prosecuted or defended by a representative or someone acting in a fiduciary capacity, the beneficiary shall be included in the title of the case and shall be deemed to be the real party in interest. A representative may be a trustee of an express trust, a guardian, an executor or administrator, or a party authorized by law or these Rules. An agent acting in his own name and for the benefit of an undisclosed principal may sue or be sued without joining the principal except when the contract involves things belonging to the principal.
It had been suggested by animal rights advocates and environmentalists that not only natural and juridical persons should be given legal standing because of the difficulty for persons, who cannot show that they by themselves are real parties-in-interests, to bring actions in representation of these animals or inanimate objects. For this reason, many environmental cases have been dismissed for failure of the petitioner to show that he/she would be directly injured or affected by the outcome of the case. However, in our jurisdiction, locus standi in environmental cases has been given a more liberalized approach.
Recently, the Court passed the landmark Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases, which allow for a "citizen suit," and permit any Filipino citizen to file an action before our courts for violations of our environmental laws:
SEC. 5. Citizen suit.— Any Filipino citizen in representation of others, including minors or generations yet unborn, may file an action to enforce rights or obligations under environmental laws.Upon the filing of a citizen suit, the court shall issue an order which shall contain a brief description of the cause of action and the reliefs prayed for, requiring all interested parties to manifest their interest to intervene in the case within fifteen (15) days from notice thereof. The plaintiff may publish the order once in a newspaper of a general circulation in the Philippines or furnish all affected barangays copies of said order.
Citizen suits filed under R.A. No. 8749 and R.A. No. 9003 shall be governed by their respective provisions. (Emphasis ours.)
Explaining the rationale for this rule, the Court, in the Annotations to the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases, commented:
Citizen suit. To further encourage the protection of the environment, the Rules enable litigants enforcing environmental rights to file their cases as citizen suits. This provision liberalizes standing for all cases filed enforcing environmental laws and collapses the traditional rule on personal and direct interest, on the principle that humans are stewards of nature.The terminology of the text reflects the doctrine first enunciated in Oposa v. Factoran, insofar as it refers to minors and generations yet unborn. (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted.)
Although this petition was filed in 2007, years before the effectivity of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases, it has been consistently held that rules of procedure "may be retroactively applied to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage and will not violate any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected, inasmuch as there is no vested rights in rules of procedure."
Moreover, even before the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases became effective, this Court had already taken a permissive position on the issue of locus standi in environmental cases. In Oposa,we allowed the suit to be brought in the name of generations yet unborn "based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned." Furthermore, we said that the right to a balanced and healthful ecology, a right that does not even need to be stated in our Constitution as it is assumed to exist from the inception of humankind, carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment.
In light of the foregoing, the need to give the Resident Marine Mammals legal standing has been eliminated by our Rules, which allow any Filipino citizen, as a steward of nature, to bring a suit to enforce our environmental laws. It is worth noting here that the Stewards are joined as real parties in the Petition and not just in representation of the named cetacean species. The Stewards, Ramos and Eisma-Osorio, having shown in their petition that there may be possible violations of laws concerning the habitat of the Resident Marine Mammals, are therefore declared to possess the legal standing to file this petition.
CEREZO V. TUAZON
23 March 2004 | GR No. 141538 | CARPIO, J | Indispensable Parties
PETITIONER: HERMANA R. CEREZO
RESPONDENTS: DAVID TUAZON
DOCTRINE:
An indispensable party is one whose interest is affected by the courts action in the litigation, and without whom no final resolution of the case is possible.
FACTS:
1. A Country Bus Lines passenger bus collided with a tricycle. Tricycle driver Tuazon filed a complaint for damages against Mrs. Cerezo as owner of the bus line, her husband Attorney Juan Cerezo and bus driver Danilo A. Foronda.
2. The trial court issued an order granting Tuazons motion to litigate as a pauper and denied Cerezo spouses urgent ex-parte motion.
3. After considering Tuazons testimonial and documentary evidence, the trial court ruled in Tuazons favor. The trial court made no pronouncement on Forondas liability because there was no service of summons on him. Further, the trial court held Mrs. Cerezo solely liable for the damages sustained by Tuazon arising from the negligence of Mrs. Cerezos employee, pursuant to Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:
CA ● The Court of Appeals denied the Petition for Certiorari and affirmed the trial courts order denying the petition for relief from judgment. The Court of Appeals declared that the Cerezo spouses failure to file an answer was due to their own negligence, considering that they continued to participate in the proceedings without filing an answer.
● The Court of Appeals denied the petition for annulment of judgment in a resolution dated 21 October 1999.
● The Court of Appeals denied the Cerezo spouses motion for reconsideration and stated that a distinction should be made between a courts jurisdiction over a person and its jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case. The former is acquired by the proper service of summons or by the parties voluntary appearance; while the latter is conferred by law.
● Further, the lower court admits the fact that no summons was served on defendant Foronda. Thus, jurisdiction over the person of defendant Foronda was not acquired, for which reason he was not held liable in this case. However, it has been proven that jurisdiction over the other defendants was validly acquired by the court a quo.
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not the Court of Appeals ignored the allegation that defendant-driver Foronda whose negligence is the main issue is an indispensable party whose presence is compulsory but [whom] the lower court did not summon.
RULING:
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Review is DENIED.
RATIO:
NO.
Contrary to Mrs. Cerezos assertion, Foronda is not an indispensable party to the case. An indispensable party is one whose interest is affected by the courts action in the litigation, and without whom no final resolution of the case is possible. However, Mrs. Cerezos liability as an employer in an action for a quasi-delict is not only solidary, it is also primary and direct. Foronda is not an indispensable party to the final resolution of Tuazons action for damages against Mrs. Cerezo.
The responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for a quasi-delict is solidary. Where there is a solidary obligation on the part of debtors, as in this case, each debtor is liable for the entire obligation. Hence, each debtor is liable to pay for the entire obligation in full. There is no merger or renunciation of rights, but only mutual representation. Where the obligation of the parties is solidary, either of the parties is indispensable, and the other is not even a necessary party because complete relief is available from either. Therefore, jurisdiction over Foronda is not even necessary as Tuazon may collect damages from Mrs. Cerezo alone.
Moreover, an employers liability based on a quasi-delict is primary and direct, while the employers liability based on a delict is merely subsidiary. The words "primary and direct," as contrasted with "subsidiary," refer to the remedy provided by law for enforcing the obligation rather than to the character and limits of the obligation. Although liability under Article 2180 originates from the negligent act of the employee, the aggrieved party may sue the employer directly. When an employee causes damage, the law presumes that the employer has himself committed an act of negligence in not preventing or avoiding the damage. This is the fault that the law condemns. While the employer is civilly liable in a subsidiary capacity for the employees criminal negligence, the employer is also civilly liable directly and separately for his own civil negligence in failing to exercise due diligence in selecting and supervising his employee. The idea that the employers liability is solely subsidiary is wrong.
The action can be brought directly against the person responsible (for another), without including the author of the act. The action against the principal is accessory in the sense that it implies the existence of a prejudicial act committed by the employee, but it is not subsidiary in the sense that it can not be instituted till after the judgment against the author of the act or at least, that it is subsidiary to the principal action; the action for responsibility (of the employer) is in itself a principal action.
Thus, there is no need in this case for the trial court to acquire jurisdiction over Foronda. The trial courts acquisition of jurisdiction over Mrs. Cerezo is sufficient to dispose of the present case on the merits.
CARAVAN TRAVEL AND TOURS INTERNATIONAL, INC. V. ABEJAR
February 10, 2016 | GR No. 170631 | LEONEN, J | Necessary Parties
PETITIONER: CARAVAN TRAVEL AND TOURS INTERNATIONAL, INC.
RESPONDENTS: ERMILINDA R. ABEJAR
DOCTRINE:
A necessary party is one who is not indispensable but who ought to be joined as a party if complete relief is to be accorded as to those already parties, or for complete determination or settlement of the claim subject of the action.
FACTS:
1. Reyes was hit by an L-300 van driven by Bautista. Espinosa, a witness to the accident, went to her aid and loaded her in the back of the van. Instead of driving Reyes to the hospital, Bautista left the van and an unidentified civilian came to help.
2. It was found that the registered owner of the van was Caravan which is a corporation engaged in the business of organizing travels and tours. Bautista was Caravan's employee assigned to drive the van as its service driver.
3. Caravan shouldered the hospitalization expenses of Reyes. Despite medical attendance, Reyes died two (2) days after the accident.
4. Abejar, aunt of Reyes, filed a complaint for damages againts Caravan and Bautista before the RTC of Paranaque. But since summons could not be served on Bautista, he was dropped as defendant.
PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:
RTC Found that Bautista was grossly negligent in driving the vehicle. It awarded damages in favor of Abejar.
CA ● Affirmed with modification the RTC Decision.
● Denied MR filed by Caravan
ISSUE/S:
Whether petitioner should still be held liable as an employer of Bautista, pursuant to Article 2180 of the Civil Code, although the latter was already dropped as a party. - YES
RULING:
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 3, 2005 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS.
RATIO:
YES.
Bautista, the driver, was not an indispensable party. Rather, he was a necessary party. Instead of insisting that Bautista — who was nothing more than a necessary party — should not have been dropped as a defendant, or that petitioner, along with Bautista, should have been dropped, petitioner (as a co-defendant insisting that the action must proceed with Bautista as party) could have opted to file a cross-claim against Bautista as its remedy.
The 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure spell out the rules on joinder of indispensable and necessary parties. These are intended to afford "a complete determination of all possible issues, not only between the parties themselves but also as regards to other persons who may be affected by the judgment."
In contrast to an indispensableparty, a necessary party's presence is not imperative, and his or her absence is not debilitating. Nevertheless, it is preferred that they be included in order that relief may be complete.
A person is not an indispensable party, however, if his interest in the controversy or subject matter is separable from the interest of the other parties, so that it will not necessarily be directly or injuriously affected by a decree which does complete justice between them. Also, a person is not an indispensable party if his presence would merely permit complete relief between him and those already parties to the action, or if he has no interest in the subject matter of the action. It is not a sufficient reason to declare a person to be an indispensable party that his presence will avoid multiple litigation.
Petitioner's interest and liability is distinct from that of its driver. Regardless of petitioner's employer-employee relationship with Bautista, liability attaches to petitioner on account of its being the registered owner of a vehicle that figures in a mishap.
SPOUSES ALGURA V. CITY OF NAGA
October 30 | G.R. No. 150135| Velasco, Jr., J. | Indigent Party
DOCTRINE:
Recapitulating the rules on indigent litigants, therefore, if the applicant for exemption meets the salary and property requirements under Section 19 of Rule 141, then the grant of the application is mandatory. On the other hand, when the application does not satisfy one or both requirements, then the application should not be denied outright; instead, the court should apply the "indigency test" under Section 21 of Rule 3 and use its sound discretion in determining the merits of the prayer for exemption.
FACTS:
On September 1, 1999, Spouses Antonio F. Algura and Lorencita S.J. Algura filed a Complaint for damages against the Naga City Government and its officers, arising from the alleged illegal demolition of their residence and boarding house and for payment of lost income derived from fees paid by their boarders amounting to PhP 7,000.00 monthly. Simultaneously, petitioners filed an Ex-Parte Motion to Litigate as Indigent Litigants, to which petitioner Antonio Algura's Pay Slip was appended, showing a gross monthly income of PhP 10,474.00 and a net pay of PhP 3,616.99. Also attached is a Certification issued by the Office of the City Assessor of Naga City, which stated that petitioners had no property declared in their name for taxation purposes. The RTC judge granted petitioners’ plea for exemption from filing fees. Respondents filed an Answer with Counterclaim arguing that the defenses of the petitioners in the complaint had no cause of action, the spouses' boarding house blocked the road right of way, and said structure was a nuisance per se. Respondents also filed a Motion to Disqualify the Plaintiffs for Non-Payment of Filing Fees. They asserted that in addition to the more than PhP 3,000.00 net income of petitioner Antonio Algura, who is a member of the Philippine National Police, his spouse Lorencita Algura also had a mini-store and a computer shop on the ground floor of their residence and that petitioners' second floor was used as their residence and as a boarding house, from which they earned more than PhP 3,000.00 a month. In addition, it was claimed that petitioners derived additional income from their computer shop patronized by students and from several boarders who paid rentals to them. Hence, respondents concluded that petitioners were not indigent litigants. On April 14, 2000, RTC Naga issued an Order disqualifying petitioners as indigent litigants on the ground that they failed to substantiate their claim for exemption from payment of legal fees and to comply with the third paragraph of Rule 141, Section 18 of the Revised Rules of Court — directing them to pay the requisite filing fees.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration where Lorencita claimed that the demolition of their small dwelling deprived her of a monthly income amounting to PhP 7,000.00. She, her husband, and their six (6) minor children had to rely mainly on her husband's salary as a policeman which provided them a monthly amount of PhP 3,500.00, more or less. Also, they did not own any real property as certified by the assessor's office of Naga City. More so, according to her, the meager net income from her small sari- sari store and the rentals of some boarders, plus the salary of her husband, were not enough to pay the family's basic necessities. On July 17, 2000, the RTC denied the MR, hence this petition for certiorari.
ISSUE/S:
Whether the petitioners should be considered as indigent litigants to qualify for exemption from paying filing fees.
RULING:
No. Instead of disqualifying the Alguras as indigent litigants, the trial court should have called a hearing to enable the petitioners to adduce evidence to show that they didn't have property and money sufficient and available for food, shelter, and basic necessities for them and their family. Since this Court is not a trier of facts, it will have to remand the case to the trial court to determine whether petitioners can be considered as indigent litigants using the standards set in Rule 3, Section 21.
The Complaint was filed on September 1, 1999. However, the Naga City RTC, in its April 14, 2000 and July 17, 2000 Orders, incorrectly applied Rule 141, Section 18 on Legal Fees when the applicable rules at that time were Rule 3, Section 21 on Indigent Party which took effect on July 1, 1997 and Rule 141, Section 16 on Pauper Litigants Rule 141, which became effective on July 19, 1984 up to February 28, 2000.
There are two (twin) requirements under the old Section 16, Rule 141:
a) income requirement — the applicants should not have a gross monthly income of more than PhP 1,500.00, and
b) property requirement –– they should not own property with an assessed value of not more than PhP 18,000.00.
In the case at bar, petitioners Alguras do not own real property as shown by the Certification of the Naga City assessor and so the property requirement is met. However, with respect to the income requirement, it is clear that the gross monthly income of PhP 10,474.00 of petitioner Antonio F. Algura and the PhP 3,000.00 income of Lorencita Algura when combined, were above the PhP 1,500.00 monthly income threshold prescribed by then Rule 141, Section 16 and therefore, the income requirement was not satisfied. However, if the trial court finds that one or both requirements have not been met, then it would set a hearing to enable the applicant to prove that the applicant has "no money or property sufficient and available for food, shelter and basic necessities for himself and his family." In that hearing, the adverse party may adduce countervailing evidence to disprove the evidence presented by the applicant; after which the trial court will rule on the application depending on the evidence adduced. In addition, Section 21 of Rule 3 also provides that the adverse party may later still contest the grant of such authority at any time before judgment is rendered by the trial court, possibly based on newly discovered evidence not obtained at the time the application was heard. If the court determines after hearing, that the party declared as an indigent is in fact a person with sufficient income or property, the proper docket and other lawful fees shall be assessed and collected by the clerk of court. If payment is not made within the time fixed by the court, execution shall issue or the payment of prescribed fees shall be made, without prejudice to such other sanctions as the court may impose.
Thus, the trial court should have applied Rule 3, Section 21 to the application of the Alguras after their affidavits and supporting documents showed that petitioners did not satisfy the twin requirements on gross monthly income and ownership of real property under Rule 141. Recapitulating the rules on indigent litigants, therefore, if the applicant for exemption meets the salary and property requirements under Section 19 of Rule 141, then the grant of the application is mandatory. On the other hand, when the application does not satisfy one or both requirements, then the application should not be denied outright; instead, the court should apply the "indigency test" under Section 21 of Rule 3 and use its sound discretion in determining the merits of the prayer for exemption.
Divinagracia v. Parilla
11 March 2015 | G.R. No. 196750 | CARPIO, J | PERLAS-BERNABE,J
PETITIONER: MA. ELENA R. DIVINAGRACIA
RESPONDENTS: CORONACION PARILLA, CELESTIAL NOBLEZA, CECILIA LELINA, CELEDONIO NOBLEZA, and MAUDE NOBLEZA
DOCTRINE:
The non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for the dismissal of an action.At any stage of a judicial proceeding and/or at such times as are just, parties may be added on the motion of a party or on the initiative of the tribunal concerned. If the plaintiff refuses to implead an indispensable party despite the order of the court, that court may dismiss the complaint for the plaintiff's failure to comply with the order. The remedy is to implead the non-party claimed to be indispensable.
FACTS:
5. Conrado Nobleza, Sr. (Conrado, Sr.) owned a 313-square meter parcel of land located at Cor. Fuentes-Delgado Streets, Iloilo City denominated as Lot 133-B-1-A and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-12255 (subject land).
6. During his lifetime, he contracted two marriages: (a) the first was with Lolita Palermo with whom he had two (2) children, namely, Cresencio and Conrado, Jr.;and (b) the second was with Eusela Niangar with whom he had seven (7) children, namely, Mateo, Sr.,Coronacion, Cecilia, Celestial, Celedonio, Ceruleo, and Cebeleo, Sr. Conrado, Sr. also begot three (3) illegitimate children, namely, Eduardo, Rogelio, and Ricardo. Mateo, Sr. pre-deceased Conrado, Sr. and was survived by his children Felcon, Landelin, Eusela, Giovanni, Mateo, Jr.,Tito, and Gaylord. Cebeleo, Sr. also pre-deceased his father and was survived by his wife, Maude, and children Cebeleo, Jr. and Neobel.
7. According to Santiago, upon Conrado, Sr.'s death, Cresencio, Conrado, Jr.,Felcon (in representation of his father, Mateo, Sr.,and his siblings),Coronacion, Celestial, Cecilia, Rogelio, Eduardo, and Ricardo sold their respective interests over the subject land to Santiago, as embodied in a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement or Adjudication with Deed of Sale (subject document), which was, however, not signed by the other heirs who did not sell their respective shares, namely, Ceruleo, Celedonio, and Maude (in representation of his husband, Cebeleo, Sr.,and their children).
8. The same parties executed a Supplemental Contract whereby the vendors-heirs and Santiago agreed that out of the aforesaid consideration, only P109,807.93 will be paid up front, and that Santiago will only pay the remaining balance of P337,887.73 upon the partition of the subject land.
9. However, Santiago was not able to have TCT No. T-12255 cancelled and the subject document registered because of Ceruleo, Celedonio, and Maude's refusal to surrender the said title.
10. This fact, coupled with Ceruleo, Celedonio, and Maude's failure to partition the subject land, prompted Santiago to file a Complaint 15 dated January 3, 1990 for judicial partition and for receivership.
11. Ceruleo, Celedonio, and Maude maintained that Santiago had no legal right to file an action for judicial partition nor compel them to surrender TCT No. T-12255 because, inter alia:(a) Santiago did not pay the full purchase price of the shares sold to him; and (b) the subject land is a conjugal asset of Conrado Sr. and Eusela Niangar and, thus, only their legitimate issues may validly inherit the same.
PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:
RTC ● RTC ordered the partition of the subject land between Santiago on the one hand, and Ceruleo, Celedonio, Maude, and the heirs of Mateo, Sr. (i.e.,Felcon, et al.) on the other hand and, consequently, the cancellation of TCT No. T-12255 and the issuance of a new owner's duplicate certificate in favor of Santiago and the group of Ceruleo, Celedonio, Maude, and the heirs of Mateo, Sr.
● RTC found that through the subject document, Santiago became a co-owner of the subject land and, as such, has the right to demand the partition of the same.
● However, the RTC held that Santiago did not validly acquire Mateo, Sr.'s share over the subject land, considering that Felcon admitted the lack of authority to bind his siblings with regard to Mateo, Sr.'s share thereon.
CA CA set aside the RTC Rulings and, consequently, dismissed Santiago's complaint for judicial partition.
It held that Felcon's siblings, as well as Maude's children, are indispensable parties to the judicial partition of the subject land and, thus, their non-inclusion as defendants in Santiago's complaint would necessarily result in its dismissal.
ISSUE/S:
2. Whether or not the CA correctly: (a) ruled that Felcon's siblings and Cebeleo, Sr. and Maude's children are indispensable parties to Santiago's complaint for judicial partition; and (b) dismissed Santiago's complaint for his failure to implead said omitted heirs.
RULING:
Yes. The petition is partly meritorious. CA correctly: (a) ruled that Felcon's siblings and Cebeleo, Sr. and Maude's children are indispensable parties to Santiago's complaint for judicial partition; however, it should not have dismissed Santiago's complaint for his failure to implead said omitted heirs. In instances of non-joinder of indispensable parties, the proper remedy is to implead them and not to dismiss the case
An indispensable party is one whose interest will be affected by the court's action in the litigation, and without whom no final determination of the case can be had. The party's interest in the subject matter of the suit and in the relief sought are so inextricably intertwined with the other parties' that his legal presence as a party to the proceeding is an absolute necessity. In his absence, there cannot be a resolution of the dispute of the parties before the court which is effective, complete, or equitable. Thus, the absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void, for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present.
With regard to actions for partition, Section 1, Rule 69 of the Rules of Court requires that all persons interested in the property shall be joined as defendants. All the co-heirs and persons having an interest in the property are indispensable parties; as such, an action for partition will not lie without the joinder of the said parties. 32
In the instant case, records reveal that Conrado, Sr. has the following heirs, legitimate and illegitimate, who are entitled to a pro-indiviso share in the subject land, namely: Conrado, Jr., Cresencio, Mateo, Sr., Coronacion, Cecilia, Celestial, Celedonio, Ceruleo, Cebeleo, Sr., Eduardo, Rogelio, and Ricardo. However, both Mateo, Sr. and Cebeleo, Sr. pre-deceased Conrado, Sr. and, thus, pursuant to the rules on representation under the Civil Code, their respective interests shall be represented by their children, namely: (a) for Mateo, Sr.:Felcon, Landelin, Eusela, Giovanni, Mateo, Jr.,Tito, and Gaylord; and (b) for Cebeleo, Sr.:Cebeleo, Jr. and Neobel.
The aforementioned heirs — whether in their own capacity or in representation of their direct ascendant — have vested rights over the subject land and, as such, should be impleaded as indispensable parties in an action for partition thereof. However, a reading of Santiago's complaint shows that as regards Mateo, Sr.'s interest, only Felcon was impleaded, excluding therefrom his siblings and co-representatives. Similarly, with regard to Cebeleo, Sr.'s interest over the subject land, the complaint impleaded his wife, Maude, when pursuant to Article 972 of the Civil Code, the proper representatives to his interest should have been his children, Cebeleo, Jr. and Neobel. Verily, Santiago's omission of the aforesaid heirs renders his complaint for partition defective.
Santiago's contention that he had already bought the interests of the majority of the heirs and, thus, they should no longer be regarded as indispensable parties deserves no merit. As correctly noted by the CA, in actions for partition, the court cannot properly issue an order to divide the property, unless it first makes a determination as to the existence of co-ownership. The court must initially settle the issue of ownership, which is the first stage in an action for partition. Indubitably, therefore, until and unless this issue of co-ownership is definitely and finally resolved, it would be premature to effect a partition of the disputed properties.
In this case, while it is conceded that Santiago bought the interests of majority of the heirs of Conrado, Sr. as evidenced by the subject document, as a vendee, he merely steps into the shoes of the vendors-heirs. Since his interest over the subject land is merely derived from that of the vendors-heirs, the latter should first be determined as co-owners thereof, thus necessitating the joinder of all those who have vested interests in such land, i.e.,the aforesaid heirs of Conrado, Sr.,in Santiago's complaint.
In fine, the absence of the aforementioned indispensable parties in the instant complaint for judicial partition renders all subsequent actions of the RTC null and void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties, but even as to those present.
However, the CA erred in ordering the dismissal of the complaint on account of Santiago's failure to implead all the indispensable parties in his complaint. The non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for the dismissal of an action.At any stage of a judicial proceeding and/or at such times as are just, parties may be added on the motion of a party or on the initiative of the tribunal concerned. If the plaintiff refuses to implead an indispensable party despite the order of the court, that court may dismiss the complaint for the plaintiff's failure to comply with the order. The remedy is to implead the non-party claimed to be indispensable.
In view of the foregoing, the correct course of action in the instant case is to order its remand to the RTC for the inclusion of those indispensable parties who were not impleaded and for the disposition of the case on the merits.
SPOUSES DELA CRUZ V. JOAQUIN
July 28, 2005 | GR No. 162788 | Panganiban, J., | Third Division | Effect of Death of Party Litigant
PETITIONER: Spouses JULITA DE LA CRUZ and FELIPE DE LA CRUZ
RESPONDENTS: PEDRO JOAQUIN
DOCTRINE:
A formal substitution by heirs is not necessary when they themselves voluntarily appear, participate in the case, and present evidence in defense of the deceased. The rule on the substitution by heirs is not a matter of jurisdiction, but a requirement of due process. Thus, when due process is not violated, as when the right of the representative or heir is recognized and protected, noncompliance or belated formal compliance with the Rules cannot affect the validity of a promulgated decision.
FACTS:
Pedro Joaquin filed a complaint for recovery of possession and ownership, the cancellation of title, and damages against the petitioner spouses. Joaquin alleged that he had obtained a loan from the petitioners and secured the said loan by executing a Deed of Sale over a parcel of land in Nueva Ecija in favor of petitioners. Also, a document entitled ―Kasunduan was executed evidencing that the Deed of Sale to be actually an equitable mortgage.
PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:
RTC The RTC ruled in Joaquin‘s favor and declared that the parties had entered into a sale with a right of repurchase.
CA ● The CA sustained the decision of the RTC and noted that petitioners had given respondent the right to repurchase the property within five (5) years from the date of the sale or until June 29, 1979. The CA also ordered a substitution by legal representatives, in view of Joaquin’s death.
● Hence, this petition for review assailing the appellate court’s decision on the ground, among others, that the RTC lost jurisdiction over the case upon the death of Joaquin. Petitioners assert that the RTC’s Decision was invalid for lack of jurisdiction because respondent died during the pendency of the case and there was no substation by the heirs.
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not the RTC lost its jurisdiction over the case upon the death of Joaquin. - NO
RULING:
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision and Resolution are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
RATIO:
No. The general rule is that a formal substitution by heirs is not necessary when they themselves voluntarily appear, participate in the case, and present evidence in defense of the deceased. These actions negate any claim that the right to due process was violated. Strictly speaking, the rule on the substitution by heirs is not a matter of jurisdiction, but a requirement of due process. Thus, when due process is not violated, as when the right of the representative or heir is recognized and protected, noncompliance or belated formal compliance with the Rules cannot affect the validity of a promulgated decision. Mere failure to substitute for a deceased plaintiff is not a sufficient ground to nullify a trial court’s decision. The alleging party must prove that there was an undeniable violation of due process.
The records of the present case contain a "Motion for Substitution of Party Plaintiff" filed before the CA. Evidently, the heirs of Pedro Joaquin voluntary appeared and participated in the case. The CA had ordered his legal representatives to appear and substitute for him. The substitution even on appeal had been ordered correctly. The Motion for Substitution may be deemed to have been granted; and the heirs, to have substituted for the deceased, Pedro Joaquin. There being no violation of due process, the issue of substitution cannot be upheld as a ground to nullify the trial court’s Decision.
SAN JUAN v. CRUZ
31 July 2006 | GR No. 167321| Calleja, Sr., J. | Effect of death of party litigant
PETITIONER: Epifanio San Juan, Jr.
RESPONDENTS: Judge Ramon A. Cruz, Regional Trial Court, Branch 224, Quezon City and Atty. Teodorico A. Aquino
DOCTRINE:
The second paragraph of Section 16, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the heirs may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased without requiring the appointment of an administrator or executor.The second paragraph of Section 16, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the heirs may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased without requiring the appointment of an administrator or executor.
FACTS:
1. Loreto Samia San Juan executed a Last Will and Testament naming Oscar Casa as one of the devisees therein. Upon Loreto's death, Atty. Teodorico A. Aquino filed a petition for the probate of the will in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.
2. While said petition was pending, Oscar Casa died intestate.
3. The firm of Aquino, Galang, Lucas, Espinoza, Miranda & Associates entered their appearance as counsel of Federico Casa, Jr., who claimed to be one of the heirs of Oscar Casa and their representative.
4. In 2002, the probate court issued an Order denying the entry of appearance of said law firm, considering that Federico Casa, Jr. was not the executor or administrator of the estate of the devisee.
5. Atty. Teoderico A. Aquino then filed a pleading entitled "Appointment of Administrator" signed by the legal heirs of the deceased Oscar Casa praying that one of them, Federico Casa, Jr., be designated as administrator of the estate of the deceased and that he be substituted for the deceased.
6. In compliance with the order of the court, Epifanio San Juan filed a "Motion to Declare Appointment of Administrator As Inadequate or Insufficient." He maintained that the heirs should present an administrator of the estate of Oscar Casa as the representative of the estate in the case.
7. In his reply, Aquino stated that, under Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, the heirs of Oscar Casa may be substituted for the deceased without need for appointment of an administrator or executor of the estate.
PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:
RTC ● Denied the motion of San Juan
○ Contrary to its first Order, there was no need for the appointment of an administrator or executor as substitute for the deceased devisee.
● Denied the 1st and 2nd MRs
CA ● Denied the Petition for Review on Certiorari for the nullification of the probate court’s orders
○ On the ground that it was filed beyond the 60-day period counted from notice to petitioner of the trial court’s February 27, 2004 Order.
ISSUE/S:
1. WON there is a need for the appointment of an administration of the estate of Oscar Casa or as such it is enough that he be substituted by his heirs – NO
2. WON the petition for review on certiorari in CA is time-barred – YES
RULING:
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED. Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED.
RATIO:
1. NO.
● There is no need for the appointment of an administrator of the estate of Oscar Casa. It is enough that he be substituted by his heirs.
● The second paragraph of Section 16, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is plain and explicit: the heirs may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased without requiring the appointment of an administrator or executor. However, if within the specified period a legal representative fails to appear, the court may order the opposing counsel, within a specified period, to process the appointment of an administrator or executor who shall immediately appear for the estate of the deceased.
● In the case at bar, a prior appointment of an administrator or executor of the estate of Oscar Casa is not necessary for his heirs to acquire legal capacity to be substituted as representatives of the estate. This is because from the very moment of his death, his heirs stepped into his shoes and acquired his rights as devisee/legatee of the deceased Loreto San Juan. Said heirs may designate one or some of them as their representative before the trial court.
2. YES.
● The SC agreed with the CA that the petition for review in CA was filed beyond the 60-day period.
o Petitioner received, on March 18, 2004, the February 27, 2004 Order of the court denying his motion for reconsideration of the December 2, 2003 Order. Petitioner had 60 days from March 18, 2004 or until May 17, 2004 within which to file his petition for certiorari. However, petitioner filed his petition for certiorari with the CA only on November 22, 2004.
● The 60-day period shall be reckoned from the trial court’s denial of his first MR and not of the 2nd MR, otherwise, indefinite delays will ensue.
o The 60-day period should not be reckoned from petitioner's receipt on June 11, 2004 of the denial of his May 7, 2004 second motion for reconsideration.
GAFFNEY v. BUTLER
08 November 2017 | GR No. 219408 | Effect of death of party litigant
PETITIONER: DONALD FRANCIS GAFFNEY
RESPONDENT: GINA V. BUTLER
DOCTRINE:
Neither a dead person nor his estate may be a party plaintiff in a court action. A deceased person does not have such legal entity as is necessary to bring action so much so that a motion to substitute cannot lie and should be denied by the court. An action begun by a decedent's estate cannot be said to have been begun by a legal person, since an estate is not a legal entity; such an action is a nullity and a motion to amend the party plaintiff will not likewise lie, there being nothing before the court to amend.
FACTS:
1. Donald Francis Gaffney (Gaffney) filed a complaint against Gina Butler (Butler) for sum of money.
2. Gaffney alleged that between 2006 to 2007, Butler and her husband Anthony Butler(Anthony) approached and invited Gaffney to invest in ActiveFun Corporation. Butler was the President while Anthony was the Treasurer and Chief Executive Officer.
3. Gaffney advanced the approximate amount of P12,500,000.00 representing his initial investment in ActiveFun. The proposed investment agreement did not materialize because Anthony passed away. Gaffney demanded the return of his investments from Butler, who personally undertook to repay the total amount of his investments plus accrued interest but was only able to pay the initial amount of P1,000,000.00.
4. Gaffney then instituted a legal action for the enforcement of his claim against Butler. Because no full relief can be had against the Estate/heirs of Anthony Richard Butler under the original Complaint, Gaffney filed a Motion for Leave to Admit Amended Complaint for the purpose of impleading the estate or the heirs of the late Anthony Richard Butler [as additional party-defendant], allegedly represented by petitioner as his surviving spouse.
5. Butler opposed the motion stating the ground that "only natural or juridical persons may be parties in an ordinary civil action.
PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:
RTC ● Denied Gina’s Motion to Dismiss and Donald’s Motion to Declare in Default
○ On the Motion to Dismiss - the inclusion of the estate of the late Anthony Richard Butler (Anthony), represented by his surviving spouse Gina, is necessary for a complete relief on the determination or settlement of the controversy raised in the case.
○ On the Motion to Declare in Default, the RTC observed that Gina filed an Answer to the Amended Complaint on March 12, 2013; hence, there is no reason to declare her in default.
● Denied Gina’s MR to the motion to dismiss for lack of merit
CA ● Reversed and set aside the RTC Orders and dismissed the entire complaint.
○ Gina filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65, to nullify the RTC Orders, imputing grave abuse of discretion on the RTC, which was granted by the CA.
○ Dismissed the case against Anthony’s estate since it is warranted under Section 1, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court which states that "only natural or juridical persons, or entities authorized by law may be parties in a civil action.
● Dismissed Donald’s MR for failure to raise new substantial arguments.
ISSUE/S:
1. WON the estate or heirs of Anthony, represented by his surviving spouse Gina, could be named as additional defendant - NO
RULING:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Review is hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Decision dated February 6, 2015 and the Resolution dated July 14, 2015 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 133762 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION such that the Amended Complaint is REINSTATED insofar as Gina V. Butler is concerned.
The RTC is hereby ordered to proceed, expeditiously and without delay, in resolving Civil Case No. 73187 against Gina V. Butler.
RATIO:
1. NO.
● A deceased person does not have the capacity to be sued and may not be made a defendant in a case. Section 1, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court unequivocally states that ― only natural or juridical persons, or entities authorized by law may be parties in a civil action."
● Hence, there can be no doubt that a deceased person or his estate may not be impleaded as a defendant in a civil action as they lack legal personality. Thus, when Anthony died, his legal personality ceased and he could no longer be impleaded as respondent in the present ordinary civil suit for collection. As such, the complaint against him should be dismissed on the ground that the pleading asserting the claim states no cause of action or for failure to state a cause of action pursuant to Section 1(g), Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, because a complaint cannot possibly state a cause of action against one who cannot be a party to a civil action.
● Moreover, the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the person or estate of Anthony. Summons is a writ by which the defendant is notified of the action brought against him and service thereof is the means by which the court acquires jurisdiction over his person.
● In the present case, no valid service of summons upon the deceased Anthony was or could have been made, precisely because he was already dead even before the complaint against him and his wife was filed in court.
● In several occasions, the Court has held that the trial court fails to acquire jurisdiction over a defendant who was already dead at the time the complaint was filed against him.
UY V. DEL CASTILLO
July 24, 2017 | G.R. No. 223610 | PERLAS-BERNABE, J | Effect of death of party litigant
PETITIONER: Conchita S. Uy, Christine Uy Dy, Sylvia Uy Sy, Jane Uy Tan, James Lyndon S. Uy, Irene S. Uy, Ericson S. Uy, Johanna S. Uy, and Jednathan S. Uy
RESPONDENTS: Crispulo Del Castillo, substituted by his heirs Paulita Manatad-Del Castillo, Cesar Del Castillo, Avito Del Castillo, Nila C. Dueñas, Nida C. Latosa, Lorna C. Bernardo, Gil Del Castillo, Liza C. Gungob, Alma Del Castillo, and Gemma Del Castillo
DOCTRINE:
Section 20, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court applies in cases where the defendant dies while the case is pending and not before the case was even filed in court.
FACTS:
1. The present case is an offshoot of an action for quieting of title, reconveyance, damages, and attorney's fees involving a parcel of land, known as Lot 791 and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 29129 filed by Crispulo Del Castillo against Jaime Uy and his wife, Conchita, on November 12, 1996. However, since Jaime had died six (6) years earlier in 1990, Crispulo amended his complaint and impleaded Jaime's children, i.e., the Uy siblings, as defendants. Subsequently, Jaime died on March 4, 1990 or six years before private respondents filed the Quieting of Title Case. Thus, after Conchita filed an Answer informing the RTC of Jaime's death in 1990, the complaint was amended to implead the Uy heirs: respondents Paulita Manalad-Del Castillo, Cesar Del Castillo, Avito Del Castillo, Nila C. Dueñas, Nida C. Latosa, Lorna C. Bernardo, Gil Del Castillo, Liza C. Gungob, Alma Del Castillo, and Gemma Del Castillo.
1. After due proceedings, the RTC rendered a Decision in respondents' favor, and accordingly: (a) declared them as the true and lawful owners of Lot 791; (b) nullified Original Certificate of Title No. 576, 18 as well as TCT No. 29129; and (c) ordered petitioners to pay respondents moral damages and litigation costs in the amount of P20,000.00 each, as well as attorney's fees.
2. The Uy siblings appealed the RTC's decision to the CA, but their appeal was denied. One of petitioners' arguments was they cannot be held personally liable with their separate property for Jaime's liability and that respondents should have filed a claim against Jaime's estate in accordance with Section 20, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. The CA held that such provision only applies to contractual money claims and not when the subject matter is some other relief and the collection of any amount is merely incidental thereto, such as by way of damages, as in this case.
3. The petitioners moved for reconsideration which was, however, denied by the CA. Hence, a petition for review on certiorari was filed.
PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:
RTC ● The RTC ruled in favor of the respondents, declaring them as the true owners of Lot 791 and ordering the Uy siblings to pay moral damages, litigation costs, and attorney's fees.
CA ● The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.
● The CA denied Motion for Reconsideration.
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not the respondents should have proceeded against Jaime's estate pursuant to Section 20, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court—NO
RULING:
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED.
RATIO:
1. NO.
The Uy siblings were not merely substituted in Jaime's place as defendant; rather, they were impleaded in their personal capacities. Under Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, substitution of parties takes place when the party to the action dies pending the resolution of the case and the claim is not extinguished,:
Section 16. Death of party; duty of counsel. — Whenever a party to a pending action dies, and the claim is not thereby extinguished, it shall be the duty of his counsel to inform the court within thirty (30) days after such death of the fact thereof, and to give the name and address of his legal representative or representatives. Failure of counsel to comply with his duty shall be a ground for disciplinary action.
The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased, without requiring the appointment of an executor or administrator and the court may appoint a guardian ad litem for the minor heirs.
The court shall forthwith order said legal representative or representatives to appear and be substituted within a period of thirty (30) days from notice.
If no legal representative is named by the counsel for the deceased party, or if the one so named shall fail to appear within the specified period, the court may order the opposing party, within a specified time to procure the appointment of an executor or administrator for the estate of the deceased and the latter shall immediately appear for and on behalf of the deceased. The court charges in procuring such appointment, if defrayed by the opposing party, may be recovered as costs.
Here, Jaime died on March 4, 1990 or six years before private respondents filed the Quieting of Title Case. Thus, after Conchita filed an Answer informing the RTC of Jaime's death in 1990, the complaint was amended to implead the Uy siblings. Accordingly, the Rules of Court provisions on substitution upon the death of a party do not apply and the Uy siblings were not merely substituted in place of Jaime in the Quieting of Title Case. Instead, they were impleaded in their personal capacities.
In this light, petitioners can no longer invoke Section 20, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. It applies in cases where the defendant dies while the case is pending and not before the case was even filed in court, as in this case.
At this point, the Court notes that if petitioners truly believed that Jaime's estate is the proper party to the Quieting of Title Case, they could and should have raised the lack of cause of action against them at the earliest opportunity. Obviously, they did not do so; instead, they actively participated in the case.
Time and again, the Court has repeatedly held that "a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable, and may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law, and whether it be made by the court that rendered it or by the Highest Court of the land. This principle, known as the doctrine of immutability of judgment, has a two-fold purpose, namely: (a) to avoid delay in the administration of justice and thus, procedurally, to make orderly the discharge of judicial business; and (b) to put an end to judicial controversies, at the risk of occasional errors, which is precisely why courts exist.
NOCUM V. LUCIO TAN
September 23 2005 | GR No. 145022 | Chico-Nazario, J. | Venue
PETITIONER: Armand Nocum
RESPONDENTS: Lucio Tan
DOCTRINE:
(a) Jurisdiction is the authority to hear and determine a case; venue is the place where the case is to be heard or tried; (b) Jurisdiction is a matter of substantive law; venue, of procedural law; (c) Jurisdiction establishes a relation between the court and the subject matter; venue, a relation between plaintiff and defendant, or petitioner and respondent; and, (d) Jurisdiction is fixed by law and cannot be conferred by the parties; venue may be conferred by the act or agreement of the parties
FACTS:
1. Lucio Tan filed a complaint against reporter Armand Nocum, Capt. Florendo Umali, ALPAP and Inquirer with the Regional Trial Court of Makati, docketed as Civil Case No. 98- 2288, seeking moral and exemplary damages for the alleged malicious and defamatory imputations contained in a news article.
2. Inquirer and Nocum would file an answer stating that: (1) Tan’s complaint did not state a cause of action; (2) that the defamatory statements alleged in the complaint were general conclusions without factual premises; (3) the questioned news report constituted fair and true report on the matters of public interest concerning a public figure and therefore, was privileged in nature; and (4) malice on their part was negated by the publication in the same article of plaintiff's or PAL's side of the dispute with the pilot's union.
3. ALPAP and Umali would also file their answer stating that the venue was improperly laid.
PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:
RTC ● Dismissed
○ the trial court dismissed the complaint without prejudice on the ground of improper venue.
CA ● Affirmed
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the lower court acquired jurisdiction over the civil case upon the filing of the original complaint for damages. - YES
RULING:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated 19 April 2000 is AFFIRMED in toto. No costs.
RATIO:
YES
● The lower court acquired jurisdiction over the civil case upon the filing of the original complaint for damages. It is settled that jurisdiction is conferred by law based on the facts alleged in the complaint since the latter comprises a concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff's causes of action. Under Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, the RTC is specifically designated to try a libel case.
● In the case at bar, the additional allegations in the Amended Complaint that the article and the caricature were printed and first published in the City of Makati referred only to the question of venue and not jurisdiction. These additional allegations would neither confer jurisdiction on the RTC nor would respondent's failure to include the same in the original complaint divest the lower court of its jurisdiction over the case. Respondent's failure to allege these allegations gave the lower court the power, upon motion by a party, to dismiss the complaint on the ground that venue was not properly laid
● Assuming that venue were properly laid in the court where the action was instituted, that would be procedural, not a jurisdictional impediment. In fact, in civil cases, venue may be waived. Consequently, by dismissing the case on the ground of improper venue, the lower court had jurisdiction over the case. We so hold that dismissal of the complaint by the lower court was proper considering that the complaint, indeed, on its face, failed to allege neither the residence of the complainant nor the place where the libelous article was printed and first published. Nevertheless, before the finality of the dismissal, the same may still be amended as in fact the amended complaint was admitted, in view of the court a quo's jurisdiction, of which it was never divested.
● In regards to civil actions, the Supreme Court stated that in civil cases venue relates more to the trial rather than jurisdiction. It is a procedural, not a jurisdictional, matter. It relates to the place of trial or geographical location in which an action or proceeding should be brought and not to the jurisdiction of the court. It is meant to provide convenience to the parties, rather than restrict their access to the courts as it relates to the place of trial. Petitioners' argument that the lower court has no jurisdiction over the case because respondent failed to allege the place where the libelous articles were printed and first published would have been tenable if the case filed were a criminal case.
NOCUM v. LUCIO TAN
September 23, 2005 | GR No. 145022 | Chico-Nazario, J. | Venue in Civil Cases v. Criminal Cases
PETITIONER: ARMAND NOCUM and THE PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER, INC
RESPONDENTS: LUCIO TAN
DOCTRINE:
A. Jurisdiction is the authority to hear and determine a case; venue is the place where the case is to be heard or tried; B. Jurisdiction is a matter of substantive law; venue, of procedural law; C. Jurisdiction establishes a relation between the court and the subject matter; venue, a relation between plaintiff and defendant, or petitioner and respondent; and, D. Jurisdiction is fixed by law and cannot be conferred by the parties; venue may be conferred by the act or agreement of the parties
FACTS:
1. Respondent Tan filed a complaint against reporter Nocum, Capt. Umali, ALPAP and Inquirer with the RTC for the alleged malicious and defamatory imputations contained in a news article.
2. INQUIRER and NOCUM filed their joint answer alleging that the complaint failed to state a cause of action; the defamatory statements alleged in the complaint were general conclusions without factual premises; (the questioned news report constituted fair and true report on the matters of public interest concerning a public figure and therefore, was privileged in nature; and malice on their part was negated by the publication in the same article of plaintiff‘s or PAL‘s side of the dispute with the pilot‘s union.
3. ALPAP and UMALI likewise filed their joint answer alleging that the complaint stated no cause of action; venue was improperly laid; and plaintiff Lucio Tan was not a real party in interest. It appeared that the complaint failed to state the residence of the complainant at the time of the alleged commission of the offense and the place where the libelous article was printed and first published.
PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:
RTC ● Dismissed the complaint without prejudice on the ground of improper venue. Aggrieved, Lucio Tan filed an Omnibus Motion seeking reconsideration of the dismissal and admission of the amended complaint. In par. 2.01.1 of the amended complaint, it is alleged that "This article was printed and first published in the City of Makati", and in par. 2.04.1, that "This caricature was printed and first published in the City of Makati"
● Admitted the amended complaint and deemed set aside the previous order of dismissal stating that the mistake or deficiency in the original complaint appears now to have been cured in the Amended Complaint. Also, there is no substantial amendment, but only formal, in the Amended Complaint which would affect the defendants’ defenses and their Answers.
CA ● Dissatisfied, petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals. Two petitions for certiorari were filed, one filed by petitioners and the other by defendants .
● The two petitions were consolidated. CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. Hence, this PETREV filed by the petitioners.
ISSUE/S:
1. WON RTC acquired jurisdiction over the civil case upon the filing of the original complaint for damages.— YES
RULING:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated 19 April 2000 is AFFIRMED in toto. No costs.
RATIO:
1. YES
● RTC acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter upon the filing of the original complaint. It did not lose jurisdiction over the same when it dismissed it on the grounds of improper venue. The amendment merely laid down the proper venue of the case. Jurisdiction is conferred by law based on the facts alleged in the complaint since the latter comprises a concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff's causes of action. Respondent‘s cause of action is for damages arising from libel, the jurisdiction of which is vested with the RTC.
● Petitioners are confusing jurisdiction with venue. Hon. Florenz D. Regalado,differentiated jurisdiction and venue as follows: (a) Jurisdiction is the authority to hear and determine a case; venue is the place where the case is to be heard or tried; (b) Jurisdiction is a matter of substantive law; venue, of procedural law; (c) Jurisdiction establishes a relation between the court and the subject matter; venue, a relation between plaintiff and defendant, or petitioner and respondent; and, (d) Jurisdiction is fixed by law and cannot be conferred by the parties; venue may be conferred by the act or agreement of the parties.
● The additional allegations that the article and the caricature were printed and first published in the City of Makati referred only to the question of venue and not jurisdiction. These would neither confer jurisdiction on the RTC nor would respondent‘s failure to include the same in the original complaint divest the lower court of its jurisdiction over the case. Respondent‘s failure to allege these allegations gave the lower court the power, upon motion by a party, to dismiss the complaint on the ground that venue was not properly laid. By dismissing the case on the ground of improper venue, the lower court had jurisdiction over the case.
RADIOWEALTH FINANCE CO. INC. v. PINEDA JR.
July 30, 2018 | GR No. 227147 | Perlas-Bernabe, J. | Rule 4 - Venue; When the rules on venue do not apply
PETITIONERS: Radiowealth Finance Company, Inc.
RESPONDENTS: Alfonso O. Pineda, Jr. and Josephine C. Pineda
DOCTRINE:
Jurisdiction is defined as the authority to hear and determine a cause or the right to act in a case. In addition to being conferred by the Constitution and the law, the rule is settled that a court's jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the relevant allegations in the complaint, the law in effect when the action is filed, and the character of the relief sought irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to all or some of the claims asserted. This is markedly different from the concept of venue, which only pertains to the place or geographical location where a case is filed.
FACTS:
1. Radiowealth extended a loan to the Pinedas, as evidenced by a Promissory Note which was secured by a Chattel Mortgage constituted on a vehicle owned by the latter.
2. The Promissory Note states that:
a. "Any action to enforce payment of any sums due under this Note shall exclusively be brought in the proper court within the National Capital Judicial Region (NCJR) or in any place where Radiowealth Finance Company, Inc. has a branch/office, at its sole option."
3. Due to the Pinedas’ default, Radiowealth demanded payment of the whole remaining balance of the loan.
4. As the demand went unheeded, Radiowealth filed the instant suit for sum of money and damages with application for a Writ of Replevin before the RTC of San Mateo, Rizal, further alleging that it has a branch therein.
PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:
RTC ● Issued a Writ of Replevin (Order) which it later on recalled (Amended Order)
● Ordered the dismissal of Radiowealth’s complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction since:
○ Radiowealth's principal place of business is in Mandaluyong City, Metro Manila.
○ The Pinedas’ residence is in Porac, Pampanga.
● Radiowealth moved for reconsideration which was however denied.
ISSUE/S:
WON the RTC correctly dismissed Radiowealth’s complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction — NO
RULING:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Amended Order and the Order of the RTC of San Mateo, Rizal, Branch 75 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, Civil Case No. 2814-15 SM is REINSTATED and REMANDED to the RTC for further proceedings.
RATIO:
The RTC confused the concepts of jurisdiction and venue which are not synonymous with each other.
● JURISDICTION is defined as the authority to hear and determine a cause or the right to act in a case.
o It is conferred by the Constitution and the law.
o A court's jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by:
■ the relevant allegations in the complaint;
■ the law in effect when the action is filed; and
■ the character of the relief sought, irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to all or some of the claims asserted.
● This is markedly different from VENUE, which only pertains to the place or geographical location where a case is filed.
● In this case, Radiowealth filed a complaint for sum of money involving the amount of P510,132.
o Pursuant to Sec. 19(8) of BP 129 as amended by Sec. 5 of RA 7691, the RTC has jurisdiction over Radiowealth’s complaint.
Even assuming arguendo that the RTC correctly pertained to venue, it still committed grave error in dismissing Radiowealth’s complaint.
● Rule 4 of the ROC governs the rules on venue of civil actions. Sec. 4 thereof provides that this Rule shall not apply —
o (a) In those cases where a specific rule or law provides otherwise; or
o (b) Where the parties have validly agreed in writing before the filing of the action on the exclusive venue thereof.
● Written stipulations as to venue may be:
o restrictive – the suit may be filed only in the place agreed upon; or
o permissive – the parties may file their suit not only in the place agreed upon but also in the places fixed by law.
■ As regards restrictive stipulations on venue, it must be shown that such stipulation is exclusive.
■ In the absence of qualifying or restrictive words (e.g. “exclusively”, "waiving for this purpose any other venue," "shall only" preceding the designation of venue, "to the exclusion of the other courts," or words of similar import), the stipulation should be deemed as merely an agreement on an additional forum, not as limiting venue to the specified place.
● In this case, the venue stipulation in the Promissory Note (see Fact no. 2) is indeed restrictive in nature, considering that it effectively limits the venue of the actions arising therefrom to the courts of: (a) the NCJR or (b) any place where Radiowealth has a branch/office.
o In light of Radiowealth’s standing allegation that it has a branch in San Mateo, Rizal, it appears that venue has been properly laid, unless such allegation has been disputed and successfully rebutted later on.
Even if it appears that venue has been improperly laid, it is well-settled that the courts may not motu proprio dismiss the case on the ground of improper venue.
● Where defendant fails to challenge timely the venue in a motion to dismiss as provided by Section 4 of Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, and allows the trial to be held and a decision to be rendered, he cannot on appeal or in a special action be permitted to challenge belatedly the wrong venue, which is deemed waived.
● Thus, unless and until the defendant objects to the venue in a motion to dismiss, the venue cannot be truly said to have been improperly laid, as for all practical intents and purposes, the venue, though technically wrong, may be acceptable to the parties for whose convenience the rules on venue had been devised.
NESTORIO MEMITA vs. RICARDO MASONGSONG
May 28, 2007| G.R. No. G.R. No. G.R. No. 150912 | Carpio, J. | Complaint – Actionable Document
PETITIONER: Ricardo Masongsong (Masongsong) – doing business under the business name of RM Integrated Services, was the distributor of San Miguel Foods, Inc.’s Magnolia chicken products. Masongsong supplied Magnolia chicken products on a 25-day payment credit to Memita.
RESPONDENTS: Nestorio Memita (Memita) - is the owner of Vicor Store in Burgos Public Market, Bacolod City
DOCTRINE:
The best evidence of the transaction between buyer and seller are the sales invoices. The sales invoices show that the buyer or his representative acknowledged receipt of seller’s deliveries without protest.
FACTS:
1. Masongsong supplied Magnolia chicken products on a 25-day payment credit to Memita’s Vicor Store.
2. Masongsong filed a complaint before the RTC and alleged that from 11 March 1996 to 25 June 1996, Memita’s credit on goods purchased already reached the amount of P603,520.50.
3. Before Masongsong filed the action, he made several demands to Memita but Memita failed to pay.
4. Aside from payment, Masongsong also prayed for the issuance of a writ of attachment against Memita.
5. Memita did not deny that he purchased goods on credit from Masongsong. Memita further stated that his refusal to pay was based on the following grounds: (a) questionable deliveries; (b) short deliveries and discrepancies; and (c) possible manipulation of delivery receipts.
PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:
RTC NEGROS OCCIDENTAL ● The RTC ruled in favor of Masongsong. It also denied Memita’s MR.
● The RTC reasoned that:
○ the evidence ineluctably show that the transaction between Masongsong and Memita is documented by the Sales Invoices annexed to the Complaint. Likewise, it held that Memita admitted the purchases but raised the issue of questionable and short deliveries, and that Memita also speculated that Masongsong may have manipulated the receipts;
○ the Sales Invoices were attached as annexes to the Complaint but Memita’s Answer failed to explicitly deny or contest the genuineness and due execution of any of the receipt or of the signature of Memita or of his duly authorized representative appearing in the Sales Invoice acknowledging receipt of the goods. More so, all the deliveries are evidenced by Sales Invoices on which the whole of Masongsong’s claim is based. Memita failed to point out any particular Sales Invoice which substantiated his claim of short deliveries or questionable deliveries;
○ that the best evidence of the transaction between Masongsong and Memita is the Sales Invoice for this document reflects the particulars of the transaction between the parties for a specific day. In this document, Memita acknowledged the receipt of the deliveries made by Masongsong.
CA ● The CA upheld the RTC’s decision in toto.
● Among others, the CA ruled that Memita failed to explicitly deny or contest the genuineness and due execution of the receipts or any of the signatures on the receipts.
SC ● Memita filed a petition for review on certiorari before the SC.
● Memita insisted that the RTC should not have admitted the sales invoices attached to Masongsong’s complaint. In its decision, the trial court stated that "Memita failed to point out any particular Sales Invoice which substantiates his claim of short deliveries or questionable deliveries."
● Among others, Memita raised that the seventy-two (72) sales invoices should have been excluded and denied admission for failure of Masongsong to prove in the course of the trial their authenticity and due execution.
ISSUE: Did Memita properly contest the actionable documents attached to Masongsong’s complaint?
RULING:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated 9 August 2001 and the Resolution dated 22 October 2001 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 60555 are AFFIRMED.
RATIO:
● No, Memita failed to properly contest the actionable documents (sales invoices) which Masongsong attached to his complaint.
● Memita, in alleging "questionable" and "short" deliveries, in effect alleges that Masongsong committed fraud. As the party invoking fraud, Memita has the burden of proof. Whoever alleges fraud or mistake affecting a transaction must substantiate his allegation, since it is presumed that a person takes ordinary care of his concerns and private concerns have been fair and regular.
● Memita chose to present evidence which did not "set forth the facts" nor the "substance of the matters upon which he relies to support his denial." Memita chose to present the concepts of the load order manifest and the issue form. He also presented witnesses who are current and former employees of San Miguel Foods, Inc. However, per the explanation of Mr. Alberto Valenzuela, a former issuer/receiver and route salesman of San Miguel Foods, Inc., the load order manifest shows the goods ordered by Masongsong from San Miguel Foods, Inc. But the load order manifest cannot be considered as the only basis of a customer’s order as the customer is not precluded from calling up the San Miguel Foods, Inc. office and make additional orders. Mr. Reynaldo Geaga, an employee in charge of the warehouse of San Miguel Foods, Inc., explained that the issue form reflects the quantity of goods actually obtained by Masongsong from San Miguel Foods, Inc. San Miguel Foods, Inc. then uses the issue form as basis for billing Masongsong.
● The best evidence of the transaction between Memita and Masongsong are the sales invoices. The sales invoices show that Memita or his representative acknowledged receipt of Masongsong’s deliveries without protest. Memita aired his doubts about the amounts only after Masongsong asked him to pay his credit. Moreover, although Memita confronted Masongsong with a check dated 1 July 1996 in the amount of P127,238.40 payable to RM Integrated Services, Masongsong stated that the said amount did not include any transaction in the present case.
RIDAO vs HANDMADE CREDIT AND LOANS, INC.
February 3, 2021| GR No. 236920 |Delos Santos, J |Answer-Actionable document
PETITIONER: GEMMA A. RIDAO
RESPONDENTS: HANDMADE CREDIT AND LOANS, INC.
DOCTRINE:
A copy of a page of a ledger is not an actionable document under Sec 7 Rule 8 of the Rules of Court. The ledger merely indicates that money was received as payment, but it is not evidence of the transaction between the parties. The ledger does not provide for the terms and conditions of the loan transaction from which a right or obligation may be established.
FACTS:
1. On February 20, 2004 petitioner Gemma Ridao obtained a loan ($4,000.00) from Handmade Credit Corp. (HCC) and Ridao’s brother-in-law Teofilo Manipon was the duly authorized representative of HCC. On August 24, 2004 additional loan was given to Ridao and increased her obligation to $6,167.00. Both loans are payable within a year and with 4% monthly interest. Failure to pay, HCC sent Ridao a demand letter. Having no response, HCC filed a complaint for collection of sums of money in RTC. HCC emphasized that Ridao did not pay any single centavo.
2. In her answer with Special and Affirmative Defenses and Counterclaim admitted that she obtained a loan from Teofilo however that loan was extended to her as a relative of the Spouses Manipon and not as a creditor of HCC. Ridao asserted that she fully paid her obligation through Avelino, who tendered payments to Teofilo on her behalf. As a proof Ridao attaches a copy of payment records to a page of ledger captioned “ Payment of Loan @ HCC”.
3. Ridao denied the additional loan which increased her obligation to $6,167.00, as well as the P40,000.00 loan. Ridao pointed out that the annexes attached by Handmade Credit in its Complaint consisting of promissory notes and statements of loan release were materially altered and the signatures were forged. Ridao stated that insertions were made and the dates were altered to make it appear that she entered into other loan transactions when she was out of the country at the time. Ridao insisted that the due execution and genuineness of the annexes submitted by Handmade Credit were questionable.
4. Ridao cited the special and affirmative defenses of (1) full payment, stating that Handmade Credit no longer has a right to collect, and (2) material alterations and forged signatures, which cannot be used to enforce payment against any party. As a counterclaim, Ridao asked for the payment of attorney's fees in securing the services of legal counsel.
5. During the trial, Teofilo testified that Ridao executed a personal loan. Teofilo admitted that the promissory note dated February 20, 2004 was changed to another date August 20, 2004 since the balance of the loan was only given on the said date. Teofilo testified that the first and second payments were signed by him and the third and fourth payments by Zoraida. Teofilo disputed receiving the amounts of $800.00, $900.00, and $1,500.00 since serial numbers of the dollar bills given, a policy of Handmade Credit, were not placed in the ledger. However, Teofilo admitted that since his brother Avelino was the one who made the payments, they did not issue any receipt since the ledger already indicated receipt of payment.
PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:
RTC ● The RTC ruled in favor of Ridao and held that the ledger not specifically denied under oath by HCC was deemed admitted. Also, the RTC declared that the additional loan of P40,000.00 was void or non-existent since Ridao was abroad at the time the promissory note was executed. Thus, the contract cannot be ratified nor the right to set up the defense of illegality be waived.
CA ● The CA held that since the alterations were made without the acquiescence of the other contracting party, Ridao, the instrument was void and Handmade Credit, being the party, which caused the alterations, cannot enforce the terms of the altered promissory notes. However, the CA found that since Ridao admitted borrowing $4,300.00 from Handmade Credit and its representatives, Teofilo and Zoraida, where only the total amount of $1,100.00 was acknowledged received by them as payments, then Ridao has the burden to prove payment of the remaining balance of the loan.
● Thus, the CA held that Ridao failed to present sufficient proof that the full amount of the $4,300.00 loan had been settled. As a result, Ridao should be liable for the unpaid balance in the amount of $3,200.00 or its peso equivalent, with interest. MR was denied
ISSUE: Whether or not the ledger is an actionable document under Section 7 Rule 8 of the Rules of Court.
RULING:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated August 16, 2017 and the Resolution dated January 11, 2018 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 107564 is MODIFIED. The Complaint of respondent Handmade Credit & Loans, Inc. is DISMISSED.
RATIO:
● A copy of a page of a ledger is not an actionable document. The ledger merely indicates that money was received as payment, but it is not evidence of the transaction between the parties. The ledger does not provide for the terms and conditions of the loan transaction from which a right or obligation may be established.
● Since the copy of the ledger is not an actionable document, Handmade Credit's non-filing of a reply, specifically denying the genuineness and due execution of the ledger, cannot be considered as an implied admission.
● Nevertheless, even if the ledger is not an actionable document, it is admissible as evidence and is sufficient to prove that Ridao made payments for her loan obligation and that such payments were received by Handmade Credit.
In civil cases, only a preponderance of evidence or "greater weight of the evidence" is required. In determining where the preponderance of evidence or superior weight of evidence on the issues involved lies, the court may consider all the facts and circumstances of the case, the witness' manner of testifying, their intelligence, their means and opportunity of knowing the facts to which they are testifying, the nature of the facts to which they testify, the probability of their testimony, their interest or want of interest, and also their personal credibility so far as the same may legitimately appear upon the trial.
● In this case, contrary to HCC claim that they didn’t receive payment from Ridao, the existence of Avelino’s ledger or payment of record was properly identified by Teofilo, a HCC representative.
● Also, having acknowledged that receipts were not issued and that they relied on the ledger as proof of payment on account of relationship, Handmade Credit cannot now allege non-payment by merely denying that it did not receive or collect the money in the absence of clear and competent evidence.
● It is a settled rule in evidence that the one who alleges payment has the burden of proving it. The burden of proving that the debt had been discharged by payment rests upon the debtor once the debt's existence has been fully established by the evidence on record.
● However, when the debtor introduces some evidence of payment, the burden of going forward with the evidence — as distinct from the burden of proof — shifts to the creditor. Consequently, the creditor has a duty to produce evidence to show non-payment.
● Since Ridao had shown evidence of payment, upon presentation of Avelino's payment record, then the burden to go forward with the evidence and to prove non-payment shifted to Handmade Credit.
● However, aside from the denial, Handmade Credit did not produce any other sufficient evidence to support the allegations. Handmade Credit could not produce any receipt of past payments to counter the contents of the ledger since it also relied on the ledger as its proof that it received the individual payments.
TRANS INDUSTRIAL UTILITIES INC, SPS TIU V MERIDIAN
Date JAN. 18, 2021 | GR No. 227095 | INTING | | ACTIONABLE DOCUMENT
PETITIONER: Trans Industrial Inc
RESPONDENTS: Meridian
DOCTRINE:
By the admission of the genuineness and due execution (of such document) is meant that the party whose signature it bears admits that he signed it or that it was signed by another for him with his authority; that at the time it was signed it was in words and figures exactly as set out in the pleading of the party relying upon it; that the document was delivered; and that any formal requisites required by law, such as a seal, an acknowledgment, or revenue stamp, which it lacks, are waived by him.
FACTS:
1. Trans Industrial’s President Rodolfo applied and was granted a loan by Metrobank
2. As security, Trans Idustrial, via its authorized officers with consent of Mandaue Relaty, assigned its rights over a land
3. The property subject of the deed was insufficient to secure the obligations so Sps Tiu executed a surety continuing agreement to secure the loan of P17M and 626,000USD for the dollar loan.
4. Petitioners defaulted and requested the restructuring of their loan obligations which Metrobank approved so they executed a debt settlement agreement.
5. To secure the re-structured loan obligation, petitioners undertook to secure and pay the loan of P34M but they failed again. Thus Metrobank filed an action for collection of sum of money.
6. In their amended answer with counterclaim, petitioners argued that the Trans Industrial’s Board Resolution authorized only a loan of P10M and the assignment of parcel of land at P27M was more than enough to pay the loan
7. Metrobank filed a demurrer to evidence and argued that the aggregate amount to borrow based on the Board Resolution was P15M but Metrobank allowed Trans Industrial to borrow in dollars thus Rodolfo exceeded his authority as the president.
8. RTC denied the demurrer. During the course of trial, Meridian replaced Metrobank.
PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:
RTC ● Ruled in favor of Meridian
CA ● Affirmed the RTC
● It found petitioners failed to deny under oath the secretary’s certificate confirming the resolution and debt settlement agreement
ISSUE/S:
WoN the admission to the genuineness and due execution of the secretary’s certificate does not make them valid
RATIO:
NO
● petitioners already admitted the genuineness and due execution of the Secretary's Certificate and the Debt Settlement Agreement when they failed to specifically deny under oath their genuineness and due execution. Their argument that the stockholders resolution is null and void because of a lack of quorum has no legal basis because the Secretary's Certificate speaks otherwise. The Secretary's Certificate confirming the stockholders resolution dated July 24, 2000, and the Debt Settlement Agreement dated September 25, 2000 are actionable documents set forth by respondent against petitioners in the amended complaint.
● "When an action or defense is based upon a written instrument or document, the substance of such instrument or document shall be set forth in the pleading, and the original or a copy thereof shall be attached to the pleading as an exhibit which shall be deemed to be part of the pleading, or said copy may with like effect be set forth in the pleading."|||
● Records show that petitioners failed to specifically deny under oath the documents (Secretary's Certificate and Debt Settlement Agreement) attached in the amended complaint. As established in the proceedings below, petitioners' Amended Answer was not verified as noted in the Pre-Trial Order dated January 19, 2004. Failure to verify the pleading is tantamount to failure to specifically deny under oath the documents upon which the amended complaint was based. There is no doubt that petitioners admitted the genuineness and due execution of these documents|||
RIDAO V. HANDMADE CREDIT AND LOANS, INC.
February 3, 2021 | GR No. 236920 | Corona, J. | Specific Denial Actionable Document
PETITIONER: Gemma A. Ridao
RESPONDENTS: Handmade Credit and Loans, Inc.
DOCTRINE:
To qualify as an actionable document pursuant to Section 7, Rule 8 of the Rules, the specific right or obligation which is the basis of the action or defense must emanate therefrom or be evident therein. If the document or instrument so qualifies and is pleaded in accordance with Section 7 — the substance set forth in the pleading, and the original or a copy is attached to the pleading as an exhibit — then the genuineness and due execution are deemed admitted unless the adverse party, under oath, specifically denies them, and sets forth what he claims to be the facts pursuant to Section 8, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court.
FACTS:
1. Petitioner Ridao obtained a $4,000.00 loan, as evidenced by a promissory note, with respondent. Ridao's brother-in-law, Teofilo Manipon, was the duly authorized representative of Handmade Credit.
2. Ridao obtained: (1) an additional loan which increased her loan obligation to $6,167.00, as evidenced by the same Promissory Note; and (2) a P40,000.00 loan, as evidenced by another Promissory Note.
3. For failing to pay on the due dates and despite several oral demands, Handmade Credit sent Ridao a Demand Letter for the payment of the obligation.
PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:
RTC ● Having received no response, Handmade Credit filed a Complaint for collection of sum of money against Ridao with the RTC of Pangasinan.
● Handmade Credit attached several annexes consisting of the promissory notes executed and other documents relating to the loan transactions.
● In her Answer with Special and Affirmative Defenses and Counterclaim, Ridao admitted that she obtained a loan from Teofilo. However, Ridao stated that the loan was extended to her as a relative of the spouses Teofilo and not as a creditor of Handmade Credit. An additional amount of $300.00 was given to her late husband Avelino, Teofilo's brother, who received the amount when Ridao left for abroad.
○ Ridao asserted that she had fully paid for her obligation through Avelino, who tendered payments to Teofilo on her behalf.
■ As proof, Ridao attached Avelino's payment record consisting of a copy of a page of a ledger captioned "Payment for Loan @ Handmade Credit & Loans, Inc."
● The RTC resolved the case in favor of Ridao. The RTC held that the ledger, not specifically denied under oath by Handmade Credit, was deemed admitted.
CA ● On appeal, the CA partly granted the petition in favor of Handmade Credit.
ISSUE/S:
1. WON the respondent’s non-filing of a reply is considered as an implied admission—NO
RULING:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.
RATIO:
● A copy of a page of a ledger is not an actionable document. The ledger merely indicates that money was received as payment, but it is not an evidence of the transaction between the parties. The ledger does not provide for the terms and conditions of the loan transaction from which a right or obligation may be established.
● In Young Builders Corp. v. Benson Industries, Inc., we held that to qualify as an actionable document pursuant to Section 7, Rule 8 of the Rules, the specific right or obligation which is the basis of the action or defense must emanate therefrom or be evident therein. If the document or instrument so qualifies and is pleaded in accordance with Section 7 — the substance set forth in the pleading, and the original or a copy is attached to the pleading as an exhibit — then the genuineness and due execution are deemed admitted unless the adverse party, under oath, specifically denies them, and sets forth what he claims to be the facts pursuant to Section 8, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court.
● Thus, since the copy of the ledger is not an actionable document, Handmade Credit's non-filing of a reply, specifically denying the genuineness and due execution of the ledger, cannot be considered as an implied admission.
● Nevertheless, even if the ledger is not an actionable document, it is admissible as evidence and is sufficient to prove that Ridao made payments for her loan obligation and that such payments were received by Handmade Credit.
GCASENT REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORP.
vs.
PHILBANKING CORPORATION
September 14, 2007 G.R. No. 150731 |VELASCO, JR., J.|Kinds of Pleadings
PETITIONER: CASENT REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORP
RESPONDENTS: PHILBANKING CORPORATION
DOCTRINE:
Where the defense in the Answer is based on an actionable document, a Reply specifically denying it under oath must be made; otherwise, the genuineness and due execution of the document will be deemed admitted.
FACTS:
1. In 1984, Petitioner Casent Realty Development Corporation executed two promissory notes in favor of Rare Realty Corporation (Rare Realty).
2. On August 8, 1986, these promissory notes were assigned to respondent Philbanking Corporation through a Deed of Assignment.
3. Despite demand, Casent Realty failed to pay the promissory notes, thus PhilBanking filed with
4. RTC-Makati a complaint for the collection of money.
5. In its answer petitioner raised as one of its defenses that: On August 27, 1986, the parties executed a Dacion en Pago (Dacion) which ceded and conveyed Casent Realty’s property to Philbanking, with the intention of totally extinguishing petitioner’s outstanding accounts with respondent. Petitioner presented a Confirmation dated April 3, 1989 issued by respondent stating that petitioner had no loans with the bank as of December 31, 1988 and Petitioner complied with the condition in the Dacion. Respondent sent confirmation statements in of 1989, which showed that petitioner had no more outstanding loan.
6. Respondent presented its evidence and formally offered its exhibits. Petitioner then filed a Motion for Judgment on Demurrer to the Evidence, pointing out that the plaintiff’s failure to file a Reply to the Answer which raised the Dacion and Confirmation Statement constituted an admission of the genuineness and execution of said documents; and that since the Dacion obliterated petitioner’s obligation covered by the promissory notes, the bank had no right to collect anymore.
7. Respondent subsequently filed an Opposition which alleged that: (1) the grounds relied upon by petitioner in its demurrer involved its defense and not insufficiency of evidence; (2) the Dacion and Confirmation Statement had yet to be offered in evidence and evaluated; and (3) since respondent failed to file a Reply, then all the new matters alleged in the Answer were deemed controverted.
PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:
RTC ● RTC ruled in favor of petitioner, Motion for Judgment on Demurrer to the Evidence granted
CA CA reversed RTC/s decision and ruled that under the Rules of Civil Procedure, the only issue to
be resolved in a demurrer is whether the plaintiff has shown any right to relief under the facts presented and the law. Thus, it held that the trial court erred when it considered the Answer which alleged the Dacion, and that its genuineness and due execution were not at issue. It added that the court a quo should have resolved whether the two promissory notes were covered by the Dacion, and that since petitioner’s demurrer was granted, it had already lost its right to present its evidence.
ISSUE/S:
1. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN EXCLUDING THE PETITIONER’S AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES IN ITS ANSWER IN RESOLVING A DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE.
RULING:
WHEREFORE, the March 29, 2001 Decision and November 7, 2001 Resolution of the CA are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
RATIO:
YES
● What should be resolved in a motion to dismiss based on a demurrer to evidence is whether the plaintiff is entitled to the relief based on the facts and the law. However, the plaintiff’s evidence should not be the only basis in resolving a demurrer to evidence. The "facts" referred to in Section 8 should include all the means sanctioned by the Rules of Court in ascertaining matters in judicial proceedings. These include judicial admissions, matters of judicial notice, stipulations made during the pre-trial and trial, admissions, and presumptions, the only exclusion being the defendant’s evidence.
● Section 8, Rule 8, RoC. How to contest such documents.––When an action or defense is founded upon a written instrument, copied in or attached to the
corresponding pleading as provided in the preceding section, the genuineness and due execution of the instrument shall be deemed admitted unless the adverse party, under oath, specifically denies them, and sets forth, what he claims to be the facts; but the requirement of an oath does not apply when the adverse party does not appear to be a party to the instrument or when compliance with an order for an inspection of the original instrument is refused.
● Since respondent failed to file a Reply, in effect, respondent admitted the genuineness and due execution of said documents. Under Rule 6, Section 10, RoC:
Section 10. Reply.––A reply is a pleading, the office or function of which is to deny, or allege facts in denial or avoidance of new matters alleged by way of defense in the answer and thereby join or make issue as to such new matters. If a party does not file such reply, all the new matters alleged in the answer are deemed controverted.
● We agree with petitioner. Rule 8, Section 8 specifically applies to actions or defenses founded upon a written instrument and provides the manner of denying it. It is more controlling than Rule 6, Section 10 which merely provides the effect of failure to file a Reply. Thus, where the defense in the Answer is based on an actionable document, a Reply specifically denying it under oath must be made; otherwise, the genuineness and due execution of the document will be deemed admitted. Since respondent failed to deny the genuineness and due execution of the Dacion and Confirmation Statement under oath, then these are deemed admitted and must be considered by the court in resolving the demurrer to evidence. We held in Philippine American General Insurance Co., Inc. v. Sweet Lines, Inc. that "[w]hen the due execution and genuineness of an instrument are deemed admitted because of the adverse party’s failure to make a specific verified denial thereof, the instrument need not be presented formally in evidence for it may be considered an admitted fact.
● As to the issue, whether the Dacion and Confirmation Statement proved the extinguishment of petitioner’s liability. The court ruled that the promissory notes were given as security for the loan granted by respondent to Rare Realty. Through the Deed of Assignment, respondent stepped into the shoes of Rare Realty as petitioner’s creditor. Respondent alleged that petitioner obtained a separate loan of PhP 3,921,750. Thus, when petitioner and respondent executed the Dacion on August 27, 1986, what was then covered was petitioner’s loan from the bank.
● The language of the Dacion is unequivocal––the property serves in full satisfaction of petitioner’s own indebtedness to respondent, referring to the loan of PhP 3,921,750. For this reason, the bank issued a Confirmation Statement saying that petitioner has no unpaid obligations with the bank as of December 31, 1988.
In 1989, however, Rare Realty defaulted in its payment to respondent. Thus, respondent proceeded against the security assigned to it, that is, the promissory notes issued by the petitioner.
Serrano Mahilum v. Spouses Ilano
June 22, 2015| G.R. No. 197923 | Del Castillo, J. | Negative Pregnant
PETITIONER: Ruby Ruth S. Serrano Mahilum
RESPONDENTS: SPOUSES EDILBERTO ILANO AND LOURDES ILANO
DOCTRINE:
a negative pregnant is a form of negative expression which carries with it an affirmation or at least an implication of some kind favorable to the adverse party. It is a denial pregnant with an admission of the substantial facts alleged in the pleading. Where a fact is alleged with qualifying or modifying language and the words of the allegation as so qualified or modified are literally denied, it has been held that the qualifying circumstances alone are denied while the fact itself is admitted.
"A denial in the form of a negative pregnant is an ambiguous pleading, since it cannot be ascertained whether it is the fact or only the qualification that is intended to be denied."
FACTS:
1. Petitioner Ruby Ruth S. Serrano Mahilum is the registered owner of a parcel of land covered by a transfer certificate of title.
2. She entrusted the original owner’s duplicate copy of TCT to Teresa Perez (Perez) – a purported real estate broker – who claimed that she can assist petitioner in obtaining a loan with the TCT as collateral. After several months, petitioner demanded the return of the title, but Perez failed to produce the same; after much prodding, Perez admitted that the title was lost. In June 2004, petitioner executed an Affidavit of Loss and caused the same to be annotated upon the original registry copy of the transfer certificate of title
3. Petitioner was informed however that her TCT was not lost, but that it was presented to the registry by respondents, spouses Edilberto and Lourdes Ilano, who claimed that the property covered by the title was sold to them. The respondents however did not register the alleged sale
4. Petitioner confronted respondents, who showed her a notarized Agreement with right of repurchase and an unnotarized and undated Deed of Absolute Sale on which documents petitioner’s purported signatures were affixed. Petitioner denied having executed said document and claimed that her purported signatures therein were in fact falsified and forged. She demanded the return of her TCT which respondents refused
5. Thereafter the petitioner filed an action for annulment of agreement and deed of absolute sale.
PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:
CA ● On appeal the CA dismissed the petitioner’s case for failure to state a cause of action – for failure of the complaint to allege that respondents were purchasers in bad faith.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not respondents can interpose the defense of being innocent purchasers for value.
RULING:
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The assailed February 2, 2011 Decision and. July 28, 2011 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 113782 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is remanded to the Regional Trial Court of Las Pinas City, Branch 255 in Civil Case No. LP-07-0109 for proper disposition.
RATIO:
NO
1. Since a new title was never issued in respondents’ favor and, instead, title remained in petitioner’s name, the former never came within the coverage and protection of the Torrens system, where the issue of good or bad faith becomes relevant. Since respondents never acquired a new certificate of title in their name, the issue of their good or bad faith which is central in an annulment of title case is of no consequence; petitioner’s case is for annulment of the Agreement and Deed of Absolute Sale, and not one to annul title since the certificate of title is still in her name.
2. The jurisprudential bases for the CA’s pronouncement that there is a failure to state a cause of action if there is no allegation in the complaint that respondents were purchasers in bad faith – Castillo v. Heirs of Vicente Madrigal and Heirs of Julian Tiro v. Philippine Estates Corporation – involved complaints for annulment of new titles issued to the buyers; they cannot apply to petitioner’s case where title remains in her name.
3. Petitioner’s case is to annul the agreement and deed of sale based on the allegation that they are forgeries, and that respondents were parties to the fraud; since no new title was issued in respondents’ favor, there is no new title to annul. Indeed, if the agreement and deed of sale are forgeries, then they are a nullity and convey no title.38 The underlying principle is that no one can give what one does not have. Nemo dat quod non habet
4. In this case, it is the petitioner who must be protected under the Torrens system – as the registered owner of the subject property. «A certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible and incontrovertible title to the property in favor of the person whose name appears therein. The real purpose of the Torrens system of land registration is to quiet title to land and put a stop forever to any question as to the legality of the title.
COLMENAR vs. COLMENAR
June 21, 2021 | GR No. 252467 | Lazaro-Javier | Affirmative Defenses
DOCTRINE:
The 2019 Amendments should not have been applied in this case because the prescribed thirty (30) day period had long expired under Rule 8, Sec. 12(c), thus, is no longer feasible. As a consequence, Colmenar lost his substantial right to be heard on the common affirmative defense of the companies, and his right to seek a reconsideration of the order of dismissal which were both granted him under the 1997 Revised Rules on Civil Procedure.
FACTS:
1. Frank Colmenar, herein petitioner, was the son of Francisco Jesus Colmenar who died leaving real properties in General Trias, Cavite. Since Frank was situated in the States, he only learned that respondents Apollo, Jeannie and Victoria Colmenar, acting as surviving heirs of Francisco, allocated unto themselves the interests of his late father of the aforementioned real properties. The properties were subsequently sold to ProFriends without his knowledge and consent, which effectively deprived him of his successional rights.
2. The Deed of Sale was made void. However, the buyers invoked affirmative defense lack of cause of action and failed to state a cause of action.
3. Initially, the trial court ruled in favor of the petitioner. However, during the pendency of the appeal, the 2019 amendment to the Rules of Court took effect. Judge GFill then stated that she applied Section 12, Rule 8 of the 2019 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure where she stated:
a. “They are being resolved in consonance with Rule 8 Section 12, particularly par. (a) and (c) of the 2020 Amendments to the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which took effect on May 1, 2020. As per this new provision, the Court shall motu proprio resolve the affirmative defense if claim [sic] allegedly states no cause of action, among others. The Court marries the case status with the new provision.”
4. Frank now seeks affirmative relief from the Court against the assailed Order dated May 22, 2020. He faults Judge Gill for applying the 2019 Rules on Civil Procedure to the case, and based thereon, motu proprio acted on the affirmative defenses of respondent companies despite the clear injustice it caused to him.
5. It was claimed that Judge Gill motu proprio acted on and granted the affirmative defenses of respondent companies despite previously denying them through her Omnibus Order dated February 12, 2020. This hasty turn-about caused him great prejudice as he was peremptorily deprived of the opportunity to assert his claim against respondent companies. More so considering the trial court's earlier pronouncement that the issues presented could be better threshed out through a full dressed trial. Worse, he could not even seek a reconsideration from the assailed disposition because Section 12, Rule 15 of the 2019 Amendments prohibits the filing of a motion for reconsideration of court actions on affirmative defenses.
ISSUE: WON the trial court erred when it applied the 2019 Amendments to resolve the affirmative defenses pleaded by the companies, albeit the case was already pending when the 2019 Amendments took effect? – YES
RATIO:
Yes. Judge Gill applied Rule 8, Sec. 12(c) of the 2019 Amendments when she resolved motu proprio the affirmative defense of companies, that is, the complaint failed to state a cause of action.
● In the Omnibus Order dated February 12, 2020, Judge Gill did not resolve the affirmative defense of lack of cause of action raised by ProFriends. She only resolved the common affirmative defense of PEC, Amaia, and Crisanta Realty that the complaint failed to state a cause of action. And yet, in the assailed Order dated May 22, 2020, the case against ProFriends was also dismissed on the ground that the complaint failed to state a cause of action, the common affirmative defense raised only by PEC, Amaia, and Crisanta Realty.
● It has been repeatedly held, however, that failure to state a cause of action and lack of cause of action are distinct and separate grounds to dismiss a particular action. Zuniga-Santos v. Santos-Gran explained that failure to state a cause of action refers to the insufficiency of the allegations in the pleading, while lack of cause of action refers to the insufficiency of the factual basis for the action. Dismissal for failure to state a cause of action may be raised at the earliest stages of the proceedings through a motion to dismiss under Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules of Court or raised as an affirmative defense in an answer, while dismissal for lack of cause of action may be raised any time after the questions of fact have been resolved on the basis of stipulations, admissions or evidence presented by the plaintiff.
● A cause of action is defined as an act or omission by which a party violates a right of another. A complaint states a cause of action if it sufficiently avers the existence of the three (3) essential elements of a cause of action, namely:
○ (a) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; (b) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and (c) an act or omission on the part of the named defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages. If the allegations of the complaint do not state the concurrence of these elements, the complaint becomes vulnerable to a motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of action.
● Here, Frank essentially avers that:
○ (a) he is the legitimate son and lawful heir of Francisco Jesus Colmenar; (b) his father left real properties in the Philippines, the rights and interests of which would legally pass on to his heirs upon his death; (c) the individual respondents are not the lawful heirs of Francisco Jesus Colmenar, thus, have no claim to the properties left by the latter; (d) the individual respondents, nonetheless, despite being devoid of any right in or authority over the estate of his father, were able to effect a void extrajudicial settlement of his father's estate, and thereafter, a void sale of his father's properties in favor of respondent companies, which, as a consequence, also did not acquire a valid title hereto.
● As such, petitioner claims that, as legitimate child and lawful heir of Francisco Jesus Colmenar, he has the right to the relief prayed for. i.e., to declare as void the extrajudicial settlement of estate effected by the individual respondents who, not being lawful heirs of his father, had no legal right to settle the estate; and to declare as void the subsequent deeds of sale executed by these individual respondents in favor of respondent companies which consequently also did not derive any valid title from the individual respondents. Clearly, there is a cause of action provided by Frank.
● The records show that when Judge Gill motu proprio resolved the affirmative defenses, the prescribed thirty (30) day period had long expired. Judge Gill should have, therefore, desisted from applying the 2019 Amendments to the case below, specifically Rule 8, Sec. 12(c) thereof, because when she did, the same was no longer feasible.
● It was inaccurate for Judge Gill to say that she was motu proprio acting on the affirmative defenses. In truth, she had already resolved this common affirmative defense of failure to state a cause of action, together with the other affirmative defenses in her Omnibus Order. Instead of applying the 2019 Amendments, Judge Gill could have simply resolved the pending motions for reconsiderations of the companies.
● As a consequence, Colmenar lost his substantial right to be heard on the common affirmative defense of the companies, and his right to seek a reconsideration of the order of dismissal which were both granted him under the 1997 Revised Rules on Civil Procedure.
MBTC vs. CPR PROMOTIONS AND MARKETING, INC.. et al
June 22, 2015 | GR No. 200567 | J. Valesco | Compulsory and Permissive Counterclaim
PETITIONER: METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST COMPANY
RESPONDENTS: CPR PROMOTIONS AND MARKETING, INC. and SPOUSES CORNELIO P. REYNOSO, JR. and LEONIZA F. REYNOSO
DOCTRINE:
In determining whether a counterclaim is compulsory or permissive:
(a) Are the issue of fact or law raised by the claim and counterclaim largely the same?
(b) Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit on defendant’s claims, absent the compulsory claim rule?
(c)Will substantially the same evidence support or refute plaintiffs claim as well as the defendant’s counterclaim?
(d) Is there any logical relation between the claim and the counterclaim, such that the conduct of separate trials of the respective claims of the parties would entail a substantial duplication of effort and time by the parties and the court?
FACTS:
1. From February to October 1997, respondent CPR Promotions obtained loans from petitioner MBTC. These loans were covered by 15 promissory notes all signed by respondents spouses Reynoso as Treasurer and President of CPR Promotions, respectively.
2. To secure the loans, the spouses Reynoso executed two deeds of real estate mortgage on separate dates.
3. The first mortgage, securing the amount of P6.5M was executed over real estate covered by TCT No. 624835; the other was executed over properties covered by TCT Nos. 565381, 263421, and 274682 to secure the amount of P2.5M.
4. Thereafter, the spouses Reynoso executed a continuing surety agreement binding themselves solidarily with CPR Promotions to pay any and all loans CPR Promotions may have obtained from petitioner MBTC, including those covered by the said PNs, but not to exceed P13M.
5. Upon maturity of the loans, respondents defaulted, prompting MBTC to file a petition for extra-judicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgages, pursuant to Act No. 3135, as amended.
6. MBTC participated at a public auctions sale and submitted the highest bids. As a result, petitioner was issued the corresponding Certificates of Sale.
7. Notwithstanding the foreclosure of the mortgaged properties for the total amount of PhP13,614,000, petitioner MBTC alleged that there remained a deficiency balance plus interest and charges as stipulated and agreed upon in the PNs and deeds of real estate mortgages.
8. Despite petitioner's repeated demands, however, respondents failed to settle the alleged deficiency. Thus, petitioner filed an action for collection of sum of money against respondents.
RTC Ruling:
9. On October 11, 2007, the RTC-Makati ruled in favor of petitioner that there, indeed, was a balance plus interest and charges and that respondents are liable for the said amount, as part of their contractual obligation.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals:
10. The appellate court, through the assailed Decision, reversed the court a quo and ruled in favor of respondents, ordering plaintiff-appellee Metrobank to refund or return to the defendants-appellants Reynoso the amount of PhP722,602.22 representing the remainder of the proceeds of the foreclosure sale, with legal interest.
11. The appellate court found that petitioner failed to prove that there was a deficiency, since the records failed to corroborate the claimed amount.
12. On October 24, 2011, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which the appellate court denied.
13. Petitioner claims that respondent spouses should be made to answer for certain specific expenses connected with the foreclosure.
14. In their comment, respondents maintained the propriety of the CA’s grant of a refund, arguing that in their Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim, they laid down in detail the excess of the prices of the foreclosed properties over their obligation.
PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:
RTC ● Ruled in favor of MBTC
CA ● Reversed the decision of the RTC
ISSUE/S: WON the court shall allow the counterclaim - NO
RULING: For having failed to adequately substantiate its claims, We cannot sustain the finding of the trial court that respondents are liable for the claimed deficiency, inclusive of foreclosure expenses. Neither can We sustain the CA's finding that respondents are entitled to the recovery of the alleged excess payment.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED. Accordingly, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated September 28, 2011 in CA-G.R. CV No. 91424 and its February 13, 2012 Resolution are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The award of refund in favor of respondents in the amount of P722,602.22 with legal interest of six percent (6%) per annum is hereby DELETED.
RATIO:
1. While We fully agree with the CA that MBTC was not able to prove the amount claimed, We however, find that neither were respondents able to timely setup their claim for refund. Respondents belatedly raised their compulsory counterclaim
2. Accordingly, a counterclaim is compulsory if:
● (a) it arises out of or is necessarily connected with the transaction or occurrence which is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim;
● (b) it does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction; and
● (c) the court has jurisdiction to entertain the claim both as to its amount and nature, except that in an original action before the RTC, the counterclaim may be considered compulsory regardless of the amount.
3. In determining whether a counterclaim is compulsory or permissive, We have, in several cases, utilized the following tests:
● (1) Are the issues of fact or law raised by the claim and the counterclaim largely the same?
● (2) Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit on defendant's claims, absent the compulsory counterclaim rule?
● (3) Will substantially the same evidence support or refute plaintiff's claim as well as the defendant's counterclaim?
● (4) Is there any logical relation between the claim and the counterclaim, such that the conduct of separate trials of the respective claims of the parties would entail a substantial duplication of effort and time by the parties and the court? (compelling test of compulsoriness).
4. Based on the above tests, it is evident that a claim for recovery of the excess in the bid price vis-a-vis the amount due should be interposed as a compulsory counterclaim in an action for recovery of a deficiency filed by the mortgagee against the debtor-mortgagor.
● First, in both cases, substantially the same evidence is needed in order to prove their respective claim.
● Second, adjudication in favor of one will necessarily bar the other since these two actions are absolutely incompatible with each other; a debt cannot be fully paid and partially unpaid at the same time.
● Third, these two opposing claims arose from the same set of transactions.
● And finally, if these two claims were to be the subject of separate trials, it would definitely entail a substantial and needless duplication of effort and time by the parties and the court, for said actions would involve the same parties, the same transaction, and the same evidence.
5. It is elementary that a defending party's compulsory counterclaim should be interposed at the time he files his Answer, and that failure to do so shall effectively bar such claim.
6. As it appears from the records, what respondents initially claimed herein were moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorney's fees. Then, realizing, based on its computation, that it should have sought the recovery of the excess bid price, respondents set up another counterclaim, this time in their Appellant's Brief filed before the CA.
7. Unfortunately, respondents' belated assertion proved fatal to their cause as it did not cure their failure to timely raise such claim in their Answer. Consequently, respondents' claim for the excess, if any, is already barred.
TIONGSON V. NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY
G.R. No. 166964, October 11, 2005 | J YNARES-SANTIAGO | Compulsory and Permissive Counterclaim
PETITIONER:TIONGSON
RESPONDENTS:NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY
DOCTRINE: A counterclaim presupposes the existence of a claim against the party filing the counterclaim. Hence, where there is no claim against the counterclaimant, the counterclaim is improper and it must be dismissed. More so where the complaint is dismissed at the instance of the counterclaimant. In other words, if the dismissal of the main action results in the dismissal of the counterclaim already filed, it stands to reason that the filing of a motion to dismiss the complaint is an implied waiver of the compulsory counterclaim because the grant of the motion ultimately results in the dismissal of the counterclaim.
FACTS:
1. On April 3, 1987, respondent National Housing Authority (NHA) filed a complaint for eminent domain with the RTC of Manila against petitioners who are owners of several lots located in Tondo, Manila. Instead of an answer, petitioners filed motions to dismiss with prayer for actual, moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees.
2. On March 11, 1988, NHA depicted the amount of P21 Million with the PNB as provisional just compensation for the subject lots. The RTC then dismissed the complaint and the counterclaims of the defendants were also dismissed. The CA affirmed the decision of the lower court.
3. NHA then filed a motion for leave of court to withdraw deposit but failed to specify a hearing date, then filed a second motion for leave to withdraw deposit which set the hearing on November 10, 2000.
4. On appeal, the CA held that the dismissal of petitioners’ counterclaim barred them from presenting evidence to prove damages. It ruled that the trial court’s assessment that they suffered damages is conjectural and inconsistent with the dismissal of the counterclaim
PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:
RTC dismissed the complaint and the counterclaims of the defendants were also dismissed
CA affirmed the decision of the lower court.
ISSUE/S: Whether the counterclaim should be dismissed-YES.
RULING:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
RATIO:
● A counterclaim presupposes the existence of a claim against the party filing the counterclaim. Hence, where there is no claim against the counterclaimant, the counterclaim is improper and it must be dismissed. More so where the complaint is dismissed at the instance of the counterclaimant. In other words, if the dismissal of the main action results in the dismissal of the counterclaim already filed, it stands to reason that the filing of a motion to dismiss the complaint is an implied waiver of the compulsory counterclaim because the grant of the motion ultimately results in the dismissal of the counterclaim.
● The aforementioned doctrine is in consonance with the primary objective of a counterclaim which is to avoid and prevent circuity of action by allowing the entire controversy between the parties to be litigated and finally determined in one action, wherever this can be done with justice to all parties concerned.
● The court dismissed petitioners’ counterclaim without reservation as to their claim for damages. Petitioners did not adduce evidence as to the extent of damage caused by NHA. NHA appealed the dismissal of the complaint while petitioners opted not to appeal the dismissal of their counterclaim. The dismissal of the complaint for expropriation became final and executory on July 26, 1993. Plainly, the same is already beyond review.
● In the case at bar, the trial court dismissed NHA’s complaint for expropriation upon determination that its acquisition is not for public purpose. Along with the dismissal of the complaint, the trial court also dismissed the counterclaim for actual, moral, and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees.
SPOUSES CARPIO v. RURAL BANK OF STO. TOMAS
May 4, 2006 | GR No. 153171 | SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J | Compulsory and Permissive Counterclaim
PETITIONER: SPOUSES RODOLFO CARPIO and REMEDIOS ORENDAIN
RESPONDENTS: RURAL BANK OF STO. TOMAS (BATANGAS), INC.
DOCTRINE:
The Rule distinctly provides that the required certification against forum shopping is intended to cover an "initiatory pleading," meaning an "incipient application of a party asserting a claim for relief." Certainly, respondent bank's Answer with Counterclaim is a responsive pleading, filed merely to counter petitioners' complaint that initiates the civil action.
FACTS:
1. Spouses Rodolfo Carpio and Remedios Orendain, petitioners, filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 83, Tanauan, Batangas, a Complaint (for annulment of foreclosure sale and damages) against the Rural Bank of Sto. Tomas, Batangas, Inc., respondent, and Jaime Ozaeta, clerk of court and ex-officio sheriff of the same court.
2. In their Complaint, petitioners alleged that they are the absolute owners of a parcel of land with an area of 19,405 square meters, more or less, located at Barangay San Vicente, Sto. Tomas, Batangas. They obtained a loan from respondent bank and to secure the loan, they executed a real estate mortgage over the same property in favor of respondent bank.
3. Thereafter, without prior demand or notice to petitioners, respondent bank filed a Petition for Extra-Judicial Foreclosure of Mortgage. Sheriff Jaime Ozaeta conducted a public auction sale of the mortgaged property. Respondent bank was the only bidder. Petitioners further alleged that the sale was conducted without proper publication as the sheriff's notice of sale was published in a newspaper which is not of general circulation.
4. Respondent bank filed its Answer with Counterclaim, denying specifically the material allegations of the complaint. By way of counterclaim, respondent bank alleged that it suffered: (a) actual damages of P100,000.00; (b) compensatory damages of P100,000.00; (c) moral damages of P500,000.00; and (d) litigation expenses of not less than P50,000.00.
5. Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss the counterclaim on the ground that respondent bank's counterclaim was not accompanied by a certification against forum shopping.
6. Respondent bank filed an opposition to the motion, contending that its counterclaim, which is compulsory in nature, is not a complaint or initiatory pleading that requires a certification against forum shopping.
PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:
RTC ● RTC issued an Order denying the motion to dismiss the counterclaim for lack of merit.
○ Under Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, the same requires the plaintiff or principal party to certify under oath the complaint or other initiatory pleading purposely to prevent forum shopping. In the case at bar, defendant Rural Bank's counterclaim could not be considered a complaint or initiatory pleading because the filing of the same is but a result of plaintiffs' complaint and, being a compulsory counterclaim, is outside the coverage of Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court.
CA ● The CA affirmed the RTC Ruling.
ISSUE/S:
1. WON the counterclaim, which is compulsory in nature, is not a complaint or initiatory pleading that requires a certification against forum shopping - YES
RULING:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 58995 are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
RATIO:
1. YES
● The Court stressed that the Rule distinctly provides that the required certification against forum shopping is intended to cover an "initiatory pleading," meaning an "incipient application of a party asserting a claim for relief."
o Certainly, respondent bank's Answer with Counterclaim is a responsive pleading, filed merely to counter petitioners' complaint that initiates the civil action. In other words, the rule requiring such certification does not contemplate a defendant's/respondent's claim for relief that is derived only from, or is necessarily connected with, the main action or complaint.
■ In fact, upon failure by the plaintiff to comply with such requirement, Section 5, quoted above, directs the "dismissal of the case without prejudice," not the dismissal of respondent's counterclaim.
Sy-Vargas v. Estate of Ogsos
January 25, 2016 | GR No. 221062 | BRION, J. | Compulsory and Permissive Counterclaim
PETITIONER: ELIZABETH SY-VARGAS
RESPONDENTS: THE ESTATE OF ROLANDO OGSOS, SR. and ROLANDO OGSOS, JR.
DOCTRINE:
In view of the finding that the counterclaim is permissive, and not compulsory as held by the courts a quo, respondents are required to pay docket fees. However, it must be clarified that respondents' failure to pay the required docket fees, per se, should not necessarily lead to the dismissal of their counterclaim. It has long been settled that while the court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fees, its non-payment at the time of filing of the initiatory pleading does not automatically cause its dismissal provided that:
(a) the fees are paid within a reasonable period; and
(b) there was no intention on the part of the claimant to defraud the government.
FACTS:
● Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari are decisions of the Court of Appeals which affirmed with modification the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Dumaguete City, Branch 36 (RTC) ordering petitioner Elizabeth Sy-Vargas (petitioner) and her sister, Kathryn T. Sy (Kathryn), to pay respondents the Estate of Rolando Ogsos, Sr. (Ogsos, Sr.) and Rolando Ogsos, Jr., (Ogsos, Jr.; collectively, respondents) the amount of P10,391,981.76, representing the value of the sugar and molasses that could have been produced from 1999 to 2004, if only respondents were not deprived by petitioner and Kathryn of possession and enjoyment of the leased agricultural farm.
● Petitioner and Kathryn, who are among the heirs of Fermina, claimed that the lease rentals from crop year 1994-1995 to crop year 1998-1999 were not paid. They filed a Complaint for Specific Performance and Damages against respondents, before the RTC to recover the unpaid lease rentals. Pertinently, they did not include in their claim the lease rental for crop year 1999-2000 because respondents had already abandoned the leased premises since the said crop year.
● Respondents also averred that since crop years 1994 to 1997-1998, the average production of sugarcane is 1,308.68 lkg. of sugar and 30.409 tons of molasses per year, as computed on the basis of the Planter's Production Reports. Thus, when petitioner and Kathryn took possession of the leased premises, respondents lost their profits equivalent to the aforesaid production starting from crop year 1999-2000 until the termination of the lease contract on crop year 2003-2004. Accordingly, respondents filed a counterclaim for these lost profits plus damages.
● Respondents moved for the dismissal of the complaint in view of the absence of the required Certificate of Non-Forum Shopping. In a Resolution, the RTC dismissed the case without prejudice.
● Respondents filed an Ex-Parte Motion to Set Case for Pre-Trial, which was granted by the RTC, setting the pre-trial. Petitioner and their counsel failed to appear at the pre-trial and to file their pre-trial brief. Thus, respondents filed a manifestation with motion to present evidence ex-parte praying that petitioner and Kathryn be declared in default, and that respondents be allowed to present evidence on their counterclaim ex-parte, which the RTC granted.
PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:
RTC RTC ruled in favor of the respondents. It held that petitioner and Kathryn reneged on their obligation to maintain respondents' peaceful and adequate enjoyment of the leased premises when the former forcibly and unlawfully deprived the latter of possession thereof in December 1998, despite payment of the lease rentals. Due to this, petitioner and Kathryn were held liable for breach of the lease contract.
CA Petitioner and Kathyrn appealed to the CA.
The CA ruled that the RTC was correct in ruling that respondents' counterclaim is not permissive but compulsory; hence, payment of docket fees was not necessary. Further, the CA ruled that even though the counterclaim was compulsory, the same would not be automatically dismissed upon the dismissal of the action if the dismissal was caused by the fault of the plaintiff, as in this case.
ISSUE/S:
● WON the case should be dismissed due to failure to pay docket fees as required for permissive counterclaims.
RULING:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated February 28, 2014 and the Resolution dated October 1, 2015 of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CV No. 03710 are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION deducting from the counterclaim award of P10,391,987.76 in favor of the Estate of Rolando Ogsos, Sr. and Rolando Ogsos, Jr. (respondents) the amount of P900,000.00, which represents the unpaid lease rentals for the crop years 1999 to 2004 as above-discussed. Moreover, a judgment lien shall be imposed on the monetary award given to respondents corresponding to the unpaid docket fees on the permissive counterclaim.
Accordingly, the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Dumaguete City, Branch 36, or his duly authorized deputy, is hereby ordered to enforce the judgment lien and to assess and collect the appropriate docket fees from respondents.
RATIO:
● No.
The SC ruled that the counter-claim was permissive. However, respondents cannot be faulted for non-payment of docket fees in connection with their counterclaim, primarily because the RTC had already found such counterclaim to be compulsory in nature. Such finding was then affirmed on appeal by the CA in its assailed Decision. As such, the lower courts did not require respondents to pay docket fees and even proceeded to rule on their entitlement thereto. Verily, respondents' reliance on the findings of the courts a quo, albeit erroneous, exhibits their good faith in not paying the docket fees, much more their intention not to defraud the government. Thus, the counterclaim should not be dismissed for nonpayment of docket fees. Instead, the docket fees required shall constitute a judgment lien on the monetary awards in respondents' favor.
CASENT REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORP. v. PHILBANKING CORP.
September 14, 2007 | [G.R. No. 150731 | Velasco, J. | Rule 6
PETITIONER: Casent Realty Development Corp.
RESPONDENTS: Philbanking Corporation
DOCTRINE:
Where the defense in the answer is based on an actionable document, a reply specifically
denying it under oath must be made; otherwise, the genuineness and due
execution of the document will be deemed admitted.
FACTS:
1. Casent Realty Development Corporation executed two promissory notes in favor of Rare Realty Corporation. It was agreed in PN No. 84-04 that the loan it covered would earn an interest of 36% per annum and a penalty of 12% in case of non-payment by June 27, 1985, while the loan covered by PN No. 84-05 would earn an interest of 18% per annum and 12% penalty if not paid by June 25, 1985.
2. Respondent alleged that despite demands, petitioner failed to pay the promissory notes upon maturity such that its obligation already amounted to PhP5,673,303.90 as of July 15, 1993.
3. Respondent filed on July 20, 1993 a complaint before the Makati City RTC for the collection of said amount.
4. In its Answer, petitioner raised the following as special/affirmative defenses:
a. The complaint stated no cause of action or if there was any, the same was barred by estoppel, statute of frauds, statute of limitations, laches, prescription, payment, and/or release;
b. On August 27, 1986, the parties executed a Dacion en Pago 7 (Dacion) which ceded and conveyed petitioner's property in Iloilo City to respondent, with the intention of totally extinguishing petitioner's outstanding accounts with respondent.
5. The parties failed to reach an amicable settlement during the pre-trial conference.
6. Thereafter, Philbanking presented its evidence and formally offered its exhibits. Casent Realty then filed a Motion for Judgment on Demurrer to the evidence, pointing out that the plaintiff's failure to file a Reply to the Answer which raised the Dacion and Confirmation Statement constituted an admission of the genuineness and execution of said documents; and that since the Dacion obliterated petitioner's obligation covered by the promissory notes, the bank had no right to collect anymore.
7. The trial court ruled in favor of petitioner and dismissed the complaint.
8. On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC.
PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:
RTC ● Respondent filed a complaint before the Makati City RTC for the collection of a sum of money.
● The RTC ruled in favor of petitioner and dismissed the complaint on the ground that the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff had been extinguished by a Dacion en Pago duly executed by said parties.
CA ● The CA reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC.
● It ruled that the only issue to be resolved in a demurrer is whether the plaintiff has shown any right to relief under the facts presented and the law.
● Thus, it held that the trial court erred when it considered the Answer which alleged the Dacion, and that its genuineness and due execution were not at issue.
● It added that the court a quo should have resolved whether the two promissory notes were covered by the Dacion, and that since petitioner's demurrer was granted, it had already lost its right to present its evidence.
ISSUE/S:
1. WON respondent's failure to file a reply and deny the Dacion and Confirmation Statement under oath constitute a judicial admission of the genuineness and due execution of these documents. – YES.
RULING:
WHEREFORE, the March 29, 2001 Decision and November 7, 2001 Resolution of the CA are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
RATIO:
1. YES.
● Rule 8, Section 8 specifically applies to actions or defenses founded upon a written instrument and provides the manner of denying it. It is more controlling than Rule 6, Section 10 which merely provides the effect of failure to file a Reply. Thus, where the defense in the Answer is based on an actionable document, a Reply specifically denying it under oath must be made; otherwise, the genuineness and due execution of the document will be deemed admitted.
o Since respondent failed to deny the genuineness and due execution of the Dacion and Confirmation Statement under oath, then these are deemed admitted and must be considered by the court in resolving the demurrer to evidence.
o The SC held in Philippine American General Insurance Co., Inc. v. Sweet Lines, Inc. that when the due execution and genuineness of an instrument are deemed admitted because of the adverse party's failure to make a specific verified denial thereof, the instrument need not be presented formally in evidence for it may be considered an admitted fact.
● However, admission of the genuineness and due execution of the Dacion and Confirmation Statement does not prevent the introduction of evidence showing that the Dacion excludes the promissory notes. Petitioner, by way of defense, should have presented evidence to show that the Dacion includes the promissory notes.
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas v. BF Homes, Inc.,
June 10 2019 | GR No. 228239 | Parts and Contents of a Pleading
PETITIONER: BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS
RESPONDENTS:BF HOMES INCORPORATED
DOCTRINE: Section 5, Rule 45 of the ROC provides that the failure of the petitioner to submit the required documents that should accompany the petition, including the certification against forum shopping, shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal of the case. The same rule applies to certifications against forum shopping signed by a person on behalf of a corporation which are unaccompanied by proof that said signatory is authorized to file a petition on behalf of the corporation.
FACTS:
In 2002, Tierra Grande Farms (Tierra Grande) obtained several loans from Banco Filipino. To secure the loan, Tierra Grande executed a Deed of Mortgage over BF Homes’ properties by virtue of an SPA, issued by BF Homes in favour of Tierra Grande. On April 02, 2009, Banco Filipino applied for a Special Liquidity Facility Loan from BSP. As a security for this loan, the former delivered to BSP the alleged Deed of Assignment of its credits over a PN and their corresponding mortgages on real properties, including the properties in the name of BF Homes mortgaged by Tierra Grande to Banco Filipino. On June 31, 2013, BF Homes found out that BSP applied for extrajudicial foreclosure and sale of real estate mortgage (REM) of its real properties mortgaged by Tierra Grande to Banco Filipino.
Accordingly, BF Homes prayed that the RTC make a declaration of its rights and duties under the Deed of Assignment of Mortgage between Banco Filipino and BSP and whether the property in the name of BF Homes mortgaged by Tierra Grande to Banco Filipino can be mortgaged by the latter to BSP.
PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:
RTC The RTC ordered the dismissal of the case for lack of authority to file the petition. It ruled that in the absence of a valid authorisation to sign the verification and certification against forum shopping, the petition has no legal effect.
CA The CA reversed and set aside the Orders of the RTC. It held that BF Homes substantially complied with the requirements of verification and certification against forum shopping when it attached in its amended petition the revised secretary’s certificate which now refers to BF Homes instead of BF Town Corporation.
ISSUE/S:
Whether the CA erred in ruling that there was substantial compliance by BF Homes as regards the requirements of verification and certification against forum shopping.
RULING:
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is GRANTED. The Decision datedMay 12, 2016 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 102601 isREVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Petition in SCA No. 13-0016 pending in theRegional Trial Court, Branch 201, Las Piñas City, is ordered DISMISSED.
RATIO:
The Supreme Court found the petition meritorious.
As a general rule, a pleading need not be verified unless there is a law or rule specifically requiring the same. Since the petition before the RTC prays that a writ of prohibition be issued commanding the Clerk of Court and Ex-Officio Sheriff of the RTC to desist from conducting further proceedings in the foreclosure case, the petition is required to be verified. The requirement regarding verification of a pleading is formal, not jurisdictional. Such requirement is simply a condition affecting the form of pleading, the non-compliance of which does not necessarily render the pleading fatally defective. Verification is simply intended to secure an assurance that the allegation in the pleading are true and correct and are not the product of imagination or mere speculation. The court may order the correction of the pleading if the verification is lacking.
On the other hand, the lack of certification against forum shopping is generally not curably by the submission thereof after the filing of the petition. Section 5, Rule 45 of the ROC provides that the failure of the petitioner to submit the required documents that should accompany the petition, including the certification against forum shopping, shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal of the case. The same rule applies to certifications against forum shopping signed by a person on behalf of a corporation which are unaccompanied by proof that said signatory is authorized to file a petition on behalf of the corporation. Hence, even if the Court excuses the non-compliance as regards the requirement of verification, the issue of whether the certification against forum shopping is defective remains.
Accordingly, since BF Homes is a corporation, the certification against forum-shopping attached to its petition filed with the RTC must be executed by an officer or member of the board of directors or by one who is duly authorized to do so. Otherwise, such a petition will have to be dismissed.
The original secretary’s certificate attached to the petition evidencing the authority of the officer to file the petition, refers to the case of BF Town Corporation vs BSP and NOT BF Homes Incorporated vs BSP. The former is an entirely different corporation from the latter. Thus, the court agrees with the RTC that the absence of a valid authorization to sign the verification and certification against forum shopping would make the petition of no legal effect.
Jorgenetics Swine Improvement Corp. v. Thick & Agri- Products, Inc.
5 May 2021 | GR No. 201044 & 22691 | Hernando, J. | Verification
PETITIONER: JORGENETICS SWINE IMPROVEMENT CORPORATION
RESPONDENTS: THICK & THIN AGRI-PRODUCTS, INC.
DOCTRINE:
The purpose of a verification in the petition is to secure an assurance that the allegations of a pleading are true and correct, are not speculative or merely imagined, and have been made in good faith. To achieve this purpose, the verification of a pleading is made through an affidavit or sworn statement, confirming that the affiant has read the pleading whose allegations are true and correct of the affiant's personal knowledge or based on authentic records.
The chairperson and president of a corporation may sign the verification and certification without need of board resolution. Moreover, lack of authority of a corporate officer to undertake an action on behalf of the corporation may be cured by ratification through the subsequent issuance of a board resolution.
FACTS:
1. On November 10, 2008, TTAI filed a complaint for replevin with damages against Jorgenetics Swine Improvement Corporation (Jorgenetics), seeking possession of 4,765 heads of hogs that were the subject of a chattel mortgage between the parties. In its complaint, TTAI alleged that the parties entered into an agreement where TTAI would supply, on credit, feeds and other supplies necessary for Jorgenetics' hog raising business. As security for payment of their obligation amounting to Php20,000,000.00, Jorgenetics executed a chattel mortgage 6 over its hog livestock inventories in favor of TTAI. While TTAI delivered feeds and supplies pursuant to the agreement, Jorgenetics failed to pay for the same despite demand.
2. Jorgenetics moved to dismiss the complaint for replevin on the ground of invalid service of summons, since service was made on its farm in Rizal instead of its place of business in Quezon City, and in view of the lack of justification from the sheriff for availing of substituted service to the person of Almirol. In its motion to dismiss, Jorgenetics likewise prayed for the quashal of the writ of replevin and for the replevin bond to be made wholly answerable for the damages it allegedly suffered.
3. The case was re-raffled to Branch 93 and subsequently to Branch 75. Thereafter, the trial court issued the February 4, 2010 Order, directing the dismissal of the complaint for replevin for failure to acquire jurisdiction over the person of Jorgenetics by reason of the invalid service of summons.
4. Jorgenetics moved for reconsideration, which was denied in a January 8, 2016 Resolution. Hence, it filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari docketed as G.R. No. 222691, seeking the reversal of the CA's October 29, 2014 Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 130075 and for the affirmation in toto of the trial court's: (a) October 18, 2012 Order, which mandated the enforcement of the February 4, 2010 Order of dismissal of the trial court and the return of the properties subject of replevin to Jorgenetics; and (b) March 15, 2013 Order, which mandated the reinstatement of the case pursuant to the March 29, 2011 Decision in CA G.R. SP No. 114682 but which likewise ordered the return of the properties subject of replevin to Jorgenetics.
5. Notably, TTAI filed a Manifestation and Motion on December 13, 2017, where it manifested that the trial court has rendered a May 2, 2017 decision on the merits in the main case, declaring TTAI as the rightful possessor of the hogs and ordering Jorgenetics to pay TTAI the deficiency judgment in the amount of P14,999,980.00 along with interest, attorney's fees, and costs of the suit. TTAI manifested that in view of the lapse of the period to move for the reconsideration or appeal the above indicated Decision without any action on the part of the parties, the said Decision had become final and executory which renders the Petitions moot and academic. Accordingly, TTAI moved for the dismissal of the instant petitions before this Court.
6. TTAI contends that Mr. Romeo J. Jorge, the chairperson and president of petitioner, had no authority to file the Petition in G.R. No. 201044 on behalf of Jorgenetics at the time of the filing thereof, and that the belated submission of the Board Resolution indicating Mr. Jorge's authority and ratifying the filing of the Petition will not cure the defect.
7. TTAI alleges that the Petition in G.R. No. 222691 should be dismissed outright, since the verification and certification of non-forum shopping was signed by Mr. Jorge and notarized a day prior to the date of the Petition.
PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:
RTC ● ruled in favor of JORGENETICS; directing the dismissal of the complaint for replevin for failure to acquire jurisdiction over the person of Jorgenetics by reason of the invalid service of summons.
CA ● reversed RTC ruling; nullified the order of dismissal and reinstating TTAI's complaint for replevin.
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether Jorgenetic’s belated submission of the board resolution will cure the defect. (YES)
2. Whether variance in the date of the verification with the date of the Petition is fatal to the petitioner's case. (NO)
RULING:
1. YES. In Cagayan Valley Drug Corp. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, this Court ruled that certain officials or employees of a corporation can sign the verification and certification on its behalf without need of a board resolution, such as but not limited to the chairperson of the board of directors, the president of a corporation, the general manager or acting general manager, personnel officer, and an employment specialist in a labor case. Moreover, the "lack of authority of a corporate officer to undertake an action on behalf of the corporation may be cured by ratification through the subsequent issuance of a board resolution, recognizing the validity of the action or the authority of the concerned officer."
Given the foregoing, Mr. Jorge, as the chairperson and president of the petitioner, is sufficiently authorized to sign the verification and certification on behalf of Jorgenetics. Any doubt on his authority to sign the verification and certification is likewise obviated by the secretary's certificate it submitted upon the orders of this Court, which ratified Mr. Jorge's authority to represent petitioner and file the Petition in G.R. No. 201044.
2. NO. A variance in the date of the verification with the date of the Petition is not fatal to the petitioner's case.
In connection thereto, a variance in the date of the verification with the date of the petition is not necessarily fatal to Jorgenetics' case since the variance does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that no verification was made, or that the verification was false. It does not necessarily contradict the categorical declaration made by Jorgenetics in its affidavit that its representatives read and understood the contents of the pleading.
To demand the litigants to read the very same document that is to be filed in court is too rigorous a requirement.
VICTORY LINER, INC. V. MALINIAS
May 29, 2007 | GR No. 151170 | TINGA, J.| Verification
PETITIONER: VICTORY LINER, INC.
RESPONDENTS: MICHAEL MALINIAS
DOCTRINE:
The submission of a certificate against forum shopping is deemed obligatory, the requirement has been relaxed under justifiable circumstances under the rule on substantial compliance. The same characteristics hold true as to the verification requirement.
FACTS:
1. A vehicular collision occurred between a bus owned by petitioner Victory Liner, Inc. and an Isuzu Truck used by respondent Michael Malinias. Both vehicles were damaged from the accident. A complaint for sum of money and damages was instituted by respondent against petitioner and the bus driver, Leoncio Bulaon.
2. After pre-trial, the bus driver was dropped as defendant in the case after summons could not be served on him and respondent agreed to waive his cause of action against said driver.
3. During the trial, no appearance was made for the bus company, thus it was declared in default and the case was submitted for decision.
PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:
MTC ● MTC rendered judgment in favor of respondent.
● Through its new counsel, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration. The MTC ruled in an Order that the notice did not conform with the mandatory requirements of Section 5, Rule 15 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, and that the motion was thus a mere scrap of paper which did not suspend the period to appeal.
● The MTC declared that its earlier judgment had become final and executory.
● What then followed was a series of unsuccessful attempts by petitioner to have the lower courts set aside or stay the now-final judgment against it.
RTC ● Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with the RTC imputing grave abuse of discretion to the MTC, and seeking to annul the MTC’s rulings. Petition was denied.
CA ● Petitioner filed a "Petition for Certiorari to Annul Judgment" under the aegis of Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
● The petition for annulment of judgment was accompanied by a Verification and Certification Against Forum Shopping which was signed by counsel for petitioner. On that basis, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition outright stressing the rule that it should be the petitioner, not its counsel, which should execute the verification and certification against forum shopping.
● The appellate court observed that in petitioner’s Motion for Extension to submit the certification of authority, it was explained that petitioner’s counsel was constrained to sign the verification and certification against forum shopping because "the certificate of authority granted to the petitioner’s station manager in Baguio City has been misplaced." The CA thus concluded that "the one really authorized to represent the petitioner is Operations Manager Rogelio Ortega stationed in Baguio City, but whose authority has been misplaced or lost, as in fact, the latter signed the certification on non-forum shopping in the petition filed before the RTC." The Court of Appeals also reiterated that subsequent compliance such as petitioner’s counsel’s subsequent submission of her authority to represent the petitioner, would not excuse petitioner’s failure to comply with the required certification against forum-shopping in the first instance.
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing outright the petition for annulment of judgment on the ground that the Verification and Certificate against forum shopping was signed by counsel.
RULING:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
RATIO:
YES.
It is of importance that, as borne by the Certificate of Authority executed by petitioner’s Corporate Secretary, counsel for petitioner had been authorized by petitioner’s Board of Directors to prepare and file with the Court of Appeals the petition herself as of 10 July 2001, or seven (7) days before the petition was indeed filed. We fail to understand the significance attached by the Court of Appeals on the prior authority of the Baguio station manager to perform the same acts. The impression left by the disquisition of the appellate court is that such prior authority was beyond recall by petitioner’s Board of Directors, and that no new person could be similarly authorized by the corporation to perform such acts.
The fact that the previous authority may have been misplaced or lost, thus causing petitioner to authorize a new person to file the necessary pleadings or petitions in the case involving the respondent, is of no consequence if the new authority is issued before the filing of the pleading that requires verification or certification against forum-shopping. The circumstance is similar to a situation where the previously authorized person had died or severed his or her connection with the corporate litigant. Juridical persons appearing before the courts are not perpetually bound to maintain the same authorized representatives in the preparation and certification of pleadings.
In any event, the observation of the Court of Appeals that substantial compliance "will not suffice in the matter involving strict observance" of the certification requirement on non-forum shopping contradicts our recent jurisprudence which holds that "the rule of substantial compliance may be availed of with respect to the contents of the certification against forum shopping."
While the lack of certification against forum shopping is generally not cured by its submission after the filing of the petition, and the submission of a certificate against forum shopping is deemed obligatory, the requirement has been relaxed under justifiable circumstances under the rule on substantial compliance. The same characteristics hold true as to the verification requirement.
We hold and so rule that the appellate court’s utilization on petitioner’s belated submission of the complete verification and certification requirements as anchor for the dismissal of the petition for annulment of judgment does not merit affirmance.
TANYAG V. TANYAG
November 10, 2021 | G.R. No. 231319 | LEONEN, J.| Certification Against Forum Shopping
PETITIONER: ARTURO C. TANYAG
RESPONDENTS: DOLORES G. TANYAG
DOCTRINE:
Upon the parties' filing of a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage, trial courts also acquire jurisdiction over matters incidental and consequential to the marriage. Among these is the settlement of the parties' common properties. By filing another petition for the determination of which properties form part of the co-ownership, a party commits forum shopping by splitting causes of action.
FACTS:
1. Arturo was married to Dolores and their property relations were governed by the rules on conjugal partnership of gains.
2. Dolores filed a Petition to declare their marriage null and void due to Arturo's psychological incapacity before the RTC of QC (Nullity Case).
3. During the pendency of the Nullity Case, Dolores filed a separate Petition for Declaration of Paraphernal Property before the RTC of La Trinidad, Benguet (Property Case). In this Petition, she prayed that the trial court declare as her exclusive paraphernal property two parcels of land and that Arturo be ordered to surrender to her the owner's duplicate of the titles.
4. Arturo challenged the trial court's jurisdiction over his person in the Property Case. He also alleged that the Property Case was barred by litis pendentia and that Dolores was guilty of forum shopping because of the Nullity Case.
4. RTC of QC declared the marriage between Dolores and Arturo null and void. Dolores thus moved to liquidate, partition, and distribute their properties in the Nullity Case. However, her motion was denied.
5. Meanwhile, Arturo filed a Motion for Preliminary Hearing on Affirmative Defenses in the Property Case, seeking to have the Petition dismissed on the ground of primary jurisdiction, litis pendentia , and deliberate forum shopping. After an exchange of pleadings, the RTC of La Trinidad Benguet denied Arturo's motion.
PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:
RTC QC ● Declared the marriage between Dolores and Arturo null and void.
RTC Benguet ● Denied Motion for Preliminary Hearing on Affirmative Defenses in the Property Case filed by Arturo
CA ● Dismissed the same.
● Denied MR.
ISSUE/S:
Whether the Petition for Declaration of Paraphernal Property must be dismissed on the ground of litis pendentia. - YES
RULING:
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals' September 26, 2016 Decision and April 19, 2017 Resolution in CA-G.R. SP No. 145613 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Petition for Declaration of Paraphernal Property docketed as Civil Case No. 14-F-2175 before the Regional Trial Court of La Trinidad, Benguet, Branch 9 is DISMISSED.
RATIO:
YES. Respondent's Property Case is barred by litis pendentia. As she committed forum shopping, the Property Case should be dismissed.
Forum shopping can be committed in several ways:
(1) filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action and with the same prayer, the previous case not having been resolved yet (where the ground for dismissal is litis pendentia );
(2) filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action and the same prayer, the previous case having been finally resolved (where the ground for dismissal is res judicata); and
(3) filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action but with different prayers (splitting of causes of action, where the ground for dismissal is also either litis pendentia or res judicata).
While the Property Case does not involve the validity of the marriage, the outcome of the Nullity Case will necessarily affect the outcome of the Property Case. The status of a marriage determines the property relations between the parties. The declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage on the ground of psychological capacity will create a special co-ownership between the parties under Article 147 of the Family Code.
The settlement of the parties' common property is an incidental and consequential matter thereto. Thus, the trial court having jurisdiction over the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may take cognizance of the same. A party to a petition for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may, in the same proceeding, file a motion for the liquidation, partition, and distribution of the properties of the spouses.
The Property Case should be dismissed for litis pendentia if the liquidation, partition, and distribution are still pending in the Nullity Case, or for res judicata if the liquidation, partition, and distribution have already been finally resolved in the Nullity Case.
VICTORY LINER, INC. V. MALINIAS
May 29, 2007 | G.R. No. 151170| Tinga, J. | Certification Against Forum Shopping
DOCTRINE:
The rule of substantial compliance may be availed of with respect to the contents of the certification. While the lack of certification against forum shopping is generally not cured by its submission after the filing of the petition, and the submission of a certificate against forum shopping is deemed obligatory, the requirement has been relaxed under justifiable circumstances under the rule on substantial compliance.
FACTS:
The origin of this case was a vehicular collision in La Union between a Victory Liner bus and an Isuzu truck used by Malinias. Nobody died but both vehicles incurred damages. Malinias filed a complaint for sum of money and damages against petitioner. During the trial, the petitioner was declared to have waived its right to adduce evidence due to non-appearance of its counsel. Thus, on January 12, 1998, the MTC ruled in favor of Malinias. The petitioner filed a MR but was denied and ruled to be a mere scrap of paper. Petitioner then filed a notice of appeal but it was filed beyond the reglementary period. Petitioner filed a Petition for Relief from Judgment with the MTC but was denied being filed out of time. Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 with the RTC imputing grave abuse of discretion to MTC. The same was dismissed being belatedly filed. Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari to Annul Judgment under Rule 47 with the CA but was dismissed outright because it was the petitioner’s counsel which executed the verification and certification against forum shopping. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but to no avail. Hence, this petition for review under Rule 45.
ISSUE/S:
Whether the CA erred in dismissing the petition for annulment of judgment.
RULING:
Yes. The appellate court cited the rule that substantial compliance could not cure the defect in the verification or certification requirements. Yet the bare fact remains that counsel for petitioner was authorized to prepare the petition and to execute the verification and certification requirements at the time the petition was filed with the Court of Appeals, a fact borne out by the Certificate of Authority itself. The error consisted in petitioner counsel's failure to attach such certificate to the petition, but she did submit said certificate to the Court of Appeals the very next day. Petitioner emphasizes that the certificate of authority submitted on 18 July 2001 was filed "on the 15th day of the 60-day reglementary period to file appeal," perhaps to stress the point that if the petition itself was filed on the same day as the certificate of authority, the petition would have still been timely. However, petitioner seems to forget that under Rule 47, its petition for annulment of judgment based on extrinsic fraud actually had a term of four (4) years as "reglementary period." The rule of substantial compliance may be availed of with respect to the contents of the certification. While the lack of certification against forum shopping is generally not cured by its submission after the filing of the petition, and the submission of a certificate against forum shopping is deemed obligatory, the requirement has been relaxed under justifiable circumstances under the rule on substantial compliance. The same characteristics hold true as to the verification requirement. Thus, the reliance on this ground for the dismissal of the petition for annulment of judgment does not merit affirmance.
Cosco Philippines Shipping, Inc. v. Kemper Insurance Co.
April 23, 2012 | G.R. No. 179488 | PERALTA, J.| Certification Against Forum Shopping
PETITIONER: COSCO PHILIPPINES SHIPPING, INC
RESPONDENTS: KEMPER INSURANCE COMPANY
DOCTRINE:
since respondent is a corporation, the certification must be executed by an officer or member of the board of directors or by one who is duly authorized by a resolution of the board of directors; otherwise, the complaint will have to be dismissed. The lack of certification against forum shopping is generally not curable by mere amendment of the complaint, but shall be a cause for the dismissal of the case without prejudice. The same rule applies to certifications against forum shopping signed by a person on behalf of a corporation which are unaccompanied by proof that said signatory is authorized to file the complaint on behalf of the corporation
FACTS:
6. Respondent insured the shipment of imported frozen boneless beef (owned by Genosi, Inc.),which was loaded at a port in Brisbane, Australia, for shipment to Genosi, Inc. (the importer-consignee) in the Philippines. However, upon arrival at the Manila port, a portion of the shipment was rejected by Genosi, Inc. by reason of spoilage arising from the alleged temperature fluctuations of petitioner's reefer containers.
7. Thus, Genosi, Inc. filed a claim against both petitioner shipping company and respondent Kemper Insurance Company. The claim was referred to McLarens Chartered for investigation, evaluation, and adjustment of the claim. After processing the claim documents, McLarens Chartered recommended a settlement of the claim which Genosi, Inc. (the consignee-insured) accepted.
8. Thereafter, respondent paid the claim of Genosi, Inc. (the insured). Consequently, Genosi, Inc.,through its General Manager, Avelino S. Mangahas, Jr.,executed a Loss and Subrogation Receipt.. Respondent then made demands upon petitioner, but the latter failed and refused to pay the said amount.
9. Respondent filed a Complaint for Insurance Loss and Damages against petitioner before the trial court.
10. During the pre-trial proceedings, respondent's counsel proffered and marked its exhibits, while petitioner's counsel manifested that he would mark his client's exhibits on the next scheduled pre-trial. However, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss, contending that the same was filed by one Atty. Rodolfo A. Lat, who failed to show his authority to sue and sign the corresponding certification against forum shopping. It argued that Atty. Lat's act of signing the certification against forum shopping was a clear violation of Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Court.
PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:
RTC ● RTC granted petitioner's Motion to Dismiss and dismissed the case without prejudice, ruling that it is mandatory that the certification must be executed by the petitioner himself, and not by counsel.
● Since respondent's counsel did not have a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) to act on its behalf, hence, the certification against forum shopping executed by said counsel was fatally defective and constituted a valid cause for dismissal of the complaint.
CA ● CA reversed and set aside the trial court's order.
● The CA ruled that the required certificate of non-forum shopping is mandatory and that the same must be signed by the plaintiff or principal party concerned and not by counsel; and in case of corporations, the physical act of signing may be performed in behalf of the corporate entity by specifically authorized individuals.
● However, the CA pointed out that the factual circumstances of the case warranted the liberal application of the rules and, as such, ordered the remand of the case to the trial court for further proceedings.
ISSUE/S:
2. Whether or not Atty. Lat was properly authorized by respondent to sign the certification against forum shopping on its behalf.
3. Whether or not petitioner is estopped by laches from raising the defect in respondent's certificate of non-forum shopping?
RULING:
1. No. There is no proof that respondent, a private corporation, authorized Atty. Lat, through a board resolution, to sign the verification and certification against forum shopping on its behalf. Accordingly, the certification against forum shopping appended to the complaint is fatally defective, and warrants the dismissal of respondent's complaint for Insurance Loss and Damages (Civil Case No. 99-95561) against petitioner.
In the present case, since respondent is a corporation, the certification must be executed by an officer or member of the board of directors or by one who is duly authorized by a resolution of the board of directors; otherwise, the complaint will have to be dismissed. The lack of certification against forum shopping is generally not curable by mere amendment of the complaint, but shall be a cause for the dismissal of the case without prejudice. The same rule applies to certifications against forum shopping signed by a person on behalf of a corporation which are unaccompanied by proof that said signatory is authorized to file the complaint on behalf of the corporation.
There is no proof that respondent, a private corporation, authorized Atty. Lat, through a board resolution, to sign the verification and certification against forum shopping on its behalf. Accordingly, the certification against forum shopping appended to the complaint is fatally defective, and warrants the dismissal of respondent's complaint for Insurance Loss and Damages (Civil Case No. 99-95561) against petitioner.
While there were instances where the Court have allowed the filing of a certification against non-forum shopping by someone on behalf of a corporation without the accompanying proof of authority at the time of its filing, it did so on the basis of a special circumstance or compelling reason. Moreover, there was a subsequent compliance by the submission of the proof of authority attesting to the fact that the person who signed the certification was duly authorized.
Contrary to the CA's finding, the Court finds that the circumstances of this case do not necessitate the relaxation of the rules. There was no proof of authority submitted, even belatedly, to show subsequent compliance with the requirement of the law. Neither was there a copy of the board resolution or secretary's certificate subsequently submitted to the trial court that would attest to the fact that Atty. Lat was indeed authorized to file said complaint and sign the verification and certification against forum shopping, nor did respondent satisfactorily explain why it failed to comply with the rules. Thus, there exists no cogent reason for the relaxation of the rule on this matter. Obedience to the requirements of procedural rules is needed if we are to expect fair results therefrom, and utter disregard of the rules cannot justly be rationalized by harking on the policy of liberal construction.
Moreover, the SPA dated May 11, 2000, submitted by respondent allegedly authorizing Atty. Lat to appear on behalf of the corporation, in the pre-trial and all stages of the proceedings, signed by Brent Healy, was fatally defective and had no evidentiary value. It failed to establish Healy's authority to act in behalf of respondent, in view of the absence of a resolution from respondent's board of directors or secretary's certificate proving the same. Like any other corporate act, the power of Healy to name, constitute, and appoint Atty. Lat as respondent's attorney-in-fact, with full powers to represent respondent in the proceedings, should have been evidenced by a board resolution or secretary's certificate.
2. No. Respondent's allegation that petitioner is estopped by laches from raising the defect in respondent's certificate of non-forum shopping does not hold water.
In Tamondong v. Court of Appeals, we held that if a complaint is filed for and in behalf of the plaintiff who is not authorized to do so, the complaint is not deemed filed. An unauthorized complaint does not produce any legal effect. Hence, the court should dismiss the complaint on the ground that it has no jurisdiction over the complaint and the plaintiff. 27 Accordingly, since Atty. Lat was not duly authorized by respondent to file the complaint and sign the verification and certification against forum shopping, the complaint is considered not filed and ineffectual, and, as a necessary consequence, is dismissable due to lack of jurisdiction.
Jurisdiction is the power with which courts are invested for administering justice; that is, for hearing and deciding cases. In order for the court to have authority to dispose of the case on the merits, it must acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties. Courts acquire jurisdiction over the plaintiffs upon the filing of the complaint, and to be bound by a decision, a party should first be subjected to the court's jurisdiction. Clearly, since no valid complaint was ever filed with the RTC, Branch 8, Manila, the same did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of respondent.
Since the court has no jurisdiction over the complaint and respondent, petitioner is not estopped from challenging the trial court's jurisdiction, even at the pre-trial stage of the proceedings. This is so because the issue of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal, and is not lost by waiver or by estoppel.
LARA'S GIFT V. PNB GENERAL INSURERS (capitalized)
January 24, 2018 | GR No. 230429-30||| Velasco, J., | Third Division | Judicial Affidavit Rule
PETITIONER: LARA'S GIFT AND DECORS, INC.
RESPONDENTS: PNB GENERAL INSURERS CO., INC. and UCPB GENERAL INSURANCE CO., INC.,
DOCTRINE:
Section 34. Offer of evidence. — The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. The purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified.
FACTS:
Lara's Gifts and Decors, Inc. (LGDI) is engaged in the business of manufacturing, selling, and exporting various handicraft items and decorative products. It leased buildings/warehouses from J.Y. & Sons Realty Co., Inc. The handicraft products, raw materials, and machineries and equipment of petitioner were insured against fire and other allied risks with respondent PNB General Insurers Co., Inc. (PNB Gen) covering the period of February 19, 2007 (4:00 p.m.) to February 18, 2008 (4:00p.m.).
Approximately four hours before the policy was about to expire, a fire broke out. Petitioner immediately claimed from the respondents for the loss and damage of its insured properties. Taking into consideration the findings of the independent adjusters and the report of its forensic specialists, respondents denied petitioner's claim, petitioner then filed a Complaint for Specific Performance and Damages against respondents.
During the trial, petitioner's counsel produced the Questioned Documents in open court and asked Mr. Villafuerte to identify those documents, seeking to introduce and mark them as exhibits. Respondents immediately objected in open court to the introduction and presentation of the Questioned Documents on the grounds that they were neither touched upon nor covered by the witness' cross-examination, and that the same were being introduced for the first time at this late stage of proceeding, without giving the parties opportunity to verify their relevance and authenticity. They argued that since these documents were not presented, identified, marked, and even compared with the originals during the Pre-Trial Conference, they should be excluded pursuant to the Guidelines on Pre-Trial and JA Rule.
PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:
RTC ● The RTC issued an Order overruling the objections of respondents and allowing petitioner to propound questions relating to the Questioned Documents.
CA ● The CA ruled that the RTC erred in allowing the introduction of the 2nd Supplemental Judicial Affidavit in evidence, including the attached Questioned Documents, since petitioner failed to comply with Sections 2 and 10 of the JA Rule which prohibit the presentation, marking and identification of additional exhibits during trial that were not promptly submitted during pre-trial.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the CA erred in disallowing the introduction of additional documentary exhibits during trial and the filing of the 2nd Supplemental Judicial Affidavit.- YES
RULING:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Amended Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 138321 and 138774 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Court of Appeals' December 21, 2015 Decision is REINSTATED.
RATIO:
The JA Rule and the Guidelines on Pre-Trial do not totally proscribe the submission of additional evidence even after trial had already commenced... the submission of evidence beyond the mandated period in the JA Rule is strictly subject to the conditions that: a) the court may allow the late submission of evidence only once; b) the party presenting the evidence proffers a valid reason for the delay; and c) the opposing party will not be prejudiced thereby.
To disallow the presentation of the Questioned Documents on the ground of Mr. Villafuerte's incompetence to identify and authenticate the same for lack of personal knowledge is premature at this juncture. Sec. 34, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence clearly instructs that:
Section 34. Offer of evidence. — The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. The purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified.
Following Sec. 19 of Rule 132, the documents sought to be presented undoubtedly are private in character, and hence, must be identified and authenticated in the manner provided in the Rules. The failure to properly authenticate the documents would result in their inadmissibility. The court, however, can only rule on such issue upon the proponent's formal offer of evidence, which, pursuant to Sec. 35, Rule 132, is made after the presentation of the party's testimonial evidence. The present case clearly has not reached that stage yet when the documents were introduced in court.
LAZARO v. BREWMASTER INT’L, INC.,
23 August 2010 | GR No. 182779 | Nachura, J. | Ultimate v. Evidentiary Facts
PETITIONER: VICTORINA (VICTORIA) ALICE LIM LAZARO
RESPONDENTS: BREWMASTER INTERNATIONAL, INC.,
DOCTRINE:
The basic requirement under the rules of procedure is that a complaint must make a plain, concise, and direct statement of the ultimate facts on which the plaintiff relies for his claim. Ultimate facts mean the important and substantial facts which either directly form the basis of the plaintiff’s primary right and duty or directly make up the wrongful acts or omissions of the defendant. They refer to the principal, determinative, constitutive facts upon the existence of which the cause of action rests. The term does not refer to details of probative matter or particulars of evidence which establish the material elements.
FACTS:
1. A complaint for sum of money was filed by respondent Brewmaster International, Inc., a marketing company engaged in selling and distributing beer and other products of Asia Brewery, Inc against Prescillo Lazaro and petitioner Victorina Alice Lazaro, with MeTC Makati City.
2. It was alleged in the complaint that the petitioners obtained on credit from Brewmaster beer and other products in the total amount of P138,502.92 evidenced by sales invoices and that despite demands, petitioners refused to pay. Brewmaster prays for such other or further relief and remedies that are just and equitable in the premises.
a. Photocopies of sales invoices indicating the amount of the goods purchased and showing that they were sold to "TOTAL" and received by a certain Daniel Limuco.
b. Victoria, in her own answer with counterclaims, denied having transacted with respondent, and averred that the documents attached to the complaint showed that it was Total which purchased goods from respondent.
3. MeTC dismissed the complaint, stating that:
a. Respondent failed to meet the burden of proof required to establish its claim by preponderance of evidence. The sales invoices attached to the complaint showed that the beer and the other products were sold to Total and were received by a certain Daniel Limuco;
b. they did not indicate, in any way, that the goods were received by petitioner or her husband.
PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:
RTC ● Affirmed the decision of MeTC
CA ● Reversed the RTC decision
○ Granted the petitioner’s prayers applying Sec. 7 and Sec. 6 of the revised Rules on Summary Procedure stating that judgment should have been rendered “as may be warranted by the facts alleged in the complaint” considering that both defendants failed to appear during the preliminary conference.
● Denied the MR
ISSUE/S:
1. WON the complaint against the petitioner lacks cause of action – NO
RULING:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court of Appeals Decision dated September 4, 2007 and Resolution dated January 31, 2008 are AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.
RATIO:
1. NO.
● The complaint against the petitioner does not lack cause of action.
● Petitioner contends that the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure does not warrant the automatic grant of relief in favor of the plaintiff when the complaint fails to state a cause of action. She avers that respondent’s complaint fails to state a cause of action; hence, no relief can be given to respondent. Petitioner points out that the sales invoices formed part of the complaint and should be considered in determining whether respondent has a cause of action against her. Consideration of the said sales invoices, she avers, would show that there is no contractual relationship between her and respondent; the invoices did not indicate in any way that petitioner was liable for the amount stated therein.
● The basic requirement under the rules of procedure is that a complaint must make a plain, concise, and direct statement of the ultimate facts on which the plaintiff relies for his claim.
● Ultimate facts mean the important and substantial facts which either directly form the basis of the plaintiff’s primary right and duty or directly make up the wrongful acts or omissions of the defendant. They refer to the principal, determinative, constitutive facts upon the existence of which the cause of action rests. The term does not refer to details of probative matter or particulars of evidence which establish the material elements.
● The test of sufficiency of the facts alleged in a complaint to constitute a cause of action is whether, admitting the facts alleged, the court could render a valid judgment upon the same in accordance with the prayer of the petition or complaint. To determine whether the complaint states a cause of action, all documents attached thereto may, in fact, be considered, particularly when referred to in the complaint.
● The inquiry is into the sufficiency, not the veracity of the material allegations in the complaint. Thus, consideration of the annexed documents should only be taken in the context of ascertaining the sufficiency of the allegations in the complaint.
● Petitioner argues that the complaint fails to state a cause of action since reference to the sales invoices attached to and cited in the Complaint shows that it was not her who purchased and received the goods from respondent.
● Contrary to the petitioner's stance, the Complaint sufficiently states a cause of action. The following allegations in the complaint adequately make up a cause of action for collection of sum of money against petitioner:
o (1) that petitioner and her husband obtained beer and other products worth a total of ₱138,502.92 on credit from respondent; and (2) that they refused to pay the said amount despite demand.
● As correctly held by the CA, the sales invoices are not actionable documents. They were not the bases of the respondent's action for the sum of money but were attached to the Complaint only to provide details on the alleged transactions. They were evidentiary in nature and not even necessary to be stated or cited in the Complaint.
Reyes v. RTC of Makati
11 August 2008 | G.R. No. 165744 | Brion, J | Rule 8, Manner of Making Allegations in Pleadings
PETITIONER: OSCAR C. REYES,
RESPONDENTS: HON. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MAKATI, Branch 142, ZENITH INSURANCE CORPORATION, and RODRIGO C. REYES
DOCTRINE:
A derivative suit is an action filed by stockholders to enforce a corporate action.
“Section 1. Derivative Action. – A stockholder may bring an action in the name of a corporation or association as the case may be, provided that: He was a stockholder or member at the time the acts or transactions subject of the action occurred and at the time the action was filed; He exerted all reasonable efforts, and alleges the same with particularity in the complaint, to exhaust all remedies available under the articles of incorporation, by-laws, laws or rules governing the corporation or partnership to obtain the relief he desires; No appraisal rights are available for the act or acts complained of; and The suit is not a nuisance or harassment suit. In case of nuisance or harassment suit, the court shall forthwith dismiss the case.
FACTS:
1. Petitioner and private respondent were siblings together with two others, namely Pedro and Anastacia, in a family business established as Zenith Insurance Corporation (Zenith), from which they owned shares of stocks. The Pedro and Anastacia subsequently died. The former had his estate judicially partitioned among his heirs, but the latter had not made the same in her shareholding in Zenith. Zenith and Rodrigo filed a complaint with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) against petitioner (1) a derivative suit to obtain accounting of funds and assets of Zenith, and (2) to determine the shares of stock of deceased Pedro and Anastacia that were arbitrarily and fraudulently appropriated [by Oscar, and were unaccounted for]. In his answer with counterclaim, petitioner denied the illegality of the acquisition of shares of Anastacia and questioned the jurisdiction of SEC to entertain the complaint because it pertains to settlement of [Anastacia’s] estate. The case was transferred to
PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:
RTC ● Petitioner filed Motion to Declare Complaint as Nuisance or Harassment Suit and must be dismissed.
○ RTC denied the motion.
CA ● The motion was elevated to the Court of Appeals by way of petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus,
○ but was again denied.
ISSUE/S:
1. WON the complaint is a mere nuisance or harassment suit that should be dismissed under the Interim Rules of Procedure of Intra-Corporate Controversies;
2. WON the complaint is a derivative suit within the jurisdiction of the RTC acting as a special commercial court
RULING:
In summary, whether as an individual or as a derivative suit, the RTC – sitting as special commercial court – has no jurisdiction to hear Rodrigo’s complaint since what is involved is the determination and distribution of successional rights to the shareholdings of Anastacia Reyes. Rodrigo’s proper remedy, under the circumstances, is to institute a special proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased Anastacia Reyes, a move that is not foreclosed by the dismissal of his present complaint.
WHEREFORE, we hereby GRANT the petition and REVERSE the decision of the Court of Appeals dated May 26, 2004 in CA-G.R. SP No. 74970. The complaint before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 142, Makati, docketed as Civil Case No. 00-1553, is ordered DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction.
RATIO:
1. YES
● The rule is that a complaint must contain a plain, concise, and direct statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff’s cause of action and must specify the relief sought. Section 5, Rule 8 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that in all averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake must be stated with particularity.
● These rules find specific application to Section 5(a) of P.D. No. 902-A which speaks of corporate devices or schemes that amount to fraud or misrepresentation detrimental to the public and/or to the stockholders.
● Allegations of deceit, machination, false pretenses, misrepresentation, and threats are largely conclusions of law that, without supporting statements of the facts to which the allegations of fraud refer, do not sufficiently state an effective cause of action.
● Fraud and mistake are required to be averred with particularity in order to enable the opposing party to controvert the particular facts allegedly constituting such fraud or mistake.
● Tested against these standards, charges of fraud against Oscar were not properly supported by the required factual allegations. While the complaint contained allegations of fraud purportedly committed by him, these allegations are not particular enough to bring the controversy within the special commercial court’s jurisdiction; they are not statements of ultimate facts, but are mere conclusions of law: how and why the alleged appropriation of shares can be characterized as “illegal and fraudulent” were not explained nor elaborated on. The case must be dismissed.
2. NO
● The allegations of the present complaint do not amount to a derivative suit.
● First, as already discussed above, Rodrigo is not a shareholder with respect to the shareholdings originally belonging to Anastacia; he only stands as a transferee-heir whose rights to the share are inchoate and unrecorded.
● Second, in order that a stockholder may show a right to sue on behalf of the corporation, he must allege with some particularity in his complaint that he has exhausted his remedies within the corporation by making a sufficient demand upon the directors or other officers for appropriate relief with the expressed intent to sue if relief is denied.
● Lastly, Court found no injury, actual or threatened, alleged to have been done to the corporation due to Oscar’s acts. If indeed he illegally and fraudulently transferred Anastacia’s shares in his own name, then the damage is not to the corporation but to his co-heirs; the wrongful transfer did not affect the capital stock or the assets of Zenith.
● In summary, whether as an individual or as a derivative suit, the RTC – sitting as special commercial court – has no jurisdiction to hear Rodrigo’s complaint since what is involved is the determination and distribution of successional rights to the shareholdings of Anastacia Reyes. Rodrigo’s proper remedy, under the circumstances, is to institute a special proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased Anastacia Reyes, a move that is not foreclosed by the dismissal of his present complaint.
MOMARCO IMPORT CO., INC. V. VILLAMENA
July 27, 2016 | G.R. No. 192477 | BERSAMIN, J | Declaration of Default
PETITIONER: Momarco Import Co., Inc.
RESPONDENTS: Felicidad Villamena
DOCTRINE:
A default judgment is frowned upon because of the policy of the law to hear every litigated case on the merits. But the default judgment will not be vacated unless the defendant satisfactorily explains the failure to file the answer, and shows that it has a meritorious defense.
FACTS:
1. Felicidad Villamena initiated an action against Momarco Import Company, Inc. for the nullification of a deed of absolute sale involving registered real property and its improvements situation in Caloocan City as well as of (2) the transfer certificate of title (TCT) issued in favor of the latter by virtue of said deed of absolute sale on the ground of falsification. Villamena alleged that she is the owner of the subject parcel of land. Momarco informed Villamena that TCT over aforesaid property had been cancelled and new TCT was issued in favor of Momarco on the strength of a purported SPA executed by Dominador Villamena, her late husband, appointing Felicidad, as his attorney-in-fact and a deed of absolute sale purportedly executed by her in favor of Momarco on May 21, 1997, the same date as the SPA.
1. The SPA was allegedly a forgery since Dominador died on June 22, 1991. The deed of sale was allegedly falsified since what Villamena executed in favor of Mamarco a deed of real estate mortgage to secure a loan of P100,000.00.
2. Villamena filed a motion to declare Momarco in default for failure of defendant to file its answer as of said date despite the filing of an Entry of Appearance by its counsel. On September 10, 1998, Momarco filed its Answer with Counterclaim which denied the allegations in the complaint; said that Villamena failed to pay the loan it owed to Momarco so she offered to execute a deed of sale over the property on account of her inability to pay, presenting her husband's SPA already signed and notarized. Momarco was declared in default, and its answer was ordered stricken from the records.
3. RTC allowed Villamena to present her evidence ex parte. RTC rendered the default judgment nullifying the assailed deed of absolute sale and TCT. Momarco appealed to CA, which affirmed the RTC decision and denied subsequent Motion for Reconsideration.
4. Hence, this appeal.
PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:
RTC ● The RTC rendered the default judgment nullifying the deed of absolute sale and the TCT.
CA ● The CA affirmed the RTC’s default judgment.
● The CA denied Motion for Reconsideration.
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not the CA gravely erred in upholding the default judgment of the RTC, in: (1) ordering its answer stricken off the records; (2) allowing the respondent to adduce her evidence ex parte; and (3) rendering the default judgment based on such evidence.—NO
RULING:
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review on certiorari; AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of Appeals.
RATIO:
1. NO.
Under Section 3, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court, the three requirements to be complied with by the claiming party before the defending party can be declared in default are: (1) that the claiming party must file a motion praying that the court declare the defending party in default; (2) the defending party must be notified of the motion to declare it in default; (3) the claiming party must prove that the defending party failed to answer the complaint within the period provided by the rule. It is plain, therefore, that the default of the defending party cannot be declared motu proprio.
Although the respondent filed her motion to declare the petitioner in default with notice to the petitioner only on August 19, 1998, all the requisites for properly declaring the latter in default then existed. On October 15, 1998, therefore, the RTC appropriately directed the
answer filed to be stricken from the records and declared the petitioner in default. It also received ex parte the respondent's evidence, pursuant to the relevant rule.
Momarco’s logical remedy was to have moved for the lifting of the declaration of its default but despite notice it did not do the same before the RTC rendered the default judgment on August 23, 1999. Its motion for that purpose should have been under the oath of one who had knowledge of the facts, and should show that it had a meritorious defense, and that its failure to file the answer had been due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence. Momarco tendered no substantiation of what was its meritorious defense, and did not specify the circumstances of fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence that prevented the filing of the answer before the order of default issued — the crucial elements in asking the court to consider vacating its own order.
Momarco's temerity for delay is betrayed by the fact that it had waited for a judgment to be rendered by the court a quo before it challenged the order declaring it in default. If it truly believed that it had a "meritorious defense[,] which if properly ventilated could have yielded a different conclusion [by the trial court]," then it could very well have moved to set aside the Order of Default immediately after notice thereof or anytime before judgment. Under the circumstances, that would have been the most expeditious remedy.
A default judgment does not pretend to be based upon the merits of the controversy. Its existence is justified on the ground that it is the one final expedient to induce defendant to join issue upon the allegations tendered by the plaintiff, and to do so without unnecessary delay. A judgment by default may amount to a positive and considerable injustice to the defendant; and the possibility of such serious consequences necessitates a careful examination of the grounds upon which the defendant asks that it be set aside.
CRISOLOGO-JOSE V. LAND BANK
JUne 22,2006 | GR No. 167399 | Garcia J | Rule 11, Sec. 11 Extension of Time to File Answer
PETITIONER: Crisologo-Jose
RESPONDENTS: Land Bank of the Phils.
DOCTRINE:
To admit or to reject an answer filed after the prescribed period is addressed to the sound discretion of the court
FACTS:
1. Petitioner is the owner of various parcels of land covered under separate titles located in Talavera, Nueva Ecija. According to the petitioner, respondent Land Bank gave these landholdings which she inherited from her uncle, Alejandro T. Lim - a measly valuation of P9,000.00 per hectare
2. Petitioner filed a PETITION for determination of just compensation respecting her landholdings. During petitioner’s presentation of her evidence, the trial court admitted Land Bank’s ANSWER.
PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:
RTC ● rendered judgment fixing the fair market value of the 61.7860 hectares of the land in question at P100,000.00 per hectare.
CA ● Reversed
○ petitioner faults the appellate court for relying on and lending credence to the allegations and defenses that respondent averred in its answer which it filed beyond the 15-day period prescribed under Section 1, Rule 11 of the Rules of Court. Petitioner also blames the trial court for admitting, instead of expunging from the records, said answer and for not declaring the respondent in default.
ISSUE/S:
Whether the answer filed by the respondent should have been expunged from the records for having been filed beyond the 15-day period prescribed under Section 1, Rule 11 of the Rules of Court -- NO
RULING:
WHEREFORE, subject to the aforesaid modifications, the judgment of respondent Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
RATIO:
NO
● To admit or to reject an answer filed after the prescribed period is addressed to the sound discretion of the court.
● In fact, Section 11, Rule 11 of the Rules authorizes the court to accept answer though filed late, thus: SECTION. 11. Extension of time to plead. – Upon motion and on such terms as may be just, the court may extend the time to plead provided in these Rules.
● The court may also, upon like terms, allow an answer or other pleading to be filed after the time fixed by these Rules.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE v. CTA THIRD DIVISION
January 26, 2021 | GR No. 238093 | Effect of Failure to Plead; Declaration of Default; Extension of Time to File Answer
PETITIONER: COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE
RESPONDENTS: THE THIRD DIVISION OF THE CTA AND AZ CONTRACTING SYSTEM SERVICES, INC.
DOCTRINE:
Under Section 3, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court, there are three (3) requirements before the claiming party may have the defending party declared in default: (1) that the claiming party must file a motion praying that the court declare the defending party in default; (2) the defending party must be notified of the motion to declare it in default; (3) the claiming party must prove that the defending party failed to answer the complaint within the period provided by the rule.
FACTS:
1. On 30 March 2017, AZ Contracting System Service, Inc. (ACSSI) filed a petition for review before the CTA seeking review of petitioner's denial through inaction of ACSSI's claim for refund of excess and unutilized creditable withholding taxes for the year 2014, in the amount of Php15,352,600.00.
2. Accordingly, on 06 April 2017, the CTA issued Summons, directing petitioner to submit his Answer within fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof.
3. Petitioner, however, failed to file an Answer. As such, on 28 July 2017, or more than three (3) months since the period for petitioner to file an Answer had lapsed, ACSSI filed a Motion to Declare Respondent in Default. This was granted by the CTA in its Resolution dated 22 August 2017.
PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:
CTA ● The CTA denied petitioner's Motion on 09 November 2017. It held that petitioner failed to show that his failure to file an Answer was due to excusable negligence and that he has a meritorious defense. The CTA underscored that the grounds raised by petitioner did not prevent him from asking for additional time to file an Answer or to file an Opposition to ACSSI's Motion to Declare Respondent in Default. Such failure to file the relevant pleadings manifests petitioner's negligence in attending the present case.
● Further, the CTA also noted that the Summons was personally served on petitioner on 10 April 2017 and on the Solicitor General on 11 April 2017. However, it took the petitioner six (6) months to finally participate in the court proceedings. Such actions contradict the assertions of petitioner's counsel that she exerted diligence in handling the case, and should therefore not be countenanced.
ISSUE/S:
1. WON the court acted with grave abuse of discretion in declaring the petitioner in default. — NO
RULING:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. Accordingly, the Resolution dated 10 January 2018 rendered by the Court of Tax Appeals Third Division in CTA No. 9558 is AFFIRMED.
RATIO:
1. NO
● When a defendant is served with summons and a copy of the complaint, he or she is required to answer within 15 days from its receipt. The defendant may also move to dismiss the complaint "[w]ithin the time for but before filing the answer." Fifteen days is sufficient time for a defendant to prepare his defenses against the plaintiffs allegations in the complaint. Thus, a defendant who fails to answer within 15 days from service of summons either presents no defenses or was prevented from filing his or her answer within the required period due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence.
● In either case, the court may declare the defendant in default on plaintiffs motion and notice to the defendant. The court shall then try the case until judgment without the defendant's participation and grant the plaintiff such relief as his or her complaint may warrant.
● Under Section 3, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court, there are three (3) requirements before the claiming party may have the defending party declared in default: (1) that the claiming party must file a motion praying that the court declare the defending party in default; (2) the defending party must be notified of the motion to declare it in default; (3) the claiming party must prove that the defending party failed to answer the complaint within the period provided by the rule.
● ACSSI filed the Motion to Declare Respondent in Default on 28 July 2017. The same was served by personal service to the petitioner, as evidenced by the stamp "Received" by the BIR-NOB-Litigation Division on 28 July 2017. Thus, the first and second requirements have been met.
● Anent the third requirement, We note that it took six (6) months from receipt of summons for petitioner to participate in the court proceedings. In all that time, the petitioner did not seek an extension of time to file an Answer or even inform the CTA that they cannot file the same on time. Thus, We find that all the elements for a valid declaration of default are present in the instant case. The CTA was correct in granting ACSSI's Motion and declaring petitioner in default.
RODRIGUEZ v. USA GOVERNMENT
June 28, 2021 | GR No. 251830 | Delos Santos, J. | Rule 9 Effect of Failure to Plead; Declaration of Default
PETITIONERS: Imelda G. Rodriguez
RESPONDENTS: Government of the United States of America, represented by the Philippine Department Of Justice
DOCTRINE:
Section 3, Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules of Court requires three requirements which must be complied with by the claiming party before the court may declare the defending party in default, to wit: (1) the claiming party must file a motion asking the court to declare the defending party in default; (2) the defending party must be notified of the motion to declare them in default; and (3) the claiming party must prove that the defending party has failed to answer within the period provided by the Rule.
FACTS:
1. The Government of the United States of America, represented by the DOJ, filed before the RTC a Petition for Extradition.
a. The petition sought for the extradition of spouses Rodriguez from the Philippines to the United States of America (US) after they allegedly fled from US jurisdiction where they are wanted to stand trial in the Municipal Court of Los Angeles Judicial District, Los Angeles, California.
2. Spouses Rodriguez did not file an Answer to the petition for extradition. Instead, they filed several motions on various dates from 2001 to 2009 touching matters they alleged as necessary for them to file an answer, which will warrant the dismissal of the petition for extradition, for inhibitions of the presiding judges, and in matters of bail.
3. The RTC repeatedly ordered the petitioner to file her answer. Still, petitioner did not file her answer and instead filed motions on various dates from 2009 to 2013 on the matters of procedural rules to be observed in the extradition proceedings, deferments or postponements, clarifications, and declaration of respondent in default.
4. Respondent filed a motion to declare petitioner in default.
5. The RTC denied respondent's motion but gave petitioner 15 days to file her answer.
6. However, petitioner did not file her answer to the petition for extradition and, instead, filed various motions.
PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:
RTC ● Issued an Order directing the respondent to present evidence despite the non-filing of any responsive pleading by the petitioner.
● Respondent’s counsel prayed that the petitioner be declared in default.
○ The Court calls that the previous orders directing the respondent to present evidence despite non-filing of any responsive pleading is in effect a declaration of default.
● Petitioner received the signed copy of the Order and filed a verified Motion to Set Aside the Order of Default.
○ Issued a Resolution denying petitioner's Motion to Set Aside the Order of Default
● Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari assailing the Orders of the RTC that declared them in default.
● Rendered a Decision granting the petition for extradition
CA ● Dismissed the Petition for Certiorari, ratiocinating that the RTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in declaring petitioner in default
○ The petition has already been rendered moot and academic after she appealed the RTC decision.
● Also ruled that the RTC did not err in granting the petition for extradition and ordering petitioner to be deported to the US
ISSUE/S:
1. WON the RTC wrongfully declared the petitioner in default — YES
RULING:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated September 13, 2019 and the Resolution dated February 20, 2020 of the Court of Appeals in the consolidated cases of CA-G.R. SP No. 155299 and CA-G.R. CV No. 111132 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Orders and Resolutions dated June 15, 2017, June 28, 2017, November 22, 2017, and March 14, 2018, as well as the Decision dated April 19, 2018 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 19, granting the petition for extradition in Civil Case No. 01- 190375 are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner's Answer to the petition for extradition is DEEMED ADMITTED. The case is hereby ordered REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings, and thereafter, to resolve the case with utmost dispatch.
RATIO:
1. YES, the RTC wrongfully declared the petitioner in default.
● Section 3, Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules of Court requires three requirements which must be complied with by the claiming party before the court may declare the defending party in default, to wit:
o (1) the claiming party must file a motion asking the court to declare the defending party in default;
o (2) the defending party must be notified of the motion to declare them in default; and
o (3) the claiming party must prove that the defending party has failed to answer within the period provided by the Rule.
● In this case, there was no existing motion filed which could be validly acted upon by the RTC when it declared petitioner in default.
● To recall, while respondent previously filed a motion to declare petitioner in default back on August 13, 2013, the same, however, was already denied by the RTC in its Order dated January 15, 2015.
● What is clear, on the other hand, is that during the hearing on June 15, 2017, respondent's counsel again sought to declare petitioner in default by making an impromptu and oral motion that petitioner be declared in default for failure to file her responsive pleading despite repeated orders.
o This oral motion, however, falls short of the requirements under the rules on declaring a defendant in default.
● To stress, a motion filed for the declaration of default is expressly required by the rules.
o Said motion cannot be made verbally during a hearing such as what respondent's counsel did in this case.
● In addition, the oral motion to declare petitioner in default violated the requirement of notice of such motion to the defending party prior to the hearing thereof.
● A notice of the motion to declare a defendant in default is indispensable to avoid surprises on the opposite party and to give him time to study and meet the arguments.
● Further, the RTC also committed an error when it held in its Resolution that the oral motion of respondent's counsel during the June 15, 2017 hearing was a mere reiteration of a previously filed written motion. For one, such justification is not stated in its Order dated June 15, 2017. It is clearly an afterthought.
ERLINDA GAJUDO, FERNANDO GAJUDO, JR., ESTELITA GAJUDO, BALTAZAR GAJUDO and DANILO ARAHAN CHUA vs. TRADERS ROYAL BANK
March 21, 2006 | G.R. No. 151098 | Panganibnan, C.J. | Declaration of Default; Extension of Time to File Answer
PETITIONER: Erlinda Gajudo, Fernando Gajudo, Jr., Estelita Gajudo, Baltazar Gajudo and Danilo Chua (Gajudo, et al.)
RESPONDENTS: Traders Royal Bank
DOCTRINE:
The mere fact that a defendant is declared in default does not automatically result in the grant of the prayers of the plaintiff. To win, the latter must still present the same quantum of evidence that would be required if the defendant were still present. A party that defaults is not deprived of its rights, except the right to be heard and to present evidence to the trial court. If the evidence presented does not support a judgment for the plaintiff, the complaint should be dismissed, even if the defendant may not have been heard or allowed to present any countervailing evidence.
FACTS:
1. In mid-1977, Danilo Chua obtained a P75,000.00 loan from Traders Royal Bank secured by a real estate mortgage over a parcel of land, and owned in common by the Gajudo, et al.
2. When the loan was not paid, Traders Royal Bank commenced extra-judicial foreclosure proceedings on the property. Later on, the Sheriff of Quezon City sold the property to the Traders Bank, the highest bidder therein, for the sum of P24,911.30.
3. Gajudo, et al. alleged that the auction sale was tainted with irregularity.
4. Gajudo, et al. filed a complaint before the RTC Quezon City against Traders Bank and the City Sheriff and the Register of Deeds of Quezon City. Gajudo, et al. sought the annulment of the extra-judicial foreclosure and auction sale made by the city sheriff of Quezon City of a parcel of land.
PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:
RTC ● After being duly served with summons, Traders Royal Bank filed answer with counterclaim filed but such answer referred to another civil case pending before another branch of the same RTC. For this reason, Gajudo, et al. filed a motion to declare Traders Royal Bank bank in default, alleging that no answer has been filed despite the service of summons on it.
● Upon proof that Gajudo, et al. had indeed served Traders Royal Bank with a copy of said motion, the RTC issued an Order of default against Traders Bank.
● Traders Royal Bank averred that that the erroneous filing of said answer was due to an honest mistake of the typist and inadvertence of its counsel. The RTC denied Traders Royal Bank’s motion to set aside the order of default.
CA ● The CA rejected Traders Royal Bank’s argument that the order of default be set aside.
● According to CA, the reasons offered by the Traders Royal Bank for failing to file an answer were “at once specious, shallow and sophistical and can hardly be dignified as a ‘mistake’ or ‘excusable negligence,’ which ordinary prudence could not have guarded against.”
● The CA ruled that the erroneous docket number placed on the Answer filed before the RTC was not an excusable negligence by the bank’s counsel. The bank’s counsel had a bounden duty to be scrupulously careful in reviewing pleadings. Also, there were several opportunities to discover and rectify the mistake, but these were not taken. Moreover, the Traders Royal Bank’s Motion to Set Aside the Partial Decision and to Admit the Answer was not accompanied by an affidavit of merit. These mistakes and the inexcusable negligence committed by respondent’s lawyer were binding on the bank.
● On the issue of whether Gajudo, et al. had convincingly established their right to relief, the CA held that there was no ground to invalidate the foreclosure sale of the mortgaged property. CA also noted that Gajudo, et al. failed to prove that the bank had agreed to sell the property back to them.
SC ● Gajudo, et al. filed a Petition for Review under Rule 45 before the SC.
● Gajudo et al. challenges the CA Decision for applying Section 3 of Rule 9 of the [1997] Rules of Court, rather than Section 1 of Rule 133 of the same Rules. In essence, Gajudo, et al. argued that the quantum of evidence for judgments flowing from a default order under Section 3 of Rule 9 is not the same as that provided for in Section 1 of Rule 133.
ISSUE: Upon the declaration of default of the defendants, are the complainants automatically entitled to the relief prayed for?
RULING:
WHEREFORE, this Petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision and Resolution AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
RATIO:
● No, complainants are not automatically entitled to the relief prayed for, once the defendants are declared in default.
● Favorable relief can be granted only after the court has ascertained that the relief is warranted by the evidence offered and the facts proven by the presenting party. It would be meaningless to require presentation of evidence if every time the other party is declared in default, a decision would automatically be rendered in favor of the non-defaulting party and exactly according to the tenor of his prayer. This is not contemplated by the Rules nor is it sanctioned by the due process clause."
● Default or the failure of the defendant to answer should not be interpreted as an admission by the said defendant that the plaintiff’s cause of action find support in the law or that plaintiff is entitled to the relief prayed for.
● Being declared in default does not constitute a waiver of rights except that of being heard and of presenting evidence in the trial court.
● A defaulted defendant is not actually thrown out of court. While in a sense it may be said that by defaulting he leaves himself at the mercy of the court, the rules see to it that any judgment against him must be in accordance with law. The evidence to support the plaintiff’s cause is, of course, presented in his absence, but the court is not supposed to admit that which is basically incompetent. Although the defendant would not be in a position to object, elementary justice requires that only legal evidence should be considered against him. If the evidence presented should not be sufficient to justify a judgment for the plaintiff, the complaint must be dismissed. And if an unfavorable judgment should be justifiable, it cannot exceed in amount or be different in kind from what is prayed for in the complaint."
● In sum, while Gajudo, et al. were allowed to present evidence ex parte under Section 3 of Rule 9, they were not excused from establishing their claims for damages by the required quantum of proof under Section 1 of Rule 133. Stated differently, any advantage they may have gained from the ex parte presentation of evidence does not lower the degree of proof required. Clearly then, there is no incompatibility between the two rules.
Notes:
Between the two rules (Section 3 of Rule 9, and Section 1 of Rule 133), there is no incompatibility that would preclude the application of either one of them. Section 3 of Rule 9 governs the procedure which the trial court is directed to take when a defendant fails to file an answer. According to this provision, the court "shall proceed to render judgment granting the claimant such relief as his pleading may warrant," subject to the court’s discretion on whether to require the presentation of evidence ex parte. The same provision also sets down guidelines on the nature and extent of the relief that may be granted. In particular, the court’s judgment "shall not exceed the amount or be different in kind from that prayed for nor award unliquidated damages."
As in other civil cases, basic is the rule that the party making allegations has the burden of proving them by a preponderance of evidence. Moreover, parties must rely on the strength of their own evidence, not upon the weakness of the defense offered by their opponent. This principle holds true, especially when the latter has had no opportunity to present evidence because of a default order. Needless to say, the extent of the relief that may be granted can only be as much as has been alleged and proved with preponderant evidence required under Section 1 of Rule 133.
ALPHA PLUS INTERNATIONAL ENTERPRISES CORP. vs. PHILIPPINE CHARTER INSURANCE CORP.
February 10, 2021| GR No.203756 | Hernando, J | Effect of amended pleadings
PETITIONER: Alpha Plus International Enterprises Corp.
RESPONDENTS: Philippine Charter Insurance, Corp.
DOCTRINE:
The Supreme Court reiterated the principle that the filing of an amended complaint does not retroact to the date of the filing of the original pleading; hence, the statute of limitation runs until the submission of the amendment. An amended complaint that introduces new demands supersedes the original one, and the action is deemed commenced on the date of the amended complaint’s filing.
TS:
1. Alpha Plus International Enterprises Corporation (Alpha Plus), engaged in the optical media business, acquired two fire insurance policies from Philippine Charter Insurance Corp. (PCIC) covering June 9, 2007, to June 9, 2008. On February 24, 2008, Alpha Plus’ warehouse was destroyed by fire, leading it to file an insurance claim with PCIC. PCIC denied the claim on January 22, 2009, and after failing to reach a settlement, Alpha Plus filed a Complaint for Specific Performance, Collection of Sum of Money, and Damages against PCIC and its officers in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan on January 20, 2010.
2. Alpha Plus filed an Amended Complaint on February 9, 2010, seeking P300 million in actual damages and additional legal interests. The RTC denied PCIC’s Motions to Dismiss based on jurisdictional concerns, lack of cause of action, and prescription. However, the Court of Appeals (CA) granted PCIC’s Petition for Certiorari, ruling that Alpha Plus’ action had prescribed based on the filing of the Amended Complaint and ordered the dismissal of the case.
PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:
RTC ● RTC ruled in favor of Alpha Plus but CA reversed, which ruled that prescription should be counted 360 days from the filing of the amended complaint, thus prescription has already set-in.
CA ● The appellate court granted the Petition for Certiorari of respondents. Consequently, it nullified and set aside the RTC Orders dated April 5, 2011 and June 21, 2011, and ordered the trial court to dismiss Civil Case No. 41-M- 2010. The CA found that since petitioner raised new demands in its Amended Complaint, the period of prescription should be counted from the filing thereof, and not from the filing of the original complaint.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in ordering the dismissal of Alpha Plus complaint on the ground of prescription.
RULING:
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED. The Decision dated July 20, 2012 and Resolution dated October 3, 2012 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 121025 areAFFIRMED. Costs on petitioner.
RATIO:
● The Supreme Court affirmed the CA’s decision, denying Alpha Plus’ Petition for Review on Certiorari. The Court agreed that the prescription of the insurance claim was duly established, differing only in the calculation of the prescriptive period.
● It emphasized that the 365-day period, as per the Insurance Code and consistent with jurisprudence, should be applied instead of the 360-day period used by the CA.
● The amended complaint introduced new demands not present in the original complaint, effectively superseding it and rendering the original complaint functus officio. The filing of the Amended Complaint was considered the commencement of the lawsuit, which was beyond the prescriptive period.
● The Supreme Court reiterated the principle that the filing of an amended complaint does not retroact to the date of the filing of the original pleading; hence, the statute of limitation runs until the submission of the amendment.
● An amended complaint that introduces new demands supersedes the original one, and the action is deemed commenced on the date of the amended complaint’s filing.
BIGLANG-AWA V PHIL TRUST CO.
March, 28, 2008 | GR No 158998. | Austria | amendment as a matter of right
PETITIONER: Ligaya, Charito, Liwayway, Paraluman all surnamed Biglang-Awa
RESPONDENTS: PTC
DOCTRINE:
Substantial amendments may be made only upon leave of court. But such leave may be refused if it appears to the court that the motion was made with intent to delay. Orders of the Court upon the matters provided in this Section shall be made upon motion filed in court, and after notice to the adverse party, and an opportunity to be heard.
FACTS:
1. Petitioners filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of deeds, cancellation of titles and reconveyanc before RTC-QC against Tolentino and PTC, alleging that they are the legitimate owners of the 8 parcels of land in Novaliches.
2. They averred that Tolentino falsified their documents and mortgaged the 4 of 8 parcels of land with PTC and that Tolentino was able to secure new titles over the subject lands to his name.
3. Tolentino filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of cause of action
4. Petitioner filed a notice of dismissal
5. Respondent filed its Answer with compulsory counterclaim praying for the dismissal of the case and for failure of petitioner to verify and certify the complaint
6. The RTC confirmed the notice of dismissal thus the action, as far as petitioner is concerned, is DISMIISED WITH PREJUDICE.
7. Tolentino then filed a motion for issuance of certificate of finality of the court order
8. Petitioners filed MR and subsequently a Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint and to Admit Attached Amended Complaint, which seeks to implead Liwayway Biglang-Awa contending the same arguments.
9. The court denied the motion.
10. Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari alleging the grave abuse of discretion when the court denied the motion to admit the amended complaint.
ISSUE/S:
WoN the CA committed error of law in disregarding the fact that it is a matter of right of the petitioners to amend their complaint prior to the submission of an answer by the adverse party
RATIO:
NO
● In Republic of the Philippines v. Africa, this Court held that where some but not all of the defendants have answered, plaintiffs may amend their complaint once, as a matter of right, in respect to claims asserted solely against the non-answering defendants, but not as to claims asserted against the other defendants.
● In the present case, prior to petitioners' filing of their Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint and to Admit Attached Amended Complaint, respondent already filed its Answer with Counterclaim. Hence, since respondent had already filed its answer, it follows that petitioners may no longer amend their complaint against the former as a matter of right. They may do so only upon leave of court, as provided under Section 3, Rule 10 of the same Rules, which they did by filing their Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint.
NATIONAL MINES AND ALLIED WORKERS UNION V. CALDERON-BARGAS
December 10, 2007 | GR No. 157232 | Azcuna, J. | Amendment as a matter of right
PETITIONER: National Mines and Allied Workers Union (NAMAWU)
RESPONDENTS: Hon. Adelina Calderon-Bargas, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 78, Regional Trial Court of Morong Rizal, and Norma G. Mitra
DOCTRINE:
Under the Rules of Court, a party may amend his pleading once as a matter of right at any time before a responsive pleading is served, or in the case of a reply, at any time within ten (10) days after it is served. At this stage, a party has the absolute right to amend his pleading and may introduce a new cause of action or change in theory. On the other hand, substantial amendments after the answer had been filed may be made only upon leave of court; but such leave may be refused if it appears to the court that the motion was made with intent to delay.
FACTS:
1. Petitioner, representing the workers of private respondent, filed a complaint with the NLRC for unfair labor practice, illegal dismissal, underpayment of wages, nonpayment of holiday pay and 13th month pay against private respondent, Norma G. Mitra.
2. The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of the workers, ordering Mitra to pay the amount of P1,669,897. Accordingly, a writ of execution was issued.
3. The NLRC Sheriff levied upon a parcel of land belonging to private respondent. As the highest bidder in the execution sale conducted by the Sheriff, petitioner acquired title to the property.
PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:
RTC ● Mitra filed a complaint for "Annulment of Final Deed of Sale, Certificate of Sale, Notice of Levy on Execution and Cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title" against petitioner, the Sheriff, and the Register of Deeds of Morong, Rizal. The case was assigned to public respondent Judge.
● In its Answer with Counterclaim and Opposition to the Issuance of a TRO, petitioner averred that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the subject matter. Public respondent issued an Order dismissing the complaint for lack of jurisdiction.
● Upon private respondent's failure to file an appeal, the Orders of the RTC dismissing the complaint and denying the motion for reconsideration became final and executory.
● Private respondent filed a Motion to Admit Amended Complaint.
● Petitioner opposed, on the following grounds: 1) it was filed out of time; 2) the amendment substantially changed the cause of action, defense or theory of the case; 3) the amendment will result in the alteration of a final judgment on a substantial matter; 4) the amendment sought to confer jurisdiction upon the court when none had existed before; and 5) the amendment was intended to delay the proceedings.
● The public respondent, however, granted the motion.
ISSUE/S:
1. WON the public respondent acted without jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion in allowing private respondent's amended complaint—YES
RULING:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.
RATIO:
● Under the Rules of Court, a party may amend his pleading once as a matter of right at any time before a responsive pleading is served, or in the case of a reply, at any time within ten (10) days after it is served. At this stage, a party has the absolute right to amend his pleading and may introduce a new cause of action or change in theory. On the other hand, substantial amendments after the answer had been filed may be made only upon leave of court; but such leave may be refused if it appears to the court that the motion was made with intent to delay.
● In the present case, however, the motion to file an amended complaint was filed one month after the Order of the trial court dismissing private respondent's complaint became final due to the latter's failure to perfect an appeal. As a rule, the aggrieved party must perfect his appeal within the period as provided for by law. The rule is mandatory in character. A party's failure to comply with the law will result in the decision becoming final and executory and, as such, can no longer be modified or reversed. Thus, it is beyond the power or jurisdiction of the court which rendered the decision or order to amend or revoke the same after the lapse of the fifteen-day reglementary period to file an appeal.
NATIONAL MINES AND ALLIED WORKERS UNION (NAMAWU)
vs.
HON. ADELINA CALDERON-BARGAS, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 78, Regional Trial Court of Morong, Rizal, and NORMA G. MITRA
December 10, 2007|G.R. No. 157232 |AZCUNA, J.:.|Amended and Supplemental Pleadings
PETITIONER:NATIONAL MINES AND ALLIED WORKERS UNION (NAMAWU)
RESPONDENTS: HON. ADELINA CALDERON-BARGAS, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 78, Regional Trial Court of Morong, Rizal, and NORMA G. MITRA
DOCTRINE:
Under the Rules of Court, a party may amend his pleading once as a matter of right at any time before a responsive pleading is served, or in the case of a reply, at any time within ten (10) days after it is served.10 At this stage, a party has the absolute right to amend his pleading and may introduce a new cause of action or change in theory.11 On the other hand, substantial amendments after the answer had been filed may be made only upon leave of court; but such leave may be refused if it appears to the court that the motion was made with intent to delay.
FACTS:
1. In August of 1992, petitioner, representing the workers of private respondent, filed a complaint with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) for unfair labor practice, illegal dismissal, underpayment of wages, nonpayment of holiday pay and 13th month pay against private respondent, Norma G. Mitra.2
2. A decision was rendered by Labor Arbiter Antonio Macam on April 22, 1999 in favor of the workers, ordering private respondent to pay the amount of ₱1,669,897. Accordingly, a writ of execution was issued on August 31, 1999.
3. NLRC Sheriff Juanito Atienza levied upon a parcel of land belonging to private respondent. As the highest bidder in the execution sale conducted by the Sheriff, petitioner acquired title to the property on December 6, 1999.
4. On July 16, 2001, private respondent filed a complaint for "Annulment of Final Deed of Sale, Certificate of Sale, Notice of Levy on Execution and Cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title No. M-105453"3 against petitioner, Sheriff Juanito Atienza and the Register of Deeds of Morong, Rizal, Dinna P. Mantuano. The case was assigned to public respondent Judge Adelina Calderon-Bargas of Branch 78, RTC, Morong, Rizal.
5. In its Answer with Counterclaim and Opposition to the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order, petitioner averred that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case because it is an offshoot of a labor dispute that had been decided by the NLRC.
6. On January 21, 2002, public respondent issued an Order dismissing the complaint for lack of jurisdiction and ruling that any decision in the civil case may render ineffective the decision rendered in the labor case.
7. Private respondent’s subsequent Motion for Reconsideration was denied in an Order dated June 19, 2002, the pertinent portions of which read:
8. Plaintiff stated that she does not question the legality or validity of the decision of the Labor Arbiter in Case No. RAB-IV-8-4482-92, but the procedure followed by Ms. Dinna Mantuano-Lao, [Register of Deeds], and Sheriff Juanito J. Atienza, when the former cancelled the name of the plaintiff on TCT No. M-46298, and issued TCT No. M-105453 in the name of defendant NAMAWU.
9. However, a reading of the allegations in the complaint shows that plaintiff questions not only the process of notification in the Notice of Levy, but the alleged lack of notice of the proceedings in NLRC Case No. RAB-IV-8-4482-92 had before the Labor Arbiter.
10. She alleges in the complaint… that "plaintiff never received any summons or copy of the complaint in the aforesaid case; she never hired a lawyer to represent her in said case; she never received any NOTICES of any decision, execution, levy, auction or sale."
11. Considering that plaintiff is questioning her lack of notice from the issuance of summons, until the levy or attachment of the property in question, it is clear, therefore, that plaintiff does not only question the procedure followed by Sheriff Juanito J. Atienza, but also the procedure of the Labor Arbiter, since she was allegedly not given notice on all the proceedings before the Labor Arbiter.
PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:
RTC ● After careful consideration of the arguments raised by the parties, the Court finds the Motion to Admit Amended Complaint impressed with merit; resolves to grant said motion and to ADMIT the Amended Complaint.
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether public respondent acted without jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the Order dated January 30, 2003, allowing private respondent’s amended complaint.
RULING:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Order dated January 30, 2003, of Presiding Judge Adelina Calderon-Bargas of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, Morong, Rizal, in Civil Case No. 01-1322-M is SET ASIDE, and the Orders issued on January 21, 2002 and June 19, 2002, respectively dismissing private respondent’s complaint and denying her motion for reconsideration are REINSTATED.
RATIO:
YES
● Under the Rules of Court, a party may amend his pleading once as a matter of right at any time before a responsive pleading is served, or in the case of a reply, at any time within ten (10) days after it is served.10 At this stage, a party has the absolute right to amend his pleading and may introduce a new cause of action or change in theory.On the other hand, substantial amendments after the answer had been filed may be made only upon leave of court; but such leave may be refused if it appears to the court that the motion was made with intent to delay.
● In the present case, however, the motion to file an amended complaint was filed one month after the Order of the trial court dismissing private respondent’s complaint became final due to the latter’s failure to perfect an appeal. As a rule, the aggrieved party must perfect his appeal within the period as provided for by law.13 The rule is mandatory in character. A party’s failure to comply with the law will result in the decision becoming final and executory and, as such, can no longer be modified or reversed.14 Thus, it is beyond the power or jurisdiction of the court which rendered the decision or order to amend or revoke the same after the lapse of the fifteen-day reglementary period to file an appea
Limbauan v. Acosta
June 30, 2008 | G.R. No. 148606 | Leonardo-De Castro, J.
| Amendment as a matter of right
PETITIONER:CHARLES LIMBAUAN
RESPONDENTS: FAUSTINO ACOSTA
DOCTRINE:
In an action for unlawful detainer, the lessor must first make a demand for the lessee to pay rent or comply with the conditions of the lease and vacate the premises. The lessee must fail to comply with the demand within the specified period before an action for unlawful detainer can be filed. The demand requirement is a jurisdictional prerequisite for bringing an unlawful detainer suit.
FACTS:
1. In 1938, the Government acquired the Tata Estate consisting of 808 hectares, located in Sometime in 1938, Kalookan, primarily for a leprosarium, the State utilized only one-fifth of the property for the purpose... under RA 4085.
2. In 1971, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Proclamation No. 843 allocating the property to the Department of Health, the National Housing Corporation, the PHHC and Department of Social Welfare and Development. In August, 1982, Faustino Acosta, who was then a Barangay Councilman, Acosta took possession of a vacant portion of the Tala Estate and constructed his house thereon, executed... a deed styled "Registration of Property"... over another vacant portion of the Estate, west of the Barangay Hall, with an area of 150 square meters,...
3. Sometime in February, 1995, Congress approved Republic Act 7999 under which the State converted a portion of the Estate, with a total area of 120 hectares, for use as a housing site for residents and employees of the Department of Health, with the National Housing Authority On January 2, 1996, Faustino, through Law Interns in the office of Legal Aid of the University of the Philippines, sent a letter to Charles demanding that the latter vacate the properly within five (5) days from notice for his failure to pay the monthly rentals in the amount of P60.00 a month since October, 1987.
4. Charles Limbauan ignored the letter and refused to vacate the property.Faustino, forthwith, filed. on February 7, 1996, a complaint for "Unlawful Detainer against Charles.
PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:
CA ● On December 29. 1997, the Court promulgated a Decision in favor of the Plaintiff and against the Defendant, on June 26, 2001, the CA dismissed the aforementioned Petition for Review and affirmed the decision of the RTC.
Issues:
a. Did The Honorable Court Of Appeals In Rendering The Assailed Decision Commit Grave Abuse Of Discretion Amounting To Excess Of Jurisdiction?...
b. Whether Or Not The Case Is Rendered Moot And Academic On Account Of The Death Of The Respondent.
RULING:
It is well settled that the failure of counsel to comply with his duty under Section 16 to inform the court of the death of his client and no substitution of such party is effected, will not invalidate the proceedings and the judgment thereon if the action survives the death of such party. Moreover, the decision rendered shall bind his successor-in-interest. The instant action for unlawful detainer, like any action for recovery of real property, is a real action and as such survives the death of Faustino Acosta. His heirs have taken his place and now represent his interests in the instant petition. Hence, the present case cannot be rendered moot despite the death of respondent.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby DENIED. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 49144 is hereby AFFIRMED.
RATIO:
1. Hence, it is settled that for the purpose of bringing an ejectment suit, two requisites must concur, namely:
a. there must be failure to pay rent or to comply with the conditions of the lease and
b. there must be a demand both to pay or to comply and vacate within the periods... specified in Section 2, particularly, 15 days in the case of land and 5 days in the case of buildings.
2. The first requisite refers to the existence of the cause of action for unlawful detainer while the second refers to the jurisdictional requirement of demand in order that said... cause of action may be pursued.
3. As the subject matter of the instant case is a parcel of land, the expiration of the aforesaid fifteen-day period is a prerequisite to the filing of an action for unlawful detainer Respondent's first demand letter dated January 2, 1996 gave petitioner five (5) days from receipt within which to pay the unpaid rentals and vacate the premises.
4. Petitioner received the demand letter on January 10, 1996 while respondent brought the... action for unlawful detainer on February 7, 1996 which was clearly more than 15 days from the time petitioner received the demand letter on January 10, 1996 and well within the one-year period set forth by Section 1, Rule 7048]
5. Thus, the fact that... respondents demand letter granted petitioner five (5) days to pay and to vacate the subject property is of no moment because what is important and required under Section 2 of Rule 70 is for the lessor to allow a period of fifteen (15) days to lapse before commencing an action... for unlawful detainer. petitioner capitalizes on the failure of respondents counsel to inform the court of the death of his client, Faustino Acosta, who passed away on October 22, 2000 while the case was pending appeal with the CA.
6. He avers that such failure rendered... the case moot and academic as no proper substitution of a party was affected in compliance with Rule 3, Section 16 of the Rules of Court. Section 16, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that:
7. Sec. 16. Death of party; duty of counsel. - Whenever a party to a pending action dies, and the claim is not thereby extinguished, it shall be the duty of his counsel to inform the court within thirty (30) days after such death of the fad thereof, and to give... the name and address of his legal representative or representatives. Failure of counsel to comply with this duty shall be a ground for disciplinary action.
8. It is well settled that the failure of counsel to comply with his duty under Section 16 to inform the court of the death of his client and no substitution of such party is effected, will not invalidate the proceedings and the judgment thereon if the action survives the death of such party. the decision rendered shall bind his successor-in-interest
9. The instant action for unlawful detainer, like any action for recovery of real property. is a real action and as such survives the death of Faustino Acosta. His heirs have... taken his place and now represent his interests in the instant petition.
10. Hence, the present case cannot be rendered moot despite the death of the respondent. the petition for review is hereby DENIED.
Sante v. Claravall
date | GR No. 173915 | Villarama, Jr.| Amendment as a matter of right
DOCTRINE:
An amendment cannot be allowed when the court has no jurisdiction over the original complaint and the purpose of the amendment is to confer jurisdiction on the court.
FACTS:
1. Respondent Vita Kalashian filed before the RTC of Baguio City a complaint for damages against petitioners.
2. Alleging that:
a. While she was inside the Police Station of Natividad, Pangasinan, petitioner Irene Sante uttered words: “How many rounds of sex did you have last night with your boss, Bert? You fuckin’ bitch!” Bert refers to Albert Gacusan, respondent’s friend and one (1) of her hired personal security guards detained at the said station and who is a suspect in the killing of petitioners’ close relative.
3. Respondent prayed that petitioners be held liable to pay moral damages in the amount of P300,000.00; P50,000.00 as exemplary damages; P50,000.00 attorney’s fees; P20,000.00 litigation expenses; and costs of suit.
4. Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss5 on the ground that it was the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) and not the RTC of Baguio, that had jurisdiction over the case.
5. They argued that the amount of the claim for moral damages was not more than the jurisdictional amount of P300,000.00, because the claim for exemplary damages should be excluded in computing the total claim.
6. The trial court denied the motion, and also reiterated its denial of the motion to dismiss and denying petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.
7. Aggrieved, petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition before the CA
8. Meanwhile, on July 14, 2004, respondent and her husband filed an Amended Complaint increasing the claim for moral damages.
9. Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss with Answer Ad Cautelam and Counterclaim, but the trial court denied their motion in an Order.
10. Hence, petitioners again filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition before the CA.
11. The case was raffled to the Seventeenth Division of the Court of Appeals.
12. The Court of Appeals, Seventh Division, promulgated a decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 85465: Civil Case No. 5794-R for damages is ordered DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction.
13. The Court of Appeals held that the case clearly falls under the jurisdiction of the MTCC, as the allegations show that plaintiff was seeking to recover moral damages in the amount of P300,000.00, which amount was well within the jurisdictional amount of the MTCC. The Court of Appeals added that the totality of claim rule used for determining which court had jurisdiction could not be applied to the instant case because plaintiff’s claim for exemplary damages was not a separate and distinct cause of action from her claim of moral damages, but merely incidental to it. Thus, the prayer for exemplary damages should be excluded in computing the total amount of the claim.
14. The Court of Appeals, this time in CA-G.R. SP No. 87563, rendered a decision affirming the September 17, 2004 Order of the RTC denying petitioners’ Motion to Dismiss Ad Cautelam.
15. The Court of Appeals additionally ruled that respondent can amend her complaint by increasing the amount of moral damages from P300,000.00 to P1,000,000.00, on the ground that the trial court has jurisdiction over the original complaint and respondent is entitled to amend her complaint as a matter of right under the Rules.
ISSUE: WON the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in allowing the amendment of the complaint? – NO
RATIO:
No. The RTC is correct in allowing the amendment of the complaint.
● Administrative Circular No. 09-9419 provides:
○ 2. The exclusion of the term “damages of whatever kind” in determining the jurisdictional amount under Section 19 (8) and Section 33 (1) of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691, applies to cases where the damages are merely incidental to or a consequence of the main cause of action. However, in cases where the claim for damages is the main cause of action, or one of the causes of action, the amount of such claim shall be considered in determining the jurisdiction of the court.”
● In the instant case, the complaint filed in Civil Case No. 5794-R is for the recovery of damages for the alleged malicious acts of petitioners. The complaint principally sought an award of moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorney’s fees and litigation expenses, for the alleged shame and injury suffered by respondent by reason of petitioners’ utterance while they were at a police station in Pangasinan. It is settled that jurisdiction is conferred by law based on the facts alleged in the complaint since the latter comprises a concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff’s causes of action.20 It is clear, based on the allegations of the complaint, that respondent’s main action is for damages. Hence, the other forms of damages being claimed by respondent, e.g., exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and litigation expenses, are not merely incidental to or consequences of the main action but constitute the primary relief prayed for in the complaint.
● Considering that the total amount of damages claimed was P420,000.00, the Court of Appeals was correct in ruling that the RTC had jurisdiction over the case.
● The Court of Appeals in affirming the RTC’s order allowing the amendment of the original complaint from P300,000.00 to P1,000,000.00 despite the pendency of a petition for certiorari filed before the Court of Appeals, is proper.
● While it is a basic jurisprudential principle that an amendment cannot be allowed when the court has no jurisdiction over the original complaint and the purpose of the amendment is to confer jurisdiction on the court (Siasoco v. Court of Appeals).
● Here, the RTC clearly had jurisdiction over the original complaint and amendment of the complaint was then still a matter of right (Sec. 2, Rule 10, Rules of Court).
SPOUSES LAMBINO vs. HON. PRESIDING JUDGE and BPI FAMILY BANK.
January 24, 2007 | GR No. 169551 | J. Callejo, Sr. | Supplemental Pleadings
PETITIONER: SPOUSES ORLANDO and CARMELITA LAMBINO
RESPONDENTS: HON. PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 172, Valenzuela City, and BPI FAMILY BANK
DOCTRINE:
1. A supplemental complaint must be consistent with, and in aid of, the cause of action set forth in the original complaint. A new and independent cause of action cannot be set up. It must be based on matters arising subsequent to the original complaint related to the claim or defense presented therein, and founded on the same cause of action.
2. The admission or non-admission of a supplemental pleading is not a matter of right but is
discretionary on the court. Among the factors that the court will consider are: (1) resulting prejudice to the parties; and (2) whether the movant would be prejudiced if the supplemental pleading were to be denied.
FACTS:
1. On July 21, 1994, petitioners Lambino secured a housing loan from private respondent BPI Family Savings Bank, Inc. The interest rate was 19% per annum payable in 180 monthly installments of P10,097.26.
2. Petitioners executed a Mortgage Loan Agreement (MLA) over their property as security for the loan. Under the MLA, the proceeds of the loan would be released to petitioners depending on the percentage of work completed.
3. However, petitioners failed to pay the monthly amortizations from January 15, 1995 to May 15, 1995.
4. On May 22, 1995, private respondent filed a petition for the extrajudicial foreclosure with the Ex-Officio Sheriff of the RTC-Valenzuela.
5. On June 26, 1995, petitioners filed a complaint for annulment of the MLA and the extrajudicial foreclosure sale with a prayer for a TRO before the RTC-Valenzuela.
● They alleged therein that private respondent had released only P555,047.19 instead of their P600,000.00 loan.
● They offered to pay their monthly amortization but private respondent required them to pay a monthly amortization of P12,900.00 effective December 1995.
● Despite demand, private respondent refused to release the difference of P44,962.78 of their loan and to readjust their monthly amortization conformably with the MLA.
6. The court issued a TRO and the sale at public auction was reset.
7. On April 16, 1996, petitioners offered to settle the balance amounting to P539,066.64, less late payment charges, mortgage redemption insurance premium interests, foreclosure expenses, attorney's fees and liquidated damages in the total amount of P305,042.57. They proposed to pay on monthly installments for a 15-year period, at an interest rate of 19% per annum.
● However, private respondent rejected the offer.
● In the meantime, the court suspended pretrial to enable the parties to settle the matter amicably.
8. The pretrial proceeding was terminated on July 23, 1998. The hearing for petitioners to adduce their evidence was set on September 17, 1998. On July 10, 2000, petitioners filed a Motion to Admit their Supplemental Complaint wherein they alleged the following:
● The plaintiffs were forced to litigate due to the Petition for Extrajudicial Foreclosure of Mortgage filed by defendant bank and unlawful imposition of escalating and arbitrary rate of interest without the consent of the plaintiffs and not authorized under the Real Estate Mortgage Contract despite advance interest has been deducted thereon, which should not been deducted therefrom, and in spite of the fact that the principal loan of P600k was not released in one occasion, but in 4 occasions separated by 1 and ½ month
○ The unauthorized deductions and advance interest charges were known by plaintiffs only for the first time at the Pre-Trial Brief of defendants.
● Aside from the unauthorized deductions and advance interest payment made, defendant bank also imposed escalating and arbitrary rate of interest.
● The foreclosure and/or liability of plaintiffs should be limited only to the amount in the mortgage [REM] and can not include other items, such as late payment charges, liquidated damages and attorney's fees in accordance with the ruling of the Supreme Court
● That plaintiffs, in fact, offered to settle their indebtedness as early as April 16, 1996 provided that the arbitrary charges, penalties and attorney's fees be deleted but defendant bank refused and insisted for plaintiffs to pay the aforesaid charges, penalties and attorney's fees, a copy of plaintiffs' letter is hereto attached and marked as integral part hereof.
● Petitioners prayed that, after due proceedings, judgment be rendered in their favor
9. On August 11, 2000, the trial court denied the motion of petitioners in its finding that the alleged escalating and arbitrary rate of interest and other charges imposed by private respondent had accrued long before the complaint was filed.
● It held that under Section 6, Rule 10 of the Revised Rules of Court, only transactions, occurrences, or events which accrued after the date of the complaint may be set forth in the supplemental complaint.
10. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration alleging therein that the escalating, arbitrary rate of interest, and other charges referred to their supplemental complaint took place after the filing of their complaint. They insist that it was discovered for the first time only after they had been furnished with the statements of account by defendant during pretrial.
● However, on January 2, 2001, the court issued an Order denying the motion of petitioners.
11. Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the CA which was dismissed.
● The imposition of interests and other charges on the loan obligations are but mere consequences of the execution of the mortgage loan agreement.
● They cannot be considered supervening events because after the loans have been incurred, interests and/or other charges start to accrue until the full payment of the account.
● Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration which the appellate court denied.
PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:
RTC ● Denied the Motion to Admit Supplemental Complaint
CA ● Dismissed the Petition for Certiorari
ISSUE/S: WON the supplemental complaint should be admitted – NO.
RULING: The petition is denied for lack of merit.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 63512 are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners. SO ORDERED.
RATIO:
1. Section 6 of Rule 10 reads:
Sec. 6. Matters subject of supplemental pleadings. — Upon motion of a party, the court may, upon reasonable notice and upon such terms as are just, permit him to serve a supplemental pleading setting forth transactions, occurrences or events which have happened since the date of the pleading sought to be supplemented. If the court deems it advisable that the adverse party should plead thereto, it shall so order, specifying the time therefor.
2. A supplemental complaint must be consistent with, and in aid of, the cause of action set forth in the original complaint. A new and independent cause of action cannot be set up by such complaint.
● must be based on matters arising subsequent to the original complaint related to the claim or defense presented therein, and founded on the same cause of action.
3. However, although the facts occur before the commencement of the suit, if a party does not learn of their existence until after he has filed his pleading, he may file a supplemental pleading.
4. As a general rule, leave will be granted to file a supplemental complaint which alleges any material fact which happened or came within plaintiff's knowledge since the original complaint was filed, such being the office of a supplemental complaint. The admission or non-admission of a supplemental pleading is not a matter of right but is discretionary on the court.
5. Among the factors that the court will consider are:
● (1) resulting prejudice to the parties; and
● (2) whether the movant would be prejudiced if the supplemental pleading were to be denied.
6. A motion for leave to file a supplemental pleading may be denied if he is guilty of undue delay or laches which causes substantial prejudice to the opposing party.
● It bears stressing, however, that the substantial rights of the parties and the merits of the case are not to be considered and resolved in a mere motion for leave to file a supplemental complaint.
7. Before they filed their original complaint, petitioners were already aware of the deductions made on the proceeds of the loan, for interest charges, MRI premium, and fire insurance premium.
8. They should have sought to nullify such charges in the original complaint, but they did not. They are thus proscribed from incorporating the same via a supplemental complaint.
ADA V. BAYLON
13 August 2012 | GR No. 182435 | REYES, J.| Supplemental Pleadings
PETITIONER: LILIA B. ADA, LUZ B. ADANZA, FLORA C. BAYLON, REMO BAYLON, JOSE BAYLON, ERIC BAYLON, FLORENTINO BAYLON and MA. RUBY BA YLON
RESPONDENTS: FLORANTE BAYLON
DOCTRINE:
A supplemental pleading may properly allege transactions, occurrences or events which had transpired after the filing of the pleading sought to be supplemented, even if the said supplemental facts constitute another cause of action.
FACTS:
1. Florentino and Maximina Baylon died in 1961 and 1974, respectively. They were survived by their children Rita, Victoria, Dolores, Panfila, Ramon, and Lilia. Victoria died in 1981, survived by a daughter, Luz Adanza, one of the petitioners. Ramon, on the other hand, was survived by respondent Florante Baylon when he died in 1989.
2. The petitioners filed with the RTC a Complaint for partition against Florante, Rita and Panfila. They allege that Spouses Baylon owned 43 parcels of land and that Rita took possession of the said parcels of land, appropriating for herself the income from the same. They further allege that Rita used the income to buy two parcels of land. Because of this, the petitioners wanted to include those two parcels of land in the partition by filing a civil case.
3. During the pendency of the case, Rita, through a Deed of Donation conveyed the Lots to Florante. Rita died intestate and without any issue.
4. Learning of the said donation inter vivos in favor of Florante, the petitioners filed a Supplemental Pleading, praying that the said donation in favor of the respondent be rescinded in accordance with Article 1381(4) of the Civil Code.
PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:
RTC ● The RTC held that the death of Rita during the pendency of the case, had rendered the issue of ownership insofar as parcels of land which she claims as her own moot since the parties below are the heirs to her estate. Thus, the RTC regarded Rita as the owner of the said 10 parcels of land and, accordingly, directed that the same be partitioned among her heirs.
● The RTC also rescinded the donation inter vivos of Lots in favor of Florante.
CA ● The CA reversed the decision of the trial court and held that before the petitioners may file an action for rescission, they must first obtain a favorable judicial ruling that Lot No. 4709 and half of Lot No. 4706 actually belonged to the estate of Spouses Baylon and not to Rita. Until then, the CA asserted, an action for rescission is premature.
● Further, the CA ruled that the petitioners’ action for rescission cannot be joined with their action for partition, accounting and damages through a mere supplemental pleading.
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not the CA was correct when it provided that the action for rescission could not be lumped up with the action for partition through a mere supplemental pleading.
RULING:
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing disquisitions, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED.
RATIO:
NO.
Section 6, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court reads:
Sec. 6. Supplemental Pleadings. – Upon motion of a party the court may, upon reasonable notice and upon such terms as are just, permit him to serve a supplemental pleading setting forth transactions, occurrences or events which have happened since the date of the pleading sought to be supplemented. The adverse party may plead thereto within ten (10) days from notice of the order admitting the supplemental pleading.
In Young v. Spouses Sy, this Court had the opportunity to elucidate on the purpose of a supplemental pleading. Thus:
As its very name denotes, a supplemental pleading only serves to bolster or add something to the primary pleading. A supplement exists side by side with the original. It does not replace that which it supplements. Moreover, a supplemental pleading assumes that the original pleading is to stand and that the issues joined with the original pleading remained an issue to be tried in the action. It is but a continuation of the complaint. Its usual office is to set up new facts which justify, enlarge or change the kind of relief with respect to the same subject matter as the controversy referred to in the original complaint.
The purpose of the supplemental pleading is to bring into the records new facts which will enlarge or change the kind of relief to which the plaintiff is entitled; hence, any supplemental facts which further develop the original right of action, or extend to vary the relief, are available by way of supplemental complaint even though they themselves constitute a right of action.
Thus, a supplemental pleading may properly allege transactions, occurrences or events which had transpired after the filing of the pleading sought to be supplemented, even if the said supplemental facts constitute another cause of action.
Here, the issue as to the validity of the donation inter vivos of Lot No. 4709 and half of Lot No. 4706 made by Rita in favor of Florante is a new cause of action that occurred after the filing of the original complaint. However, the petitioners’ prayer for the rescission of the said donation inter vivos in their supplemental pleading is germane to, and is in fact, intertwined with the cause of action in the partition case. Lot No. 4709 and half of Lot No. 4706 are included among the properties that were sought to be partitioned.
The petitioners’ supplemental pleading merely amplified the original cause of action, on account of the gratuitous conveyance of Lot No. 4709 and half of Lot No. 4706 after the filing of the original complaint and prayed for additional reliefs, i.e., rescission. Indeed, the petitioners claim that the said lots form part of the estate of Spouses Baylon, but cannot be partitioned unless the gratuitous conveyance of the same is rescinded. Thus, the principal issue raised by the petitioners in their original complaint remained the same.
ROA vs.S POUSES SY
G.R. No. 221586, September 14, 2021 | J LAZARO-JAVIER | Bill of Particulars
PETITIONER:ZENAIDA D. ROA
RESPONDENTS:SPS. ROBINSON K. AND MARY VALERIE S. SY, MARIE ANTOINETTE R. FRANCISCO, AND THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF MAKATI CITY
DOCTRINE: When parties seek a bill of particulars, they in effect admit that the complaint bears the ultimate facts comprising a valid cause of action. What they ask for though is simply a specification of these ultimate facts to enable them to properly prepare their responsive pleading or to prepare for trial. Consequently, any challenge against the complaint based on its supposed failure to state a cause of action is no longer feasible after the parties have sought a bill of particulars.
FACTS:
1. Petitioner Zenaida Roa filed a complaint against respondents Marie Antoinette Francisco (Francisco), Spouses Sy and Register of Deeds of Makati City (RD Makati), as evidenced by TCT, she and her sister are the legitimate owners of a property located at 73 Amorsolo Street, San Lorenzo Village, Makati City.
2. She learned from a relative that their title had been cancelled by the RD Makati, and by virtue of a deed of sale, a new TCT was issued in the name of Francisco. The deed of sale was purportedly executed between her and her sister Amelia, on the one hand, and their niece Francisco, on the other
3. She alleged that it was impossible for her to have signed the deed since she was in Washington D.C. at the time it was purportedly executed, as evidenced by her arrival and departure record issued by the Bureau of Immigration. On the other hand, her sister Amelia could not have signed the same on her own volition since she had been suffering from Alzheimer's disease for the last 10 years already prior to the supposed date of the sale. Francisco subsequently sold the property to Spouses Sy. Consequently, a new TCT was further issued in the name of Spouses Sy.
4. Francisco was able to secure a title in her name only on July 16, 2012, while the sale of the same property to Spouses Sy was supposedly done on July 20, 2012. At the time Francisco and Spouses Sy started negotiating on the sale, the Sps Sy already knew of the existence of her title considering the close proximity between the date the sale to Spouses Sy took place and the date Francisco secured a certificate of title in her name. During respondents' initial negotiation, petitioner and Amelia were still the registered owners of the property.
5. Instead of filing an answer, Spouses Sy filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of action. The complaint allegedly rested on conjectures and contained no specific averments of bad faith on their part. Spouses Sy further claimed that they acted in good faith when they relied on Francisco's title and noted no suspicious circumstances attending the sale transaction.
6. The trial court denied Spouses Sy's motion to dismiss for lack of merit. It noted that the complaint stated that petitioners were the registered owners of the property. Francisco fraudulently registered the property in her name by presenting a spurious and forged deed of sale. Ultimately, Spouses Sy purchased the property from Francisco despite her fraudulent title. A Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied by the Trial Court. Thereafter, they filed a "Motion for Bill of Particulars dated April 14, 2014 and later an "Amended Motion for Bill of Particulars”.
PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:
RTC The trial court granted the motion under Order and ordered petitioner to submit her bill of particulars.
CA reversed RTC’s decision stating that petitioner failed to particularly allege when Spouses Sy started to negotiate with Francisco for the purchase of the property. This is allegedly an ultimate fact necessary to determine whether Spouses Sy exercised due diligence in ascertaining the genuineness of Francisco's title. The lack of this particular averment supposedly calls for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of lack of cause of action against Spouses Sy.
ISSUE/S: Whether the filing of motion for a bill in particular negates the claim of Spouses Sy that the complaint states no cause of action against them.-YES
RULING:
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is GRANTED.
RATIO:
● Yes. The filing of the motion for a bill of particulars, which in truth is a request for written interrogatories, negates the claim of Spouses Sy that the complaint states no cause of action against them.
● A cause of action is defined as an act or omission by which a party violates a right of another. A complaint states a cause of action if it sufficiently avers the existence of the three (3) essential elements of a cause of action, namely: (a) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; (b) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and (c) an act or omission on the part of the named defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages.
● If, however, the complaint contains ambiguity, indefiniteness, or uncertainty, a party may move for a more definite statement or for a bill of particulars of any matter which is not averred with sufficient definiteness or particularity to enable him or her to properly prepare his or her responsive pleading or to prepare for trial. It is not the office of a bill of particulars to supply material allegations necessary to the validity of a pleading, or to change a cause of action or defense stated in the pleading, or to state a cause of action or defense other than the one stated.
● Also, it is not the office or function of a bill of particulars to set forth the pleader's theory of his cause of action or a rule of evidence on which he intends to rely or to furnish evidential information whether such information consists of evidence which the pleader proposes to introduce or of facts which constitute a defense
● This means that when parties seek a bill of particulars, they in effect admit that the complaint bears the ultimate facts comprising a valid cause of action. What they ask for though is simply a specification of these ultimate facts to enable them to properly prepare their responsive pleading or to prepare for trial. Consequently, any challenge against the complaint based on its supposed failure to state a cause of action is no longer feasible after the parties have sought a bill of particulars.
SPOUSES GONZALES v. MARMAINE REALTY CORPORATION
January 13, 2016 | GR No. 214241 | Perlas-Bernabe, J. | Rule 13; Notice of Lis Pendens
PETITIONER: SPOUSES RAMON and LIGAYA GONZALES
RESPONDENTS: MARMAINE REALTY CORPORATION, represented by MARIANO MANALO
DOCTRINE:
"Lis pendens," which literally means pending suit, refers to the jurisdiction, power or control which a court acquires over a property involved in a suit, pending the continuance of the action, and until final judgment. Founded upon public policy and necessity, lis pendens is intended to keep the properties in litigation within the power of the court until the litigation is terminated; and to prevent the defeat of the judgment or decree by subsequent alienation. The filing of a notice of lis pendens has a two-fold effect: (a) to keep the subject matter of the litigation within the power of the court until the entry of the final judgment to prevent the defeat of the final judgment by successive alienations; and (b) to bind a purchaser, bona fide or not, of the land subject of the litigation to the judgment or decree that the court will promulgate subsequently.
FACTS:
1. A Complaint for Recognition as Tenant with Damages and Temporary Restraining Order was filed by Sps. Gonzales against herein respondent Marmaine Realty Corporation (Marmaine) before the Office of the Provincial Adjudicator, Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), Region IV (Tenancy Case).
2. After initially filing a Motion to Dismiss, Marmaine seasonably filed an Answer with Counterclaim and, thereafter, trial ensued.
PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:
PARAD ● The Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) issued a Resolution ordering the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction in Sps. Gonzales' favor.
○ In view thereof, Sps. Gonzales filed a Notice of Lis Pendens before the Register of Deeds of Batangas, which was then annotated on the certificates of title of Marmaine's properties.
● After due proceedings, the PARAD issued a Decision in the Tenancy Case, dismissing Sps. Gonzales' complaint for lack of merit.
DARAB ● Affirmed the PARAD ruling.
○ Due to the failure on the part of Sps. Gonzales to further appeal, the DARAB Decision became final and executory and an Entry of Judgment was issued.
3. In view of the finality of the ruling in the Tenancy Case, Marmaine filed a Motion for Cancellation of Notice of Lis Pendens.
PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:
PARAD ● It initially denied Marmaine’s motion but on reconsideration, it directed the Register of Deeds of Batangas to cancel the notice of lis pendens annotated on Marmaine's certificates of title.
○ The PARAD held that such cancellation is warranted in view of the final and executory judgment in the Tenancy Case in Marmaine's favor.
● Dissatisfied, petitioners went straight to the CA via a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.
CA ● The CA dismissed the petition on the ground of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies.
○ It held that Sps. Gonzales improperly elevated the case to it via a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, pointing out that the proper remedy from a PARAD's denial of a motion for reconsideration is an appeal to the DARAB, and not a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE/S:
1. WON the CA erred in dismissing the petition for review before it due to petitioners' failure to exhaust administrative remedies - YES
2. WON the PARAD correctly ordered the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens annotated on the certificates of title of Marmaine's properties - YES
RULING:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
RATIO:
1. YES
● The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies instructs that before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the courts, it is a pre-condition that he avail himself of all administrative processes afforded him as a general rule.
o One of the exceptions to said doctrine is when the question involved is purely legal and will ultimately have to be decided by the courts of justice.
In the case at bar, Sps. Gonzales correctly pointed out that the issue they raised before the CA, i.e., the propriety of the cancellation of the Notice of Lis Pendens, falls within the aforesaid exception as the same is a purely legal question, considering that the resolution of the same would not involve an examination of the probative value presented by the litigants and must rest solely on what the law provides on the given set of circumstances. Verily, the CA erred in dismissing Sps. Gonzales' petition for review before it, considering that the matter at issue — a question of law — falls within the known exceptions of the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.
2. YES
● Under Section 14, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court, a notice of lis pendens may be cancelled "after proper showing that the notice is for the purpose of molesting the adverse party, or that it is not necessary to protect the rights of the party who caused it to be recorded."
● In the same vein, case law likewise instructs that a notice of lis pendens may be cancelled in situations where: (a) there are exceptional circumstances imputable to the party who caused the annotation; (b) the litigation was unduly prolonged to the prejudice of the other party because of several continuances procured by petitioner; (c) the case which is the basis for the lis pendens notation was dismissed for non-prosequitur on the part of the plaintiff; or (d) judgment was rendered against the party who caused such a notation.
o In the case at bar, records show that the notice of lis pendens that Sps. Gonzales caused to be annotated on Marmaine's certificates of title stemmed from the Tenancy Case filed by the former against the latter. Since the Tenancy Case had already been decided against Sps. Gonzales with finality, it is but proper that the PARAD order the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens subject of this case.
■ In sum, the PARAD properly ordered the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens that Sps. Gonzales caused to be annotated on Marmaine's certificates of title in view of the finality of the decision in the Tenancy Case.
Equitable PCI Bank, Inc. v. South Rich Acres, Inc.
May 4, 2021 | G.R. Nos. 202384 & 202397 | BRION, J. | Notice of Lis Pendens
PETITIONER: EQUITABLE PCI BANK, INC. (now BDO)
RESPONDENTS: SOUTH RICH ACRES, INC., TOP SERVICE, INC. and the CITY OF LAS PIÑAS
DOCTRINE:
A litigant may avail himself of the notice of lis pendens in any of the following case:
(a) an action to recover possession of real estate;
(b) an action to quiet title thereto;
(c) an action to remove clouds thereon;
(d) an action for partition; and
(e) any other proceedings of any kind in Court
directly affecting the title to the land or the use or occupation thereof or the building thereon.
Note: This digest is focused on the discussion on the lis pendens. However, in reading the full text, you will see that the high court had primarily discussed police power and just compensation.
FACTS:
● This case involves the following consolidated petitions: (1) Petition for Review filed by Equitable PCI Bank, Inc. (EPCIB) (now Banco de Oro Unibank, Inc. (BDO) docketed as G.R. No. 202384; and (2) Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by South Rich Acres, Inc. (SRA) and Top Service, Inc. (Top Service) docketed as G.R. No. 202397. Both petitions assail the Decision dated March 9, 2012 and the Resolution dated June 20, 2012 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 91117.
● the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of Las Piñas enacted City Ordinance No. 34397, which declared Marcos Alvarez Avenue as a public road.
● Subsequently, SRA and Top Service filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief and Damages with a Prayer for Preliminary Injunction with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Las Piñas City against the City of Las Piñas, seeking to annul City Ordinance No. 34397
● In the meantime, the Royal South Subdivision makes use of Marcos Alvarez Avenue for ingress and egress. Royal Asia Multi-Properties, Inc. (RAMPI) filed a Motion for Leave of Court to File Answer in Intervention on the ground that it has legal interest in the upholding of the validity and constitutionality of City Ordinance No. 343-97 because SRA and Top Service had been unjustifiably demanding payment from them for the use of Marcos Alvarez Avenue.
PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:
RTC Ruled in favor of SRA and Top Services.
Ordered the annotation of the notice of lis pendens on the lots of RAMPI.
CA Orders the Registry of Deeds to cancel the notices of lis pendens annotated on all the TCT of Royal South Subdivision project of the respondent-appellant Equitable PCI Bank (now BDO)
ISSUE/S:
● WON the notice of lis pendens on the property of BDO should be cancelled.
RULING:
WHEREFORE, the petitions in G.R. Nos. 202384 and 202397 are DENIED. The Decision dated March 9, 2012 and the Resolution dated June 20, 2012 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 91117 are AFFIRMED.
RATIO:
● Yes.
SRA's argument that the order of the RTC to annotate the notice of lis pendens on BDO's titles has attained finality, and thus, can no longer be cancelled, is erroneous. As expressly provided under Section 77 of PD 1529, before final judgment, the notice of lis pendens may be cancelled upon order of the court after proper showing that the notice is for the purpose of molesting the adverse party, or that it is not necessary to protect the rights of the party who caused it to be recorded.
On the other hand, after final judgment, the notice of lis pendens is rendered functus officio. Thus, under Section 77 of PD 1529, in cases where there is already a final judgment, the notice of lis pendens may be cancelled upon the registration of a certificate of the clerk of court in which the action or proceeding was pending stating the manner of disposal thereof.
SABADO v. SABADO
May 12, 202 |G.R. No. 214270 | Hernando, J. | Rule 14
PETITIONER: Jay v. Sabado
RESPONDENT: Tina Marie L. Sabado, for herself and her minor children
DOCTRINE:
Jurisdiction over the person of the respondent in a petition for TPO/PPO under RA 9262 can be acquired through any of the means of serving summons under the Rules of Court. In an action in personam such as a petition for TPO/PPO under RA 9262, the purpose of summons is two-fold: (1) to notify the defendant that an action has been brought against him; and (2) to acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant.
FACTS:
1. A Petition for Temporary and Permanent Protection Order, Support and Support Pendente Lite was filed by Tina against her husband Jay.
a. Tina alleged that she and Jay would quarrel often over petty things, even during her pregnancy. There came a time when Jay abandoned Tina and their children, depriving them of financial support. By February 2012, the monthly allotment from Jay which previously amounted to $4,000.00 was reduced to $2,500.00. Jay also stopped visiting their children.
2. Thus, Tina prayed for the issuance of a Temporary Protection Order (TPO), the grant of P120,000.00 monthly support to be remitted automatically by Jay's employer, and the eventual issuance of a Permanent Protection Order (PPO).
3. The court sheriff made several attempts to personally serve the summons, petition, and TPO to Jay at his address but the security guard said he was not around. He also tried to serve them at the office of his employer, only to be told that appellant was abroad for deployment.
a. Atty. Gary Palmero, counsel of Jay in a criminal case for violation of Republic Act No. 9262, went to Branch 136 and received a copy of the Order and Petition as evidenced by the latter's signature therein.
b. On January 17, 2013, Jay filed an Entry of Appearance with Opposition to the Issuance of Permanent Protection Order where he asserted that he was merely a chief officer and not a ship captain.
PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:
RTC ● The trial court issued an Order denying the admission of appellant's Opposition for having been belatedly filed two (2) months after the issuance of the TPO.
● The trial court issued a PPO in favor of Tina. It pointed out that Jay already waived his opportunity to oppose the petition for his failure to file the necessary pleading on time.
CA ● The CA affirmed the findings of the trial court.
● It held that there was no improper service of summons. The notice received by counsel representing a party in an action in court is equivalent to notice to the party himself. Consequently, when Atty. Palmero received the copy of the Order and TPO, Jay was considered to have been duly notified as well.
ISSUE/S:
WON the service of order and TPO made to Atty. Palmero constitutes a valid service of summons. – NO.
RULING:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
RATIO:
1. NO.
● Summons is a procedural tool. It is a writ by which the defendant is notified that an action was brought against him or her. In an action in personam, brought to enforce personal rights and obligations, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is mandatory. In such actions, therefore, summonses serve not only to notify the defendant of the filing of an action, but also to enable acquisition of jurisdiction over his person.
o A protection order is not a procedural mechanism , which is imperative for the progression of an initiated action. Rather, it is itself a substantive relief which prevents further acts of violence against a woman or her child.
o The similarities of a summons and a protection order begin and end with their informative capacity. At no point does the Anti-VAWC Law intimate that the temporary protection order is the means for acquiring jurisdiction over the person of the respondent.
o Section 15 of the Anti-VAWC Law's reference to "immediate personal service" is an incident of the underlying urgency which compelled the ex parte issuance of a protection order. It should not be construed as a restriction on the manner of acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of the respondent.
● Jurisdiction over the person of the respondent in a petition for TPO/PPO under RA 9262 can be acquired through any of the means of serving summons under the Rules of Court.
o In an action in personam such as a petition for TPO/PPO under RA 9262, the purpose of summons is two-fold: (1) to notify the defendant that an action has been brought against him; and (2) to acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant.
o When the defendant does not voluntarily submit to the court's jurisdiction or when there is no valid service of summons, any judgment of the court which has no jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is null and void.
● In the case at bar, the sheriff attempted to personally serve the summons, petition, and TPO in Jay's residence and place of employment as per the Sheriff's Return.
o However, records show that Jay was out of the country from August 7, 2012 to January 5, 2013 due to his overseas employment. Since personal service could not be effected upon him, summons should be served through substituted service, extraterritorial service, or by publication in accordance with Sections 7, 15 and 16, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court.
o Notably, none of these modes of service were resorted to by Tina.
● Granting arguendo that Jay knew of the pending TPO case against him, whether through Atty. Palmero or another person, the requirement of summons cannot be dispensed with. Jurisdiction over the person of the defendant cannot be acquired notwithstanding his knowledge of the pendency of a case against him, unless he was validly served with summons. Thus, serving the order and TPO to Atty. Palmero cannot be considered a valid service of summons.
SAROL vs. Sps. DIAO
December 9, 2020 | GR No. 244129 | Service on Address indicated in the Complaint
PETITIONER: ELEONOR SAROL
RESPONDENTS: SPOUSES GEORGE GORDON DIAO AND MARILYN A. DIAO, ET. AL.
DOCTRINE: Jurisdiction over the person did not acquired by the court.
FACTS:
VERSION OF SAROL: In 2007, petitioner Sarol purchased from a certain Claire Chiu a parcel of land in Negros Oriental. Sarol claims to have purchased the property (“LOT 7150”) for P2,000,000.00, where she initially
paid P1,800,000.00 and settled the remaining balance amounting to P200,000.00 in 2011. On July 20, 2011, the Deed of Sale over the property was executed and there was an issuance of TCT under the name of the Petitioner Sarol.
Sarol had been in possession of the property since 2007 and began developing a beach resort. She eventually left the Philippines to reside in Germany. Her father, Emproso Sarol, was the one who managed all her assets and properties (beach resort and the LOT 7150) together with Marie Jeane Alanta who also managed the beach resort.
VERSION OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT: On the other hand, Spouses Diao claim that their property is adjacent to Lot No. 7150. According to them, upon the survey of the property, the vendor, Claire Chu erroneously included their property specifically including their 464 square meters. Technically there is OVERLAP of the property of Sarol and the property of the Private Respondents. They immediately demanded Claire Chiu and Sarol to return their portion of the property, but to no avail
FILING OF THE COMPLAINT:
Spouses Diao filed a complaint with the RTC of Dumaguete, against Claire Chiu, her husband Ginghis Chiu, the Register of Deeds of Negros Oriental, and Sarol Spouses Diao sought to partially cancel the contracts from which Claire Chiu derived ownership over Lot No. 7150, to reconvey an area of 464 square meters from said property in their favor and to hold Claire Chiu and Sarol liable for damages.
RTC CIVIL PROCEDURE: Summons was issued for service to Claire Chiu, her husband Ginghis Chiu, the Register of Deeds of Negros Oriental, and Sarol. The address of Sarol indicated in the summons states "Guinsuan, Poblacion, Zamboanguita, Negros Oriental or the location of the property she purchased from Claire Chiu. Respondent Sheriff Tale issued a Sheriffs Return of Summons which states that:
● summons was served on Claire Chiu
● summons was NOT served on to Sarol "on the ground that she is out of the country."
So the Private Respondent moved for the issuance of alias summons.
Sheriff Tale stated his three failed attempts to personally serve the alias summon to Sarol at Guinsuan, Poblacion, Zamboanguita, Negros Oriental.
O on July 10, 2015, the alias summons was not served because nobody was around the location.
O In the evening of the same date, he, again failed to serve the alias summons after receiving information from the caretaker that Sarol left a few days ago
O Early morning of July 11, 2015, Sheriff Tale spoke with the caretaker and learned that Sarol arrived the Philippines on July 3, 2015 and left for Germany on July 7, 2015;
O that the caretaker had no idea of Sarol's return.
Spouses Diao moved that summons be served by publication in a newspaper of general circulation in the City of Dumaguete and in the Province of Negros Oriental pursuant to Section 15, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court on extraterritorial service of summons.
Meanwhile, Claire Chiu filed an answer to the complaint= JURISDICTION ACQUIRED BY THE RTC But Sarol failed to file any pleadings. RTC declared them in default and allowed spouses to present evidence ex parte.
PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:
RTC ● Ordering the defendants to reconvey to the plaintiff the 464 Square meter portion of Lot No. 7150 by executing deed of conveyance. RTC’s decision became final and issued a Writ of Execution.
CA ● Sarol is a Filipino resident, who was temporarily out of the country. Therefore, the rules on service of summons under Section 16, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court is applicable.
● Under Section 16, service of summons, to a resident defendant, who is temporarily out of the country, may be effected by modes provided for in Section 15, Rule 14 of the Rul es of Court.
● Section 15 on extraterritorial service of summons, one of the modes of service may be "effected x x x by publication in a newspaper of general circulation, in which case a copy of the summons and order of the court shall be sent by registered mail to the last known address of the defendant x x x"
● In the case at bar, personal service of the summons and the alias summons could not be effected at Sarol's address in Guinsuan, Poblacion, Zamboanguita, Negros Oriental because Sarol was out of the c ountry.
● Spouses Diao moved for the service of summons by publication which the RTC granted Therefore, there is PROPER SUMMONS BY PUBLICATION.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the RTC acquired jurisdiction.
RULING:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolution dated December 13, 2018 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 12099 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision dated December 13, 2017 and the Writ of Execution dated May 2, 2018 of the Regional Trial Court of Dumaguete City, Branch 44 in Civil Case No. 2015-15007 are declared NULL and VOID.
SO ORDERED.
RATIO:
NO. THE RTC DID NOT ACQUIRED JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON.
The SC explained that in order to effect the proper service of summons it is crucial to furnish the correct address of the defendant or respondent in a complaint because this is a DUE PROCESS.
Failure of this is a jurisdictional defect. Thus, absent the proper service of summons, the trial court does not acquire jurisdiction and renders null and void all subsequent proceedings and issuances in relation to the case.
In the case at bar, the summons and alias summons issued by the court to Sarol indicated her residential address at "Guinsuan, Poblacion, Zamboanguita, Negros Oriental." Which is the property (LOT 7150).
Spouses Diao considered the location of the property to be Sarol's place of residence. It reveals then that her residence was in: Tamisu, Bais City, Negros Oriental. Which is stipulated in the deed of sale as well or the TCT under Sarol’s name.
Therefore, Sarol’s residence was in Tamisu, Bais City, Negros Oriental. Which the service of summon must be served. The preferred mode of service of summons shall be done personally upon the defendant or respondent.
However, our rules set out other modes of service.
Section 7, Rule 14.
Therefore, service of summons to Sarol, even by substituted service, should have been effected in Tamisu, Bais City, Negros Oriental. Assuming that, Guinsuan, Poblacion, Zamboanguita, Negros Oriental is Sarol's regular place of business.
SC held that there was no substituted service effected because:
The Sheriff's Return of Summons (april 16, 2015 and july 25, 2015 for the alias summon) is an unsuccessful service because she was out of the country. The returns of the sheriff do not state that substituted service of summons was made to the designated persons provided under Section 7, Rule 14.
RECOURSE OF THE SPOUSES DIAO: SERVICE OF SUMMON BY PUBLICATION AND EXTRATERRITORIAL SERVICE.
Through extraordinary modes which require leave of court and the court is required to fully comply with all the requirements of permitting service by publication. To avail this mode, the action or complaint filed against a non resident defendant:
o(1) affects the personal status of the plaintiff or relates to; or
o(2) the subject of which, is property within the Philippines, in which the defendant has or claims a lien or interest, actual or contingent;
o(3) in which the relief demanded consists, wholly or in part, in excluding the defendant from any interest therein; or
o(4) the property of the defendant has been attached within the Philippines.
In the case at bar:
oSarol is out of the country and the action pertains to her interest over a parcel of land located in the Philippines
The RTC granted the extraterritorial service on Sarol by publication in a newspaper of general circulation in the. City of Dumaguete and in the Province of Negros Oriental, for two consecutive weeks and to send copies of the summons and of the order of the court a quo by registered mail to the last known address o f Sarol in Guinsuan, Poblacion,
Zamboanguita Negros Oriental.
Under Sec.15, Rule 14, ROC provides that:
O publication must be duly observed and copies of the summons and order of the court be served at Sarol's last known correct address by registered mail, as a complement to the publication.
O Failure to strictly comply with the requirements of the rules regarding the mailing of copies of the summons and the order for its publication is a fatal defect in the service of summons.
Again, the summon and the order of publication must be served or mailed in her residence which is in : Tamisu, Bais City, Negros Oriental.
=DEFECT OF SERVICE OF SUMMON THROUGH PUBLICATION
Since, there is defect of the service of summon (personal and publication), there is violation of due process which renders the proceedings and issuances NULL AND VOID.
Our rules explicitly provide that lack of jurisdiction is one of the grounds in a petition for annulment of judgment. Had there been the proper service of summons, Sarol would have had such remedies as, a motion for new trial, appeal, certiorari, petition for relief from judgment, among others, to assail the Decision of the RTC.
Yap v. Lagtapon
23 January 2017 | GR No. 196347 | Caguioa, J. | Personal Service
PETITIONER: SUSAN A. YAP
RESPONDENTS: ELIZABETH LAGTAPON
DOCTRINE:
It is axiomatic that a public official enjoys the presumption of regularity in the discharge of one's official duties and functions. Here, in the absence of clear indicia of partiality or malice, the service of Summons on petitioner Yap is perforce deemed regular and valid. Correspondingly, the Return of Service of Precioso as process server of the RTC constitutes prima facie evidence of the facts set out therein.
To successfully overcome such presumption of regularity, case law demands that the evidence against it must be clear and convincing; absent the requisite quantum of proof to the contrary, the presumption stands deserving of faith and credit. In this case, the burden of proof to discharge such presumption lay with petitioner Yap.
FACTS:
1. On 9 October 1997, [respondent Lagtapon] instituted a civil suit against [petitioner Yap] for a sum of money with the Regional Trial Court of Negros Occidental docketed as Civil Case No. 97-9991 and the same was raffled off to the respondent court.
2. Summons was issued and as per return of service of summons dated 4 November 1997 prepared by the process server of the respondent court in the person of Ray R. Precioso, he served on November 4, 1997 the summons on [petitioner Yap] who, however, refused to acknowledge receipt thereof, thus, compelling him to tender the same and left (sic) a copy thereof for her.
3. As no answer was filed, [respondent Lagtapon] filed a motion to declare [petitioner Yap] in default dated 16 December 1997. The said motion was granted by the respondent court in an order issued on 12 January 1998 declaring [petitioner Yap] in default and allowing [respondent Lagtapon] to present her evidence ex-parte on 9 February 1998.
4. The Ex-Officio Provincial Sheriff for Negros Occidental issued a notice of sale on execution dated 25 September 2000 setting the auction sale of petitioner's property on 17 October 2000. The property of petitioner that was put up for execution sale consists of a parcel of land identified as Lot 11, Block 2 of the subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-91608 covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-110467 situated at Herminia Street, Villa Valderrama (sic), Barangay Mandalagan, Bacolod City.
5. Proceeding from such developments, petitioner Yap filed the subject Petition for Annulment with the CA, assailing the RTC Decision on the ground that Summons was not validly served on her, which thus prevented the RTC from acquiring jurisdiction over her person. 7 In particular, petitioner Yap alleged that at the time Summons was allegedly served on November 4, 1997 (as evidenced by the Return of Service), 8 she was not residing in either of the addresses supplied by respondent Lagtapon in her Complaint, 9 namely: (i) Herminia Street, Villa Valderama, Bacolod City, and (ii) Frankfurt Street, Jesusa Heights, Bacolod City.
6. With respect to the first address, petitioner Yap claimed that while she used to reside therein, she had already moved out from the said address sometime in June 1997 and started leasing out the same on July 1998. 11 Hence, the Summons could not have been served on her on November 4, 1997, as she had already vacated from the said address by then.
7. Meanwhile, regarding the second address, petitioner Yap averred that she never resided at any such place. Allegedly, at the time of the service of Summons, she was residing somewhere else, specifically in "Frankfurt Street, Sunshine Valley Subdivision, Barangay Estefania, Bacolod City" (as compared to "Frankfurt Street, Hesusa (sic) Heights, Bacolod City"), which she started leasing from June 1997 (upon vacating the first address) until September 1999.
8. Simply put, petitioner Yap wholly denied the fact of service of Summons, as reflected in the Return of Service dated November 4, 1997 14 accomplished by the RTC's process server, Roy R. Precioso (Precioso).
9. Notably, it was stated in the said Return that the Summons, together with a copy of the Complaint and its annexes, was served personally on petitioner Yap on November 4, 1997, at about 4:35 p.m., and that the latter refused to sign the same, which prompted Precioso to tender and leave a copy of the Summons with petitioner Yap. 15 While the place of service was not indicated in the Return, it should be noted that Precioso subsequently executed an Affidavit dated February 21, 2001, attesting to the fact that he served the Summons on petitioner Yap at "Frankfurt Street, Hesusa Village, Bacolod City".
PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:
CA ● Denied Yap’s Petition for Annulment and upheld the validity of the service of Summons on petitioner Yap. The CA held that petitioner Yap's evidence failed to rebut the presumption of regularity, i.e., that she failed to satisfactorily establish the fact that she was residing elsewhere during the time of the service of Summons, contrary to what was stated in the Return of Service.
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether CA ommitted reversible error in dismissing the Petition for Annulment and ruling that the RTC had validly acquired jurisdiction over petitioner Yap's person through service of summons.
RULING: .
NO. WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the Court resolves to DENY the instant Petition and AFFIRM in toto the Decision dated July 27, 2006 and Resolution dated February 23, 2011 of the Court of Appeals-Twentieth (20th) Division in CA-G.R. SP No. 61944.
It is axiomatic that a public official enjoys the presumption of regularity in the discharge of one's official duties and functions. Here, in the absence of clear indicia of partiality or malice, the service of Summons on petitioner Yap is perforce deemed regular and valid. Correspondingly, the Return of Service of Precioso as process server of the RTC constitutes prima facie evidence of the facts set out therein.
To successfully overcome such presumption of regularity, case law demands that the evidence against it must be clear and convincing; absent the requisite quantum of proof to the contrary, the presumption stands deserving of faith and credit. In this case, the burden of proof to discharge such presumption lay with petitioner Yap.
With respect to item (i), petitioner Yap would want the Court to rely on statements allegedly made by petitioner Yap's neighbors with respect to a purported lease contract between petitioner Yap and her landlord in lieu of a statement from the landlord himself. In the first place, the records are bereft of any lease contract involving the residence in the Sunshine Valley address
All told, the Court hereby upholds the finding of the CA in its questioned Decision that petitioner Yap's evidence does not constitute clear and convincing evidence to overturn the presumption of regularity attendant to the Return of Service. Following Umandap v. Sabio, Jr., 69 self-serving assertions made by an aggrieved party are insufficient to disregard the statements made in the sheriff's certificate after service of Summons. In light of petitioner Yap's failure to rebut such presumption, the Court finds that the RTC properly acquired jurisdiction over petitioner Yap's person, which renders the RTC Decision valid. Accordingly, the CA correctly dismissed the subject Petition for Annulment.
SAROL V. SPOUSES DIAO
December 9, 2020| GR No. 244129 | CARANDANG, J.| Substituted Service
PETITIONER: ELEONOR SAROL
RESPONDENTS: SPOUSES GEORGE GORDON DIAO AND MARILYN A. DIAO, ET. AL.
DOCTRINE:
The service of summons is vital and indispensable to defendant's right to due process. A violation of this due process is a jurisdictional defect which renders null and void all subsequent proceedings and issuances in relation to the case.
RECIT- READY SUMMARY:
Petitioner Sarol purchased from a certain Claire Chiu a parcel of land. Sarol eventually left for Germany while her father Emproso Sarol managed her properties in the Philippines. Spouses Diao claim that their property is adjacent to lot. Claire Chiu caused to survey the property, however, the area, as surveyed, is erroneous because it included 464 square meters of Spouses Diao's property. Thus, Spouses Diao filed a complaint with the RTC sought to partially cancel the contracts. Respondent Sheriff Tale issued a Sheriffs Return of Summons, which states that summons was served on Claire Chiu but could not be served to Sarol "on the ground that she is out of the country." Spouses Diao then moved for the issuance of alias summons.
The Court ruled that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over Sarol. Absent the proper service of summons, the trial court does not acquire jurisdiction and renders null and void all subsequent proceedings and issuances in relation to the case. Section 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court allows the substituted service of summons if, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be served within a reasonable time. It shall be effected by leaving copies of the summons: (a) at the defendant's residence with some person of suitable age and discretion residing therein; or (b) at the defendant's place of business with some competent person in charge thereof.
FACTS:
1. Petitioner Sarol purchased from a certain Claire Chiu a parcel of land. Sarol claims to have purchased the property for P2,000,000.00, where she initially paid P1,800,000.00 and settled the remaining balance amounting to P200,000.00.
2. Sarol had been in possession of the property since 2007 and began developing a beach resort. She eventually left the Philippines to reside in Germany. Her father, Emproso Sarol, was made to manage all her assets in the Philippines, and Marie Jeane Alanta-ol to manage the beach resort.
3. Spouses Diao claim that their property is adjacent to lot. Prior the sale, Claire Chiu caused to survey the property yielding an area of 1,217 square meters. However, the area, as surveyed, is erroneous because it included 464 square meters of Spouses Diao's property.
4. They immediately demanded Claire Chiu and Sarol to return their portion of the property, but to no avail.
5. Spouses Diao filed a complaint with the RTC sought to partially cancel the contracts from which Claire Chiu derived ownership over Lot, to reconvey an area of 464 square meters from said property in their favor and to hold Claire Chiu and Sarol liable for damages.
PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:
RTC ● Summons was issued for service to Claire Chiu, her husband Ginghis Chiu, the Register of Deeds of Negros Oriental, and Sarol. The address of Sarol indicated in the summons states "Guinsuan, Poblacion, Zamboanguita, Negros Oriental," or the location of the property she purchased from Claire Chiu.
● Respondent Sheriff Tale issued a Sheriffs Return of Summons, which states that summons was served on Claire Chiu but could not be served to Sarol "on the ground that she is out of the country." Spouses Diao then moved for the issuance of alias summons.
● Upon motion of Spouses Diao, Claire Chiu and Sarol were declared in default.
● The RTC rendered a Decision in favor of Spouses Diao.
CA ● The CA dismissed the petition for annulment of judgment and held that Sarol is a Filipino resident, who was temporarily out of the country. Thus, the rules on service of summons under Section 16, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court is applicable.
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not the RTC acquired jurisdiction over Sarol.
RULING:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.
RATIO:
NO.
The proper service of summons is important because it serves to acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant or respondent, or to notify said person of the action filed against them and to afford an opportunity to be heard on the claims made against them. Thus, absent the proper service of summons, the trial court does not acquire jurisdiction and renders null and void all subsequent proceedings and issuances in relation to the case.
Here, the summons and alias summons issued by the court a quo to Sarol indicated her residential address at "Guinsuan, Poblacion, Zamboanguita, Negros Oriental." The address is undisputedly the location of the property, which is the subject matter of this case. However, the records pertaining to Sarol's claim over the subject property reveal that her place of residence is in Tamisu, Bais City, Negros Oriental. The Deed of Sale between Sarol and Claire Chiu indicates that Sarol's residence is in "Tamisu, Bais City." The transfer certificate of title registered under Sarol's name for the subject property also indicates that Sarol's place of residence is in "Tamisu, Bais City, Negros Oriental Central Visayas. Absent any allegation and evidence to prove otherwise, We give credence to Sarol's position that her place of residence is not in Guinsuan, Poblacion, Zamboanguita, Negros Oriental. For this reason, the service of summons should have been made in Tamisu, Bais City, Negros Oriental.
The preferred mode of service of summons shall be done personally upon the defendant or respondent. However, our rules set out other modes of service. Section 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court allows the substituted service of summons if, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be served within a reasonable time. It shall be effected by leaving copies of the summons: (a) at the defendant's residence with some person of suitable age and discretion residing therein; or (b) at the defendant's place of business with some competent person in charge thereof. "Dwelling house" or "residence" refers to the place where the person named in the summons is living at the time when the service is made, even though he may be temporarily out of the country at the time.
Therefore, service of summons to Sarol, even by substituted service, should have been effected in Tamisu, Bais City, Negros Oriental. Assuming that Guinsuan, Poblacion, Zamboanguita, Negros Oriental is Sarol's regular place of business, We find that there was no substituted service effected. The Sheriff's Return of Summons and Sheriff's Return of Alias Summons report the unsuccessful service to Sarol because she is out of the country. Sheriff Tale accounted in the Return of Alias Summons that he merely inquired from the caretaker the whereabouts of Sarol. From the foregoing, the returns of the sheriff do not state that substituted service of summons was made to the designated persons provided under Section 7, Rule 14.
Spouses Diao are not totally without recourse as the rules allow summons by publication and extraterritorial service. These are extraordinary modes which require leave of court. In fact, in view of Sheriff Tale's reports of failure to serve summons on Sarol, Spouses Diao moved for the extraterritorial service of summons by publication under Section 15, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. Under this rule, one of the modes to effect the extraterritorial service of summons is by publication in a newspaper of general circulation in such places and for such time as the court may order, in which case a copy of the summons and order of the court shall be sent by registered mail to the last known correct address of the defendant. Furthermore, to avail this mode, the action or complaint filed against a nonresident defendant: (1) affects the personal status of the plaintiff or relates to; or (2) the subject of which, is property within the Philippines, in which the defendant has or claims a lien or interest, actual or contingent; or (3) in which the relief demanded consists, wholly or in part, in excluding the defendant from any interest therein; or (4) the property of the defendant has been attached within the Philippines.
We reiterate that the service of summons is vital and indispensable to defendant's right to due process. A violation of this due process is a jurisdictional defect which renders null and void all subsequent proceedings and issuances in relation to the case. Thus, the judgment and the Writ of Execution issued by the RTC of Dumaguete City is null and void.
EUCDI UNITED CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT, INC. V. DE GUZMAN
September 16, 2020 | GR No. 196836 |, J.| Substituted Service
PETITIONER: EUCDI UNITED CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT, INC. (EUCDI), EUNICON UNITED CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT, INC. (EUNICON), EMMANUEL ESPESO, ABRAHAM ESPESO, ADAMSON IBAÑEZ, AND JEGUNDINA ESPESO
RESPONDENTS: SARA FRANCESCA SOLIVEN DE GUZMAN
DOCTRINE:
The preferred mode of service of summons is personal service. It is effected by handling a copy of the summons to the defendantin person, or, if he refuses to receive and sign for it, by tendering it to him. If the defendant is a domestic private juridical entity, service may be made on its president, managing partner, general manager, corporate secretary, treasurer, or in-house counsel. This enumeration is exclusive.
FACTS:
1. Respondent filed before the RTC of QC a complaint for sum of money and damages with prayer for ex-parte issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment against petitioners. This arised from the agreement to construct a house for respondent and despite the 50% advance payment made by the latter, EUCDI failed to fulfill its obligation as no progress was made on the construction site. Thus, she demanded that EUCDI return the downpayment.
2. The case was raffled and RTC granted the prayer for preliminary attachment.
3. In the Sheriff's Return it was reported that the Sheriff had served copies of the summons on petitioners EUCDI, EUNICON, Abraham, Adamson and Emmanuel through EUCDI's secretary and receiving officer Mhel C. Marquez.
4. On the same day, he also submitted a Partial Officer's Return, reporting that his efforts to effect personal service of summons on petitioners proved to be futile and that the garnishment of petitioners' bank account did not go smoothly.
5. Petitioners moved to quash the summons and the writ of attachment/garnishment on ground that the court allegedly failed to acquire jurisdiction over their persons since Ms. Mhel C. Marquez upon whom the summons was served was neither the president, managing partner, general manager, corporate secretary, treasurer nor in-house counsel of EUCDI and EUNICON.
6. Furthermore, they argued that substituted service was not validly effected on them either for the Sheriff's Return did not state that it was impossible to effect personal service despite the sheriff's efforts to do so within a reasonable time; for some justifiable reasons, personal service cannot be effected; and service was done at the defendant's residence or defendant's office or regular place of business. In view of the flawed service of summons therefore in this case, the court did not acquire jurisdiction over their persons, hence, the writ of preliminary attachment/garnishment was invalid.
7. Sheriff then issued a Notice of Levy on Preliminary Attachment of petitioners' personal properties. Through his Second Partial Officer's Return, he reported that he succeeded in serving summons on Spouses Emmanuel and Jegundina Espeso and the attachment of some of their properties
PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:
RTC ● Denied petitioners' motion to quash summons and writ of attachment/garnishment, as well as Jegundina's motion to dismiss.
● Failure to personally serve summons on petitioners was not due to his own fault but to the unavailability of the corporate officers at their principal place of business and their alleged residences.
● Denied MR.
CA ● Via Petition for certiorari. Concurred in the trial court's finding that Sheriff's returns categorically bore the circumstances showing that it was futile to effect personal service of summons on petitioners, hence, substituted service through Marquez became necessary. At any rate, Sheriff enjoyed the presumption of regularity in the performance of his official functions.
ISSUE/S:
Did the trial court acquire jurisdiction over the persons of petitioners? - YES
RULING:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated February 16, 2011 and Resolution dated May 12, 2011 in CA G.R. SP No. 103594 are AFFIRMED.
The letter dated February 20, 2017 of Ms. Aurora A. Mua, Records Officer III, Office-in-Charge, Archives Section, Judicial Records Division, Court of Appeals, Manila, transmitting the rollo of CA G.R. SP No. 103594 with 555 pages, is NOTED.
RATIO:
YES.
Regardless of the type of action — whether it is in personam, in rem or quasi in rem — the preferred mode of service of summons is personal service. It is effected by handling a copy of the summons to the defendantin person, or, if he refuses to receive and sign for it, by tendering it to him. If the defendant is a domestic private juridical entity, service may be made on its president, managing partner, general manager, corporate secretary, treasurer, or in-house counsel. This enumeration is exclusive. Hence, service of summons made upon persons other than those enumerated is invalid.
Here, the Returns having sufficiently established petitioners' wrongful act of evading personal service, the Court deems the substituted serviceeffected on petitioners' secretary Mhel Marquez to be substantially compliant with the requirements of the law. To rule otherwise would inflict further injustice on private respondent whose quest for justice has already been delayed for over fourteen (14) years now with nary a clear resolution at sight.
CCC INSURANCE COPR. V. KAWASAKI STEEL CORP.
June 22, 2015 | G.R. No. 156162| Leonardo-De Castro, J. | Summons
DOCTRINE:
The regular mode of serving summons upon a private Philippine Corporation is by personal service upon one of the officers of such corporation identified in Section 13 of 1964 Rules of Court. Ordinarily, such personal service may be expected to be made at the principal office of the corporation. Section 13, does not, however, impose such requirement, and so personal service upon the corporation may be effected through service upon, for instance, the president of the corporation at his office or residential address.
FACTS:
Kawasaki and FF Mañacop Construction Inc (FMMCI) , formed a consortium agreement for the purpose of contracting with the Philippine Government for the construction of a fishing port network in Pangasinan. The Republic made an advance payment for the Project to the Kawasaki-FFMCCI Consortium in the amount of P9,300,066.15, representing 15% of the contract price of P62,000,441.00. The Consortium secured a surety bond to counter-guarantee the advance payment made and a letter of credit (performance bond) to guarantee faithful performance of the obligations in the construction contract. FMMCI ceased performing its work on the project. Kawasaki informed CCC Insurance Corp. (CCCIC) about the cessation of operations of FFMCCI, and the failure of FFMCCI to perform its obligations in the Project and repay the advance payment made by Kawasaki. Consequently, Kawasaki formally demanded that CCCIC, as surety, pay Kawasaki the amounts covered by the Surety and Performance Bonds. Unheeded, Kawasaki went to RTC to file a complaint against CCCIC to collect on the said surety bond and the performance bond but CCCIC denied any liability. CCCIC subsequently filed a Third-Party Complaint against FFMCCI and its President Mafiacop based on the two Indemnity Agreements which FFMCCI and Mañacop executed in favor of CCCIC. The RTC issued summonses but FFMCCI and Mañacop failed to file any responsive pleading to the Third-Party Complaint of CCCIC. Upon motion of CCCIC, the RTC issued an Order declaring FFMCCI and Mañacop in default. The RTC rendered a decision dismissing the Complaint of Kawasaki and the counterclaim of CCCIC. On appeal, The CA partially granted the Third-Party Complaint of CCCIC by holding Mafiacop liable under the Indemnity Agreements he executed in favor of the insurance company, while declaring the RTC was without jurisdiction over FFMCCI due to invalid service of summons.
ISSUE/S:
Whether a service through on e of the directors of a corporation is a valid service of summons.
RULING:
Yes. Rule 14, Section 13 of the 1964 Rules of Court, which was then in force, allowed the service of summons upon a director of a private domestic corporation.
Sec. 13 provides. “ Service upon private domestic corporation or partnership. - If the defendant is a corporation organized under the laws of the Philippines or a partnership duly registered, service may be made on the president, manager, secretary, cashier, agent, or any of its directors.”
The appellate court overlooked the fact that the service of summons on FFMCCI at its principal address at #86 West Avenue, Quezon City failed because FFMCCI had already vacated said premises without notifying anyone as to where it transferred. For this reason, the RTC, upon the motion of CCCIC, issued an Order , directing the issuance and service of Alias Summons to the individual directors of FFMCCI. Eventually, the Alias Summons was personally served upon FFMCCI director Vicente Concepcion.
Since the aforementioned rule does not require that service on the private domestic corporation be served at its principal office in order for the court to acquire jurisdiction over the same, the personal service of the Alias Summons on an FFMCCI director was sufficient for the RTC to acquire jurisdiction over FFMCCI itself.
INTEGRATED MICRO ELECTRONICS INC. v. STANDARD INSURANCE CO, INC.
August 27, 2020 | GR No. 210302 | Lopez, J. | Service Upon Private Domestic Juridical Entity - Exclusive List
PETITIONER: Integrated Micro Electronics Inc.
RESPONDENTS: Standard Insurance Co, Inc.
DOCTRINE:
Sec. 11. Service upon domestic private juridical entity. — When the defendant is a corporation, partnership or association organized under the laws of the Philippines with a juridical personality, service may be made on the president, managing partner, general manager, corporate secretary, treasurer, or in-house counsel.
The enumeration under the new rule is restricted, limited and exclusive following the rule in statutory construction that expressio imios est exclusio cilterius. Had the Rules of Court Revision Committee intended to liberalize the rule on service of summons, we said, it could have easily done so by clear and concise language. Absent a manifest intent to liberalize the rule, we stressed strict compliance with Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
FACTS:
1. On May 24, 2009, a fire broke out at Integrated Micro's building causing damage to its production equipment and machineries.
2. Integrated Micro filed a claim for indemnity from Standard Insurance but was rejected on Feb 24, 2010 on the ground that the cause of the loss was an excluded peril.
3. Almost a year thereafter, on April 11, 2011, Integrated Micro filed a complaint for specific performance and damages against Standard Insurance before the RTC asking actual damages of US$1,117,056.84, or its peso equivalent at the time of loss, or the amount of P52,892,641.35.
4. Standard Insurance moved to dismiss the complaint for invalid service of summons, lack of cause of action, and prescription.
5. Allegedly, the summons was served upon the legal assistant or the secretary of Standard Insurance's in-house counsel, who was not authorized to receive summons under Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Court.
PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:
RTC ● RTC denied the motion to dismiss and directed Standard Insurance to file a responsive pleading
CA ● Standard Insurance filed a petition for certiorari, the CA granted the petition and ruled that Integrated Micro's cause of action had prescribed and that the summons was improperly served
ISSUE/S:
[Numbered paragraphs]
1. WON the service of summons was invalid
RULING:
Sec. 11. Service upon domestic private juridical entity. — When the defendant is a corporation, partnership or association organized under the laws of the Philippines with a juridical personality, service may be made on the president, managing partner, general manager, corporate secretary, treasurer, or in-house counsel.
Notably, this provision amended Rule 14, Section 1326 of the 1964 Rules of Court that allowed service to an agent of a corporation.ℒαwρhi৷ The new rule, however, has specifically identified and limited the persons to whom service of summons must be made. Contrary to Integrated Micro's assertion, the amendment effectively abandoned the substantial compliance doctrine and restricted the persons authorized to receive summons for juridical entities. As aptly discussed in Sps. Mason v. Court of Appeals,viz.:
The question of whether the substantial compliance rule is still applicable under Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure has been settled in Villarosa which applies squarely to the instant case, x x x We held that there was no valid service of summons on Villarosa as service was made through a person not included in the enumeration in Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which revised the Section 13, Rule 14 of the 1964 Rules of Court. We discarded the trial court's basis for denying the motion to dismiss, namely, private respondent's substantial compliance with the rule on service of summons, and fully agreed with petitioner's assertions that the enumeration under the new rule is restricted, limited and exclusive following the rule in statutory construction that expressio imios est exclusio cilterius. Had the Rules of Court Revision Committee intended to liberalize the rule on service of summons, we said, it could have easily done so by clear and concise language. Absent a manifest intent to liberalize the rule, we stressed strict compliance with Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
FOR THESE REASONS, the petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals' Decision dated March 26, 2013 in CA-G.R. SP No. 124433 is AFFIRMED.
Heirs of Manguiat v. Court of Appeals
August 20, 2008 | G.R. Nos. 150768 & 160176 | PUNO, C.J | Service on Public Corporations
PETITIONER: HEIRS OF MAMERTO MANGUIAT, represented by GERARDO MANGUIAT; HEIRS OF FELIPE MARUDO, represented by JOSE MARUDO; HEIRS OF JULIANA MAILON, represented by GAVINA MAILON MENDOZA; HEIRS OF LEONCIA MERCADO, represented by ANIANA MANGUIAT; HEIRS OF VICENTE PEREZ, represented by SOTERO PEREZ; HEIRS OF VICENTE GARCIA, represented by MACARIO GARCIA LUCIDO; and HEIRS OF TRANQUILINA MENDOZA, represented by RUFINA MENDOZA
RESPONDENTS: THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and J.A. DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
Rule 14, Section 13 of the 1997 Rules of Procedure provides:
SEC. 13. Service upon public corporations. — When the defendant is the Republic of the Philippines, service may be effected on the Solicitor General; in case of a province, city or municipality, or like public corporations, service may be effected on its executive head, or on such other officer or officers as the law or the court may direct. 23
It is clear under the Rules that where the defendant is the Republic of the Philippines, service of summons must be made on the Solicitor General.
FACTS:
On May 14, 1999, Petitioners filed a complaint against respondent J.A. Development Corporation (JDC), Bureau of Telecommunications (BUTEL), Juan dela Cruz, and Pedro dela Cruz with the Regional Trial Court of Tagaytay City for quieting of title and cancellation of certificates of title over Lot 1993, commonly known as the "Calamba Estate".
Petitioners alleged that they succeeded to the rights of their predecessors-in-interest to whom Lot 1993 was awarded on November 13, 1914 by virtue of a Sales Certificate, in accordance with the provisions of the Friar Land Act. Petitioners, thus, sought to annul the Torrens title issued to respondent, BUTEL, Juan dela Cruz, and Pedro dela Cruz.
On May 19, 1999, summons was served on respondent JDC through its employee, Jacqueline de los Santos.
On the same date, summons was served on BUTEL through a certain employee, Cholito Anitola.
The sheriff's return did not describe the position of Mr. Anitola at BUTEL.
Respondent JDC moved to dismiss the complaint on the following grounds: (1) lack of jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter of the case; (2) lack of cause of action; (3) prescription; and (4) improper venue. 4 With leave of court, it supplemented its motion by raising the additional ground of res judicata citing the judgment of the same court in Civil Case No. TG-1516. It contended that Civil Case Nos. TG-1904 and TG-1516 have identical parties and causes of action, and that the order of dismissal of the latter case has long become final due to prescription, and laches has long set in. The motion to dismiss was denied on January 11, 2000. 6 JDC filed a motion for reconsideration which, to date, has not been resolved.
On July 1, 1999, petitioners moved to have BUTEL declared in default for its failure to file an answer despite service of summons and to allow them to present their evidence ex parte.
The motion was granted on November 10, 1999.
A week later, the petitioners presented their evidence before the branch clerk of court acting as commissioner.
PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:
RTC
● RTC promulgated a partial decision against BUTEL.
● On March 28, 2000, petitioners filed a motion to execute.
● On April 7, 2000, respondent JDC moved to set aside the partial decision, arguing in the main that the decision constitutes a prejudgment of the merits of the entire case.
● On July 17, 2000, the trial court denied the motion.
● On August 25, 2000, respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the order.
● On August 8, 2000, the trial court ordered the issuance of a writ of execution.
● On September 15, 2000, respondent JDC filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals to annul: (1) the partial decision dated February 18, 2000; (2) the order dated July 17, 2000; and (3) the writ of execution dated August 8, 2000.
● On October 31, 2000, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed a petition for Annulment of Judgment with the Court of Appeals docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 61703, and raffled to its Ninth Division.
● It sought the nullification of the partial decision dated February 18, 2000 on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
● It alleged that the service of summons made on BUTEL was not valid as it was not made upon the Solicitor General who is its statutory counsel and representative.
CA ● On August 29, 2001, the Fifteenth Division of the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision granting the petition of respondent JDC.
● On January 22, 2003, the Ninth Division of the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision granting the petition of the Republic of the Philippines and setting aside the judgment of the trial court in Civil Case No. TG-1904 for lack of jurisdiction.
● Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but the motion was denied on September 29, 2003.
● They then filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure with this Court which was docketed as G.R. No. 160176.
On May 25, 2005, this Court resolved to consolidate G.R. Nos. 150768 and 160176.
In G.R. No. 160176, petitioners assert that summons was validly served on the Republic of the Philippines considering that the sheriff's return states that it was "duly served". They further aver that Section 13, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure does not limit service of summons to the Solicitor General but allows service on other officers as the court may direct. They point out that the failure to inform the Solicitor General of Civil Case No. TG-1904 can only be attributed to the gross negligence of the BUTEL.
For its part, respondent Republic of the Philippines contends that summons must be served upon it through the Solicitor General and that service of summons on an employee of the BUTEL is insufficient compliance with Section 13, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not jurisdiction over the BUTEL was validly acquired by the Regional Trial Court through service of summons upon its employee whose authority to do so does not appear from the sheriff's return?
RULING:
No. It is clear under the Rules that where the defendant is the Republic of the Philippines, service of summons must be made on the Solicitor General. The records show that the sheriff served summons on an ordinary employee and not on the Solicitor General. Consequently, the trial court acquired no jurisdiction over BUTEL, and all proceedings therein are null and void.
Summons must be served upon a party for valid judgment to be rendered against him. This not only comports with basic procedural law but the constitutional postulate of due process. The disputable presumption that an official duty has been regularly performed will not apply where it is patent from the sheriff's or server's return that it is defective.
Rule 14, Section 13 of the 1997 Rules of Procedure provides:
SEC. 13. Service upon public corporations. — When the defendant is the Republic of the Philippines, service may be effected on the Solicitor General; in case of a province, city or municipality, or like public corporations, service may be effected on its executive head, or on such other officer or officers as the law or the court may direct.
It is clear under the Rules that where the defendant is the Republic of the Philippines, service of summons must be made on the Solicitor General. The BUTEL is an agency attached to the Department of Transportation and Communications created under E.O. No. 546 on July 23, 1979, and is in charge of providing telecommunication facilities, including telephone systems to government offices. It also provides its services to augment limited or inadequate existing similar private communication facilities. It extends its services to areas where no communication facilities exist yet; and assists the private sector engaged in telecommunication services by providing and maintaining backbone telecommunication network. It is indisputably part of the Republic, and summons should have been served on the Solicitor General.
Petitioners rely solely on the sheriff's return to prove that summons was properly served. We quote its contents, viz.:
THIS IS TO CERTIFY that on the 19th day of May 1999, the undersigned caused the service of Summons and Complaint upon defendant J.A. Development Corporation at the address indicated in the summons, the same having been received by a certain Jacqueline delos Santos, a person employed thereat, of sufficient age and discretion to receive such process, who signed on the lower portion of the Summons to acknowledge receipt thereof.
Likewise, copy of the Summons and Complaint was served upon defendant Bureau of Telecommunications at the address indicated in the Summons, a copy of the same was received by a certain Cholito Anitola, a person employed thereat, who signed on the lower portion of the Summons to acknowledge receipt thereof.
It is incumbent upon the party alleging that summons was validly served to prove that all requirements were met in the service thereof. This burden was not discharged by the petitioners. The records show that the sheriff served summons on an ordinary employee and not on the Solicitor General. Consequently, the trial court acquired no jurisdiction over BUTEL, and all proceedings therein are null and void.
SPOUSES ROXAS V. ASIATRUST DEVELOPMENT BANK, INC.
January 6, 2020 | GR No. 203506 | Delos Santos, J., | Third Division | Service when identity or whereabouts of defendant is unknown
PETITIONER: SPS ROXAS
RESPONDENTS: Asiatrust Development Bank, Inc.
DOCTRINE:
Entry of appearance and very urgent omnibus motion to: a) set aside order of default; and b) admit appended answer. The entry of appearance was made without qualification or objection to the RT's jurisdiction. This in itself amounts to voluntary appearance in the proceedings.
FACTS:
Kamakura Food Corporation was granted a Credit Line in the amount of P13,000,000.00 by the Asiatrust Development Bank, Inc. In consideration thereof, its Vice-President, Nancy Dy, along with its authorized signatories, Alfredo and Cecilia Roxas, executed a Continuing Suretyship on May 19, 1999, whereby they jointly and severally bound themselves with Kamakura and guaranteed the full and due payment and performance of all the obligations of Kamakura. They likewise guaranteed that if such obligation was not fully or duly paid or performed on due date thereof, they shall pay and perform the same together with any and all interests, penalties and other fees and charges thereon.
Subsequently, Kamakura, through Nancy Dy, Alfredo and Cecilia Roxas, obtained a loan from Asiatrust in the amount of P7,000,000.00 and P1,000,000.00 evidenced by Promissory Note. Upon maturity of the promissory notes and despite several demands, Kamakura failed to pay its indebtedness.
Consequently, Asiatrust filed a Complaint for Sum of Money and Damages against Kamakura, Nancy Dy, Alfredo and Cecilia Roxas before the Regional Trial Court wherein it alleged that its demands remained unheeded and the loan obligation remains unpaid. Thus, it prayed that judgment be rendered ordering the (petitioners] to pay the following; P25,851,218.72, plus legal interests, judicial expenses and other charges; P500,000.00 as moral damages; P250,000.00 as exemplary damages; P250,000.00 as attorney's fees.
PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:
RTC ● RTC rendered judgment in favor of plaintiff Asiatrust Development Bank, Inc., as substituted by Schuykill Asset Strategists (SPV-AMC) and against the [petitioners], ordering the latter (1) to pay the total loan obligation of P25,851,218.72 plus legal interest from the date this case is filed in court until fully paid; and (2) the costs of suit.
CA ● CA rendered the assailed Decision which partially modified the TC Decision. On the substantive issues, the CA observed that petitioners did not deny that they voluntarily executed the document denominated as Continuing Suretyship, which expressly states that they are jointly and severally liable with Kamakura for the full and due payment and performance of all its obligations.
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not the RTC acquired jurisdiction over their persons despite improper service of summons
RULING:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed April 11, 2012 Decision and September 19, 2012 Resolution issued by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 89871 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Petitioners are ORDERED to pay respondent the following:
1. Seven Million Nine Hundred Forty-Four Thousand Nine Hundred Twenty-Two Pesos and 42/100 (P7,944,922.42) representing the principal amount due, plus the stipulated interest at the rate of 18.5% per annum to be computed from the filing of the complaint on August 15, 2003 until full payment;
2. Legal interest on the 18.5% per annum interest due on the principal amount at the rate of 12% per annum from the filing of the complaint on August 15, 2003 until June 30, 2013, and 6% per annum from July 1, 2013 until full payment;
3. Penalty charges at the rate of 12% per annum computed from the filing of the complaint on August 15, 2003 until full payment; and
4. Costs of suit.
RATIO:
We find no sufficient ground to reverse the findings of the CA, which are in accord with the Rules of Court (Rules), jurisprudence, and the evidence on record. Jurisdiction over a defendant in a civil case is acquired either through service of summons or through voluntary appearance in court. Here, the sheriff attempted several times to serve the summons on petitioners personally, but failed since petitioners* address could not be found and no one can give their possible location. The impossibility of personal service of summons warranted the resort to service by publication pursuant to Section 14, Rule 14 of the Rules. 16 The Court will not delve into factual issues raised by petitioners pertaining to perceived defects in the service of summons by publication. The Court is not a trier of facts. The rule is that factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the CA, are deemed conclusive and binding upon the Court. This is subject to exceptions, but none of those are present in this case. Petitioners argument that service of summons by publication is improper in a suit for the collection of sum of money lacks merit. We had occasion to clarify the matter in the case of Santos, Jr. v. PNOC Exploration Corporation. The petitioner in that case claimed that substituted service may be availed of only in an action in rem. However, We declared this argument wrong, ruling that the in rem/in personam distinction was significant under the old rule because it was silent as to the kind of action to which the rule was applicable. This silence impelled the Court to limit the application of the old rule to in rem actions only. However, the rule has been changed.
The present Sec. 14, Rule 14 of the Rules expressly states that service of summons by publication applies "in any action." Thus, service of summons by publication may now be made in any action, whether in personam, in em or quasi in rem. In any event, as correctly held by the CA, even assuming that the service of summons in this case was defective, the RT acquired jurisdiction over the persons of petitioners when they made a voluntary appearance in the proceedings. Sec. 20, Rule 14 of the Rules provides that the defendant voluntary appearance in the action shall be equivalent to service of summon Here, petitioners voluntarily appeared in the action when they filed an entry of appearance and very urgent omnibus motion a) to set aside order of default b) admit appended answer.
PROCIANOS-COHEN v. HEIRS of MAGDAYAO
29 September 2021 | GR No. 241558 | Rule 18
PETITIONER: ANN PROCIANOS-COHEN
RESPONDENTS: HEIRS OF ANACITO L. MAGDAYAO, NAMELY: CELITA M. BONILLO, NERIA M. JAVIER, EDDIE M. MAGDAYAO, ELSA M. AGUIRRE, AND ROLANDO M. MAGDAYAO,
DOCTRINE:
In any action where the defendant is designated as an unknown owner, or the like, or whenever his whereabouts are unknown and cannot be ascertained by diligent inquiry, service may, by leave of court, be effected upon him by publication in a newspaper of general circulation and in such places and for such time as the court may order. Service by publication may be effected even in actions in personam, provided that personal and substituted service were first availed of but failed, and diligent inquiries were made as to defendant’s whereabouts.
FACTS:
1. Cohen and Felomina Magdayao, Anacito's sister, supposedly executed a Deed of Absolute Sale, whereby the latter sold Lot A to the former, even if Felomina's Certificate of Death indicated that she died in 2007. Notwithstanding a previous Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate in 1991, a Partition Agreement was executed in 2008. In this Partition Agreement, Lot A was apportioned in favor of Felomina, although a number of signatories had already died by the time such instrument was executed. Eventually issued in the name of Cohen were TCTs derived from Tax Declaration in Felomina’s name; one TCT originated from a Tax Declaration in Anacito's name.
2. A Complaint for Cancellation and/or Annulment of Deed of Absolute Sale and TCT with Damages was filed by respondents Heirs of Magdayao against Cohen and the Register of Deeds of Palawan.
3. The complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. 4923 and the RTC issued summons for Cohen. However, the summons was not served personally to Cohen as she was no longer residing at the address indicated, as she was already based in USA.
4. The heirs of Magdayao filed a motion for leave of court to serve summons by publication which the RTC granted. Pursuant thereto, and as indicated by an Affidavit of Publication, the national periodical newspaper Pinoy Text published the complaint - but notably not the Summons - for 3 consecutive weeks.
5. The heirs of Magdayao filed a Motion to Declare Defendants in Default and Set Pre-Trial Conference. Cohen was then declared in default and the heirs were allowed to present evidence ex-parte.
6. The RTC granted the 1st and 3rd prayers of the heirs of Magdayao. However, it denied the prayer to declare them as absolute owners of Lot A, as records show that Anacito had disposed of Lot A to a third person.
a. Deed of Absolute Sale and Partition Agreement as void and non-existing document.
b. Tax Declaration in the name of Procianos-Cohen is cancelled.
7. The RTC Decision was sent to Cohen by registered mail in the same address where she no longer resided.
8. Sometime in 2016, Cohen learned about it while she was out of the country, and discovered the notice of lis pendens. She argued that the RTC Decision was rendered with extrinsic fraud and without jurisdiction over her person.
9. Cohen filed her Petition for Annulment of Judgment, under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court before the Court of Appeals.
a. She argued that the RTC Decision was rendered with extrinsic fraud and without jurisdiction over her person
b. That jurisdiction over the defendant is still required in actions quasi in rem, and arguing for the first time,
c. That the RTC did not have jurisdiction to entertain the complaint since the assessed value of Lot A fell below the RTC’s jurisdiction.
PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:
CA ● Denied the Petition for Annulment of Judgment
○ It found that the service of summons by publication was procedurally flawed but still valid for an action quasi in rem, it was sufficient that the RTC has acquired jurisdiction over the res.
○ Pointed out that Cohen could have still availed of other remedies but inexplicably failed to do so.
● Denied the Motion for Partial Reconsideration of Cohen
○ Cohen maintained that the RTC decision had already attained finality when she obtained notice of it.
○ The heirs argued that the motion was procedurally infirm and that Cohen failed to avail of other available remedies prior to the Rule 47 petition, and that the complaint involved an action incapable of pecuniary estimation cognizable by the RTC.
ISSUE/S:
1. WON the lower court acquired jurisdiction over Cohen’s person – NO
2. WON the petition for annulment of judgment is the proper remedy – NO
RULING:
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari dated July 30, 2018 is DENIED. The Decision dated March 26, 2018 and the Resolution dated July 19, 2018 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 149539 are AFFIRMED. Petitioner Ann Procianos-Cohen's Petition for Annulment of Judgment dated December 8, 2016 was properly dismissed by the Court of Appeals for failure to avail of the appropriate remedies under the Rules. SO ORDERED.
RATIO:
1. NO.
● Cohen contends that the Complaint presents an action in personam, for which personal notice is required, while the CA ruled that the action is one quasi in rem, for which jurisdiction over the res is sufficient. Cohen is correct.
● When the proceeding is strictly in personam brought to determine the personal rights and obligations of the parties, personal service within the state or a voluntary appearance in the case is essential to the acquisition of jurisdiction so as to constitute compliance with the constitutional requirement of due process.
● Nevertheless, then-prevailing Rule 14, Section 14 (presently Rule 16) of the Rules of Court permitted service by publication upon persons whose whereabouts are unknown:
o Service upon defendant whose identity or whereabouts are unknown. — In any action where the defendant is designated as an unknown owner, or the like, or whenever his whereabouts are unknown and cannot be ascertained by diligent inquiry, service may, by leave of court, be effected upon him by publication in a newspaper of general circulation and in such places and for such time as the court may order.
● In Pua v. Deyto, service by publication may be effected even in actions in personam, provided that personal and substituted service were first availed of but failed, and diligent inquiries were made as to defendant’s whereabouts.
● Accordingly, the complaint filed by the heirs of Magdayao, which sought to nullify the Deed of Absolute Sale and Cohen's TCT, presented an action in personam, for which personal service was required, although service by publication could be, but was defectively, availed of. The Sheriff's Return of Summons showed how personal service was attempted, but failed.
● However, the heirs of Magdayao stopped right there, no longer attempted substituted service of summons, and immediately resorted to service by publication. Neither did they demonstrate, in their Motion for Leave of Court to Serve Summons by Publication, their diligent inquiries to ascertain Cohen's whereabouts. Thus, the RTC should not have ordered service by publication.
● Accordingly, service of summons on Cohen was defectively carried out, and the RTC never acquired jurisdiction over her person.
● Still, if this Court were to subscribe to the CA's ruling that the complaint presented an action quasi in rem, lack of notice to Cohen would still be a denial of due process, a ground she should properly invoke in her petition.
● On subject matter jurisdiction, this Court first clarifies that this ground may be invoked even belatedly into the proceedings for a petition for annulment of judgment. According to Rule 47, Section 3 of the Rules of Court, if the petition for annulment of judgment is premised on lack of jurisdiction, the petition may be filed at any time before it is barred by laches or estoppel. More importantly, such pronouncement coincides with the tenet that the issue of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal.
● RTC did not have jurisdiction to entertain the complaint since this involved title to real property, for which assessed value is jurisdictional, as Cohen correctly argued in her motion for partial reconsideration.
2. NO.
● Lack of subject matter jurisdiction and jurisdiction over her person, and denial of due process were grounds available to Cohen.
● The RTC Decision was improperly served on Cohen by registered mail, so she acquired notice thereof only on October 3, 2016 when she and/or her representatives secured the records from the RTC.
● At this point, the RTC Decision had not yet, as to her, attained finality, and it was only then that the reglementary period for availing of other remedies began to run.
● Within such time, Cohen could have filed a motion for new trial, alleging extrinsic fraud, or a motion for reconsideration, arguing lack of jurisdiction.
● Even failing these two remedies, Cohen could have appealed and assigned as reversible errors the defective service of both summons and the RTC Decision.
● However, Cohen did not resort to these available remedies, much less sufficiently explain why she could not have availed of them.
● Owing to the exceptional character of the remedy of annulment of judgment, the limitations and guidelines set forth by Rule 47 of the Rules of Court should be strictly complied with. A petition for annulment of judgment which ignores or disregards any of these limitations and guidelines cannot prosper.
Perkin Elmer Singapore Pte Ltd. v. Dakila Trading Corp.
August 14, 2007 | G.R. No. 172242, |CHICO-NAZARIO,J | Extraterritorial Service of Summons
PETITIONER: PERKIN ELMER SINGAPORE PTE LTD
RESPONDENTS: DAKILA TRADING CORPORATION
DOCTRINE:
Doctrine is highlighted in the summary
FACTS:
1. Dakila Trading Corp. entered into a Distribution Agreement with Perkin-Elmer Instruments Asia Pte Ltd. (FEIN, a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of Singapore and engaged in the business of manufacturing, producing, selling or distributing various Laboratory/analytical instruments. By virtue of the said agreement, respondent was appointed by PEIA as the sole distributor of its products in the Philippines and shall receive a commission for its sales.
2. PEIA unilaterally terminated the Distribution Agreement, prompting respondent to file before the RTC of Mandaluyong City a Complaint for Collection of Sum of Money and Damages with Prayer for Issuance of a Writ of Attachment against PEIA and PEIP.
3. RTC denied the prayer for the issuance of a writ of attachment.
4. Respondent then filed Ex-Parte Motions for Issuance of Summons and for Leave of Court to Deputize Respondent's General Manager, Richard A. Tee, to Serve Summons Outside of the Philippines, which the RTC granted. An Alias Summons was issued to PEIA but it was served and received by Perkinelmer Asia, a Singaporean based sole proprietorship, owned by the petitioner and, allegedly, a separate and distinct entity from PEIA.
5. PEIP moved to dismiss the Complaint on the ground that it states no cause of action.
6. Perkinelmer Asia, on the other hand, sent letters to the respondent and to the RTC to inform them of the wrongful service of summons upon Perkinelmer Asia.
7. Accordingly, respondent filed an amended complaint claiming that PEIA had become a sole proprietorship owned by the petitioner, and subsequently changed its name to Perkinelmer Asia.
PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:
RTC ● The RTC admitted the amended complaint and the respondent then filed another Motion for the Issuance of Summons, which was also granted.
○ Petitioner subsequently filed with the RTC a Motion to Dismiss respondent's Amended Complaint on the ground that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner.
● The RTC denied petitioner's Motion to Dismiss stating that the respondent's allegation of ownership by the petitioner of shares of stocks in the PEIP means there is an allegation of personal property in the Philippines.
● Even though the Amended Complaint is primarily for damages, it does relate to a property of the petitioner, to which the latter has a claim interest, or an actual or contingent lien, which will make it fall under one of the requisites for extraterritorial service under Section 15, rule 14 of the ROC. Thus, it could be gainfully said that the summons had been validly served for RTC to acquire jurisdiction over the petitioner.
CA ● Affirmed the RTC decision
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not there is a proper service of summons and acquisition of jurisdiction.
RULING:
Since petitioner’s counterclaim is compulsory in nature and its cause of action survives that of the dismissal of respondent’s complaint, then it should be resolved based on its own merits and evidentiary support.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated 4 April 2006, in CA-G.R. SP No. 78981, affirming the Orders, dated 4 November 2002 and 20 June 2003, of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaluyong City, Branch 212, in Civil Case No. MC99-605, is hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. Respondent’s Amended Complaint in Civil Case No. MC99-605 as against the petitioner is hereby ordered DISMISSED, and all the proceedings against petitioner in the court a quo by virtue thereof are hereby DECLARED NULL AND VOID. The Regional Trial Court of Mandaluyong City, Branch 212, is DIRECTED to proceed without further delay with the resolution of respondent’s Complaint in Civil Case No. MC99-605 as to defendant PEIP, as well as petitioner’s counterclaim. No costs.
RATIO:
NO
● Extraterritorial service of summons applies only where the action is in rem or quasi in rem, but not if an action is in personam.
● When the case instituted is an action in rem or quasi in rem, Philippine courts already have jurisdiction to hear and decide the case because in the aforementioned actions, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is not a prerequisite to confer jurisdiction on the court, provided that the court acquires jurisdiction over the res.
● Thus, in such instance, extraterritorial service of summons can be made upon the defendant. The said extraterritorial service of summons is not for the purpose of vesting the court with jurisdiction, but for complying with the requirements of fair play or due process, so that the defendant will be informed of the pendency of the action against him and the possibility that property in the Philippines belonging to him or in which he has an interest may be subjected to a judgment in favor of the plaintiff, and he can thereby take steps to protect his interest if he is so minded.
● On the other hand, when the defendant or respondent does not reside and is not found in the Philippines, and the action involved is in personam, Philippine courts cannot try any case against him because of the impossibility of acquiring jurisdiction over his person unless he voluntarily appears in court.
● In the case at bar, this Court sustains the contention of the petitioner that there can never be a valid extraterritorial service of summons upon it because the case before the court a quo involving collection of a sum of money and damages is indeed an action in personam as it deals with the personal liability of the petitioner to the respondent by reason of the alleged unilateral termination by the former of the Distribution Agreement
SAROL V. SPOUSES DIAO
December 9, 2020 | G.R. No. 244129 | CARANDANG, J | Extraterritorial Service of Summons
PETITIONER: Eleonor Sarol
RESPONDENTS: Spouses George Gordon Diao and Marilyn A. Diao, et al.
DOCTRINE:
In order to effect the proper service of summons it is crucial to furnish the correct address of the defendant or respondent in a complaint. The proper service of summons is important because it serves to acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant or respondent, or to notify said person of the action filed against them and to afford an opportunity to be heard on the claims made against them.
FACTS:
1. Sometime in 2007, petitioner Sarol purchased from a certain Claire Chiu a parcel of land located in Guinsuan, Poblacion, Zamboanguita, Negros Oriental. Sarol had been in possession of the property since 2007 and began developing a beach resort. She eventually left the Philippines to reside in Germany.
2. Spouses Diao claim that their property is adjacent to Lot No. 7150. In 2009, Spouses Diao learned of an overlap as it included 464 square meters of their property. They immediately demanded Claire Chiu and Sarol to return their portion of the property, but to no avail. Spouses Diao filed a complaint with the RTC.
3. Summons was issued for service. Sheriff Tale stated his three failed attempts to personally serve the alias summons to Sarol. Sheriff Tale narrates that the alias summons was not served because nobody was around the location. For this reason, a service of summons on Sarol was done by publication in a newspaper of general circulation in the City of Dumaguete and in the Province of Negros Oriental, for two consecutive weeks and the copies of the summons and of the order were sent by registered mail to the last known address of Sarol in Guinsuan, Poblacion, Zamboanguita Negros Oriental.
4. Sarol argued that there was a defective service of summons by Sheriff Tale. While she is named a recipient of the summons, the address was incorrect. She claimed that after her purchase of the subject property from Claire Chiu, she migrated to Germany. Hence, personal service of the summons could not have validly been effected. Other modes of service of summons were also not proven to have been successfully executed. Sarol asserted failure on the part of Sheriff Tale to effect substituted service of summons. Sarol also argued that the RTC erred in allowing the service of summons by publication because none of the rules for such mode of service are applicable.
5. Spouses Diao argue that Sarol returns to the beach resort every year, and that the resort caretaker had a pre-arranged agreement with Sheriff Tale to inform the latter when Sarol is in the Philippines. Sarol clearly evaded the service of summons, leaving Spouses Diao with no other choice but to resort to serve summons by publication. Moreover, a Petition for Annulment of Judgment may be resorted when there is no available or adequate remedy.
PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:
RTC ● The RTC rendered a decision in favor of the respondents.
CA ● The CA dismissed the petition for annulment of judgment petition.
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the plaintiff Sarol.—NO
RULING:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.
RATIO:
1. NO.
SC reiterates that the service of summons is vital and indispensable to the defendant's right to due process. A violation of this due process is a jurisdictional defect which renders null and void all subsequent proceedings and issuances in relation to the case.
The preferred mode of service of summons shall be done personally upon the defendant or respondent. However, our rules set out other modes of service. Section 7, Rule 14 43 of the Rules of Court allows the substituted service of summons if, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be served within a reasonable time. It shall be effected by leaving copies of the summons: (a) at the defendant's residence with some person of suitable age and discretion residing therein; or (b) at the defendant's place of business with some competent person in charge thereof.
The SC found that the address in Guinsuan, Poblacion, Zamboanguita, Negros Oriental is not Sarol's place of residence. Therefore, service of summons to Sarol, even by substituted service, should have been effected in Tamisu, Bais City, Negros Oriental. Assuming that Guinsuan, Poblacion, Zamboanguita, Negros Oriental is Sarol's regular place of business, the SC found that there was no substituted service effected. The Sheriff's Return of Summons and Sheriff's Return of Alias Summons report the unsuccessful service to Sarol because she is out of the country. Sheriff Tale accounted in the Return of Alias Summons that he merely inquired from the caretaker the whereabouts of Sarol. From the foregoing, the returns of the sheriff do not state that substituted service of summons was made to the designated persons provided under Section 7, Rule 14.
As Sarol is out of the country and the action pertains to her interest over a parcel of land located in the Philippines, the RTC granted the extraterritorial service on Sarol by publication in a newspaper of general circulation in the City of Dumaguete and in the Province of Negros Oriental, for two consecutive weeks and to send copies of the summons and of the order of the court a quo by registered mail to the last known address of Sarol in Guinsuan, Poblacion, Zamboanguita Negros Oriental. Following the provisions of Section 15, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court and the order of the court, publication must be duly observed and copies of the summons and order of the court be served at Sarol's last known correct address by registered mail, as a complement to the publication. The failure to strictly comply with the requirements of the rules regarding the mailing of copies of the summons and the order for its publication is a fatal defect in the service of summons. Considering that Sarol's last known address is in Tamisu, Bais City, Negros Oriental, copies of the summons and order of the court must be sent to this address. As Spouses Diao furnished an address in Guinsuan, Poblacion, Zamboanguita, Negros Oriental, service of summons by publication is defective in view of the failure to mail the requirements of Section 15, Rule 14 to the correct address of Sarol. Relatedly, the findings of the CA on service of summons by publication under Section 16, 53 Rule 14 of the Rules of Court cannot be considered proper because this rule also follows the same procedures set out in Section 15, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court on publication and mailing to the last known correct address of the defendant or respondent. Spouses Diao only assert compliance with publication of summons in Dumaguete City and Negros Oriental. There were no records presented showing proof of service by registered mail of the summons and the order of the court to the last known address of Sarol as required under the rules by the court a quo in this case.
Thus, the judgment and the Writ of Execution issued by the RTC is null and void. In which case, the petition for annulment of judgement under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court is proper. Lack of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court in rendering the judgment or final order is either lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action, or lack of jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner.
SABADO v. SABADO
May 12, 202 |G.R. No. 214270 | Hernando, J. | Service on Residents Temporarily Out of the Philippines
PETITIONER: Jay v. Sabado
RESPONDENT: Tina Marie L. Sabado, for herself and her minor children
DOCTRINE:
Summons is a procedural tool. It is a writ by which the defendant is notified that an action was brought against him or her. In an action in personam, brought to enforce personal rights and obligations, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is mandatory. In such actions, therefore, summonses serve not only to notify the defendant of the filing of an action, but also to enable acquisition of jurisdiction over his person
Tina Sabado filed a Petition for Temporary and Permanent Protection Order and Support Pendente Lite against her husband Jay Sabado. Tina alleged that she and Jay would quarrel often over petty things, even during her pregnancy. There came a time when Jay abandoned Tina and their children, depriving them of financial support.
When the RTC issued a TPO, the court sheriff made several attempts to personally serve the summons, petition, and TPO to Jay at his address but the security guard said he was not around. He also tried to serve them at the office of his employer, only to be told that Jay was abroad for deployment. Atty. Palermo, Jay’s counsel in a VAWC case pending before RTC Branch 140, went to RTC Branch 136 and received a copy of the order and petition. Later, Jay filed an Entry of Appearance with Opposition to the Issuance of PPO.
Issue: WON the service of order and TPO made to Atty. Palmero constitutes a valid service of summons. – NO.
Jurisdiction over the person of the respondent in a petition for TPO/PPO under RA 9262 can be acquired through any of the means of serving summons under the Rules of Court. In an action in personam such as a petition for TPO/PPO under RA 9262, the purpose of summons is two-fold: (1) to notify the defendant that an action has been brought against him; and (2) to acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant.
Here, the sheriff attempted to personally serve the summons, petition, and TPO in Jay's residence and place of employment. Records show that Jay was out of the country due to his overseas employment. Since personal service could not be effected upon him, summons should be served through substituted service, extraterritorial service, or by publication in accordance with Sections 7, 15 and 16, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. ina should have resorted to substituted service or extraterritorial service of summons if personal service could not be effected, in accordance with Section 16, A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC and Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. In this case, none of the modes of service were resorted to by Tina..
FACTS:
1. Tina and Jay were married in 1999. Their marriage bore 2 children, Tina was a bank employee while Jay was a ship captain. Tina filed a Petition for Temporary and Permanent Protection. Order, Support and Support Pendente Lite against Jay due to the latter having abandoned them after being abusive.
2. Tina alleged that she and Jay would quarrel often over petty things, even during her pregnancy. There came a time when Jay abandoned Tina and their children, depriving them of financial support. By February 2012, the monthly allotment from Jay which previously amounted to $4,000.00 was reduced to $2,500.00. Jay also stopped visiting their children.
3. Thus, Tina prayed for the issuance of a Temporary Protection Order (TPO), the grant of P120,000.00 monthly support to be remitted automatically by Jay's employer, and the eventual issuance of a Permanent Protection Order (PPO).
4. TPO13 was issued by the trial court in favor of Tina. The respondent is given five days from notice within which to file opposition.
5. The court sheriff made several attempts to personally serve the summons, petition, and TPO to Jay at his address but the security guard said he was not around. He also tried to serve them at the office of his employer, only to be told that appellant was abroad for deployment.
i. Atty. Gary Palmero, counsel of Jay in a criminal case for violation of Republic Act No. 9262, went to Branch 136 and received a copy of the Order and Petition as evidenced by the latter's signature therein.
ii. On January 17, 2013, Jay filed an Entry of Appearance with Opposition to the Issuance of Permanent Protection Order where he asserted that he was merely a chief officer and not a ship captain.
PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:
RTC
● The trial court issued a PPO28 in favor of Tina. It pointed out that Jay already waived his opportunity to oppose the petition for his failure to file the necessary pleading on time.
CA ● The CA affirmed the findings of the trial court.
● Hence, Tina should have resorted to substituted service or extraterritorial service of summons if personal service could not be effected, in accordance with Section 16, A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC and Rule 14 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE/S:
Whether the trial court failed to acquire jurisdiction over the person of Jay for improper service of summons. – NO.
RULING:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
RATIO:
2. NO.
● Summons is a procedural tool. It is a writ by which the defendant is notified that an action was brought against him or her. In an action in personam, brought to enforce personal rights and obligations, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is mandatory. In such actions, therefore, summonses serve not only to notify the defendant of the filing of an action, but also to enable acquisition of jurisdiction over his person.
● Jurisdiction over the person of the respondent in a petition for TPO/PPO under RA 9262 can be acquired through any of the means of serving summons under the Rules of Court.
o In an action in personam such as a petition for TPO/PPO under RA 9262, the purpose of summons is two-fold: (1) to notify the defendant that an action has been brought against him; and (2) to acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant.
o When the defendant does not voluntarily submit to the court's jurisdiction or when there is no valid service of summons, any judgment of the court which has no jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is null and void.
● In the case at bar, the sheriff attempted to personally serve the summons, petition, and TPO in Jay's residence and place of employment as per the Sheriff's Return.
● However, records show that Jay was out of the country from August 7, 2012 to January 5, 2013 due to his overseas employment. Since personal service could not be effected upon him, summons should be served through substituted service, extraterritorial service, or by publication in accordance with Sections 7, 15 and 16, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. Notably, none of these modes of service were resorted to by Tina.
● Granting arguendo that Jay knew of the pending TPO case against him, whether through Atty. Palmero or another person, the requirement of summons cannot be dispensed with. Jurisdiction over the person of the defendant cannot be acquired notwithstanding his knowledge of the pendency of a case against him, unless he was validly served with summons. Thus, serving the order and TPO to Atty. Palmero cannot be considered a valid service of summons.
BARBER v. CHUA
Date | GR No. | Ponente | Summons; Service on Residents Temporarily Outside the Philippines
PETITIONER: DIANA BARBER
RESPONDENTS: ROLANDO CHUA
DOCTRINE:
Under Section 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, service of summons may properly be made to a person of suitable age and discretion found at the defendant's residence.
FACTS:
1. On 10 August 2007, Rolando Chua (respondent) filed a complaint for ejectment of extended structures that partly occupied the portion of firewall, damage to property with prayer for moral and exemplary damages with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Cainta, Rizal, docketed as Civil Case No MTC-1259. He alleged that Diana Barber (Barber), his neighbor, built a portion of the second floor of her house on top of his firewall.
2. Barber, Rex Jimeno (Jimeno), and Jaquelyn Beado (Beado) (petitioners, collectively), filed a motion to dismiss, claiming that the MTC had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case and Barber's person. They claimed that the complaint did not raise the issue of material or physical possession of a property but the removal of certain structures that encroached upon the respondent's property. The complaint referred to encroachment, not of a land or building, but of a firewall, which they claim cannot be a subject of an ejectment case. As such, the case is one for specific performance, which is within the RTC's jurisdiction.
3. Petitioners also contend that the action being in personam, summons should have been personally served to Barber. They alleged that at the time of service, on 16 August 2007, Barber was not in the Philippines as she is allegedly, a citizen and permanent resident of the United States. They argued. that the server's return did not contain any explanation as to why substituted service was resorted to.
PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:
MTC ● Dismissed respondent's complaint for lack of jurisdiction. It held that the complaint failed to allege stealth or tolerance, and that respondent's prayer seeking removal of petitioners' permanent structures on top of his firewall falls short of what is required in an ejectment complaint.
ISSUE/S:
1. WON the MTC has jurisdiction over Barber's person and the subject matter of the complaint.— YES
RULING:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated 09 October 2012 and Resolution dated 28 January 2013 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 122303 are AFFIRMED. The Municipal Trial Court of Cainta, Rizal is DIRECTED to resolve the instant case with dispatch.
RATIO:
1. YES
● While service of summons should generally be effected on the defendant herself, case law allows resort to substituted service for defendants who are residents but are temporarily out of the country. Despite Barber's allegation that she is now an American citizen, the Court agrees with the CA that she is likewise a Philippine resident who is temporarily out of the country.
● Jurisprudence has defined a dwelling, house, or residence as the place where the person named in the summons is living at the time when the service is made, even though he may be temporarily out of the country at the time. Indeed, it remains undisputed that Barber stays in the house adjacent to respondent's property whenever she returns to the Philippines. Under Section 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, service of summons may properly be made to a person of suitable age and discretion found at defendant's residence.
● In the case of Pavlow v. Mendenilla, this Court also upheld the resort to substituted service of summons upon an American citizen who maintained a residence in Makati but was out of the country at the time of service. Guided by the foregoing, the service of summons to Barber's aunt Norma Balmastro should be deemed sufficient to clothe the RTC jurisdiction over Barber's person.
BDO v. SPS. CHANG
May 3, 2021 | GR No. 250769 | First Division (Notice) | Rule 14 - Summons; Return and Proof of Service
PETITIONERS: BDO Unibank, Inc.
RESPONDENTS: Spouses Henry Chang and Te Lee Chang, Tiffany Hazel Lee Chang, Harold Timothy Lee Chang, and Howard Terrence Lee Chang
DOCTRINE:
Resort to substituted service may only be made upon the concurrence of two requisites: (1) the impossibility of personal service of summons within a reasonable time after diligent efforts at locating the defendants; and (2) service upon any of the persons identified in Rule 14, Section 7 of the Rules of Court.
FACTS:
1. BDO Unibank, Inc. (BDO) filed a Complaint for collection of sum of money with application for issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Attachment against respondents and Chemvision, Inc. (Chemvision).
2. In the Complaint, BDO alleged that it extended various credit accommodations to Chemvision which the latter failed to pay despite repeated demands. BDO further alleged that respondents refused to comply with various surety agreements they executed in favor of BDO.
3. The RTC issued an Order granting BDO's application for the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Attachment. Sheriffs Joseph Edwin Carreon (Sheriff Carreon), Camilo Tabaco, Jr. (Sheriff Tabaco), and Alberto H. Buenaventura (Sheriff Buenaventura) were appointed to implement the writ of attachment and to serve summons upon Chemvision and respondents.
4. In the Sheriff's Partial Report, the sheriffs narrated the attempts made at personal service of summons together with the Complaint and its annexes, Writ of Preliminary Attachment, orders of the RTC, and preliminary attachment bond. However, these attempts were deemed futile.
5. Because of the failure to effect personal service, the sheriffs resorted to substituted service of summons, in accordance with the provisions of Rule 14, Section 7(a) and (b) of the New Rules of Court, by leaving copies of the Summons together with a copy of the Complaint and its complete annexes, Writ of Preliminary Attachment, Order and Bond:
a. Thru Mr. Domingo Zamudio, who introduces himself as the Security Officer of Henry and Te, who refuse to affix his signature on the receiving copies of the same, on their address at Lexus New Manila Address.
b. Thru Mr. Aproniano Catiang, Jr., who introduces himself as the Security Officer of Tiffany, Harold, and Howard who refuses to affix his signature on the receiving copies of the same, on their 7th St. New Manila Address.
c. Thru Mr. Jennifer Deflin, who introduces himself as the Security Officer of Henry, Te, Tiffany, Hazel, Harold, Howard who refuses to affix his signature on the receiving copies of the same, on their San Francisco Del Monte Address.
6. Subsequently, Te filed a Special Entry of Appearance with Motion to Dismiss claiming lack of jurisdiction over her person. Te averred that she came to know of BDO's Complaint and the Writ of Preliminary attachment after verifying cases filed against her with the Office of the Clerk of Court. Claiming that she has yet to receive a copy of the summons, Complaint, and the Writ of Preliminary Attachment, she prayed for the dismissal of the case.
7. In the Sheriff's Report, Sheriff Buenaventura informed the RTC that he effected personal service upon Chemvision through Te, Chemvision's President, who received the same but refused to sign the original copy of the court processes.
8. Having received no responsive pleading, BDO filed a motion to declare Chemvision and Respondents in default.
9. Thereafter, Tiffany, Harold, and Howard, through counsel, filed a Motion to Dismiss dated claiming that the RTC had no personal jurisdiction over them as the substituted service of summons was invalid. They argued that:
a. Since impossibility of prompt personal service was never established, then the resort to substituted service was improper.
b. Security officers Delfin and Catiang were unknown to them.
i. To this, they presented a certification from the security agency engaged to provide security services for the residential compound located at the 7th Street New Manila Address that there was no security guard or employee with the name Aproniano Catiang, Jr.
PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:
RTC ● Acting on BDO's motion to declare in default and Respondents' Motion to Dismiss, it ruled that there was an invalid service of summons upon Respondents.
● Instead of dismissing the case, the RTC ordered the issuance of alias summons.
● Finding the service of summons on Chemvision effective, the RTC declared Chemvision in default.
○ It was not shown that the security officers who received the summons on behalf of Respondents were "authorized and possessed relations of confidence" and, hence, service on these security officers could not be considered as valid substituted service of summons.
○ BDO's argument that Respondents voluntarily submitted to the court's jurisdiction due to the appearance of Atty. Rabino during the August 2014 motion hearing was rejected.
CA ● Sustained the RTC's finding that there was an invalid substituted service of summons.
ISSUE/S:
1. WON the RTC acquired personal jurisdiction over Respondents either by a valid substituted service of summons or their voluntary submission to the court's jurisdiction — NO
RULING:
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DENIED. The challenged Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED.
RATIO:
1. NO, Respondents never acquiesced to the jurisdiction of the RTC.
● The Court has extensively discussed the contours of personal and substituted service of summons in Manotoc v. Court of Appeals (Manotoc). As a rule, summons must be served personally. Resort to substituted service may only be made upon the concurrence of two requisites:
o (1) the impossibility of personal service of summons within a reasonable time after diligent efforts at locating the defendants; and
o (2) service upon any of the persons identified in Rule 14, Section 7 of the Rules of Court.
● Otherwise stated, when confronted with a challenge on the validity of a substituted service of summons, the Court must examine two aspects: first, the impossibility of personal service and, second, the manner by which substituted service was made.
● A perusal of the Sheriff's Partial Report would show that several attempts to effect personal service were made on at least two different dates. Efforts to locate Respondents were clearly stated in the Sheriff's Partial Report which led the sheriffs to visit six different addresses. The impossibility of personal service within a reasonable time despite diligent efforts in locating Respondents was sufficiently proven.
● The bone of contention lies in the manner by which substituted service was effected.
o When efforts to personally serve summons on a defendant within a reasonable time is impossible, substituted service may be done by leaving copies of the summons at the defendant's dwelling house or residence or at the defendant's office or regular place of business.
o If substituted service is made at the defendant's house or residence, the sheriff must leave a copy of the summons with a person of "suitable age and discretion residing therein."
■ This refers to a person who has reached the age of legal capacity and has sufficient discernment to comprehend the importance of a summons as well as the duty to deliver it immediately to the defendant.
o If substituted service is made at the defendant's office or regular place of business, the sheriff must leave a copy of the summons with a "competent person in charge thereof."
■ This refers to any person managing the office or the business of the defendant, such as the president or a manager.
o In either case, the proof of return or the sheriffs' report must disclose specific details regarding the inquiries made and the competencies of the person upon whom copies of the summons and court processes were given.
● It must nevertheless be emphasized that the absence in the sheriff's return of statements showing compliance with the statutory and jurisprudential requirements of substituted service of summons does not conclusively prove that the service is invalid.
● While the sheriff's return carries with it the presumption, albeit disputable, of regularity in the sense that the entries therein are deemed correct, it does not necessarily follow that an act done in relation to the official duty for which the return is made was not done simply because it was not disclosed therein. Besides, the sheriff's neglect in making such a disclosure should not unduly prejudice the plaintiff if what was undisclosed was in fact done.
● In the case at bar, when confronted with allegations from Respondents that there was improper service of summons, the RTC proceeded to hear the motions filed together with BDO's oppositions thereto.
● BDO failed to present countervailing evidence to meet these assertions of the respondents that the security guard was unknown to them.
● Moreover, the claim by Respondents that they have not received a copy of the summons, together with the Complaint and other court processes, was never challenged by BDO.
The Court further notes that the sheriffs were accompanied by representatives of BDO. Thus, it would have been easy for BDO to have presented testimonial evidence that would show compliance with the legal requirements in substituted service of summons. Instead of doing so, BDO merely relied on the presumption of regularity in the performance of the sheriffs' official duty.
● Finally, BDO's contention that, nevertheless, Respondents have voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the RTC, is bereft of any factual and legal basis.
● While it is true that one who seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court, this is tempered by the concept of conditional appearance, such that a party who makes a special appearance to challenge, among others, the court's jurisdiction over his person cannot be considered to have submitted to its authority.
● The Court is convinced that Respondents never acquiesced to the jurisdiction of the RTC. The appearance of the counsel for the Respondents was precisely to challenge the court's jurisdiction. Their initial prayer for time to respond to BDO's motion to declare them in default cannot be considered voluntary submission.
FELICITAS Z. BELO v. CARLITA MARCANTONIO
September 08, 2020 | G.R. No. 243366 | Reyes, J. JR., J.:| Voluntary Appearance
PETITIONER: Felicita Z. Belo – the lender (Belo)
RESPONDENTS: Carlita C. Marcantonio – contracted a loan with Belo secured by real estate mortgage (Marcantonio)
DOCTRINE:
One who seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court, i.e., Motion to Set Aside/Lift Order of Default and to Re-Open Trial on the ground of defective service of summons.
PETITIONER: Felicita Z. Belo – the lender (Belo)
RESPONDENTS: Carlita C. Marcantonio – contracted a loan with Belo secured by real estate mortgage (Marcantonio)
DOCTRINE:
One who seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court, i.e., Motion to Set Aside/Lift Order of Default and to Re-Open Trial on the ground of defective service of summons.
FACTS:
1. Belo filed a complaint for foreclosure of mortgage against Marcantonio.
2. The clerk of court then issued summons addressed to Marcantonio’s known address. Per the Sheriff's Return, copies of said summons and the complaint along with its annexes were left to a Giovanna Marcantonio (was a person of suitable age and discretion) whom the sheriff recorded as her "niece" because Marcantonio was not at the given address at that time.
3. No responsive pleading was, however, filed. Thus, upon Belo’s motion, Marcantonio was declared in default. Belo was then allowed to present evidence ex parte, and thereafter, the case was submitted for decision.
4. Before judgment was rendered, Marcantonio learned about Belo’s case against her. Marcantonio immediately, thus, filed a Motion to Set Aside/Lift Order of Default and to Re-Open Trial on the ground of defective service of summons. She averred therein, among others, that she learned about the case only on April 5, 2016 through her niece, a certain Mae Zamora; that she was not able to file a responsive pleading as she did not receive a copy of the summons; that she is currently a resident of Cavite and no longer a resident of Mandaluyong where the summons was served; and that said summons was received by her daughter (not niece as stated in the Sheriff's Return) Giovanna, who never sent the same to her, being unaware of the significance thereof, further averred that she has good and meritorious defenses to defeat Belo's claim for foreclosure of mortgage as the same was pursued through fraudulent misrepresentation perpetrated by one Maria Cecilia Duque, and that at any rate, certain payments have already been made, which controverted the amount claimed in the complaint.
5. Despite the defective service of summons, Belo insisted that such defect has already been cured by Marcantonio’s filing of a Motion to Set Aside/Lift Order of Default and to Re-Open Trial, which is deemed as a voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the trial court.
PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:
RTC ● The RTC held that the substituted service of summons upon Marcantonio was validly made. The RTC then denied Marcantonio’s motion, including its MR.
● The RTC ruled that Marcantonio’s filing of the motion to lift default order and to re-open trial, as well as the MR of the order denying said motion, amounted to a voluntary appearance which already vested it with jurisdiction over her person.
CA ● CA ruled that there was improper resort to substituted service of summons. It held that the sheriff's single attempt to effect personal service, as well as the mere statement in the Sheriff's Return that "earnest efforts were exerted to serve summons personally to the defendant" without describing the circumstances surrounding the alleged attempt to personally serve the summons, did not justify resort to substituted service.
● On the matter of voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court, the CA ruled that Marcantonio’s motions cannot be deemed as voluntary appearance that vested jurisdiction upon the trial court over the person of respondent considering that the same were filed precisely to question the court's jurisdiction. The CA observed that Marcantonio raised the defense of lack of jurisdiction due to improper service of summons at the first opportunity, and repeatedly argued therefor.
SC ● Marcantonio filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari
ISSUE: Are Marcantonio’s motions deemed voluntary appearance such that cured the defective service of summons upon her?
RULING:
WHEREFORE, the present petition is DENIED. The Decision dated June 29, 2018 and the Resolution dated November 23, 2018 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 153771 are hereby AFFIRMED. Accordingly, the Decision dated May 25, 2018 of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaluyong City, Branch 208, in Civil Case No. MCI5-9374 is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court, Branch 208, Mandaluyong City is DIRECTED to allow Carlita C. Marcantonio to file a responsive pleading within the terms and period as provided for under the Rules of Court; to participate in the foreclosure proceedings; and thereafter, to resolve the case with utmost dispatch.
RATIO:
● Yes, Marcantonio’s motions are deemed voluntary appearance which cured the defective service of summons.
● Marcantonio has indeed already submitted herself to the jurisdiction of the RTC when she moved for the setting aside of the order of default against her and asked the trial court for an affirmative relief to allow her to participate in the trial. Such voluntary submission actually cured the defect in the service of summons.
● Marcantonio has already been notified of Belo’s action against her and her mortgaged property, which prompted her to file the Motion to Set Aside/Lift Order of Default and to Re-Open Trial, questioning the trial court's jurisdiction on the ground of defective service of summons and asking for affirmative relief to allow her to participate in the proceedings. It is, thus, only at this point when Marcantonio was deemed, for purposes of due process, to have been notified of the action involving her and her mortgaged property. It is also only at this point when Marcantonio was deemed to have submitted herself to the jurisdiction of the RTC. Jurisprudence states that one who seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court.
NOTES:
● However, while the defect in the service of summons was cured by Marcantonio’s voluntary submission to the RTC's jurisdiction, it is not sufficient to make the proceedings binding upon Marcantonio without her participation. This is because the service of summons or, in this case the voluntary submission, merely pertains to the "notice" aspect of due process. Equally important in the concept of due process is the "hearing" aspect or the right to be heard. This aspect of due process was not satisfied or "cured" by Marcantonio’s voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the RTC when she was unjustifiably disallowed to participate in the proceedings before the RTC.
● In this case, at a certain point of the proceedings, upon Marcantonio’s discovery of the case against her and her property, or specifically, after issuance of default order, Belo’s presentation of evidence ex parte, and submission of the case for resolution, she (Marcantonio) filed a Motion to Set Aside/Lift Order of Default and to Re-Open Trial, where she averred that her failure to file an answer was due to the defective service of summons. The fact of improper service of summons in this case is undisputed and established. Despite such meritorious justification for failure to file answer, the RTC insisted on the validity of the default order and continuously disallowed respondent to participate in the proceedings and defend her case. Such improper service of summons rendered the subsequent proceedings before the trial court null and void as it deprived respondent her right to due process.
● The service of summons is a vital and indispensable ingredient of a defendant's constitutional right to due process, which is the cornerstone of our justice system. Due process consists of notice and hearing. Notice means that the persons with interests in the litigation be informed of the facts and law on which the action is based for them to adequately defend their respective interests. Hearing, on the other hand, means that the parties be given an opportunity to be heard or a chance to defend their respective interests.
● The concept of due process consists of the twin requirements of notice and hearing. Thus, while respondent had been notified of the proceedings, she was however, deprived of the opportunity to be heard due to the RTC's insistence on the validity of the default order despite improper service of summons. Considering, therefore, the defective service of summons, coupled with respondent's plea to be allowed to participate upon learning about the proceedings, it was erroneous on the part of the RTC to insist on disallowing respondent to defend her case. This, to be sure, is tantamount to a violation of respondent's right to due process - a violation of her right to be heard. The CA, therefore, did not err when it nullified the Orders dated August 15, 2016 and September 22, 2017 of the RTC. Accordingly, the RTC Decision rendered during the pendency of the case before the CA should perforce be nullified.
● Considering further, however, respondent's voluntary submission to the trial court's jurisdiction and her consistent plea to be allowed to participate in the proceedings before the trial court despite violation of her right to due process, it is only proper to allow the trial to proceed with her participation in the interest of substantial justice, to expedite the proceedings, and to avoid multiplicity of suits. After all, nothing is more fundamental in our Constitution than the guarantee that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, and property without due process of law.
ROXAS vs ASIATRUST DEVELOPMENT BANK, INC.
January 6, 2020| GR No. 203506 |Delos Santos, J | Voluntary Appearance
PETITIONER: Alfredo and Cecila Roxas
RESPONDENTS: Asiatrust Development Bank, Inc
DOCTRINE:
Jurisdiction over a defendant in a civil case is acquired either through service of summons or through voluntary appearance in court.Here, the sheriff attempted several times to serve the summons on petitioners personally, but failed since petitioners' address could not be found and no one can give their possible location. The impossibility of personal service of summons warranted the resort to service by publication pursuant to Section 14, Rule 14 of the Rules.
FACTS:
1. On March 31, 1999, Kamakura Food Corporation was granted a Credit Line in the amount of P13,000,000.00 by the Asiatrust Development Bank, Inc. In consideration thereof, its Vice-President, Nancy Dy, along with its authorized signatories, Alfredo and Cecilia Roxas, executed a Continuing Suretyship on May 19, 1999, whereby they jointly and severally bound themselves with Kamakura and guaranteed the full and due payment and performance of all the obligations of Kamakura.
2. They likewise guaranteed that if such obligation was not fully or duly paid or performed on due date thereof, they shall pay and perform the same together with any and all interests, penalties and other fees and charges thereon.
3. Consequently, on August 15, 2003, Asiatrust filed a Complaint for Sum of Money and Damages against Kamakura, Nancy Dy, Alfredo and Cecilia Roxas before the Regional Trial Court
4. Summonses were issued by the court. Several attempts were made by the sheriff to serve the summonses and the copies of the complaint to Kamakura, Nancy Dy, Alfredo and Cecilia Roxas, but to no avail. The summons for Nancy Dy was eventually served through substituted service while the summonses for Kamakura and Alfredo and Cecilia Roxas remained unserved.
5. With prior leave of court, Asiatrust caused the publication of the summons in Saksi Ngayon on July 23, 30 and August 6, 2004. Thereafter, it submitted the affidavit of publication of the publisher/editor-in-chief thereof and an affidavit of mailing of Asiatrust's employee to the effect that he sent a copy of the summons by registered mail to the last known addresses of Kamakura and Alfredo and Cecilia Roxas.
PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:
RTC ● RTC rendered a decision in favor of plaintiff Asiatrust Development Bank, Inc., as substituted by Schuykill Asset Strategists (SPV-AMC) and against the [petitioners], ordering the latter (1) to pay the total loan obligation of P25,851,218.72 plus legal interest from the date this case is filed in court until fully paid; and (2) the costs of suit.
CA ● the CA rendered the assailed Decision which partially modified the RTC Decision
● The CA also held that even assuming that the service of summons was defective or flawed, the RTC acquired jurisdiction over petitioners when they made a voluntary appearance in the proceedings. They filed an Entry of Appearance and Very Urgent Omnibus Motion (to set aside order of default and to admit appended answer) which did not question the jurisdiction of the RTC over their persons. The filing of a pleading that seeks affirmative relief amounts to voluntary appearance which consequently renders the issue of lack of jurisdiction moot
ISSUE: Petitioners' voluntary appearance rendered the issue of lack of jurisdiction over their persons moot
RULING:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed April 11, 2012 Decision and September 19, 2012 Resolution issued by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 89871 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Petitioners are ORDERED
RATIO:
● Jurisdiction over a defendant in a civil case is acquired either through service of summons or through voluntary appearance in court. Here, the sheriff attempted several times to serve the summons on petitioners personally, but failed since petitioners' address could not be found and no one can give their possible location. The impossibility of personal service of summons warranted the resort to service by publication pursuant to Section 14, Rule 14 of the Rules
● The Court will not delve into factual issues raised by petitioners pertaining to perceived defects in the service of summons by publication. The Court is not a trier of facts. The rule is that factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the CA, are deemed conclusive and binding upon the Court. This is subject to exceptions, but none of those are present in this case.
● The entry of appearance was made without qualification or objection to the RTC's jurisdiction. This in itself amounts to voluntary appearance in the proceedings. The motion, on the other hand, mainly alleged that summons, together with copies of the complaint and annexes, were published in Saksi Ngayon, which is not a newspaper of general circulation.
SADHWHANI V SADHWHANI
Aug. 4, 2019 | GR No. 217365| Caguioa | dismissal with prejudice vs without prejudice
PETITIONER: Sadhwhani spouses
RESPONDENTS: Gop and Kanta Sadhwhani
DOCTRINE:
We distinguish a dismissal with prejudice from a dismissal without prejudice. The former disallows and bars the refiling of the complaint; whereas, the same cannot be said of a dismissal without prejudice. Likewise, where the law permits, a dismissal with prejudice is subject to the right of appeal.
FACTS:
1. The instant case instant dispute involves conflicting claims of ownership over: 1) a parcel of land located at 58 Aries St., Bel Air, Makati (Bel Air Property), and 2) condominium unit 602-A at the Ritz Tower, Ayala Avenue, Makati City (Ritz Condominium Unit) (together, subject properties). The subject properties were allegedly purchased by the Spouses Satramdas and Kishnibai Sadhwani (Sps. Sadhwani) and the titles thereof were allegedly placed in the name of their son, herein respondent Gop S. Sadhwani (respondent Gop), in trust for his parents.
2. The other legitimate children filed a complaint for reconveyance, partition, and accounting against their brother Gop and wife Kanta
3. Gop and Kanta filed a motion to dismiss
4. RTC granted the motion to dismiss on the grounds of lack of capacity to sue because the spouses were Indians and prohibited to own properties
5. The RTC also denied the MR
6. Petitioners filed the instant petition under Rule 45
ISSUE/S:
WoN petitioners availed the correct remedy to challenge the dismissal of the complaint
RATIO:
YES
● Petitioners availed of the wrong remedy and disregarded the hierarchy of courts
● Rule 41, Section 1 expressly states that no appeal may be taken from an order dismissing an action without prejudice. In such cases, the remedy available to the aggrieved party is to file an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court|||
● Verily, Section 1, Rule 41 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure recites the instances when appeal may not be taken, specifically, in case of an order dismissing an action without prejudice, in which case, the remedy available to the aggrieved party is Rule 65.||| (
● We distinguish a dismissal with prejudice from a dismissal without prejudice. The former disallows and bars the refiling of the complaint; whereas, the same cannot be said of a dismissal without prejudice. Likewise, where the law permits, a dismissal with prejudice is subject to the right of appeal.
BLAY V. BAÑA
March 7, 2018 | GR No. 232189 | Perlas-Bernabe, J. | Dismissal upon Motion of Plaintiff
PETITIONER: Alex Raul B. Blay
RESPONDENTS: Cynthia B. Baña
DOCTRINE:
Where the plaintiff moves for the dismissal of the complaint to which a counterclaim has been interposed, the dismissal shall be limited to the complaint. Such dismissal shall be without prejudice to the right of the defendant to either prosecute his counterclaim in a separate action or to have the same resolved in the same action. Should he opt for the first alternative, the court should render the corresponding order granting and reserving his right to prosecute his claim in a separate complaint. Should he choose to have his counterclaim disposed of in the same action wherein the complaint had been dismissed, he must manifest within 15 days from notice to him of plaintiff's motion to dismiss.
FACTS:
1. Petitioner filed before the RTC a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, seeking that his marriage to respondent be declared null and void on account of his psychological incapacity pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code. Subsequently, respondent filed her Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim.
2. Petitioner later lost interest over the case, and thus, filed a Motion to Withdraw his petition.
3. In her comment/opposition, respondent invoked Section 2, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court, and prayed that her counterclaims be declared as remaining for the court's independent adjudication.
4. Petitioner filed his reply, averring that respondent's counterclaims are barred from being prosecuted in the same action due to her failure to file a manifestation therefor within fifteen (15) days from notice of the Motion to Withdraw, which — according to petitioner — was required under the same Rules of Court provision.
PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:
RTC ● The RTC granted petitioner's Motion to Withdraw petition.
● It declared respondent's counterclaim "as remaining for independent adjudication" and as such, gave petitioner fifteen (15) days to file his answer thereto.
● Dissatisfied, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied. Thus, he elevated the matter to the CA via a petition for certiorari.
CA ● The CA dismissed the petition. It found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC, holding that under Section 2, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court, if a counterclaim has been filed by the defendant before the service upon him of the petitioner's motion for dismissal, the dismissal shall be limited to the complaint.
○ Petitioner moved for reconsideration, which was denied.
ISSUE/S:
1. WON the the CA erred in upholding the RTC Orders declaring respondent's counterclaim for independent adjudication before the same trial court—YES
RULING:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.
RATIO:
● As per the second sentence of Sec. 2, Rule 17, if a counterclaim has been pleaded by the defendant prior to the service upon him of the plaintiff's motion for the dismissal — as in this case — the rule is that the dismissal shall be limited to the complaint. Commentaries on the subject elucidate that "[i]nstead of an 'action' shall not be dismissed, the present rule uses the term 'complaint'. A dismissal of an action is different from a mere dismissal of the complaint. For this reason, since only the complaint and not the action is dismissed, the defendant inspite of said dismissal may still prosecute his counterclaim in the same action."
● However, as stated in the third sentence of Section 2, Rule 17, if defendant desires to prosecute his counterclaim in the same action, he is required to file a manifestation within fifteen (15) days from notice of the motion. Otherwise, his counterclaim may be prosecuted in a separate action. As explained by renowned remedial law expert, former Associate Justice Florenz D. Regalado, in his treatise on the matter:
o Under this revised section, where the plaintiff moves for the dismissal of the complaint to which a counterclaim has been interposed, the dismissal shall be limited to the complaint. Such dismissal shall be without prejudice to the right of the defendant to either prosecute his counterclaim in a separate action or to have the same resolved in the same action. Should he opt for the first alternative, the court should render the corresponding order granting and reserving his right to prosecute his claim in a separate complaint. Should he choose to have his counterclaim disposed of in the same action wherein the complaint had been dismissed, he must manifest within 15 days from notice to him of plaintiff's motion to dismiss. x x x
● In this case, the CA confined the application of Section 2, Rule 17 to that portion of its second sentence which states that the "dismissal shall be limited to the complaint." Evidently, the CA ignored the same provision's third sentence, which provides for the alternatives available to the defendant who interposes a counterclaim prior to the service upon him of the plaintiff's motion for dismissal. As may be clearly inferred therefrom, should the defendant desire to prosecute his counterclaim, he is required to manifest his preference therefor within fifteen (15) days from notice of the plaintiff's motion to dismiss. Failing in which, the counterclaim may be prosecuted only in a separate action.
HEIRS OF BARTOLOME J. SANCHEZ, REPRESENTED BY EDNA N. VDA. DE SANCHEZ, Petitioners,
v.
HELDELITA, ALLEN, ALBERTO, ARTHUR, MARIA ANITA, ALL SURNAMED ABRANTES, Respondents.
August 04, 2021|G.R. No. 234999 |INTING, J.|Dismissal of Actions
PETITIONER:HEIRS OF BARTOLOME J. SANCHEZ, REPRESENTED BY EDNA N. VDA. DE SANCHEZ
RESPONDENTS: HELDELITA, ALLEN, ALBERTO, ARTHUR, MARIA ANITA, ALL SURNAMED ABRANTES
The requisites of litis pendentia are: "(a) the identity of parties, or at least such as representing the same interests in both actions; (b) the identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity of the two cases such that judgment in one, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other."
FACTS:
1. The case involves a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Deed of Confirmation of Absolute Sale, Reconveyance, Liquidation, Damages, and Attorney's Fees filed by Horacio Abrantes (Horacio) against the Heirs of Bartolome which involved a parcel of land.
2. Horacio died during the case; hence, the case was withdrawn. 4 years later, Horacio’s heirs filed a similar second complaint against the Heirs of Bartolome involving the same parcel of land. The two complaints involve the same subject matter, substantially the same parties, the same causes of action, and the same underlying objectives, or reliefs sought.
PROCEDURAL AND CASE HISTORY:
RTC ● RTC Branch 3 dismissed the Second Complaint on the ground of res judicata relative to the First Dismissal Order of the Regional Trial Court
CA In turn the Court of Appeals affirmed the Second Dismissal Order on the ground of litis pendentia, not res judicata, relative to the First Complaint.
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether plitis pendentia the proper reason for dismissal of the case.
RULING:
W