Municipality of Sta. Maria Bulacan v. Buenaventura

 

Municipality of Sta. Maria Bulacan v. Buenaventura

G.R. No. 191278

March 29, 2023

 

FACTS:

                On Oct. 11, 2002, respondent filed a complaint for sum or money and damages against the petitioners Municipality of Sta. Maria, Bulacan, its then Mayor Bartolome Ramos (Mayor Ramos) and the Municipal Members of the Sangguniang Bayan of Sta Maria Bulacan. Respondent alleged that he is the registered owner of a parcel of land in Barangay Guyong, Sta. Maria Bulacan. He claimed that without his knowledge and consent, petitioners took possession and constructed a road on a part of the property. Upon discovery thereof, respondent wrote to Mayor Ramos demanding the removal of the constructed road. The petitioners committed to return the property to the respondent in its original condition. The petitioners argued that the complaint has no cause of action as the land in which the road was constructed belongs to Barangay Guyong, Sta. Maria, Bulacan by virtue of a Deed of Donation executed by the respondent in the latter's favor. The RTC held that the notarized Deed of Donation which has the respondent's signature is a public document and as such is admissible without further proof of its authenticity and is entitled to full faith and credit. The RTC adjudged that the Deed of Donation is deemed valid until annulled in a proceeding specifically lodged for the purpose, not the one before it which is a case for sum of money and damages. Accordingly, it held that the petitioners acted in good faith in relying upon the Deed of Donation as the basis for its construction on the subject property and are not liable for damages. On appeal, the CA reversed the trial court’s judgement. The appellate court held that the Deed of Donation was forged.

 

ISSUE:

                Whether or not the Deed of Donation is valid and sufficient to support the petitioners’ construction on the subject premises.

 

HELD:

                No. As a rule, forgery cannot be presumed. It must be proved by clear, positive, and convincing evidence. The burden rests upon the party alleging forgery to prove his or her case by preponderance of evidence. Forgery can be established by a visual comparison between the alleged forged signature and the authentic and genuine signature of the person whose signature is theorized to have been forged. On this matter, the opinion of handwriting experts is not conclusive upon the courts, particularly when "the question involved is mere handwriting similarity or dissimilarity, which can be determined by a visual comparison of specimens of the questioned signatures with those of the currently existing ones." In determining whether there has been forgery, the judge is not bound to rely upon the testimonies of handwriting experts. The judge must conduct an independent examination of the questioned signature to arrive at a reasonable conclusion as to its authenticity. In this case, the Court agrees with the conclusion of the CA that the respondent's signature on the deed is a forgery. The respondent established by preponderance of evidence that his signature on the instrument is a forgery. As observed by the court, by the bare look on the signature of the [respondent] as found in the verification/certification portion of his complaint vis-à-vis his signature appearing on the questioned Deed of Donation, one would show patent and distinct dissimilarities Indeed, a simple visual examination and comparison of the specimen signatures of the respondent in the Verification and Certification of his Complaint as well as of his letter of demand to Mayor Ramos dated May 14, 2002, with that in the subject Deed of Donation, clearly reveals that they are not one in the same and have been affixed by different persons. The petitioner did not submit any countervailing evidence, thus, based on the weight of evidence presented, the Court is more inclined to rule on the respondent's favor.

On the issue of the respondent’s rights, recovery of possession may no longer be had as the return of the subject property is no longer feasible as a road has already been constructed thereon. Thus, in the higher interest of justice, in order to prevent irreparable injury that may result if the subject property were to be surrendered and the public would be prevented from having access to the road, payment of just compensation is warranted under the premises reckoned from the time of taking on April 11, 2002, the date when the petitioner took possession and constructed a road on the respondent's property.