Alfiler v. Spouses Cayabyab

 

Alfiler v. Spouses Cayabyab

G.R. No. 217111

March 13, 2023

 

FACTS:

Sometime in March 1985, Quintin Santiago, Jr. lodged before the Lupon Tagapamayapa of Barangay Quirino, Quezon City, a complaint for ejectment and squatting against petitioner's mother, Linglingay Corpuz, and several others involving the property in Quezon City registered under Quintin. On May 1, 1985, the parties executed an Amicable Settlement. Pursuant to their agreement, Linglingay, et al. allegedly made five partial payments to Quintin. On March 12, 1997, Quintin died. On March 18, 2010, spouses John and Geraldine Cayabyab (respondents), represented by their attorney-infact, Jose Vasallo, filed before the MeTC a Complaint for Ejectment against petitioner, her sister, Meda Delza Armamento (Meda), Spouses Alfredo and Lolita Garduce, Romeo Magdaluyo, Gina Villanueva, A.B. Morato, and all persons claiming rights under them(Garduce et al). Respondents alleged that they are the owners of the subject property, having acquired the same under a Deed of Absolute Sale(DOAS) which was purportedly executed by Quintin through his attorney-in-fact, Norman Santiago (Norman) and that Garduce et al. have been in possession of the subject property, illegally building their houses without paying rent since 1997. Respondents issued a final demand letter to Garduce, et al. to vacate the premises, but, despite such demand, Garduce, et al. continued to refuse to vacate the property. Garduce et al, denied respondents' claim of ownership and possession over the subject property and argued that the DOAS is null and void because assuming that there indeed was an SPA between Norman and Quintin, such contract of agency was extinguished by the latter's death on March 12, 1997, or five months prior to the execution of the DOAS. MeTC ruled in favor of respondents.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the alleged contract of agency was extinguished by Quintin’s death.

HELD:

YES, the contract of agency was extinguished. According to Article 1919 of the Civil Code, “Agency is extinguished: xxx (3) By the death, civil interdiction, insanity or insolvency of the principal or of the agent.” In this case, respondents are then mistaken in their belief that the DOAS would confer to them any right whatsoever to the subject property. Settled is the rule that an agency is extinguished by the death of the principal. It is by reason of the very nature of the relationship between a principal and an agent that any act of an agent after the death of his principal is void ab initio, except as explicitly provided for in the New Civil Code: (1) Art. 1930 when the agency is coupled with an interest, and (2) Art. 1931 when the agent performed an act for the principal without knowledge of the principal's death and the third person who contracted with him acted in good faith. Neither of which are alleged or applicable in this case. Additionally, it is not enough that the existence of an SPA be merely referred to in a deed of sale. It must be offered in evidence. If no evidence is offered, it only gives rise to the presumption that no such written authority exists. Thus, absent a written SPA and for want of authority, as the seller was already deceased at the time of sale, the DOAS is void ab initio. Respondents do not have any interest, rights, or claim over the subject property. Accordingly, they have not established their de facto right of possession because there is no right of ownership to speak of, even in the provisional sense.