People v. Custodio
G.R. 129895
April 30, 2003
FACTS:
The RTC and CA convicted the accused for the crime of Parricide. Dalag, a member of the PNP, was lawfully married to Leah Dalag. They had three children.The marriage of Armando and Leah was far from idyllic. Their coverture was marred by violent quarrels, with Leah always at the losing end. Each time the couple had a quarrel, she sustained contusions, bruises and lumps on different parts of her body. One night, the children heard their parents quarreling. Leah was admonishing Armando not to drink liquor. The kids sensed that some object was being banged on the wall. Thereafter, they heard their mother cry. Francis and Princess Joy rushed outside and were horrified when from a distance of three meters, they saw Armando pushing and kicking Leah on the left side of her body. Leah fell to the ground as Armando continued to beat her up, punching her on the different parts of the body. The kids pleaded to their father to stop maltreating their mother. He grabbed Leah’s hair and banged her head on the wall. Leah’s forehead directly hit the wall. In the process, Armando stepped on a nail. Even as she was being assaulted by her husband, she told him Toy, Toy, I will find some medicine for your wound. Leah then fled to the house of their neighbor, Tia Feli. Armando ran after Leah and pushed her to the house of Felisa. Armando herded Leah back to the house. Princess Joy she saw her mother being pushed by her father. Leah fell to the ground and lost consciousness. Armando placed the head of Leah on a stone and ordered Princess Joy to get some water. She did. She poured water on the face of her mother but the latter did not move. Armando then tried to revive Leah by applying mouth-to-mouth resuscitation to no avail. Leah was brought to the hospital the following day but never regained her consciousness until she died on August 22. Dr. Jesse Rey T. Cruel, the medico-legal officer, testified that Leah suffered severe beatings and traumatic physical violence resulting in intracranial hemorrhage which caused her death.
ISSUE:
Whether or not accused is guilty of parricide
HELD:
Yes. ART. 246. Parricide. Any person who shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or any of his ascendants, or descendants, or his spouse, shall be guilty of parricide and shall be punished by the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death. (Restored by Sec. 5, RA No. 7659.) The prosecution is mandated to prove the following essential elements: 1.) a person is killed; 2.) the deceased is killed by the accused; and 3.) the deceased is the father, mother or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or a legitimate other ascendant or other descendant, or the legitimate spouse of the accused.
People v. Rebucan
G.R. No. 182551
July 27, 2011
FACTS:
The RTC and CA convicted the accused for the crime of Murder. That on or about the 6th day of November, 2002, in the Municipality of Carigara, Province of Leyte, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with deliberate intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and wound FELIPE LAGERA Y OBERO, 65 years old and RANIL TAGPIS Y LAGERA, 1 year old, with the use of a long bolo (sundang) which the accused had provided himself for the purpose, thereby inflicting upon Felipe Lagera Hypovolemic shock, massive blood loss and multiple hacking wounds upon Ranil Tagpis: Hypovolemic shock, massive blood loss and hacking wound, head[,] which wounds caused the death of Felipe Lagera y Obera and Ranil Tagpis y Lagera.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused is guilty of murder
HELD:
Yes. According to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, any person who shall kill another shall be guilty of murder if the same was committed with the attendant circumstance of treachery, among other things, and that the situation does not fall within the provisions of Article 246. There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. The essence of treachery is a deliberate and sudden attack, offering an unarmed and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or to escape. There is treachery even if the attack is frontal if it is sudden and unexpected, with the victims having no opportunity to repel it or defend themselves, for what is decisive in treachery is that the execution of the attack made it impossible for the victims to defend themselves or to retaliate. In the instant case, the evidence of the prosecution established the fact that the killings of Felipe and Ranil were attended by treachery, thus qualifying the same to murder.
People v. Lagman
G.R. No. 197807
April 16, 2012
FACTS:
The RTC and CA convicted the accused for the crime of Murder. On February 24, 2002, at about 1:30 p.m, prosecution witness Donna Maniego was in front of her banana cue store on Lakandula Street, Tondo, Manila. She was seated alongside her mother, Violeta Sicor, inside the sidecar of a motorcycle. Without warning, the accused approached her and punched her face several times. The accused turned on Sicor, grabbed her and stabbed her in the middle of her buttocks with a small knife. Maniego got out of the sidecar and ran to the barangay hall for help. Upon finding that the barangay chairman was not around, Maniego went to check on her common-law spouse, Jondel Santiago, at the house of Santiago’s mother. On her way there, she saw the accused stab Santiago four (4) times from a distance of five (5) to six (6) meters. The distance between where Maniego was punched and where Santiago was stabbed was about nine (9) meters. Maniego then saw the accused flee the scene of the crime carrying a knife and heading towards Juan Luna Street. Seeing that Santiago was mortally hurt, Maniego rushed Santiago to Gat Andres Bonifacio Hospital but he later expired. While Maniego was at the hospital, she saw the accused, who was being treated after an angry crowd mauled her. Maniego informed the policeman who was escorting the accused that it was the latter who had stabbed and killed Santiago.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the RTC
HELD:
No. The elements of murder are: (1) that a person was killed; (2) that the accused killed him or her; (3) that the killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC); and (4) that the killing is not parricide or infanticide. Santiago was killed and that it was accused-appellant who killed him as there was an eyewitness to the crime. Santiago’s killing was attended by the qualifying circumstance of treachery as testified to by the prosecution eyewitness, Maniego. Paragraph 16, Art. 14 of the RPC defines treachery as the direct employment of means, methods, or forms in the execution of the crime against persons which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to the offender arising from the defense which the offended party might make. Maniegos testimony proved the presence of treachery in this case. Witness saw accused stab the victim who was lighting a cigarette. He was stabbed once in the chest, twice on the back, and another one at the neck
People v. Macaspac
G.R. No. 198954
February 22, 207
FACTS:
The RTC and CA convicted the accused for the crime of Murder. At around 8:00 in the evening of July 7, 1988, Macaspac along with four other persons including one Robert Jebulan. In the course of their drinking spree, an argument ensued between Macaspac and Jebulan. It became so heated that, Macaspac uttered to the group: “Hintayin nyo ako d’yan, wawalisin ko kayo, “and then left. After around three minutes, Macaspac returned wielding a knife. He confronted and taunted Jubulan, saying, “Ano?”. Jebulan simply replied, “Tama na”. At that point, Macaspac suddenly stabbed Jebulan on the lower right area of his chest and ran away. The others witnessed the stabbing of Jebulan. He was rushed to the hospital but was rushed dead on arrival. Macaspac initially invoked self-defense, testifying that he and Jebulan had scuffed for the possession of the knife, and that he had then stabbed Jebulan once he seized control of the knife. However, he later on claimed that Jebulan had been stabbed by accident when he fell on the knife. He denied being the person with whom Jebulan had the argument, which he insisted had been between Barcomo and one Danny. According to him, he tried to pacify their argument, but his efforts angered Jebulan, who draw out the knife and tried to stab him. He fortunately evaded the stab thrust of Jebulan, whom he struck with a wooden chair to defend himself. The blow caused Jebulan to fall on the knife, puncturing his chest. On February 19, 2008, the RTC found Macaspac guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder and sentenced him to an imprisonment of reclusion perpetua. On appeal, the CA affirmed conviction of Macaspac with modification of the imposition of the civil liability. The case elevated to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in affirming Macaspac’s conviction for murder.
HELD:
The Court sees no misreading by the RTC and the CA of the credibility of the witnesses and the evidence of the parties. On the contrary, the CA correctly observed that inconsistencies had rendered Macaspac’s testimony doubtful as to shatter his credibility. The Court cannot uphold the CA’s conclusion on the attendance of treachery. According to the facts, he did not mount the attack with surprise because the heated argument between him and the victim and his angry threat of going back “to sweep them” had sufficiently forewarned the latter of the impending lethal assault. The requisites for the appreciation of evident premeditation are: (1) the time when the accused determined to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that the accused had clung to his determination to commit the crime; and, the lapse of a sufficient length of time between the determination and execution to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act. The first and second requisites were established. But it is the essence of this circumstance that the execution of the criminal act be preceded by cool thought and reflection upon the resolve to carry out the criminal intent during the space of time sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment. By quickly returning to the group with a knife, he let no appreciable time pass to allow him to reflect upon his resolve to carry out his criminal intent. It was as if the execution immediately followed the resolve to commit a crime. As such, the third requisite was absent. Without the prosecution having sufficiently proved the attendance of either treachery or evident premeditation, Macaspac was guilty only of homicide for the killing of Jebulan. Macaspac shall suffer the indeterminate penalty of eight years of prision mayor, as minimum, to 14 years, eight months and 1 day of reclusion temporal.
Wacoy & Quibac v. People
G.R. No. 213792 – 213886
June 22, 2015
FACTS:
The RTC and CA convicted the accused for the crime of Rape. At around 3:30 am of June 16, 2003, AAA was sleeping beside her 2 year old nephew, BBB, when Pareja hugged her and kissed her nape and neck. AAA cried, but Pareja covered her and BBB with a blanket. Pareja removed AAA’s clothes and he also took off his pants and underwear. The accused went on top of AAA and held her hands, AAA resisted, but accused parted her legs using his own legs, and tried to insert his provate part into hers. Accused stopped when AAA’s cry got louder. AAA kicked the accused’s upper thigh as the latter was about to stand up. Accused put his clothes on and threatened to kill AAA is she disclosed the incident to anyone. At aound 6:00 am of the same day, AAA proceeded to the house of her older sister, DDD and narrated to her what had happened. Afterwards, AAA and her two siblings went to the Mandaluyong Police station to report the incident.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the RTC
HELD:
Yes. Carnal knowledge was not proven with moral certainty. Rape is consummated by having carnal knowledge of a woman with the use of force, threat, or intimidation, or when she is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or when she is under 12 years of age or is demented. Carnal knowledge is defined as the act of a man having sexual intercourse or sexual bodily connection with a woman. It must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. From the testimony of AAA, the SC found it clear that Pareja’s penis did not penetrate but merely touched AAA’s private part. In fact, AAA confirmed on cross-examination that Pareja did not succeed in inserting his penis into her vagina. In People v. Campuhan, the SC laid down the parameters of genital contact in rape cases: a. Touching when applied to rape cases does not simply mean mere epidermal contact, stroking or grazing of organs, a slight brush or a scrape of the penis on the external layer of the victim’s vagina or the mons pubis. b. there must be sufficient and convincing proof that the penis indeed touched the labias or slid into the female organ and not merely stroked the external surface thereof for an accused to be convicted of consummated rape. c. touching the labia majoria or the labia minora of the pudendum constitutes consummated rape without any showing of such penetration, it can only be attempted rape or ats of lasciviousness.
Article 6 of the RPC states that there is attempt when the offender commences the commission of the rime directly by overt act but does not perform all the acts of execution by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance. In People v. Publico, the SC ruled that when the touching of the vagina by the penis is coupled with the intent to penetrate, attempted rape is committed; otherwise, the crime committed is merely acts of lasciviousness. In the case at bar, the totality of the appellant’s acts demonstrated the unmistakable objective to insert his penis into the victim’s private pats.
People v. Abarca
G.R. No. 74433
September 14, 1987
FACTS:
That on or about 15th day of July 1984 in the city of Tacloban Leyte Philippines, the accused Francisco Abarca went to the bus station and travel to Dolores Eastern Samar to fetch his daughter in the morning. Unfortunately, the trip was delayed at 2 pm because of his failure to catch the trip plus the engine trouble which causes him to proceed at his father’s house, and then later went home. When he reaches home the accused caught his wife in the act of sexual intercourse with Khingsley Koh in the meantime his wife and Koh notice him, that makes her wife push her paramour and got his revolver. Abarca peeping above the built-in cabinet in their room jumped and ran away to look for a firearm at the PC soldier’s house to where he got the M-16 rifle. The accused lost his wife and Koh in vicinity at his house and immediately proceeded to a mahjong house where he caught the victim aimed and shoot Koh with several bullets on his different parts of his body causing Mr. Khingsley Koh’s instantaneous death. By that time, Arnold and Lina Amparado had inflicted multiple wounds due to stray bullets causing Mr. Amparado’s one and one-half month loss of working capacity including his serious hospitalization and the latter’s wife who had slighter physical injuries from the incident. The RTC hereby sentenced Abarca to death for Murder with double Frustrated Murder and must indemnify the Amparado Spouses and Heirs of Kho.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused is liable.
HELD:
Yes. The accused-appellant did not have the intent to kill the Amparado couple. Although as a rule, one committing an offense is liable for all the consequences of his act, the rule presupposes that the act done amounts to a felony. The accused-appellant is totally free from any responsibility performing an illegal act when he fired shots at the victim but he cannot be entirely without fault. It appears that before firing at the deceased, he uttered warning words which is not enough of a precaution to absolve him for the injuries sustained by the Amparados. The acts of execution which should have produced the crimes of murders as a consequence, nevertheless did not produce it by reason of causes independent of his will; nonetheless, the Court finds negligence on his part. He is liable under the first part, second paragraph, of Article 365 that is less serious physical injuries through simple imprudence or negligence. For the separate injuries suffered by the Amparado spouses impose upon the accused-appellant arresto mayor in its medium and maximum period to being the graver penalty.
People v. Entrampas
G.R. No. 212161
March 29, 2017
FACTS:
Accused-appellant Juanito Entrampas (Entrampas) and BBB were common-law spouses. They co-habited for eight years, from 1995 to 2003. AAA, BBB’s daughter from previous relationship, lived with them. She look up to Entrampas as her adoptive father. Sometime in February 2003, at about 5:00 pm., in a rural sitio of Barangay Bawod, San Isidro, Leyte. AAA arrived from school to cook for her family. She was interrupted by Entrampas and was asked to go to the room upstairs. The 11-year old girl obeyed. Once in the room, Entrampas forced AAA to lie down on the floor. She was warned by the accused-appellant that if she shouted he would kill her. She was also warned that if she told her mother about what he was about to do, he would kill them. Entrampas took off the child’s panty, undressed himself, and inserted his penis into her vagina. AAA felt pain as he penetrated her. Her vagina bled. She cried and pleaded him to stop.
As he consummated the act, she noticed a knife on the wall within his reach. She become more fearful. After satisfying himself, he again warned the child that he would kill her and her mother if she informed anyone about the incident.The incident occurred again a week later in February 2003. Entrampas told AAA to lie down , penetrated her vagina, and then left her. Over the following months, Entrampas repeatedly raped AAA, who out of fear, and remained silent. In July 2003 BBB observed some changes in her daughter’s body. AAA’s belly had become noticeably bigger. Entrampas and BBB went to BBB’s brother, CCC, on September 2003, To confess the crime he had committed against AAA. Entrampas allegedly felt remorseful and told CCC to kill him for avenge AAA. CCC immediately reported the matter to the police.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Entrampas is guilty of statutory rape
HELD:
Yes. The accused-appellant Entrampas is guilty beyond reasonable Doubt of two (2) statutory rape. On the two(2) charges of qualified rape, AAA clearly and consistently communicated how the accused-appellant threatened and forced her into having sexual congress with him. Her failures to resist the sexual aggression and to immediately report the incident to the authorities or her mother do not undermine her credibility. The silence of the rape victim does not negate her sexual molestation or make her charge baseless, untrue , or fabricated. A minor cannot be expected to act like an adult or a mature experienced woman who would have a courage and intelligence to disregard the threat to her life and complain immediately that she had been sexually assaulted. Forced and intimidation must be appreciated in light of the victim’s perception and judgement when the assailant committed the crime. In rape perpetrated by close kin, such as the common-law spouse of the child’s mother, actual force or intimidation need not be employed. While accused-appellant was not a biological father of AAA. She considered him as a father since she was a child. Moral influence or ascendancy added to the intimidation of AAA. It enhanced the fear that cowed the victim into silence. Accused-appellant’s physical superiority and moral influence depleted AAA’s resolved to stand up against her foster father. The threats to her and her mother’s lives, as well as the knife within accused-appellant’s reach, further prevented her for from resisting her assailant. As accused-appellant sexually assaulted AAA, she cried and pleaded him to stop. Her failure to shout or to tenaciously repel the acussed-appellant does not mean that she voluntarily submitted to his dastardly act. Accused-appellant’s act amounted to statutory rape through carnal knowledge under Article 266-A(1)(d) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended: Article 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. Rape is Committed- 1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances: a). Through force, threat, or intimidation; b). When the offended party is deprived of a reason otherwise unconscious; c). By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and d). When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be presented.
Acussed-appellant also committed the crime with the aggravating/qualifiying circumstance that he was the common-law spouse of AAA’s mother. Under Article 266-B (1) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended: Article 266-B. Penalties. –Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall punisher by reclusion perpetua. The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following aggravating/qualifying circumstances: 1). When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a guardian or the common –law spouse of the parent of the victim.
People v. Jessie Gabriel
G.R. No. 213390
March 15, 2017
FACTS:
Appe1lant was indicted for rape in an Information which alleged:That on or about the 17 day of February 2010, in the City of Dagupan,Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-namedaccused JESSIE GABRIEL y GAJARDO, with force and intimidation, did thenand there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally, have carnal knowledge upon one["AAA"], a 17-year old minor, against her will and consent, to the damage and prejudice of the latter.Contrary to Article 266-A par. 1-a, in relation to the 2nd par. of Article 266-B ofthe Revised Penal Code as amended by RA 8353.Arraigned thereon, appellant entered a negative plea. Trial ensued on the RTCrendered a decision finding herein accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt crime ofRape, defined and penalized under Article 266-A (a) of the Revised Penal Code asamended by Republic Act No. 8353. Accused appealed but the CA thumbed down theappeal, anchoring its verdict on the RTC’s ratiocination, and more particularly on“AAA’s” testimony-in-chief relative to the actual assault on her person in the mannerquoted. Indeed, the CA’s findings that “AAA” was raped by appellant were a virtualreiteration of the RTC’s own summation as regards the rape.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the victim’s testimony sufficient to convict accused for the crime of rape.
HELD:
Yes. In the 1901 case of United States v. Ramos, 1 Phil. 81, this Court had already declared that “when a woman testifies that she has been raped she says, in effect, that all that is necessary to constitute the commission of this crime has been committed. It is merely a question then, whether or not this court accepts her statement.” Jurisprudence has clung with unrelenting grasp to this precept. The trial court’s assessment and evaluation of the credibility of witnesses vis-a-vis theirtestimonies ought to be upheld as a matter of course because of its direct, immediate and firsthand opportunity to observe the deportment of witnesses as they delivered their testimonies in open court. Thus, the trial court’s findings bearing on the credibility of witnesses on thesematters are invariably binding and conclusive upon the appellate court unless of course, there is ashowing that the trial court had overlooked, misapprehended or misconstrued some fact orcircumstance of weight or substance, or had failed to accord or assign such fact or circumstanceits due import or significance.
People v. Gutierez
G.R. No. 208007
April 2, 2014
FACTS:
AAA, who was then 10 years old and a Grade 2 student at Camp 7 Elementary School in Baguio City, went home from school to have lunch. On the way home, she met Rodrigo (accused) at his house. He brought her to his room and laid her down on the bed. He then raised her skirt, removed her panties, pulled down his pants, and then inserted his penis into her vagina. Rodrigo stayed on top of her for a long time, and when he withdrew his penis, white liquid came out. He then gave her five pesos before she went back to school. AAA went back to school. Her adviser, Agustina Chapap asked her where she came from because she was tardy. AAA initially did not answer, but she then admitted she came from “Uncle Rod” and that she went there to ask for money. The adviser, together with another teacher, Rona Ambaken, brought AAA to the principal’s office. AAA was brought to the comfort room where Ambaken inspected her panties. The principal was able to confirm that AAA was touched since AAA’s private organ was swelling. Her underwear is also wet. Another teacher went to the barangay hall and the police station to report the incident. An information was filed, charging Rodrigo with statutory rape. On trial, AAA disclosed that Rodrigo had done the same thing to her about 10 times on separate occasions. In his defense, Rodrigo denied the accusations and stated that he was already at work by 1:30PM. He said that he has a relationship with AAA’s sister and that a similar complaint was filed against him, but it was settled at the barangay level.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Gutierez is guilty of statutory rape.
HELD:
YES. Rape under Art. 266-A is committed: 1. By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances: a. Through force, threat, or intimidation; b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; c. By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and d. When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present.
Statutory rape is committed when (1) the offended party is under 12 years of age and (2) the accused has carnal knowledge of her, regardless of whether there was force, threat or intimidation; whether the victim was deprived of reason or consciousness; or whether it was done through fraud or grave abuse of authority. It is enough that the age of the victim is proven and that there was sexual intercourse. What the law punishes in statutory rape is carnal knowledge of a woman below twelve (12) years old. Thus, force, intimidation and physical evidence of injury are not relevant considerations; the only subject of inquiry is the age of the woman and whether carnal knowledge took place. The law presumes that the victim does not and cannot have a will of her own on account of her tender years; the child's consent is immaterial because of her presumed incapacity to discern good from evil.
AAA was able to narrate in a clear and categorical manner the ordeal that was done to her. As a child-victim who has taken significant risks in coming to court, her testimony deserves full weight and credence. AAA's ordeal was supported by the testimonies of her teachers whose concern for her led to the discovery of the crime. The medical certificate presented in court, together with the testimonies of the physicians, is consistent with the finding that she was sexually abused. Beyond reasonable doubt, Rodrigo Gutierez raped AAA, a minor who was only 10 years of age. Rodrigo asserted that AAA's failure to cry out for help shows reasonable doubt.He noted that her house was just near his house where the incident happened. In any case, whether she cried for help is immaterial in a charge of statutory rape since "the law presumes that such a victim, on account of her tender age, does not and cannot have a will of her own."
People v. Crisostomo
G.R. No. 196435
January 29, 2014
FACTS:
In three separate Informations, accused was charged with rape. The victim in these cases “AAA” testified that at noon time of April 8, 1999, she was playing with her playmates whereupon she wandered by the house of accused which was just below their house. “AAA” clarified during her cross-examination that there was a vulcanizing shop owned by her father located in their house and where accused was employed. While “AAA” was at the house of accused, she claimed that her genitals and buttocks were burned with a lighted cigarette by the said accused. “AAA” testified further that her clothes were taken off by the same accused who also took his clothes off after which he allegedly placed himself on top of her, inserted his penis and proceeded to have illicit carnal knowledge of the then six (6) year old girl. Appellant argued that the trial court erred in finding “AAA’s” testimony credible considering that she was unsure whether a match, rod or a cigarette stick, was used in burning her private parts.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused is guilty.
HELD:
Yes. The SC held appellant guilty of two counts of rape by sexual assault and one count of rape by sexual intercourse. When the offended party is under 12 years of age, the crime committed is “termed statutory rape as it departs from the usual modes of committing rape. What the law punishes is carnal knowledge of a woman below 12 years of age. Thus, the only subject of inquiry is the age of the woman and whether carnal knowledge took place. The law presumes that the victim does not and cannot have a will of her own on account of her tender years.” Likewise, the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt appellant’s guilt for two counts of rape by sexual assault. Records show that appellant inserted a lit cigarette stick into “AAA’s” genital orifice causing her labia majora to suffer a 3rd degree burn. Appellant likewise inserted a lit cigarette stick into “AAA’s” anal orifice causing 3rd degree burns in her perianal region.
“AAA’s” “uncertainty” on whether it was a match, rod or a cigarette stick that was inserted into her private parts, did not lessen her credibility. Such “uncertainty” is so inconsequential and does not diminish the fact that an instrument or object was inserted into her private parts. This is the essence of rape by sexual assault. ” The gravamen of the crime of rape by sexual assault is the insertion of the penis into another person’s mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into another person’s genital or anal orifice.” In any event, “inconsistencies in a rape victim’s testimony do not impair her credibility, especially if the inconsistencies refer to trivial matters that do not alter the essential fact of the commission of rape.”
People v. Jastiva
G.R. No. 199268
February 12, 2014
FACTS:
On August 3, 2004, AAA, a 67-year-old married woman, was drying corn in their small barn in a farmland, when her husband, BBB, left her alone to attend to their sick daughter. At about 11:00 in the evening, AAA was fast asleep when Aurelio Jastiva (Jastiva) threatened her with a knife and warned her not to shoutbecause he will have sexual intercourse with her. AAA was able to grab Jastiva’s hand but then, she felt theblade of the knife he held. Thereafter, Jastiva removed AAA’s underwear but he cannot proceed with hislewd design because his penis was not yet erected. Jastiva, therefore, toyed with AAA’s sexual organ by licking it. Jastiva then made his way up and tried to suck AAA’s tongue. After that, Jastiva held his penisand inserted it to AAA’s vagina. After ravishing his victim and before AAA could stand up, Jastiva patted AAA’s shoulder and said "Salamat." Since it was dark in the barn, it was only after the consummation ofthe crime that AAA recognized who her assailant is.On the next day, AAA relayed her nightmare to her neighbor and her husband BBB. The spouses reportedthe incident and AAA was medically examined. The doctor found that AAA’s vaginal opening, labia major and labia minora on both sides, showed signs of irritation and is reddish in color, in addition to a partialseparation of tissues between the labium. AAA also sustained multiple scratches at her lips. AAA filed a Complaint for Rape against Jastiva. The latter argued that the evidence presented by theprosecution was not sufficient to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. He questioned the credibility of AAA on the ground that AAA did not shout for help nor struggle against her assailant. Also, AAA couldnot have positively identified the perpetrator because it was too dark in the barn. The accused alsoquestioned the ability of the victim to identify her rapist just by seeing its face illuminated by moonlight since it was dark and there is lack of lightning in the “kamalig” where the crime took place. Furthermore, Jastiva questioned the credibility of the medical examination and argued that the filing of the case by AAA was ill-motivated.The accused presented three witnesses which are his daughter, common-law wife and Ordas (a visitor inhis house when the crime happened). The witnesses have said that Jastiva was in his own house on thenight of the incident and it was impossible for the accused to have left the house without being noticed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused is guilty of rape.
HELD:
Yes. The elements of rape (under paragraph 1, subparagraph a of Article 266-A) are as follows: (1) that theoffender is a man; (2) that the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman; and (3) that such act isaccomplished by using force, (threat) or intimidation.The prosecution was able to prove the guilt of Jastiva beyond reasonable doubt based on AAA’s credible,positive and categorical testimony, AAA’s positive identification Jastiva as the perpetrator, the physicalevidence presented and the absence of ill motive on the part of AAA in filing the complaint against Jastiva.
Firstly, the Court ruled that a conviction of rape may issue upon the sole basis of the victim’s accurate and credible testimony. No decent and sensible woman will publicly admit to being raped and, thus, run therisk of public contempt, unless she is, in fact, a rape victim. The force, violence, or intimidation in rape isa relative term, depending not only on the age, size, and strength of the parties but also on their relationship with each other. And physical resistance need not be established in rape when intimidation is exercised upon the victim and the latter submits herself against her will to the rapist’s advances because of fear forher life and personal safety. In this case, AAA was already 67 years of age when she was raped in the darkby Jastiva who was armed with a knife. A woman of such age could only recoil in fear. Moreover, physicalresistance is not the sole test to determine whether a woman involuntarily succumbed to the lust of anaccused. The law does not impose a burden on the rape victim to prove resistance. What needs only to beproved by the prosecution is the use of force or intimidation by the accused in having sexual intercourse with the victim which it did in the case at bar.
Secondly, AAA has established Jastiva as her attacker despite the allegation that it was dark in the barn which made it impossible for AAA to identify him. AAA testified to the fact that she saw Jastiva when he walked past her after the incident and his face was finally illuminated by the moonlight. The high courtheld that an accused need not always be identified under a perfect or near perfect visibility. The Court isnot disposed to doubt the evidenced ability of the complainant to identify her rapist especially because AAA testified that she knows Jastiva very well since Jastiva is her neighbor living some 100 meters awayfrom the crime scene. Thus, AAA does not need to mention any distinguishing features of Jastiva. Thirdly, the Medical Certificate is consistent with AAA’s assertion that Jastiva raped her.
Lastly, Jastiva did not allege, much less show, that AAA was prompted by improper or malicious motivesto impute upon him such a serious charge. This being so, the categorical and positive identification of Jastiva prevails over the latter’s plain alibi and bare denial. Jastiva was not able to show that the RTC and CA overlooked any fact or material of consequence thatcould have altered the outcome had they taken it into consideration, this court will not disturb on appeal.
People & AAA v. CA
G.R. No. 183652
February 25, 2015
FACTS:
On March 25, 2004, AAA, together with Christian Lim, Joefhel Oporto, and Raymund Carampatana, ate dinner at the house of one Mark Gemeno at Purok, Bulahan, Maranding. After eating, Lim invited them to go to Alson’s Palace. In the bedroom, they saw Montesco with Batoctoy, Roda, dela Cruz, Rudinas, Diego, and Angelo. They had a drinking spree. At first, AAA refused to drink because she had never tried hard liquor before. During the session, they shared their problems with each other. When it was AAA’s turn, she became emotional and started crying. It was then that she took her first shot. She consumed more or less 5 glasses of Emperador Brandy and felt dizzy so she laid her head down on Oporto’s lap. Oporto then started kissing her head. This angered her so she told them to stop. Then, Roda also kissed her. AAA was already sleepy, but they still forced her to take another shot. She heard Lim say, "Hubuga na, hubuga na," (You make her drunk, you make her drunk). And heard another say, "You drink it, you drink it." She leaned on Oporto’s lap again, then she fell asleep. They woke her up and Lim gave her the Emperador Brandy bottle to drink the remaining liquor inside. She tried to refuse but they insisted, so she drank directly from the bottle. Again, she fell asleep. The next thing she knew, Roda and Batoctoy were carrying her down the stairs, and then she was asleep again. When she regained consciousness, she saw that she was already at the Alquizola Lodging House. She would thereafter fall back asleep and wake up again. And during one of the times that she was conscious, she saw Oporto on top of her, kissing her on different parts of her body, and having intercourse with her. She started crying. She tried to resist when she felt pain in her genitals. She also saw Carampatana and Moises Alquizola inside the room, watching as Oporto abused her. At one point, AAA woke up while Carampatana was inserting his penis into her private organ. She cried and told him to stop. Alquizola then joined and started to kiss her. For the last time, she fell unconscious. When she woke up, it was already 7:00a.m. of the next day. Her body felt heavy and exhausted. She found herself with her shirt on but without her lower garments. The upper half of her body was on top of the bed but her feet were on the floor. There were also red stains on her shirt. When she told them that she was raped, her mother started hitting her. They reported the incident to the police and subsequently undergone a medical examination. Dr. Acusta found an old hymenal laceration at 5 o’clock position and hyperemia or redness at the posterior fornices. The vaginal smear likewise revealed the presence of sperm.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused is guilty of rape.
HELD:
Yes. The elements of rape are: (1) the offender had carnal knowledge of the victim; and (2) such act was accomplished through force or intimidation; or when the victim is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or when the victim is under twelve years of age. Here, the accused intentionally made AAA consume hard liquor more than she could handle. They still forced her to drink even when she was already obviously inebriated. They never denied having sexual intercourse with AAA, but the latter was clearly deprived of reason or unconscious at the time the private respondents ravished her. The CA, readily concluded that she agreed to the sexual act simply because she did not shout or offer any physical resistance, disregarding her testimony that she was rendered weak and dizzy by intoxication, thereby facilitating the commission of the crime. The appellate court never provided any reason why AAA’s testimony should deserve scant or no weight at all, or why it cannot be accorded any credence. In reviewing rape cases, the lone testimony of the victim is and should be, by itself, sufficient to warrant a judgment of conviction if found to be credible. Also, it has been established that when a woman declares that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to mean that she has been raped, and where her testimony passes the test of credibility, the accused can be convicted on that basis alone. The trial court correctly ruled that if AAA was not truthful to her accusation, she would not have opened herself to the rough and tumble of a public trial. AAA was certainly not enjoying the prying eyes of those who were listening as she narrated her harrowing experience. AAA positively identified the private respondents as the ones who violated her. She tried to resist, but because of the presence of alcohol, her assaulters still prevailed.
People v. Laoag
G.R. No. 178321
October 5, 2011
FACTS:
AAA testified that she and her friend were walking on their way to apply. Suddenly, appellant, who was holding an ice pick and a lead pipe, waylaid them and forcibly brought them to a grassy area. Without warning, appellant struck AAA in the head with the lead pipe causing her to feel dizzy and to fall down. When Jennifer saw this, she cried out for help but appellant also hit her on the head with the lead pipe, knocking her down. Appellant stabbed Jennifer several times with the ice pick and thereafter covered her body with thick grass. Appellant then turned to AAA. !e hit AAA in the head several times more with the lead pipe and stabbed her on the face. While AAA was in such defenseless position, appellant pulled down her "Jogging pants, removed her panty, and pulled up her blouse and bra. Then went on top of her, sucked her breasts and inserted his penis into her vagina. After raping AAA, appellant also covered her with grass. At that point, AAA passed out. When AAA regained consciousness, it was nighttime and raining hard. She crawled until she reached her uncle’s farm at daybreak. When she saw him, she waved at him for help. She later learned that Jennifer had died. Appellant, on the other hand, denied the charges against him. Appellant testified that he was at home cooking dinner around the time the crimes were committed. With him were his children, & Ronnie, Jay, Oliver and Conrado, Jr. and his nephew, Rey Laog. At around seven o’clock, he was arrested by the police officers of San Rafael, Bulacan. He learned that his wife had reported him to the police after he went wild that same night and struck with a lead pipe a man whom he saw talking to his wife inside their house. When he was already incarcerated, he learned that he was being charged with murder and rape.
ISSUE:
Whether or not accused is guilty of murder and rape.
HELD:
In People v. Larrañaga, this Court explained the concept of a special complex crime, as follows: A discussion on the nature of special complex crime is imperative. Where the law provides a single penalty for two or more component offenses, the resulting crime is called a special complex crime. Some of the special complex crimes under the Revised Penal Code are (1) robbery with homicide, (2) robbery with rape, (3) kidnapping with serious physical injuries, (4) kidnapping with murder or homicide, and (5) rape with homicide. In a special complex crime, the prosecution must necessarily prove each of the component offenses with the same precision that would be necessary if they were made the subject of separate complaints. As earlier mentioned, R.A. No. 7659 amended Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code by adding thereto this provision: “When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention, or is raped, or is subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed;” and that this provision gives rise to a special complex crime. In the cases at bar, the Information specifically alleges that the victim Marijoy was raped “on the occasion and in connection” with her detention and was killed “subsequent thereto and on the occasion thereof.” Considering that the prosecution was able to prove each of the component offenses, appellants should be convicted of the special complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention with homicide and rape.
Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, provides only a single penalty for the composite acts of rape and the killing committed by reason or on the occasion of the rape.ART. 266-B. Penalties. – Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
Whenever the rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death. When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has become insane, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.When the rape is attempted and a homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion thereof, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, homicide is committed, the penalty shall be death.
Considering that the prosecution in this case was able to prove both the rape of AAA and the killing of Jennifer both perpetrated by appellant, he is liable for rape with homicide under the above provision. There is no doubt that appellant killed Jennifer to prevent her from aiding AAA or calling for help once she is able to run away, and also to silence her completely so she may not witness the rape of AAA, the original intent of appellant. His carnal desire having been satiated, appellant purposely covered AAA’s body with grass, as he did earlier with Jennifer’s body, so that it may not be easily noticed or seen by passersby. Appellant indeed thought that the savage blows he had inflicted on AAA were enough to cause her death as with Jennifer. But AAA survived and appellant’s barbaric deeds were soon enough discovered.
People v. Villaflores
G.R. No. 184926
April 11, 2012
FACTS:
Victim Marita, 4 years and 8 months of age, was just playing in their backyard in Bagong Silang, Caloocan in the morning of July 2, 1999. When her mother noticed her missing, she called her husband to look for her but the search has gone futile until midnight. They sought the assistance of the police the following day. In her desperation, the mother consulted a clairvoyant (manghuhula) who said that Marita is just 5 houses away from them. True enough, they found Marita’s lifeless body covered with a blue and yellow sack inside a comfort room of an abandoned house just 5 structures away from the victim’s house. Marita’s face was black and blue and bloody. She had been tortured and strangled with a nylon rope. Witnesses Aldrin Bautista and Jovy Solidum pointed to Villaflores as the culprit. Villaflores was arrested and charged with rape with homicide.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused are guilty.
HELD:
Yes. The felony of rape with homicide is a composite crime. A composite crime, also known as a special complex crime, is composed of two or more crimes that the law treats as a single indivisible and unique offense for being the product of a single criminal impulse. It is a specific crime with a specific penalty provided by law, and differs from a compound or complex crime under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. There are distinctions between a composite crime, on the one hand, and a complex or compound crime under Article 48, on the other hand. In a composite crime, the composition of the offenses is fixed by law; in a complex or compound crime, the combination of the offenses is not specified but generalized, that is, grave and/or less grave, or one offense being the necessary means to commit the other. For a composite crime, the penalty for the specified combination of crimes is specific; for a complex or compound crime, the penalty is that corresponding to the most serious offense, to be imposed in the maximum period. A light felony that accompanies a composite crime is absorbed; a light felony that accompanies the commission of a complex or compound crime may be the subject of a separate information.
Republic Act No. 8353 (Anti-Rape Law of 1997) pertinently provides: Article 266-A. Rape; When and How Committed. Rape is committed 1) By a man who have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances: a) Through force, threat, or intimidation; b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the circumstance mentioned above be present.
People v. Jose Broniola
G.R. No. 211027
June 29, 2015
FACTS:
Around 5:30 in the afternoon, Alfredo Abag was on his way home bringing some Taiwan fish to sell when he met the appellant at a shortcut road passable only to people and animals. He noticed that appellant had scratches on his face and his hand was holding a bolo with blood on it. Appelant asked for the price of the fish but didn’t buy it and left. He also seems restless and uneasy. Then, AAA’s father reported to the authorities that his daughter was missing. Next morning, he went with Abag and other barangay officials to search for AAA. They found her dead lying on a grassy area near a farm hut owned by Jhonefer Q. Darantinao. AAA’s body bore several hack wounds, blood oozed from her mouth, her one hand and one finger were cut off. He knows appellant because they are neighbors. Their families had a rift because appellant’s father was killed by his son-in-law, Lito Miguel.
DEFENSE: n the morning of February 28, 2000, appellant was plowing his farm located adjacent to their house. After having lunch, he worked in the fishpond just beside their house until 3:00 o’clock in the afternoon. Thereafter, he stayed inside their house together with his mother, wife and children. Appellant claimed he does not know Abag, AAA or BBB.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused is guilty of rape with homicide.
HELD:
Yes. : Appellant was charged and convicted of rape with homicide. The felony of rape with homicide is a special complex crime that is, two or more crimes that the law treats as a single indivisible and unique offense for being the product of a single criminal impulse. In rape with homicide, the following elements must concur: (1) the appellant had carnal knowledge of a woman; (2) carnal knowledge of a woman was achieved by means of force, threat or intimidation; and (3) by reason or on occasion of such carnal knowledge by means of force, threat or intimidation, the appellant killed a woman. In this case, nobody witnessed the actual rape and killing of AAA. Appellant, however, may still be proven as the culprit despite the absence of eyewitnesses. Direct evidence is not a condition sine qua non to prove the guilt of an accused beyond reasonable doubt. For in the absence of direct evidence, the prosecution may resort to adducing circumstantial evidence to discharge its burden.
It is settled that in the special complex crime of rape with homicide, both the rape and the homicide must be established beyond reasonable doubt. In this regard, we have held that the crime of rape is difficult to prove because it is generally unwitnessed and very often only the victim is left to testify for herself. It becomes even more difficult when the complex crime of rape with homicide is committed because the victim could no longer testify. Thus, in crimes of rape with homicide, as here, resort to circumstantial evidence is usually unavoidable.
People v. Suansing
G.R. No. 189822
September 2, 2013
FACTS:
Jojie Suansing was accused of raping AAA who was suffering from mental retardation. Sometime before April 8, 2001, GGG, the sister of the accused, requested FFF, the friend of the victim, to get from Suansing’s boarding house an electric fan and a transformer. FFF, her brother and AAA went to the boarding house. After giving the requested items, Suansing ordered FFF and her brother to leave AAA behind. GGG, upon learning that AAA was still with the accused, requested FFF to fetch AAA. Upon arriving at the boarding house, she noticed that the door was closed. She called out to AAA who opened the door and came out fixing her short pants. FFF then asked AAA if anything happened. AAA replied that after FFF and her brother left the boarding house, appellant pulled her inside the room, removed her shoes and panty, told her to lie down on the floor, and inserted his penis into her vagina without her consent. AAA requested FFF not to tell anyone that she was raped by appellant. On August 3, 2001, EEE learned about the rape and confronted AAA. EEE then reported the incident to police authorities. The genital examination of AAA on August 6, 2001 revealed old hymenal lacerations. Her psychiatric evaluation also disclosed that she was suffering from mild retardation with the mental age of a 9 to 12-year old child. Although with impaired adaptive skills, the RTC found AAA qualified to testify.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the RTC.
HELD:
No. (1) The appreciation of the fact of the appellant’s knowledge of “AAA’s” mental
retardation was alleged in the Information; and (2) The damages awarded.
For the charge of rape to prosper, the prosecution
must prove that:
(1) The offender had carnal knowledge of a woman,
(2) through force or intimidation, or when she was deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious, or when she was under 12 years of age or was demented.” From these requisites, it can thus be deduced that rape is committed the moment the offender has
sexual intercourse with a person suffering from mental retardation. Carnal knowledge of a woman who is a mental retardate is rape. A mental condition of retardation deprives the complainant of that natural instinct to resist a bestial assault on her chastity and
womanhood. For this reason, sexual intercourse with one who is intellectually weak to the extent that she is incapable of giving consent to the carnal act already constitutes rape, without requiring proof that the accused used force and intimidation in committing the act.
Only the facts of sexual congress between the accused and the victim and the latter’s mental
retardation need to be proved. The SC held that the evidence presented by the prosecution established beyond reasonable doubt the sexual congress between appellant and AAA and the latter’s mental retardation.AAA positively identified appellant as her rapist.
People v. Cataytay
G.R. No. 196315
October 22, 2014
FACTS:
BBB (AAA’s mother) testified that she knew accused-appellant Cataytay as her neighbor in their compound in Mandaluyong City. Accused-appellant was a shoe repairman who had a shop six houses away from BBB’s house. On September 7, 2003, at around 6:30 p.m., BBB left AAA in their house to look for BBB’s youngest daughter. Thirty minutes later, when she reached the bridge near Block 37, her neighbor, Lito, told her that there was a problem, and brought her to the barangay outpost. AAA and the accused-appellant were already at the outpost. Lito told the persons at the outpost that she was the mother of the victim. When BBB saw AAA, the latter told her, “Mommy, ni-rape po ako.” BBB asked her who raped her. AAA responded by pointing to accused-appellant. During the interviews made by the barangay officials, AAA narrated how she was raped by accused-appellant, which ended when a certain “Mimi” knocked at the door. When accused-appellant answered the knock, Mimi told the former that she will shout if he does not leave the house. AAA went out of the house and sought help from their neighbors. One of their neighbors, Amelita Morante, called the barangay officials at the outpost. BBB identified a Psychological Evaluation Report from the DSWD dated May 25, 1999, which was conducted in connection with another rape case. The report stated that AAA had the mental capacity of an eight-year-old child. BBB also identified AAA’s birth certificate which showed that she was biologically 19 years old at the time of the incident. On cross-examination, BBB confirmed that AAA was the victim in a rape case in 1999 against a certain Norberto Lerit. BBB admitted that she did not personally witness the alleged rape committed by Cataytay. When AAA appeared as the second witness for the prosecution, the prosecution manifested that by merely looking at her, it was apparent that she was mentally retardate.10 AAA, who was crying while being asked questions, testified that she was raped by accused-appellant by inserting his penis into her, despite her protestations. After the deed, she was given money by accused-appellant. She knew the accused-appellant before the incident as a shoe repairman. DSWD Social Worker Arlene Gampal testified that she referred AAA to the National Center for Mental Health (NCMH) for psychological examination. She also conducted a Social Case Study upon AAA in relation to the incident of sexual abuse at the hands of the accused. NCMH Psychologist Susan Sabado was presented as a prosecution witness, but her testimony was dispensed with when the defense agreed to a stipulation regarding her expertise and that the tests conducted on AAA affirmed that the latter had a mental capacity of a seven-year-old child.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused is liable.
HELD:
Yes. Article 266-A. Rape; When and How Committed.1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances: a) Through force, threat or intimidation; b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present. In People v. Caoile, we differentiated the terms “deprived of reason” and “demented,” as follows: The term demented refers to a person who has dementia, which is a condition of deteriorated mentality, characterized by marked decline from the individual's former intellectual level and often by emotional apathy, madness, or insanity. On the other hand, the phrase deprived of reason under paragraph 1 (b) has been interpreted to include those suffering from mental abnormality, deficiency, or retardation. Thus, AAA, who was clinically diagnosed to be a mental retardate, can be properly classified as a person who is “deprived of reason,” and not one who is “demented.” In the case at bar, AAA was clinically diagnosed to have mental retardation with the mental capacity of a seven-year old child. The prosecution and the defense agreed to stipulate on the conclusion of the psychologist that the “mental age of the victim whose chronological age at the time of the commission of the offense is nineteen (19) years old x x x is that of a seven (7) year old child.” Accused-appellant is therefore criminally liable for rape under paragraph 1(b) of Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code.
People v. Nerio, Jr.
G.R. No. 200940
July 22, 2015
FACTS:
AAA, a child with special needs, was born on April 15, 1990 and was adopted by Kathlene and Rick. In the afternoon of February 26, 2003, Kathlene was working in the school canteen of Aplaya Elementary School when she noticed that AAA, who was enrolled at the same school, was missing. Thinking that AAA just went to her cousin’s house near school, Kathlene did not worry until after school hours when AAA was still nowhere to be found. She then went to look for her child, and when she was unsuccessful, she went to the police to have the incident placed in the blotter. Rick likewise looked for AAA, and he was told that his daughter was seen boarding a minibus with a group of people who just had a picnic at the beach. Together with their neighbor, Rosaliah, Rick and Kathlene proceeded to Matanao, Davao del Sur, after learning that the minibus was Matabao-bound. With the assistance of the police, they were able to find the owner of the minibus who told them that he indeed saw AAA inside his bus. The charterer of the minibus, Arthur Lucero, informed them that AAA went to the house of the Nerios in Blocon, Magsaysay, Davao del Sur. When Lucero knocked, it was the mother of the accused-appellant, Violeta, who opened the door. When Kathlene asked about her daughter, Violeta told her that AAA was sleeping upstairs. But when Kathlene started climbing the stairs, Violeta immediately corrected herself and said that AAA was, in fact, sleeping on the ground floor. Still, Kathlene proceeded and upon seeing a room with the door left ajar, she went inside. To her dismay, she saw her daughter scantily clad sleeping beside a half-naked Nerio, with her head resting on the latter’s shoulder. They took AAA and proceeded to the Matanao Police Station to report the incident before finally returning home to Digos. On February 28, Dr. Arthur Navidad examined AAA and found a hymenal laceration at eleven (11) o’clock position, which appeared fresh and could not have occurred more than three (3) days from the date he examined AAA.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused is guilty of rape.
HELD:
Yes. It is settled that carnal knowledge of a woman who is a mental retardate is rape as she is in the same class as a woman deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious. The term “deprived of reason” has been construed to encompass those who are suffering from mental abnormality, deficiency or retardation. Carnal knowledge of a woman above twelve (12) years of age but with the mental age of a child below twelve (12) years, even if she agrees to the same, is rape because a mental retardate cannot give a valid and intelligent consent to such act. Contrary to the defense, the prosecution was able to establish that AAA is indeed a special child. In fact, Nerio himself said in his direct testimony that he and his family had known from the start that AAA is a special child. At the time of the incident, AAA was already in her sixth year as a Grade 1 pupil. According to Kathlene, she first noticed that her adopted child was mentally challenged when the latter was merely six (6) years old. Dr. Navidad observed that when he was about to conduct the physical examination, AAA, a thirteen year old, acted more like a small child. Lastly, the lower court observed that while in court and seated next to Kathlene, AAA would bury her head on the lap of her mother and would make unnecessary and imperceptible sounds. Here, AAA was not presented to testify in court because she was declared unfit to fully discharge the functions of a credible witness. The psychologist who examined her found that her answers reveal a low intellectual sphere, poor insight, and lack of real capacity to deal with matters rationally. She could hardly even understand simple instructions. The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, who were not shown to have any malicious motive to fabricate a story, positively identified Nerio as the person seen alone with AAA in bed in the evening of February 26, 2003. AAA, who was only in a sando and panties, had her head on the shoulder of Nerio, who was naked and only had a blanket covering the lower portion of his body. Although Nerio denied this because he allegedly slept downstairs, while AAA slept with his mother and sisters upstairs, his testimony is inconsistent with that of his mother, who testified that AAA and Nerio actually slept in one (1) room, but she lay between the two. Further, Dr. Navidad found a fresh hymenal laceration on AAA’s genitals. He explained it could not have been inflicted more than three (3) days from the date he examined AAA. There was likewise no showing that AAA met with another man during that three-day-period. Hence, the courts below did not err when they held that these pertinent circumstanced proven during the trial form an unbroken chain of events leading to the conclusion that Nerio had carnal knowledge of AAA without her consent.
People v. Obogne
G.R. No. 199740
March 24, 2014
FACTS:
The RTC and CA convicted accused for the crime of simple rape. AAA" recalled that while she was playing, [appellant] saw her and asked her to go with him because he would give her a sugar cane. Appellant brought AAA to his house and while inside, ‘he removed her panty, and then inserted his penis into her vagina and he got the knife and then he took a sugar cane and then he gave it to her and then she went home.Appellant Jerry Obogne was charged with the crime of rape m an Information that reads as follows: That on or about the 29th day of July 2002, in the afternoon, in barangay Ogbong, municipality of Viga, province of Catanduanes, Philippines, within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the said accused by means of force and intimidation, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously x x x succeeded in having carnal knowledge of "AAA", a 12-year old mentally retarded person, to the damage and prejudice of the said "AAA".
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused is guilty of simple rape.
HELD:
Yes. As held in People v. Limio: By itself, the fact that the offended party in a rape case is a mental retardate does not call for the imposition of the death penalty, unless knowledge by the offender of such mental disability is specifically alleged and adequately proved by the prosecution. For the Anti-Rape Law of 1997, now embodied in Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) expressly provides that the death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with the qualifying circumstance of ‘(10) when the offender knew of the mental disability, emotional disorder and/or physical handicap of the offended party at the time of the commission of the crime.’ Said knowledge x x x qualifies rape as a heinous offense. Absent said circumstance, which must be proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt, the conviction of appellant for qualified rape under Art. 266-B (10), RPC, could not be sustained, although the offender may be held liable for simple rape and sentenced to reclusion perpetua.
People v. Joson
G.R. No. 206393
January 21, 2015
FACTS:
AAA lives with appellant and his common-law partner. AAA testified that at around 1:00 in the morning of 14 May 2009, and while appellant’s wife was away, AAA was awakened by appellant undressing her. AAA tried to struggle but appellant was tightly holding her arms. After undressing her, appellant kissed and mounted her. Appellant was able to insert his penis into her vagina. AAA felt pain in her genitalia. Thereafter, appellant went back to sleep leaving AAA crying. At about 6:00 or 7:00 in the morning, appellant left AAA with a letter apologizing for what happened and begging her not to tell on his wife. At around 5:00 in the afternoon of that same date, AAA related to appellant’s wife the rape incident.6And on 1 June 2009, AAA, accompanied by her father, reported the incident to the police and she executed a sworn statement detailing the rape Also submitted as part of the prosecution’s evidence is the birth certificate of AAA to prove that she was still a minor at the time the rape was committed on 14 May 2009.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused is guilty of rape.
HELD:
Yes. AAA’s testimony has established all the elements of rape required under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code. First, appellant had carnal knowledge of the victim. AAA positively identified her own brother as the assailant. She was likewise unwavering in her narration that appellant inserted his penis into her vagina. Second, appellant employed threat, force and intimidation to satisfy his lust. The Supreme Court has, time and again, ruled that the force or violence that is required in rape cases is relative; when applied, it need not be overpowering or irresistible. That it enables the offender to consummate his purpose is enough. The parties’ relative age, size and strength should be taken into account in evaluating the existence of the element of force in the crime of rape. The degree of force which may not suffice when the victim is an adult may be more than enough if employed against a person of tender age. In the case at bench, the accused-appellant employed that amount of force sufficient to consummate the rape. It must be stressed that, at the time of the incident, AAA was only 14 years old. Considering the tender years of the offended party as compared to the accused-appellant who was in the prime of his life, the act of the accused-appellant in pinning the arms of AAA to avoid any form of resistance from her suffices. Force or intimidation is not limited to physical force. As long as it is present and brings the desired result, all consideration of whether it was more or less irresistible is beside the point.
People v. Candellada
G.R. No. 189293
July 10, 2013
FACTS:
AAA was the second of three daughters of accused Vicente Candellada and his deceased first wife. AAA lived with accused-appellant and the latter’s second wife, while AAA’s two sisters lived with accused-appellant’s mother. While they were still living in Davao, accused-appellant impregnated AAA. When AAA was already five months pregnant, accused-appellant brought her with him to Lanao del Norte. Cadellada approached a certain Gemina and asked permission if he could stay at Gemina’s old house with his wife, introducing AAA to Gemina as his wife. Gemina and her husband agreed. While they were staying at Gemina’s old house, accused-appellant had intercourse with AAA many times, but AAA could only remember eight specific dates, i.e., on May 30, 2004; June 2, 2004; June 12, 2004; July 10, 2004; August 13, 2004; November 5, 2004; December 15, 2004; and December 25, 2004. When asked to explain what "intercourse" meant, AAA stated that Candellada inserted his penis into her vagina. AAA further testified that she consistently resisted Candellada’s bestial acts but he threatened to stab her with a knife. Lastly, AAA narrated that she delivered a baby boy with Gemina’s help on September 24, 2004, but the baby died four days later. On December 28, 2004, accused-appellant again made amorous advances on AAA. AAA refused so accused-appellant became violently angry. He mauled AAA and hit her head with a piece of wood, which rendered her unconscious. Gemina, who saw what happened, asked help from the Barangay Captain. The Barangay Captain and civilian volunteers arrested the accused-appellant. Thus he was not able to consummate his attempt to have intercourse with AAA.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the RTC.
HELD:
No. Qualified rape is defined and punished under the following provisions of the Revised Penal Code, as amended: ART. 266-A. Rape; When and How Committed. – Rape is committed –
1)By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances: a) Through force, threat or intimidation; b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious; c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present.
For a conviction of qualified rape, the prosecution must allege and prove the ordinary elements of (1) sexual congress, (2) with a woman, (3) by force and without consent; and in order to warrant the imposition of the death penalty, the additional elements that (4) the victim is under eighteen years of age at the time of the rape, and (5) the offender is a parent (whether legitimate, illegitimate or adopted) of the victim. In a prosecution for rape, the accused may be convicted solely on the basis of the testimony of the victim that is credible, convincing, and consistent with human nature and the normal course of things, as in this case. In resolving rape cases, primordial consideration is given to the credibility of the victim’s testimony. The settled rule is that the trial court's conclusions on the credibility of witnesses in rape cases are generally accorded great weight and respect, and at times, even finality. What is important is that AAA had categorically testified that on eight specific dates, her father, accused-appellant, armed with a knife, successfully had sexual intercourse with her by inserting his penis into her vagina. It is noteworthy to mention that even if accused-appellant did not use a knife or made threats to AAA, accused-appellant would still be guilty of raping AAA, for in rape committed by a close kin, such as the victim's father, stepfather, uncle, or the common-law spouse of her mother, it is not necessary that actual force or intimidation be employed; moral influence or ascendancy takes the place of violence or intimidation. With the guilt of accused-appellant for the eight rapes already established beyond reasonable doubt, the Court of Appeals was correct in imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua, without eligibility of parole, instead of death, for each count of rape, pursuant to Republic Act No. 9346.
People v. Cial
G.R. No. 191362
October 9, 2013
FACTS:
Marciano Cial was charged with the crime of rape. In the information, it was alleged that Cial had carnal knowledge of AAA, a minor, 13 years old, against her will. The commission of the rape was attended by the qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship, Cial being the common-law husband of AAA's mother. Sometime in December 2002, Cial called AAA and told her to go to the bedroom inside their house. Once inside, Cial took off AAA's shorts and panty and spread her legs. He pulled his pants down to his thighs and inserted his penis into the AAA's vagina. AAA did not try to struggle because Cial had a bolo on his waist. Thereafter, Cial threatened to kill AAA and her family if she reported the incident to anyone. At that time, AAA's maternal grandmother was in the house but was unaware that AAA was being ravished. Unable to endure the torment, AAA confided her ordeal to her mother but the latter did not believe her. AAA ran away from home and went to her maternal uncle’s house. There, she disclosed the incident to her mother’s siblings. Cial denied the allegations claiming that AAA's aunt fabricated the charge because Cial called her a thief.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused is guilty of qualified rape.
HELD:
No. The prosecution failed to present AAA's Certificate of Live Birth. AAA also testified that she does not know her age and birthday. Hence, the prosecution failed to prove minority. Moreover, the prosecution failed to establish AAA's relationship with Cial. Although the information alleged Cial is the common law husband of AAA's mother, AAA referred to him as her stepfather. The terms “common-law husband” and “step-father” have different legal connotations. For Cial to be a step-father to AAA, he must be legally married to AAA’s mother. Since the qualifying circumstances of minority and relationsip are not present, Cial should only be guilty of simple rape.
People v. Lucena
G.R. No. 190632
February 26, 2014
FACTS:
Appellant Lucena is a Barangay Tanod Volunteer. On the night of the incident, they arrested the victim AAA (then 17 years old) for violation of city ordinance imposing curfew on minors. 2 brgy. Tanods, including the appellant, brought AAA to the vicinity of the barangay hall. The other tanod went inside the brgy. Hall and when he returned, Lucena told him that he will just be the one to bring AAA back to her house. However, instead of escorting AAA back to her house, appellant brought her to Kabuboy Bridge in Paranaque. While on their way, the appellant threatened AAA that he would kill her once she resists or jumps off the tricycle. Upon arrival, the appellant ordered AAA to alight from the tricycle. Upon arrival, the appellant ordered AAA to alight from the tricycle. They went to a grassy area. He subsequently pointed a gun at AAA and commanded her to lie down and to take off her clothes. The appellant later put the gun down on the ground and inserted his penis into AAA’s vagina despite the latter’s plea not to rape her. Satisfied, the appellant stopped. But after about 5 minutes, appellant, once again, inserted his penis into AAA’s vagina. Thereafter, he stopped. On the 3rd time, appellant inserted again his penis into AAA’s vagina. Fulfilling his bestial desire, the appellant stopped and finally ordered AAA to dress up. Appellant even threatened AAA that he would kill her should she tell anyone about what happened between them. The next day, AAA lodged her complaint against Lucena. An information for rape was filed against Lucena.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the RTC
HELD:
No. The force and violence required in rape cases is relative and need not be overpowering or irresistible when applied. For rape to exist, it is not necessary that the force or intimidation be so great or be of such character as could not be resisted – it is only necessary that the force or intimidation be sufficient to consummate the purpose which the appellant had in mind. Further, it should be viewed from the perception and judgment of the victim at the time of the commission of the crime. What is vital is that the force or intimidation be of such degree as to cow the unprotected and vulnerable victim into submission. Force is sufficient if it produces fear in the victim, such as when the latter is threatened with death. In this case, appellant was armed with a gun and the same was pointed at AAA while she was ordered to lie down and to take off her clothes, to which she acceded because of fear for her life and personal safety. The appellant then put the gun down on the ground and successfully inserted his penis into AAA’s vagina, not only once but thrice. This happened despite AAA’s plea not to rape her. And, after satisfying his lust, the appellant threatened AAA that he would kill her should she tell anyone about the incident. This same threat of killing AAA was first made by the appellant while the former was still inside the tricycle on their way to Kabuboy Bridge. It cannot be denied, therefore, that force and intimidation were employed by the appellant upon AAA in order to achieve his depraved desires.
While it is true that the appellant had already put the gun down on the ground the moment he inserted his penis into AAA’s vagina and was actually unarmed on those 3 episodes of sexual intercourse, the same does not necessarily take away the fear of being killed that had already been instilled in the mind of AAA. Emphasis must be given to the fact that the gun was still within appellant’s reach, therefore, he could still make good of his threat on AAA at anytime the latter would show any resistance to his evil desires. Further, We agree with the trial court that appellant should be convicted of 3 counts of rape. It appears from the facts that the appellant thrice succeeded in inserting his penis into the private part of AAA. The 3 penetrations occurred one after the other at an interval of 5 minutes wherein the appellant would rest after satiating his lust upon his victim and, after he has regained his strength, he would again rape AAA. Hence, it can be clearly inferred from the foregoing that when the appellant decided to commit those separate and distinct acts of sexual assault upon AAA, he was not motivated by a single impulse, but rather by several criminal intent.
People v. Tionloc
G.R. No. 212193
February 15, 2017
FACTS:
At around 9:30 PM of September 29, 2008, AAA was having a drinking session with appellant and Meneses in the appellant’s house. After some time, she felt dizzy so she took a nap. She was roused from her sleep by Meneses who was mounting her and inserting his penis into her vagina. She felt pain but could only cry in silence for fear that the knife nearby would be used to kill her if she resist. While still feeling dizzy, appellant approached her and asked if he could also have sex with her. When she did not reply, appellant mounted and raped her. The following day, AAA reported the incident to the police and underwent a medical examination and the results revealed two lacerations in her hymen. The RTC clarified that appellant is charged with rape through sexual intercourse under paragraph 1, Article 266-A of the RPC based on the allegations in the Information and not with rape by sexual assault under paragraph 2 of the same provision of the law. Appellant appealed the RTC’s decision arguing that discrepancies in sworn statement of AAA and her testimony diminished her credibility. The CA ruled that discrepancies between the affidavit and testimony of AAA did not impair her credibility; the CA held that the rape victim AAA is not expected to make an errorless recollection of the incident, so humiliating and painful that she might even try to obliterate it from her memory. CA therefore affirmed the decision of the RTC with modification.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Trial Court gravely erred in finding the accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged.
HELD:
Yes. Force as an element of rape, must be sufficient to consummate the purposes which the accused had in mind. In this case, the prosecution established that appellant was 18 year old man who had sexual intercourse with AAA, a woman who was 24 years old during the incident. However, there was no evidence to prove that appellant used force, threat, or intimidation during his sexual congress with AAA. There was no evidence that the knife was placed nearby precisely to threaten or intimidate her. Appellant went on top of AAA without saying anything or uttering threatening words. For her part, AAA neither intimated any form of resistance nor expressed any word or rejection to appellant’s advances. Three things are thus clear from the testimony of AAA: first, appellant never employed force, threat, or intimidation against her, second, AAA never gave the slightest hint of rejection when appellant asked her to have sex with him, and third, appellant did not act with force since he readily desisted when AAA felt slightest pain and tried to move during their sexual congress. AAA could have resisted right from the start. But she did not, and chose not to utter a word or make any sign of rejection of appellant’s sexual advances. The fact that AAA was tipsy or drunk at that time cannot be held against the appellant. Thus, as usual, she voluntarily went with them to the house of appellant and chatted with them while drinking liquor, the prosecution failed to show that she was deprived of her will power. It has been ruled repeatedly that in criminal litigation, the evidence of the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot draw strength from weakness of the defense. Thus, the failure of the prosecution to discharge its burden of evidence in this case entitles appellant to an acquittal.
People v. Jumawan
G.R. No. 187495
April 21, 2014
FACTS:
An information for the crime of Acts of Lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC in relation to Section 5, Article III of Republic Act (R.A) No. 7610 was charged against Petitioner. AAA, who was then 11 y/o testified that sometime between the periods of 14 October 2003 to 25 January 2004, while their entire household was asleep and had retired for the night, she was awakened by petitioner, her own father, licking her vagina and mashing her breasts. At the time, AAA was sleeping at the second level of their residence with her younger sister, BBB. AAA immediately and repeatedly shouted for her mother, CCC, who was sleeping outside the room, but to no avail. AAA continued to shout for her mother prompting petitioner to leave and run out of the room. AAA cried herself to sleep, and on the very next day told her mother of what her father, petitioner, had done to her. Petitioner denied the charge, claiming that his wife, CCC, AAA’s mother, merely fabricated such a story. Petitioner countered that he and his wife, CCC, had fought on the night of 6 August 2003, which impelled CCC to create the convoluted charge of petitioner sexually abusing his own daughter. Ultimately, petitioner claimed that on the night in question, within the period from 14 October 2003 to 25 January 2004, no crime occurred, his days ending as did his workday which were from 8:30 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused is liable
HELD:
Yes. The mere act of committing lascivious conduct with a child who is exploited in prostitution or subjected to sexual abuse constitutes the offense. It is a malum prohibitum, an evil that is proscribe and was duly alleged in the Information against petitioner. Above all, it is quite clear by specific provision of Section 5 Article III of R.A. No. 7610 that when the victim is under 12 years of age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted under the RPC, but the penalty is that which is provided in R.A. No. 7610. Petitioner’s submission that he cannot be penalized under R.A. No. 7610 because the Information failed to indicate its applicability, is, therefore, without merit. As regards the imposable penalty, the lower courts imposed the penalty on petitioner of fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months of reclusion temporalas minimum to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months of reclusion temporal as maximum. We find need to modify the penalty imposed by the lower court as it failed to properly apply Republic Act No. 4103, the Indeterminate Sentence Law. We need also to discuss how the correct penalty is reached given that the trial court, except for the dispositive portion of the decision, which was simply affirmed by the appellate court, did not specifically mention the applicability of R.A. No. 7610 in the determination of the imposable penalty on petitioner. Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610 provides the imposable penalty for Acts of Lasciviousness when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age, albeit the offense is prosecuted under Article 336 of the RPC, is reclusion temporalin its medium period. The range of the imposable penalty on petitioner of reclusion temporalin its medium period is fourteen (14) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months. The Indeterminate Sentence Law is applicable to prison sentence both for an offense punished by the RPC and an offense punished "by any other law." In Criminal Case, where AAA was still below 12 years old at the time of the commission of the acts of lasciviousness, the imposable penalty is reclusion temporal in its medium period in accordance with Section 5(b), Article III of Republic Act No. 7610. This provision specifically states "[t]hat the penalty for lascivious conduct when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age shall be reclusion temporal in its medium period." Considering the presence of the aggravating circumstance of relationship, as explained, the penalty shall be imposed in its maximum period.
People v. Amarela & Racho
G.R. No. 225642-43
January 17, 2018
FACTS:
AAA is single, a housekeeper and a resident of Davao City. AAA testified that on February 10, 2009, at around 6:00 o’clock in the evening, she was watching a beauty contest with her aunt at a basketball court where a make-shift stage was put up. The only lights available were those coming from the vehicles around. She had the urge to urinate so she went to the comfort room beside the building of the Maligatong Cooperative near the basketball court. She was not able to reach the comfort room because Amarela suddenly pulled her towards the day care center. She was shocked and was no match to the strength of Amarela who pulled her under the stage of the day care center. He punched her in the abdomen which rendered her weak. Then Amarela undressed her. She tried to resist him but he was stronger. He boxed her upper thigh and she felt numb. He placed himself on top of her and inserted his penis inside her vagina and made a push and pull movement. She shouted for help and then three men came to her rescue so Amarela fled. The three persons brought her to a hut. But they closed the hut and had bad intentions with her. So she fled and hid in a neighboring house. She was brought to the Racho residence and herein accused Racho was told by his mother to bring her to her aunt’s house instead. AAA said that Racho brought her to a shanty along the way against her will. She was told to lie down. When she refused, Racho boxed her abdomen and she felt sick. She resisted by kicking him but he succeeded in undressing her. He, then, undressed himself and placed himself on top of AAA. Racho then inserted his penis into AAA’s vagina. After consummating the act, Racho left her. So AAA went home alone. The RTC found AAA’s testimony, positively identifying both Amarela and Racho, to be clear, positive, and straightforward. Hence, the trial court did not give much weight to their denial as these could not have overcome the categorical testimony of AAA. As a result, Amarela and Racho were convicted.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt.
HELD:
No. More often than not, where the alleged victim survives to tell her story of sexual· depredation, rape cases are solely decided based on the credibility of the testimony of the private complainant. In doing so, we have hinged on the impression that no young Filipina of decent repute would publicly admit that she has been sexually abused, unless that is the truth, for it is her natural instinct to protect her honor. However, this misconception, particularly in this day and age, not only puts the accused at an unfair disadvantage, but creates a travesty of justice. The “women’s honor” doctrine surfaced in our jurisprudence sometime in 1960. In the case of People v. Tana, the Court affirmed the conviction of three (3) armed robbers who took turns raping a person named Herminigilda Domingo. The Court, speaking through Justice Alejo Labrador, said: It is a well-known fact that women, especially Filipinos, would not admit that they have been abused unless that abuse had actually happened. This is due to their natural instinct to protect their honor. We cannot believe that the offended party would have positively stated that intercourse took place unless it did actually take place.
This opinion borders on the fallacy of non sequitor. And while the factual setting back then would have been appropriate to say it is natural for a woman to be reluctant in disclosing a sexual assault; today, we simply cannot be stuck to the Maria Clara stereotype of a demure and reserved Filipino woman. We, should stay away from such mindset and accept the realities of a woman’s dynamic role in society today; she who has over the years transformed into a strong and confidently intelligent and beautiful person, willing to fight for her rights. In this way, we can evaluate the testimony of a private complainant of rape without gender bias or cultural misconception. It is important to weed out these unnecessary notions because an accused may be convicted solely on the testimony of the victim, provided of course, that the testimony is credible, natural, convincing, and consistent with human nature and the normal course of things. Thus, in order for us to affirm a conviction for rape, we must believe beyond reasonable doubt the version of events narrated by the victim.
In this case, however, the version in AAA’s affidavit-complaint is remotely different from her court testimony. At the first instance, AAA claims that she was pulled away from the vicinity of the stage; later, in court, she says that she was on her way to the rest room when she was grabbed. By this alone, we are hesitant to believe AAA’s retraction because it goes into whether it was even possible for Amarela to abduct AAA against her will. If we were to take into account AAA’s initial claim that Amarela pulled her away from the vicinity of the stage, people facing the stage would easily notice that a man was holding a woman against her will. Thus, AAA’s version that she was on her way to the rest room, instead of being pulled away from the crowd watching the beauty contest, would make it seem that nobody would notice if AAA was being taken away against her will. If indeed AAA was on her way to the rest room when she was grabbed by Amarela, why does her sworn statement reflect another story that differs from her court testimony? To our mind, AAA’s testimony could have been concocted to just make her story believable rather than sticking to her original story that Amarela introduced himself and pulled her away from the stage. We cannot say that this inconsistency is simply a minor detail because it casts some doubt as to whether AAA was telling the truth – that she was abducted against her will before she was raped.Although we cannot acquit Amarela solely based on an inconsistency, this instance already puts AAA’s credibility in question. Again, we must remember that if we were to convict based solely on the lone testimony of the victim, her testimony must be clear, straightforward, convincing, and consistent with human experience. We must set a high standard in evaluating the credibility of the testimony of a victim who is not a minor and is mentally capable. From AAA’s testimony, we are unsure whether she was able to see Amarela given the lighting conditions in the crime scene. In her re-direct examination, AAA clarified that she identified Amarela while she was being pulled to the day care center. Even so, the prosecution failed to clarify as to how she was able to do so when, according to AAA herself, the way to the day care center was dark and covered by trees. Thus, leaving this material detail unexplained, the Court again draws reservations from AAA’s testimony. Proving the identity of the accused as the malefactor is the prosecution’s primary responsibility. The identity of the offender, like the crime itself, must be established by proof beyond reasonable doubt. Indeed, the first duty of the prosecution is not to prove the crime but to prove the identity of the criminal, for even if the commission of the crime can be established, there can be no conviction without proof of identity of the criminal beyond reasonable doubt The prosecution in this case miserably failed to present a clear story of what transpired. Whether AAA’s ill-fated story is true or not, by seeking relief for an alleged crime, the prosecution must do its part to convince the court that the accused is guilty. Prosecutors are given ample resources of the government to present a logical and realistic account of every alleged crime, and they should, to the best of their ability, present a detailed story to get a conviction. But here we cannot ascertain what happened based on the lone testimony of AAA. It should have been the prosecution’s duty to properly evaluate the evidence if it had enough to convict Amarela or Racho.
Ricalde v. People
G.R. No. 211002
January 21, 2015
FACTS:
On January 30, 2002, at around 2:00 a.m., XXX, then 10 years old, woke up as “he felt pain in his anus and stomach and something inserted in his anus.” He saw that Ricalde, 31 years old, a distant relative and textmate of XXX, “fondled his penis.” When Ricalde returned to the sofa, XXX ran toward his mother’s room to tell her what happened. He also told his mother that Ricalde played with his sexual organ. RTC found Ricalde guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape through sexual assault. CA affirmed the conviction but lowered the amount of damages.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the slightest penetration into one’s anus constitutes rape through sexual assault.
HELD:
Yes. XXX testified that he “felt something was inserted into his anus.” The slightest penetration into one’s sexual organ distinguishes an act of lasciviousness from the crime of rape. Long line of cases consider a woman’s private organ since most if not all existing jurisprudence on rape involves a woman victim. Nevertheless, this interpretation can apply by analogy when the victim is a man in that the slightest penetration to the victim’s anal orifice consummates the crime of rape through sexual assault. The gravamen of the crime is the violation of the victim’s dignity. The degree of penetration is not important. Rape is an “assault on human dignity.”
People v. Dulay
G.R. 193854
September 24, 2012
FACTS:
AAA was 12 years old when the whole incident happened. AAA's sister introduced the appellant to AAA as someone who is nice. Thereafter, appellant convinced AAA to accompany her at a wake at GI San Dionisio, Parañaque City. Before going to the said wake, they went to a casino and to Sto. niño to look for appellant's boyfriend, but he was not there. When they went to Bulungan Fish Port to ask for some fish, they saw appellant's boyfriend. Afterwards, AAA, appellant and the latter's boyfriend proceeded to the Kubuhan located at the back of the Bulungan Fish Port. When they reached the Kubuhan, appellant suddenly pulled AAA inside a room where a man known by the name “Speed” was waiting. AAA saw “Speed” give money to appellant and heard “Speed” tell appellant to look for a younger girl. Thereafter, “Speed” wielded a knife and tied AAA's hands to the papag and raped her. AAA asked for appellant's help when she saw the latter peeping into the room while she was being raped, but appellant did not do so. After the rape, “Speed” and appellant told AAA not to tell anyone what had happened or else they would get back at her. AAA went to San Pedro, Laguna after the incident and told her sister what happened and the latter informed their mother about it. AAA, her sister and mother, filed a complaint at Barangay San Dionisio. Thereafter, the barangay officials of San Dionisio referred the complaint to the police station.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused is guilty of rape.
HELD:
No. To be a principal by indispensable cooperation, one must participate in the criminal resolution, a conspiracy or unity in criminal purpose and cooperation in the commission of the offense by performing another act without which it would not have been accomplished. Nothing in the evidence presented by the prosecution does it show that the acts committed by appellant are indispensable in the commission of the crime of rape. The events narrated by the CA, from the time appellant convinced AAA to go with her until appellant received money from the man who allegedly raped AAA, are not indispensable in the crime of rape. Anyone could have accompanied AAA and offered the latter's services in exchange for money and AAA could still have been raped. Even AAA could have offered her own services in exhange for monetary consideration and still end up being raped. Thus, this disproves the indispensable aspect of the appellant in the crime of rape. It must be remembered that in the Information, as well as in the testimony of AAA, she was delivered and offered for a fee by appellant, thereafter, she was raped.
Bongalon v. People
G.R. No. 169533
March 20, 2013
FACTS:
On May 11, 2002, Jayson Dela Cruz (Jayson) and Roldan, his older brother, both minors, joined the evening procession for the Santo Niño at Oro Site in Legazpi City; that when the procession passed in front of the petitioner’s house, the latter’s daughter Mary Ann Rose, also a minor, threw stones at Jayson and called him "sissy"; that the petitioner confronted Jayson and Roldan and called them names like "strangers" and "animals"; that the petitioner struck Jayson at the back with his hand, and slapped Jayson on the face; that the petitioner then went to the brothers’ house and challenged Rolando dela Cruz, their father, to a fight, but Rolando did not come out of the house to take on the petitioner; that Rolando later brought Jayson to the Legazpi City Police Station and reported the incident; that Jayson also underwent medical treatment at the Bicol Regional Training and Teaching Hospital; that the doctors who examined Jayson issued two medical certificates attesting that Jayson suffered the following contusions.
ISSUE:
Whether or not accused is guilty of child abuse.
HELD:
No. (b) "Child Abuse" refers to the maltreatment, whether habitual or not, of the child which includes any of the following: (1) Psychological and physical abuse, neglect, cruelty, sexual abuse and emotional maltreatment; (2) Any act by deeds or words which debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human being; (3) Unreasonable deprivation of his basic needs for survival, such as food and shelter; or (4) Failure to immediately give medical treatment to an injured child resulting in serious impairment of his growth and development or in his permanent incapacity or death.
Although we affirm the factual findings of fact by the RTC and the CA to the effect that the petitioner struck Jayson at the back with his hand and slapped Jayson on the face, we disagree with their holding that his acts constituted child abuse within the purview of the above-quoted provisions. The records did not establish beyond reasonable doubt that his laying of hands on Jayson had been intended to debase the "intrinsic worth and dignity" of Jayson as a human being, or that he had thereby intended to humiliate or embarrass Jayson. The records showed the laying of hands on Jayson to have been done at the spur of the moment and in anger, indicative of his being then overwhelmed by his fatherly concern for the personal safety of his own minor daughters who had just suffered harm at the hands of Jayson and Roldan. With the loss of his self-control, he lacked that specific intent to debase, degrade or demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human being that was so essential in the crime of child abuse. It is not trite to remind that under the well-recognized doctrine of pro reo every doubt is resolved in favor of the petitioner as the accused. Thus, the Court should consider all possible circumstances in his favor.
Jabalde v. People
G.R. No. 195224
June 15, 2016
FACTS:
There were conflicting testimonies regarding an incident where Lin, a 7 yr old, was playing langitlupa with Nova, who hit her head on the ground. Nova’s mother who is a school teacher, Jabalde, who is also Lin’s grandmother, allegedly slapped and choked Lin in anger. There is medical proof that indeed Lin sustained injuries. Jabalde’s account said she thought that her daughter had died which made her faint and when she asked Lin he was uneasy and kept on jumping and apologizing and so she merely held him still. She claims that the complaint against her was due to a grudge involving inheritance. Lin’s mother Aileen, is her niece. The RTC ruled against Jabalde.
ISSUE:
Whether or not acts complained of are covered by the Revised Penal Code (RPC) or R.A. No. 7610 "Special Protection of Children against Abuse, Exploitation, Discrimination Act."
HELD:
The law under which Jabalde was charged, tried and found guilty of violating is Section 10(a), Article VI, of R.A. No. 7610 (a) Any person who shall commit any other acts of child abuse, cruelty or exploitation or to be responsible for other conditions prejudicial to the child's development including those covered by Article 59 of Presidential Decree No. 603
Having lost the strength of her mind, she lacked that specific intentto debase, degrade or demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human being that was so essential in the crime of child abuse. In fine, the essential element of intent was not established with the prescribed degree of proof required for a successful prosecution under Section 10(a), Article VI of R.A. No. 7610.It would be unforeseeable that Jabalde acted with cruelty when prosecution's witness herself testified that the abrasions suffered by Lin were just "mildly inflicted." If Jabalde indeed intended to abuse, maltreat and injure Lin, she would have easily hurt the 7-year-old boy with heavy blows. Jabalde committed then the crime of Slight physical injuries under Art 266 of the RPC. Her acts of laying hands against Lin showed the essential element of intent which is a prerequisite in all crimes punishable under the RPC. Thus, in case of physical injuries under the [RPC], there must be a specific animus iniuriandi or malicious intention to do wrong against the physical integrity or well-being of a person, so as to incapacitate and deprive the victim of certain bodily functions.
For passion and obfuscation to be considered a mitigating circumstance, it must be shown that:
(1) an unlawful act sufficient to produce passion and obfuscation was committed by the intended victim; (2) the crime was committed within a reasonable length of time from the commission of the unlawful act that produced the obfuscation in the accused's mind; and (3) the passion and obfuscation arose from lawful sentiments and not from a spirit of lawlessness or revenge
Rosaldes v. People
G.R. No. 173988
June 15, 2016
FACTS:
On February 13, 1996, seven year old Michael Ryan Gonzales, then a Grade 1 pupil at Pughanan Elementary School located in the Municipality of Lambunao, Iloilo, was hurriedly entering his classroom when he accidentally bumped the knee of his teacher, petitioner Felina Rosaldes, who was then asleep on a bamboo sofa). Roused from sleep, petitioner asked Michael Ryan to apologize to her. When Michael did not obey but instead proceeded to his seat,, petitioner went to Michael and pinched him on his thigh. Then, she held him up by his armpits and pushed him to the floor. As he fell, Michael Ryan's body hit a desk. As a result, he lost consciousness. Petitioner proceeded to pick Michael Ryan up by his ears and repeatedly slammed him down on the floor. Michael Ryan cried. After the incident, petitioner proceeded to teach her class. During lunch break, Michael Ryan, accompanied by two of his classmates, Louella Loredo and Jonalyn Gonzales, went home crying and told his mother about the incident (TSN, March 14, 1997, p. 7). His mother and his Aunt Evangeline Gonzales reported the incident to their Barangay Captain, Gonzalo Larroza who advised them to have Michael Ryan examined by a doctor. Michael Ryan's aunt and Barangay Councilman Ernesto Ligante brought him to the Dr. Ricardo Y. Ladrido Hospital where he was examined by Dr. Teresita Castigador. They, likewise, reported the incident to the Police Station.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in convicting the petitioner.
HELD:
No. Although the petitioner, as a schoolteacher, could duly discipline Michael Ryan as her pupil, her infliction of the physical injuries on him was unnecessary, violent and excessive. The boy even fainted from the violence suffered at her hands. She could not justifiably claim that she acted only for the sake of disciplining him. Her physical maltreatment of him was precisely prohibited by no less than the Family Code, which has expressly banned the infliction of corporal punishment by a school administrator, teacher or individual engaged in child care exercising special parental authority (i.e., in loco parentis), viz: Article 233. The person exercising substitute parental authority shall have the same authority over the person of the child as the parents. In no case shall the school administrator, teacher or individual engaged in child care exercising special parental authority inflict corporal punishment upon the child. Section 3 of Republic Act No. 7610 defines child abuse thusly: (b) "Child abuse" refers to the maltreatment, whether habitual or not, of the child which includes any of the following: (1) Psychological and physical abuse, neglect, cruelty, sexual abuse and emotional maltreatment; (2) Any act by deeds or words which debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human being; (3) Unreasonable deprivation of his basic needs for survival, such as food and shelter; or (4) Failure to immediately give medical treatment to an injured child resulting in serious impairment of his growth and development or in his permanent incapacity or death. In the crime charged against the petitioner, therefore, the maltreatment may consist of an act by deeds or by words that debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human being. The act need not be habitual. The CA concluded that the petitioner "went overboard in disciplining Michael Ryan, a helpless and weak 7-year old boy, when she pinched hard Michael Ryan on the left thigh and when she held him in the armpits and threw him on the floor[; and as] the boy fell down, his body hit the desk causing him to lose consciousness [but instead] of feeling a sense of remorse, the accused-appellant further held the boy up by his ears and pushed him down on the floor." On her part, the trial judge said that the physical pain experienced by the victim had been aggravated by an emotional trauma that caused him to stop going to school altogether out of fear of the petitioner, compelling his parents to transfer him to another school where he had to adjust again. Such established circumstances proved beyond reasonable doubt that the petitioner was guilty of child abuse by deeds that degraded and demeaned the intrinsic worth and dignity of Michael Ryan as a human being.
Quimvel v. People
G.R. No. 214497
April 18, 2017
FACTS:
AAA, who was seven years old at the time of the incident, is the oldest among the children of XXX and YYY. XXX worked as a household helper in Batangas while YYY was a Barangay Tanod who derived income from selling vegetables. AAA and her siblings, BBB and CCC, were then staying with YYY in Palapas, Ligao City. At around 8 o'clock in the evening of [July 18,] 2007, YYY went out of the house to buy kerosene since there was no electricity. While YYY was away, Quimvel arrived bringing a vegetable viand from AAA's grandfather. AAA requested Quimvel to stay with them as she and her siblings were afraid. He agreed and accompanied them. AAA and her siblings then went to sleep. However, she was awakened when she felt Quimuel's right leg on top of her body. She likewise sensed Quimvel inserting his right hand inside her panty. In a trice, she felt Quimvel caressing her private part. She removed his hand. Quimvel was about to leave when YYY arrived. She asked him what he was doing in his house. Quimvel replied that he was just accompanying the children. After he left, YYY and his children went back to sleep. On July 29, 2007, XXX arrived from Batangas. Later in the evening while XXX was lying down with her children, she asked them what they were doing while she was away. BBB told her that Quimvel touched her Ate. When XXX asked AAA what Quimvel did to her, she recounted that Quimvel laid down beside her and touched her vagina. Upon hearing this, XXX and YYY went to the Office of the Barangay Tanod and thereafter to the police station to report the incident. Afterwards, they brought AAA to a doctor for medical examination. As expected, Quimvel denied the imputation hurled against him. He maintained that he brought the ducks of AAA' s grandmother to the river at 7 o'clock in the morning, fetched it and brought it back at AAA's grandmother's place at 4 o'clock in the afternoon of [July 18,] 2007. After that, he rested. He said that he never went to AAA's house that evening. When YYY confronted and accused him of touching AAA, he was totally surprised. Even if he denied committing the crime, he was still detained at the Barangay Hall. He was then brought to the police station for interrogation. Eventually, he was allowed to go home. He did not return to the house of AAA's grandmother to avoid any untoward incidents. Lending credence to AAA' s straightforward and categorical testimony, the Regional Trial Court rendered its Judgment finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Acts of Lasciviousness. The CA rendered its assailed Decision affirming, with modification, the Judgment of the trial court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not assuming without admitting that he is guilty hereof, he may be convicted only of acts of lasciviousness under Art. 336 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) and in relation to Sec. 5(b) of RA 7610.
HELD:
Yes. Under Article 336 of the RPC, the accused performs the acts of lasciviousness on a child who is neither exploited in prostitution nor subjected to "other sexual abuse." In contrast, under Section 5 of RA 7610, the accused performs the acts of lasciviousness on a child who is either exploited in prostitution or subjected to "other sexual abuse." Section 5 of RA 7610 deals with a situation where the acts of lasciviousness are committed on a child already either exploited in prostitution or subjected to "other sexual abuse." Clearly, the acts of lasciviousness committed on the child are separate and distinct from the other circumstance that the child is either exploited in prostitution or subjected to "other sexual abuse." Contrary to the exposition, the very definition of "child abuse" under Sec. 3(b) of RA 7610 does not require that the victim suffer a separate and distinct act of sexual abuse aside from the act complained of. For it refers to the maltreatment, whether habitual or not, of the child. Thus, a violation of Sec. 5(b) of RA 7610 occurs even though the accused committed sexual abuse against the child victim only once, even without a prior sexual affront.
Torres v. People
G.R. No. 206627
January 18, 2017
FACTS:
On November 3, 2003, CCC and AAA were at the barangay hall of Clarin, Bohol waiting for the conciliation proceedings to begin when they chanced upon Torres who had just arrived from fishing. CCC's wife, who was also with them at the barangay hall, persuaded Torres to attend the conciliation proceedings to answer for his liability. Torres vehemently denied damaging CCC's multicab. In the middle of the brewing argument, AAA suddenly interjected that Torres damaged CCC's multicab and accused him of stealing CCC's fish nets. Torres told AAA not to pry in the affairs of adults. He warned AAA that he would whip him if he did not stop. However, AAA refused to keep silent and continued to accuse Torres of damaging his uncle's multicab. Infuriated with AAA's meddling, Torres whipped AAA on the neck using a wet t-shirt. Torres continued to hit AAA causing the latter to fall down from the stairs. CCC came to his nephew's defense and punched Torres. They engaged in a fistfight until they were separated by Barangay Captain Hermilando Miano. Torres hit AAA with a wet t-shirt three (3) times. Based on the physical examination conducted by Dr. Vicente Manalo, Jr., AAA sustain a contusion. After the prosecution rested its case, the defense presented the following version of the incident: Torres testified that he had just arrived tired from fishing when CCC badgered him to answer for the damage he had allegedly caused to CCC's multicab. AAA abruptly interrupted the heated discussion between the two men. Angered by what AAA had done, Torres told AAA to stop making unfounded accusations or he would be forced to whip him. AAA called Torres' bluff, which further provoked Torres. Torres attempted to hit AAA but was thwarted by the timely intervention of CCC, who suddenly attacked. Torres claimed that CCC filed this case to preempt him from filing a complaint for physical injuries against CCC. He also claimed that he tried to settle the matter with CCC and CCC's wife. However, the parties failed to reach an agreement due to the unreasonable demands of the spouses.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in sustaining his conviction on a judgment premised on a misapprehension of facts; and
(2) Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in affirming his conviction despite the failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
HELD:
This Court finds no reason to disturb the factual findings of the trial court. The trial court neither disregarded nor overlooked any material fact or circumstance that would substantially alter the case. The presence or absence of one person during the incident is not substantial enough to overturn the finding that petitioner whipped AAA three (3) times with a wet t-shirt. Assuming, without admitting, that petitioner did whip AAA, petitioner argues that it should not be considered as child abuse because the law requires intent to abuse. Petitioner maintains that he whipped AAA merely to discipline and restrain the child "from further intensifying the situation." He also maintains that his act was justified because AAA harassed and vexed him. Thus, petitioner claims that there could not have been any intent to abuse on his part. Petitioner contends that the injuries sustained by AAA will not affect the latter's physical growth or development and mental capacity. He argues that he could not be convicted of child abuse without proof that the victim's development had been prejudiced.
He begs the indulgence of this Court and claims that his conviction would only serve as a "precedent to all children to act recklessly, errantly and disobediently" and would then create a society ruled by juvenile delinquency and errant behavior. If at all, petitioner claims that he could only be convicted of slight physical injuries under the Revised Penal Code for the contusion sustained by AAA. Respondent maintains that the act of whipping AAA is an act of child abuse. Respondent argues that the act complained of need not be prejudicial to the development of the child for it to constitute a violation of Republic Act No. 7610. Respondent, citing Sanchez v. People, argues that Section 10(a) of Republic Act No. 7610 defines and punishes four distinct acts. We reject petitioner's contention that his act of whipping AAA is not child abuse but merely slight physical injuries under the Revised Penal Code. The victim, AAA, was a child when the incident occurred. Therefore, AAA is entitled to protection under Republic Act No. 7610, the primary purpose of which has been defined in Araneta v. People thus:
Republic Act No. 7610 is a measure geared towards the implementation of a national comprehensive program for the survival of the most vulnerable members of the population, the Filipino children, in keeping with the Constitutional mandate under Article XV, Section 3, paragraph 2, that "The State shall defend the right of the children to assistance, including proper care and nutrition, and special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial to their development."
Del Socorro v. Van Wilsem
G.R. No. 193707
December 10, 2014
FACTS:
Petitioner Norma A. Del Socorro and respondent Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem contracted marriage in Holland. They were blessed with a son named Roderigo Norjo Van Wilsem, who at the time of the filing of the instant petition was sixteen (16) years of age. Unfortunately, their marriage bond ended by virtue of a Divorce Decree issued by the appropriate Court of Holland. At that time, their son was only eighteen (18) months old. Thereafter, petitioner and her son came home to the Philippines. According to petitioner, respondent made a promise to provide monthly support to their son. However, since the arrival of petitioner and her son in the Philippines, respondent never gave support to the son, Roderigo. Not long thereafter, respondent came to the Philippines and remarried in Pinamungahan, Cebu, and since then, have been residing thereat. To date, all the parties, including their son, Roderigo, are presently living in Cebu City. Petitioner, through her counsel, sent a letter demanding for support from respondent. However, respondent refused to receive the letter. Because of the foregoing circumstances, petitioner filed a complaint affidavit with the Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu City against respondent for violation of Section 5, paragraph E(2) of R.A. No. 9262 (Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004) for the latter’s unjust refusal to support his minor child with petitioner.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the foreign nation can be held liable under RA 9262.
HELD:
Yes. Since the respondent is a citizen of Holland or the Netherlands, we agree with the RTC-Cebu that he is subject to the laws of his country, not to Philippine law, as to whether he is obliged to give support to his child, as well as the consequences of his failure to do so. In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute or case has the burden of proving the foreign law. In the present case, respondent hastily concludes that being a national of the Netherlands, he is governed by such laws on the matter of provision of and capacity to support. While respondent pleaded the laws of the Netherlands in advancing his position that he is not obliged to support his son, he never proved the same. When the foreign law, judgment or contract is contrary to a sound and established public policy of the forum, the said foreign law, judgment or order shall not be applied. SECTION 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children.- The crime of violence against women and their children is committed through any of the following acts: (e) Attempting to compel or compelling the woman or her child to engage in conduct which the woman or her child has the right to desist from or desist from conduct which the woman or her child has the right to engage in, or attempting to restrict or restricting the woman's or her child's freedom of movement or conduct by force or threat of force, physical or other harm or threat of physical or other harm, or intimidation directed against the woman or child. This shall include, but not limited to, the following acts committed with the purpose or effect of controlling or restricting the woman's or her child's movement or conduct: (2) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her children of financial support legally due her or her family, or deliberately providing the woman's children insufficient financial support; (i) Causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the woman or her child, including, but not limited to, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, and denial of financial support or custody of minor children of access to the woman's child/children.
Dinamling v. People
G.R. No. 199522
June 22, 2015
FACTS:
Ricky Dinamling, a police officer and a married man is the accused in a 2 criminal cases for violation of RA No. 9262 with special qualifying aggravating circumstance of the victim being pregnant at the time of the abuse. The Victim on the other hand, is AAA, to whom Dinamling had an illicit relationship for five years and to whom he begot two common children, aged 4 and 2 at the time of the abuse. On the night of March 14, 2007, while the illicit relationship was still on-going, Dinamling, and a friend went to the boarding house of AAA drunk. While AAA was putting the two children to bed Dinamling started to evict AAA and the children, ordering AAA to pack her things in a trash bag and a carton box for ducklings. His reason for the eviction was that she was allegedly using the place as a "whore house" wherein she "brought (her) partners." AAA initially did not want to leave but she left when Dinamling threw a baby's feeding bottle outside the house, causing it to break. She then went to the house of BBB and requested the latter to fetch her children. When BBB and another friend went for the children, Dinamling already had left with the older child and only the baby was left. The baby was brought by the friends back to AAA. In the past, there were similar incidents that happened between Dinamling and AAA. Dinamling would hit AAA's head, pull her hair and kick her. Even the mere sound of petitioner’s motorcycle makes AAA fear the impending abuse. Six days later, or on March 20, 2007, at around 9:00 p.m., AAA was at the house of CCC when Dinamling arrived. He shouted and counted down for AAA to come out. When she came out, Dinamling punched her at the left ear, which subsequently bled. When AAA asked him why he kept on following her when she already had left him, Dinamling shouted her family name and told her she was "good-for-nothing." AAA left for the barangay captain's house, but Dinamling caught up with her and kicked her until she fell to the ground. On the road, Dinamling pulled down AAA's pants and panty and shouted at her while people looked on. Dinamling then threw the pants and panty back at AAA and shouted her family name. Dinamling, then intoxicated, left on a motorcycle. AAA stayed at her friend's home until she felt some back pain in the next morning. She found out she was bleeding and about to miscarry so she was immediately brought to the hospital. There, she was told by Dr. Baguilat that she was 19 weeks pregnant and had an incomplete abortion. She was hospitalized for four days. Dinamling visited her but showed no remorse over his acts.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused is guilty.
HELD:
Yes. The testimonies suffice to establish the elements of the crime as defined in Section 5(i) of RA No. 9262 and as alleged in the two Informations filed against petitioner. The provision of the law states: Section 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children.- The crime of violence against women and their children is committed through any of the following acts: (i) Causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the woman or her child, including, but not limited to, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, and denial of financial support or custody of minor children or access to the woman's child/children. From the aforequoted Section 5(i), in relation to other sections of RA No. 9262, the elements of the crime are derived as follows: (1) The offended party is a woman and/or her child or children; (2) The woman is either the wife or former wife of the offender, or is a woman with whom the offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or is a woman with whom such offender has a common child. As for the woman's child or children, they may be legitimate or illegitimate, or living within or without the family abode; (3) The offender causes on the woman and/or child mental or emotional anguish; and (4) The anguish is caused through acts of public ridicule or humiliation, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, denial of financial support or custody of minor children or access to the children or similar such acts or omissions.
People v. Bayabos, et. al.
G.R. No. 171222
February 18, 2015
FACTS:
Fernando C. Balidoy, Jr. was admitted as a probationary midshipman at the PMMA. In order to reach active status, all new entrants were required to successfully complete the mandatory “Indoctrination and Orientation Period,” which was set from 2 May to 1 June 2001. Balidoy died on 3 May 2001.anroblesvirtuallawlibrary The National Bureau of Investigation probed the death of BALIDOY. After months of investigation, it forwarded its findings to the provincial prosecutor of Zambales for the preliminary investigation and possible criminal prosecution of those involved in the orientation and indoctrination of the PMMA Class of 2005. Subsequently, the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Zambales issued a Resolution finding probable cause to charge the following as principals to the crime of hazing: Aldwin Alvarez, Leotharius C. Montez, Rudence G. Reyes, and Jed Nicholas S. Simpas.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan erred in its decision.
HELD:
Yes. The Sandiganbayan erred when it dismissed outright the case against respondents, on the sole ground that the case against the purported principals had already been dismissed. It is a settled rule that the case against those charged as accomplices is not ipso facto dismissed in the absence of trial of the purported principals; the dismissal of the case against the latter; or even the latter’s acquittal, especially when the occurrence of the crime has in fact been established. In People v. Rafael, the Supreme Court En Banc reasoned thus: “The corresponding responsibilities of the principal, accomplice, and accessory are distinct from each other. As long as the commission of the offense can be duly established in evidence, the determination of the liability of the accomplice or accessory can proceed independently of that of the principal.” Accordingly, so long as the commission of the crime can be duly proven, the trial of those charged as accomplices to determine their criminal liability can proceed independently of that of the alleged principal. The Court notes in the present case that Bayabos et al. merely presented the Order of Entry of Judgment dismissing the case against ALVAREZ ET AL. Nowhere is it mentioned in the order that the case was dismissed against the alleged principals, because no crime had been committed. In fact, it does not cite the trial court’s reason for dismissing the case. Hence, the Sandiganbayan committed an error when it simply relied on the Order of Entry of Judgment without so much as scrutinizing the reason for the dismissal of the case against the purported principals.
