Showing posts with label TITLE 14 CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE. Show all posts
Showing posts with label TITLE 14 CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE. Show all posts

TITLE 14 CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE CASE DIGESTS

Ivler v. Hon. Modesto

G.R. 172716

November 17, 2010

FACTS:

    Due to a vehicular collision in August 2004, petitioner Jason Ivlerwas charged before the MeTC of Pasig, with two separate offenses: (1) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries (Criminal Case No. 82367) for injuries sustained by respondent Evangeline L. Ponce (respondent Ponce); and (2) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property (Criminal Case No. 82366) for the death of respondent Ponce’s husband Nestor C. Ponce and damage to the spouses Ponce’s vehicle. Petitioner posted bail for his temporary release in both cases. On 7 September 2004, petitioner pleaded guilty to the charge in Criminal Case No. 82367 and was meted out the penalty of public censure. Invoking this conviction, petitioner moved to quash the Information in Criminal Case No. 82366 for placing him in jeopardy of second punishment for the same offense of reckless imprudence. The MeTC refused quashal.  Petitioner elevated the matter to the RTC. Petitioner also sought from the MeTC the suspension of proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366, including the arraignment on 17 May 2005, invoking S.C.A. No. 2803 as a prejudicial question. Without acting on petitioner’s motion, the MeTC proceeded with the arraignment and, because of petitioner’s absence, cancelled his bail and ordered his arrest.Seven days later, the MeTC issued a resolution denying petitioner’s motion to suspend proceedings and postponing his arraignment until after his arrest. Petitioner sought reconsideration but as of the filing of this petition, the motion remained unresolved.

ISSUE:

    Whether or not petitioner forfeited his standing to seek relief in S.C.A. 2803 when the MeTC ordered his arrest following his non-appearance at the arraignment.

 HELD:

    No. Petitioner’s non-appearance at the arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366 did not divest him of personality to maintain the petition in S.C.A. 2803

    The protection afforded by the Constitution shielding petitioner from prosecutions placing him in jeopardy of second punishment for the same offense bars further proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366 Dismissals of appeals grounded on the appellant’s escape from custody or violation of the terms of his bail bond are governed by the second paragraph of Section 8, Rule 124, in relation to Section 1, Rule 125, of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure authorizing this Court or the Court of Appeals to "also, upon motion of the appellee or motuproprio, dismiss the appeal if the appellant escapes from prison or confinement, jumps bail or flees to a foreign country during the pendency of the appeal." The "appeal" contemplated in Section 8 of Rule 124 is a suit to review judgments of convictions.

    The RTC’s dismissal of petitioner’s special civil action for certiorari to review a pre-arraignment ancillary question on the applicability of the Due Process Clause to bar proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366 finds no basis under procedural rules and jurisprudence.

    The mischief in the RTC’s treatment of petitioner’s non-appearance at his arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366 as proof of his loss of standing becomes more evident when one considers the Rules of Court’s treatment of a defendant who absents himself from post-arraignment hearings. Under Section 21, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the defendant’s absence merely renders his bondsman potentially liable on its bond (subject to cancellation should the bondsman fail to produce the accused within 30 days); the defendant retains his standing and, should he fail to surrender, will be tried in absentia and could be convicted or acquitted. Indeed, the 30-day period granted to the bondsman to produce the accused underscores the fact that mere non-appearance does not ipso facto convert the accused’s status to that of a fugitive without standing.


 

Mariano v. People

G.R. 178145

July 7, 2014

FACTS:

Sometime, at about 6:30 in the evening, Ferdinand de Leon was driving his owner type jeep along Barangay Engkanto, Angat, Bulacan. With him were his wife, Urbanita, and their two-year old son, as they just came from a baptismal party. Luis de Leon, an uncle of Ferdinand, also came from the baptismal party and was driving his owner type jeep. Accused-appellant Reynaldo Mariano was driving his red Toyota pick-up with his wife, Rebecca, and their helper, Rowena AƱos, as passengers. They had just attendeda worship service in Barangay Engkanto. The Toyota pick-up overtook the jeep of Ferdinand de Leon and almost bumped it. Ferdinand got mad, overtook the pick-up and blocked its path. Reynaldo Mariano stopped the pick-up behind the jeep. Ferdinand alighted from his jeep and approached Reynaldo. Ferdinand claimed that he and Reynaldo had an altercation. However, Reynaldo insisted that he just stayed inside the pick-up and kept quiet while Ferdinand hurled invectives at him. Urbanita tried to pacify Ferdinand and sought the assistance of Luis de Leon. Luis intervened and told Ferdinand and Reynaldo "magpasensiyahannalamang kayo at pagpasensiyahanmosi Ferdinand." Ferdinand and Reynaldo heeded the advice of Luis and they went their separate ways.

Instead of proceeding to his house in Norzagaray, Ferdinand decided to drop by his mother’s house in San Roque, Angat to pick up some items. He parked his jeep in front of the house of his mother and alighted therefrom. However, hewas bumped by a moving vehicle, thrown four (4) meters away and lostconsciousness.Urbanita shouted, "Mommy, Mommy, nasagasaansiFerdie." She identified the fast moving vehicle that bumped Ferdinand as the same red Toyota pick-up driven by Reynaldo. On the other hand, Reynaldo and his wife, Rebecca, tried to show that the jeep of Ferdinand stopped on the road in front of the house of the latter’s mother about five (5) to six (6) meters away from their pick-up. Reynaldo stopped the pick-up as he saw an oncoming vehicle, which he allowed to pass. Thereafter, Reynaldo made a signal and overtook the jeep of Ferdinand. However, Ferdinand suddenly alighted from his jeep, lost his balance and was sideswiped by the overtaking pick-up. Reynaldo did not stop his pick-up and he proceeded on his way for fear that the bystanders might harm him and his companions. After bringing his companions to their house in Marungko, Angat, Bulacan, Reynaldo proceeded to Camp Alejo S. Santos in Malolos, Bulacan to surrender and report the incident.

ISSUE:

                Whether or not the CA correctly convicted the accused

HELD:

                Yes. Reynaldo tried to show that he stopped his pick-up five (5) to six (6) meters behind the jeep of Ferdinand, as he allowed an oncoming vehicle to pass. Thereafter, he overtook the jeep of Ferdinand. However, the fact that Ferdinand’s body was thrown four (4) meters away from his jeep showed that Reynaldo was driving his pick-up at a fast speed when he overtook the jeep of Ferdinand. As aptly observed by the court a quo, only a vehicle that is moving beyond the normal rate of speed and within the control of the driver’s hands could have caused Ferdinand’s injuries. The very fact of speeding is indicative of imprudent behavior, as a motorist must exercise ordinary care and drive at a reasonable rate of speed commensurate with the conditions encountered, which will enable him or her to keep the vehicle under control and avoid injury to others using the highway. As held in People v. Garcia:

"A man must use common sense, and exercise due reflection in all his acts; it is his duty to be cautious, careful, and prudent, if not from instinct, then through fear of incurring punishment. He is responsible for such results as anyone might foresee and for acts which no one would have performed except through culpable abandon. Otherwise his own person, rights and property, all those of his fellow-beings, would ever be exposed to all manner of danger and injury." Thus, had Reynaldo not driven his pick-up at a fast speed in overtaking the jeep of Ferdinand, he could have easily stopped his pick-up or swerved farther to the left side of the road, as there was no oncoming vehicle, when he saw that Ferdinand alighted from his jeep and lost his balance, in order to avoid hitting the latter or, at least, minimizing his injuries.

Reckless imprudence consists involuntary, but without malice, doing or failing to do an act from which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing of failing to perform such act, taking into consideration his employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition and other circumstances regarding persons, time and place. To constitute the offense of reckless driving, the act must be something more than a mere negligence in the operation of the motor vehicle, but a willful and wanton disregard of the consequences is required. The Prosecution must further show the direct causal connection between the negligence and the injuries or damages complained of. In the absence of any cogent reasons, therefore, the Court bows to the CA’s observations that the petitioner had driven his pick-up truck at a fast speed in order to overtake the jeep of Ferdinand, and in so attempting to overtake unavoidably hit Ferdinand, causing the latter’s injuries.

 

 

Gonzaga v. People

G.R. No. 195671

Januray 21, 2015

FACTS:

Dionesio Sr. and his children were ascending the curving road going to Bocboc, Bukidnon on their proper lane on the right side of the road when a Toyota Land Cruiser driven by Rogelio was swiftly descending the same lane from the opposite direction.  Dionesio, Sr. blew the horn of his motorcycle to signal the Land Cruiser to return to its proper lane but the Land Cruiser remained. In order to avoid collision, Dionesio, Sr.tried to swerve to the left, but the Land Cruiser suddenly swerved towards the same direction and collided head-on with the motorcycle causing Dionesio’s death and his children’s injury. Hence, this case of Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Homicide with Double Serious Physical Injuries and Damage to Property.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Rogelio is guilty of Reckless Imprudence.

HELD:

Yes. Reckless imprudence, as defined in Article 365 of the RPC, consists in voluntarily, but without malice, doing or failing to do an act from which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing or failing to perform such act, taking into consideration his employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition and other circumstances regarding persons, time and place.

In order to establish a motorist’s liability for the negligent operation of a vehicle, it must be shown that there was a direct causal connection between such negligence and the injuries or damages complained of. To constitute the offense of reckless driving, the act must be something more than a mere negligence in the operation of a motor vehicle – a willful and wanton disregard of the consequences is required. Willful, wanton or reckless disregard for the safety of others within the meaning of reckless driving statutes has been held to involve a conscious choice of a course of action which injures another, either with knowledge of serious danger to others involved, or with knowledge of facts which would disclose the danger to any reasonable person. Verily, it is the inexcusable lack of precaution or conscious indifference to the consequences of the conduct which supplies the criminal intent and brings an act of mere negligence and imprudence under the operation of the penal law, without regard to whether the private offended party may himself be considered likewise at fault.

Rogelio’s act of driving very fast on the wrong side of the road was the proximate cause of the collision, resulting to the death of Dionesio, Sr. and serious physical injuries to Dionesio, Jr. and Cherry. Notably, the road where the incident occurred was a curve sloping upwards towards Brgy. Bocboc where the Inguitos were bound and descending towards the opposite direction where Rogelio was going. Indeed, the very fact of speeding, under such circumstances, is indicative of imprudent behavior. Consequently, the Court finds that Rogelio acted recklessly and imprudently in driving at a fast speed on the wrong side of the road while approaching the curve where the incident happened, thereby rendering him criminally liable, as well as civilly accountable for the material damages resulting therefrom.

 

 

 

Dr. Cruz v. Dr. Agas

G.R. 204095

June 15, 2015

FACTS:

Dr. Jaime Cruz (Cruz) engaged the services of St. Luke’s Medical Center (SLMC) for a medical check-up. He underwent stool, urine, bloody and other body fluid tests. He was then sent to the Gastro-Enterology Department for a scheduled gastroscopy and colonoscopy. The specialist assigned to him was absent, so he gave the colonoscopy results to the attending female anesthesiologist. Thereafter he underwent the procedure, but when he woke up he felt something was wrong. He felt dizzy, cold clammy perspiration and pain in his abdomen, and when he tried to urinate he collapsed. He tried to consult the specialist who treated him, but was nowhere to be found. He then found his cardiologist Dra. Agnes Del Rosario (Rosario) who observed his condition and referred him to the surgical department which suspected that he had a hemorrhage. Dr. Cruz agreed, and upon waking up in the ICU, he found that 6-8 inches of his colon was missing. It was found out that there was a tear in the colonic wall which caused the bleeding. During his recuperation, despite the painkillers, he was in under so much pain. Dr. Cruz claimed that Dr. Felicismo Agas (Agas) admitted that he was the one who conducted the colonoscopy procedure, but insisted that nothing was wrong. Dr. Cruz was discharged from SLMC, nevertheless he complained of having a hard time digesting his food, he had to be fed every 2 hours because he easily got full, and had fresh blood stools every time he moved his bowel, and had lost his appetite and had gastric acidity. He claimed that he was in good condition prior to the surgery.

ISSUE:

                Whether or not Dr. Agas is guilty of reckless imprudence and medical negligence

HELD:

                NO. In the case at hand, Dr. Cruz failed to show that the DOJ gravely abused its discretion in finding that there was lack of probable cause and dismissing the complaint against Dr. Agas for Serious Physical Injuries through Reckless Imprudence and Medical Malpractice. A medical negligence case can prosper if the patient can present solid proof that the doctor, like in this case, either failed to do something which a reasonably prudent doctor would have done, or that he did something that a reasonably prudent doctor would not have done, and such failure or action caused injury to the patient. To successfully pursue this kind of case, a patient must only prove that a health care provider either failed to do something which a reasonably prudent health care provider would have done, or that he did something that a reasonably prudent provider would not have done; and that failure or action caused injury to the patient. Simply put, the elements are duty, breach, injury and proximate causation. In this case, Dr. Cruz has the burden of showing the negligence or recklessness of Dr. Agas. Although there is no dispute that Dr. Cruz sustained internal hemorrhage due to a tear in the serosa of his sigmoid colon, he failed to show that it was caused by Dr. Agas’s negligent and reckless conduct of the colonoscopy procedure. In other words, Dr. Cruz failed to show and explain that particular negligent or reckless act or omission committed by Dr. Agas. Stated differently, Dr. Cruz did not demonstrate that there was "inexcusable lack of precaution" on the part of Dr. Agas.

 

 


 

Senit v. People

G.R. 192914

January 11, 2016

FACTS:

                Senit charged with Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Multiple Serious Physical Injuries and Damage to Property. Upon arraignment, he pleaded guilty. However, he transferred residence and his whereabouts became unknown so he was not presented as a witness by his new counsel.Thus, RTC rendered its Decision in Absentia convicting Senit of the crime charged. Senit filed a motion for new trial on the ground that errors of law or irregularities have been committed during trial which prejudiced his substantial rights. He claimed that he was not abel to present evidence during trial because he was not notified of the schedule. The motion for new trial was denied. CA affirmed RTC decision. On WON RTC and CA erred in denying the motion for new trial to allow Senit to present evidence on his behalf, the SC ruled in the negative. The SC ruled that a new trial may not be opened on the basis of evidence which was available during trial but was not presented due to its negligence. Here, Senit was given the opportunity to be heard and to present evidence to substantiate his defense, but he forfeited this right, through his own negligence, by notinforminghis counsel of his whereabouts and not appearing in court at the scheduled hearings

ISSUE:

Whether or not the RTC and the CA erred in denying the motion for new trial or to reopen the same in order to allow the petitioner to present evidence on his behalf

HELD:

No. First, no substantial right of the accused was prejudice during trial. Trial in absentia is authorized under Section 14(2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution which provides that after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable.

Second, there is no legal basis for the grant of the motion for new trial. A motion for new trial based on newly-discovered evidence may be granted only if the following requisites are met: (a) that the evidence was discovered after trial; (b) that said evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence; (c) that it is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative or impeaching; and (d) that the evidence is of such weight that, if admitted, it would probably change the judgment. It is essential that the offering party exercised reasonable diligence in seeking to locate the evidence before or during trial but nonetheless failed to secure it.

However, a new trial may not be had on the basis of evidence which was available during trial but was not presented due to its negligence. The Court finds no reason to waive the procedural rules in order to grant the motion for new trial of the petitioner. Senit was not in any way deprived of his substantive and constitutional right to due process as he had previous notice of the criminal case filed against him. SC noted that the petitioner had been arraigned already, thus the court had acquired jurisdiction over him. In fact, there was already initial presentation of evidence for the defense when his whereabouts became unknown.

 He was given the opportunity to present evidence in his defense. The petitioner he was duly accorded all the opportunities to be heard and to present evidence to substantiate his defense, but he forfeited this right, through his own negligence, by not appearing in court at the scheduled hearings. He wasted his opportunity to be heard by not being diligent enough to ask about the status of the criminal case against him and inform his counsel of his whereabouts.

 

 

 

Sevilla v. People

G.R. No. 194390

August 13, 2014

FACTS:

Sevilla, a former councilor of Malabon City, was charged with falsification of public document due to a false narration he made in his Personal Data Sheet (PDS) when he answered “no” to the question of whether there is a pending criminal case against him despite the pendency of a criminal case against him for assault upon an agent of a person in authority The Sandiganbayan found him guilty of Falsification of Public Documents Through Reckless Imprudence. The Sandiganbayan opined that Sevilla cannot be convicted of falsification of public document under Article 171(4) of the RPC since he did not act with malicious intent to falsify the aforementioned entry in his PDS. However, considering that Sevilla’s PDS was haphazardly and recklessly done, which resulted in the false entry therein, the Sandiganbayan convicted Sevilla of falsification of public document through reckless imprudence under Article 365 of the RPC.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Sevilla can be convicted of the felony of falsification of public document through reckless imprudence.

HELD:

Yes. However, the designation of the felony is erroneous. The Sandiganbayan convicted Sevilla of reckless imprudence, punished under Article 365 of the RPC, which resulted into the falsification of a public document. However, the Sandiganbayan designated the felony committed as "falsification of public document through reckless imprudence." The foregoing designation implies that reckless imprudence is not a crime in itself but simply a modality of committing it. Quasi-offenses under Article 365 of the RPC are distinct and separate crimes and not a mere modality in the commission of a crime.

Were criminal negligence is but a modality in the commission of felonies, operating only to reduce the penalty therefore, then it would be absorbed in the mitigating circumstances of Art. 13, specially the lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong as the one actually committed. Furthermore, the theory would require that the corresponding penalty should be fixed in proportion to the penalty prescribed for each crime when committed willfully. For each penalty for the willful offense, there would then be a corresponding penalty for the negligent variety. But instead, our Revised Penal Code (Art. 365) fixes the penalty for reckless imprudence at arresto mayor maximum, to prision correccional[medium], if the willful act would constitute a grave felony, notwithstanding that the penalty for the latter could range all the way from prision mayor to death, according to the case. It can be seen that the actual penalty for criminal negligence bears no relation to the individual willful crime, but is set in relation to a whole class, or series, of crimes.