Monroy v. People

 

Monroy v. People

G.R. No. 235799

July 29, 2019

FACTS:

                The RTC and CA convicted Jasper Monroy y Mora for the crime of violating Sec. 5 (b) Art. III of RA 7610. On October 17, 2014, at around nine (9) o' clock in the evening, AAA was watching television in the sala when petitioner, who was drunk and wearing only his underwear, approached her and suddenly pulled the blanket that AAA was using, telling her that he was just borrowing it.10 At that time, BBB and CCC were at the second floor of the house. After a while, AAA asked for her blanket back from petitioner, as she was ready to go to sleep. However, petitioner grabbed her left arm and pulled her onto his bed. While pinning her to the bed, petitioner removed her shorts and underwear and thereafter, inserted his penis into her vagina. She tried to shout but petitioner covered her mouth; she feared for her life after recalling an incident in December 2013 when petitioner got mad and poked a knife against BBB's neck. Thereafter, petitioner stood up, walked to the kitchen, and told her that he was going to sleep. Meanwhile, as AAA pulled up her clothes, she realized that her life was already worthless and contemplated on committing suicide.12 Thus, she left a suicide note13 and then consumed a medicine for dogs from the veterinary clinic being managed by the brother of AAA's brother-in-law. She woke up the following morning in the hospital and was discharged in the afternoon of the same day.

ISSUE:

                Whether or not the CA erred in upholding the conviction of petitioner.

HELD:

                Yes. That the sexual intercourse between the parties appears to be consensual is bolstered by the fact that AAA failed to cry or shout for help, or at the very least, offer some kind of resistance against petitioner's advances. She claimed to have tried to shout but petitioner allegedly covered her mouth; still, under the circumstances, and fully aware that petitioner was about to defile her, she could have made any kind of noise in order to alert her sister BBB and CCC, who were upstairs at the time. While it is true that the failure of the victim to shout for help or resist the sexual advances of the rapist is not tantamount to consent, in this case it created a serious doubt when taken together with the other pieces of evidence tending to show that AAA consented to the sexual congress and merely fabricated the rape charge against petitioner. Neither can the Court accept AAA's explanation that she was afraid of petitioner because she recalled an incident in 2013 when petitioner allegedly poked a knife against BBB's neck; at the particular moment when AAA alleged that petitioner forced himself upon her, there was no immediate threat of bodily harm or injury as to rouse fear or panic in AAA.

As regards the CA's conviction of petitioner for violation of Section 5 (b), Article III of RA 7610 on the premise that consent is immaterial under such charges, it bears to point out that "consent of the child is material and may even be a defense in criminal cases" involving the aforesaid violation when the offended party is 12 years old or below 18 years old, as in AAA's case. The concept of consent under Section 5 (b), Article III of RA 7610 peculiarly relates to the second element of the crime — that is, the act of sexual intercourse is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse. A child is considered "exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse" when the child is pre­ disposed to indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct because of money, profit or any other consideration or due to the coercion of any adult, syndicate, or group, which was not shown in this case; hence, petitioner's conviction for the said crime cannot be sustained.