Saudi Arabian Airlines v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 122191,
October 8, 1998.
DOCTRINE: "Characterization", or the "Doctrine of qualification" is the "process of
deciding whether or not the facts relate to the kind of question specified in a conflict's
rule." The purpose of "characterization" is to enable the forum to select the proper law.
An essential element of conflict rules is the indication of a "test" or "connecting factor"
or "point of contact". Choice-of-law rules invariably consist of a factual relationship
(such as property right, contract claim) and a connecting factor or point of contact, such
as the situs of the res, the place of celebration, the place of performance, or the place of
wrongdoing.
FACTS:
On January 21, 1988 defendant SAUDIA hired plaintiff as a Flight Attendant for its
airlines based in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. While on a lay-over in Jakarta, Indonesia,
plaintiff went to a disco dance with fellow crew members Thamer Al-Gazzawi and Allah
Al-Gazzawi, both Saudi nationals. Thamer attempted to rape plaintiff.
Morada refused to cooperate when SAUDIA’s Legal Officer and its base manager tried
to negotiate the immediate release of the detained crew members with Jakarta police.
Through the intercession of Saudi Arabian government, Thamer and Allah were
deported and, eventually, again put in service by SAUDIA. But Morada was transferred
to Manila. One year and a half year later, Morada was again ordered to see SAUDIA’s
Chief Legal Officer. Instead, she was brought to a Saudi court where she was asked to
sign a blank document, which turned out to be a notice to her to appear in court.
Monada returned to Manila. Defendant SAUDIA summoned plaintiff to report to Jeddah
once again and see Miniewy on June 27, 1993 for further investigation. Plaintiff did so
after receiving assurance from SAUDIA's Manila manger, Aslam Saleemi, that the
investigation was routinary and that it posed no danger to her. She was escorted by
SAUDIA’s legal officer to court, the judge rendered a decision against her sentencing
her to five months imprisonment and to 286 lashes. Apparently, she was tried by the
court which found her guilty of (1) adultery; (2) going to a disco, dancing and listening to
the music in violation of Islamic laws; and (3) socializing with the male crew, in
contravention of Islamic tradition. Because SAUDIA refused to lend her a hand in the
case, plaintiff sought the help of the Philippines Embassy in Jeddah. The latter helped
her pursue an appeal from the decision of the court. To pay for her upkeep, she worked
on the domestic flights of defendant SAUDIA while, ironically, Thamer and Allah freely
served the international flights.. Morada filed a complaint for damages against SAUDIA,
with the RTC of QC. SAUDIA filed Omnibus Motion to Dismiss which raised the ground
that the court has no jurisdiction, among others which was denied.
ISSUE: Whether or not the case may be tried under Philippine laws and may file for
damages
HELD:
YES. Where the factual antecedents satisfactorily establish the existence of a foreign
element, we agree with petitioner that the problem herein could present a "conflicts"
case. A factual situation that cuts across territorial lines and is affected by the diverse
laws of two or more states is said to contain a "foreign element". The presence of a
foreign element is inevitable since social and economic affairs of individuals and
associations are rarely confined to the geographic limits of their birth or conception.
In the instant case, the foreign element consisted in the fact that private respondent
Morada is a resident Philippine national, and that petitioner SAUDIA is a resident
foreign corporation. Also, by virtue of the employment of Morada with the petitioner
Saudia as a flight stewardess, events did transpire during her many occasions of travel
across national borders, particularly from Manila, Philippines to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia,
and vice versa, that caused a "conflicts" situation to arise. We thus find private
respondent's assertion that the case is purely domestic, imprecise. A conflicts problem
presents itself here, and the question of jurisdiction confronts the court a quo. Weighing
the relative claims of the parties, the court a quo found it best to hear the case in the
Philippines. Had it refused to take cognizance of the case, it would be forcing private
respondent to seek remedial action elsewhere, where she no longer maintains
substantial connections. That would have caused a fundamental unfairness to her.
Moreover, by hearing the case in the Philippines no unnecessary difficulties and
inconvenience have been shown by either of the parties. The choice of forum of the
private respondent should be upheld.
Considering that the complaint in the court a quo is one involving torts, the "connecting
factor" or "point of contact" could be the place or places where the tortious conduct or
lex loci actus occurred. And applying the torts principle in a conflicts case, we find that
the Philippines could be said as a situs of the tort (the place where the alleged tortious
conduct took place). This is because it is in the Philippines where petitioner allegedly
deceived private respondent, a Filipina residing and working here. According to her, she
had honestly believed that petitioner would, in the exercise of its rights and in the
performance of its duties, "act with justice, give her due and observe honesty and good
faith." Instead, petitioner failed to protect her, she claimed. That certain acts or parts of
the injury allegedly occurred in another country is of no moment. For in our view what is
important here is the place where the over-all harm or the totality of the alleged injury to
the person, reputation, social standing and human rights of complainant, had lodged,
according to the plaintiff below (herein private respondent). All told, it is not without
basis to identify the Philippines as the situs of the alleged tort.
Moreover, with the widespread criticism of the traditional rule of lex loci delicti commissi,
modern theories and rules on tort liability have been advanced to offer fresh judicial
approaches to arrive at just results. In keeping abreast with the modern theories on tort
liability, we find here an occasion to apply the "State of the most significant relationship"
rule, which in our view should be appropriate to apply now, given the factual context of
this case. Prescinding from this premise that the Philippines is the situs of the tort
complained of and the place "having the most interest in the problem", we find, by way
of recapitulation, that the Philippine law on tort liability should have paramount
application to and control in the resolution of the legal issues arising out of this case.
Further, we hold that the respondent Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the
parties and the subject matter of the complaint; the appropriate venue is in Quezon City,
which could properly apply Philippine law. Moreover, we find untenable petitioner's
insistence that "since private respondent instituted this suit, she has the burden of
pleading and proving the applicable Saudi law on the matter." As aptly said by private
respondent, she has "no obligation to plead and prove the law of the Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia since her cause of action is based on Articles 19 and 21" of the Civil Code of the
Philippines. In her Amended Complaint and subsequent pleadings, she never alleged
that Saudi law should govern this case. And as correctly held by the respondent
appellate court, "considering that it was the petitioner who was invoking the applicability
of the law of Saudi Arabia, then the burden was on it petitioner to plead and to establish
what the law of Saudi Arabia is".
