Villarete v. Alta Vista Golf and Country Club, Inc.,

 

Villarete v. Alta Vista Golf and Country Club, Inc.,

G.R. No. 255212

February 20, 2023

 

FACTS:

                On May 13, 2011, then OIC-City Treasurer of Cebu City, Ofelia M. Oliva caused the publication with The Freeman newspaper, a "Notice of Sale of Tax Delinquent Properties" which includes, among others Lot No. 4 PSU-192448, covered by OCT No. 0-251 registered in the name of Heirs of Benigno Sumagang. Plaintiff-Appellee Alta Vista participated in the auction sale held on May 27, 2011, and secured the winning bid over Lot No. 4 PSU-192448, in the amount of PhP295,994.89. After payment of the bid amount, the corresponding official receipt and Certification of Sale of Delinquent Property were issued to Alta Vista. Anita Sumagang, one of the Heirs of Benigno Sumagang wrote a letter to then OIC-City Treasurer Ofelia N. Oliva. In a letter dated May 23, 2011 (year mistakenly indicated as 2011, should have been 2012), Oliva advised the Heirs of Benigno Sumagang to redeem the subject lot on or before May 28, 2011 (mistakenly indicated as 2011, should have been 2012), and required documents to show proof of the legal personality or identity of Anita Sumagang as one of the Heirs of Benigno Sumagang. On May 28, 2012, Anita Sumagang went to the Office of the City Treasurer with sufficient cash to pay the redemption price, interest, and other charges. The tender of payment, however, was not accepted by Arnold Binondo, the personnel-in-charge of the Real Property Tax Division, for failure of Anita Sumagang to bring with her documents proving her identity as an heir of Benigno Sumagang. On May 30, 2012, Anita Sumagang went back to the Office of the City Treasurer bringing with her, proof of her identity, as one of the Heirs of Benigno Sumagang, and she was allowed to redeem the subject lot. On June 4, 2012, a Certificate of Redemption dated June 4, 2012 was issued in favor of the Heirs of Benigno Sumagang. A Notice of Redemption similarly dated, was issued to Alta Vista, requiring it to surrender the Certificate of Sale previously issued in its favor. Alta Vista, in a letter dated June 22, 2012, replied, pointing out that the redemption made by the Heirs of Benigno Sumagang was invalid as it was made beyond the one year redemption period. Alta Vista demanded from the Office of the City Treasurer to cancel the Certificate of Redemption in favor of the Heirs of Benigno Sumagang. On October 11, 2012, Emma Villarete, the sitting City Treasurer at that time, denied Alta Vista's demand for the issuance of the final Deed of Conveyance. Alta Vista filed a Petition for Mandamus and Damages before the Regional Trial Court of the City of Cebu, docketed as Civil Case No. Ceb-39242.

 

ISSUE:

                Whether the CA erred when it refused to uphold the liberal policy of petitioner in the application of the redemption period.

 

HELD:

                Yes. In the present case, Anita gave notice to the City Treasurer of Cebu as early as May 22, 2012 that she intended to redeem the subject property. On May 28, 2012, or on the last day of the redemption period, Anita was ready to pay the full amount in cash, but was turned down by the Real Property Tax Division of the City of Cebu simply because she was unable to bring with her a written document that would prove her identity as an heir of Benigno — a document she was in fact able to bring just two (2) days after. These circumstances show that there was an earnest and sincere effort to tender payment and exercise the right to redeem on Anita's part. Indeed, as Anita presented the document to show her right to redeem two (2) days thereafter, or on May 30, 2012, and paid the full amount of the redemption price, including the two percent (2%) interest for every month as well as the expenses of the sale, this should be looked upon with favor. Petitioner should not be faulted in its liberal application of redemption rules and allowing the heirs to redeem the property, especially considering that they have been residing therein ever since Benigno was issued a title over the lot.To stress, where the redemptioner has chosen to exercise the right of redemption, it is the policy of the law to aid rather than to defeat such right.

Bureau of Internal Revenue v. Tico Insurance Company, Inc., Glowide Enterprises, Inc., and Pacific Mills, Inc.

 Bureau of Internal Revenue v. Tico  Insurance Company, Inc., Glowide  Enterprises, Inc., and Pacific Mills, Inc. 

GR No. 204226

April 18, 2022 

 

It is only after the notice of tax lien is annotated on the pertinent title that a judgment creditor’s rights can be affected and the tax lien may be considered to retroact to the date of assessment. GLOWIDE and PMI’s rights over the condominium units are superior to the BIR’s claim, and are thus entitled to possession and conveyance of the condominium units.  

 

Which between the BIR, on the one hand, and Glowide and PMI, on the other, is entitled to ownership of the condominium units.  

 

The Supreme Court held that while a tax lien retroacts to the time when the tax assessment was made, it shall not be valid against a judgment creditor until the notice of tax lien has filed with the Register of Deeds and annotated on the affected title. In this case, the BIR’s tax lien could only be enforceable against Glowide and Pacific Mills when it was annotated on the title on February 15, 2005. Since the rights of Glowide and Pacific 

Mills over the condominium units retroact to December 22, 2000, the date of inscription of their notice of levy, the condominium units may no longer be considered Tico’s property when the BIR annotated its tax lien in 2005. After the sale of the condominium units, rights over the condominium units have already vested upon Glowide and Pacific Mills, subject only to Tico’s right of redemption. 

Excellent Essentials International Corp. v. Extra Excel International Philippines, Inc.

 Excellent Essentials International Corp. v. Extra Excel International Philippines, Inc., 

G.R. No. 192797, 

April 18, 2018

DOCTRINE: The elements of tortuous interference: (1) existence of a valid contract; (2)

knowledge on the part of the third person of the existence of contract; and (3)

interference of the third person is without legal justification or excuse.

FACTS: Excel International and Excel Philippines entered into an exclusive right

contract wherein the latter was granted exclusive rights to distribute Excel products in

the Philippines. Under the same contract, Excel International reserved the right to

discontinue or alter their agreement at any time. Excel International experienced intracorporate

struggle over the control of the corporation and the operations of its various

exclusive distributors in Asia. It ended with new management, which in her capacity as

president of Excel International, revoked Excel Philippines' exclusive rights contract and

appointed Excellent Essentials as its new exclusive distributor in the Philippines.

Despite the revocation of its exclusive rights contract and the appointment of Excellent

Essentials, Excel Philippines continued its operation in violation of the new exclusive

distributorship agreement. Excel International, through counsel, demanded that Excel

Philippines cease from selling, importing, distributing, or advertising, directly or

indirectly, any and all of E. Excel products. With its demand unheeded, Excel

International and Excellent Essentials filed a complaint for injunction and damages

against Excel Philippines. On its part, Excel Philippines argued that Excel International

had no right to unilaterally revoke its exclusive right to distribute E. Excel products in the

Philippines pursuant to an agreement showing that Excel Philippines' exclusive

distributorship was irrevocable. In fact, it was because of this agreement that Excel

Philippines was incorporated so that it would become Excel International's exclusive

distributor within the Philippines.

ISSUES:

Whether or not Excellent Essentials, a third party, may be held liable for damages under

the contract between Excel Philippines and Excel International.

HELD:

Yes. Under the principle of relativity of contracts, only those who are parties to a

contract are liable to its breach. Under Article 1314 of the Civil Code, however, any third

person who induces another to violate his contract shall be liable to damages to the

other contracting party. The elements of tortuous interference:

(1) existence of a valid contract

(2) knowledge on the part of the third person of the existence of contract

(3) interference of the third person is without legal justification or excuse

In the case before us, we observe the same unjust conduct exhibited by Excellent

Essentials tantamount to tortuous interference.

To sustain a case for tortuous interference, the defendant must have acted with

malice or must have been driven by purely impure reasons to injure plaintiff;

otherwise stated, his act of interference cannot be justified. We further explained

that ·the word induce refers to situations where a person causes another to choose

one course of conduct by persuasion or intimidation.

Contrary to Excellent Essentials' argument in the instant petition, its participation

in the scheme against Excel Philippines transgressed the bounds of permissible

financial interest. Its mere corporate existence played an important factor for

Stewart to revoke Excel Philippines' exclusive· right to distribute E. Excel products

in the Philippines. For without it, or the participation of its incorporators, Excel

International would not have the means to connect with the marketing network

Excel Philippines established. Simply put, Excellent Essentials became the vessel

for the breach of Excel International's contractual undertaking with Excel

Philippines.

Pascual v. Ford Motor Company Philippines, Inc.

   Pascual v. Ford Motor Company Philippines, Inc., 

G.R. No. 220667, 

January 27, 2016

DOCTRINE: Before a manufacturer or seller may be held liable for any damage caused

by their product, the following must be present: first, proof that the product in question

was defective; second, the defect must be present upon delivery or manufacture of the

product, or when the product was sold to the purchaser; and third, the product must have

reached the consumer without substantial change in the condition in which it was sold.

FACTS:

In November 2006, petitioner Olivia Pascual bought a second-hand Ford E-150.

Sometime in April 2008, Pascual’s driver was driving the vehicle at moderate speed along

the National Highway in Nueva Vizcaya when the right rear wheel suddenly detached,

causing Pascual and other passengers to suffer physical injuries and to be rushed to the

hospital.

Pascual filed complaint for damages based on quasi-delict against respondents

Ford Motor Company Philippines (FMCI), a Ford manufacturer and Ford Group

Philippines, Inc. (FGPI), a Ford distributor in the Philippines, claiming that both are liable

for the defective vehicle.

Respondents FMCI and FGPI denied their liability averring that Pascual cannot

claim the manufacturer’s warranty against hidden defects because the vehicle was

bought second hand and the warranty has already expired after two years from the day it

was bought from a Ford dealer on November 2000. They presented evidence that the

vehicle was repaired and altered by non-Ford authorized dealers to enable it to carry a

load beyond its capacity; and the heavy load stress caused the wheel to detach.

The RTC held respondents liable due to the factory defect of the vehicle; that the

vehicle was still purchased from them and that they failed to protect Pascual as the enduser

at the time of the incident.

The CA reversed the RTC ruling explaining that the vehicle had already undergone

unauthorized alterations at the time of the incident, and even if respondents were

negligent, the doctrine of proximate cause applies. The alteration is an efficient

intervening cause that would release respondents from liability. Pascual was negligent by

failing to check the vehicle before purchasing it; thus, it is her negligence that is the

proximate cause of the accident.

ISSUES:

Whether or not FMCI and FGPI are liable to Pascual for quasi-delict

HELD:

NO. Before a manufacturer or seller may be held liable for any damage caused by

their product, the following must be present:

First, proof that the product in question was defective;

Second, the defect must be present upon delivery or manufacture of the product,

or when the product left the seller’s or manufacturer’s control, or when the product

was sold to the purchaser; and

Third, the product must have reached the consumer without substantial change in

the condition in which it was sold.

Here, Pascual failed to present proof that the vehicle was defective upon its

manufacture; and the alteration in the vehicle after it was sold is considered a substantial

change in the vehicle’s condition. Thus, FMCI and FGPI cannot be held liable for any

damage caused by the vehicle’s defect.

Garcia v. Ferro Chemicals, Inc.

 Garcia v. Ferro Chemicals, Inc., 

G.R. No. 172505, 

October 1, 2014

DOCTRINE:

Private complainants in criminal cases are not precluded from filing a motion for

reconsideration and subsequently an appeal on the civil aspect of a decision acquitting

the accused. An exception to the rule that only the Solicitor General can bring actions in

criminal proceedings before the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court is "when the

private offended party questions the civil aspect of a decision of a lower court."

The extinction of the penal action does not necessarily carry with it the extinction of the

civil action, whether the latter is instituted with or separately from the criminal action.

However, if the state pursues an appeal on the criminal aspect of a decision of the trial

court acquitting the accused and private complainant/s failed to reserve the right to

institute a separate civil action, the civil liability ex delicto that is inherently attached to

the offense is likewise appealed. Private complainant cannot anymore pursue a

separate appeal from that of the state without violating the doctrine of non-forum

shopping.

FACTS: On July 15, 1988, Antonio Garcia, (Garcia) as seller, and Ferro Chemicals,

Inc., (FCI) through Ramon Garcia, as buyer, entered into a deed of absolute sale and

purchase of shares of stock.

In 1989, the class "A" shares in Alabang Country Club, Inc. and proprietary membership

in the Manila Polo Club, Inc. which are covered in the deed of absolute sale and

purchase of stock, were sold at public auction to Philippine Investment System

Organization (PISO).

An information based on the complaint of FCI was filed against Garcia before the

Regional Trial Court (RTC), charging him with estafa, for allegedly misrepresenting to

FCI that the shares subject of the contracts was free from all liens and encumbrances.

The RTC acquitted Garcia for insufficiency of evidence. It held that the element of false

pretense, fraudulent act or means which constitute the very cause or the only motive

which induced the private complainant to enter into the questioned deed of sale is

wanting.

On August 1997, FCI appealed to the Court of Appeals as to the civil aspect of the

case. The notice of appeal filed was entitled "Notice of Appeal Ex Gratia Abudantia Ad

Cautelam (Of The Civil Aspect of the Case)."

On October 1997, the Makati City Prosecutor’s Office and FCI also filed a petition for

certiorari assailing the RTC’s decision and order acquitting Antonio Garcia. They argued

that the trial court "acted in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of

jurisdiction when it rendered the judgment of acquittal based on affidavits not at all

introduced in evidence by either of the parties thereby depriving the people of their

substantive right to due process of law." The verification/certification against forum

shopping, signed by Ramon Garcia as president of FCI, disclosed that the notice of

appeal was filed "with respect to the civil aspect of the case." The court dismissed the

petition for certiorari filed and entry of judgment was made.

However, the Court of Appeals, granted the appeal. The CA found that Garcia failed to

disclose the PISO’s lien over the club shares. Thus, Garcia filed a petition for review on

certiorari assailing the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE: Whether the act of Ferro Chemicals, Inc. in filing the notice of appeal before the

Court of Appeals and the petition for certiorari assailing the same trial court decision

amounted to forum shopping.

HELD: Yes, FCI committed forum shopping. All of the elements for forum shopping are

present. There is identity as to the parties. The FCI also filed an appeal before the Court

of Appeals and a petition for certiorari before this court assailing the same trial court

decision. Even if its notice of appeal to the CA was entitled "Notice of Appeal Ex Gratia

Abudantia Ad Cautelam (Of the Civil Aspect of the Case), there is identity of the rights

asserted and reliefs prayed for in both actions. The civil liability asserted by FCI before

the Court of Appeals arose from the criminal act. It is in the nature of civil liability ex

delicto. However, FCI did not reserve the right to institute the civil action for the recovery

of civil liability ex delicto or institute a separate civil action prior to the filing of the

criminal case. Thus, it is an adjunct of the criminal aspect of the case.

When the civil action for the recovery of civil liability ex delicto is instituted with the

criminal action, whether by choice of private complainant or as required by the law, the

case will be prosecuted under the direction and control of the public prosecutor. The

civil action cannot proceed independently of the criminal case. This includes

subsequent proceedings on the criminal action such as an appeal. FCI joined the public

prosecutor in filing the petition for certiorari before this court.

However, private complainants in criminal cases are not precluded from filing a motion

for reconsideration and subsequently an appeal on the civil aspect of a decision

acquitting the accused. An exception to the rule that only the Solicitor General can bring

actions in criminal proceedings before the Court of Appeals or this court is "when the

private offended party questions the civil aspect of a decision of a lower court.”

In a criminal case in which the offended party is the State, the interest of the private

complainant or the offended party is limited to the civil liability arising there from. Hence,

if a criminal case is dismissed by the trial court or if there is an acquittal, a

reconsideration of the order of dismissal or acquittal may be undertaken, whenever

legally feasible, insofar as the criminal aspect thereof is concerned and may be made

only by the public prosecutor; or in the case of an appeal, by the State only, through the

OSG. The private complainant or offended party may not undertake such motion for

reconsideration or appeal on the criminal aspect of the case. However, the offended

party or private complainant may file a motion for reconsideration of such dismissal or

acquittal or appeal therefrom but only insofar as the civil aspect thereof is concerned. In

so doing, the private complainant or offended party need not secure the conformity of

the public prosecutor. If the court denies his motion for reconsideration, the private

complainant or offended party may appeal or file a petition for certiorari or mandamus, if

grave abuse amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction is shown and the aggrieved

party has no right of appeal or given an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

This is in consonance with the doctrine that:

The extinction of the penal action does not necessarily carry with it the extinction of the

civil action, whether the latter is instituted with or separately from the criminal action.

The offended party may still claim civil liability ex delicto if there is a finding in the final

judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from which the liability may arise

exists. Jurisprudence has enumerated three instances when, notwithstanding the

accused’s acquittal, the offended party may still claim civil liability ex delicto: 

(a) if the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required;

(b) if the court declared that the liability of the accused is only civil; and 

(c) if the civil liability of the accused does not arise from or is not based upon the crime of which the

accused is acquitted.

However, if the state pursues an appeal on the criminal aspect of a decision of the trial

court acquitting the accused and private complainant/s failed to reserve the right to

institute a separate civil action, the civil liability ex delicto that is inherently attached to

the offense is likewise appealed. The appeal of the civil liability ex delicto is impliedly

instituted with the petition for certiorari assailing the acquittal of the accused. Private

complainant cannot anymore pursue a separate appeal from that of the state without

violating the doctrine of non-forum shopping.

On the other hand, the conclusion is different if private complainant reserved the right to

institute the civil action for the recovery of civil liability ex delicto before the Regional

Trial Court or institute a separate civil action prior to the filing of the criminal case in

accordance with Rule 111 of the Rules of Court. In these situations, the filing of an

appeal as to the civil aspect of the case cannot be considered as forum shopping. This

is not the situation here.

Spouses Cabasal v. BPI Family Savings Bank, Inc.

 Spouses Cabasal v. BPI Family Savings Bank, Inc., 

G.R. No. 233846, 

November 18, 2020

DOCTRINE: Article 19 is the general rule which governs the conduct of human relations.

By itself, it is not the basis of an actionable tort. Article 19 describes the degree of care

required so that an actionable tort may arise when it is alleged together with Article 20 or

Article 21.

FACTS:

Petitioners spouses Nestor Cabasal (Nestor) and Ma. Belen Cabasal (Belen)

(collectively, petitioners) were granted by BPI Family Savings Bank (BPI) a credit line for

their build and sell business. Sometime in 1997, petitioners purchased two (2) real

properties with improvements using said credit line as source of payment. Consequently,

petitioners executed (2) Mortgage Loan Agreements 6 in favor of BPI. While looking for

prospective buyers for the properties, petitioners religiously paid their amortizations.

However, it took them three (3) years to find a willing buyer in the person of Eloisa

Guevarra Co (Eloisa) who agreed to buy their properties by way of sale with assumption

of mortgage.

At that time, petitioners' accounts with BPI were already past due. Hence, Nestor

asked for an updated statement of account from respondent Alma De Leon (respondent).

On 06 July 2000, Nestor and Eloisa went to BPI to obtain a copy of petitioners' statement

of account, and to effectuate the transfer of mortgage to Eloisa. However, respondent

informed them that their transfer agreement would not be recognized by BPI since Eloisa

was not a client of the bank.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the CA failed to apply Article 20 of the Civil Code to the duly proven

negligence committed by respondent Alma de leon which respondent bank is vicariously

liable

HELD:

NO. There was no negligence on the part of the respondent BPI. The principle of

abuse of rights, as enshrined in Article 19 of the Civil Code, provides that every person

must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice,

give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith. Article 19 is the general rule

which governs the conduct of human relations. By itself, it is not the basis of an actionable

tort. Article 19 describes the degree of care required so that an actionable tort may arise

when it is alleged together with Article 20 or Article 21.

Whether the principle of abuse of rights has been violated resulting in damages

under Article 20 or other applicable provision of law depends on the circumstances of

each case. Article 20 covers violations of existing law as basis for an injury. It allows

recovery should the act have been willful or negligent. "Willful" may refer to the intention

to do the act and the desire to achieve the outcome that the plaintiff in tort action considers

as injurious. "Negligence" may refer to a situation where the act was consciously done

but without intending the injurious result. Article 21, on the other hand, concerns injuries

that may be caused by acts which are not necessarily proscribed by law. This article

requires that the act be willful, that is, that there was an intention to do the act and a desire

to achieve the outcome. In cases under Article 21, the legal issues revolve around

whether such outcome should be considered a legal injury on the part of the plaintiff or

whether the commission of the act was done in violation of the standards of care required

in Article 19.

After a perusal of the facts and evidence on hand, the Court holds that contrary to

the RTC's findings, petitioners failed to prove that respondent and BPI acted in bad faith

or negligence so as to be liable under Articles 20 and 21 of the New Civil Code. Bad faith

does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence. It imports a dishonest purpose or

some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong, a breach of known duty through

some motive or interest or ill will that partakes of the nature of fraud. It is, therefore, a

question of intention, which can be inferred from one's conduct and/or contemporaneous

statements.

Similarly, petitioners cannot also fault respondent for not being able to direct them

to the proper loan division of BPI. Respondent was under no obligation to do that. She

could have done so as a courtesy to Nestor, the latter being a client of BPI, but her failure

to extend such assistance at that time is not tantamount to negligence or bad faith on her

part, much less be the proximate cause why the transaction between Nestor and Eloisa

failed to materialize.

Tocoms Philippines, Inc. v. Philips Electronics and Lighting, Inc.

  Tocoms Philippines, Inc. v. Philips Electronics and Lighting, Inc., 

G.R. No. 214046, 

February 5, 2020

DOCTRINE: The legal concept of bad faith denotes a dishonest purpose, moral deviation,

and a conscious commission of a wrong. It includes "a breach of known duty through

some motive or interest or ill will that partakes of the nature of fraud. It is, therefore, a

question of intention, which can be inferred from one's conduct and/or contemporaneous

x x x statements. " Bad faith under the law cannot be presumed; it must be established

by clear and convincing evidence. As such, the case must be reinstated so that PELI may

once and for all prove its bona fides in its dealings with Tocoms, in connection with the

expiration of their Distribution Agreement.

FACTS: 

Tocoms was appointed as Philippines distributor of Philips Domestic Appliance

by respondent PELI and its principal Philips Singapore, which was renewed on a yearly

basis from 2001 and 2008. In its complaint to which the distributorship agreement

(agreement) was attached, Tocoms claimed that it had consistently delivered and even

surpassed its targets before the end of 2012. Further, Tocoms stated that it has made

disclosures of its plans for 2012 in preparation for the renewal of the agreement.

However, on January 2 2013, PELI called for a meeting and terminated the agreement,

to the surprise of Tocoms. As a result of this sudden termination, Tocoms said that its

strongest client Western Marketing was set to return its inventory worth PHP 5 million

($103 million), and that it was going to lose PHP 2 million from other dealers. Tocoms

also alleged that PELI offered unreasonable terms to buy back its inventories where it

stood to lose about PHP12 million and was pressuring Tocoms to accept the terms by

recalling the Import Commodity Clearance (ICC) needed to sell said products in the

Philippines. Moreover, Tocoms also alleged that the new distributor Fabriano had been

selling the licensed products at a much lower price even before the termination of the

agreement, and had prodded Western Marketing to return the products it purchased from

Tocoms, to the injury of the latter.

ISSUE: 

Was PELI in bad faith?

HELD: 

The Supreme Court, reversed the CA's decision and ruled that if the allegations

made by Tocoms were hypothetically admitted, the acts constitute bad faith on the part

of PELI and the court may validly award damages in favour of Tocoms. The SC further

observed that PELI, not having filed its answer, has not yet been able to prove that its

acts were done without malice and bad faith. The SC ruled that the concept of bad faith

denotes a dishonest purpose, moral deviation, and a conscious commission of a wrong

and that bad faith under the law cannot be presumed – it must be established by clear

and convincing evidence. As such the case must be reinstated so that PELI may prove

good faith in its dealings with Tocoms in the context of the expiration of its distributorship

agreement.

The legal concept of bad faith denotes a dishonest purpose, moral deviation, and a

conscious commission of a wrong. It includes "a breach of known duty through some

motive or interest or ill will that partakes of the nature of fraud. It is, therefore, a question

of intention, which can be inferred from one's conduct and/or contemporaneous x x x

statements. " Bad faith under the law cannot be presumed; it must be established by clear

and convincing evidence. As such, the case must be reinstated so that PELI may once

and for all prove its bona fides in its dealings with Tocoms, in connection with the

expiration of their Distribution Agreement.