TITLE 10 CRIMES AGAINST PROPERTY CASE DIGESTS

People v. Dillatan

G.R. No. 212191

September 5, 2018

FACTS:

                The RTC and CA convicted the accused for the crime of robbery with homicide. Herein private complainants, the spouses Henry and Violeta Acob (Spouses Acob), were owners of a market stall at the public market of Sta. Rosa, Aurora, Isabela. Around 6 o'clock in the evening of February 7, 2010, the Spouses Acob, together with their son, Homer, closed their stall and proceeded home by riding together on their motorcycle. Homer was the driver, Violeta sat at the middle, while Henry sat behind her. They were approaching the entrance to their barangay around 6:30 p.m. when they noticed two persons, whom they later identified as herein accused-appellants, near a motorcycle. When they passed, accused-appellants rode the motorcycle and tailed them. Accused-appellants eventually caught up with them, whereupon, accused Dillatan forced them to stop and immediately declared a holdup. Violeta embraced Homer, while Dillatan grabbed her belt bag which contained P70,000.00 cash. Thereafter, Dillatan uttered, "barilin mo na." Garcia then fired at the victims hitting, first, the left hand of Violeta. The bullet went through the left hand of Violeta and pierced Homer's chest causing the latter to fall down together with the motorcycle. Henry, on the other hand, was able to get off the motorcycle and tried to escape but Garcia also fired at him thereby hitting his right knee. Accused-appellants, thereafter, fled through their motorcycle. Several people then came to the aid of the private complainants and brought them to the hospital where Homer later expired by reason of his gunshot wound. Violeta and Henry were treated for their wounds. Accused-appellants were apprehended by police authorities later at night where they were subsequently identified by Violeta at the police station as the ones who grabbed her belt bag and shot them. A criminal complaint was subsequently filed against accused-appellants.

ISSUE:

                Whether or not CA erred in affirming the RTC

HELD:

                No. This Court has ruled that common human experience tells us that when extraordinary circumstances take place, it is natural for persons to remember many of the important details. This Court has held that the most natural reaction of victims of criminal violence is to strive to see the features and faces of their assailants and observe the manner in which the crime is committed. Most often the face of the assailant and body movements thereof, create a lasting impression which cannot be easily erased from a witness' memory. Experience dictates that precisely because of the unusual acts of violence committed right before their eyes, eyewitnesses can remember with a high degree of reliability the identity of criminals at any given time. 

Accused-appellants' lackluster defenses of denial and alibi fail to cast doubt on the positive identification made by Henry and Violeta and the continuous chain of circumstances established by the prosecution. This Court has consistently held that alibi and denial being inherently weak cannot prevail over the positive identification of the accused as the perpetrator of the crime. They are facile to fabricate and difficult to disprove, and are thus generally rejected Besides, for the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must prove not only that he was at some other place at the time of the commission of the crime but also that it was physically impossible for him to be at the locus delicti or within its immediate vicinity. The excuse must be so airtight that it would admit of no exception. Where there is the least possibility of accused-appellants' presence at the crime scene, as in this case, the alibi will not hold water. The Court finds no cogent reason to depart from the ruling of the lower courts that apart from their self-serving testimony that they were someplace else at the time of the commission of the crime, accused-appellants were unable to sufficiently show that it was physically impossible for them to be at the scene of the crime when it was committed.

People v. Balute

G.R. No. 212932

January 21, 2015

FACTS:

At around 8 o’clock in the evening of March 22, 2002, SPO1 Raymundo B. Manaois (SPO1 Manaois) was on board his owner-type jeepney with his wife Cristita and daughter Blesilda, and was traversing Road 10, Tondo, Manila. While the vehicle was on a stop position at a lighted area due to heavy traffic, two malepersons, later on identified as Balute and a certain Leo Blaster (Blaster), suddenly appeared on either side of the jeepney, with Balute poking a gun at the side of SPO1 Manaois and saying “putang ina, ilabas mo!” Thereafter, Balute grabbed SPO1 Manaois’s mobile phone from the latter’s chest pocket and shot him at the left side of his torso. SPO1 Manaois reacted by drawing his own firearm and alighting from his vehicle, but he was unable to fire at the assailants as he fell to the ground. He was taken to Mary Johnston Hospital where he died despite undergoing surgical operation and medical intervention.

According to the accused, Balute denied having any knowledge of the charges against him. He maintained, inter alia, that on March 22, 2002, he was at the shop of a certain Leticia Nicol (Nicol) wherein he worked as a pedicab welder from 8:00 o’clock in the morning until 10:00 o’clock in the evening, and did not notice any untoward incident that day as he was busy working the entire time. Nicol corroborated Balute’s story, and imputed liability on Blaster and a certain Intoy.

 

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA correctly upheld Balute’s conviction for robbery with homicide

 

HELD:

Yes. The appeal is bereft of merit. The CA correctly upheld Balute’s conviction for robbery with homicide. In People vs. Ibañez, the Court exhaustively explained that “a special complex crime of robbery with homicide takes place when a homicide is committed either by reason, or on the occasion, of the robbery.” To sustain a conviction for robbery with homicide, the prosecution must prove the following elements: 1) the taking of personal property belonging to another; 2) with intent to gain; 3) with the use of violence or intimidation against a person; and 4) on the occasion or by reason of the robbery, the crime of homicide, as used in its generic sense, was committed. A conviction requires certitude that the robbery is the main purpose and the objective of the malefactor, and the killing is merely incidental to the robbery. The intent to rob must precede the taking of human life but the killing may occur before, during or after the robbery. Homicide is said to have been committed by reason or on occasion of robbery if, for instance, it was committed: (a) to facilitate the robbery or the escape of the culprit; (b) to preserve the possession by the culprit of the loot; (c) to prevent discovery of the commission of the robbery; or (d) to eliminate witnesses in the commission of the crime.

In the instant case, the CA correctly upheld the RTC’s finding that the prosecution was able to establish the fact that Balute poked his gun at SPO1 Manaois, took the latter’s mobile phone, and thereafter, shot him, resulting in his death despite surgical and medical intervention. This is buttressed by Cristita and Blesilda’s positive identification of Balute as the one who committed the crime as opposed to the latter’s denial and alibi which was correctly considered by both the RTC and the CA as weak and self-serving, as it is well-settled that “alibi and denial are outweighed by positive identification that is categorical, consistent and untainted by any ill motive on the part of the eyewitnesses testifying on the matter.

 

 

People v. Orosco

G.R. No. 209227

March 25, 2015

FACTS:

                Appellant, along with Abner Astor, "John Doe" and "Peter Doe," were charged with Robbery with Homicide defined and penalized under Article 294 of the RPC. Albert Arca went to the store of Lourdes Yap at Purok 4, Bgy. Rawis to buy ice but it was not yet frozenso he went home. Thereafter, he was again sent on errand to buy ice at the same store. After purchasingthe ice, he noticed there was a verbal tussle between Yap and two male customers. The men were arguingthat they were given insufficient change and insisting they gave a P500 and not P100. When Yap opened the door, the two men entered the store. From outside the store and thru its open window grills, Arca saw one of the men placed his left arm around the neck of Yap and covered her mouth with his right hand while the other man was at her back restraining her hands. He recognized the man who was holding the hands of Yap as Charlie Orosco, while he described the man who covered her mouth asthin, with less hair and dark complexion. The latter stabbed Yap at the center of her chest then releasedher and she fell down on the floor. Orosco then took a thick wad of bills from the base of the santo at thealtar in front of the store's window, after which he and the man who stabbed Yap fled together with twoother men outside who acted as lookouts. Arca went near the bloodied victim but also left and went homeafraid because he was seen by one of the lookouts Yap was brought to the Aquinas University Hospital but she was declared dead on arrival. Later, at theNBI Legazpi City District office, Arca positively identified Abner Astor (Astor) as one of the two lookouts.However, Orosco appellant was arrested as Astor, John Doe and Peter Doe remained at large. Orosco testified that on the date and time of the incident, he was at his house in Bigaa taking care of histhree-year-old child while his wife was washing clothes until past 3:00 PM. He denied knowing Yap and Astor. He admitted that he was a resident of Purok 4, Bgy. Rawis, his family transferred to their otherhouse at Bigaa. He denied knowing Arca and he does not know of any motive for Arca to testify againsthim. Orosco's wife also testified to confirm appellant’s defense. On cross-examination, she replied that it will take less than one hour from Bigaa to Rawis.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA correctly upheld Orosco’s conviction for Robbery with Homicide.

HELD:

Yes. SC The testimony of a sole witness, if found convincing and credible by the trial court, is sufficient to supporta finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Corroborative evidence is necessary only when there are reasonsto warrant the suspicion that the witness falsified the truth or that his observation had been inaccurate. Arca named appellant as one of those who robbed and killed Yap but refused to pinpoint him in opencourt. Nonetheless, to the Court's mind, Arca's act of constantly looking towards Orosco's direction whenever he was asked to point out one of the culprits, is a mute but eloquent manner of identifyingOrosco as one of the perpetrators of the crime. As such, Arca's act is sufficient identification already. Atthe next hearing, Arca was recalled to the witness stand and this time he was able to pinpoint appellant asamong those persons who robbed and killed Yap. Arca stated that he was hesitant to identify and pointout accused earlier because he feared what Orosco might do to him.  The elements of the crime of Robbery with Homicide under Article 294 of the RPC are:(1) The taking of personal property is committed with violence or intimidation against persons;(2) The property taken belongs to another;(3) The taking is done with animo lucrandi; and(4) By reason of the robbery or on the occasion thereof, homicide (used in its generic sense) is committed. Homicide is said to have been committed by reason or on the occasion of robbery if it is committed (a) to facilitate the robbery or the escape of the culprit;(b) to preserve the possession by the culprit of the loot;(c) to prevent discovery of the commission of the robbery; or(d) to eliminate witnesses to the commission of the crime.

 In robbery with homicide, the original criminal design of the malefactor is to commit robbery, withhomicide perpetrated on the occasion or by reason of the robbery. The intent to commit robbery mustprecede the taking of human life. The homicide may take place before, during or after the robbery.

Here, the homicide was committed by reason of or on the occasion of the robbery as appellant and JohnDoe had to kill Yap to accomplish their main objective of stealing her money. The earlier verbal tussle where the two pretended to have paid a greater amount and asked for the correct change was just a ployto get inside the store where the victim kept her earnings. To verify whether the cash payment was indeeda P500 or P100 bill, the victim let them enter the store but once inside they got hold of her and stabbedher.

 All the foregoing indicate the presence of conspiracy between appellant and his co-accused in theperpetration of robbery and killing of the victim. It must be stressed that appellant played a crucial role inthe killing of the victim to facilitate the robbery. He was behind the victim holding her hands while JohnDoe grabbed her at the neck. His act contributed in rendering the victim without any means of defendingherself when John Doe stabbed her frontally in the chest. Having acted in conspiracy with his co-accused,appellant is equally liable for the killing of Yap.  The concerted manner in which the appellant and his companions perpetrated the crime showed beyondreasonable doubt the presence of conspiracy.

 Appellant was positively identified by Arca as among those who perpetrated the robbery and killing of Yap. Also, it was not physically impossible for appellant to be at the scene of the crime considering the presenceof many public conveyances which would drastically cut the one hour walk from Bigaa to Rawis to only a"couple of minutes"

 

 

People v. Cabbab

G.R. No. 173479

July 12, 2007

FACTS:

Appellant was charged along with his cousin-in-law Segundino Calpito, with the crimes of Double Murder and Attempted Murder with Robbery committed with treachery, evident premeditation, with intent to kill and intent to gain. The prosecution alleges that father and son Vidal Agbulos and Winner Agbulos, together with Eddie Quindasan, Felipe Abad and Police Officer (PO) William Belmes, attended a "fiesta" celebration, but it was already over when they got there. On their way home, they were met by accused-appellant Juan Cabbab, Jr. and Calpito who invited them to play "pepito," a local version of the game of "russian poker." Winner Agbulos won the game. While walking on their way home, PO William Belmes, who was behind Winner Agbulos and Eddie Quindasan picking-up guava fruits from a tree, saw accused-appellant, accused Calpito and a companion running up a hill. Suddenly, he heard gunshots and saw Winner Agbulos and Eddie Quindasan, who were then walking ahead of the group, hit by the gunfire. By instant, PO William Belmes dove into a canal to save himself from the continuous gunfire of accused-appellant. PO William Belmes ran towards Vidal Agbulos and Felipe Abad, who were walking behind the group, and informed the two that Winner Agbulos and Eddie Quindasan were ambushed by accused-appellant and Calpito. The three (3) proceeded to the crime scene where they saw the dead body of Winner Agbulos together with Eddie Quindasan whom they mistook for dead. The three sought help from the police authorities of Pilar, Abra and returned to the scene of the crime where they found Eddie Quindasan who was still alive and who narrated that it was Juan Cabbab, Jr. and Calpito who ambushed them and took the money, estimated at P12,000.00, of Winner Agbulos which he won in the card game. Eddie Quindasan was brought to the Abra Provincial Hospital but died the following day. The Trial Court acquitted Calpito but found appellant Juan Cabbab, Jr. guilty of two crimes, i.e. (1) robbery with double homicide and (2) attempted murder. The CA modified the trial court's decision and found appellant guilty of the special complex crime of Robbery with Homicide and imposed upon him the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The CA also affirmed appellant's conviction, as well as the penalty imposed, for the separate crime of attempted murder.

 

ISSUE:

                Whether or not the accused is guilty

HELD:

Yes. Robbery with Homicide. To warrant conviction for the crime of Robbery with Homicide, the prosecution is burdened to prove the confluence of the following elements: (a)the taking of personal property is committed with violence or intimidation against persons; (b)the property taken belongs to another; (c)the taking is characterized by intent to gain or animo lucrandi; and (d)by reason of the robbery or on the occasion thereof, homicide is committed.

In Robbery with Homicide, so long as the intention of the felon is to rob, the killing may occur before, during or after the robbery. It is immaterial that death would supervene by mere accident, or that the victim of homicide is other than the victim of robbery, or that two or more persons are killed. Once a homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion of the robbery, the felony committed is the special complex crime of Robbery with Homicide. In pursuit of his plan to rob Agbulos of his winnings, appellant shot and killed him as well as his companion, Eddie Quindasan. However, that the two courts below erred in convicting appellant of the separate crime of attempted murder for the shooting of PO William Belmes. Attempted homicide or attempted murder committed during or on the occasion of the robbery, as in this case, is absorbed in the crime of Robbery with Homicide which is a special complex crime that remains fundamentally the same regardless of the number of homicides or injuries committed in connection with the robbery.

People v. Suyu

G.R. No. 170191

August 16, 2006

FACTS:

At around 7:15 in the evening on January 13, 1996, Clarissa Angeles, a third-year student of St. Paul University, was with her boyfriend, William Ferrer. They were eating snacks inside a pick-up truck parked in a vacant lot. Suddenly, a man, who turned out to be Rommel Macarubbo, appeared in front of the truck, pointed a gun at them and said: "This is a holdup. If you will start the engine of the car, I will shoot you." Thereafter, another man, who turned out to be Willy Suyu, lifted the lock on William's side and entered the pick-up. Willy Suyu then took Ferrer's wallet which contained around P150.00. A third man, who turned out to be Francis Cainglet, took Clarissa's jewelry valued at around P2, 500.00 and cash amounting to P10.00. Thereafter, Willy Suyu clubbed William and dragged him out of the truck. Fortunately, William was able to escape and immediately went to the police station to report the incident. Meanwhile, Willy Suyu lifted the lock of the pick-up truck at Clarissa's side. Macarubbo then opened the door. The two and Cainglet dragged the girl to a hilly place, not far away. Macarubbo and Willy Suyu held her by the arms, while Cainglet poked a fan knife at her. There, they ravished her.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the accused is guilty.

HELD:

Yes. Robbery with rape defined and penalized under Article 294, paragraph 1 of the RPC. While it is true that the victim initially did not reveal to the authorities the fact that she was raped after the robbery, this does not cast doubt on her testimony for it is not uncommon for a rape victim right after her ordeal to remain mum about what really transpired. Jurisprudence has established that delay in revealing the commission of rape is not an indication of a fabricated charge, and the same is rendered doubtful only if the delay was unreasonable and unexplained.

Appellants also assert that the medical report issued by Dr. Pintucan does not conclusively suggest that Clarissa was raped, for during the examination, her deportment was not of that of a rape victim and the examination of her cervix did not even suggest forcible assault.The said argument is, however, without merit. Hymenal lacerations which are usually inflicted when there is complete penetration are not essential in establishing the crime of rape as it is enough that a slight penetration or entry of the penis into the lips of the vagina takes place. Partial penile penetration is as serious as full penetration; the rape is deemed consummated in either case. Dr. Pintucan further found contusion and hematoma on the victim, which bolsters Clarissa's recount that she was dragged, forced to lie down, and raped. The conviction thus of appellants for robbery with rape defined and penalized under Article 294, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code is correct. The intent to rob must precede the rape. In robbery with rape, the intention of the felony is to rob and the felony is accompanied by rape. The rape must be contemporaneous with the commission of the robbery. There is only one single and indivisible felony of robbery with rape and any crimes committed on the occasion or by reason of the robbery are merged and integrated into a single and indivisible felony of robbery with rape.

 

 

 

 

People v. Barra

G.R. No. 198020

July 10, 2013

FACTS:

An information was filed against Appellant Joseph Barra charging him of special complex crime of robbery with homicide committed against the victim Elmer Lagdaan. On October 9, 2003 at around 9:00 p.m., one witness stated that he was on his way home when in the light of a bright moon, he saw Barra enter the house of Lagdaan (victim), which was lit with a lamp, and poked a gun to the victim’s right forehead and demanded money. When the victim stated that the money was not in his possession, appellant shot him. The victim died due to massive hemorrhage secondary to gunshot wound. In his defense, Barra (appellant) denied the charges against him arguing that the elements for the special complex crime of robbery with homicide were not proven particularly the element of taking of personal property. Appellant also claimed that he was in Batangas City, with his brother Benjamin, visiting his sister when he was arrested and brought to Camarines Sur.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Barra is guilty of robbery with homicide

HELD:

No. The SC affirmed the decision of the CA. Barra is guilty of attempted robbery with homicide. Requisites to be proven by the prosecution for appellant to be convicted of robbery with homicide under Art. 294, are, to wit: 1) the taking of personal property is committed with violence or intimidation against persons; 2) the property taken belongs to another; 3) the taking is characterized by intent to gain or animo lucrandi; and 4) by reason of the robbery or on the occasion thereof, homicide (used in its generic sense) is committed.Appellant’s intention was to extort money from the victim. By reason of the victim’s refusal to give up his personal property – his money – to appellant, the victim was shot in the head, causing his death. The element of taking was not complete, making the crime one of attempted robbery with homicide as opposed to the crime appellant was convicted in the RTC.

The elements of attempted and frustrated robbery with homicide as defined in Art. 297 of the Revised Penal Code are: 1) there is an attempted or frustrated robbery 2) a homicide is committed In the present case, the crime of robbery remained unconsummated because the victim refused to give his money to appellant and no personal property was shown to have been taken. It was for this reason that the victim was shot. Since the RTC and the Court of Appeals found appellant’s crime to be aggravated by disregard of dwelling, the Court of Appeals correctly imposed the maximum penalty of reclusion perpetua.

 

 

 

Amparo v. People

G.R. No. 204990

February 22, 2017

FACTS:

On April 26, 2007, the accused Ahmed Alcubar, Roberto Guarino, Juanito Salmeo, and Ramon Amparo y Ibanez conspired and confederated together and helped one another armed with deadly bladed weapons and therefore in band, with intent of gain and by means of force, violence and intimidation, that is, by boarding a passenger jeepney with Plate No. DGM-407 at the comer of C.M. Recto Avenue and T. Mapua Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila and immediately poked said arms upon RAYMOND IGNACIO, and announced the holdup, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously took, robbed and carried away the Nokia 6680 worth Pl4,000.00 of said Raymond G. Ignacio against his will. The accused were arraigned and they pleaded "not guilty." Trial ensued. Raymond Ignacio testified that on April 26, 2007, he was riding a jeepney going to Lawton when two (2) men boarded the jeepney along T. Mapua Street. One of them sat beside him, pointed a knife at him and declared a hold-up. He was ordered to take his necklace off and hand over his mobile phone Ignacio then heard a gunshot, causing the robbers to be rattled and drop their knives on the jeepney bench.A police officer arrived and ordered the robbers to alight from the jeepney. Four ( 4) men, later identified as Alcubar, Guarino, Salmeo, and Amparo, were handcuffed and taken to the police station. Ignacio identified Alcubar as the man who poked a knife at him, and Guarino as the one who announced the hold-up. He also identified Salmeo and Amparo as the ones who sat in the front seat beside the driver. He admitted that he did not know what Salmeo and Amparo were doing at the time of the incident. However, he testified that he saw them place their knives on the jeepney bench when the police fired the warning shot. SP03 Renato Perez testified that on the day of the incident, he was about to report for work when he noticed a commotion inside a passenger jeepney. He then saw Alcubar embracing a man later identified as Ignacio, while pointing a "stainless one foot long double bladed fan knife" at him. He followed the jeepney and fired a warning shot. Later, he arrested Alcubar. SP03 Perez ordered the other 3 men to alight from the jeepney when the other passengers pointed them out as Alcubar's companions. Another police officer arrived and helped him make the arrest. Upon frisking the men, he recovered a balisong from Guarino, an improvised kitchen knife from Salmeo, and a fan knife from Amparo. He also testified that he invited the other passengers to the police station to give their statements but only Ignacio went with him.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA erred in finding that petitioner was guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with band.

HELD:

No. Under Revised Penal Code, Article 293. Who are Guilty of Robbery. - Any person who, with intent to gain, shall take any personal property belonging to another, by means of violence against or intimidation of any person, or using force upon anything, shall be guilty of robbery; Article 294. Robbery with Violence Against or Intimidation of Article 295. Robbery with physical injuries, committed in an uninhabited place or by a band, or with the use of firearm on a street, road or alley. - If the offenses mentioned in subdivisions three, four, and five of the next preceding article shall be committed in an uninhabited place or by a band or by attacking a train, street car, motor vehicle or airship, or by entering the passengers' compartments in a train or, in any manner, taking the passengers thereof by surprise in the respective conveyances, or on a street, road, highway, or alley, and the intimidation is made with the use of a firearm, the offender shall be punished by the maximum period of the proper penalties. In the same cases, the penalty next higher in degree shall be imposed upon the leader of the band; Article 296. Definition of a band and penalty incurred by the members thereof-When more than three armed malefactors take part in the commission of robbery, it shall be deemed to have been committed by a band. When any of the arms used in the commission of the offense be an unlicensed firearm, the penalty to be imposed upon all the malefactors shall be the maximum of the corresponding penalty provided by law, without prejudice to the criminal liability for illegal possession of such unlicensed firearm. Any member of a band who is present at the commission of a robbery by the band, shall be punished as principal of any of the assaults committed by the band, unless it be shown that he attempted to prevent the same.

               

 

Fransdilla v. People

G.R. No. 197562

April 20, 2015

FACTS:

                Fransdilla, the lone appellant, seeks to reverse the decision... whereby the Court of Appeals affirmed her conviction and that of her co-accused for robbery on the basis of conspiracy.  Private complainant Lalaine saw appellant. Upon noticing Aurora, Lalaine went to the gate and asked Aurora what is their purpose, as there were four (4) of them. Aurora then inquired about Lalaine's sister. The latter replied that Cynthia was in the Japanese Embassy and asked Aurora if there was any other person whom she wanted to talk to. It was then that Aurora told Lalaine that she was from POEA. It was upon said pretension that Lalaine offered herself to instead talk to her and allowed her to enter their house. When they were already having a... conversation, Aurora asked Lalaine if she could use the telephone, which the latter acceded to and handed her a cordless telephone. Lalaine noticed that Aurora seemed to keep on dialing the telephone and even said that the person she was calling did not know how to use the... telephone. But still, Aurora kept on dialing the telephone. Thereafter, appellant... asked for a cigarette. After Lalaine gave Aurora the cigarette, the four (4) other men outside the gate, who were with Aurora, suddenly came inside the house. The four (4) men stood behind Aurora who was still dialing the telephone. When Aurora told... that she could not contact the person she was calling, she asked Lalaine if she could use the comfort room, which the latter again permitted. When Aurora came back, she sat down again but in... crossed-legs as she said she was having a menstrual period. Upon saying that, Lalaine's attention was focused on her. At this juncture, accused Edgardo Cacal poked a gun at Lalaine's neck and announced that it was a hold-up. While appellant Edgardo Cacal was poking a gun at Lalaine's neck, accused Danilo Cuanang and the two (2) other men proceeded to the kitchen. In the kitchen, Danilo and his two (2) other companions herded their maids, private complainant's niece and cousin inside the bodega. Cacal looked around the room and when he spotted upon the vault opened the door and called for his companions to come along. Accused Cuanang came up and the two carried the vault and brought it downstairs. But before they went downstairs, they threatened Lalaine not to follow them and to just stay in the room but Lalaine opened the door and followed them. When Lalaine was halfway downstairs, accused Cacal turned his back and saw her. Accused Cacal then brought her inside her room. Appellants and their co-accused then left the house on board two (2) cars that were waiting... for them just outside the house At this point, Lalaine shouted for help, thereafter, a relative came by to help and untied her. Lalaine then called her sister Cynthia and related the incident. Cynthia reported the incident to the police authorities.

ISSUE:

                Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the RTC

HELD:

                No. In the eyes of the law, conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a crime and decide to commit it. The overt acts of each of the conspirators must tend to execute the offense agreed upon, for the merely passive conspirator cannot be held to be still part of the conspiracy without such... overt acts, unless such conspirator is the mastermind. Here, Fransdilla was satisfactorily shown not to have been a mere passive co-conspirator, but an active one who had facilitated the access into the house by representing herself as an employee of the POEA. In that respect it is not always required to establish that two or more persons met and explicitly entered into the agreement to commit the crime by laying down the details of how their unlawful scheme or objective would be carried out.In establishing conspiracy, the State could rely on direct as well as circumstantial evidence. Lalaine's testimony against Fransdilla constituted both kinds of evidence. Lalaine's direct testimony showed the latter's overt participation in the execution of the robbery, while the... following circumstances indicated the unity of action and common purpose or design to commit the robbery among Fransdilla and her co-accused, specifically: (1) Fransdilla and her co-accused went together to the complainants' house (2) she talked to Joel to solicit information on the whereabouts of Cynthia; (3) upon learning that Cynthia was not home, she stepped outside the gate and talked to two men sitting inside a vehicle parked outside the house; (4) she pretended to be an employee of the POEA... in order to gain entry into the house; (5) she performed acts purposely aimed to distract Lalaine in order to give her cohorts the opportunity to enter the house and commit the robbery; (5) during the robbery, she was not tied up like the household members, but moved freely... around the house, and at one point Lalaine spotted her peeping into the bedroom where Lalaine was then being held; and (7) she and the others fled together in two separate vehicles after the robbery. In light of the foregoing, the CA justly concluded that the State established beyond reasonable doubt the guilt for of all the accused, including Fransdilla, for the robbery.Crime committed was the complex crime of  robbery in an inhabited house by armed men... under Article 299 of the Revised Penal Code and robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons... under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code CA ruled that all the accused, including Fransdilla, were guilty of committing the complex crime of robbery in an inhabited house under Article 299, Revised Penal Code, and robbery with intimidation... or violence under Article 294, Revised Penal Code.

 

 

 

Ablaza v. People

G.R. 217722

September 26, 2018

FACTS:

According to the victim Rosario S. Snyder, she was using her cellphone while walking along JoloStreet, Barangay Barreto, Olongopo City when a motorcycle with two male persons on board stoppedbeside her. The backrider then suddenly grabbed her three necklaces. Before finally speeding away,the male persons looked back at her to check if all her necklaces were stolen. Snyder then went to thePolice Station to report the incident. She identified Petitioner Jomar Ablaza as the driver of themotorcycle. She alleged that she had a good look at the robbers’ faces when they looked back at her. When Snyder and a policeman went to the house of Ablaza, they found Jay Lauzon, who they earlierlearned to be the backrider, hiding under the kitchen sink. Ablaza denied the allegations against him.The RTC found Ablaza and Lauzon guilty of the crime of robbery under Article 294 (5) of the RPC.Ablaza contended that the RTC should have convicted him only of theft and not robbery.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Ablaza is guilty of robbery.

HELD:

No. The Court held that Ablaza should be held liable only for theft. In the case of People v. Concepcion, Article 293 of the [Revised Penal Code (RPC)] defines robbery as a crime committed by any person who, with intent to gain, shall take any personal property belonging to another, by means of violence against or intimidation of any person, or using force upon anything.' Theft, on the other hand, is committed by any person who, with intent to gain but without violence against or intimidation of persons nor force upon things, shall take the personal property of another without the latter's consent. Applying this in the case at bar, Snyder’s testimony is bereft of any showing that Ablaza and Lauzon used violence or intimidation in taking her necklaces.  She merely stated that they grabbed her necklaces without mentioning that they made use of violence or intimidation in grabbing them. The word ‘grab’ means to take or seize by or as if by a sudden motion or grasp. It does not suggest the presence of violence or physical force in the act. The suddenness of the act of taking or seizing cannot be equated with the employment of violence or physical force. Here, Snyder did not allege that she was pushed or harmed by the persons who took her necklaces. Moreover, the use of force is not an element of the crime of simple robbery under Article 294 (5) of the RPC. Article 294 of the RPC covers robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons. In People v. Judge Alfeche, Jr., the Court held that there are five classes of robbery under the Article294, namely: (a) robbery with homicide (par. 1); (b) robbery with rape, intentional mutilation, or the physical injuries penalized in subdivision 1 of Article 263 (par. 2); (c) robbery with physical injuries penalized in subdivision 2 of Article 263 (par. 3); (d) robbery committed with unnecessary violence or with physical injuries covered by subdivisions 3 and 4 of Article 263 (par. 4); and (e) robbery in other cases, or simply robbery (par. 5), where the violence against or intimidation of persons cannot be subsumed by, or where it is not sufficiently specified so as to fall under, the first four paragraphs. Paragraphs one to four involve the use of violence against persons. Intimidation can only fall under paragraph five. For the requisite of violence to obtain in cases of simple robbery, the victim must have sustained less serious or slight physical injuries in the occasion of robbery. For there to be intimidation, intense fear must be produced in the mind of the victim which restricts or hinders the exercise of the latter’s free will. In this case, Snyder did not sustain any injury at all. There is no showing that she was pushed orotherwise harmed on the occasion of robbery. There is also no intimidation in this case. Based on Snyder’s testimony, the act of the accused in grabbing her necklaces is so sudden, hence no fear could have been produced in Snyder’s mind as to deprive her of the exercise of her will. Accordingly, Ablaza must be held liable only for the crime of theft, not robbery.

 

 

Medina v. People

G.R. No. 182648

June 17, 2015

FACTS:

                The RTC and CA convicted the accused for the crime of simple theft under Art. 308 in relation to Art. 309 par. 1 of the RPC. Henry Lim is a resident of Calao West, Santiago City, Isabela. He is the registered owner of a Sangyong Korando Jeep with Plate No. WPC-207, which was involved in an accident that caused damage to its roof and door.  On April 27, 2002, he engaged the services of Medina, who is a mechanic and maintains a repair shop in Buenavista, Santiago City, Isabela. At the time the jeep was delivered to Medina’s shop, it was still in running condition and serviceable because the underchassis was not affected and the motor engine, wheels, steering wheels and other parts were still functioning. A reasonable time elapsed, but no repairs were made on the jeep. So, in the morning of September 4, 2002, Purita Lim, Lim’s sister, instructed Danilo Beltran to retrieve the jeep from Medina’s shop on the agreement that he would instead repair the vehicle in his own auto shop. Beltran, however, was not able to get the jeep since its alternator, starter, battery, and two tires with rims worth P5,000, P5,000, P2,500, and P10,000, respectively, could not be found. Upon inquiry, Medina told him that he took and installed them on Lim’s another vehicle, an Isuzu pick-up, which was also being repaired in the shop. Beltran went back in the afternoon of the same day and was able to get the jeep, but without the missing parts. He had it towed and brought it to his own repair shop. Before placing the jeep therein, he reported the incident to Purita. Later, the jeep was fully repaired and put back in good running condition.

ISSUE:

                Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the RTC

HELD:

                No. Abundo v. Sandiganbayan, which was relied upon by Medina, does not apply. In said case, the element of lack of owner's consent to the taking of the junk chassis was absent since the records showed that Abundo made a request in writing to be allowed to use one old jeep chassis among the pile of junk motor vehicles. His request was granted. A memorandum receipt was issued and signed. Pursuant thereto, the chassis was taken out. There was no furtive taking or unlawful asportation. The physical and juridical possession of the junk chassis was transferred to Abundo at his request, with the consent or acquiescence of the owner, the Government, represented by the public officials who had legal and physical possession of it. We noted that the crime of theft implies an invasion of possession; therefore, there can be no theft when the owner voluntarily parted with the possession of the thing. The Court agreed with the observation of the Solicitor General that a thief does not ask for permission to steal. Indeed, a taking which is done with the consent or acquiescence of the owner of the property is not felonious Medina cannot acquit himself on the basis of a purported acknowledgment receipt that he and Tumamao identified during their presentation as witnesses for the defense. According to his testimony, Mendoza came to his place and saw the subject auto parts while being transferred from the jeep to the pick-up and that, relative thereto, Medina even called barangay officials and let them signed a document to bear witness on the matter. The document, dated July 25, 2002, which was marked as Exhibit “2,” was signed by Mendoza, Jovy Bardiaga (said to be Lim’s chief mechanic), Mario Pascual (said to be Medina’s helper), and Rosalina Bautista and Tumamao (said to be barangay kagawads). Ostensibly, they signed the document while facing each other in front of Medina’s house.

 

 

 

 

People v. Nielles

G.R. No. 200308

February 23, 2015

FACTS:

The RTC and CA convicted the accused for Qualified Theft. Juanita Flores (Flores) was engaged in the business of guaranteeing purchase orders and gift checks ofShoemart and Landmark and disposing, selling or transferring them for consideration. Nielles initially worked as Flores' househelp but was eventually hired to work at Flores' office performing clerical jobs likesorting invoices. When Flores' business grew, Nielles was assigned to bill and collect from sub-guarantors,and to encash and deposit checks. Nielles collected P640,353.86 from the sub-guarantors. However, shedid not remit the amount to Flores or deposit it in Flores' account. Instead, Nielles issued 15 personalchecks totaling P640,353.86 and deposited them to Flores' account. All the checks were dishonored uponpresentment due to "account closed." Nielles thereafter absconded. Nielles asserted that since Flores was abroad, she could not have personally known whether she indeedcollected amounts from the sub-guarantors. She posited that mere issuance of the 15 checks is not proofthat she received/collected payments from the sub-guarantors or that she failed to remit the moniesbelonging to Flores. Nielles insisted that the prosecution failed to establish that she indeed collected moniesfrom the sub-guarantors amounting to P640,353.86.

Nielles maintains that the prosecution failed to establish that she unlawfully took the amount ofP640,353.86 belonging to Flores. She claims that mere issuance of the checks does not prove unlawfultaking of the unaccounted amount. She insists that, at most, the issuance of the checks proves that thesame was issued for consideration.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA erred in finding the Nielles guilty of Qualified Theft.

HELD:

No. Prosecution satisfactorily established all the elements of qualified theft, to wit:1) Taking of personal property;2) That said property belongs to another;3) That the said taking was done with intent to gain;4)That it was done without the owner's consent;5)That it was accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation against persons, or of force upon things; and 6) That it was done with grave abuse of confidence. Nielles took the amount of P640,353.86 from Flores without her consent by failing to turn over the amount she collected from the former's sub-guarantors. Instead, she issued fifteen (15) personal checks and deposited the same to Flores' account which however, all bounced for the reason "account closed". The taking of the amount collected by Nielles was obviously done with intent to gain as she failed to remit the same. Intent to gain is presumed from the act of unlawful taking. Further, the unlawful act was accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation against persons, or of force upon things as the payment to her of the said amount was voluntarily handed to her by the sub-guarantors as she was known to be entrusted with the collection of payments. The circumstance of grave abuse of confidence that made the same as qualified theft was also proven. Nielles herself testified that as a cashier, her functions and responsibilities include billings and collections from their agents and making of deposits and withdrawals in behalf of Flores. It is beyond doubt that an employee like a cashier who comes into possession of the monies she collected enjoys the confidence reposed in her by her employer, as in the instant case.

Flores testified that upon having been apprised of the unremitted collections, she conducted an investigation and inquired from her sub-guarantors who admitted making payments to appellant. She also testified that when Nielles arrived from Hongkong, she went to Flores' office and admitted to having converted the collections to her personal use. Besides, we note that in Nielles' Counter Affidavit, she already admitted having taken without the knowledge and consent of private complainant several purchase orders and gift checks worth thousands of pesos. She claimed though that she was only forced to do.

Zapanta v. People

G.R. No. 170863

March 20, 2013

FACTS:

                Information filed with the RTC charged the petitioner with the crime of qualified theft. The petitioner, Anthony V. Zapanta, then Project Manager of the Porta Vaga Building Construction, a project being undertaken then by the Construction Firm, ANMAR. A Mojica Construction and General Services  undertook the Porta Vaga building construction. AMCGS subcontracted the fabrication and erection of the building’s structural and steel framing to Anmar, owned by the Marigondon family. The petitioner instructed the truck driver, and about 10 Anmar welders to unload about 10 to 15 pieces of 20 feet long wide flange steel beams at Anmar’s alleged new contract project along Marcos Highway. On another occasion, he again instructed the driver and welders to unload about 5 to 16 pieces of 5 meters and 40 feet long wide flange steel beams on Marcos Highway. Later, Engr. Aquino, project manager of AMCGS informed Engr. Marigondon that several wide flange steel beams has been returned to Anmar’s warehouse as reflected in the logbook. The petitioner entered a plea of “not guilty.” In his defense, the petitioner denied the charge against him. He claimed that AMCGS, not Anmar, employed him. The prosecution offered in evidence oral testimonies as well as documentary evidence as established facts. RTC convicted the petitioner of qualified theft. CA set aside the petitioner’s arguments and affirmed the RTC’s decision. Later, CA denied the motion for reconsideration that followed, the petitioner filed the present petition.

ISSUE:

                Whether or not the CA committed a reversible error in affirming the RTC’s decision convicting the petitioner of the crime of qualified theft.  

HELD:

                The CA did not commit a reversible error in affirming the RTC’s decision. Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, lays the guidelines in determining the sufficiency of the complaint or information, provides: “xx information is sufficient if it states,  xxx, the approximate date of the commission of the offense, xxx”As to the sufficiency of the allegation of the date of the commission of the offense, Section 11, Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure adds: “It is not necessary to state in the complaint or information the precise date the offense was committed except when it is a material ingredient of the offense. xx” With these provisions, when the date given in the complaint is not of the essence of the offense, it need not be proven as alleged. In this case, the petitioner had been fully apprised of the charged of qualified theft since the information stated the approximate date of the commission of the offense through the words “sometime in the month of October, 2001.”

 

 

 

People v. Cahilig

G.R. No. 199208

July 30, 2014

FACTS:

                Cahilig worked as cashier at Wyeth Philippines Employees Savings and Loan Association, Inc. (WPESLAI). She was tasked with handling, managing, receiving, and disbursing the funds of the WPESLAI. It was discovered that from 31 May 2000 to 31 July 2001, Cahilig made withdrawals from the funds ofWPESLAI and appropriated the same for her personal benefit. Cahilig would prepare disbursement vouchers, to be approved by the WPESLAI president and Board of Directors, in order to withdraw funds from one of WPESLAI’s bank accounts then transfer these funds to its other bank account. The withdrawal was done by means of a check payable to Cahilig, in her capacity as WPESLAI cashier. This procedure for transferringfunds from one bank account to another was said to be standard practice at WPESLAI. However, Cahilig did not actually transfer the funds. Instead, she made it appear in her personal WPESLAI ledger that a deposit was made into her account and then she would fill out a withdrawal slip to simulate a withdrawal of said amount from her capital contribution.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Cahilig was guilty of qualified theft.

HELD:

                YES. The elements of Qualified Theft, committed with grave abuse of confidence, are as follows: 1.) Taking of personal property; 2.)That the said property belongs to another; 3.)That the said taking be done with intent to gain; 4.)That it be done without the owner’s consent; 5.)That it be accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation against persons, nor of force upon things; 6.)That it be done with grave abuse of confidence. All the elements are present in this case.

 Cahilig took money from WPESLAI and its depositors by taking advantage of her position. Her intent to gain is clear in the use of a carefully planned and deliberately executed scheme to commit the theft. Grave abuse of confidence, as an element of Qualified Theft, “must be the result of the relation by reason of dependence, guardianship, or vigilance, between the appellant and the offended party that might create a high degree of confidence between them which the appellant abused.” Cahilig’s position was one reposed with trust and confidence, considering that it involves “handling, managing, receiving, and disbursing” money from WPESLAI’s depositors and other funds of the association. Cahilig’s responsibilities as WPESLAI cashier required prudence and vigilance over the money entrusted into her care.  However, instead of executing her duties, she deliberately misled the board of directors into authorizing disbursements for money that eventually ended up in her personal account, a fact that Cahilig did not deny.

 

 

People v. Donio

G.R. No. 212815

March 1, 2017

FACTS:

Accused-Appellant Donio together with his two co-accused were charged of carnapping with homicide. Donio assisted by counsel de officio pleaded not guilty when arraigned while his two co-accused were at-large. Trial on the merits proceeded. One of the witnesses for the prosecution is a police officer who in line with their duties and functions, conducting a checkpoint  on November 26,2003 were implementing their campaign against hijacking, carnapping  and kidnapping along McArthur Highway. When a speeding tricycle abruptly stop near the check point which caught the attention of the police officers. They approached the vehicle and asked the identity of the driver, and the driver handed over to the Police Officer a temporary license bearing the name Raul Layug which he likewise identified himself as Raul Layug but later identified as Enrile Donio. When asked by the Police Officers, Donio and his two companions to produce the Certificate of Legislation and official receipt of the vehicle, they failed to do so and were asked to bring the tricycle to the check point. Upon visual search, the police officers discovered a bloodstained mini jungle bolo inside. The motorcycle and the bolo were seized by the policeman and brought the three to the police station. While in the police station, Donio was allowed to leave when he asked permission to get the OR and CR of the vehicle, but never returned. Meanwhile, in the morning of the same date, November 26, 2003, Rodrigo, the brother of Raul Layug was searching for him, the victim , who have not returned home since last night and was driving the tricycle owned by Rodrigo. Rodrigo accompanied by his cousin went to a certain barangay where they found the remains of Raul Layug. Another tricycle driver informed Rodrigo that he saw a similar tricycle that of Rodrigo's at the Conception Police Station. Rodrigo and his other brother went to the police station and found out that the two other companion of Donio were released. When on December 2003, the Layug brothers returned to the police station learning that Donio was apprehended.

ISSUE:

Whether the Prosecution has successfully proven beyond reasonable doubt, the guilt of the accused of the crime of car napping with homicide.

HELD:

Yes. The prosecution has proven that the accused committed the crime of carnapping  considering that all  of the elements of the crime were existent and homicide was produced in the course of the commission of the carnapping.

 

 

Ong v. People

G.R. No. 190475

April 10, 2013

FACTS:

                Private complainant was the owner of forty-four (44) Firestone truck tires of which 6 were sold and 38 tires remained inside the warehouse. Private complainant marked the tires using a piece of chalk before storing them inside the warehouse All thirty-eight (38) truck tires were stolen from the warehouse, the gate of which was forcibly opened. Private complainant, together with caretaker Cabal, reported the robbery. Private complainant chanced upon Jong's Marketing, a store selling tires in Paco, Manila, owned and operated by appellant. Private complainant inquired if appellant was selling any Model T494 1100 by 20 by 14 ply Firestone tires, to which the latter replied in the affirmative. Appellant brought out a tire fitting the description, which private complainant recognized as one of the tires stolen from his warehouse, based on the chalk marking and the serial number thereon. Private complainant then left the store and reported the matter to the police. A buy-bust team was formed and the appellant was arrested and the a total of 13 tires were confiscated

ISSUE:

Whether or not the appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of P.D. 1612 or Anti-Fencing Law.

HELD:

                Yes.  Fencing is defined in Section 2 (a) of P.D. 1612 as the "act of any person who, with intent to gain for himself or for another, shall buy, receive, possess, keep, acquire, conceal, sell or dispose of, or shall buy and sell, or in any manner deal in any article, item, object or anything of value which he knows, or should be known to him, to have been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft." The essential elements of the crime of fencing are as follows:  a crime of robbery or theft has been committed;  the accused, who is not a principal or on accomplice in the commission of the crime of robbery or theft, buys, receives, possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells or disposes, or buys and sells, or in any manner deals in any article, item, object or anything of value, which has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft;  the accused knew or should have known that the said article, item, object or anything of value has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; and  there is, on the part of one accused, intent to gain for oneself or for another

                Fencing is malum prohibitum, and P.D. 1612 creates a prima facie presumption of fencing from evidence of possession by the accused of any good, article, item, object or anything of value, which has been the subject of robbery or theft; and prescribes a higher penalty based on the value of the property.

 

 

People v. Dimat

G.R. No. 181184

January 25, 2012

FACTS:

The government charged the accused Mel Dimat with violation of the Anti­Fencing Lawbefore the Manila Regional Trial Court (RTC) Samson Delgado, together with Jose Mantequilla and police officers Danilo Ramirez and Ruben Familara, testified that in December 2000 Delgados wife, Sonia, bought from accused Dimat a 1997 Nissan Safari bearing plate number WAH­569 for P850,000.00. The deed of sale gave the vehicles engine number as TD42­126134 and its chassis number as CRGY60­ YO3553. Ramirez and other officers of the Traffic Management Group spotted the Nissan Safari on E. Rodriguez Avenue, bearing a suspicious plate number. After stopping and inspecting the vehicle, they discovered that its engine number was actually TD42­119136 and its chassis number CRGY60­YO3111. They also found the particular Nissan Safari on their list of stolen vehicles. They brought it to their Camp Crame office and there further learned that it had been stolen from its registered owner, Jose Mantequilla. Matequilla affirmed that the 1997 Nissan Safari is his and was carnapped on May 25, 1998 at Robinson’s Galleria parking area.Dimat claimed that he did not know Mantequilla. He bought the 1997 Nissan Safari in good faith and for value from a certain Manuel Tolentino under a deed of sale that gave its engine number as TD42­126134 and its chassis number as CRGY60­YO3553. Dimatsold the vehicle to Delgado. He claimed that although the Nissan Safari that he sold and the one in custody of the police officers had the same plate number, they were actually no the same vehicle. In 2005 the RTC found Dimat guilty of violation of the Anti­Fencing Law and sentenced him to an imprisonment of 10 years, 8 months, and 1 day of prision mayor to 20 years of reclusion temporal. Also ordered to pay P850,000.00 for actual damages and P50,000 for exemplary damages.CA affirmed the decision but modified it to imprisonment of 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor in its medium period, as minimum, to 17 years, 4 months, and 1 day of reclusion temporal in its maximum period, as maximum

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA erred in its decision of convicting of Anti-Fencing

HELD:

The elements of fencing are 1) a robbery or theft has been committed; 2) the accused, who took no part in the robbery or theft, buys, receives, possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells or disposes, or buys and sells, or in any manner deals in any article or object taken during that robbery or theft; (3) the accused knows or should have known that the thing derived from that crime; and (4) he intends by the deal he makes to gain for himself or for another.

The defense presented by Dimat is flawed. First, the Nissan Safari Delgado bought from him, when stopped on the road and inspected by the police, turned out to have the engine and chassis numbers of the Nissan Safari stolen from Mantequilla. Second. Dimat claims lack of criminal intent as his main defense. But Presidential Decree 1612 is a special law and, therefore, its violation is regarded as malumprohibitum, requiring no proof of criminal intent.

 

 

 

Carganillo v. People

G.R. No. 182424

September 22, 2014

FACTS:

                The RTC and CA convicted the accused for the crime of estafa under Art. 315 par. (b) of the RPC. On September 23, 1998, Teresita Lazaro, a rice trader in Rizal, Nueva Ecija, gave the petitioner the amount of ₱132,000.00 for the purpose of buying palay. The petitioner, who was alleged tobe an "ahente" or agent in the buy-and-sell of palay, agreed to deliver the palayto the Lazaro Palay Buying Station on or before November 28, 1998. According to the "Kasunduan" signed by the petitioner, the parties agreed that for every kilo of palaybought the petitioner shall earn a commission of twenty centavos (P0.20). But if no palayis purchased and delivered on November 28, the petitioner must return the ₱132,000.00 to Teresita within 1 week after November 28. After failing to receive any palayor the ₱132,000.00 on November 28 and 1 week thereafter, respectively, Teresita made oral and written demands to the petitioner for the return of the ₱132,000.00 but her demands were simply ignored. She thus filed an affidavit-complaint for estafa against the petitioner before the Fiscal’s Office. Thereafter, an Information4 for the crime of estafa was filed in court.

The petitioner pleaded not guilty tothe crime and denied that she entered into a "principal-agent" agreement with, and received the ₱132,000.00 from, Teresita. She alleged that she owedTeresita a balance of ₱13,704.32 for the fertilizers and rice that she purchased from the latter in 1995 and 1996,5 and that, in November 1996, she was made to sign a blank "Kasunduan" that reflected no written date and amount.6 She likewise denied personally receiving any written demand letter from Teresita.

ISSUE:

                Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the RTC

HELD:

                No. Under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the offense of estafacommitted with abuse of confidence requires the following elements: (a) that money, goods or other personal property is received by the offender in trust or on commission, orfor administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the same; (b) that there be misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the offender, or denial on his part of such receipt; (c) that such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and (d) there is demand by the offended party to the offender. The Court finds that all the elements of estafa are present in this case: that the petitioner received in trust the amount of ₱132,000.00 from Teresita for the purpose of buying palay and misappropriated it when she failed to return the said amount to Teresita upon demand. As the CA and the RTC did, the Court finds worthy of credit and belief the "Kasunduan" presented in evidence by the prosecution that was admittedly signed by the petitioner and which contained the terms of agreement between her and Teresita. This document clearly stated that the petitioner received in trust the amount of ₱132,000.00 from Teresita for the purpose of buying palaywith the corresponding obligations to (1) deliver the palay to the Lazaro Palay Buying Station on or before November 28, 1998, and (2) return the ₱132,000.00 to Teresita one week after November 28 in the event that the petitioner failed to make palay purchases.

 

 

Corpuz v. People

G.R. No. 180016

April 29, 2014

FACTS:

                Danilo Tongcoy, he and the petitioner (Corpuz) met at the Admiral Royale Casino is Olongapo City sometime in 1990. Private complainant (Tongcoy) was then engaged in a business of lending money to casino players and petitioner (Corpuz) heared that Tongcoy had some jewelries for sale. Corpuz approached Tongcoy on May  2, 1991 and offered to sell the said jewelries on a commission basis. Tongcoy agreed and turned over to the petitioner the following items with a total value of 98,000 pesos: 18k diamond ring for men (45,000 pesos) woman’s bracelet (12,000 pesos) 1 men’s necklace (*price not indicated in case but it’s 16,000 pesos) men’s bracelet (25,000 pesos) According to Tongcoy, Corpuz signed a receipt. And they both agreed that the petitioner shall remit the proceed of the sale and/or, if unsold to return the same items, within a period of 60 days. The period expired without the petitioner remitting the proceeds of sale or returning the unsold jewelries. Private complainant was able to meet the petitioner, and the latter promised that he will pay for the value of items entrusted to him. (But to no avail) Private complainant then filed against petitioner the crime of estafa. Petitioner Corpuz entered a plea of not guilty. Trial in the merits ensued. Defense presented the lone testimony of the petitioner. Petitioner and private complainant were collecting agents of Antonio Balajadia, who is engaged in loaning business Petitioner denied having transacted any business with private complainant. Petitioner admitted of obtaining a loan from Balajadia for which he signed a black receipt. Petitioner claimed that the same receipt then dated May 2, 1991 was used as evidence against him for the supposed agreement to sell the jewelries, which he never saw.

ISSUE:

                Whether or not the accused is guilty of estafa

HELD:

                Yes. The Court affirmed with modification the decision of RTC and Court of Appeals finding the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1, sub-paragraph (b) of the RPC. The Court affirmed with Modification that the penalty imposed is the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from 3 years, 2 months and 11 days of prison correccional, as minimum, and 15 years of reclusion temporal as maximum.

An argument raised by Dean Jose ManulaDiokno, one the esteemed amici curiae, that the incremental penalty (IPR – incremental penalty rule)provided under Art 315 (Estafa) of the RPC violated the Equal Protection Clause and is a cruel and unusalpunishement. The equal protection clause require equality among equals, which is tested by 4 requisites:

Classification rest on substantial distinctions

IPR does not rest on substantial distinctions as 10k may be substancial in the past, but not today. (violates first requisite)

o             Germane to the purpose of law

IPR was devised so that those who commit estafa involving higher amounts would receive heavier penalties, however this is no longer achieved cause a person who steals 142k would receive the same penalty as someone who steals 100M. (violates second requisite)

o             Not limited to existing conditions only

The IPR is limited to existing conditions at the time the law was promulgated, conditions that no longer exist today. (violated 3rd req.)

·                     Applies equally to all members of the same class (not violated )

Belen Real v. People

G.R. No. 152065

January 29, 20

 

FACTS:

                The RTC and CA convicted petitioner for the crime of estafa under Art. 315 par. 1 (b). On January 10, 1989, around 8:30 a.m., petitioner arrived at Uy's house at Nueva Villa Subdivision, Barangay Alangilan, Batangas City and requested Uy to lend her some pieces of jewelry as she had a buyer at that time. Because petitioner is his "kumadre," since Uy was one of the sponsors in the wedding of petitioner's daughter, and because petitioner was his agent for quite a time, Uy agreed. He showed petitioner some pieces of jewelry and allowed the latter to select from them. Petitioner selected seven (7) pieces of jewelry. Uy prepared a receipt for the items selected by petitioner and handed the same to the latter. After checking the receipt, petitioner wrote the name Benjamin Uy at the upper portion thereof and affixed her signature at the lower portion including her address. Ten days thereafter, Uy went to petitioner's house at Aplaya, Bauan, Batangas and asked about their transaction. Petitioner informed Uy that the pieces of jewelry were already sold but the payment was in the form of check. Petitioner showed Uy five (5) pieces of checks all dated January 31, 1989 and requested the latter to collect on said date. Uy acceded, but when he returned on January 31, 1989, petitioner again requested him to return the following day as she had not encashed the checks yet. Uy again agreed but when he demanded the payment the following day, petitioner called him "makulit" and "could not sleep for that matter." Petitioner further remarked that the more she would not pay Uy. Constrained, Uy brought the matter to his lawyer, Atty. Dimayacyac, who thereafter sent a demand letter to petitioner. Despite receipt thereof, petitioner failed to make good her obligation. Consequently, Uy lodged a criminal complaint against petitioner before the City Prosecutor of Batangas.

ISSUE:

                Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the RTC

HELD:

                Yes. The elements of estafa  under Art. 315, par. 1 (b) of the RPC are as follows: (1) that money, goods or other personal property is received by the offender in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the same; (2) that there be misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the offender or denial on his part of such receipt; and (3) that such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another. Although the trial court only mentioned in passing that damage was caused to private complainant Uy, it cannot be denied that there exists a factual basis for holding that petitioner's refusal to account for or return the pieces of jewelry had prejudiced the rights and interests of Uy. Certainly, disturbance of property rights is equivalent to damage and is in itself sufficient to constitute injury within the meaning of Art. 315, par. 1 (b) of the RPC. In this case, Uy, who is a businessman, not only failed to recover his investment but also lost the opportunity to realize profits therefrom. Anxiety also set in as he ran the risk of being sued by the person who likewise entrusted him the same pieces of jewelry. To assert his legal recourse, Uy further incurred expenses in hiring a lawyer and in litigating the case.While sustaining the conviction of petitioner of the crime charged, this Court rules, however, that the penalty imposed by the trial court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals was improper.

 

 

Suliman v. People

G.R. 190970

November 24, 2014

FACTS:

Vilma Suliman and one Luz P. Garcia were charged before the Regional Trial Court of Manila with two (2) counts of illegal recruitment under Section 6, paragraphs (a), (l) and (m) of Republic Act No. 8042, otherwise known as the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, as well as four (4) counts of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code. Only petitioner was brought to trial as her co-accused, Garcia, eluded arrest and remained at-large despite the issuance of a warrant for her arrest.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the accused is guilty of illegal recruitment  and of estafa under Art. 315 paragraph

HELD:

Yes, the accused is guilty of illegal recruitment. In the present case, both the RTC and the CA found that the prosecution has established that petitioner and her co- accused committed the acts enumerated under the provisions of Section 6 (a), (l) and (m) of R.A. 8042 when: (1) they separately charged the private complainants the amounts of P132,460.00, P120,000.00 and P21,400.00 as placement fees ; (2) they failed to actually deploy the private complainants without valid reasons , and; (3) they failed to reimburse the said complainants after such failure to deploy .

The accused is guilty of estafa. The act complained of in the instant case is penalized under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the RPC, wherein estafa is committed by any person who shall defraud another by false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud. It is committed by using fictitious name, or by pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions, or by means of other similar deceits.The elements of estafa by means of deceit are the following: 1) that there must be a false pretense or fraudulent representation as to his power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions; 2) that such false pretense or fraudulent representation was made or executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud; 3) that the offended party relied on the false pretense, fraudulent act, or fraudulent means and was induced to part with his money or property; and 4) that, as a result thereof , the offended party suffered damage.

In the instant case, all the foregoing elements are present. Petitioner and her co-accused misrepresented and falsely pretended that they had the capacity to deploy the private complainants for employment either in South Korea, Saudi Arabia and Canada. The misrepresentation was made prior to private complainants’ payment of placement fees. It was the misrepresentation and false pretenses made by petitioner and her co-accused that induced the private complainants to part with their money. As a result of such false pretenses and misrepresentations, the private complainants suffered damages as the promised employment abroad never materialized and the various amounts of money they paid were never recovered .Petitioner argues that she could not be held liable because she was not privy nor was she aware of the recruitment activities done by her co-accused. Petitioner avers that when her coaccused received several amounts of money from the private complainants, she acted in her personal capacity and for her own benefit without the knowledge and consent of petitioner. The Court is not persuaded. As owner and general manager, petitioner was at the forefront of the recruitment activities of Suliman International. Undoubtedly, she has control, manage mentor direction of the business of the said company. Petitioner’s denial is an intrinsically weak defense, especially in the face of positive assertions made by the private complainants who had no ill motive to falsely testify against her. Petitioner cannot deny participation in the recruitment of the private complainants because the prosecution has established that petitioner was the one who offered the private complainants an alleged alternative employment in Ireland when their original deployment did not materialize.

People v. Tibayan

G.R. No. 209655

January 14, 2015

FACTS:

                Tibayan Group Investment Company, Inc. (TGICI) is an open-end investment company registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) on September 21, 2001. 10 Sometime in 2002, the SEC conducted an investigation on TGICI and its subsidiaries. In the course thereof, it discovered that TGICI was selling securities to the public without a registration statement in violation of Republic Act No. 8799, otherwise known as "The Securities Regulation Code," and that TGICI submitted a fraudulent Treasurer's Affidavit before the SEC. Resultantly, on October 21, 2003, the SEC revoked TGICI's corporate registration for being fraudulently procured. - The complainants were enticed to invest in TGICI due to the offer of high interest rates, as well as the assurance that they will recover their investments. After giving their money to TGICI, private complainants received a Certificate of Share and post-dated checks, representing the amount of the principal investment and the monthly interest earnings. - Upon encashment, the checks were dishonored, as the account was already closed, prompting private complainants to bring the bounced checks to the TGICI office to demand payment. At the office, the TGICI employees took the said checks, gave private complainants acknowledgement receipts, and reassured that their investments, as well as the interests, would be paid. - However, the TGICI office closed down without private complainants having been paid and, thus, they were constrained to file criminal complaints against the incorporators and directors of TGICI.

ISSUE:

                Whether or not the accused is guilty of estafa

HELD:

                Yes. Section 1 of PD 1689 defines Syndicated Estafa as follows: - Section 1. Any person or persons who shall commit estafa or other forms of swindling as defined in Articles 315 and 316 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, shall be punished by life imprisonment to death if the swindling (estafa) is committed by a syndicate consisting of five or more persons formed with the intention of carrying out the unlawful or illegal act, transaction, enterprise or scheme, and the defraudation results in the misappropriation of moneys contributed by stockholders, or members of rural banks, cooperatives, "samahang nayon(s)," or farmers' associations, or funds solicited by corporations/associations from the general public. Thus, the elements of Syndicated Estafa are: a. Estafa or other forms of swindling, as defined in Articles 315 and 316 of the RPC, is committed; b. the Estafa or swindling is committed by a syndicate of five (5) or more persons; and c. defraudation results in the misappropriation of moneys contributed by stockholders, or members of rural banks, cooperative, "samahang nayon(s)," or farmers' associations, or of funds solicited by corporations/associations from the general public. The accused-appellants, along with the other accused who are still at large, used TGICI to engage in a Ponzi scheme, resulting in the defraudation of the TGICI investors.  A Ponzi scheme is a type of investment fraud that involves the payment of purported returns to existing investors from funds contributed by new investors. Its organizers often solicit new investors by promising to invest funds in opportunities claimed to generate high returns with little or no risk. In this light, it is clear that all the elements of Syndicated Estafa, committed through a Ponzi scheme, are present in this case, considering that: (a) the incorporators/directors of TGICI comprising more than five (5) people, including herein accused-appellants, made false pretenses and representations to the investing public in this case, the private complainants regarding a supposed lucrative investment opportunity with TGICI in order to solicit money from them; (b) the said false pretenses and representations were made prior to or simultaneous with the commission of fraud; (c) relying on the same, private complainants invested their hard earned money into TGICI; and (d) the incorporators/directors of TGICI ended up running away with the private complainants' investments, obviously to the latter's prejudice.

 

Hao v. People

G.R. 183345

September 17, 2014

FACTS :

Manuel Dy Awiten, claimed that as a longtime client of Asiatrust Bank (where Ngo was the manager)  and because of  their good business relationship, he took Ngo’s advice to deposit his money in an investment that will give  a higher rate of return.  Ngo introduced Dy to Gracia Hao(petitioner), who presented herself as an officer of various reputable companies and an incorporator of State Resources Development Corporation where subsequently DY invested. Dy’s initial investment was P10M. He received the promised interest from is investment. Thus, convincing him to invest more. He invested almost P100M. The additional investments were given through checks. Gracio Hao also issued several checks representing Dy’s earnings. These checks were subsequently dishonored.

Dy seek Ngo’s help to recover the amount. Ngo promised, however, Dy subsequently discovered that the former already resigned from the bank. This time, Dy confronted Gracia. Dy learned that his money was invested in the realty business of Gracia Hao’s realty business. Dy filed a complaint with the public prosecutor. The public prosecutor filed an information for syndicated estafa.  Warrant of arrest were subsequently issued against the Hao’s and other accused Hao filed a motion to defer arraignment and motion to lift warrant of arrest. They invoked lack of probable cause and the pendency of their petition for review with the DOJ.

CA affirmed the RTC’s decision with regard to the twin motion. However, the CA opined that the information shows only probable cause for simple estafa only.Hence this petition.

ISSUE:

 Whether or not the arraignment shall be deferred because of the pendency of the petition for review with the DOJ

HELD:

No. Under Section 11(c), Rule 116of the Rules of Court, an arraignment may be suspended if there is a petition for review of the resolution of the prosecutor pending at either the DOJ, or the Office of the President. However, such period of suspension should not exceed sixty (60) days counted from the filing of the petition with the reviewing office.As the petitioners alleged, they filed a petition for review with the DOJ on November 21, 2003. Since this petition had not been resolved yet, they claimed that their arraignment should be suspended indefinitely.

The Court emphasizes that the right of an accused to have his arraignment suspended is not an unqualified right. In Spouses Trinidad v. Ang, we explained that while the pendency of a petition for review is a ground for suspension of the arraignment, the Rules limit the deferment of the arraignment to a period of 60 days reckoned from the filing of the petition with the reviewing office. It follows, therefore, that after the expiration of the 60-day period, the trial court is bound to arraign the accused or to deny the motion to defer arraignment.  As the trial court found in its February 26, 2004 order, the DOJ's delay in resolving the petitioners' petition for review had already exceeded 60 days. Since the suspension of the petitioners' arraignment was already beyond the period allowed by the Rules, the petitioners' motion to suspend completely lacks any legal basis. As a final note, we observe that the resolution of this case had long been delayed because of the petitioners’ refusal to submit to the trial court’s jurisdiction and their erroneous invocation of the Rules in their favor. As there is probable cause for the petitioners’ commission of a crime, their arrest and arraignment should now ensue so that this case may properly proceed to trial, where the merits of both the parties’ evidence and allegations may be weighed.

 

 

People v. Wagas

G.R. No. 157943

September 4, 2013

FACTS:

Gilbert R. Wagas appeals his conviction for estafa under the decision rendered on July 11, 2002 by the RTC. On April 30, 1997 Wagas, with deliberate intent, with intent to gain and by means of false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud. Knowing that he did not have sufficient funds deposited with BPI, and without informing Alberto Ligaray of that circumstance, did then and there issue Check No. 0011003, dated May 08, 1997 in the amount of P200,000. Check was dishonored for the reason "drawn against insufficient funds" Despite of notice and several demands made upon said accused to make good said check or replace the same with cash, he had failed and refused and up to the present time still fails and refuses to do so, to the damage and prejudice of Alberto Ligaray. Ligaray testified that on April 30, 1997: Wagas placed an order for 200 bags of rice over the telephone that he and his wife would not agree at first to the proposed payment of the order by postdated check, but because of Wagas’ assurance that he would not disappoint them and that he had the means to pay them because he had a lending business and money in the bank, they relented and accepted the order that he released the goods to Wagas on April 30, 1997 and at the same time received BPI Check payable to cash and postdated May 8, 1997 that he later deposited the check with Solid Bank, his depository bank, but the check was dishonored due to insufficiency of funds that he called Wagas about the matter, and the latter told him that he would pay upon his return to Cebu and that despite repeated demands, Wagas did not pay him. Wagas testified: He admitted having issued BPI Check No. 0011003 to Cañada, his brother-in-law, not to Ligaray.  He denied having any telephone conversation or any dealings with Ligaray. He explained that the check was intended as payment for a portion of Cañada’s property that he wanted to buy, but when the sale did not push through, he did not anymore fund the check. On cross-examination, the Prosecution confronted Wagas with a letter dated July 3, 1997 apparently signed by him and addressed to Ligaray’s counsel, wherein he admitted owing Ligaray P200,000 for goods received

ISSUE:

Whether or not Wagas could be held guilty of estafa simply because he had issued the check used to defraud Ligaray

HELD:

 No. In order to constitute estafa, the act of postdating or issuing a check in payment of an obligation must be the efficient cause of the defraudation. This means that the offender must be able to obtain money or property from the offended party by reason of the issuance of the check, whether dated or postdated. The Prosecution established that Ligaray had released the goods to Cañada because of the postdated check the latter had given to him; and that the check was dishonored when presented for payment because of the insufficiency of funds.The Prosecution did not establish beyond reasonable doubt that it was Wagas who had defrauded Ligaray by issuing the check. Firstly, Ligaray expressly admitted that he did not personally meet the person with whom he was transacting over the telephone. Secondly, the check delivered to Ligaray was made payable to cash. Under the Negotiable Instruments Law, this type of check was payable to the bearer and could be negotiated by mere delivery without the need of an indorsement. This rendered it highly probable that Wagas had issued the check not to Ligaray, but to somebody else like Cañada, his brother-in-law, who then negotiated it to Ligaray. Relevantly, Ligaray confirmed that he did not himself see or meet Wagas at the time of the transaction and thereafter, and expressly stated that the person who signed for and received the stocks of rice was Cañada. It bears stressing that the accused, to be guilty of estafa as charged, must have used the check in order to defraud the complainant.  What the law punishes is the fraud or deceit, not the mere issuance of the worthless check.  Wagas could not be held guilty of estafa simply because he had issued the check used to defraud Ligaray.

 

 

The proof of guilt must still clearly show that it had been Wagas as the drawer who had defrauded Ligaray by means of the check. Thirdly, Ligaray admitted that it was Cañada who received the rice from him and who delivered the check to him. Considering that the records are bereft of any showing that Cañada was then acting on behalf of Wagas, the RTC had no factual and legal bases to conclude and find that Cañada had been acting for Wagas. This lack of factual and legal bases for the RTC to infer so obtained despite Wagas being Cañada’s brother-in-law.Finally, Ligaray’s declaration that it was Wagas who had transacted with him over the telephone was not reliable because he did not explain how he determined that the person with whom he had the telephone conversation was really Wagas whom he had not yet met or known before then. The Prosecution did not show through Ligaray during the trial as to how he had determined that his caller was Wagas. Thus, considering that the circumstances of the identification of Wagas as the person who transacted on the rice did not preclude a reasonable possibility of mistake, the proof of guilt did not measure up to the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt demanded in criminal cases. Perforce, the accused’s constitutional right of presumption of innocence until the contrary is proved is not overcome, and he is entitled to an acquittal,44 even though his innocence may be doubted.Nevertheless, an accused, though acquitted of estafa, may still be held civilly liable where the preponderance of the established facts so warrants. Wagas as the admitted drawer of the check was legally liable to pay the amount of it to Ligaray, a holder in due course.

 

 

 

People v. Villanueva

G.R. No. 163662

February 25, 2015

FACTS:

Accused-appellant Villanueva was charged with the crime of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2 (d) of the Revised Penal Code. The RTC and the CA found her guilty beyond reasonable of the crime charged.Records show that complainant Madarang went to Villanueva’s residence and was able to sell to Villanueva five sets of jewelry worth P 1,010,000.00. Villanueva made out nine checks drawn against Philippine National Bank (PNB), eight of which were postdated for the payment of such jewelry. Madarang received the checks because of Villanueva’s assurance that they would all be honored upon presentment. However, the drawee bank paid only one of the eight postdated checks since the remaining checks were dishonored by reason of Account Closed or Drawn Against Insufficient Funds.

Villanueva denies the crime and insists on the absence of fraud when she drew the postdated checks. She avers that (a) the checks were issued as replacement; (b) the checks could only be deposited or encashed after Madarang was notified of the sufficiency of funds; and (c) the receipt presented by the Prosecution failed to embody the real intention of the parties. She further argues that the checks were not executed prior to or simultaneous with the alleged fraud and that Madarang had instigated her to issue the checks, hence, she cannot be held liable for estafa.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Villanueva commited estafa under Article 315 paragraph 2(d), of the Revised Penal Code in issuing the seven postdated checks

HELD:

Yes. The estafa charged under Article 315 paragraph 2(d) may be committed when: (1) the offender has postdated or issued a check in payment of an obligation contracted at the time of the postdating or issuance; (2) at the time of postdating or issuance of said check, the offender has no funds in the bank, or the funds deposited are not sufficient to cover the amount of the check; and (3) the payee has been defrauded. The deceit should be the efficient cause of the defraudation and should either be prior to or simultaneous with, the act of the fraud. In the present case, all the elements of estafa were present.

The first element was admitted by Villanueva, who confirmed that she had issued the checks to Madarang in exchange for the jewelry she had purchased. There is no question that Madarang accepted the checks upon the assurance of Villanueva that they would be funded upon presentment. The second element was likewise established because the checks were dishonored upon presentment due to insufficiency of funds or because the account was already closed. The third element was also proved by the showing that Madarang suffered prejudice by her failure to collect from Villanueva the balance of P995, 000. In her defense, Villanueva adverts to an agreement with Madarang whereby the latter would deposit or encash the checks only after being informed of the sufficiency of funds in Villanueva’s account. This defense, however, crumbles because she did not present proof of the supposed agreement. The prosecution has proved the existence of all elements of estafa under Article 315 paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code, hence, accused-appellant’s conviction is affirmed.

 

 

 

 

 

De Castro v. People

G.R. 171672

February 2, 2015

FACTS:

                Matuguina and Cornejo left their savings account passbooks with the accused within the space of a week in October – November 1993 when they went to the bank’s Malibay branch to transact on their accounts.  Matuguina, in particular, withdrew the sum of P500 on October 29 and left her passbook with the accused upon the latter’s instruction.  She had to return two more times before the branch manager Cynthia Zialcita sensed that something wrong was going on.  Learning of Matuguina’s problem, Zialcita told the accused to return the passbook to her on November 8.  On this day, the accused came up with the convenient excuse that she had already returned the passbook.  Skeptical, Zialcita reviewed Matuguina’s account and found three withdrawal slips dated October 19, 29 and November 4, 1993 containing signatures radically different from the specimen signatures of the depositor and covering a total of P65,000.  It was apparent that the accused had intervened in the posting and verification of the slips because her initials were affixed thereto.  Zialcita instructed her assistant manager Benjamin Misa to pay a visit to Matuguina, a move that led to the immediate exposure of the accused.  Matuguina was aghast to see the signatures in the slips and denied that the accused returned the passbook to her.  When she went back to the bank worried about the unauthorized withdrawals from her account, she met with the accused in the presence of the bank manager.  She insisted that the signatures in the slips were not her, forcing the accused to admit that the passbook was still with her and kept in her house. Zialcita also summoned Juanita Ebora, the teller who posted and released the November 4 withdrawal.  When she was asked why she processed the transaction, Ebora readily pointed to the accused as the person who gave to her the slip.  Since she saw the accused’s initials on it attesting to having verified the signature of the depositor, she presumed that the withdrawal was genuine.  She posted and released the money to the accused. On the same day, November 8, Zialcita instructed Misa to visit another depositor, Milagrosa Cornejo, whom they feared was also victimized by the accused.  Their worst expectations were confirmed.  According to Cornejo, on November 3, she went to the bank to deposit a check and because there were many people there at the time, she left her passbook with the accused.  She returned days later to get it back, but the accused told her that she left it at home.  Misa now showed to her a withdrawal slip dated November 4, 1993 in which a signature purporting to be hers appeared.  Cornejo denied that it was her signature.  As with the slips affecting Matuguina, the initials of the accused were unquestionably affixed to the paper. Zialcita reported her findings posthaste to her superiors.  The accused initially denied the claims against her but when she was asked to write her statement down, she confessed to her guilt.  She started crying and locked herself inside the bathroom.  She came out only when another superior Fed Cortez arrived to ask her some questions.  Since then, she executed three more statements in response to the investigation conducted by the bank’s internal auditors.  She also gave a list of the depositors’ accounts from which she drew cash and which were listed methodically in her diary. The employment of the accused was ultimately terminated.  The bank paid Matuguina P65,000, while Cornejo got her refund directly from the accused.  In the course of her testimony on the witness stand, the accused made these further admissions: (a) She signed the withdrawal slips Exhibits B, C, D and H which contained the fake signatures of Matuguina and Cornejo;(b) She wrote and signed the confession letter Exhibit K;(c) She wrote the answers to the questions of the branch cluster head Fred Cortez Exhibit L, and to the auditors’ questions in Exhibit M, N and O;(d) Despite demand, she did not pay the bank.

ISSUE:

                Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the RTC

HELD:

                Yes. the petitioner has accepted the findings of fact about the transactions that gave rise to the accusations in court against her for four counts of estafa through falsification of a commercial document.  She raised no challenges against such findings of fact here and in the CA, being content with limiting herself to the supposed denial of her rights to due process and to counsel, and to the inadmissibility of the evidence presented against her. In the CA, her main objection focused on the denial of her right against self-incrimination and to counsel, which denial resulted, according to her, in the invalidation of the evidence of her guilt.Debunking the petitioner’s challenges, the CA stressed that the rights against self-incrimination and to counsel guaranteed under the Constitution applied only during the custodial interrogation of a suspect. In her case, she was not subjected to any investigation by the police or other law enforcement agents. Instead, she underwent an administrative investigation as an employee of the BPI Family Savings Bank, the investigation being conducted by her superiors. She was not coerced to give evidence against herself, or to admit to any crime, but she simply broke down bank when depositors Matuguina and Cornejo confronted her about her crimes.

                The accused comes to Court on appeal to nullify her conviction on the ground that the evidence presented against her was obtained in violation of her constitutional right against self-incrimination.  She also contends that her rights to due process and counsel were infringed.  Without referring to its name, she enlists one of the most famous metaphors of constitutional law to demonize and exclude what she believes were evidence obtained against her by illegal or unconstitutional means – evidence constituting the fruit of the poisonous tree.  The Court holds, however, that in the particular setting in which she was investigated, the revered constitutional rights of an accused to counsel and against self-incrimination are not apposite.

 

 

Gamaro & Umali v. People

G.R. No. 211917

Febraury 27, 2017

FACTS:

                The RTC and CA convicted the accused for the crime of estafa. That on or about January 2, 2002, in the City of San Pablo, Republic of the Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused above-named, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, did then and there, defraud one JOAN FRUCTOZA E. FINEZA, in the following manner, to wit: That Norma C. Gamaro, pretending that she is knowledgeable in the business of buy and sell of jewelry, other merchandise and financing, assuring complainant of a sure market and big profit lure and entice complainant Joan Fructoza E. Fineza to enter into the business and the latter purchased and delivered to her the jewelry amounting to P2,292,519 with the obligation to manage the business for private complainant and remit the proceeds of the sale to her, but accused, far from complying, with her obligation, managed the business as her own, failing to remit the proceeds of the sale and pledging jewelries to Lluillier Pawnshop where accused Josephine Umali work while the checks issued by respondent Rowena Gamaro to guarantee their payment were all dishonoured for having been drawn against insufficient funds, to the damage and prejudice of the offended party in the aforementioned amount.

ISSUE:

                Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the RTC

HELD:

                No. Article 315. Swindling (estafa).  (b) By misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of another, money, goods, or any other personal property received by the offender in trust or on commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the same, even though such obligation be totally or partially guaranteed by a bond; or by denying having received such money, goods, or other property. The elements of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1 (b) are as follows: (1) that money, goods, or other personal properties are received by the offender in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of, or to return, the same; (2) that there is a misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the offender or a denial of the receipt thereof; (3) that the misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and (4) that there is a demand made by the offended party on the offender.

                The prosecution was able to prove the crime of estafa under paragraph 1 (b). As held by the CA, Fineza positively and categorically testified on the transaction that transpired between her and petitioners and accused Rowena Gamaro. The failure to account upon demand, for funds or property held in trust, is circumstantial evidence of misappropriation. As mentioned, petitioner Norma Gamaro failed to account for, upon demand, the jewelry which was received by her in trust. This already constitutes circumstantial evidence of misappropriation or conversion to petitioner's own personal use. The failure to return upon demand the properties which one has the duty to return is tantamount to appropriating the same for his own personal use. As in fact, in this case, Fineza, herself redeemed the pieces of jewelry using her own money.

 

 

 

Osorio v. People

G.R. No. 20771

July 2, 2018

FACTS:

                The RTC and CA convicted the accused for the crime of estafa. That in or about and sometime during the period comprised from November 19, 2001 to January 11, 2002, in the City of Manila the said accused, by means of false manifestations and fraudulent representations which she made to said JOSEFINA O. GABRIEL, prior to and even simultaneous with the commission of the fraud, to the effect that her money, if invested with Philamlife Fund Management will earn 20% interest per annum, and by means of other similar deceits, induced and succeeded in inducing the said JOSEFINA O. GABRIEL to give and deliver, as in fact, she gave and delivered to the said accused the total amount of Php200,000.00, on the strength of the manifestations and representations of said accused well knowing that the said manifestation and representation were false and fraudulent and were made solely for the purpose of obtaining, as in fact she did obtain the total amount of Php200,000.00, which amount once in her possession, misapplied and converted the same to her own personal use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of said JOSEFINA O. GABRIEL in the aforesaid amount Php200,000, Philippine Currency.

ISSUE:

                Whether or not the accused is guilty of estafa

HELD:

                No. Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code is broad in application. It is intended as a catch-all provision to cover all other kinds of deceit not falling under Articles 315, 316, and 317 of the Revised Penal Code.For an accused to be held criminally liable under Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code, the following elements must exist:(a) [The accused makes a] false pretense, fraudulent act or pretense other than those in [Articles 315, 316, and 317]; (b) such false pretense, fraudulent act or pretense must be made or executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud; and (c) as a result, the offended party suffered damage or prejudice. All the elements of Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code are present in this case. Petitioner, in soliciting private complainant's money, falsely represented that it would be invested in Philam Life and that its proceeds would be used to pay for private complainant's insurance premiums. This false representation is what induced private complainant to part with her funds and disregard the payment of her insurance premiums. Since petitioner deviated from what was originally agreed upon by placing the investment in another company, private complainant's insurance policies lapsed.

 

 

 

 

Campos v. People & FWCC

G.R. No. 187401

September 17, 2014

FACTS:

                The RTC and CA convicted the accused for the crime of violating BP22. On March 17, 1995, Campos obtained a loan, payable on installments, from respondent First Women's Credit Corporation (FWCC) in the amount of P50,000.00. She issued several postdated checks in favor of FWCC to cover the agreed installment payments. Fourteen of these checks drawn against her Current Account No. 6005-05449-92 with BPI Family Bank-Head Office, however, were dishonored when presented for payment. The checks were declared by the drawee bank to be drawn against a "closed account."

ISSUE:

                Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the RTC

HELD:

                No. To be liable for violation of B.P. 22, the following essential elements must be present: (1) the making, drawing, and issuance of any check to apply for account or for value; (2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon its presentment; and (3) the subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment.

                The presence of the first and third elements is undisputed. An issue being advanced by Campos through the present petition concerns her alleged failure to receive a written demand letter from FWCC, the entity in whose favor the dishonored checks were issued. In a line of cases, the Court has emphasized the importance of proof of receipt of such notice of dishonor, although not as an element of the offense, but as a means to establish that the issuer of a check was aware of insufficiency of funds when he issued the check and the bank dishonored it, in relation to the second element of the offense and Section 2 of B.P. 22. Considering that the second element involves a state of mind which is difficult to establish, Section 2 of B.P. 22 creates a presumption of knowledge of insufficiency of funds.

 

 

 

Griffith v. CA

379 SCRA 94

March 12, 2002

FACTS:

                The RTC and CA convicted the accused for the crime of violating BP 22. In 1985, Phelps Dodge Philippines, Inc. leased its lot and factory building to Lincoln Gerard, Inc. for a term of two years at a monthly rental of P75,000. When Lincoln Gerard, Inc. incurred rental arrearages, Geoffrey F. Griffith, in his capacity as president of Lincoln Gerard, Inc., issued the following checks: Far East Bank and Trust Co. Check No. 06B-C-075065, dated April 15, 1986 for P100,000.00, payable to Phelps Dodge Phils. Inc.; and Far East Bank and Trust Co. Check No. 06B-C-075066, dated May 1, 1986 for P115,442.65, payable to Phelps Dodge Phils. Inc. The voucher for these checks contained the following instruction: These checks are not to be presented without prior approval from this Corporation to be given not later than May 30, 1986. Also written on the face of the voucher was the following note: However, if written approval of Lincoln Gerard, Inc. is not given before May 30, 1986, Phelps Dodge, Phils. shall present the checks for payment. This is final and irrevocable. On May 29, 1986, Griffith wrote Phelps Dodge not to present the said checks for payment on May 30, 1986 because they could not be funded due to a four-week labor strike that had earlier paralyzed the business operations of Lincoln Gerard. Previously, in a letter dated May 20, 1986, Phelps Dodge, through its treasurer Ricardo R. Manarang, advised Lincoln Gerard that it was transferring the contents of the Lincoln Gerard warehouse in the leased premises since a new tenant was moving in. Phelps Dodge told Lincoln Gerard that its properties would be placed "in our compound and under our custody." On June 2, 1986 when no further communication was received from Lincoln Gerard, Phelps Dodge presented the two checks for payment but these were dishonored by the bank for having been drawn against insufficient funds. Three days later, Phelps Dodge sent a demand letter to Lincoln Gerard, apprising Griffith of the dishonor of the checks and asking him to fund them within the time prescribed by law.9 Lincoln Gerard still failed to fund the checks but Griffith sent a letter to Phelps Dodge, explaining Lincoln's inability to fund said checks due to the strike.10 Subsequently, on June 19, 1986, Phelps Dodge notified Lincoln Gerard that its properties would be foreclosed. Phelps Dodge went ahead with the foreclosure and auction sale on June 20, 1986,11 despite Lincoln Gerard's protest.

ISSUE:

                Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the RTC

HELD:

                Yes. The Bouncing Checks Law "was devised to safeguard the interest of the banking system and the legitimate public checking account user."25 It was not designed to favor or encourage those who seek to enrich themselves through manipulation and circumvention of the purpose of the law.26 Noteworthy, in Administrative Circular No. 12-2000, this Court has expressed a policy preference for fine as penalty in cases of B.P. 22 violations rather than imprisonment to "best serve the ends of criminal justice."

Moreover, while the philosophy underlying our penal system leans toward the classical school that imposes penalties for retribution, such retribution should be aimed at "actual and potential wrongdoers". Note that in the two criminal cases filed by Phelps Dodge against petitioner, the checks issued were corporate checks that Lincoln Gerard allegedly failed to fund for a valid reason duly communicated to the payee. Further, it bears repeating that Phelps Dodge, through a notarial foreclosure and auction that were later on judicially declared invalid, sold Lincoln Gerard's property for cash amounting to P1,120,54029 to satisfy Phelps Dodge claim for unpaid rentals. Said property was already in Phelps Dodge's custody earlier, purportedly because a new tenant was moving into the leased premises. The obligation of Lincoln Gerard to Phelps Dodge for said rentals was onlyP301,953.12.30 Thus, by resorting to the remedy of foreclosure and auction sale, Phelps Dodge was able to collect the face value of the two checks, totalling P215,442.65. In fact, it impounded items owned by Lincoln Gerard valued far in excess of the debt or the checks. This was the situation when, almost two years after the auction sale, petitioner was charged with two counts of violation of B.P. 22. By that time, the civil obligation of Lincoln Gerard, Inc. to Phelps Dodge Phils. Inc. was no longer subsisting, though respondent Court of Appeals calls the payment thereof as involuntary. That the money value of the two checks signed by petitioner was already collected, however, could not be ignored in appreciating the antecedents of the two criminal charges against petitioner. Because of the invalid foreclosure and sale, Phelps Dodge was ordered to pay or returnP1,072,586.88 to Lincoln Gerard, per decision of the RTC, which became final after it was affirmed by the appellate court. The Court cannot, under these circumstances, see how petitioner's conviction and sentence could be upheld without running afoul of basic principles of fairness and justice. For Phelps Dodge has, in our view, already exacted its proverbial pound of flesh through foreclosure and auction sale as its chosen remedy.

 

 

Lim v. People

G.R. No. 190834

December 3, 2014

FACTS:

Lim issued two checks payable to cash to Baddie for the printing materials. Due to the delay in the delivery of the said materials, Lim issued a “Stop Payment” order for the two checks. However, the checks were drawn against insufficient funds. Lim was not able to arrange payments with Baddie within five banking days after receiving notice of the said error. Although, Lim was able to give the full payment for the materials after a lapse of more than one month.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Lim has committed estafa.

HELD:

No. It must be noted that Lim has already paid in full the amount of the dishonored checks six months before the information was filed. In doing so, he was exonerated from the imposition of penalties for violation of BP bilang 22. It is a consistent rule that penal statutes are construed strictly against the State and liberally in favor of the accused. Since penal laws should not be applied mechanically, the Court must determine whether the application of the penal law is consistent with the purpose and reason of the law.

 

 

 

Buebos & Buebos v. People

G.R. No. 163938

March 28, 2008

FACTS:

On January 1, 1994 around 3:00 o’clock in the morning, Adelina B. Borbe was in her house at Hacienda San Miguel, Tabaco, Albay watching over her sick child. She was lying down when she heard some noise around the house. She got up and looked through the window and saw the four accused, Rolando Buela, Sarmelito Buebos, Dante Buebos and Antonio Cornel, Jr. congregating in front of her hut. When she went out, she saw the roof of her nipa hut already on fire. She shouted for help. Instead of coming to her immediate succor, the four fled. At some distance away, Olipiano Berjuela heard Adelina scream for help. Olipiano was then drinking with Pepito Borbe to celebrate New Year’s Eve. Olipiano immediately ran to the place and saw a number of people jumping over the fence. When he focused his flashlight on them, he was able to identify Sarmelito Buebos, Dante Buebos and Antonio Cornel, Jr. He also saw Rolando Buela running away. On complaint of Adelina, petitioners Dante and Sarmelito Buebos, together with Rolando Buela and Antonio Cornel, Jr., were indicted for arson.

ISSUE:

                Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the RTC

HELD:

No. The nature of Destructive Arson is distinguished from Simple Arson by the degree of perversity or viciousness of the criminal offender. The acts committed under Art. 320 of the Revised Penal Code (as amended) constituting Destructive Arson are characterized as heinous crimes for being grievous, odious and hateful offenses and which, by reason of their inherent or manifest wickedness, viciousness, atrocity and perversity are repugnant and outrageous to the common standards and norms of decency and morality in a just, civilized and ordered society. On the other hand, acts committed under PD 1613 constituting Simple Arson are crimes with a lesser degree of perversity and viciousness that the law punishes with a lesser penalty. In other words, Simple Arson contemplates crimes with less significant social, economic, political and national security implications than Destructive Arson. However, acts falling under Simple Arson may nevertheless be converted into Destructive Arson depending on the qualifying circumstances present.  Prescinding from the above clarification vis-à-vis the description of the crime as stated in the accusatory portion of the Information, it is quite evident that accused-appellant was charged with the crime of Simple Arson  for having "deliberately set fire upon the two-storey residential house of ROBERTO SEPARA and family . . . knowing the same to be an inhabited house and situated in a thickly populated place and as a consequence thereof a conflagration ensued and the said building, together with some seven (7) adjoining residential houses, were razed by fire." Now, to the penalty. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum of the indeterminate penalty should range from six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years. Considering that no aggravating or mitigating circumstance attended the commission of the offense, the penalty should be imposed in its medium period [eight (8) years and one (1) day to ten (10) years]. The minimum of the indeterminate sentence is prision correctional,which has a range of six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years, to be imposed in any of its periods.       

 

 

 

 

People v. Macabando

G.R. No. 188708

July 31, 2013

FACTS:

 At 4:00pm on December 21, 2001, appellant broke bottles on the road holding G.I. pipe, and shouted that he wanted to get even (“manabla ko”). Afterwards, he uttered that he would burn his house.At 6:35 pm, Cornelio saw smoke coming from appellant’s house. He got a pail of water, and poured its contents into the fire. Eric Quilantang, a neighbor, ran to the barangay headquarters to get a fire extinguisher. When Eric approached the burning house, the appellant, who was carrying a traveling bag and a gun, told him not to interfere; the appellant then fired 3 shots in the air. The appellant also told the people around that whoever would put out the fire would be killed. Appellant’s Defense: He admitted that he felt angry because one of his radio cassettes for sale had been stolen. He appellant claimed that he went to sleep after looking for his missing radio cassette, and that the fire had already started when he woke up. He denied making a threat to burn his house and maintained that he did not own a gun. He added that the gunshots came from the explosion of firecrackers that he intended to use during the New Year celebration. The prosecution charged the appellant with the crime of destructive arson under Article 320 of the RPC.

ISSUE:

                Whether or not he is guilty of arson under PD 1613

HELD:

                Article 320 contemplates the malicious burning of structures, both public and private, hotels, buildings, edifices, trains, vessels, aircraft, factories and other military, government or commercial establishments by any person or group of persons. PD 1613 governs simple arson. Section 3. Other Cases of Arson. The penalty of Reclusion Temporal to Reclusion Perpetua shall be imposed if the property burned is any of the following: 2. Any inhabited house or dwelling; P.D. No. 1613 contemplates the malicious burning of public and private structures, regardless of size, not included in Article 320 of the RPC, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659. This law punishes simple arson with a lesser penalty because the acts that constitute it have a lesser degree of perversity and viciousness. Simple arson contemplates crimes with less significant social, economic, political, and national security implications than destructive arson. The elements of simple arson under Section 3(2) of P.D. No. 1613 are: (a) there is intentional burning; and (b) what is intentionally burned is an inhabited house or dwelling. Both these elements have been proven. The Information alleged that the appellant set fire to his own house, and that the fire spread to other inhabited houses. These allegations were established during trial through the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses which the trial and appellate courts found credible and convincing, and through the report of the Bureau of Fire Protection which stated that damaged houses were residential, and that the fire had been intentional. Moreover, the certification from the City Social Welfare and Development Department likewise indicated that the burned houses were used as dwellings. The appellant likewise testified that his burnt two-story house was used as a residence. The acts committed under Art. 320 of The Revised Penal Code constituting Destructive Arson are characterized as heinous crimes "for being grievous, odious and hateful offenses and which, by reason of their inherent or manifest wickedness, viciousness, atrocity and perversity are repugnant and outrageous to the common standards and norms of decency and morality in a just, civilized and ordered society." On the other hand, acts committed under PD 1613 constituting Simple Arson are crimes with a lesser degree of perversity and viciousness that the law punishes with a lesser penalty. In other words, Simple Arson contemplates crimes with less significant social, economic, political and national security implications than Destructive Arson.

 

 

Intestate Estate of Manola Gonzales vda. De Carungcong v. People

G.R. No. 181409

February 11, 2010

FACTS: The above-named accused (respondent), by means of deceit, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud the deceased mother in the following manner, to wit: the said accused induced said deceased, who was already then blind and 79 years old, to sign and thumbmark a special power of attorney the daughter of said accused, making her believe that said document involved only her taxes, accused knowing fully well that said document authorizes his minor daughter to sell, assign, transfer or otherwise dispose of to any person or entity of her properties all located at Tagaytay City. The duly appointed administratrix of petitioner intestate estate of her deceased mother, filed a complaint-affidavit for estafa against the accused (her brother-in-law, a Japanese national). The accused moved for the quashal of the Information, claiming that under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code, his relationship to the person allegedly defrauded, the deceased who was his mother-in-law, was an exempting circumstance. The trial court granted Sato’s motion and ordered the dismissal of the criminal case. The petition for certiorari with CA was likewise dismissed. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

1^st  Whether or not the death of accused’s wife and deceased mother’s daughter, Zenaida, extinguished the relationship by affinity between the accused and deceased and 2^nd  should be exempt from criminal liability

HELD:

 1^st No. Relationship by affinity between the surviving spouse and the kindred of the deceased spouse continues even after the death of the deceased spouse, regardless of whether the marriage produced children or not. Thus, the relationship by affinity between the accused and deceased is not extinguished by the death of Zenaida. 2^nd  No. The absolutory cause under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code only applies to the felonies of theft, swindling and malicious mischief. Under the said provision, the State condones the criminal responsibility of the offender in cases of theft, swindling and malicious mischief. As an act of grace, the State waives its right to prosecute the offender for the said crimes but leaves the private offended party with the option to hold the offender civilly liable. However, the coverage of Article 332 is strictly limited to the felonies mentioned therein. The plain, categorical and unmistakable language of the provision shows that it applies exclusively to the simple crimes of theft, swindling and malicious mischief. It does not apply where any of the crimes mentioned under Article 332 is complexed with another crime, such as theft through falsification or estafa through falsification. Under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code, the State waives its right to hold the offender criminally liable for the simple crimes of theft, swindling and malicious mischief and considers the violation of the juridical right to property committed by the offender against certain family members as a private matter and therefore subject only to civil liability. The waiver does not apply when the violation of the right to property is achieved through (and therefore inseparably intertwined with) a breach of the public interest in the integrity and presumed authenticity of public documents. For, in the latter instance, what is involved is no longer simply the property right of a family relation but a paramount public interest.