Dy v People of the Philippines,
G.R. No. 189081,
August 10, 2016
DOCTRINE:
Our law recognizes two kinds of acquittal, with different effects on the civil liability of the
accused. First is an acquittal on the ground that the accused is not the author of the act
or omission complained of. This instance closes the door to civil liability, for a person
who has been found to be not the perpetrator of any act or omission cannot and can
never be held liable for such act or omission. There being no delict civil liability ex
delicto is out of the question, and the civil action, if any, which may be instituted must be
based on grounds other than the delict complained of. This is the situation contemplated
in Rule 111 of the Rules of Court. The second instance is an acquittal based on
reasonable doubt on the guilt of the accused. In this case, even if the guilt of the
accused has not been satisfactorily established, he is not exempt from civil liability
which may be proved by preponderance of evidence only. This is the situation
contemplated in Article 29 of the Civil Code, where the civil action for damages is "for
the same act or omission." Although the two actions have different purposes, the
matters discussed in the civil case are similar to those discussed in the criminal case.
However, the judgment In the criminal proceeding cannot be read in evidence In the civil
action to establish any fact there determined, even though both actions involve the
same act or omission. The reason for this rule is that the parties are not the same and
secondarily, different rules of evidence are applicable. Hence, notwithstanding herein
petitioner's acquittal, the Court of Appeals in determining whether Article 29 applied,
was not precluded from looking into the question of petitioner's negligence or reckless
imprudence.
FACTS:
Petitioner Gloria S. Dy (Dy) was the General Manager of MCCL. During her
employment as General Manager, she was able to convince Mr. William Mandy (Mandy)
to purchase a property owned by Patranco. Considering that the transaction involved a
large amount of money, Dy was able to convince Mandy to obtain a loan of Php
20,000,000.00 for the payment of the purchase price of the property. As collateral,
MCCL, through Mandy, executed a real estate mortgage over MCCL’s Numancia
Property.
Sometime in February 1999, MCCL received a notice of foreclosure from ICBC.
Because of this, Mandy executed 13 Allied Bank Checks and 12 Asia Trust Bank
Checks in order to prevent the foreclosure of the Numancia Property. Mandy delivered
the same to Dy with the instruction that the checks should be paid to ICBC in order to
prevent the foreclosure of the Numancia Property.
However, Dy never paid the checks to ICBC. Instead, she encashed the checks and
appropriated the same for her own personal use. As such, ICBC was able to
successfully foreclose the Numancia Property.
Because of this, MCCL, through Mandy, filed a criminal complaint for Estafa against Dy.
After a full-blown trial, the RTC acquitted Dy but ordered her to pay MCCL the value of
the checks she encashed. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the
RTC.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not there can be a finding of civil liability ex delicto when accused
was acquitted of the crime charged.
(2) Whether or not the courts can award damages arising from a contract in criminal
cases.
HELD:
(1) Yes. The accused, despite being acquitted, can be held civilly liable.
There is an important difference between civil and criminal proceedings that require a
fine distinction as to how these twin actions shall proceed. These two proceedings
involve two different standards of proof. A criminal action requires proof of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt while a civil action requires a lesser quantum of proof, that of
preponderance of evidence. This distinction also agrees with the essential principle in
our legal system that while a criminal liability carries with it a corresponding civil liability,
they are nevertheless separate and distinct. In other words, these two liabilities may
co-exist but their existence is not dependent on each other
The Civil Code states that when an accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the
ground that his guilt has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for
damages for the same act or omission may be filed. In the latter case, only
preponderance of evidence is required. This is supported by the Rules of Court which
provides that the extinction of the criminal action does not result in the extinction of the
corresponding civil action. The latter may only be extinguished when there is a "finding
in a final judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from which the civil
liability may arise did not exist." Consistent with this, the Rules of Court requires that in
judgments of acquittal the court must state whether "the evidence of the prosecution
absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the accused or merely failed to prove his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. In either case, the judgment shall determine if the act or
omission from which the civil liability might arise did not exist.”
Thus, whether an exoneration from the criminal action should affect the corresponding
civil action depends on the varying kinds of acquittal. In Manantan v. Court of Appeals,
we explained — Our law recognizes two kinds of acquittal, with different effects
on the civil liability of the accused. First is an acquittal on the ground that the accused is
not the author of the act or omission complained of. This instance closes the door to civil
liability, for a person who has been found to be not the perpetrator of any act or
omission cannot and can never be held liable for such act or omission. There being no
delict civil liability ex delicto is out of the question, and the civil action, if any, which may
be instituted must be based on grounds other than the delict complained of. This is the
situation contemplated in Rule 111 of the Rules of Court. The second instance is an
acquittal based on reasonable doubt on the guilt of the accused. In this case, even if the
guilt of the accused has not been satisfactorily established, he is not exempt from civil
liability which may be proved by preponderance of evidence only. This is the situation
contemplated in Article 29 of the Civil Code, where the civil action for damages is "for
the same act or omission." Although the two actions have different purposes, the
matters discussed in the civil case are similar to those discussed in the criminal case.
However, the judgment In the criminal proceeding cannot be read in evidence In the civil
action to establish any fact there determined, even though both actions involve the
same act or omission. The reason for this rule is that the parties are not the same and
secondarily, different rules of evidence are applicable. Hence, notwithstanding herein
petitioner's acquittal, the Court of Appeals in determining whether Article 29 applied,
was not precluded from looking into the question of petitioner's negligence or reckless
imprudence.
In Dayap v. Sendiong, we further said —
The acquittal of the accused does not automatically preclude a judgment
against him on the civil aspect of the case. The extinction of the penal action
does not carry with it the extinction of the civil liability where: (a) the acquittal
is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required;
(b) the court declares that the liability of the accused is only civil; and (c) the
civil liability of the accused does not arise from or is not based upon the
crime of which the accused is acquitted. However, the civil action based on
delict may be deemed extinguished if mere is a finding on the final judgment
in the criminal action that the act or omission from which the civil liability may
arise did not exist or where the accused did not commit the acts or omission
imputed to him.
Hence, a civil action filed for the purpose of enforcing civil liability ex delicto, even if
mandatorily instituted with the corresponding criminal action, survives an acquittal when
it is based on the presence of reasonable doubt. In these instances, while the evidence
presented does not establish the fact of the crime with moral certainty, the civil action
still prevails for as long as the greater weight of evidence tilts in favor of a finding of
liability. This means that while the mind of the court cannot rest easy in penalizing the
accused for the commission of a crime, it nevertheless finds that he or she committed or
omitted to perform acts which serve as a separate source of obligation. There is no
sufficient proof that the act or omission is criminal beyond reasonable doubt, but there is
a preponderance of evidence to show that the act or omission caused injury which
demands compensation.
(2) Applying the foregoing rules in this case, the Supreme Court ruled that whenever
the elements of estafa are not established, and that the delivery of any personal
property was made pursuant to a contract, any civil liability arising from the estafa
cannot be awarded in the criminal case. This is because the civil liability arising
from the contract is not civil liability ex delicto, which arises from the same act or
omission constituting the crime. Civil liability ex delicto is the liability sought to be
recovered in a civil action deemed instituted with the criminal case.
When the court finds that the source of obligation is in fact, a contract, as in a contract
of loan, it takes a position completely inconsistent with the presence of estafa. In estafa,
a person parts with his money because of abuse of confidence or deceit. In a contract, a
person willingly binds himself or herself to give something or to render some service.50
In estafa, the accused's failure to account for the property received amounts to criminal
fraud. In a contract, a party's failure to comply with his obligation is only a contractual
breach. Thus, any finding that the source of obligation is a contract negates estafa. The
finding, in turn, means that there is no civil liability ex delicto. Thus, the rulings in the
foregoing cases are consistent with the concept of fused civil and criminal actions, and
the different sources of obligations under our laws.
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