Baksh v. CA, G.R. No. 97336, February 19, 1993

 Baksh v. CA, 

G.R. No. 97336, 

February 19, 1993

DOCTRINE:

The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong.

In the light of the laudable purpose of Article 21, the Court is of the opinion, and so hold,

that where a man's promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of

his love by a woman and his representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the

proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him in a sexual congress, proof that he had,

in reality, no intention of marrying her and that the promise was only a subtle scheme or

deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept him and to obtain her consent to the

sexual act, could justify the award of damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of such

promise to marry but because of the fraud and deceit behind it and the willful injury to her

honor and reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential, however, that such injury

should have been committed in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public

policy.

FACTS: Private respondent, without the assistance of counsel, filed with the aforesaid

trial court a complaint for damages against the petitioner for the alleged violation of their

agreement to get married.

She alleges in said complaint that: she is twenty-two (22) years old, single, Filipino and a

pretty lass of good moral character and reputation duly respected in her community;

Petitioner, on the other hand, is an Iranian citizen residing at the Lozano Apartments,

Guilig, Dagupan City, and is an exchange student taking a medical course at the Lyceum

Northwestern Colleges in Dagupan City; before 20 August 1987, the latter courted and

proposed to marry her; she accepted his love on the condition that they would get married;

they therefore agreed to get married after the end of the school semester, which was in

October of that year; petitioner then visited the private respondent's parents in Bañaga,

Bugallon, Pangasinan to secure their approval to the marriage;

Sometime in 20 August 1987, the petitioner forced her to live with him in the Lozano

Apartments; she was a virgin before she began living with him; a week before the filing of

the complaint, petitioner's attitude towards her started to change; he maltreated and

threatened to kill her; as a result of such maltreatment, she sustained injuries;

During a confrontation with a representative of the barangay captain of Guilig a day before

the filing of the complaint, petitioner repudiated their marriage agreement and asked her

not to live with him anymore and; the petitioner is already married to someone living in

Bacolod City. Private respondent then prayed for judgment ordering the petitioner to pay

her damages

ISSUE: Whether or not Article 21 of the Civil Code applies to the case at bar

HELD: 

YES. The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an

actionable wrong. This notwithstanding, the said Code contains a provision, Article 21,

which is designed to expand the concept of torts or quasi-delict in this jurisdiction by

granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is

impossible for human foresight to specifically enumerate and punish in the statute books.

In the light of the above laudable purpose of Article 21, We are of the opinion, and so

hold, that where a man's promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance

of his love by a woman and his representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes

the proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him in a sexual congress, proof that he

had, in reality, no intention of marrying her and that the promise was only a subtle scheme

or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept him and to obtain her consent to

the sexual act, could justify the award of damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of

such promise to marry but because of the fraud and deceit behind it and the willful injury

to her honor and reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential, however, that such

injury should have been committed in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or

public policy.

In the instant case, respondent Court found that it was the petitioner's "fraudulent and

deceptive protestations of love for and promise to marry plaintiff that made her surrender

her virtue and womanhood to him and to live with him on the honest and sincere belief

that he would keep said promise, and it was likewise these fraud and deception on

appellant's part that made plaintiff's parents agree to their daughter's living-in with him

preparatory to their supposed marriage."

In short, the private respondent surrendered her virginity, the cherished possession of

every single Filipina, not because of lust but because of moral seduction — the kind

illustrated by the Code Commission in its example earlier adverted to. The petitioner could

not be held liable for criminal seduction punished under either Article 337 or Article 338

of the Revised Penal Code because the private respondent was above eighteen (18)

years of age at the time of the seduction.