Ivler v. Hon. Modesto
G.R. 172716
November 17, 2010
FACTS:
Due to a vehicular collision in August 2004, petitioner Jason Ivlerwas charged before the MeTC of Pasig, with two separate offenses: (1) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries (Criminal Case No. 82367) for injuries sustained by respondent Evangeline L. Ponce (respondent Ponce); and (2) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property (Criminal Case No. 82366) for the death of respondent Ponce’s husband Nestor C. Ponce and damage to the spouses Ponce’s vehicle. Petitioner posted bail for his temporary release in both cases. On 7 September 2004, petitioner pleaded guilty to the charge in Criminal Case No. 82367 and was meted out the penalty of public censure. Invoking this conviction, petitioner moved to quash the Information in Criminal Case No. 82366 for placing him in jeopardy of second punishment for the same offense of reckless imprudence. The MeTC refused quashal. Petitioner elevated the matter to the RTC. Petitioner also sought from the MeTC the suspension of proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366, including the arraignment on 17 May 2005, invoking S.C.A. No. 2803 as a prejudicial question. Without acting on petitioner’s motion, the MeTC proceeded with the arraignment and, because of petitioner’s absence, cancelled his bail and ordered his arrest.Seven days later, the MeTC issued a resolution denying petitioner’s motion to suspend proceedings and postponing his arraignment until after his arrest. Petitioner sought reconsideration but as of the filing of this petition, the motion remained unresolved.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner forfeited his standing to seek relief in S.C.A. 2803 when the MeTC ordered his arrest following his non-appearance at the arraignment.
HELD:
No. Petitioner’s non-appearance at the arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366 did not divest him of personality to maintain the petition in S.C.A. 2803
The protection afforded by the Constitution shielding petitioner from prosecutions placing him in jeopardy of second punishment for the same offense bars further proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366 Dismissals of appeals grounded on the appellant’s escape from custody or violation of the terms of his bail bond are governed by the second paragraph of Section 8, Rule 124, in relation to Section 1, Rule 125, of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure authorizing this Court or the Court of Appeals to "also, upon motion of the appellee or motuproprio, dismiss the appeal if the appellant escapes from prison or confinement, jumps bail or flees to a foreign country during the pendency of the appeal." The "appeal" contemplated in Section 8 of Rule 124 is a suit to review judgments of convictions.
The RTC’s dismissal of petitioner’s special civil action for certiorari to review a pre-arraignment ancillary question on the applicability of the Due Process Clause to bar proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366 finds no basis under procedural rules and jurisprudence.
The mischief in the RTC’s treatment of petitioner’s non-appearance at his arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366 as proof of his loss of standing becomes more evident when one considers the Rules of Court’s treatment of a defendant who absents himself from post-arraignment hearings. Under Section 21, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the defendant’s absence merely renders his bondsman potentially liable on its bond (subject to cancellation should the bondsman fail to produce the accused within 30 days); the defendant retains his standing and, should he fail to surrender, will be tried in absentia and could be convicted or acquitted. Indeed, the 30-day period granted to the bondsman to produce the accused underscores the fact that mere non-appearance does not ipso facto convert the accused’s status to that of a fugitive without standing.
Mariano v.
People
G.R.
178145
July 7,
2014
FACTS:
Sometime, at about 6:30 in the
evening, Ferdinand de Leon was driving his owner type jeep along Barangay
Engkanto, Angat, Bulacan. With him were his wife, Urbanita, and their two-year
old son, as they just came from a baptismal party. Luis de Leon, an uncle of
Ferdinand, also came from the baptismal party and was driving his owner type
jeep. Accused-appellant Reynaldo Mariano was driving his red Toyota pick-up
with his wife, Rebecca, and their helper, Rowena Años, as passengers. They had
just attendeda worship service in Barangay Engkanto. The Toyota pick-up overtook
the jeep of Ferdinand de Leon and almost bumped it. Ferdinand got mad, overtook
the pick-up and blocked its path. Reynaldo Mariano stopped the pick-up behind
the jeep. Ferdinand alighted from his jeep and approached Reynaldo. Ferdinand
claimed that he and Reynaldo had an altercation. However, Reynaldo insisted
that he just stayed inside the pick-up and kept quiet while Ferdinand hurled
invectives at him. Urbanita tried to pacify Ferdinand and sought the assistance
of Luis de Leon. Luis intervened and told Ferdinand and Reynaldo
"magpasensiyahannalamang kayo at pagpasensiyahanmosi Ferdinand."
Ferdinand and Reynaldo heeded the advice of Luis and they went their separate
ways.
Instead of proceeding to his house in
Norzagaray, Ferdinand decided to drop by his mother’s house in San Roque, Angat
to pick up some items. He parked his jeep in front of the house of his mother
and alighted therefrom. However, hewas bumped by a moving vehicle, thrown four
(4) meters away and lostconsciousness.Urbanita shouted, "Mommy, Mommy,
nasagasaansiFerdie." She identified the fast moving vehicle that bumped
Ferdinand as the same red Toyota pick-up driven by Reynaldo. On the other hand,
Reynaldo and his wife, Rebecca, tried to show that the jeep of Ferdinand
stopped on the road in front of the house of the latter’s mother about five (5)
to six (6) meters away from their pick-up. Reynaldo stopped the pick-up as he
saw an oncoming vehicle, which he allowed to pass. Thereafter, Reynaldo made a
signal and overtook the jeep of Ferdinand. However, Ferdinand suddenly alighted
from his jeep, lost his balance and was sideswiped by the overtaking pick-up.
Reynaldo did not stop his pick-up and he proceeded on his way for fear that the
bystanders might harm him and his companions. After bringing his companions to
their house in Marungko, Angat, Bulacan, Reynaldo proceeded to Camp Alejo S.
Santos in Malolos, Bulacan to surrender and report the incident.
ISSUE:
Whether or
not the CA correctly convicted the accused
HELD:
Yes. Reynaldo tried to show that he stopped his
pick-up five (5) to six (6) meters behind the jeep of Ferdinand, as he allowed
an oncoming vehicle to pass. Thereafter, he overtook the jeep of Ferdinand.
However, the fact that Ferdinand’s body was thrown four (4) meters away from his
jeep showed that Reynaldo was driving his pick-up at a fast speed when he overtook
the jeep of Ferdinand. As aptly observed by the court a quo, only a vehicle
that is moving beyond the normal rate of speed and within the control of the
driver’s hands could have caused Ferdinand’s injuries. The very fact of
speeding is indicative of imprudent behavior, as a motorist must exercise
ordinary care and drive at a reasonable rate of speed commensurate with the
conditions encountered, which will enable him or her to keep the vehicle under
control and avoid injury to others using the highway. As held in People v.
Garcia:
"A man must use common sense, and
exercise due reflection in all his acts; it is his duty to be cautious,
careful, and prudent, if not from instinct, then through fear of incurring
punishment. He is responsible for such results as anyone might foresee and for
acts which no one would have performed except through culpable abandon.
Otherwise his own person, rights and property, all those of his fellow-beings,
would ever be exposed to all manner of danger and injury." Thus, had
Reynaldo not driven his pick-up at a fast speed in overtaking the jeep of
Ferdinand, he could have easily stopped his pick-up or swerved farther to the
left side of the road, as there was no oncoming vehicle, when he saw that Ferdinand
alighted from his jeep and lost his balance, in order to avoid hitting the
latter or, at least, minimizing his injuries.
Reckless imprudence consists
involuntary, but without malice, doing or failing to do an act from which
material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part
of the person performing of failing to perform such act, taking into
consideration his employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition
and other circumstances regarding persons, time and place. To constitute the
offense of reckless driving, the act must be something more than a mere
negligence in the operation of the motor vehicle, but a willful and wanton
disregard of the consequences is required. The Prosecution must further show
the direct causal connection between the negligence and the injuries or damages
complained of. In the absence of any cogent reasons, therefore, the Court bows
to the CA’s observations that the petitioner had driven his pick-up truck at a
fast speed in order to overtake the jeep of Ferdinand, and in so attempting to
overtake unavoidably hit Ferdinand, causing the latter’s injuries.
Gonzaga v.
People
G.R. No.
195671
Januray
21, 2015
FACTS:
Dionesio Sr. and his children were
ascending the curving road going to Bocboc, Bukidnon on their proper lane on
the right side of the road when a Toyota Land Cruiser driven by Rogelio was
swiftly descending the same lane from the opposite direction. Dionesio, Sr. blew the horn of his motorcycle
to signal the Land Cruiser to return to its proper lane but the Land Cruiser
remained. In order to avoid collision, Dionesio, Sr.tried to swerve to the
left, but the Land Cruiser suddenly swerved towards the same direction and
collided head-on with the motorcycle causing Dionesio’s death and his
children’s injury. Hence, this case of Reckless Imprudence Resulting to
Homicide with Double Serious Physical Injuries and Damage to Property.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Rogelio is guilty of
Reckless Imprudence.
HELD:
Yes. Reckless imprudence, as defined
in Article 365 of the RPC, consists in voluntarily, but without malice, doing
or failing to do an act from which material damage results by reason of
inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing or failing
to perform such act, taking into consideration his employment or occupation,
degree of intelligence, physical condition and other circumstances regarding
persons, time and place.
In order to establish a motorist’s liability for the negligent
operation of a vehicle, it must be shown that there was a direct causal connection between such negligence and the injuries or
damages complained of. To constitute the offense of reckless driving, the act
must be something more than a mere negligence in the operation of a motor
vehicle – a willful and wanton disregard of the consequences is required.
Willful, wanton or reckless disregard for the safety of others within the
meaning of reckless driving statutes has been held to involve a conscious
choice of a course of action which injures another, either with knowledge of
serious danger to others involved, or with knowledge of facts which would
disclose the danger to any reasonable person. Verily, it is the inexcusable
lack of precaution or conscious indifference to the consequences of the conduct
which supplies the criminal intent and brings an act of mere negligence and
imprudence under the operation of the penal law, without regard to whether the
private offended party may himself be considered likewise at fault.
Rogelio’s act of driving very fast on
the wrong side of the road was the proximate cause of the collision, resulting
to the death of Dionesio, Sr. and serious physical injuries to Dionesio, Jr.
and Cherry. Notably, the road where the incident occurred was a curve sloping
upwards towards Brgy. Bocboc where the Inguitos were bound and descending
towards the opposite direction where Rogelio was going. Indeed, the very fact
of speeding, under such circumstances, is indicative of imprudent behavior.
Consequently, the Court finds that Rogelio acted recklessly and imprudently in
driving at a fast speed on the wrong side of the road while approaching the
curve where the incident happened, thereby rendering him criminally liable, as
well as civilly accountable for the material damages resulting therefrom.
Dr. Cruz
v. Dr. Agas
G.R.
204095
June 15,
2015
FACTS:
Dr. Jaime Cruz (Cruz) engaged the
services of St. Luke’s Medical Center (SLMC) for a medical check-up. He
underwent stool, urine, bloody and other body fluid tests. He was then sent to
the Gastro-Enterology Department for a scheduled gastroscopy and colonoscopy.
The specialist assigned to him was absent, so he gave the colonoscopy results
to the attending female anesthesiologist. Thereafter he underwent the
procedure, but when he woke up he felt something was wrong. He felt dizzy, cold
clammy perspiration and pain in his abdomen, and when he tried to urinate he
collapsed. He tried to consult the specialist who treated him, but was nowhere
to be found. He then found his cardiologist Dra. Agnes Del Rosario (Rosario)
who observed his condition and referred him to the surgical department which
suspected that he had a hemorrhage. Dr. Cruz agreed, and upon waking up in the
ICU, he found that 6-8 inches of his colon was missing. It was found out that
there was a tear in the colonic wall which caused the bleeding. During his
recuperation, despite the painkillers, he was in under so much pain. Dr. Cruz
claimed that Dr. Felicismo Agas (Agas) admitted that he was the one who
conducted the colonoscopy procedure, but insisted that nothing was wrong. Dr.
Cruz was discharged from SLMC, nevertheless he complained of having a hard time
digesting his food, he had to be fed every 2 hours because he easily got full,
and had fresh blood stools every time he moved his bowel, and had lost his
appetite and had gastric acidity. He claimed that he was in good condition
prior to the surgery.
ISSUE:
Whether or
not Dr. Agas is guilty of reckless imprudence and medical negligence
HELD:
NO. In
the case at hand, Dr. Cruz failed to show that the DOJ gravely abused its
discretion in finding that there was lack of probable cause and dismissing the
complaint against Dr. Agas for Serious Physical Injuries through Reckless
Imprudence and Medical Malpractice. A medical negligence case can prosper if
the patient can present solid proof that the doctor, like in this case, either
failed to do something which a reasonably prudent doctor would have done, or
that he did something that a reasonably prudent doctor would not have done, and
such failure or action caused injury to the patient. To successfully pursue
this kind of case, a patient must only prove that a health care provider either
failed to do something which a reasonably prudent health care provider would
have done, or that he did something that a reasonably prudent provider would
not have done; and that failure or action caused injury to the patient. Simply
put, the elements are duty, breach, injury and proximate causation. In this
case, Dr. Cruz has the burden of showing the negligence or recklessness of Dr.
Agas. Although there is no dispute that Dr. Cruz sustained internal hemorrhage
due to a tear in the serosa of his sigmoid colon, he failed to show that it was
caused by Dr. Agas’s negligent and reckless conduct of the colonoscopy
procedure. In other words, Dr. Cruz failed to show and explain that particular
negligent or reckless act or omission committed by Dr. Agas. Stated differently,
Dr. Cruz did not demonstrate that there was "inexcusable lack of
precaution" on the part of Dr. Agas.
Senit v. People
G.R. 192914
January 11, 2016
FACTS:
Senit
charged with Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Multiple Serious Physical Injuries
and Damage to Property. Upon arraignment, he pleaded guilty. However, he
transferred residence and his whereabouts became unknown so he was not
presented as a witness by his new counsel.Thus, RTC rendered its Decision in
Absentia convicting Senit of the crime charged. Senit filed a motion for new
trial on the ground that errors of law or irregularities have been committed
during trial which prejudiced his substantial rights. He claimed that he was
not abel to present evidence during trial because he was not notified of the
schedule. The motion for new trial was denied. CA affirmed RTC decision. On WON
RTC and CA erred in denying the motion for new trial to allow Senit to present
evidence on his behalf, the SC ruled in the negative. The SC ruled that a new
trial may not be opened on the basis of evidence which was available during
trial but was not presented due to its negligence. Here, Senit was given the
opportunity to be heard and to present evidence to substantiate his defense,
but he forfeited this right, through his own negligence, by notinforminghis
counsel of his whereabouts and not appearing in court at the scheduled hearings
ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC and the CA
erred in denying the motion for new trial or to reopen the same in order to allow
the petitioner to present evidence on his behalf
HELD:
No. First, no substantial right of the accused was prejudice during
trial. Trial in absentia is authorized under Section 14(2), Article III of the
1987 Constitution which provides that after arraignment, trial may proceed
notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly
notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable.
Second, there is
no legal basis for the grant of the motion for new trial. A motion for new
trial based on newly-discovered evidence may be granted only if the following
requisites are met: (a) that the
evidence was discovered after trial; (b) that said evidence could not have been
discovered and produced at the trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence;
(c) that it is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative or impeaching;
and (d) that the evidence is of such weight that, if admitted, it would
probably change the judgment. It is essential that the offering party exercised
reasonable diligence in seeking to locate the evidence before or during trial
but nonetheless failed to secure it.
However, a new trial may not be had on
the basis of evidence which was available during trial but was not presented
due to its negligence. The Court finds no reason to waive the procedural rules
in order to grant the motion for new trial of the petitioner. Senit was not in
any way deprived of his substantive and constitutional right to due process as
he had previous notice of the criminal case filed against him. SC noted that
the petitioner had been arraigned already, thus the court had acquired
jurisdiction over him. In fact, there was already initial presentation of
evidence for the defense when his whereabouts became unknown.
He was given the opportunity to present
evidence in his defense. The petitioner he was duly accorded all the
opportunities to be heard and to present evidence to substantiate his defense,
but he forfeited this right, through his own negligence, by not appearing in
court at the scheduled hearings. He wasted his opportunity to be heard by not
being diligent enough to ask about the status of the criminal case against him
and inform his counsel of his whereabouts.
Sevilla v.
People
G.R. No.
194390
August 13,
2014
FACTS:
Sevilla, a former councilor of Malabon
City, was charged with falsification of public document due to a false
narration he made in his Personal Data Sheet (PDS) when he answered “no” to the
question of whether there is a pending criminal case against him despite the
pendency of a criminal case against him for assault upon an agent of a person
in authority The Sandiganbayan found him guilty of Falsification of Public
Documents Through Reckless Imprudence. The Sandiganbayan opined that Sevilla
cannot be convicted of falsification of public document under Article 171(4) of
the RPC since he did not act with malicious intent to falsify the
aforementioned entry in his PDS. However, considering that Sevilla’s PDS was
haphazardly and recklessly done, which resulted in the false entry therein, the
Sandiganbayan convicted Sevilla of falsification of public document through
reckless imprudence under Article 365 of the RPC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Sevilla can be
convicted of the felony of falsification of public document through reckless
imprudence.
HELD:
Yes. However, the designation of the
felony is erroneous. The Sandiganbayan convicted Sevilla of reckless
imprudence, punished under Article 365 of the RPC, which resulted into the
falsification of a public document. However, the Sandiganbayan designated the
felony committed as "falsification of public document through reckless
imprudence." The foregoing designation implies that reckless imprudence is
not a crime in itself but simply a modality of committing it. Quasi-offenses
under Article 365 of the RPC are distinct and separate crimes and not a mere
modality in the commission of a crime.
Were criminal negligence is but a
modality in the commission of felonies, operating only to reduce the penalty
therefore, then it would be absorbed in the mitigating circumstances of Art.
13, specially the lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong as the one actually
committed. Furthermore, the theory would require that the corresponding penalty
should be fixed in proportion to the penalty prescribed for each crime when
committed willfully. For each penalty for the willful offense, there would then
be a corresponding penalty for the negligent variety. But instead, our Revised
Penal Code (Art. 365) fixes the penalty for reckless imprudence at arresto
mayor maximum, to prision correccional[medium], if the willful act would
constitute a grave felony, notwithstanding that the penalty for the latter
could range all the way from prision mayor to death, according to the case. It
can be seen that the actual penalty for criminal negligence bears no relation
to the individual willful crime, but is set in relation to a whole class, or
series, of crimes.
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