Alba v. Arollado

 

Alba v. Arollado

G.R. No. 237140

October 5, 2020

 

FACTS:

In 2000, Nida Arollado (Nida) purchased on credit from Regina Q. Alba (Regina) crude oil and other petroleum products. She issued three checks which were subsequently dishonored by the drawee banks. Despite demand, Nida failed to pay. Hence, Regina filed a complaint for a sum of money against Nida. In her answer, Nida admitted that she issued the dishonored checks but claimed that she already settled the amounts through installment payments. She also claimed that assuming there are still unpaid amounts, Regina’s right to collect had already been prescribed since the transaction took place more than 10 years ago. The RTC granted Regina’s claim. On appeal, the CA found that the action had already been prescribed. Regina only had six years to recover the amount, computed from the date of dishonor of the checks. Since the complaint was filed only on June 4, 2013, the action has already been prescribed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the action has already prescribed.

HELD:

Yes, the three checks are not the kind of “writing” or “written agreement” contemplated by law for the 10-year limitation to apply. Regina’s right to collect a sum of money against Nida must be enforced within six years under Art. 1145 of the Civil Code. Relative thereto, Art. 1150 of the same code provides that the prescriptive period for actions which have no special provision ordaining otherwise shall be counted from the day they may be brought. It is the legal possibility of bringing the action that determines the starting point from the computation of the period of prescription. In the case of Philippine National Bank v. Francisco Buenaseda, the Supreme Court explained that, “xxx an action based upon a written contract prescribes in 10 years, whereas one predicated on a contract not in writing must be commenced in 6 years.” Further, it was held in the same case that, “A "writing" for the payment of money sued in an action, within the meaning of the ten-year statute of limitations, is one which contains either an express promise to pay or language from which a promise to pay arises by fair implication. It is sufficient if the words import a promise or an agreement or if this can be inferred from the terms employed. Evidently, while it is not necessary that there be an express promise, the writing, to be within the statute, must on its face contain words or language which would fairly imply such a promise to pay. In other words, it must affirmatively appear that the promise of payment was given by the language of the writing itself. xxx where the promise or agreement to pay on which the action is based does not appear in express terms or by fair implication in writing, but the cause of action arises out of facts collateral to the instrument, it does not fall within the provision of the statute of limitations.”